established, movements and parties committed to the Islamization of state and society continue to grow stronger. Turkey secularized because it was centrally strong enough to do so. Religion was merely relegated to the role of private religion as a part of the national identity, but "is only faintly able to lay claim to the control of public life."

Iran rejected the secularist policies of the Shah and began a process of re-Islamization because the central government was weak and could not prevent it or impose indefinitely its designs upon the grass roots populace of the vast rural areas. In both instances, the re-formulations and re-groupings followed not along an identifiable basic Islamic pattern, but along earlier, non-Islamic templates.

The book is fresh and its ideas are anything but a rehash of old theories. It commands attention and deserves wide circulation.

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Egyptian perceptions of collective identity, their relation to policy and action, and the relation of both to changing historical conditions are the concerns of this book. At the beginning of the twentieth century, most educated Egyptians combined local Egyptian patriotism with loyalty to the Ottoman state and attachment to the wider Islamic community, but a small minority espoused a narrower Egyptian territorial patriotism. The results of World War I, notably the Ottoman defeat, gave the lead to Egyptianism. Consequently, the Revolution of 1919 was waged for purely Egyptian nationalist goals and resulted in the establishment of an Egyptian national state. The newly established Egyptianism held the field in the conflict over the Caliphate, 1924-26. In response to this "drastic historical transformation," Egyptian intellectuals developed a new collective image. First, Egyptian was categorically separated from Arab. Then it was demonstrated how the unique environment of the Nile Valley, history, and race had created a unique nation whose "only authentic national heritage" was Pharaonic. Accordingly, Egyptian literature and arts must draw exclusively from the Pharaonic heritage. Pharaonicism influenced not only the arts but politics. Egypt did not turn its back on the Arabs, Islam,
and the East, but the public and the government reacted on the basis of Egyptian national interest. Nevertheless, continued Egyptian concern with Arab and Islamic questions, even in the heyday of Pharaonism, was a portent of pressures which were soon to have significant effect.

The late notice of the continued vitality and future import of Arab and Islamic sentiment is a bit discordant, for the book’s organization and a number of general statements indicate the extinction of both sentiments by Pharaonism. But the treatment of particulars conclusively demonstrates that Egypt-first was the unrivaled principle in intellectual and political life. Conceptualization and analysis are outstanding; the quantity and quality of sources virtually unparalleled. The second volume is eagerly anticipated.

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Huppert writes on the re-politicization of Judaism, in the form of the advent to political power of the so-called religious political parties. He writes not about the so-called ultra-Orthodox extremists (Agudat Yisrael, which is non-Zionist, or anti-Zionist ones), but about the religious-Zionist parties held to be moderate, which are Mizrachi, Poel Mizrachi, and now the National Religious Party (NRP). These parties have been on the scene from the beginning of Zionism, so Huppert takes up the political establishment of Judaism not on account of the 1988 elections, which turned a chronic problem into an acute one, but because Zionism as a movement has been developing for close to a century now.

Orthodox Judaism in its NRP form controls the religious courts, which govern matters of personal status, the public-religious educational system, inculcating Orthodox religious ideology, local religious councils, and the like. So, he maintains, “Long before the issue reached its present proportions Orthodoxy also became the dominant voice for dormant ethnicity. It was largely due to Orthodox pressure that some sovereign state structures and systems financed by the state budget became institutionalized on ethnic lines.” His main point is that the establishment as state religion of Orthodox Judaism is led by “the ‘good guys’ of the NRP.”

This affects the following areas of public life: “medicine (by restricting autopsy); industry, transportation, and entertainment; burials; the food industry; the military (by creating exceptional options for wo-