will have to deal with conflicting claims on their resources, arising from sectional and political rivalries, competition between public and private or cooperative enterprises, and the like. This applies even more to programs of rehabilitation than to those of pure relief. The need for relief will be great enough, however, to absorb the energies of all groups which seek to participate.

The relief program will cover at least China, southeastern Asia, and probably Japan as well. In all these countries, whatever local groups have a hand in the administration of relief will inevitably acquire thereby considerable power and prestige. The cooperation of foreign and Asiatic administrators will have its effect on national administrative standards and practices. Many of the relief efforts may be wasted, or even socially harmful, unless they are in harmony with local needs, and unless they are geared to a constructive pattern of national development. Foreign financing of these programs—probably largely American—will confer upon the foreign countries involved great powers and great responsibilities. Care must be taken to ensure adequate representation to local groups in planning and carrying out relief activities. So far as possible, the arrangements should be so planned as to include reciprocal benefits.

The whole question calls for intensive study, which should be set on foot immediately, before the end of hostilities in Asia and even before any areas are recaptured from Japan. The British and American governments have been studying the problems of post-war relief and rehabilitation, and consulting with each other, as, for example, in the recent visit of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross to Washington. It is to be hoped that adequate attention is being given to the problems of reconstruction in Asia, and that adequate representation will be afforded to representatives of the peoples and governments of Asia in the planning and administration of programs of relief and rehabilitation.

Miriam S. Farley

The End of Special Privileges in China

It was ten months after the United States and Great Britain became fighting allies of the Chinese against the Axis before Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was able to announce that the two great democracies were willing to relinquish their extraterritorial rights in China. Following closely Mr. Willkie's forthright speeches in Chungking, this announcement was hailed by the Chinese as evidence that the century-old restrictions on China's sovereignty were ended and that America and Britain were finally prepared to deal with China on an equal basis.

It is understood that both the United States and Britain already have presented draft treaties on this subject to the Chinese Government for its consideration. It is important, therefore, to analyze the significance of this latest move in Anglo-American-Chinese relations.

The right of extraterritoriality is the core of the whole regime of special treaty rights and privileges forced upon China just over a century ago. The British-Chinese treaty of Nanking, signed on August 29, 1842, exacted the first rights of trade and residence in the five ports China was required to open to foreign commerce. The American-Chinese treaty of July 3, 1844, contained the first clear statement of the right of extraterritoriality. Upon these treaties was reared the whole structure of foreign rights and privileges.

This was an elaborate system, including rights of travel, residence, navigation, the right to establish foreign industries, the privilege of garrisoning China's principal ports, and control of customs and salt administration and river conservancy. It enabled the Western powers and Japan to exploit China's trade and resources with a minimum of interference from the Chinese Government.

Although the Chinese Republic made numerous attempts to end this system, the foreign powers yielded reluctantly. Save for a few minor concessions, the right to a fixed tariff was the only major right relinquished before this latest act. Qualified promises had been made to end extraterritoriality, and, after 1937, Japan's conquests made the exercise of this and other treaty rights of little consequence. Nevertheless, both the United States and Great Britain attempted to maintain their special rights in both occupied and Free China. On America's part, this action was mainly prompted by a desire to check Japan and as support for our legal case against Japanese violations of treaties and of international law. Chinese opinion regarded this policy as only a mild effort to check Japan rather than a real attempt to aid China. Pearl Harbor ended any justification for such a policy.

The American and British announcements of their willingness to negotiate promptly the end of extraterritoriality came, appropriately, on October 10, 1942, the thirty-first anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic. The event was symbolized by the ringing of the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia thirty-one times. The Chinese were highly appreciative of these actions and general enthusiasm greeted the announcements.

On more sober reflection, however, many Chinese began to wonder whether the end of extraterritoriality would really mean the attainment of full freedom from "special privileges" or would be just another step along...
the road. These doubts were increased by the statement of British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Richard Law, who told the House of Commons in late October that Britain had no intention of returning Hongkong to China. Although Britain gained legal title to Hongkong by the Treaty of 1842, China was forced to make the transfer and therefore the Chinese regard Britain's position in this colony as a part of the whole structure of special privileges. Prime Minister Churchill's recently expressed desire to "hold the Empire" has raised further doubts as to British intentions in the minds of many Chinese, and indicates to them a lack of agreement between America and Britain concerning the end of special privileges in the Far East.

What the Chinese want is a clear renunciation by their allies, Britain and America, of the whole system of special privileges, not just piecemeal concessions to this desire. Ta Kung Pao, the leading Chungking newspaper, listed the following fifteen special rights as forming the basis of this system: consider jurisdiction or extraterritoriality; concessions and settlements; leased territories; garrison rights: demilitarization; Legation quarter in Peking; Pai Ho and Whangpoo conservancy management; interior navigation and employment of foreign pilots; coastal trade; rights of cruise and anchorage of warships; establishment of foreign factories in treaty ports; foreign inspectorate of customs; railway and mining rights; missionary work; and unilateral most-favored-nation clause. This does not include rights such as that to a fixed tariff, previously relinquished.

It is to be hoped that the treaties now under negotiation not only will end extraterritoriality but also will deal so definitively with related questions of special privileges as to write off once and for all the whole system of special rights in China. For no postwar settlement in the Far East consonant with the Four Freedoms and with the Atlantic Charter can be built upon the retention of any special privileges in China by any nation.

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Coalition War in the East
Prepared by HERRYMON MAURER

No one, regrettably, owes allegiance to the United Nations. Individuals, whether they are statesmen or soldiers, generals or farmers, are men of their own countries, and as Americans they do not say, "God bless the United Nations," or as Chinese, "Ten thousand years to the United Nations," or as Fighting French, "Vive les Nations Unis." Coalition war, as a consequence, becomes far more difficult than coalition politics; tory and labor, republican and democrat can through appeal to higher power act together in emergencies far more easily than can American and Britain, Chinese and Russian, who have nothing above them to which to appeal except a vision of victory. The fact of nation discourages unity, discourages even coalition, a temporary joining together for limited aims. As it is, the United Nations, in effecting their coalition, have done little but declare that they are fighting in the same war and that their governments have agreed not to frame separate treaties of peace.

In the East, the coalition suffers also from the attitude which sees Asia and the Pacific as a secondary front. This attitude is by no means identical with the military decision to defeat Hitler first and then to close in on Japan—a decision already made and one at which there is no use cavilling—for it is concerned not so much with strategic procedure as it is with political conclusions. It sometimes overlooks the new importance of Asia in world affairs, believes that Japan's fall will be the necessary consequence of Germany's and fails to see that the front second in time requires war planning as broad and as exact as that required for joint action in Europe. Such convictions have helped to establish between the United States and England, and to a far lesser degree Russia, a coalition still incomplete but at least partially effective; lend-lease shipments and military action in North Africa are its fruits. But, at the same time, the same convictions have helped to prevent comparable unity of action in the Pacific and in the continent of Asia. However much it may be needed, there is no effective coalition for the Eastern front—and scant possibility of getting it so long as the secondary idea remains generally entrenched.

To describe the obstacles is not to negate the possibility of circumventing them. To find methods for ensuring joint action in the East, however, it is essential first to examine the problem and to trace its repercussions in international military, economic, and political action.

I.

A coalition is essentially a pool into which each party puts what he can best afford—supplies, men, tactics, or space. From the pool is drawn whatever is