The author lovingly describes and discusses her data in developing estimates of factor shares and income distributions in Turkish agriculture. These data are taken from secondary sources, in which Turkey is especially rich, and most of them date back to the early 1950's.

The book will be of interest not only to students of Turkey and the Middle East but also as a source of information on a subject that has been previously little treated, partly because of the conceptual difficulties and partly because of the measurement difficulties. Eva Hirsch's courageous attack on the first and her exploitation of a large and varied source of data for the second has enabled her to produce a documented picture of income shares and distribution in Turkish agriculture. The principal conclusion unsurprisingly is that "size of land operation is one of the basic factors creating inequality of incomes from farm operation" (p. 169). This inequality of land holdings is further supported by high values of output per acre on large (commercial) farms which are more specialized than the small (subsistence) farms. This picture is mixed, however, and in areas of less rich resource endowment large (extensive) farms have lower returns per unit area than the small farmer who, producing for home consumption, has no product market problem. It is suggested that the spread of the market economy will therefore diminish the importance of this factor in the inequality of income distribution. The mechanization on large farms is also important in increasing both yields and acreage put under the plow, an effect that is only partly offset by higher costs. On the other hand, income from livestock, nonfarm employment, home processing of farm products and renting-out of land by small farmers tend to decrease the inequality.

In a book dealing essentially with large amounts of data and their manipulation there is a conspicuous absence of any statistics. The author is content to give mean observations from the data—nowhere are there even any ranges or other simple descriptive statistics which would permit the reader to judge the value of the data. Also absent is any hypothesis or test of validity of the conclusions. This weakness is also evident in the lack of any clear theoretical framework. If this had been present, much of the discussion of the numbers could have been eliminated and more attention given to their substance.

It has to be said that this is not an easy book to read. The text is often awkward. There are in the book's 313 pages 137 pages of appendices, footnotes, and references. The practice of putting footnotes and references at the end of the book is infuriating; the continuous flipping backwards and forwards also resulted in disintegration of the book's paper binding. There is not a single map or chart. These could have simplified the exposition enormously. Finally, the title is misleading, although the subtitle is not.

In summary, the book provides detailed estimates of income distribution in Turkey as of the early 1950's. It does not provide much insight into the economic role or process of agricultural income distribution in a low-income country.

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Why, in a regime that professes to be based on scientific thought as well as realism, were Soviet leaders so quickly moved to support the agrobiologist Lysenko and then so long reluctant to abandon him and other pseudo-scientists who despised the methods of science and feared scientific discussion? David Joravsky traces the "evolving interaction of agriculture, natural science, ideology, and political power" (p. xii) of the four decades spanning the rise and fall of T. D. Lysenko in order to distill some highly satisfying answers. Consequently, his fine book is far more than the history of a feckless charlatan. (That Joravsky has entitled it *The Lysenko Affair* should not put off the prospective reader; for, in view of what he has written, there is no way in which this brief but nicely old-fashioned title—connotative as it is of scandal in high places—could be justly translated into something like *The Lysenko Caper*.)

Joravsky holds that farming, not ideology, was the basic problem underlying the turn to Lysenko. Ideology was involved, of course, in the compulsions driving the Kremlin. The brutal sacrifice of science and agriculture was by a regime whose fear-ridden arrogance long prevented it from understanding either the requirements of science or the costs of the trade-off of an underfinanced, collectivized agriculture for the Kremlin's investment in heavy industry. In the conviction that power creates truth, practice was the guide of thought, for the job of science was to catch up with and illuminate practice. But whether practice or theory, as Joravsky sums it up, there was only one real guide: "The boss knows best" (p. 232).

The boss did not, of course, and the theme of the book is that of the inarticulated "underlying issue"—the protracted and bitter conflict between "Stalinist willfulness and scientific realism" (p. 96).

The nuances of Joravsky's account cannot be re-captured here, but he shows that in the long contest of politics with science the Kremlin was never quite fully to prevail and was finally forced to concessions far beyond anything in Stalin's ken. When the issues were joined, agricultural scientists, like others, usually took the course of obscurity or silence but some endorsed or yielded to Lysenkosmism. But these "liable men of scientific principle... managed to keep functioning as a scientific community" (p. 201), while the geneticists—a highly visible and theoretic discipline—were overwhelmed with disaster. Joravsky's implicit distinction between scientists and intellectuals permits him, in the main, to cast intellectual-
als in the roles of timeservers and sycophants; the heroes of the account are the “Varangians” (p. 166), a small group of chemists, physicists, and mathematicians “who ventured out of their special fields in defense of genetics” (p. 223).

Joravsky is not to be faulted for what his book was not designed to do, but we would have liked to be informed more fully of the way in which the broad but thin film of scientists, artists, and intellectuals has managed to be the source and sustenance of the illegal but loyal opposition. How does one account for the Medvedevs and Sakharovs and the paths which they have cut through the thicket? We would also have liked to know more of the ways in which the bureaucracy (increasingly infiltrated with scientists and technologists) was apparently converted into a counterforce to the Kremlin. And curiously enough, although the book abounds with allusions to economics (cf. pp. 12–13, 37, 195, 228, and 308), the otherwise fulsome index contains no references to the discipline. But in these matters we are not so much carping as expressing the hope that Joravsky has not yet called a halt to his labors.

As Joravsky sought to demonstrate, The Lysenko Affair is persuasive evidence of the utility and validity of current and recent history conceived and born outside of the comforting dark of the archives. Access to the archives would have eased his task, of course, but what Joravsky has done here in assessing the clash of science and political purpose might have been too soon arrested by the refuge of the official files. Forced to examine the course of events outside of the Kremlin and to trace their foreshadowings and reflections in party meetings, farms, research institutes, and the underground press of science, Joravsky catches the drama of the subornation of science by politics and power.

One may judge Joravsky’s account to mean that science is not necessarily virtuous, but, if she is to yield her charms of truth, she can be brought most fruitfully to bed only on her own terms—a lesson the Kremlin learned slowly, reluctantly, and imperfectly.

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This volume consists of 19 articles, written by former students of E. S. Mason in his honor. The articles are grouped into two parts; the first is entitled Industrial Organization and Public Policy and the second, Economic Development and International Trade. Each part will be discussed in turn but it should be noted straightway that this volume has very little to say about the implications of industrial organization for the development of poor nations. This will likely be a disappointment to many prospective readers in agricultural economics.

Of the 15 articles in part I, three focus on methods and problems in industrial organization research (J. McKenzie, A. Phillips, J. Bain); two on antitrust policy and regulation (D. Turner, S. Loescher); and two on implications of uncertainty for performance of firms (J. Lintner, R. Caves). Also included are two case studies, one on world oil pricing (M. Adelman) and the other on international telecommunications (M. Peck). The remaining articles deal with growth of firms (R. Vernon), consumer behavior (R. Holton), joint bidding for offshore oil leases (J. Markham) and market structures and commodity taxes (R. Bishop).

Loescher gives a lengthy analysis of the 1911 Standard Oil case, arguing that it provides precedents for current legal theory of the anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers and for the allocation of antitrust resources in attacking illegal conglomerate mergers. In contrast to Turner’s contribution, the analysis will be of interest mainly to the specialized reader.

Turner seems to draw very heavily on his experience in the Department of Justice. He argues that “any costs of applying divestiture remedies to economically significant monopolies and highly concentrated industries would be far outweighed by prospective gains.” His assessment of the benefits consists mainly of citing researches by Bain and Collins and Preston; the literature using the concept of consumer surplus in measuring welfare losses is wholly ignored. His assessment of the costs are only somewhat more convincing. Turner also finds little to be pleased about regarding the effects of direct regulation; subsidy and protection fare even worse in his critique.

Adelman seeks to determine what one can learn about price theory by studying price determination in the world oil market and vice versa. In his usual sassy and provocative manner he (1) vigorously supports the profit maximization hypothesis; (2) insists that in analysis of industry, structure is little more than a check (“it is simply too imprecise”) on conclusions drawn from behavior; and (3) pours cold water on Galbraith’s substitution of planning by the technostructure for the unconscious planning of the market.

Turning briefly to some of the other articles, Peck not only sheds much light on current problems in the competition between cables and satellites in international telecommunications, but also provides evidence for Turner’s thesis that direct regulation often leaves much to be desired. Caves argues that large companies with market power give up profits in favor of avoiding uncertainty; brief analysis of welfare effects is also given. The theoretical analysis by Lintner appears to open up many avenues for empirical research on the firm. Bain takes another look at the implications of the stability (or variability) of market structure for research. He explains once again his