The Diet ratified both the peace treaty and the Japanese-American security pact by large majorities, but not before the government had been closely questioned. Dissatisfaction with the treaty has been expressed both in the Diet and in the press on such points as the post-treaty position of American troops in Japan, the status of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands and of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin (all of which Japan would like to recover), reparations, the confiscation of Japanese overseas assets, Japanese Prisoners in Russia, and the costs of rearmament. Although the Yoshida cabinet has a safe majority in the House of Representatives it is being widely criticized in the country—not, of course, entirely on international issues—and demands are heard for dissolving the Diet and holding a new election.

**East and West on Balance**

Thus as Japan regains her sovereignty she becomes a bone of contention between the Eastern and Western blocs, with the West seeking to cement its relations with Japan and to enlist her cooperation to the fullest possible extent, while the East seeks to weaken her ties with the United States and to sabotage her cooperation with the West. Both sides, in their efforts to influence Japan, will no doubt combine inducements with open or veiled threats, e.g., the inducement of trade with China, the threat of invasion from the continent, the inducement of American war orders, the threat of withdrawing American aid.

The United States appears to have more to offer. It holds the best cards, but they must be played skilfully. For although Japan urgently needs the protection and support of the United States, the United States also needs cooperation from Japan, and the Japanese know this. Moreover, the very strength of the American position gives the Communist side a certain psychological advantage, for no country enjoys being in a position of enforced dependence. Russian propaganda may be expected to exploit to the maximum any possibilities of stirring up anti-American sentiment. Yet if the United States caters too much to Japanese desires, it may forfeit the good will of other equally valuable allies.

In sum, in the measure that the United States succeeds in its aim of helping Japan to stand on her own feet and make a positive contribution to the strength of the Western bloc, it will at the same time be putting her in a position where she can take an increasingly independent line in pursuing her own interests, which will not necessarily coincide at all points with those of the United States or its allies. Although the United States is in a strong position vis-à-vis Japan, it would be a mistake to think that Tokyo will see eye to eye with Washington on every subject.

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**Yoshida’s Letter to Dulles**

*Text of letter from Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to Ambassador John Foster Dulles, dated December 24, 1951, released to press January 16, 1952.*

Dear Ambassador Dulles:

While the Japanese Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were being debated in the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors of the Diet, a number of questions were submitted and statements made relative to Japan's future policy toward China. Some of the statements, separated from their context and background, gave rise to misapprehensions which I should like to clear up.

The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace and commercial intercourse with China, which is Japan’s close neighbor.

At the present time it is, we hope, possible to develop that kind of relationship with the National Government of the Republic of China, which has the seat, voice, and vote of China in the United Nations, which exercises actual governmental authority over certain territory, and which maintains diplomatic relations with most of the members of the United Nations.

To that end my Government on Nov. 17, 1951, established a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa, with the consent of the National Government of China. This is the highest form of relationship with other countries which is now permitted to Japan, pending the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. The Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa is important in its personnel, reflecting the importance which my Government attaches to relations with the National Government of the Republic of China.

My Government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the National Government of China, if that Government so desires, a treaty which will reestablish normal relations between the two Governments in conformity with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the Republic of China. We will promptly explore this subject with the National Government of China.

As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by the United Nations of being an aggressor, and in consequence the United
Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral treaty of peace comes into force pursuant to the provisions of Art. 5 (A) (III), whereby Japan has undertaken "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action."

Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. In fact there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the present Government of Japan.

In view of these considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime in China.

Yours sincerely,

Shigeru Yoshida

Stalin’s Message to Japan

I wish the Japanese workers deliverance from unemployment and low wages, elimination of high prices of consumer goods and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

I wish the Japanese peasants deliverance from landlessness and land shortage, elimination of high taxes and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentia full victory of the democratic forces of Japan, revival and advance of the country’s economic life, the flowering of national culture, science and art and success in the struggle for the preservation of peace.

With respect,

J. Stalin

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN AGRICULTURE

Although southeast and south Asia’s agricultural production in the 1950-51 crop year was roughly at the prewar level, output of major food crops and output per capita remained significantly below prewar, according to US Department of Agriculture reports. For many countries, population increases reinforced the impact of lower production, or offset gains.

The high total production was maintained largely because rubber output is currently about 75 percent above prewar levels. Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand have shown large increases in production, but food crops were below prewar in all of these countries except Thailand.

Relatively low production of rice, which accounts for about 43 percent of the area’s total agricultural output, also affected the 1950-51 results. Although Thailand’s yields have been 50 percent above prewar, the other two major producers, Burma and Indochina, reached only about 75 percent of the prewar level. In the major sugar-producing countries, Formosa, Indonesia, and the Philippines, output was substantially below prewar.

Preliminary 1950-51 estimates of total production and per capita production in the south and southeast Asia countries, compared with 1935-39 annual averages, were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Prewar</th>
<th>1950-51 Total</th>
<th>1950-51 Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
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<td>Formosa</td>
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<td>73</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foreign Agriculture, January 1952.