The Indian Communist Party

BY RUTH FISCHER

In the general election of 1951-52, the first to be held in the Republic of India, the Communist Party unexpectedly emerged as a serious challenge to the Congress Party, not because of the number of contests won by its candidates but because it showed itself to be solidly entrenched in certain strategic regions of the country. Viewed against the background of the victory of the Communists in China, the rise of the Indian Party is of special interest. It is impossible, however, correctly to assess the prospects of this Party without first reviewing certain of the key events in its history. The record will show the unwisdom of drawing facile analogies between the Indian and the Chinese Communist movements.

Not until 1942 did the Indian Communists come of age as a party and achieve the nation-wide organization which they had desired for more than twenty years. Two factors in particular were responsible for the slow development of Indian Communism. First, it was presented to the country in the terminology of rationalism, the French Enlightenment and Western Marxism, with a touch of Brahmin hauteur—an approach ill suited to Indian society. Second, Indian nationalist aspirations found expression in Gandhi’s movement, which had developed characteristically Indian methods of organizing peasant resistance to British rule. Thus the Indian Communist Party remained on the fringe of the nationalist movement even when, in 1935, after enunciation of the Popular Front program by the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, the Indian Communists formed a united front with the Socialists as well as cooperating with the Congress Party against the British in an attempt at integration in the over-all national struggle. In those years Congress and Communist leaders, who spent much time in jail, were united by their common persecution.

In the years immediately before 1942 (following the promulgation of the Defense of India Ordinance of December 3, 1939), Communists had been subject to arrest, and many had been confined in the detention camp for political prisoners at Deoli. When, however, the Soviet Union was attacked by Germany, Sir Reginald Maxwell, the Secretary for Home Affairs in the Government of India, brought the interned Communists a letter from the British Communist Harry Pollitt asking them to cooperate with the British authorities in an anti-fascist effort, and offered to secure their release if they would do so. On their agreement, the Communists were released, and in July 1942 the ban on their Party was lifted, so that it acquired legal standing for the first time in nearly a decade. On their part, the Communists thereupon began to support the anti-fascist People’s War.

This sudden shift from an anti-British, nationalist policy to support of the British war effort had a disastrous effect on the development of the Party as an organization. It served to rekindle latent sectarian and

Miss Fischer, who was at one time Chairman of the German Communist Party and a member of the Presidium of the Comintern, visited India in 1951-52 in connection with a study of Comintern policies in Asia.

1 The early Comintern generation had high hopes for the coming Indian revolution. At the Second World Congress of the Communist International in 1920, Lenin wrote a thesis on the National and Colonial Questions, with India primarily in mind, in which he urged a policy that would effect “the closest alliance of all the national and colonial liberation movements with Soviet Russia; the form of this alliance is to be determined by the degree of development of the Communist movement among the proletariat of each country, or of the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement of the workers and peasants in backward countries or among backward nationalities. . . .” (See V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Moscow, 1938, Vol. 10, pp. 233-37.)

A supplementary, and contradictory, thesis was written at Lenin’s request by the youthful future founder of the Indian Communist Party, M. N. Roy, who, removed by background and education from the Western proletariat, paradoxically placed much more emphasis than Lenin on the necessity for a proletarian revolution in India. More than twenty years passed before the weak, isolated Indian Communist organizations even merged as one all-India party, and during that time the Indian movement was repeatedly cited by the Comintern as an example of bad organization, confused ideology and impotent politics, in contrast to the Chinese Communists, who succeeded in establishing a united party as early as 1920, gained considerable political and military experience, developed a corps of talented leaders, and became an important force not only in China but also in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. (See Protocol of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, Hamburg, 1928, Vol. 3, pp. 244-45.)

2 The details of this incident are taken from a forthcoming study of Indian Communism prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations by Minoo R. Masani, who very kindly permitted the writer to consult it in manuscript. See also Masani’s article “The Communist Party in India,” Pacific Affairs, March 1951.

3 The First Congress of the Indian Communist Party took place in 1943.
doctrinal tendencies because of the difficulties involved in presenting a wholly European concept—that of anti-fascism, or the resistance of European peoples to domination either by Germany or by a German-controlled fascist axis—in a distinctly non-European milieu. Nevertheless, the propensity of Indian intellectuals to interest themselves spiritually in the problems of the non-Indian world, as well as their cosmopolitan experience and psychology, and the fairly extensive knowledge of European conditions on the part of Indian exiles, enabled the Communists to win new adherents and to avoid engulfment in the tide of national sentiment that reached a crest with the voluntary evacuation of India by the British.

Cooperation with Britain

The period of British-Communist cooperation in India illuminates several aspects of the Indian Communist movement and particularly its present situation vis-à-vis the Congress Party and Government. P. C. Joshi, who was then head of the Party, advocated permanent cooperation, through the People's War, between the Soviet Union and the capitalist but anti-fascist world powers, the United States and Great Britain. Joshi had started his political career as a follower of Gandhi, having been recruited by Jawaharlal Nehru, and remained an admirer of the Mahatma throughout his career. Yet he found himself forced to accuse Gandhi of pro-fascist sympathies, since the Party line of the time held that the millennium would be achieved by an Allied victory, which would free all peoples, including the Indian, from colonial bondage. On their part, Gandhi and the other Congress leaders were outraged by the Communists' behavior.4

While the Indian Communist Party thus found itself in the anomalous position of fighting in the same camp with its traditional arch-enemy, Britain, the struggle between the Congress movement and London reached a climax. The Indian nationalists were not anti-German in the way that the British or French liberals and laborites were. Hitler as an antagonist of Britain was not unpopular in India, and the war between Germany and Britain was hopefully regarded there as the beginning of a cataclysm that might overturn even the British Raj.5 Nehru's political philosophy contained, and contains today, stronger elements of Western anti-Fascism than Gandhi's, whose policy of non-resistance to Japanese aggression was nothing more than a formula for conditional cooperation with the Japanese "Quit Asia" offensive. Prime Minister Churchill, sensing the danger, ordered the arrest of the whole Congress hierarchy, including Gandhi and .

4 Traces of that bitter controversy appear in an interesting pamphlet, Correspondence between Mahatma Gandhi and P. C. Joshi (Bombay, 1945). Gandhi asked Joshi many awkward questions about the meaning of the "people's war." He inquired, for instance, whether it signified a war in behalf of India's millions, or of the Negroes of Africa and the United States, or of all of them, and whether the Allies were engaged in such a war. The most troublesome question concerned the finances of the Party, for it was commonly believed that the Indian Communists were accepting money from the government for propaganda purposes. When Gandhi requested a public audit of the Party's accounts, Joshi replied that the treasurer of the Party was working with a thousand Party members at Bezwada, "removing the silt from the canal so that 50,000 acres may get more water and the peasants of Kistna may grow more food for famished Malayses." He offered, however, to submit the accounts for Gandhi's inspection at the first possible moment, adding: "You will find some anonymous donors, but I believe that you also accept anonymous donors. But to dispel any suspicion that 'anonymous' may be code for Government cash, I am prepared to give you (not your representative) the names." As far as the writer is aware, this inspection never took place.

5 A similar sympathy had been felt for Germany in the first world war. The Germans had been popular at that time because of their demonstrated ability to inflict military defeats on a power which had appeared omnipotent to its subject peoples, and because their government had promised an Indian Revolutionary Committee in Berlin that it would supply money and arms in support of the Indian war of independence.

M. N. Roy has recently disclosed that a committee calling itself a General Staff was formed in India to direct the coming revolution, that a messenger was dispatched to Berlin to obtain arms, and that he himself went first to Java on a similar quest and then, on the advice of the German ambassador to China, set out for Germany, disguised as a Christian priest. After wandering for a year and a half through Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines, Japan, Korea and China, he reached San Francisco in the summer of 1916, expecting that the United States would ultimately prove as helpful as Germany. Instead, he was arrested as a dangerous German spy, for the United States was already drifting toward war with Germany and did not regard Indian-German cooperation with a benevolent eye. ("The Quest for the Golden Fleece," The Radical Humanist, Calcutta, February 1, 1953.)

The attempt to obtain German assistance for the Indian revolution was renewed somewhat more vigorously in the second world war, when Subhas Chandra Bose, an outstanding Congress figure who had opposed Gandhi's refusal to countenance the use of force against the British, formed an Indian National Army of some 2,000 Indians stranded in Europe, and assumed the title of Netaji, or leader. At the same time, Rash Behari Bose organized an Indian Independence League in Southeast Asia. Subhas Bose, planning to liberate India by means of an invading army, flew to Japan in 1944 or 1945 with the intention of proceeding thence to Burma, but was reportedly killed in an airplane accident en route. He is celebrated in present-day India as a Resistance hero who disproved the common assumption that Indians are inherently passive and non-militant. The ex-members of his legion, who comprise a special elite, collaborated with wartime Germany, not because they endorsed Hitler's domestic policies, but in the belief that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."
Nehru, on August 8, 1942—not until, that is, the British had won the support of the Indian Communists. Although Gandhi’s, and more particularly Nehru’s, policy toward the West became more neutral, and in this sense more anti-Japanese, during the following years, to emerge at the end of the war with a rather clearly pro-Western orientation, Congress leaders have never forgiven the Communists for their wartime alignment with the British Indian government.6

The advent of independence after the war found the Indian Communists unprepared and confused. The most conservative British political element in India believed that India was unfit for unification and would fall apart as soon as the protectors of law, order and civilization had withdrawn. The Communists blended this British distrust of their country with a crude adaptation of Mao Tse-tung’s peasant-war strategy, and sought a Yenan of their own from which to march on New Delhi. In doing so, they overlooked the fact that Mao did not march on Nanking until after twenty years of trial and error, in the course of which he had consolidated the most powerful Communist party outside of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, at the outset of independence Indian affairs were sufficiently disorganized to lend a semblance of logic to the Communists’ shift to an insurrectionist strategy. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the Moslem ruler of sixteen million Hindus, resisted the central government for more than a year at a time when communal warfare and the exodus of millions of refugees had created conditions approaching anarchy in the Punjab, and when the Kashmir issue seemed to be leading to a war with Pakistan. The conflict between New Delhi and the Nizam brought on a peasant uprising, which the Communists exploited by entrencing themselves in several areas, of which Telengana became the most widely known. They were anxious to atone for their past sins of opportunism by manifesting ultra-revolutionary virtues, and were also responding to the current of extremism which stimulated Communist parties throughout the world in that Zhedanov era. Their seizure of local power in the border region required them to take over village organizations, establish camps, and form guerrilla detachments which ranged over wide areas and expropriated landlords by force of arms. Thus, for the first time, the Indian Communist Party was confronted with problems of practical policy. Because of the insecure position of the central government, the Communists had high hopes of making Hyderabad their Yenan and of marching thence to New Delhi. In the autumn of 1948, however, the government drove them out of Hyderabad City, which they had controlled for more than a year, and this reverse ended the attempt to establish an Indian Yenan.

Confusion in the Party

The shifts from propaganda to insurrectionist policy and back again, more or less, to propaganda did not occur without confusion among the leading cadres of the Party. In this transitional period Joshi had supported Gandhi and Nehru, and had coined the slogan: “All support to the Nehru government. Fight communality, increase production, and do not foment strikes.”7 At the Second Congress of the Indian Party in February 1948, he was dismissed as General Secretary for having advocated cooperation with the government of the national bourgeoisie instead of having enlarged “the partial struggles of the present period . . . [so that they may] become wide mass battles, miniature civil wars which, when organized on a sufficiently big scale, develop into political battles and throw up embryonic state forms.”8 After B. T. Ranadive succeeded Joshi, the Party, despite its formal unity, split into sections, one operating mainly in the south under Ranadive, and another concentrating its efforts in the industrial areas, where S. A. Dange, a trade-union leader, remained the apostle of Europeanization of the Indian Communist movement.

The Telengana period increased the hostility that already existed between the Congress government and the Communist Party. Acting against the Communists as quickly and energetically as against the Nizam, the government declared them to be bandits, unworthy of the name of Communist.9 The police were directed to rid the countryside of local terrorists, and many Communist cadre functionaries were immobilized by appli-

---

6 In a debate in Parliament in 1952 concerning an extension of the Preventive Detention Law, the Home Minister, Dr. K. N. Katju, said: “The only period in which the Communist Party cooperated with the authorities in the preservation of peace and tranquillity was for three years after 1942.” (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 18, 1952.)

7 The British Communist Party seemed to favor this coexistence policy, and advised the Indian Party to seek admittance to the National Congress, which, it said, was divided into two camps: the progressive, led by Pandit Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah of Kashmir, and the reactionary, led by Sardar Patel.

8 See The Communist, Bombay, July 1949.

9 A Communist pamphlet of the time, quoted in Communist Violence in India (Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 1949), illustrated the prevailing mood: “Labourers, peasants, students, and citizens, punish these murderers with death, by organizing strikes, processions and squads, assault the reactionary Congress leaders severely, set fire to Congress offices . . . attack the houses of the Ministers . . . attack the jail gates and rescue your brethren . . . Proceed in defiance of death. Inflict punishment on the murderers” (p. 30). See also Erandgaon: Story of Violence and Terror, Directorate of Publicity, Government of Bombay, 1950.
cation of the Preventive Detention Law (sponsored by Patel in 1950, following a pattern of similar Public Safety Acts in force under British rule), which became the government's chief weapon against Communist subversive activities, while the Party, as such, remained legal.

As the power of the central government increased, the Party's strength declined and its internal difficulties mounted. Joshi, although expelled from the Party, continued to advocate reformist Communism and attacked the Party for its sectarian, insurrectionary, traitorous tactics which could create only frustration and demoralization. In the midst of these controversies occurred an incident that had an important bearing on relations between the Indian Party and Moscow as well as on the crisis within the Moscow Party itself. In mid-1949 Ranadive not only strongly opposed Joshi's "right deviationism" but attacked Mao Tse-tung for having formulated certain theses "which no Communist could accept" and for having protracted the Chinese civil war by failing "to fight for the hegemony of the proletariat," a tactical policy which, Ranadive asserted, could lead only to disaster. Mao's theories, he concluded, were unacceptable, reactionary, Titoist deviations, running counter to every tenet of Marxism and Leninism, and wholly unfitted to contribute constructively to Indian Communist policy. The Chinese Communist Party, it may be recalled, was at about that time executing a retreat similar to that of the Indian Party, and there was no indication of its ultimate triumph. It is quite likely, therefore, that Ranadive criticized Mao Tse-tung with the encouragement of a particular Moscow group and in the belief that he could gain favor by attacking Mao's Party and regime, which were then the subject of secret Moscow discussions. Ranadive's attack was certainly induced in some measure also by the jealousy which exists between the two major branches of Asian Communism.

In any event, he was quickly forced by Moscow to recant. The moderate Indian Communists seized the occasion offered by the change in Moscow's attitude following Zhdanov's death to oppose Ranadive. At a national conference in 1951, Ranadive was expelled for adventurism, and a new program was drafted, to be implemented in a series of local meetings in preparation for the imminent general election. The new General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, is regarded as a typical apparatus man, lacking theoretical authority but able to keep the feuding factions and sub-factions in line. After 1951, the Party reverted to the political gradualism of the Popular Front concept, and emphasized an alliance with the other classes, including the national bourgeoisie, in order to eliminate all foreign capitalists and Anglo-American political influence in India. The 1951 thesis laid all possible stress on the untimeliness of attempting to effect a socialist transformation in India. As its goal it set replacement of the existing "anti-democratic and anti-popular" government by a People's Democratic Coalition of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces.

The General Election

Despite their inconsistent policies, the Communists scored a surprising victory in the Indian general election of November 1951-February 1952. They enjoyed their most substantial successes in precisely those regions in which they had been most terrorist, most aggressive against the landlords, and most unorthodox in their methods of impressing themselves on the village populations as the leaders of revolutionary change. True, they attracted only six million votes as against twelve million for the Socialists and 107 million for the Congress candidates; and they did poorly in the industrial centers of Calcutta and Bombay. Yet the Socialist votes were widely scattered, whereas the Communist votes were won primarily in the three southern states of Hyderabad, Madras and Travancore-Cochin, where the Party had concentrated its forces.

The relatively large Communist vote in these states does not support the facile thesis that poverty breeds communism. Indian villagers, to be sure, exist at a level which, by Western standards, represents permanent poverty, and Madras was at the time facing near-famine. On the other hand, the populations of these states are among the most politically literate and best educated in India. Travancore-Cochin, for instance, has the highest literacy rate of any Indian state. Yet the Communists not only won over Hindus, Moslems and Christians, but also achieved a working arrangement in Tamilnad with the anti-Brahmin Dravida Kazhakam, an organization which has a long history of anti-northern activity and which, as a "self-respect" movement, has often been allied with Communist-front organizations. They succeeded in aligning themselves with communalist organizations and in making themselves the spokesmen of the "Indian Ukrainians," the

10 See The Communist, June-July 1949, later withdrawn from circulation and now difficult to obtain.

11 Joshi, for example, declared: "The victory of the Chinese Communists is the glory of world Communism; the collapse of Indian Communism is its shame." See Madhu Limaye, Communist Party: Facts and Fiction, Hyderabad, 1951, p. 70.

12 See Draft Program of the Communist Party of India, Bombay, 1951, pp. 9, 12.

13 Ravi Narayan Reddi, Communist candidate in the state of Hyderabad, received 309,162 votes, or 78.8 percent of all votes cast in his district.
Telegu-speaking people, who had been demanding autonomous statehood for Andhra, a part of northern Madras State, ever since independence. Another interesting aspect of the election was the Communists' success among the tribemen in the mountainous border state of Tripura.14

The Communists' uneven but substantial achievements in the election reflected continuing political instability in several key areas. India is cushioned against external shocks by its vast expanse and the complexity of its society, but its borders nevertheless approach the Soviet Union, the country of the Permanent Revolution, and China, the country of the new Revolution. Communist prospects in India must, therefore, be viewed in the light of this proximity to the two Communist world powers.

In the states of Hyderabad, Madras and Travancore-Cochin, the Congress Party has been able, despite Communist victories, to maintain its own administration but it has had to concede the demand for an independent Andhra State, established on a linguistic basis.15 In the new state assembly, comprising members of the present Madras legislature, the Communists will hold 41 seats as against 40 for the Congress Party, but the latter may achieve an anti-Communist majority in coalition with several smaller parties. Such coalitions do not, however, afford a stable basis for a government, and since Communist influence in Andhra is strong, the infant state may witness a new phase of Indian Communism. The Party may have an opportunity to govern on a state and local scale; if it does, its performance there will determine its standing elsewhere in India.

Another potential trouble spot is Nepal, whose importance has increased by virtue of its proximity to Communist Tibet. In the winter of 1951-52, it was the scene of an armed coup, led from prison by a Communist who had subverted his guard and some Nepali army officers before another military group quelled the uprising and forced him to flee to Tibet. Subsequently there was widespread peasant unrest, leading to the destruction of moneylenders' accounts and to riots in the eastern foothills. The Indian press reported in July 1952 that hundreds of Nepali landlords had fled to India in fear of Communist-inspired terrorist campaigns. The unrest has since subsided, and the Indian government has assisted the Nepali authorities in re-establishing a measure of tranquillity there. The important consideration, however, is not the occasional occurrence of riots but the fact that the wind of uncompensated expropriation now blowing southward across the Tibetan mountains may be a forerunner, not only of further difficulties in the border state, but of an increasing dilemma which will confront the Indian government as long as the problem of land reform in India remains unsolved.

The Prospect in Kashmir

Kashmir, precisely because its status is in dispute between India and Pakistan, has become the testing ground for an interesting experiment in what is sometimes termed "Kashmiri socialism." Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah, a close friend of Nehru's, has successfully carried out land reforms without compensation to expropriated landowners, as would be required in India by the Constitution, and these reforms have won India the support of many Kashmiri Moslem peasants who had resented the Hindus on both religious and economic grounds. At the same time, Kashmir's famous craftsmen have been organized into producers' cooperatives and provided with a controlled market by the establishment of Kashmir Houses throughout India, where their products are offered for sale at advantageous government-fixed prices. Kashmir, which has no modern industry, has undoubtedly made progress under this combination of land reform and craft cooperatives, and the Pakistani government, not having instituted similar measures either in Kashmir or in Pakistan, is encountering increasing difficulties in its propaganda against Indian encroachment.

Although Sheikh Abdullah's entourage and administration include a number of Communists and fellow-travelers, the extent of their influence has been exaggerated. Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, the president of the Constitutional Assembly and also a Vice-President of the All-India Peace Council, is a Communist who apparently maintains cordial relations with the Soviet Union. The Finance Minister, Deputy Minister of the Interior, and Sheikh Abdullah's Parliamentary Secretary also are reported to be Communists. Many Kashmiri dignitaries have been active participants in the Stockholm Peace Movement. Yet, despite the number of Communists in the Kashmiri government, their participation in Sheikh Abdullah's moderate but effective reform program has served to acknowledge the absence

14 The wide experience which Russian Communism has gained with numerous nomadic peoples in Mongolia, Central Asia and Siberia should receive more attention in the West than it has hitherto, for Western methods of dealing with tribal populations have been rather unsuccessful, and the rapid entrance into world politics of these previously silent members of the human family represents a new factor in the political scene, the full weight of which may be felt within the next decade. Prime Minister Nehru, who is notably sensitive to possible future developments, has had good reason to devote time and energy recently to tours of the tribal areas near the Burma border in an effort to gain local support for the Indian Republic.

15 On March 25, 1953, the central government announced that Andhra would become India's twenty-eighth state on October 1.
of a popular social issue, and they are finding difficulty in setting more ambitious goals in a state that has a happy balance of small peasants and craftsmen. The Indian Communists, who have vacillated in their attitude toward Kashmir’s future status, have let slip many of their oppositionist opportunities as a result of the rather novel manner in which Kashmir’s relationship to India has evolved in recent months.16

In general, the prospects of the Indian Communist Party present a somewhat contradictory picture. The Indian government has successfully met its first test, having weathered a state of near-anarchy, civil and religious war, drought and famine. The strengthening of civil administration and the gain in governmental experience must be weighed against symptoms of continuing internal strife. Inasmuch as the political framework in India is now definitely fixed, the Communists no longer have a chance—if they ever had one—of seizing “power” in New Delhi as leaders of a peasant rebellion. Certainly there is no likelihood of their winning a parliamentary majority in a general election.

The question remains whether they will be able to emerge from their present minority position into wider areas of political control, using as bases the nuclei of support which they have won in Andhra, Kashmir and elsewhere. If they demonstrate a capacity for government and continue their present tactics of moderation, winning allies in the process, they may increase their pressure in a society discontented with the way in which social amelioration thus far has fallen short of popular expectations of the results of national liberation. The Congress Party may in time agree to cooperate with the Communists in a popular-front government, first locally and then, much later, even nationally. Such a fusion would, however, imply a fundamental change in the Indian Communist Party itself; the complexity of Indian society requires methods of social change for which no analogy can be found.

It would be unwise at this juncture to venture a forecast of any such development, especially since Stalin’s death has launched a new phase for Communist movements everywhere. Within the next five years, the Congress Party will have to tackle tremendous problems in competition not only with the Indian Communists but also with the Chinese Communist regime nearby, and against the background of an international situation in which the relative efficacy of Western and Communist methods will be determined under conditions of permanent tension. It would therefore be unwise not to recognize that the Indian Communists may yet produce a unique Communist regime.

Indonesian Political Developments

BY ROBERT VAN NIEL

As one looks back over developments during the past fifteen months in Indonesia, one is struck by the sober aspect of the view. Easily the most spectacular incident in this period occurred on October 17, 1952, when some ten thousand citizens of Djakarta stormed the building of the Indonesian Parliament and then marched to the President’s residence, where, after listening quietly to a speech by the President, they disbanded. Advance preparations were evident, for the demonstrators carried banners and placards which called for the dissolution of Parliament and speedy general elections. Since this event, much time has been spent in seeking out the instigators, but to date there has been only the most superficial assignment of blame. Although obviously a staged performance, the demonstration certainly indicated undercurrents flowing beneath the relative quiet of the Indonesian political scene—undercurrents which have not been resolved since and which may at any time make their presence felt again.

The immediate cause of the October 17 disturbances originated in army reforms. The Sultan of Jogjakarta, Hamengko Bwono IX, who at that time was Minister of Defense and has since resigned his post, had initiated an army policy which envisioned the creation of a small, professional army with high standards of organization. The size of the army was to be almost halved from its present strength of about 200,000 men. To many irregular and to some Japanese-trained officers, this army reform seemed designed to force them out of the service. They feared that those components which had been trained in the Dutch colonial forces and incorporated in the present national army would be in an advantageous position for retention under the

16 Moscow has a permanent interest in the solution of the Kashmir question because of the proximity of Kashmir to the Soviet Union. R. Krishen’s “Kashmir and the Conspiracy against Peace” (Moscow, 1950) is devoted “to exposing Anglo-American intrigues” and the plans of the “imperialist vultures” attracted by Kashmir’s extensive natural resources. In reviewing the book, Izvestia (February 26, 1953) quoted Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq as having stated in 1952: “The Anglo-Americans have no aim other than to turn Kashmir into a military base against Russia and New China, and only for this reason are they so ardently concerned with this problem.” (See Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1953, p. 17.)