terials," including more stringent control over distribution, prices, investment and labor—apparently under the aegis of the Mobilization Act. Again, this sounds very much like the similar plan announced in June 1938, except that the new one contemplates restriction of the domestic food supply in order to release food-stuffs for export. Japan thus tightens her belt another notch, and the military state extends the scope of its power over the economic life of the nation while at the same time steadily dissipating the resources which it seeks to control.

Miriam S. Farley.

LOW MALAYAN TIN QUOTA LEADS TO CHINESE UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment problem among Chinese coolies in the tin areas of Malaya has now become so acute that some, at least of the surplus labor may have to be repatriated in the near future. The situation has been bad ever since the inauguration of the International Tin Restriction Scheme in 1931. At the end of March 1939 Sir John Bagnall, managing director of the Straits Trading Co., Ltd., stated that within little more than a year 40,000, out of approximately 100,000 coolies normally employed in the mines of British Malaya, had lost their jobs.

Hardest hit were the Chinese in the Federated State of Perak, where 10,000 were on relief during January 1939 in the Kinta Valley alone. The Perak and central Federated Malay States Governments have made strenuous efforts to absorb this group in public work projects: many were used on drainage work under the Drainage and Irrigation Department; 500 were put on antimalarial work with the Kinta Health Officer; 600 from the large open-caste mine at Hong Fatt consented to do P.W.D. road work. There has been some discussion of trying out a land settlement scheme for unemployed Chinese and of converting some mined areas back into agricultural lands. Too much resettlement, however, might carry the danger of a glutted vegetable and fruit market.

Despite the large amount of government aid, many coolies and their families are still destitute. They are forced to beg for food and to take what shelter they can find underneath houses or on the verandas of public buildings. Many drift to Singapore and add to the overcrowding there. From all reports the Chinese have borne these hardships with their usual patience and endurance. Those who were receiving any wage at all have even contributed generously to war relief funds for use in their native land. These remittances in addition to widespread unemployment have depressed business generally, particularly the small Chinese shopkeepers. The situation has become so bad this spring that not only Chinese but many Europeans are out of work and wandering the streets without apparent hope of being reinstated in their jobs. At best the Europeans are paid daily wages for prospecting work which may not last a month.

Malayan tin producers have long regarded their quota as unjustly low (see Far Eastern Survey, Aug. 24, 1938, p. 200). For the quarter April-June 1939, the quota is 28.5% compared to 25% in the previous quarter and 43% in the second quarter of 1938. This allows a small increase in exports but probably a decrease in production because carryover stocks were already too large at the beginning of the period. During the first quarter of 1939 the Chinese were permitted to store an additional 12 1/2%, or half as much again as their quotas, with local agents of the smelting companies. They received a cash advance of 70% of the estimated net value based on the tin price the day the advance was made. These stored-up stocks were to be released during the April-June period. The Chinese quota for this period was therefore correspondingly less.

The small quota of 25 to 28.5% can be produced by many mines in three weeks or a month, thus leaving the dredges unused and coolies unemployed for the remaining two months of the quota period. On January 1, 1939, half of Malaya's tin dredges were idle. Perak, the state hardest hit by restriction, had thirty dredges still running, but thirty-eight had closed down. The revenue to the government from tin export duties has also suffered seriously. It decreased from S$18 million in the first eleven months of 1937 to S$8 million in the same period of 1938.

While rubber restriction has also caused some unemployment among Indian laborers, it has not been enough to create a serious problem in caring for the unemployed. In fact many rubber producers believe that their labor situation is infinitely healthier now than in 1934, the year in which restriction started. At that time there was so much unemployment that many laborers were repatriated to India. The present strict rules on emigration from India help the situation and, in the case of rubber, the price has risen sufficiently to partially offset the decreased production. (See Far Eastern Survey, Feb. 1, 1939, p. 31.)

Patricia Glover.

JAPANESE RAYON LOSING

While rayon is still a minor item in the Philippine economy compared with cotton and cotton piece goods (all rayon imports last year amounted to only

GROUND IN PHILIPPINES

P4,822,000 of the P55,847,000 textile import), recent developments indicate that Japan is in danger of losing the position she has held since 1930 as principal sup-