equality. Scholars, students, and anyone interested in a very good analysis of the positive results of the civil rights movement and the ongoing work that it required of all Americans to build a society based on equality will like this book.

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What do we know about the world of spies? Michael Holzman attempts to answer that question as he explores the life and mind of the enigmatic figure who operated in the shadows as the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) foremost spy catcher: James Jesus Angleton.

Angleton acquired an international indoctrination early in his life as a student at private English schools, where he developed linguistic skills, and then at Yale University. At Yale he wrote poetry in French that was praised by William Carlos Williams and Archibald MacLeish, who was then the librarian of Congress and who later helped William J. Donovan organize the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Angleton’s world view and subsequent behavior as a counterintelligence agent were shaped by his encounter with the New Criticism at Yale. He theorized that such an education could be beneficial outside English departments in “some line of work, one that had direct effects on the world” (p. x). He also developed a correspondence with Ezra Pound, e.e. cummings, and Professor Norman Pearson, who in 1944 became chief of X-2, the OSS counterintelligence unit. In the late 1940s the person “to replace Pearson as [Angleton’s] mentor” was Allen Dulles, who became the first civilian head of the CIA in 1953. Angleton was well connected.

Many of Angleton’s activities discussed in this volume are familiar: his roles in the postwar Italian elections; the Bay of Pigs fiasco; Operation Mongoose; and HT/LINGUAL, the agency’s mail-opening program, which worked from a watch list that included such suspects as Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, John Steinbeck, and Martin Luther King Jr. (p. 189). Curiously, Holzman does not mention MK-ULTRA, the infamous drug-testing program in which the agency used LSD as a possible truth drug. Although there is no evidence that Angleton was directly involved in MK-ULTRA, the author notes that the CIA twice “supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working on behalf of the CIA in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro” (p. 189). No doubt Angleton’s rationalization of his involvement in such operations stemmed from a belief in the “moral unity” of the Cold War that he learned from his teachers at Yale (p. 181).

Ironically, Angleton’s downfall was due in large part to Seymour Hersh’s 1973 interview with the then CIA chief, William Colby, who “outed” Angleton for his role in Operation CHAOS, a counterintelligence investigation into the suspected foreign infiltration of the antiwar movement. Two years later Angleton was further exposed during the investigations of the CIA led by Senator Frank Church, Otis Pike, and Nelson Rockefeller. On Christmas Eve 1974, Angleton left the CIA. In the end, we are led to conclude that Angleton was a patriot, but perhaps a misguided patriot. He was “educated by men” who believed “that protecting the interest of [their] class was identical with patriotism, that those ends justified the means” (p. 323).

Although Holzman has made a valuable contribution that provides insight into the paranoid mind of a man committed to safeguarding our national security during the Cold War, this book’s appeal is limited to a narrow scholarly audience. His research reflects an extensive use of archival collections and of interviews with subjects who talked with the author without setting conditions.

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Hiroshima: The World’s Bomb. By Andrew J. Rotter. (New York: Oxford University Press,
The U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945 is, arguably, one of those choices that political scientists like to call “overdetermined”—that is, there were many reasons to do it, and few if any not to. Nonetheless, for the past half-century, historians have spilt oceans of ink writing about the atomic bomb decision and neither they nor, evidently, the public have arrived at anything like a consensus on the subject.

Into this fray steps Andrew J. Rotter, a history professor at Colgate University, who, against all odds, endeavors to add something new to the debate. Rotter’s thesis—that interest in and work on the atomic bomb was, in fact, an international phenomenon, even though the actual article turned out to be made in the USA—is hardly startling and not new. We have known for years that the Germans, the Russians, and even the Japanese were working on the bomb during the war, although none of those efforts approached the scale of America’s Manhattan Project. Nor was it surprising when members of the world’s scientific community—the so-called republic of science—quickly rallied around their respective national flags when mobilization orders came. As Rotter points out, the same thing had happened in World War I when British scientists formed a self-professed “band of brothers” to devise new types of poison gas (p. 20). When the German chemist Otto Hahn was asked, after the war, why he had similarly helped the Kaiser’s war effort, Hahn was surprised by the question.

By providing an omnibus survey of almost everything that has been written on the bomb decision—books and articles—Rotter is surely covering well-trod ground. But the book is so beautifully written and the focus so much on the individuals involved, instead of government policies, that it enlivens an old subject and renders it almost new, even to readers familiar with the literature.

Among other things, Rotter’s book is an important historical corrective to the notion, which has gained currency in recent years, that the first atomic bomb was not made in Japan and its target an American city like New York or Washington. As the author points out, Japan’s nascent bomb project was a mere sprig compared to America’s mighty oak—with a budget equivalent to, at most, a few million dollars, in contrast to the $2 billion-plus spent on the Manhattan Project.

The book is repetitive at points and somewhat dated—“What if North Korea develops nuclear weapons?” Rotter asks rhetorically and belatedly (p. 304). Likewise, readers hoping for a blinding flash of insight or even a new spin on the bomb decision are likely to be disappointed. But more than fifty years of scholarship has yet to come up with a better or more complete account of the dilemma that Harry S. Truman faced: as Rotter puts it, “Why not drop the atomic bombs?” (p. 173).

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William Inboden has written a compelling book about the importance of faith in shaping U.S. foreign policy from 1945 to 1960. He demonstrates that Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, H. Alexander Smith, and other key policy makers held strong Christian convictions that amplified their anticommunist zeal and thereby strengthened their resolve to combat Communist nations, especially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although he stretches to claim that religion played a determining role in the outcome of the Cold War, Inboden does a great service to historiography in linking religion to the conduct of American diplomacy.

Inboden begins with a history of how American Protestants viewed foreign policy after World War II, particularly in relationship to the Cold War. He demonstrates the theological context of anticommunist beliefs that arose in response to Communist atheism and repression of religion, especially in those new