to meet these points by replying that the words can be read as referring merely to clothes and cosmetics, and that it is therefore not necessarily true that 'the gruesomeness of the flayed woman is so shockingly and absurdly over-appropriate to the ostensible logic as to be, by any normal standards, inappropriate', as Rawson suggests. If this is conceded it weakens also Rawson's contention that 'The image's strong charge of undifferentiated blame is thus left to play over undefined turpitudes attributable to the whole of mankind', and opens the possibility that Swift is more in conscious control than Rawson allows of the ambiguities of meaning and tone in the passage. In that case we must look again at the main feature which Rawson identifies—Swift's 'electrifying' suggestion that 'the alternative to being a fool is to be not a wise man but a knave.' If we choose we may interpret the last sentence of the paragraph as meaning simply 'The highest pitch of what is generally understood by Happiness is "the Possession of being well deceived"—a state of peace and serenity such as is enjoyed by a fool in the company of a set of knaves.'

On the whole, while admiring Rawson's powerful and persuasive reading of the text, I do not agree that 'the force of the passage' necessarily 'transcends logical purposes': it is possible to take the paragraph as a consistent and controlled commendation of Philosophy, Reason and Curiosity by means of ironic praise of Credulity. I agree therefore with Holzknecht that 'the technique adopted ultimately leaves the matter open', since the ambiguous terms that I have mentioned allow the reader, not inappropriately, a measure of choice.

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WYATT'S 'THERE WAS NEVER NOTHING MORE ME PAYNED': A REPLY TO JOHN DOUGLAS BOYD

I am interested in what Professor Boyd does in the first article of this number with Wyatt's 'There was never nothing more me payned' rather than with his discussion of large issues of critical theory. As far as Wyatt's poem is
concerned, I think Boyd's critical problems are largely of his own making. This does not necessarily invalidate his claim that a critic, in interpreting a literary work, may seize on one interpretation rather than another because of—to put it very shortly—his own personal background. However, I would at all times argue that such a critic's interpretation is academically legitimate only if it is supported by textual evidence; secondly, that if the text supports another interpretation the first critic's view of it, though perhaps true as far as it goes, is only an incomplete truth; thirdly, that the literary critic can only appeal to the text and such 'objective' background (i.e. not the experience of the single reader) as may help to explain the text, and that the study of 'fundamental moral, psychological, even ontological judgments derived from our experience outside the poem' lies outside our province.

Suppose for the moment that Boyd's seven different readings of Wyatt's poems are all academically tenable. I do not think that we would need to have recourse to 'fundamental moral, psychological, even ontological judgments derived from our experience outside the poem'. If the readings are all based on a rationally sound and a scrupulously complete study of the evidence, we could only conclude that we must accept all of them as possible. But we would accept them because the text allows them, and because they are intellectually convincing readings of that text; the whole issue of subjectivism would not arise. It is, of course, well known that more than one literary work sparks off a number of interpretations. It may be that the various interpretations are all true so far as they go; they may all be 'correct' in the light of the facts, but all incomplete, together adding up to a more or less complete understanding of the work. Or they may be 'correct' but contradict each other. Even so, we would have to accept them on academic grounds, and if we can, there is no need to subject the critics to a psychological scrutiny. Or an interpretation may seem intellectually false, and again only a study of the text can show it so, together with a rigorous rational scrutiny of the critic's argument.

As it happens, I think that most of what Boyd has to
say about Wyatt's poem is intellectually unconvincing. I won't go so far as to say that I can always prove him wrong, but in those cases where I cannot, I do not think I need to, because the onus of proof would be on Boyd. It will be sufficient if I can show that we need not intellectually conclude that he makes his case. This is also the place to reject any suggestion that what I have to say is the product of something other than my intellect, and I challenge Boyd to show that my claim is untrue. For his information (because he might see me as siding with his seventh imaginary critic), I will add that I have not 'written several good short stories about adolescence and the problems of young married couples in twentieth-century America', that there is much about Lawrence which I detest, and that I never read Flannery O'Connor.

For the sake of convenience, here is Wyatt's poem once again (I follow the version in Boyd's article):

There was never nothing more me payned,
Nor nothing more me moved,
As when my swete hert her complayned
That ever she me loved.
   Alas the while!

With pituous loke she saide and sighed:
   Alas, what aileth me
To love and set my welth so light
On hym that loveth not me?
   Alas the while!

Was I not well voyde of all pain,
When that nothing me greved?
And nowe with sorrous I must complain,
And cannot be releved.
   Alas the while!

My restfull nyghtes and joyfull daies
Syns I began to love
Be take from me; all thing decayes,
Yet can I not remove.
   Alas the while!
She wept and wrong her handes withall,
The teres fell in my nekke;
She torned her face and let it fall;
Scarsely therewith coude speke.
Alas the while!

Her paynes tormented me so sore
That comfort had I none,
But cursed my fortune more and more
To se her sobbe and grone:
Alas the while!

In his first interpretation, Boyd makes much of the effect of the refrain, which he claims is 'the first real clue as to the irony of the speaker's voice'. But first of all we should consider who is the speaker of the refrain, and here, at this comparatively simple level, Boyd, despite (or is it: because of?) the ingenuity which he so often displays, seems to me to go astray. As he sees it, 'the two speakers set up a lugubrious antiphonal chant and response', and the refrain is 'throughout the poem a response by one speaker to another'. In other words, the refrain would thus be spoken by Wyatt as a speaker within the dramatic context. But surely we can make a very simple distinction between the Wyatt who participated, according to the poem, as an actor in the dramatic encounter between him and the woman, and the Wyatt who actually writes the poem (about a situation in the past, or at any rate one presented as such, whether it ever took place or not). As I see it, and this is a purely intellectual assumption, Wyatt the poet voices the refrain, in each stanza as a comment on what goes before. Of course there are, theoretically, various other possibilities. I would rule these out one after the other, not because they are definitely and demonstrably wrong, but because my interpretation would give simple and straightforward sense, and other assumptions would get us into problems, as Boyd's account unintentionally shows. Naturally, we must confront a textual difficulty when it occurs, but we should not create one when it does not. There is at least one other possibility that Boyd does not...
consider, namely that the refrain is part of what the lady says in stanzas 2-4, but part of what Wyatt the poet voices in the other stanzas. I do not think that either the poem or the reader stands to gain by this assumption, and am inclined to reject it for this reason and because it seems somewhat unlikely that Wyatt would thus complicate our reception of the poem.

In fact, even a brief consideration of the first stanza would automatically lead us to adopt the view that the refrain, at least there, is spoken by Wyatt the poet. He says 'There was never nothing more me payned . . . ', and this at once sets up the distinction between Wyatt the poet and Wyatt the actor. It seems simply perverse to assume that the refrain in that stanza is spoken by anyone but Wyatt the poet. There clearly is no 'antiphonal chant and response' in this stanza, and while one could see it in others, one would have to assume that Wyatt's procedure is inconsistent from one stanza to another.

Therefore, when Boyd, in his first interpretation, makes an assumption about the irony generated by the refrain, that assumption rests on another about the identity of the speaker of the refrain which we need not, and probably should not, accept. If we cannot accept this second assumption, we need not accept the first. What I say about the refrain may seem obvious, but it is apparently the obvious, here, which needs stating.

With this out of the way, there might be little need to say anything about the assumption that in the last stanza the key word is 'my'. However, it is perhaps possible to see this assumption as not necessarily prompted by the others. Boyd reads 'my' as emphatic. Of course there is no textual indication that it is. Instead, Boyd offers such argumentation as this (I can only select): 'His fortune indeed! His fortune is to be wept over by a woman who loves him desperately, and who pleads for his sympathy and affection. Few men, however altruistic, could find this situation unequivocally deplorable; even the most tender-hearted would find their pity tempered with a tinge of selfish pleasure.' A sentence like this last one is altogether removed from textual evidence. Boyd's first imaginary critic does not point at anything specific in the poem to support
his claims about the speaker's attitude. Instead, he puts himself in the place of the speaker, and imagines what he would feel. In other words, he is a victim of 'the personal fallacy' which Boyd later admits to be a 'bad but difficult-to-avoid kind of subjectivity'. Yes, it is bad, and while a critic may find it hard to avoid, he ought to. Of course, a critic is perfectly at liberty to indulge in a personal flight of the imagination if he so chooses, but this has nothing to do with the study of a literary work as—I can think of no better word—an 'object'.

Similar objections can be raised against the next few alternative interpretations offered. The first interpretation, discussed above, is by no means the only one which partly depends on an assumption about the refrain which I decline to accept. But it is not the only one either which fails to support its claims by a sufficiently objective handling of evidence. In Boyd's second interpretation, what is said about 'The teres fell in my nekke', for instance, is almost as badly subjective, and certainly as little founded on facts, as what is said about the word 'my' in the first interpretation. Boyd, in his role as the second imaginary critic, here sees a 'disagreeable messiness' in the episode, which is one thing to make the speaker adopt an ironic tone of disapproval of the lady. However, there is simply not a shred of evidence to show that the speaker sees things this way, and certainly Boyd does not produce any. For instance, he claims that 'the deliberate, metrically emphatic use of the homely and anatomical "nekke" (instead of some softer, more "poetic" term, like "breast")' is one thing that underlines the speaker's sense of the lady's grotesqueness. The use of 'nekke' is not demonstrably more 'deliberate' than any other word in the poem. It is true that in a metrical reading it would seem to get emphasis, and I would certainly grant that one could see the poem as iambic. But by the same token, one could attach great significance to all syllables in the poem that get metrical stress. If, in metrical terms, the poem is not to be seen as iambic (though surely it is), and 'nekke' would get stress according to some other metrical system, the onus would still be on Boyd to show that the metrical stress on 'nekke' is in any way
remarkable. Again, one can perhaps see the word as 'homely and anatomical', but what would that have to do with the speaker's sense of the lady's grotesqueness? It could just as easily serve another purpose.

I may be excused if I refrain from going on elaborately in this vein. Boyd's second interpretation is just as unsound as the first, and so, I am afraid, are all the others except perhaps the seventh, which, however, I would certainly not wish to set up as a model of a reading that does full justice to the poem. I may perhaps be allowed to take up just one more point. In his fourth interpretation, Boyd argues that 'the crucial twist, in this lyric, is that the traditional roles are reversed'. 'It is no wonder that the speaker, noting this reversal of roles, cannot help being a little smug and amused, at the same time that he genuinely pities the woman.' I would certainly agree that the traditional roles are reversed, and I find this of interest. But again, though we may find this ironic, it does not follow that the speaker does, an assumption for which Boyd once more cannot produce evidence. We can hardly be expected to be persuaded by the mere claim that 'the poet could not but have intended to draw pointed attention to his amusing new twist on an old and ubiquitous tradition'.

While there is more than one point of method in Boyd's article which one can quarrel with, the chief one that he clearly wants to make, I think it would be fair to say, is that the subjective element in such readings as his of Wyatt's poem 'is not avoidable'. However, it definitely is (at least in this case), and if we are to do justice to Wyatt's poem, it had better be.

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DRAMATIC CONVENTION IN THE FIRST SCENE OF THE TEMPEST

Guy Back allows that there is some differentiation of character in this scene, but that there is more is suggested, for one thing, by the summaries in the Dramatis Personae (whoever provided them—Jonson is a possibility). If we