EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM
AND THE INTERNALIST CHALLENGE

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ABSTRACT
The paper highlights how a popular version of epistemological disjunctivism (Pritchard 2012, 2016) labors under a kind of ‘internalist challenge’—a challenge that seems to have gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This is the challenge to vindicate the supposed ‘internalist insight’ that disjunctivists claim their view does well to protect (Littlejohn forthcoming 2015). The paper argues that if we advance disjunctivism within a context that recognizes a distinction between merely functional and judgmental belief (Sosa 2015), we get a view that easily overcomes the internalist challenge.

INTRODUCTION
According to a well-known version of epistemological disjunctivism, perceptual knowledge can enjoy rational support that is not only factive, but reflectively accessible as well (e.g. Pritchard 2012, 2016; McDowell 1983, 1995, 2011; Millar 2010, 2016). Duncan Pritchard is notable for advancing this sort of view in service of an account of the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge. On his view perception provides us with knowledge by virtue of providing factive and reflectively accessible rational support for perceptual beliefs.

Pritchard claims that his view has the advantage of accommodating both internalist and externalist insights with regard to perceptual knowledge. Insofar as one’s epistemic support is factive it entails that what one believes is true. And so, we capture the externalist’s insight that there should be a robust connection between one’s epistemic support and the fact known. But insofar as that epistemic support is also reflectively accessible it entails that without any special effort one can be made aware that one has it. And so, it seems we capture the internalist’s insight that it’s by providing us with reasons that perception provides us with knowledge of the world.

Some are skeptical that disjunctivism actually secures the internalist’s insight (Goldberg forthcoming; Boult 2017; Madison 2014). But others are skeptical that there’s even an internalist insight here to begin with. Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming 2015), for example, challenges the disjunctivist to explain why we should think that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons at all, let alone factive reasons, for believing what we know. It’s important that disjunctivists have something substantive to say in this connection. Otherwise it isn’t clear why it’s a virtue of disjunctivism that it aligns itself with an internalist approach. I think Littlejohn is right that disjunctivists...
should feel challenged to defend themselves on this score.

In this paper I offer a new vision for epistemological disjunctivism with precisely that challenge in mind. On the approach I favor, perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons because the kind of knowledge at issue is a species of judgmental belief (Sosa 2015). I’ll explain that it’s on account of its providing us with judgmental perceptual knowledge that perception provides us with reasons—indeed even factive reasons—that are the subject’s reasons for believing what they do.

In the first section of the paper I motivate what I’ll call the ‘internalist challenge’ for disjunctivism. This challenges the disjunctivist to vindicate the supposed internalist insight that she boasts to be able to protect—viz., the notion that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what they do. I’ll show that nothing disjunctivists have said so far gives us any good reason to suspect that this is true. In the second section I provide the framework for a version of disjunctivism that overcomes the internalist challenge. Here I rely largely on Ernest Sosa (2015) to differentiate what he calls ‘judgmental belief’ from ‘merely functional belief,’ and to describe more generally what I’ll call the ‘bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge.’ In the third section I advance a form of disjunctivism in the context of that conception, showing how it overcomes the internalist challenge. I then summarize and conclude.

1. The Internalist Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism

On Pritchard’s view, perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with factive reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what it is they know. More specifically, when you know that $p$ on the basis of perception that’s because you believe that $p$ for the reason that you see that $p$, so that the fact that you see that $p$ is your reason for believing what you do. That’s just to say that seeing that $p$ functions here as a motivating reason. What are those?

Motivating reasons capture the light in which you took something you did to be appropriate, or fitting, in your circumstances, given your aims (McDowell 1978). If your reason (i.e. motivating reason) for going to the restaurant was that they have great wine, then it’s in light of the fact that they have this wine that you took going there to be appropriate or fitting, as opposed to going somewhere else or nowhere at all. Similarly, if your reason for believing that $p$ is that you see that $p$, then it’s in light of the fact that you see that $p$ that you took believing $p$ to be appropriate, as opposed to disbelieving or suspending judgment on the matter. By leveraging motivating reasons in this way Pritchard’s disjunctivism can be seen to capture what many regard as a key internalist insight: unlike on typical externalist views, here perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what it is they know.

Pritchard (2012, 2016) has spent most of his energy defending the view against arguments for thinking it false (essentially, arguments for thinking that one couldn’t have factive motivating reasons for perceptual beliefs). But that assumes that it’s a view worth defending in the first place. In particular it assumes that there are reasons for thinking it true that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons on the basis of which we believe what we do about the world. Yet it’s not at all clear what those reasons are. This constitutes what I’ll call the ‘internalist challenge’ for epistemological disjunctivism: the challenge to say something to vindicate the supposed internalist insight that they claim their view does well to protect.

Why then think that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with
motivating reasons? In motivating their view, it is typical for disjunctivists to claim that it simply reflects a face-value assessment of our ordinary justificatory practices; and that on that account disjunctivism represents the common sense or default view for thinking about perceptual knowledge. Consider that in response to a challenge to your claim to know something on the basis of perception, you wouldn’t ordinarily cite considerations that may be true even if the belief you were defending where false. For example, if I asked you why you thought there was a tomato on the kitchen countertop, it would be odd for you to respond by citing the fact that this is anyway how things seem to you to be at the moment. Rather you would ordinarily cite something more robust—“I can see that there’s a tomato on the countertop”—something that at least entails the presence of a tomato. In Pritchard’s own words:

(. . .) in response to a challenge to a claim to (perceptually) know I might well respond by citing a factive perceptual reason in defense of my claim, which suggests that we do, ordinarily at least, allow factive reasons to offer sufficient rational support for our perceptual knowledge. (2012, p. 17)

But these practices hardly vindicate the supposed internalist insight at issue. Assuming that we’ve characterized these justificatory practices fairly, it’s not at all clear that they give us good reason to think that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons for perceptual belief.

First, these practices do not suggest that perceptual beliefs are believed for reasons so much as that if they are believed for reasons, then these can be factive reasons. After all, even if one customarily appeals to some reason in defense of claim to know something, that need not indicate that one knows that thing in virtue of believing it for the reason one cites. For example, one might customarily appeal to something like the design argument in defense of a claim to know that there is a God. But that needn’t indicate that one believes that there is a God on the rational basis of the reasons contained in that argument. More realistically, they believe that God exists on the basis of a series of religious experiences.

But then second, even if these justificatory practices were indicative of your believing something on the basis of a reason, it is not clear that the belief in question is the perceptual belief that \( p \), as opposed to the belief that you know that \( p \). Notice that even in the excerpt quoted above it is in response to a perceived challenge to perceptually know that \( p \) that we commonly cite that we see that \( p \) to be the case. If this practice is supposed to be indicative of your believing something on the basis of a reason, then is it not rather your belief that you know that \( p \) that you believe on the basis of a reason, rather than your belief that \( p \), contrary to the disjunctivist’s proposal?

These are just some reasons to be skeptical that our ordinary justificatory practices vindicate the target internalist insight: viz., that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for holding the relevant belief.

Perhaps instead we can vindicate the internalist insight in connection with epistemic responsibility. Perception provides us with knowledge for which we can be held responsible. And that is why it provides us with knowledge by providing motivating reasons for belief. But that quick little argument misfires once we distinguish between weak and robust forms of responsibility. The argument assumes that we could be epistemically responsible for our perceptual knowledge only if we believe the relevant perceptual beliefs on the basis of good reasons. But there are weaker interpretations of epistemic responsibility that do not require one to believe something motivated by reasons for thinking it true.

Imagine that you are so angry that you punch a hole through the wall. There need
not be anything that was your reason for doing this—for example you were not trying to stage some kind of a diversion. You were just angry. But you are no less responsible for what you did—not least because you should have paid attention to the reasons not to do this (i.e. it is an expensive fix, and now the children are crying). It seems you can be held responsible for an action just so long as it can be sensitive or responsive to reasons, even if there was nothing that was your reason for doing it. But then why can’t we be held responsible for our perceptual beliefs in the same fashion? We can be responsible for these sort of believing them on the basis of reasons, so long as we are appropriately sensitive to any reasons for giving them up or withholding belief (i.e. what are called ‘defeaters’). This suggests that there need not be anything that is your reason for believing something in order to be held responsible for believing it, whatever it is, so long as you are the sort of person who is appropriately responsive to reasons (Littlejohn 2015; Greco 2010, chapter 2; Sosa 2011, chapter 2).

Let us assume then that perception provides us with knowledge for which we can be held responsible. Why think that the kind of responsibility at issue is of the robust kind that requires that you believe what you do on the basis of reasons, rather than the weaker kind that requires that you believe in a way that is merely responsive to reasons? We do not yet have a straightforward vindication of the internalist’s supposed ‘insight’ even if it is true that perception provides us with knowledge for which we can be held responsible.7

Objection: But does not perception provide us with knowledge for which we can be held responsible for in a particular way? That is to say does it not provide us with knowledge that we can be answerable for. But then it is not clear how one is answerable for their perceptual knowledge if they are only weakly responsible for it, as that has been glossed above. Here is the argument modified to reflect answerability: Perception provides us with knowledge for which we can be made answerable, and that is why it provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for adopting the relevant belief.

Here is the problem. In order to be answerable for something you know it seems entirely sufficient that you be able to cite how you know what you do. But explanatory reasons are not all motivating reasons.8 That means we need some further argument to the effect that the reason you cite explaining how you know is also your reason for adopting the relevant belief. It is not at all clear why that should be the case. For example, you seem perfectly answerable for your knowledge that some proof is correct, just so long as you can cite how you know this in response to a challenge. ‘I worked it out on paper’—you might say. Yet it is hardly obvious why this should also be your reason for believing the answer to the proof (Are not your reasons represented in the various steps of the proof?).

Thus, it seems that epistemological disjunctivism currently labors under what I am calling the ‘internalist challenge.’ Disjunctivists defend the claim that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with factive reasons that are our reasons for believing what we do, and thereby claim to protect a key internalist insight. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that there is even an internalist insight here to protect. Why think in the first place that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons—let alone factive motivating reasons?9

2. JUDGMENTAL BELIEF AND THE BIFURCATED CONCEPTION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

On the view I mean to advance, perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons because perception provides us with specifically judgmental perceptual knowledge—knowledge that is a
species of judgmental belief. In this section I contrast ‘judgmental’ with ‘merely functional’ belief, as these are found in Ernest Sosa’s *Judgment and Agency*, to generate what I will call the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. Then in the section that follows I describe a new vision for disjunctivism, which I advance within the context of the framework developed here. I show how this new view overcomes the significance problem.

In his book *Judgment and Agency* (2015) Sosa writes that “we can distinguish between two sorts of ‘belief,’ one implicit and merely functional, the other not merely functional, but intentional, perhaps even consciously intentional” (p. 80). He writes later that this distinction has “animal, action-guiding beliefs on one side, and reflective judgments on the other” (p. 209). For our purposes we are especially interested in what Sosa calls “reflective judgmental belief.” He writes that this kind of belief (. . .)

(. . .) is a disposition to judge affirmatively in answer to a question, in the endeavor to answer correctly (. . .), reliably enough or even aptly. And this “judgment” that one is disposed to render is a distinctive conscious act or consciously sustained state” (p. 209).

Elsewhere Sosa adds that these judgmental beliefs are sustained through a “freely adopted evidential policy” on the part of the subject whose judgmental belief it is, a policy sustained through the subject’s will (p. 210). What that suggests is that it is part of what judgmental beliefs are that they depend upon evidence or epistemic reasons for thinking a proposition true. Since I am most interested in judgmental belief in connection with perception, it will be helpful to consider a concrete case.

So, imagine you perceive a tomato on the countertop in a ‘good case,’ where conditions are normal. What does it mean to believe that there is a tomato before you, where this is a species of what Sosa calls ‘judgmental’ belief? I take it that on Sosa’s account what that means is that, in this moment, on account of good reasons you take yourself to have for thinking the proposition true, you sustain a certain perceptual evidential policy. The policy requires that were you to explicitly consider the proposition in question with an aim toward affirming it only if you would thereby affirm knowledgably, you would affirm it to yourself with that end in mind. So by sustaining this judgmental belief under these circumstances you reveal that you take your perceptual reasons to be good enough to warrant your affirming that ‘there is a tomato before me’ for the purpose of affirming this knowledgably. It may be helpful to contrast yourself with the Pyrrhonian sceptic, for example, who we can imagine sustains a very different perceptual evidential policy under these circumstances. Since she thinks that her perceptual evidence or reasons are never good enough for this kind of free judgmental affirmation, she has adopted a policy that requires her to suspend on all such matters whenever she explicitly considers them with the relevant aim in mind.

Now in addition to your intentionally representing that there is a tomato before you, we should not lose sight of the fact that you also merely functionally represent the same proposition. According to Sosa, these latter functional beliefs implicate no such ability as we have underscored above—abilities to freely and intentionally affirm the truth of a proposition. Rather in occasionally referring to them as ‘animal beliefs’ Sosa suggests that they are the kind of representational attitudes we have in common with animals and small children. These, Sosa says, are “passive states that we cannot help entering” (p. 54). They are “fully wired-in forms of representing” (p. 94) that are “acquired automatically” by way of “normal automatic processing” (p. 53). It is these doxastic states that are principally at issue in action explanation. They are what
Daniel Dennett conceives of as “deep, behaviour disposing states” that “one’s behaviour is consonant with automatically” (pp. 307, 308). They are the sorts of beliefs that even the Pyrrhonian relies on, for example, to guide his behavior when he reaches for the tomato in order to make a sandwich.

So then in Sosa’s exposition we find contrasted two kinds of doxastic state. Merely functional beliefs we find ourselves saddled with as a result of the execution of sub-personal cognitive processes. These can manifest themselves in intentional action, independently of any more sophisticated judgmental belief on the part of the subject. The latter sort of beliefs, by contrast, themselves have the look of an intentional action. These are states of the subject sustained through an act of the will: through the choosing of a policy that requires a subject to affirm or vouch for the truth of a proposition, upon explicit consideration, with the purpose of thereby affirming knowledgably, in light of what the subject takes to be good reasons for doing so. What all this means is that when one sees a tomato one does not merely functionally represent that there is a tomato so that they can reach out and grab it, but one also intentionally represents that there is a tomato so that they can vouch for its being true.

Now doubtless one might have objections with respect to how these different kinds of belief relate to one another within a given individual. To entertain too many of them would require a paper on its own. My main purpose here is show that by advancing their proposal within the context of the framework that Sosa provides, the disjunctivist has an easy way around what I’ve called the ‘internalist challenge,’ since they have an easy vindication of the internalist insight. I will consider one objection, however, if only to motivate Sosa’s framework a bit further.

Perhaps it is not unusual to suggest that human beings believe things in ways that are different from how infants and other non-human animals believe things. Perhaps human beings believe things in ways that are distinctively reflective, even intentional, as Sosa suggests. But why think that we engage in both judgmental and merely functional belief? Here are at least two independent considerations for thinking so.

First, Michael Frede (1998) suggests that we need some such distinction between what we are calling ‘judgmental’ and ‘merely functional’ belief in order to make proper sense of the Pyrrhonian sceptic. According to Frede these skeptics really believed that they ought to suspend judgment about everything. But obviously they could not have ‘believed’ this in whatever way they were at the same time calling for a general suspension of judgment—not if we are to interpret the Pyrrhonian charitably. In order to make sense of this Frede distinguishes ‘having a view’ on a matter from ‘taking a position’ on it. Frede’s idea is that while the Pyrrhonian skeptic believed he should suspend judgment on every matter, this was merely his view, or his ‘impression’ of things, and not his considered position. After all, no one is supposed to have positions on anything, according to the Pyrrhonian. Frede also points out that in similar fashion we can explain how the Pyrrhonians were able to go about their lives safely, despite not having any beliefs. For what they never had were settled ‘positions’ on things. But while it was never their official ‘position,’ say, that a wagon coming down the street was about to run them over, this could easily have been part of their more instinctive ‘view’ of the world.

Second, in his fascinating Essay in Aid to a Grammar of Assent (1870) John Henry Newman also provides some reason for thinking that human beings adopt two kinds of doxastic attitude. Himself deeply religious, Newman was bothered by how many ‘religious persons’ seemed to sincerely avow belief in religious propositions that had little if any effect on shaping their behavior. These folks
seemed to sincerely ‘believe’ statements of religious faith in one sense, and yet clearly not in another. They believed ‘with the head,’ although not ‘with the heart,’ as you may have heard it said. Partly to make sense of this Newman distinguished between notional assent and real assent—between belief in ideas and belief in realities—which, if you read the Grammar, bear striking similarities to how Sosa distinguishes judgmental from functional beliefs, and how Frede distinguishes ‘positions’ from ‘views.’

Very well. With our bifurcated conception of human belief now on the table, it’s easy to see how this enables at least two species of perceptual knowledge. There is perceptual knowledge that’s a species of merely functional belief. And there’s perceptual knowledge that’s a species of judgmental belief. Let’s call perceptual knowledge of the former kind functional perceptual knowledge, and perceptual knowledge of the latter kind judgmental perceptual knowledge. Call the package the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge.

3. A New Vision for Disjunctivism: Or Disjunctivism About Perceptual Judgmental Knowledge

According to epistemological disjunctivism, perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons—reasons that are our reasons—for adopting the perceptual beliefs at issue. On that score disjunctivists claim that they protect an important ‘internalist insight’ to the effect that knowledge consists in your believing something on the basis of good reasons for thinking the relevant belief true. The challenge for the disjunctivist is to explain why we should think that perceptual knowledge is like that. Why think that it consists in your believing something for reasons at all—let alone factive reasons? That is the ‘internalist challenge’ for disjunctivism we motivated in the first section.

I think that part of the reason why the internalist challenge has a grip on disjunctivism is that, as it is currently conceive by its main proponents, the view is underspecified in a way that we are now in position to appreciate. Namely it is underspecified as to whether it has merely functional perceptual knowledge or rather judgmental perceptual knowledge in view. If disjunctivists leave us free to conceive of their target as a species of merely functional belief, then it is no wonder we find it mysterious why perception should provide us with knowledge by proving us with motivating reasons. After all, merely functional perceptual knowledge is something we think even animals and small children can enjoy. And we do not typically think that in order to enjoy such knowledge these subjects need to hold their perceptual beliefs in light of what they take to be good reasons for thinking them true. Or at least in nothing like the way demanded by the kind of robust responsibility requirement on knowledge that disjunctivists seem interested to accommodate.

But if by contrast we advance disjunctivism in connection with judgmental perceptual knowledge, then that is a potential game-changer. For if perception provides us not only with merely functional perceptual knowledge but also judgmental perceptual knowledge, too, then it is obvious why perception should provide us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reason for accepting the relevant proposition. After all, as we have just seen, to judgmentally believe something just is to be disposed toward an intentional performance of a sort that is executed in the light of reasons—in this case, reasons for thinking that by affirming the relevant empirical proposition with the aim of thereby affirming knowledgably, one would succeed. Beliefs of this kind are strictly a disposition to do something for a reason, sustained by a very basic perceptual evidential policy that, for example, differentiates one from the Pyrrhonian
skeptic. It can all be put simply like this: we should think that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons because the kind of knowledge it provides us with is of a kind for which it is essential that one has motivating reasons for accepting the proposition one does.

This, I submit, is the bit of background on which the disjunctivist should rely for answering the ‘internalist challenge.’ There is an internalist insight that disjunctivists are right to protect since in theorizing about the epistemology of perception it is right to be sensitive to the fact that perception provides us not only with merely functional but also judgmental perceptual knowledge.

Now it remains to be seen how we fill out the rest of the picture. Epistemological disjunctivism claims that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with motivating reasons. And on the current proposal it is because it provides us with a judgmental perceptual knowledge that it provides us with motivating reasons. But disjunctivists also claim that these reasons are meant to be factive reasons—in particular, reasons in the form of your seeing that \( p \) to be the case. How do we accommodate these reasons for judgmental belief in the current proposal?

Well so long as we are already advancing a form of disjunctivism within the context of the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge, I think the materials lay close to hand. When you judgmentally believe that \( p \) in light of the fact that you see that \( p \) to be the case, I want to say that your seeing that \( p \) is none other than your perceptually knowing that \( p \) on the ‘animal’ or merely functional level. In other words, I want to say that perception provides us with judgmental knowledge by providing us with merely functional knowledge, which constitutes one’s rational basis for the judgmental perceptual knowledge in question.

So for example: in paradigmatic cases, when you see a tomato and recognize it for what it is, you come to merely functionally know that there is a tomato before you, where as far as I can tell this can be given a purely ‘externalist’ analysis (i.e. it needn’t have anything to do with your believing anything on the basis of a reason). But not only do you recognize the tomato as a tomato, you also recognize it as something you see and thereby know to be a tomato in a merely functional way (probably on the basis of the visual phenomenology involved). Then, so long as you’re not a Pyrrhonian, in light of this recognition you will sustain a perceptual evidential policy, requiring you to affirm that there is a tomato before you, were you to explicitly consider the matter with an aim toward thereby affirm knowledgably.

That seems to me to be an entirely natural (if slightly over-technical) characterization of what we ordinarily think is going on when we know that there is a tomato before us while staring right at one. We know that it is a tomato. And we recognize that we know this. And that enables a kind of cognitive purchase on the fact that there is a tomato that is distinctively human—that goes to comprise what we can conceive of as ‘judgmental perceptual knowledge.’

**Conclusion**

In this paper I set out to cast a new vision for epistemological disjunctivism in light of what I perceived to be a challenge for the view that has gone largely unacknowledged by disjunctivists. This was the ‘internalist challenge’: the challenge to vindicate the supposed internalist insight the disjunctivist assures us is worth protecting. I claimed that if the disjunctivist can help herself to the framework Sosa has independently motivated, she has all she needs for overcoming the ‘internalist challenge.’ Perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons that are the subject’s reasons for believing what they do insofar as perception provides us with knowledge that’s a species of judgmental
beliefs. Moreover, these reasons can be as good as factive—in the form of one’s seeing that \( p \) to be the case—on account of the fact that perception also provides us with merely functional perceptual knowledge, which is importantly distinct from judgmental perceptual knowledge, for reasons I tried to make clear.

For these reasons I think there is much to be gained for a disjunctivism that is advanced within the context of the bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge. At least I think those interested in pursuing the disjunctivist program with respect to perceptual knowledge would do well to give it serious consideration.

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NOTES

Thanks to Aidan McGlynn, Giada Fratantonio, Lukas Schwengerer and Duncan Pritchard for comments and discussion on earlier drafts of this paper.

1. The views that Williamson (2000), Schellenberg (2013, 2016), and Sosa (2011) advance are also aptly described as versions of epistemological disjunctivism—although we won’t consider them here. See Smithies (2013) for a good general critique of the sort of disjunctivism looked at here. See Shaw (2016) for an application of disjunctivism to religious epistemology.

2. For Pritchard this isn’t a general claim concerning the epistemic basis of perceptual knowledge. Rather perceptual knowledge enjoys rational support that’s both factive and reflectively accessible only in paradigmatic cases does. I’ll assume this throughout.

3. Although for criticism see Kelp and Ghijsen (2016).

4. A motivating reason is a kind of explanatory reason. All motivating reasons are also explanatory reasons. If you believe that \( p \) for the reason that you see that \( p \) then you believe that \( p \) because you see that \( p \). Not all explanatory reasons, though, are motivating reasons. You might believe that \( p \) as a result of knock on head. But that needn’t imply that this is also your reason for believing what you do. For a good discussion of reasons and their various roles, see Alvarez (2010).

5. See Pritchard (2011, 2012, 2016) for defences of disjunctivism against four considerations for thinking it couldn’t possibly be true—viz., what he calls the ‘basis problem,’ ‘indistinguishability problem,’ ‘access problem,’ and a problem stemming from being able to claim one’s perceptual knowledge in radical sceptical contexts. We’ll revisit the basis problem in the final section.

6. Pritchard (2012, pp. 3–4) writes that because on his view “(. . .) we have the reflective access to the factors relevant to our epistemic standings [. . .] we can retain the appeal of epistemic internalism when in comes to the issue of epistemic responsibility.”

7. Pritchard (2015, p. 634) seems to miss this point in response to Littlejohn (2015). In response to virtually the same challenge we’ve raised here, Pritchard responds: “Often, however, I think the mature knower exercises an epistemic responsibility of a very different kind, one which does involve reflectively accessible rational support. [. . .] It is this more robust kind of epistemic responsibility, which is essentially internalist, that I want to capture in my formulation of epistemological disjunctivism.” Right. But the pertinent question is why go through the pains of capturing that robust kind of epistemic responsibility? Why think to begin with that we’re robustly responsible for our perceptual beliefs? “Internalists have always said so” shouldn’t be the desired answer.

8. See footnote 2.
Littlejohn (forthcoming) discusses two other possible arguments for thinking that perception provides us with knowledge by providing us with reasons. There isn’t any need to discuss those here since I think they struggle for the same reasons Littlejohn think so.

This is the same ‘bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge’ I rely on in Shaw (forthcoming) in order to present a novel solution to the so-called ‘basis problem’ for epistemological disjunctivism.

In what follows I substitute ‘knowledgeably’ where Sosa would say ‘apty’. I think this is a safe substitution for our purposes. This is merely to avoid having to address the technicalities of Sosa’s view of aptness with respect to belief, which would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say that, on Sosa’s view, an apt belief is not simply both true and competently formed, but true because competently formed; This isn’t something you do, for instance, when merely guessing the answer to a question in a game show. Here you might affirm that, say, Columbus sailed in 1492 in the aim of affirming truly (after all you want the prize, and you need true answers for that!). But you wouldn’t be affirming to thereby affirm knowledgeably, on Sosa’s view. For him a truly judgmental belief isn’t manifested in an intentional truth-aimed affirmation that amounts to a mere guess.

For other examples of authors that seem to distinguish between at least two kinds of belief, see Daniel Dennett (1978), Gendler (2008), and Stevenson (2002), who actually distinguishes up to six different conceptions of belief.

Compare Alan Millar (2010, 2011, 2014, 2016). Although while he agrees that, typically, in recognizing a tomato to be a tomato one also recognizes oneself as recognizing the tomato for what it is, he doesn’t conceive of this as enabling a kind of judgmental perceptual knowledge as we have here.

REFERENCES


