The Function of Law in the International Community: 75 Years After

By Martti Koskenniemi*

What was the world like into which Hersch Lauterpacht’s most important book The Function of Law in the International Community appeared? Fifteen million Americans were out of work as President Roosevelt took office in 1933. A World Monetary and Economic Conference met in the summer to debate a programme of currency stabilization and adjustment of inter-governmental debts. Even contemporaries understood that this was a ‘Period of Crisis’. They were right. 1933 was the year of Hitler’s accession as Reichskanzler and Europe’s definite turn to the path of darkness. By now Hitler had been joined by Mussolini who insisted Italy be treated as a Great Power, especially in terms of its colonial designs in Eastern Africa. Japan’s attack on China had led to the establishment of the puppet regime of Manchukuo. Diplomats kept on talking about non-recognition and economic sanctions but with little effect. The Soviet Union turned unexpectedly away from the policy of world revolution. In the following year it would join the League where it would become a staunch opponent of “revision”.

The League of Nations was in a bad way. The Manchurian situation had demonstrated the fragility of the Covenant’s collective security provisions. The Disarmament Conference had been undermined by Hitler’s accession and Japan’s withdrawal. No country had worked more to support the conference than Britain. Against a general atmosphere of hopelessness Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald suggested in the spring a new draft convention with definite levels of material and provision for conference in case of threatened violations of the peace.3

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The League’s Codification conference had ended three years earlier in general disappointment. No significant progress had been made in the conclusion of multilateral treaties in order to solidify the basis of international law. In 1933 the Permanent Court of International Justice was faced with the trickiest problem it had so far encountered, namely the legality of the planned Austro-German customs union. Was the union or was it not contrary to the pledge of neutrality Austria had made in the Peace of Saint-Germain of 1919? The case immediately raised the problem that formed the main subject of *The Function of Law in the International Community*—namely the relationship between political developments and legal rules: was the growth of German hegemony in Europe a justiciable matter?

II

In 1933 Hersch Lauterpacht was 36 years old. He had received his doctorate in Vienna in 1922 and had arrived in Britain with his wife Rachel in the following year. He enrolled in the LSE where he began to collaborate with Arnold McNair for his London dissertation, *Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law*. The work was published in 1927 and in the same year Hersch received an assistant lectureship that was upgraded to full lectureship in 1930. In the following year, he received British citizenship. At this time, he was busily giving lectures and publishing articles on international law matters, including, for example, the treatment of the Manchurian situation by the League organs. In Lauterpacht’s view, the organs had not strictly speaking violated the Covenant in failing to take effective action. The Covenant did leave them discretion. But they had failed in their political obligation to use that discretion so as to give effect to the purposes of the League.

No doubt owing to his readiness to speak on politically interesting topics Lauterpacht’s lectures were widely attended by students not working for a law degree. He also collaborated actively with the professor of international relations at the LSE, C.A.W. Manning. Even if the British legal community did not hold international law in very high value, a persistent strand of inter-war political idealism did. In the course of the 1930s, Lauterpacht worked to support the Disarmament Conference and participated in the drafting of the abortive Peace Act, proposed by Labour’s Arthur Henderson and Lauterpacht’s LSE colleague, Philip Noel-Baker. In a predominantly positivist legal environment, Lauterpacht was a natural lawyer—albeit one whose views were still more evident in his critique of sovereignty than any well-formulated normative theory. Unlike the

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Professor of International Law at the LSE, H.A. Smith, Lauterpacht was not a predominantly technical international lawyer but returned constantly to the foundational questions. In 1932, for example, he lectured to the LSE’s famous Sociological Club on ‘Is International Law Different in Nature from Other Law’—a text that became the basis of Chapter 20 of The Function of Law in the International Community.

III

The Function of Law in the International Community joins a wide European debate about the relationship between the ‘political’ and the ‘legal’ in the international world, a debate that had by that time received particular acuity in problems relating to the application of the League Covenant. After all, the Covenant’s system of dispute settlement was based on the distinction between two kinds of disputes—those that were ‘suitable for arbitration or judicial settlement’ (Covenant 13.1 Article) and those that were not and were therefore to be directed to political organs such as the Council. The question of the ‘nature’ of particular disputes, and therefore of their justiciability, had been raised in practically every case in the Permanent Court that had not been submitted to it as a result of special agreement. It had been conventionally accepted that arbitration or judicial settlement were unsuitable for dealing with disputes over ‘vital interests and honour’, and many arbitration treaties contained a specific reservation to that effect. But although Lauterpacht dealt with the topic as it arose in the international realm, he was well aware that it was a general problem of jurisprudence, in particular the kind of jurisprudence that had been developed in German public law and that had peaked in the legal debates in Weimar Germany about the nature of sovereignty and the role of the republican constitution in times of economic and political crisis.

In a significant sense, much of the way we speak about international law has been received from German public law as it developed from constitutional commentaries about the nature of the Holy Roman Empire in the 17th century to the natural law of the 18th and the formalism of the 19th centuries. No legal tradition in this period compares with the German in the depth, complexity or sense of urgency of its questions. Lauterpacht had been brought up in that tradition. One of his teachers in Vienna had been Hans Kelsen who at the time of the publication of The Function of Law was intensively engaged in a debate about the relationship between law and political sovereignty under the Weimar Constitution—the application of the infamous Article 48 on emergency powers so as to strengthen the position of the Reich, and in particular the Reichskanzler, against deviating factions in the realm. The debate concerned the foundations of

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6 Lauterpacht, above n 1 (hereinafter The Function of Law).
the legal-constitutional order. For the legalists, Kelsen as their spokesman, law itself regulated the limits of its validity. When and how emergency powers, for example, could be used was a question of legal interpretation, properly within the jurisdiction of the constitutional court. For Kelsen’s opponents, led by Carl Schmitt of the Kronjurist regime, the foundation of the constitutional order must necessarily lie outside that order itself. In particular, it must lie in a political sovereignty that can guarantee the efficiency of the constitution, if necessary by sending in the police. For Kelsen, in other words, the political decisions needed to uphold the law must be received from the law (constitution). For Schmitt, the constitution is powerless in itself—its force and effect must lie in a prior political decision about whether to follow the constitution or to make an exception to it.

The question of the respective relations of law and politics in the international world had also been frequently dealt with in German doctrine. For instance, Karl Strupp in Frankfurt had devoted a good quarter of his 1922 Habilitation on State responsibility to the question of Notrecht and gave his trial lecture precisely on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. More significantly, the question of the respective roles of law and politics in international dispute settlement was taken as the object of his 1929 doctoral dissertation by Strupp’s most famous student, Hans Morgenthau, the future father of the discipline of international relations in the United States. Morgenthau had argued that there were two kinds of international conflict—‘disputes’ that focused on well-defined single issues that could be made the object of legal settlement and what he chose to call ‘tensions’ that implicated a wider—political—antagonism and that could not usefully be submitted to legal mechanisms. There was no general rule by which the two could be identified. The ‘political’ nature of a problem depended simply on how intensely a State felt about it. When the intensity was high enough, a legal procedure would not only be useless but quite harmful.

The Function of Law could only have been written from the inside of the German tradition, from a vivid sense of the urgency of the question of the legal system’s ultimate foundation. Things seemed completely different in Britain. The validity of the British constitution, or of the legal system, was an unreflective second nature of British politics and in no need of elaborate doctrinal defense. In the troubled waters of the German and the international world of the 1930s, no such self-evidence was present. The Function of Law was German; not only in its sentence structure, but

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8 For Strupp’s treatment of the legal disputes/political disputes distinction in his various later works, see Sandra Link, Ein Realist mit Idealen—Der Völkerrechtler Karl Strupp (1886–1945) (Nomos, Baden–Baden, 2003), 241–247.
10 For Lauterpacht’s positive review, cf (1931) BYIL, 229.
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in the sensibility it transmitted to its readers. In an early essay on Spinoza, Lauterpacht had written that ‘[i]t is the ultimate results of the theory of the state which are resorted to by international lawyers as the foundation of their systems’.\(^\text{11}\) Few assumptions can be more un-English, more German than that the law emerges as deductive inferences from the political philosophy of statehood.

This, however, is the perspective adopted in *The Function of Law*. It asks the question about the proper role of law in the international world, especially vis-à-vis that which is ‘politics’, often appearing under the vocabulary of ‘sovereignty’. For, as Lauterpacht says at the outset of the book, the ‘limitation of the place of law [is] an expression of the theory of sovereignty’.\(^\text{12}\) The question is not approached in an openly philosophical or political theory vocabulary, however, but through a technique of legal argument that almost presupposes the answer that Lauterpacht will produce by it. The perspective taken here is legal-institutional. What, *The Function of Law* asks is, is the (legal) force of the claim, often raised in the practice of judicial and arbitral tribunals, that some disputes cannot be dealt with by law—that they are ‘non-justiciable’—owing to their nature as ‘political’ disputes?

IV

*The Function of Law in the International Community* was an attack on the commonly held view that there were two types of international conflicts—legal and political disputes—and that, consequently, only some of them were justiciable whereas others were not. Lauterpacht had no sympathy with these distinctions. For him they were unfounded in logical, jurisprudential as well as practical terms. In fact, as he put it, the distinctions were ideological. They were ‘... first and foremost, the work of international lawyers anxious to give legal expression to the State’s claim to be independent of law’.\(^\text{13}\) Lauterpacht agreed with Morgenthau and Schmitt that it was impossible to draw a clear distinction between the political and the legal by a determinate rule. Anything can, from some perspective, be labeled ‘political’. In particular, as he put it with special reference to Morgenthau’s dissertation, ‘[t]he State is a political institution, and all questions which affect it as a whole, in particular in its relations with other States, are therefore political’.\(^\text{14}\) But surely the mere fact that all disputes are ‘political’ in this way cannot provide a reason for regarding them as non-justiciable. In fact, says Lauterpacht, ‘it is the refusal of the State to submit the dispute to judicial settlement, and not the intrinsic nature of the controversy, which makes it political’.\(^\text{15}\) This is what it means

\(^{11}\) Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Spinoza and International Law’ (1927) VIII *BYIL*, 368.

\(^{12}\) Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law*, above n 1, 3.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, 6.  

\(^{14}\) Ibid, 153.  

\(^{15}\) Ibid, 164.
to say that the theory of non-justiciability is a consequence of the doctrine of sovereignty—it defers to the sovereign will of the State itself. But if the will of the State were a *conditio sine qua non* for a dispute being justiciable, then it would always remain open for a State to opt out from the law’s constraint. Like Morgenthau and Schmitt, Lauterpacht thought that the distinction between legal and political disputes, combined with the principle that its application was dependent on the State’s own view, led international law beyond the vanishing point of jurisprudence. But where Morgenthau concluded that the absence of a delimiting rule meant that everything was *politics*, Lauterpacht drew the contrary conclusion. For him:

... all international disputes are, irrespective of their gravity, disputes of a legal character in the sense that, so long as the rule of law is recognized, they are capable of an answer by the application of legal rules.

In other words, the fact that a State may feel strongly about some matter—for example, that it relates to its ‘vital interests’—does not exempt the matter from the law but on the contrary, calls for the application of legal rules concerning precisely those kinds of (important) matters. *The Function of Law* then goes methodologically through each of the four non-justiciability doctrines that Lauterpacht was able to identify in the international debates, showing how each attempt to delimit a realm of the ‘political’ outside the ‘legal’ in international affairs will eventually become an apology for unlimited freedom of action of States.

The first item dealt with is the claim that when there is ‘no law’ at all a matter must be dealt with in a political way. To treat this issue Lauterpacht chooses the jurisprudential vocabulary of ‘lacunae’. What force is there to the argument that in cases of ‘gaps’, judicial and arbitral bodies must decline jurisdiction and declare ‘*non liquet*’? As he had already done in his London doctoral dissertation of 1927, Lauterpacht shows that as far as legal practice is concerned, courts and tribunals appear to constantly decide cases by analogy, by general principles of law, balancing conflicting claims or having recourse to abstract points about the needs of the international community. The alleged novelty of a dispute has never prevented a tribunal from giving a legal answer to it. Of course situations must arise every now and then for which the legislator has provided no prima facie applicable solution. No legislator will have prepared for every contingency. But the fact of there not existing positive (in the sense of ‘posited’) law on every conceivable aspect of human behaviour has not, at least not in practice, led to a wide acknowledgement of the correctness of the theory of ‘gaps’.

But Lauterpacht does not merely wish to demonstrate the absence of cases of *non liquet* in international practice. He derives this state of affairs

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16 Morgenthau, *above n 9.*

17 Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law,* *above n 1158.*

18 Ibid, 110–35.

from a wider principle—namely the jurisdictional axiom ‘that the judge is bound to give a decision on the dispute before him’. There are no gaps for Lauterpacht. This does not follow from the (naive) assumption that the legislator would have foreseen everything. The completeness of the law is, instead, ‘an a priori assumption of every system of law, not a prescription of positive law’. Though particular laws or particular parts of the law may be insufficiently covered, ‘[t]here are no gaps in the legal system as a whole’. This is not a result of arguing from formal completeness of the Kelsenian type—that is to say, from the perspective of the assumption that in the absence of law, the plaintiff has no valid right and that ergo, his claim must be rejected. For Lauterpacht, the very notion of ‘law’s absence’ is untenable. For it presumes that law consists of isolated acts of State will that may or may not have extended to the matter under consideration. But this is not at all how Lauterpacht understands the law. He is, after all, a natural lawyer; although for good prudential reasons he refrained from trumpeting this in his British legal environment. But it led him to suggest that ‘gaps’ were in fact only primae impressionis difficulties to decide cases. If law is thought in terms of general principles, judicial balancing and social purposes—as Lauterpacht held it to be—then there is no principled difficulty to respond to novel situations in the end. Even ‘spurious gaps’ may be filled: an unsatisfactory single rule may be by–passed to give effect to a major principle of law, the intention of the parties or the purposes of the legal system as a whole. In this way, even legal change is regulated by the law.

A second, widely held view presupposed that only technical or otherwise minor disputes were amenable to legal settlement while ‘important’ issues needed to be dealt with in a political vein. De maximis non curat praetor. This was the view on which Morgenthau had written his doctoral dissertation, and had proposed the distinction between political ‘tensions’ and legal ‘disputes’. Sometimes, Morgenthau wrote, even a minor issue must be understood as a ‘tension’ rather than a dispute because it has become a symbol of the antagonism between the relevant states: the real issue is the political conflict, not the legal form it takes. Again, Lauterpacht begins by noting that since the Alabama case, tribunals have dealt with a wide number of important questions. Having surveyed the practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, he concludes that adhering to this principle ‘would mean the speedy and radical liquidation of the

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activities of the Court’. 27 Again, however, the main argument is not about what tribunals may have done in practice. An issue of principle is involved. Lauterpacht agrees—perhaps surprisingly—with Morgenthau and even with Carl Schmitt that whether a matter touches on the State’s ‘vital interests’ or ‘honour’ cannot be decided in abstraction from the State’s own view of it. 28 ‘These are purely subjective notions. If important issues were excluded from judicial settlement, and if the determination of the ‘importance’ of an issue were left to the party itself, then there would in fact exist an unlimited right to opt out from third party settlement. And this would be absurd.

On the other hand, Lauterpacht did not want to completely offset arguments about ‘vital interests’ or ‘honour’. It was true that they had been widely used in arbitration treaties and they did reflect important concerns of States. To discard or ignore such references would be unrealistic and counterproductive. To avoid the absurdity of self-judgment, however, the decision on whether a matter in fact touches the ‘honour’ or ‘vital interests’ of a State must be allocated to the tribunal itself in which the claim has been made. That is to say, it should be dealt with no differently from any other treaty provision or customary law principle. As such, it is tantamount to calling for a decision on the merits of the claim. But this means, of course, that the matter is fully justiciable. 29 For instance, it is often held that issues of immigration are non-justiciable. ‘In fact’, responds Lauterpacht, ‘they are typically appropriate subject for judicial settlement. An international court will in most cases invariably presume that the claim will be dismissed’. 30

The third group of arguments that presumed a distinction between legal and political disputes had to do with the need of accommodating the needs of change in law. Sometimes—and Lauterpacht must have had the debate about the revision of the Versailles peace settlement in mind—law might represent an obsolete political situation, a status quo that no longer existed. An arrangement made long ago may have come to seem too burdensome or otherwise unjust for a party. Owing to the absence of an international legislature, it was impossible to correct the matter by formal means. In such cases—so that argument went—it would be unjust, counterproductive or even dangerous to insist on the application of the law. 31 For Lauterpacht, however, arguments about the clash between law, on the one hand, and justice or peace, on the other, are completely vacuous. The political realists mistake complexity for conflict. Problems of the obsolete or unjust rule may always be tempered by reference to the larger purposes of the law, rebus sic stantibus, abuse of rights or principles of equity. 32 The view that law lags behind and must therefore sometimes be offset by new ‘political’ objectives that provide a better response to the requirements of

27 Ibid, 155.  
28 Ibid, 159.  
31 Ibid, 245–347.  
32 Ibid, 270 et seq.
the moment is again based on the old (positivist) idea that law is a matter of legislated rules—typically rules laid out by the sovereign legislator—that are carved in stone and become inevitably outdated as the reasons for their enactment have disappeared.

Yet it is a primitive legal theory that views the law in such a way. For as legal practice shows, judges and arbitrators have not lacked means to apply the law in innovative ways, and to set aside rules that appear to be obsolete or unjust: ‘much of this amending process is actually and necessarily performed by international judges in the ordinary course of their judicial function’.33 It is a matter of the normal interpretation of the rules, and often by reference to their object and purpose. Rules operate in normative environments in which there are many kinds of interpretative techniques, principles of proportionality, and reasonableness and other argumentative resources that enable the adjustment of the law according to important needs. The concerns of realism are incorporated in the law for example by the State’s undoubted right to determine the conditions of self-defence for itself and in the exception to the vitiating effect of duress in the law of treaties. The realists’ main concern is that law might sometimes fail to give due regard to the liberty and the fundamental rights of the state. As Lauterpacht responds, however:

It is not sufficiently realized that fundamental rights of States are safe under international judicial settlement, for the reason that they are fundamental legal rights.34

The fourth and last group of arguments seeking to uphold the law/politics distinction made reference to the difference between ‘disputes as to rights’ and ‘conflicts of interest’. This, too, is an empty distinction. Every right worth having makes reference to some interest, and merely having an interest in something is surely not a legitimate ground for imposing the burden of a legal duty on somebody. Legitimate and illegitimate interests, and the connected duty on somebody to contribute to the fulfillment of legitimate interest, can only be identified by making the distinction between ‘raw’ interests and interests upgraded into (legal) rights. If a state demands a piece of territory from another because this is vital for its development, it is easy to understand why it may want to deal with this as a conflict of interests rather than as a conflict of rights (because, it has no right). But if it were entitled to do this unilaterally—that is to say, if it had the opportunity to change the terms of the debate from ‘rights’ to ‘interests’ by an *ipse dixit*—then of course this would violate the interests of its opponent in a way that would be absurd. In fact, Lauterpacht says, to presume such a distinction ‘very nearly amounts to a rejection of the institution of obligatory judicial settlement’.35 For the same reason proposals to set up specialized institutions to deal with ‘conflicts of interest’ cannot be accepted. As ‘interest’ is not amenable to objective determination, this would only create

a unilateral veto from juridical settlement and an authorization to discard the rights of others.36

V

The refutations of the distinction between legal and political disputes in *The Function of Law* turn on Lauterpacht’s hermeneutic view on law—the assumption that no event is ‘essentially’ or in itself a legal or a political event. Its character as such is the result of projection, interpretation from some particular standpoint. If the distinction were upheld, it would always allow a State to present its unwillingness to submit to the legal process as a result of its ‘application’. And:

[a]n obligation whose scope is left to the free appreciation of the obligee, so that his will constitutes a legally recognized condition of the existence of the duty, does not constitute a legal bond.37

That the problem of self-judgement (or autointerpretation) becomes the central problem of Lauterpacht’s doctrinal work follows from his view that the law is always relative to interpretation. This was a basic tenet of German legal theory—both Kelsen and Schmitt shared it, as did such new streams of continental jurisprudence as Hermann Kantorowicz’s ‘free law’.38 If rules do not have essential meanings but those meanings result from interpretation, then the project to chain States into the rule of law by legislation is insufficient. Instead, ‘who judges?’ (*Quis judicabit?*) becomes the key question. In *The Function of Law*, the lawyer—as judge and arbitrator—becomes the foundation of the rule of law. This is why Lauterpacht was lead to focus on their impartiality and to examine their ability to interpret the law so that everybody’s vital interests are secured.39 To us, an enquiry into judicial honesty and competence seems a somewhat facile solution for world peace. But Lauterpacht’s rule-scepticism is ours, too. Our own pragmatism stands on the revelation that it is the legal profession (and not the rules) that is important. As Lauterpacht put it:

37 Ibid, 189. This is, paradoxically, the very point E H Carr makes against Lauterpacht. Precisely because there can be no distinction between law and politics, the latter will always prevail, E H Carr, *The Twenty-Years’ Crisis 1919–1939* (2nd edn. Macmillan, London, 1981 [1946]) 195.
38 In *The Function of Law*, there is only one reference to the free law school or to Kantorowicz himself. Nevertheless, Lauterpacht’s discussion of ‘spurious gaps’—that is, gaps that result from the unsatisfactory character of clear rules is practically indistinguishable from ‘free law’ arguments. For Lauterpacht, too, the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘spurious’ gaps is ‘relative’ (just like, he says, the difference between the legislator and the judge) and cases ‘may occur in which a decision which at first sight is contra legem can be brought within the pale of law conceived as a whole’. Like Kantorowicz, Lauterpacht refrains from associating judicial freedom with arbitrariness. ‘It is freedom within the law conceived as something more comprehensive than the sum total of its positive rules’, *The Function of Law*, above n 1, 79, 80.
There is substance in the view that the existence of a sufficient body of clear rules is not at all essential to the existence of law, and that the decisive test is whether there exists a judge competent to decide upon disputed rights and to command peace.\footnote{Ibid, 424.}

*The Function of Law* puts forward the image of judges of ‘Herculean’ gap-fillers by recourse to general principles and the law’s moral purposes that is very similar to today’s Anglo-American jurisprudential orthodoxy.\footnote{I have argued about the essential similarity of Lauterpacht’s constructivism and Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence in my *From Apology to Utopia. The Structure of International Legal Argument. Reissue with a New Epilogue* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), 52–56.} Moreover, it heralds the end of jurisprudence and grand theory in the same way legal hermeneutics does, by focusing on the interpretative practices of the legal profession.\footnote{This point is emphasized in Anthony Carty, ‘Why Theory? The Implications for International Law Teaching’ in Allott et al. (eds) *Theory and International Law: An Introduction* (1991), 77, 78–99.} Simultaneously, however, it remains hostage to and is limited by the conventions and ambitions of that profession. In this sense, *The Function of Law* is the last book on international theory—the theory of non-theory, the sophisticated face of legal pragmatism.

VI

And what has *The Function of Law in the International Community* to say to us today? Is the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘political’ disputes still an important consideration invoked to decide the jurisdiction of particular international bodies of agencies? Of course it is. Many, though by no means all, constitutional systems subscribe to the distinction and exempt issues of foreign policy from the jurisdiction of domestic supreme courts.\footnote{See eg Thomas M Franck, *Political Questions/Judicial Answers. Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs?* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992).} The ‘political questions doctrine’ followed by the US Supreme Court is one well-known, though controversial example of the view of foreign policy being essentially non-justiciable.\footnote{For a recent case, See *Schneider v Kissinger*, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).} An example of the contrary case is provided by Germany in which important foreign and even defence policy issues are regularly submitted to the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court (*Verfassungsgericht*).\footnote{For a recent case concerning the violation of parliamentary procedure in a contribution by Germany of troops for a NATO–operation in Turkey in 1983, see *BVerfG*, 2 BvE 1/03 (7 May 2008).} In Britain, as is well-known, the matter came up in the *Pinochet* case where it was pointed out by Lord Nicholls that any suggestion that the matter might be non-justiciable was mooted by the Parliament’s having specifically enacted upon it.\footnote{See eg Lord Nicholls, *Ex parte Pinochet (No. 1)*, Lord Nicholls, 119 ILR (2002), 96.} This presumes (*contra* Lauterpacht) that when there is no such (positive) legislation, there is also no jurisdiction. But in fact, non-justiciability reaches further. In a 2006
case the Court of Appeals highlighted ‘a general principle of the separation of powers between the executive and the courts, including the principle that there remain some areas which are essentially matters for the executive and not the courts’. 47

International lawyers may have thought that the settled practice by the International Court of Justice of dismissing claims by parties according to which the Court would not enjoy jurisdiction owing to the ‘political’ nature of the case, should have finished with the matter internationally. The Court, it appears, has endorsed Lauterpacht’s position and routinely asserts that the fact that a case has political implications does not mean that the Court could not pronounce on its legal aspects.48 Nevertheless, that practice has now been nuanced by the partial non liquet given by the Court in the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. 49 Moreover, the debate in the 1990s over judicial review of Security Council decisions highlighted many of the aspects of the old debate and though it remained inconclusive, there has been marked hesitation (to put it no higher) among international lawyers to affirm the Court’s jurisdiction over Council activities.39 In the European Union, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice from matters of common foreign and security policy and, a fortiori, common security and defence policy, reflects precisely the kinds of arguments against which Lauterpacht wrote The Function of Law. Nevertheless, when the jurisdiction of the ECJ has been triggered in matters that are related to foreign policy—such as in the application of economic sanctions—a remarkable development has taken place from an outright refusal to deal with such matters to a close scrutiny of sanctions from the perspective of their conformity with human rights and due process standards.51

47 R (on the Application of Gentle and Clarke) v Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Defence and Attorney General (12 December 2006), 133 ILR (2008), paragraph 75 (p. 752).
48 The “Lauterpachtian” language is particularly clear in the Tehran Hostages case where the Court pointed out that ‘disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts’ and that if the Court ‘contrary to its settled jurisprudence’ were to see this as a reason for refusing to deal with the case, ‘it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international disputes’. Tehran Hostages, ICJ Reports 1980, 20 (para 37). The most exhaustive discussion of the matter is now in Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 2004, 155–156 (para 41).
49 Here the Court concluded that ‘in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake’, Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 1996, Dispositif, 266 (E).
European Court on Human Rights, too, has frequently dealt with cases in which respondent governments have claimed that the matter pertained to the exclusive jurisdiction of the domestic authorities. The Court has never adopted a formal non-justiciability doctrine—indeed, it would be hard to see how such would work in a human rights context. But it has often been sensitive to the concerns of member governments, endowing them with a wide margin of appreciation when they were conducting policies intended to safeguard national security.52

If the terms of the inter-war debate are applied to the question about the jurisdiction of the ECJ or the ECHR, it is possible to see that behind the apparently conceptual problem about the limits of the ‘political’ vis-à-vis the ‘legal’ is a more pragmatic concern about who should have the final say about foreign policy—and thus occupy the place political theory has been accustomed to calling ‘sovereignty’. Kelsen, Schmitt, and Lauterpacht all had much to say about this, and very little that would have been both new and intelligent has been added to it thereafter. But to phrase this debate as being about ‘sovereignty’—the ‘Weimar’ perspective—does not really lead far towards resolving it. In a fragmented world there simply is no such ‘ultimate’ place from which authoritative direction could be received for any and all disputes. Perhaps the whole question should be rather brought down from conceptual abstraction and the inconsequential debates about the ‘nature’ of particular grievances. Perhaps it could be examined in terms of a the subtle institutional politics that we witness in national administrations as well as international institutions—the jurisdictional tug of war between technical experts, lawyers, and policy-makers. A question of economic sanctions, for example, can be described and dealt with from the perspective of politics, economics, security, human rights, development, and international legality. Accordingly, it may trigger the expertise and jurisdiction of political and economic experts, security institutions, human rights bodies, and development organizations—as well as of course, international judicial or arbitral tribunals. Who should be entitled to decide? Framed in these terms, drawing a line between ‘legal’ and ‘political’ (or indeed such other fields as ‘economics’, ‘security’, ‘human rights’ etc.) by an abstract rule begins to seem increasingly less important than to accept that however it is done, the matter will remain controversial and will require attention to such institutional safeguards as representation, transparency, and accountability. Each of these various institutions and forms of expertise appears to itself as the ‘ultimate’ point from which matters ought to be decided. For those outside the institution—the expert

52 In an early case, the Court held that ‘having regard to the high responsibility that a government bears to its people to protect them against any threat to the life of the nation, it is evident that a certain discretion—a certain margin of appreciation—must be left to the government’. ECHR, Lawless case, Ser.B, 1960–61, para 90, p 82. In a 1993 case concerning terrorism and the derogation from rights under Article 15 of the Convention under public emergency, the Court affirmed that a ‘wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities’. Nevertheless, this margin was not unlimited and its use was examined by the Court. ECHR, Brannigan and McBride, Ser. A 258.B., 49 (para 43).
committee, the council of diplomats, the court or tribunal—however, it may be anything but self-evident which of them should have jurisdiction, and the privilege to decide.

Hersch Lauterpacht was committed to believe that international lawyers, in particular international judges, should rule the world. This was a part of what I have called the project of gentle civilizing. It was a legal but also a political project. Putting trust in the good sense and responsibility of lawyers for resolving international disputes has its advantages, of course. But judicialization also has its well-known disadvantages. It prefers some interests against others; some voices become heard in courts and tribunals whereas other voices only with difficulty if at all. There is still much work to be done on how interests and preferences get filtered in different institutions and thus contribute to form the structural bias of such institutions. I have said this before and I will say it again: *The Function of Law in the International Community* is the most important English-language book on international law in the 20th century. It is not so because of the invulnerability of its arguments, however, but because of the acute sensitivity it shows to institutional choices for the distribution of spiritual and material values in the world. We know now that neither lawyers nor diplomats should be bosses—should have the final say—in the absolute terms of the old debate. Instead, we should choose the available vocabularies, and institutional alternatives, with a keen eye on the foreseeable effects that this will have in the global games of power in the 21st century.