tap Protestant beliefs should be broad enough to cover the wide-ranging traditions of Protestant history. This concern with history is entirely in keeping with Max Weber's massive historical scholarship, and we are certain that he would be among the first to urge contemporary sociologists to reflect on and search for cultural data to support auxiliary notions about the connection between Protestantism and capitalism.

SOME TENTATIVE MODIFICATIONS OF WEBER'S TYPOLOGY: OCCIDENTAL VERSUS ORIENTAL CITY

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ABSTRACT

This paper suggests to eliminate various difficulties concerning Weber's urban typology by offering some tentative modifications dependent on the needs of the researcher. The dichotomy of urban behavior, the appreciation and use of which is seriously hampered by an exceptionally poor translation, is one of the most important of Weber's typological dichotomies. In addition, due to the unfinished condition of Weber's opus there are several analytical ambiguities which need clarification. Recent outstanding contributions in the sociology of Islam, specifically of the Islamic medieval city, seem to support the validity of Weber's hypotheses. The evidence offered by recent studies of the ancient Mesopotamian as well as the Greco-Roman city is considered in relation to Weber's urban typological dichotomy.

Max Weber's typological dichotomy of urban behavior occupies a highly respectable place today in sociological theory. In this area, similarly to some other areas of Weber's research, there are certain more or less apparent difficulties which require the attention of the specialist and perhaps further clarification of several ambiguities. The rationale for this is well known. Max Weber did not finish his great opus and several parts were written at different stages of his intellectual growth. Some of the translators were without sociological training and in their hands the usage of various terminology became an additional source of confusion. The other translators, the professionally trained sociologists, were at times very much in a hurry (perhaps justifiably so) to satisfy the need for Weber's works in English. Stating it most charitably, some of them did not have a chance to measure up to the expectations of Weber's scholarship. Of course, certain German terms are untranslatable and the choice of English approximation was necessarily an individual decision. The purpose of this paper is to offer some tentative modifications in the dichotomy of urban behavior and render it more usable for sociological research and teaching. The paper will also account for a number of recent studies on ancient and Islamic medieval cities in order to test the validity of Weber's basic typology.

In his extensive studies of the great Oriental cultures, in which he particularly searched for the interdependence of religious and economic behavioral patterns, Max Weber offered among other sets of constructed types, a dichotomy of the two types of urban behavior: the Oriental and Occidental city. In the Occidental type Weber included the ancient and the early as well as the late medieval Western European city. In spite of this typological decision Weber was aware of the fundamental distinction between the ancient (Greco-Roman) and the late medieval Western European city. In spite of this typological decision Weber was aware of the fundamental distinction between the ancient (Greco-Roman) and the late medieval city and this awareness seems to support the need for the modification of his original formulation of the Occidental type. In the

introduction to one of his earlier works written just before his death, Weber noticed that the “concept of the citizen has not existed outside the Occident, and that of the bourgeoisie outside of the modern Occident.” The absence of the special type of policy called town-economy and policy-making guilds from the ancient city was contrasted in his later works to the presence of the guilds with the function of ruling and policy-making in the medieval city. Concerning the presence or absence of magical-animistic tribal ties in the structure of the ancient cities, Weber in later works modified his original position without changing his earlier typological formulation. Finally, according to Weber, “the emergence of the autonomous and autocephalous medieval city with their own administrative council and their Consul, Mayor or Burgomaster on the top was a process of development essentially different not only from the growth of Asiatic cities but the ancient cities as well.” Consequently, Weber was incorrect when he spoke of the burgher in antiquity in the same sense as of the burgher in the late medieval city.

A. Leo Oppenheim has recently developed a hypothesis concerning the ancient Mesopotamian cities which in his own words “relies heavily on parallels offered by the known history of the Greek cities of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., and on certain aspects in the development of Italian cities of the early Renaissance.” The cuneiform documents in the transitional period from the end of the second millennium to the first millennium B.C. in Mesopotamia contain “a number of isolated indications which, taken together, reveal that a small number of old and important cities enjoyed a status of autocephalous medieval city.” It appears, however, that Weber himself was aware of the weakness of his original formulation of the Occidental type when he emphasized that only in the later periods of Western institutional development was magic completely eliminated through certain specific events which occurred in the West. “The magical barriers between clans, tribes, and peoples, which were still known in the ancient polis to a considerable degree, were thus set aside and the establishment of the Occidental city was made possible.”

3 Max Weber, General Economic History, (trans.) F. H. Knight (1927), pp. 326 ff. “The typical citizen of the medieval city is a merchant or craftsman; he is a full citizen if he is also a householder. In antiquity, on the contrary, the full citizen is the landholder.” In spite of some legal disadvantages for the nonlandholders, which were gradually eliminated, in his “personal relations, however, the citizen of the medieval city is free. The principle ‘town air makes free’ asserted that after a year and a day the lord no longer had a right to recall his runaway serf. . . . Hence the equalization of classes and removal of unfreedom became a dominant tendency in the development of the medieval city.” Ibid., pp. 329-330.
4 Also Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (ed.) Winckelman, (trans.) Vatro Murvar (2 vols., 4th ed.; Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956), p. 750. In antiquity the full citizen, the owner of political rights based on his landownership and military service, was separated by a deep gap from the rest of the population without political rights, Metics and slaves. While slaves took care of agricultural needs, commerce and artisan trade were almost entirely in the hands of Metics (foreigners), who were denied landownership and military service, thus deprived of citizenship. The familiar and universal two-fold economic stratification did not disappear from the ancient city. Frequently, Metics and slaves, strata without any rights, were the majority of the population in the ancient city. Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Washington, D.C.: Harren Press, 1952), pp. 147-148.
5 Weber appears to argue for the absence of magical power in the ancient city by emphasizing the fact that the priestly offices were filled by auc-
certain privileges and exemptions with respect to the king and his power." He quotes three cities in Babylonia and two in different periods in Assyria including capital cities in which, not the whole body of citizens, but only a few more influential, richer and older citizens "claimed with more or less success depending on the political situation," certain exemptions in corvée work, military and tax obligations. Oppenheim admits that these exemptions were not uniquely urban, but that "the granting of tax exemptions and preferential treatment with regard to corvée work and military service to certain landed owners and tribal chieftains or to sanctuaries had become common practice for the Babylonian kings. . . ." Oppenheim also notes that there is meager evidence on the assemblies of the citizens, who were again oligarchically dominated and whose main function was to write letters to the king. In a cultural context in which there existed, according to Oppenheim himself, only one institution—the kingship of divine origin and substance—there was simply no opportunity for the growth of autonomous bodies. The king's court within the city easily dominated the other social structures if any existed. "In such a system . . . the distinction between the divine and human tends to disappear; the god is paralleled by the ensi, his family by the ensi's wife and her children, and the needs of both are supplied by the temple organization. . . ." In contrast to Oppenheim, Adams seems correct when he states that the Mesopotamian cities lacked some of the basic characteristics of the Greco-Roman cities and Weber was right when he recognized only traces of the citizens' political rights in the Babylonian patriciate.

In view of these considerations it appears to be a contribution to the typological refinement of Weber's conceptual dichotomy if the Ancient City (Greco-Roman as well as Mesopotamian) is excluded from the Occidental type of urban behavior. An outstanding German social scientist, Otto Brunner considers the late ancient city and the early medieval city as belonging to the older universal type which corresponds to Weber's Oriental type, while the late medieval city represents an entirely different and basically new type.

The basic change in the universal patterns of urban life (Oriental and Ancient) first appeared in the eleventh century in Western Europe where a new independent socio-politico-economic structure emerged: the community or sodality of burghers. A number of economic factors cannot be separated from the simultaneous emergence of the sodalian community of the burghers in the West, however the economic factors were not the only decisive ones. For the first time in human history, here in the West, a peculiar configuration of various elements was responsible for the formation of the unique social organization in which the burgherdom played an increasingly significant role as one of the three Staende (in addition

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8 Ibid., p. 120.
9 Ibid., pp. 122-123.
10 Ibid., pp. 105, 117. "Apparently the temple organization was on a steady decline after the Sumerian period, and the palace organization, grown rich and complex in a territorial state, overshadowed it increasingly as time progressed."

"While the typical city enjoyed a modicum of prosperity slightly above the subsistence level, real prosperity came to a Mesopotamian city only when it had in its midst the palace of a victorious king. . . . Only a few of the Babylonian cities had more than one or two short periods—and many none at all—of such intense flowering. From this affluence they relapsed into a drab and wretched existence, the people living among ruins, the sanctuaries dilapidated, and the city walls crumbling."


12 Robert M. Adams, "The Origin of Cities," Scientific American (September 1960). "In particular, the development of municipal politics, of a self-conscious corporate body with at least partially autonomous, secular institutions for its own administration, was not consummated until classical times."

14 Oliver C. Cox commented on Comhaire and Cahnman's contribution in this field. "Two types of society are here recognized: the one in which cities as independent social systems are either absent or ineffective, and the other in which cities serve as models for the larger society." Oliver C. Cox, "The Preindustrial City Reconsidered," The Sociological Quarterly (Spring 1964), p. 135.

15 Talcott Parsons offered the best approximation of the concept Stand, one of the untranslatable German terms, when he interpreted it as "a social
to the older *Staende*: independent clergy and feudal aristocracy).

The characteristics of the Oriental type are totally contradictory to the characteristics of the Occidental type of urban behavior and this totality of contrast warrants Weber's typological dichotomy which places both types at the opposing ends of a conceptual scale. Here are some, not all, of the major areas of contrast between the Oriental and Occidental types of urban behavior.

1. The Oriental city is juridically, constitutionally and materially (in the sense of legal contents) indistinguishable from the village. The residence of the ruler or of any administrative body being the focal point for the whole country or region is the most important feature in the structure and functioning of the Oriental city. As Wittfogel pointed out, the Oriental cities “were administrative and military footholds of the government; and the artisans and the merchants had no opportunity to become serious political rivals.” Or as Grunebaum put it concerning the Islamic medieval cities, “they were legally on the same footing with the surrounding territories (and not marked out by any special privilege), even though in actual fact they would often constitute the most important sections of a given state.”

2. Heteronomy and heterocephaly do not appear in the Oriental city, since the city is legally and constitutionally indistinguishable from the rest of the country. This characteristic fully applies to the Islamic city and here it is necessary to report on some recent research. Claude Cahen firmly emphasized that none of the elements in the Islamic city would constitute the western bourgeois “commune,” not even the Ancient city. There is no “auto-administration” even in a limited sense. The great majority of Islamic cities were integrated in the Islamic state with the garrisons located in the city, all in all completely dependent on the will of the provincial governor who sends his agents, including the fiscal, to apply the common Islamic law to all the people. Taxes were naturally state taxes and the Islamic fiscal organization, whole, and display nothing specifically urban in their fundamental structures and functions. Cahen adds that the Islamic law does not distinguish between the urban and nonurban populations and does not recognize differentiation between social classes.

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similarly to the Byzantine and the Sassanide, was rooted in a common fiscal responsibility of all the inhabitants for each locality or fiscal unit. G. E. Grunebaum also underlines that the Islamic city is not an autonomous association of citizens, but merely a functionally unified administrative entity. "There were no qualifications to be met to obtain admission to citizenship in the Muslim town for the simple reason that there was no body of town dwellers in whom political or civic authority was seen to reside." The residents did not develop their own administrative machinery, but it was the personal will of the ruler or of the governor, appointed by the ruler, that created the machinery for them. Thus the fundamental differentiation between the Occidental and the Oriental (including the Ancient) types of city is the sodalian or corporate autonomy and autocephaly of the community of the burgher-citizens in the West and the absence of the same—to use Weber's phrase—"everywhere outside the West." The city in the medieval West displayed a varying degree of autonomy and autocephaly, of course, but there was an unmistakable generalized tendency of growth in the direction of increased strengthening of the city's own political power, independence from the outside and equality within the city limits. The Western burgherdom's usurpation of ruler's rights and the breakthrough of the monolithic power of the ruler by a great number of Western cities were considered by Weber to be truly great revolutionary innovations in contrast to cities in all other cultures.

3. Merchants and artisans who happened to live in the Oriental city, and in the Orient most of them live in villages, live there to serve the ruler or the administrative body. The merchant in the Oriental city is usually an agent of the ruler, otherwise he pays a heavy price for his trade privileges, and as such he is basically different from the merchant who acts in his own name and in his own right. In general, all merchants and artisans in the Oriental city depend substantially in all their activities on the good graces, tolerance and purchased license from the political power. They are actually subjects, indiscernible from any other in the realm, without opportunities to develop any traces of corporate autonomy for their trade organizations, if such would appear. The burghers in the West being predominantly merchants and artisans were never serving men of a monistic ruler. "In sharp contrast to the

20 Claude Cahen, *Mouvements populaires et auto­ nomisme urbain dans l'Asie musulmane du Moyen Âge* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 81, 80, and 79. Cahen discusses some traces of factual absence of centralized control due to general political breakdown: 1. *Cadi*, normally appointed by the ruler, tends to become an hereditary office. 2. *Sutra* (police) only in small and isolated towns, never in large and capital cities, in times of crisis becomes more dependent on the local population through the fact that recruitment is locally limited. 3. Two popular movements, *fityân* and *ayyâyân*, can hardly have anything in common. One is the group of religious mystics, the other is the lowest stratum including beggars, escapees from prison, etc. Their activities do not cover the whole city, since they constitute only a segment of the urban population. Cahen adds that there is no trace of such movements in times of domestic tranquility, but only during power collapse or transition. Plundering, selling protection to the merchants or asking for jobs in police or army is their only activity. They do not appear in all Islamic cities, but are very marginal in terms of space and time. All three isolated phenomena are most frequently motivated by the presence of conquerors, dynasties or governors, who are newly imposed ethnic or geographic strangers. Obviously then the national or dynastic struggle is the chief motivating source of any potential autonomism or factual rebellion, and most certainly not the bourgeois-like need to institutionalize his exemptions and liberties. Cahen speaks of the uncertain and diffuse character of their leadership's function, which is visible in their title applicable to any group (tribal, ethnic, religious or vocational), the appointment by the ruler and the sphere of influence not limited to a single city but to the whole province. [Trans. by V. M.]

21 Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 142.

22 Ibid., pp. 149 and 151.


24 Even for the Mesopotamian ancient cities Oppenheim admits: "It is certainly no accident that the *rab tamkari*, 'chief trader,' was a high official at the court of the Babylonian kings." Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 94. Concerning the Islamic urban vocational or professional organizations both Cahen and Grunebaum agree that these follow the Byzantine tradition: they are established and regimented by the state, without autonomy. Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29 and Grunebaum, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
Asiatic situation, the citizens, as urban dwellers, owed no allegiance to any clan, caste or village association." In the Western medieval city the burgherdom achieved an egalitarian political community of their own bound in religious brotherhood. Within the Western city the universal two-fold political-socio-economic stratification which one finds in all other cultures disappeared completely.

4. In the Oriental city the principle of residence never superseded the significance of the kinship ties as a basis for social organization. Consequently, the Oriental city represented a more or less loose collection of kinship and tribal groups, who monopolized particular skills and trades for themselves excluding all out-group members. Under these conditions of tribal ethnocentrism and magic which “rationalized” clan and tribal exclusiveness there was no opportunity whatsoever to develop any traces of a common solidarity binding all urban dwellers. The “ideas and institutions connected with magic,” prevented the growth of the Western type of city in the Orient. Only in the Western medieval city the magic-animistic tribal and caste exclusiveness and connections disappeared from the political, economic, religious, educational patterns of behavior and the corresponding social structures. Weber credits the prophecy among the Jews and the event of Christianity with this important contribution.

Paul’s “historically significant” letter was quoted by Weber as having consequences directly correlated to the destruction of sacral exclusivity of any tribe or nation concerning the new religion. As Weber commented, Christianity has deprived kinship and tribal ties, usually based on magic, from all ritual meaning and significance. The Christian community was, according to its most inner being, a religious brotherhood of individual believers, not a ritual kinship unit, whether familial, tribal or even national. The quality of tribal and family membership based on mythical origin from the same divine progenitor or the membership conferred through magical ceremonies of adoption totally and absolutely disappeared from the Western city. The religious brotherhood of the burghers, to which an individual is admitted as an individual, not as a member of a tribe or caste, after making a personal civic oath of loyalty to his new brotherhood, is the foundation of the burghers’ sodalian or corporate autonomy and autocephaly. At the same time this religious brotherhood is the source of his individual rights. It is extremely significant that the privileged position of the burghers is a right of an individual burgher in relation to other burghers as well as to any outside third person.

5. In the Orient and “everywhere outside the West,” the army of the ruler is an older institution than the city. The ruler’s monopoly of military power was to Weber “the basis of the distinction between the military organization of Asia and that of the West.” Military power of the Western city, and with it a considerable degree of political power since there was an enormous number of interdependent cities of various sizes with similar political and defense needs, was in the hands of a religiously inspired brotherhood of burghers, sodality, Eidgenossen-
schaft, coniuratio, or universitas civium. It was a “brotherhood in arms for mutual aid and protection, involving the usurpation of political power.”34 Every citizen, as a member of this sodality, was obligated not only to serve personally, but also to equip himself with military hardware from his own pocket. His serious commitment was dramatized by the religious oath when initiated into the sodality. The exceptional quality of military potential of the city made it possible for the citizens to strive more or less successfully for an ever increasing degree of their own sodalian or corporate autonomy and autocephaly. No ruler in the West was able to destroy the city's military power or the city itself for exemplary purposes, as the Russian and Oriental rulers did rather frequently, simply because in the West there were too many cities and they were interdependent and solidary.

6. A reference to the monistic power of the Oriental ruler seems to be necessary in this context. It is not only the monopoly of the military, but in many instances the monopoly of the economic, religious and political power, concentrated in the hands of one omnipotent and god-like ruler which is the basic configuration in the Orient. In contrast to it, the Western social structure offers an entirely different configuration: quantitative diffusion of power among kings, feudal lords, vassals, subvassals (not functional-qualitative distribution in Montesquieu's sense,35 which is, of course, a later development); the differentiation of religious from political power;36 and particularly in the Western city “the forms of religious brotherhood and self-equipment for war made possible the origin and existence of the [Western] city.”37

7. The Oriental city was unable to create or foster any conditions necessary for the growth of the bourgeoisie. The absence of the bourgeoisie was one of the most conspicuous charac-

teristics in the Oriental cultures38 and in turn was responsible for a number of non-pluralistic and non-democratic patterns of behavior of the future. The bourgeoisie remained an exclusively Western phenomenon. In the West the bourgeoisie was a Stand, a privileged group, constantly bent toward achieving an ever increasing number of exemptions from the ruler's power exclusively for themselves, for their city and Stand. Freedom as the burghers understood it was a monopoly jealously guarded from any out-group. In spite of their refusal to share their freedom with non-city groups, the burghers were instrumental in diffusing the ideology of liberty and democratic pluralism.

The interdependence of groups and structures responsible for the development of the Western city was supported by additional social structures emerging only in the West. Three of these seem to justify special attention in this context: the free universities, the mendicant and reform-minded religious orders and the sodalities of university trained legal experts.

A. The phenomenal growth of the free universities from the twelfth century on in Italy, England, France, Spain, Portugal and Germany offered a permanent opportunity for relatively unrestrained discussion and criticism of existing institutions. Both faculty and students were of extremely colorful versatility in the sense that they came from many Western-European countries (using Latin as the language of communication). Since they also belonged to various religious orders, secular clergy and laity, this multiplicity of national origins and status orientations facilitated the appreciation of the unavoidable conflict of opinions leading toward a rationality of consensus.

The early trend within the Church to separate church law from secular law was strengthened by the existence of the early medieval universi-

34 Ibid., p. 319.
36 Ibid., p. 803. Actually Weber speaks here of separation of church and state since the Investiture struggle. "Separation" is perhaps too strong an expression to use for the church-state relationship of the eleventh century and after.
38 There seems to be support for this even from students of the Islamic city, who do not use the term bourgeoisie in a precise Weberian sense, but loosely to label any significant merchants' class. S. D. Goitein credits the merchants with the development of the Islamic religious law, however, they "never became an organised body and, as a class, never obtained political power. . . " S. D. Goitein, "The Rise of the Near-Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times," Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, 3 (1957), p. 584.
ties. Their structure necessitated the need for theology to be taught as a separate entity distinct from Canon law instruction; it was already accepted that secular law should be distinguished from Canon law as well as theology. In Weber's opinion this separation was instrumental in bringing about greater institutional rationality and an ever increasing rationalization in all the academic fields and "prevented the growth of such theocratic hybrid structures as developed elsewhere." In contrast to the West, "in almost all the Asiatic civilizations . . . the religious prescriptions were never differentiated from secular rules and . . . the characteristically theocratic combination of religious and ritualistic prescriptions with legal rules remained unchanged." Concerning the Orient, Weber also speaks of "an inextricable conglomeration of ethical and legal duties, moral exhortations and legal commandments without formalized explicitness . . . ."40

B. The mendicant and reform-minded religious orders were conceived and organized in direct conflict with the regular (secular) clergy. The preachers and professors of these religious orders repeatedly generated a moral crusade in which they bluntly accused the secular clergy of corruption, bribery, enjoyment of excessive luxury, keeping of wives and in general of betraying the ideals of the early Church. The charismatic leaders of the reform-demanding religious orders found frequently an enthusiastic moral and financial support for their reforms in the communities of burghers. The burghers were most generous in helping them to build the monasteries within the city walls or adjacent to the walls and they increasingly turned to the monks in their spiritual and religious needs rather than to the secular clergy, who in the burghers' opinion were involved in "corruption" and politics contrary to the burghers' interests. Once successful in achieving their autonomy and autocephaly, the burghers were unwilling to continue tolerating the clergy's freedom from taxation, immunity from the city's courts and from the city's military duties as originally provided in the Canon law. In addition, the significant labor force on the clergy's land possessions outside the city walls produced surplus merchandises which competed with the city's products. Also the burghers never appreciated the clergy's insistence that interest on loans is always sinful and ought to be prohibited. It is well known that the alliance of the burghers and the religious orders helped the Papacy against the ruler, the politically involved hierarchy and the bishops who were feudal lords at the same time. However sometimes such an alliance with the ruler's support in the form of city charters or extension of the bourgeoisie's legal privileges was directed against the feudal lords, bishops and church hierarchy when endangering the city's rights. The ruler-bourgeoisie alliances were "one of the major factors which led towards formal legal rationalization."41

The important conclusion here is the flexibility of relationships and the opportunity for every social group or structure of the medieval polity to find a more or less temporary partner for the achievement of common goals, and the obvious probability that any combination could be dissolved in the future and a new more promising alliance with other groups created. Some bargaining in the direction of creating a consensus out of conflicting interests was always necessary before a new alliance could be established.

C. The new professional sodality of university trained jurists or legal experts was independent from existing Staende, but interdependent with the community of burghers, the religious orders and the universities. As Max Weber put it very forcefully, the veritable revolutionization of political structures steadily pushing toward the development of the Western legal-rational state was carried everywhere in the West by these formally trained legal professionals. They have modified the Roman legacy by adopting in the secular and Canon law the theories and concepts of the natural law. The natural law theories were originally conceived in juristic, Stoic and early Christian thought and later secularized. The specific product of Western culture, the full rationalization of procedural law, or in Weber's terms "logically

40 Ibid., p. 226.
41 Ibid., p. 267.
formed rationality” in law, was made possible through the reception of Roman jurisprudence, first by the Italian legal professionals (notaries), and later in the North by the learned judges. This logical formalism of legal procedure cannot be found in the legal system of any other culture of the time. In Weber’s words, “there is no analogy to this on the whole earth.” The rudiments of rational juristic thought in certain periods of Hindu and Islamic legal scholarship were smothered by the theological forms of thought. The Western phenomenon of the Canon law, absent everywhere else, was to Weber one of the powerful influences in the development of the Western rationalization of procedural law. In the hands of university trained legal professionals the Roman law was and remained a successful competitor to the Canon law. The Canon law is a sacred law and there is a normative prediction that like any other sacred law, the Canon law would sooner or later claim the absolute right to legislate on all the aspects of human behavior. The legal experts cherished the cultural value of political dualism as inherited from the time of the underground existence of the Church in the Roman catacombs. This was a period of almost absolute isolation and absence of any cooperative contact in the church-state relationship. To conserve the political as well as legal dualism there was a need for some institutional support and the Western burgherdom was sufficiently motivated to defend the continuity of legal and political dualism. “And where the Canon law tried to extend its dominion it met with the vigorous and successful opposition of the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, including that of the Italian cities, with which the Papacy had to ally itself.” Similarly the burghers everywhere in the West:

Max Weber summarized the final product of the Western institutional configuration:

In conclusion, a final word of caution is necessary: The sociologist must insist on recognition and acceptance of the functional configuration of the Western city, Western feudalism and Western church, or in terms of social organization the functional interdependence of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, feudal aristocracy and politically-economically independent clergy. The free universities, mendicant orders and sodalities of legal experts basically contributed toward the stability of the whole societal system by their participation in this institutional configuration. This was the specific Western European social organization in which all three Stände with all the characteristics of each individual Stand, particularly with their own ideology and solidarity, functionally interacted. Otto Brunner warned that the phenomenon of the Western city cannot be studied as an isolated phenomenon. If the total structure is neglected and only isolated groups or structural segments drawn out and then compared to the non-Western groups, one is necessarily led to external and superficial analogies and from there to the source of the most serious errors.

44 Ibid., p. 253.
46 Ibid., p. 231.
47 Brunner, op. cit., p. 115.