

STEVEN SHAVIRO

WITHOUT CRITERIA

Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics

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Without Criteria

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Technologies of Lived Abstraction
Brian Massumi and Erin Manning, editors

Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy, Erin Manning, 2009

Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics, Steven Shaviro, 2009

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Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics

Steven Shaviro

The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England

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Technologies of Lived Abstraction

Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, editors

"*What moves as a body, returns as the movement of thought.*"
Of subjectivity (in its nascent state)
Of the social (in its mutant state)
Of the environment (at the point it can be reinvented)
"*A process set up anywhere reverberates everywhere.*"

The Technologies of Lived Abstraction book series is dedicated to works of transdisciplinary reach inquiring critically but especially creatively into processes of subjective, social, and ethical-political emergence abroad in the world today. Thought and body, abstract and concrete, local and global, individual and collective: the works presented are not content to rest with the habitual divisions. They explore how these facets come formatively, reverberatively together, if only to form the movement by which they come again to differ.

Possible paradigms are many: autonomization, relation; emergence, complexity, process; individuation, (auto)poiesis; direct perception, embodied perception, perception-as-action; speculative pragmatism, speculative realism, radical empiricism; mediation, virtualization; ecology of practices, media ecology; technicity; micropolitics, biopolitics, ontopower. Yet there will be a common aim: to catch new thought and action dawning, at a creative crossing. The Technologies of Lived Abstraction series orients to the creativity at this crossing, in virtue of which life everywhere can be considered germinally aesthetic, and the aesthetic anywhere already political.

"*Concepts must be experienced. They are lived.*"

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Preface: A Philosophical Fantasy

This book originated out of a philosophical fantasy. I imagine a world in which Whitehead takes the place of Heidegger. Think of how important Heidegger has been for thinking and critical reflection over the past sixty years. What if Whitehead, instead of Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern thought? What would philosophy be like today? What different questions might we be asking? What different perspectives might we be viewing the world from?

The parallels between Heidegger and Whitehead are striking. *Being and Time* was published in 1927, *Process and Reality* in 1929. Two enormous philosophy books, almost exact contemporaries. Both books respond magisterially to the situation (I'd rather not say the crisis) of modernity, the immensity of scientific and technological change, the dissolution of old certainties, the increasingly fast pace of life, the massive reorganizations that followed the horrors of World War I. Both books take for granted the inexistence of foundations, not even fixating on them as missing, but simply going on without concern over their absence. Both books are antiessentialist and antipositivist, both of them are actively engaged in working out new ways to think, new ways to do philosophy, new ways to exercise the faculty of wonder.

And yet how different these two books are: in concepts, in method, in affect, and in spirit. I'd like to go through a series of philosophical questions and make a series of (admittedly tendentious) comparisons, in order to spell out these differences as clearly as possible.

1 *The question of beginnings* Where does one start in philosophy? Heidegger asks the question of Being: "Why is there something, rather than nothing?" But Whitehead is splendidly indifferent to this question. He asks, instead: "How is it that there is always something new?" Whitehead doesn't see any point in returning to our ultimate beginnings. He is interested in creation

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rather than rectification, Becoming rather than Being, the New rather than the immemorially old. I would suggest that, in a world where everything from music to DNA is continually being sampled and recombined, and where the shelf life of an idea, no less than of a fashion in clothing, can be measured in months if not weeks, Whitehead's question is the truly urgent one. Heidegger flees the challenges of the present in horror. Whitehead urges us to work with these challenges, to negotiate them. How, he asks, can our culture's incessant repetition and recycling nonetheless issue forth in something genuinely new and different?

2 *The question of the history of philosophy* Heidegger interrogates the history of philosophy, trying to locate the point where it went wrong, where it closed down the possibilities it should have opened up. Whitehead, to the contrary, is not interested in such an interrogation. "It is really not sufficient," he writes, "to direct attention to the best that has been said and done in the ancient world. The result is static, repressive, and promotes a decadent habit of mind." Instead of trying to pin down the history of philosophy, Whitehead twists this history in wonderfully ungainly ways. He mines it for unexpected creative sparks, excerpting those moments where, for instance, Plato affirms Becoming against the static world of Ideas, or Descartes refutes mind–body dualism.

3 *The question of metaphysics* Heidegger seeks a way out of metaphysics. He endeavors to clear a space where he can evade its grasp. But Whitehead doesn't yearn for a return before, or for a leap beyond, metaphysics. Much more subversively, I think, he simply *does* metaphysics in his own way, inventing his own categories and working through his own problems. He thereby makes metaphysics speak what it has usually denied and rejected: the body, emotions, inconstancy and change, the radical contingency of all perspectives and all formulations.

4 *The question of language* Heidegger exhorts us to "hearken patiently to the Voice of Being." He is always genuflecting before the enigmas of Language, the ways that it calls to us and commands us. Whitehead takes a much more open, pluralist view of the ways that language works. He knows that it contains mysteries, that it is far more than a mere tool or instrument. But he also warns us against exaggerating its importance. He always points up the

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incapacities of language—which means also the inadequacy of reducing philosophy to the interrogation and analysis of language.

5 *The question of style* A philosopher's attitude toward language is also embodied in his style of writing. Heidegger's contorted writing combines a heightened Romantic poeticism with the self-referential interrogation of linguistic roots and meanings. It's a style as portentous and exasperating as the mysteries it claims to disclose. Whitehead's language, to the contrary, is dry, gray, and abstract. But in this academic, fussy, almost pedantic prose, he is continually saying the most astonishing things, reigniting the philosophic sense of wonder at every step. The neutrality of Whitehead's style is what gives him the freedom to construct, to reorient, to switch direction. It's a kind of strategic counterinvestment, allowing him to step away from his own passions and interests, without thereby falling into the pretense of a universal higher knowledge. Whitehead's language exhibits a special sort of detachment, one that continues to insist upon that from which it has become detached: particulars, singularities, and perspectives that are always partial (in both senses of this word: partial as opposed to whole, but also partial in the sense of partiality or bias).

6 *The question of technology* Heidegger warns us against the danger of technological "enframing," with its reduction of nature to the status of a "standing reserve." He demonizes science, in a manner so sweeping and absolute as to be the mirror image of science's own claims to unique authority. But you can't undo what Whitehead calls the "bifurcation of nature" by simply dismissing one side of the dichotomy. Whitehead's account of science and technology is far subtler than Heidegger's, in part because he actually understands modern science, as Heidegger clearly does not. For Whitehead, scientific and technical rationality is one kind of "abstraction." This, in itself, is not anything bad. An abstraction is a simplification, a reduction, made in the service of some particular interest. As such, it is indispensable. We cannot live without abstractions; they alone make thought and action possible. We only get into trouble when we extend these abstractions beyond their limits, pushing them into realms where they no longer apply. This is what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness," and it's one to which modern science and technology have been especially prone. But all our other abstractions—notably including the abstraction we call language—need to be approached in the same spirit of

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caution. Indeed, Whitehead's reservations about science run entirely parallel to his reservations about language. (By rights, Heidegger ought to treat science and technology in the same way that he treats language: for language itself is a technology, and the essence of what is human involves technology in just the same way as it does language).

7 *The question of representation* Heidegger mounts an incessant critique of representationalist thought. As we busily represent the world to ourselves, he says, we do not allow it to stand forth in its Being. Whitehead similarly criticizes the way that Western philosophical thought, from Descartes onward, has excessively privileged "clear and distinct" conscious perception (what Whitehead calls "presentational immediacy"), ignoring the ways that this perception is always already grounded in our bodies, and in the inheritance of the present from the past (through the process of what Whitehead calls "causal efficacy"). But there's a big difference here of emphasis. For Heidegger, representation is *the problem*: one finds it everywhere, and one must always be vigilant against it. For Whitehead, this concern is exaggerated and misplaced. In everyday life (if not in post-Cartesian philosophy) representation plays only a minor role. Even when we do represent, we are also *feeling our bodies*, and *feeling with our bodies*. The Heideggerian (and deconstructionist) critique isn't wrong so much as it isn't all that interesting or important. Rather than insisting on critique, therefore, Whitehead shows us how the world is *already* otherwise.

8 *The question of subjectivity* Heidegger polemically questions the rampant subjectivism of the humanist tradition. He seeks to undo the illusion of the autonomous, essentialized ego, with its voracious will-to-power. Of course, this aggressive questioning is the flip side of Heidegger's ontological privileging of Man as the "shepherd of Being," and as the site where Language manifests itself. The subject must be understood as an effect of Language, because Language is what calls to us and interrogates us. Now, nothing could be more foreign to Whitehead than this whole polemic. As before, this is not because Whitehead is concerned to defend what Heidegger is attacking, but because his interests lie elsewhere. Whitehead does not see the subject as an effect of language. Rather, he sees subjectivity as embedded in the world. The subject is an irreducible part of the universe, of the way things happen. There is nothing outside of experience; and experience always happens to some subject or

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other. This subject may be human, but it also may be a dog, a tree, a mushroom, or a grain of sand. (Strictly speaking, any such entities are what Whitehead calls "societies," each composed of multitudes of "actual occasions," which themselves are the subjects in question.) In any case, the subject constitutes itself in and through its experience; and thereupon it perishes, entering into the "objective immortality" of being a "datum" for other experiences of other subjects. In this way, Whitehead abolishes the *ontological* privileging of human beings over all other subjectivities. This doesn't mean, of course, that the differences between human beings and other sorts of beings are irrelevant; such differences remain pragmatically important in all kinds of situations, and for all sorts of reasons. But in undoing the ontological privilege of being human, Whitehead suggests that the critique of the subject need not be so compulsive a focus of philosophical inquiry.

If Whitehead were to replace Heidegger as the inspiration of postmodern thought, our intellectual landscape would look quite different. Certain problems that we have been overly obsessed with would recede in importance, to be replaced by other questions, and other perspectives. What Isabelle Stengers calls a "constructivist" approach to philosophy would take precedence over the tasks of incessant deconstruction. Whitehead's thought has a kind of cosmic irony to it, which offers a welcome contrast both to the narcissistic theorizing to which the heirs of Heidegger are prone, and to the fatuous complacency of mainstream American pragmatism. Whitehead's metaphysics is a ramshackle construction, continually open to revision, and not an assertion of absolute truths. It stands outside the dualities—the subject or not, meaning or not, humanism or not—with which recent theoretical thought has so often burdened us. Whitehead both exemplifies, and encourages, the virtues of speculation, fabulation, and invention. These may be opposed both to the dogmatism of humanistic or positivistic certitudes *and* to the endless disavowals, splitting of hairs, and one-upmanship that has characterized so much recent academic "theory."

Without Criteria is an experiment; it is an attempt to rethink "postmodern" theory, and especially the theory of aesthetics, from a point of view that hearkens back to Whitehead instead of Heidegger. I do this largely by reading Whitehead in conjunction with Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze wrote only briefly about Whitehead; it is unclear how familiar he was with Whitehead, or to

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what degree he was influenced by Whitehead. Nevertheless, as I will try to show, there are important affinities and resonances between the work of Whitehead and that of Deleuze. In this book, I have tried to establish a sort of relay between the two thinkers, so that each of them helps to resolve difficulties in the work of the other. I started this book reading Whitehead from a Deleuzian perspective; by the time I was finished, I found myself, instead, reading Deleuze from a Whiteheadian perspective. This reversal of perspectives is one of the effects that reading Whitehead, and writing about him, has had on me. Critical writing should always be a transformative experience. As Michel Foucault put it many years ago: "what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?" (Foucault 1986, 8).

Deleuze's affinity with Whitehead lies, above all, in his focus on affect and singularity, as a way of working toward a nondialectical and highly aestheticized mode of critique. Deleuze's aestheticism, rooted in his readings of Kant and Nietzsche, is the most misunderstood aspect of his work. It remains a scandal for those few commentators who are willing to acknowledge it at all. One of the aims of *Without Criteria* is to argue for what can be best described as a *critical aestheticism*. I am well aware that aesthetics and aestheticism have had a bad name for quite some time. But perhaps we have reached the point today, in our post-everything world, where we can take a fresh look at aesthetics. Not the least scandalous of Whitehead's assertions are his maxims that "Beauty is a wider, and more fundamental, notion than Truth," and even that "Beauty is . . . the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying." I would like to explore these claims—in deliberate contrast to the ethical focus of so much recent academic discourse.

In working through the ideas of Whitehead and Deleuze, I have found it necessary, again and again, to revert to Kant—or at least to a certain dimension of Kant. Whitehead and Deleuze are not usually thought of as Kantian or "critical" thinkers. They seem much more attuned to pre-Kantian philosophers like Spinoza and Leibniz; when they do refer to Kant, it is most often in a disparaging way. Deleuze even says that his own book on Kant approaches Kant as an "enemy." Nevertheless, I argue that certain crucial aspects of Kant's thought pave the way for the philosophical "constructivism" embraced by both Whitehead and Deleuze. I am thinking particularly of Kant's aesthetics (above

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all, his "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the Third Critique), of his transcendental argument in the First Critique (with what Whitehead calls its "conception of an act of experience as a constructive functioning"), and of his Transcendental Dialectic in the second half of the First Critique (which offers an alternative to, and an anticipatory criticism of, the Hegelian dialectic).

In the words of Michel Foucault, Kant in these texts made an "opening" in Western thought because he "articulated, in a manner that is still enigmatic, metaphysical discourse and reflection on the limits of our reason" (Foucault 1998, 76). It is perfectly true that Kant himself does very little to explore this opening; most of the time, he closes it down again, returning us to what Foucault calls "the confused sleep of dialectics and of anthropology" (ibid.). Nonetheless, this opening is there, in the margins of Kant's texts, which overflow with suggestions and possibilities that still await their proper elaboration. Whitehead and Deleuze explore certain of these alternative possibilities. Their encounters with Kant (or better, their corrections and revisions of Kant) make for an important dimension of their texts. These encounters also allow us to see Kant himself in a new light. The Kant with whom we are most familiar is the thinker who stands behind Jürgen Habermas's project of establishing norms of communicative action. But the Kant revealed by Whitehead and Deleuze puts this project most radically into question, by problematizing the very idea of such norms. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, "Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is an unrestrained work of old age, which his successors have still not caught up with: all the mind's faculties overcome their limits, the very limits that Kant had so carefully laid down in the works of his prime" (1994, 2).

In the course of its readings of Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze, *Without Criteria* seeks to address a range of issues that are crucial to cultural theory today. The critical aestheticism that I discover in the conjunction of Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze helps to illuminate contemporary art and media practices (especially developments in digital film and video), contemporary scientific and technological practices (especially the recent advances in neuroscience and in biogenetic technology), and controversies in cultural theory and Marxist theory (such as questions about commodity fetishism, about immanence and transcendence, about the role of autopoietic or self-organizing systems, and about the ways that "innovation" and "creativity" seem to have become so central to the dynamics of postmodern, or post-Fordist, capitalism). For the most part, I do not address these matters directly here—that will be a

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task for another book. But my interest in them has largely shaped my selective readings of the texts of Kant, Whitehead, and Deleuze.

No book is ever written in a vacuum; and my intellectual indebtedness in the case of *Without Criteria* is especially great. My book is largely written in the margins of Isabelle Stengers's magnificent *Penser avec Whitehead*. With this text, Stengers both made Whitehead accessible to me for the first time, and opened up the question of Whitehead's affinity with Deleuze. Erin Manning and Brian Massumi encouraged me to write this book, nurtured it throughout the stages of its preparation, and invited me a number of times to their seminars and forums in research creation, where I was able to present portions of this text, and which provided me with the intellectual stimulus that I needed to complete it. Among the many other people with whom I discussed my work, or who read and commented on portions of the manuscript, I particularly wish to thank Keith Robinson, Charles Stivale, Daniel Smith, Tim Clark, Sha Xin Wei, William Flesch, Robert Gooding-Williams, and Barrett Watten, as well as the anonymous readers of my manuscript for MIT Press, the members of the Sense Lab at Concordia University in Montreal, and the readers of my blog the Pinocchio Theory (http://www.shaviro.com/Blog).

Some sections of this book have previously been published elsewhere. An earlier version of chapter 1 appears in *Sensorium: Aesthetics, Art, Life*, edited by Barbara Bolt, Felicity Colman, Graham Jones, and Ashley Woodward (London: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007). A portion of chapter 2 appears in *Secrets of Becoming: Negotiating Whitehead, Deleuze and Butler*, edited by Roland Faber (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009). A version of chapter 3 appears in *The Affect Reader*, edited by Greg Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). A portion of chapter 4 appears in *Deleuze, Guattari, and the Production of the New*, edited by Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (New York: Continuum, 2008). Another portion of chapter 4 appears in *Deleuze, Science, and the Force of the Virtual*, edited by Peter Gaffney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).

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1
Without Criteria

"There is no science of the beautiful [*das Schöne*], but only critique," Kant says in the *Critique of Judgment*, "and there is no fine [*schön*] science, but only fine art" (1987, 172). Most recent discussions of Kant's aesthetics have concentrated on his analysis of the sublime (which is seen as prefiguring modernist—or postmodernist—concerns and practices), rather than on his analysis of the beautiful (which is generally regarded as rather conservative and old-fashioned). In what follows, I endeavor to suggest, against this common wisdom, that Kant's account of beauty is quite radical in ways that have not yet been sufficiently recognized. For Kant's theory of the beautiful is really a theory of affect and of singularity; and it implies an entirely new form of judgment. In the "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the Third Critique, Kant steps back from the legitimizing and universalizing projects of the first two Critiques, in order to problematize universalization and legitimation themselves. Beauty cannot be judged according to concepts; it is a matter neither of empirical fact, nor of moral obligation. This is why there is no science of the beautiful. For Kant, aesthetics has no foundation, and it offers us no guarantees. Rather, it throws all norms and values into question, or into crisis. Even if Kant himself ultimately shrinks from the more radical implications of his theories, a certain *critical aestheticism* still haunts his texts, and especially the Third Critique. My aim in *Without Criteria* is to unearth this subterranean dimension of Kant's argument, and to track its crucial role in the metaphysical speculations of Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze.[1]

1. My starting point for these readings and speculations is an article I wrote quite some time ago: "Beauty Lies in the Eye" (Shaviro 2002). In that text, I argued for the continuing relevance of the beautiful, rather than the sublime, for a contemporary or "postmodern" aesthetics;

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Beauty, Kant says, is not cognitive, not conceptual. "A judgment of taste is not based on *determinate* concepts"; that is to say, the concept behind such a judgment (if it can be called a "concept" at all) "does not allow us to cognize and prove anything concerning the object because it is intrinsically indeterminable and inadequte for cognition" (Kant 1987, 213). There is no objective or scientific way to determine whether an object is beautiful, and—if it is—to explain why. This is because of the strange status of aesthetic judgment. I may judge a flower to be beautiful, yet I know that "beauty is not a property of the flower itself"; the flower is beautiful "only by virtue of that characteristic in which it adapts itself to the way we apprehend it" (145). So beauty is not objectively *there*, in the world. It is not *in* nature; it is rather something that we attribute *to* nature. An aesthetic judgment, therefore, is one "whose determining basis *cannot be other* than *subjective*" (44).

Yet at the same time, beauty isn't *merely* subjective. It isn't just something that we project upon whatever it is that we see, hear, feel, touch, or taste. The attribution of beauty is not an arbitrary imposition. There is nothing about it that is special, or particular, to the person who happens to be making the judgment. It is not even "universally" subjective; for, in contrast to an empirical judgment of the understanding, a judgment of taste does not involve the mind's active impressing of its own Categories upon a passive external world. Rather, a judgment of taste involves an uncoerced *response*, on the part of the subject, to the object that is being judged beautiful. Aesthetic judgment is a kind of *recognition*: it's an appreciation of how the object "adapts itself to the way we apprehend it," even though, at the same time, it remains indifferent to us.

I'm inclined to read "adapt" here in a Darwinian sense (even though, of course, Kant could not have intended it this way). Deleuze and Guattari

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I explored the ramifications of Kant's claim that a judgment of taste is nonconceptual; I suggested that there was a close affinity between Kant's notion of beauty and Deleuze's notion of singularity; and I proposed that a radicalization of Kant's "Antinomy of Taste" (1987, 210ff.) could lead to the transformation of Kant's *sensus communis* into a "cultivation and sharing of the highest possible degree of singularity" (Shaviro 2002, 17), or into what today we should call a *dissensus* (Ranciere 2004) rather than a consensus. All these points are pursued further, and expanded on, in the course of *Without Criteria*.

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(1987) use the familiar scientific example of the orchid and the wasp. The orchid "adapts itself" to the way the wasp apprehends it; as a result, the wasp finds the orchid beautiful. The orchid isn't beautiful in and for itself; it is only beautiful *for* the wasp (and perhaps, too, for us). The orchid's interests, however, have nothing in particular to do with the wasp; the orchid only uses the wasp as a vector for its own pollination. It suits the plant just as well if a human being, having been seduced by the flower's beauty, pollinates it instead. Thus the orchid is indifferent even to the existence of the wasp; the exchange between the two organisms is what Deleuze and Guattari, quoting Rémy Chauvin, call "the *aparallel evolution* of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other" (1987, 10).

You might say that the beauty of the orchid is what Whitehead, in *Process and Reality*, calls "a lure for feeling" (1929/1978, 25 and *passim*). Whitehead prefers to speak of *propositions*, rather than judgments, because the notion of judgment tends to imply, wrongly, that "the one function" of propositions and theories "is to be judged as to their truth or falsehood" (184). Whitehead insists, rather, that "at some point" in the entertainment of a proposition "judgment is eclipsed by aesthetic delight" (185). Sometimes, of course, what supervenes is aesthetic repulsion rather than delight. But in any case, whether true or false, delicious or repugnant, a proposition points to a *potentiality* (186, 196–197). That is to say, propositions are neither actual nor fictive; they are "the tales that might be told about particular actualities," from a given perspective, and that enter into the construction (or what Whitehead calls the *concrescence*) of that very perspective (256). As such, propositions are possible routes of actualization, vectors of nondeterministic change. The "primary role" of a proposition, Whitehead says, is to "pave the way along which the world advances into novelty. . . . A proposition is an element in the objective lure *proposed for feeling*, and when admitted into feeling it constitutes *what is felt*" (187). The orchid is not beautiful in itself: but something *happens to* the wasp, or to the gardener, who encounters the orchid and feels it to be beautiful.[2]

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2. Whitehead does not ignore the question of judgment; but he regards *judgment* as a much narrower term than *proposition*. Any proposition that is admitted into thought is thereby felt, and

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Though Kant refers to "judgments of taste" rather than to "propositions," he is in accord with Whitehead at least to this extent: he says that aesthetic judgments have nothing to do with determinations of truth and falsehood. (They also have nothing to do with moral determinations of good and evil.) This is because a judgment of beauty is affective, rather than cognitive. More precisely, it is a feeling entirely divorced from objective knowledge. "A judgment of taste," Kant says, "is merely *contemplative*, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the existence of the object: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure." Such a judgment "is neither *based* on concepts, nor directed to them as *purposes*" (Kant 1987, 51). In an aesthetic judgment, I am not asserting anything about what is, nor am I legislating as to what ought to be. Rather, I am being lured, allured, seduced, repulsed, incited, or dissuaded. And for Whitehead—if not explicitly for Kant—this is part of the process by which I *become* what I am.

Beauty is therefore an *event*, a process, rather than a condition or a state. The flower is not beautiful in itself; rather, beauty *happens* when I *encounter* the flower. Beauty is fleeting, and it is always imbued with otherness. For although the feeling of beauty is "subjective," I cannot experience it at will. I can only find beauty when the object solicits me, or arouses my sense of beauty, in a certain way. Also, beauty does not survive the moment of the en-

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becomes a feeling. But only some of these feelings are judgments. "In the realization of propositions, 'judgment' is at very rare component, and so is 'consciousness' " (1929/1978, 184).

More specifically, "the term 'judgment' refers to three species among the comparative feelings. . . . In each of these feelings the datum is the generic contrast between an objectified nexus and a proposition whose logical subjects make up the nexus" (ibid., 270). That is to say, a judgment involves a "felt contrast" between a state of affairs ("an objectified nexus") and a hypothesis (a "proposition") concerning that state of affairs. The three "species" of judgment are the affirmative ("the 'yes-form' "), the negative ("the 'no-form' "), and the uncertain ("the 'suspense-form' "). Thus, what Whitehead calls judgments are the feelings corresponding to the cognitions that Kant calls judgments of the understanding, or judgments "based on *determinate* concepts" (1987, 213). As for Kant's judgments of taste, or judgments based only on *indeterminate* concepts, Whitehead would regard their corresponding feelings as propositional, but not as involving judgment.

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counter in which it is created. It cannot be recovered once it is gone. It can only be born afresh in another event, another encounter. A subject does not cognize the beauty of an object. Rather, the object *lures* the subject while remaining indifferent to it; and the subject *feels* the object, without knowing it or possessing it or even caring about it. The object *touches* me, but for my part I cannot grasp it or lay hold of it, or make it last. I cannot dispel its otherness, its alien splendor. If I could, I would no longer find it beautiful; I would, alas, merely find it useful.

This is why the apprehension of beauty is *disinterested*. The beautiful object is unconcerned with me; and in return, I have no actual interest in it. I don't care what benefit it can offer me, or what empirical "gratification" (Kant 1987, 47) it can give me, or even if it exists or not. I am only concerned with how it makes me feel; that is to say, with how it *affects* me. Outside of cognition or utilitarian interest, this is how the beautiful object allures me. In Whitehead's terms, "the basis of experience is emotional . . . the basic fact is the rise of an affective tone originating from things whose relevance is given." This *affective tone* is the "subjective form" through which "the experience constitutes itself" (Whitehead 1933/1967, 176–177).

In this way, the aesthetic experience is *intense* precisely to the extent that it is devoid of interest. "All interest," Kant says, whether empirical or rational, "either presupposes a need or gives rise to one"; only aesthetic judgment is detached from need. Kant notes that a starving person will eat just about anything; it is "only when their need has been satisfied," only when they are well fed and assured of remaining so, that people have the leisure to develop and express their *taste* with regard to food. It's only when I don't *need* something that my liking for it, my being affected by it, can be "disinterested and *free*" (Kant 1987, 52). The disinterested contemplation of beauty is a utopian conception, in that it requires and presupposes a world in which human needs have already been fulfilled.

Aesthetic disinterest may seem cold and detached, but it isn't neutral. From the indifference of the object to the disinterest of the subject—or from the former's superfluous self-exhibition to the latter's ungrounded reception—the experience of beauty is one of distance and separation. This distance is not a mere absence; it is something positively felt. When I contemplate something that I consider beautiful, I am moved precisely by that something's separation from me, its exemption from the categories that I would normally apply to it.

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This is why beauty is a lure, drawing me out of myself. Aesthetic experience is a kind of *communication without communion* and *without consensus*. It can be shared, or held in common, without uniting the ones who share it. This is all because it is "a universal communicability that is indeed not based on a concept" (Kant 1987, 79). As pure, contentless communicability, beauty is also a pure effect, divorced from its rational and material causes. The painter Francis Bacon conveys this point well when he says that, in his paintings of "the human cry," he "wanted to paint the scream [itself] more than the horror" that provoked it (Sylvester 1987, 34, 48). Bacon's scream paintings are disturbingly beautiful, all the more so in that the situations to which they refer are not.[3]

A good synonym for Kantian aesthetic disinterest might well be *passion*. The scandal of passion is that it is utterly gratuitous: it has no grounding, and no proper occasion. In this sense, it is entirely free (though I am not free with regard to it). Passion has nothing to do with my actual needs, let alone with my self-interest, or with what is "good for me." It doesn't seem to be anything of mine. It moves me, drives me, takes possession of me; but it al-

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3. Gilles Deleuze (2005, 34) cites this aphorism of Bacon's in the course of his discussion of the painter. The cry without the horror is the effect without the cause, or the event freed from the limits of its actualization in the depths of bodies: a configuration of the "virtual" to which I will return several times in the later chapters of this book.

Deleuze also implicitly invokes the Kantian notion of aesthetic disinterest in his discussion, in the second *Cinema* volume, of how films invoke "a pure optical and sound situation": one that "does not extend into action, any more than it is induced by an action." In such a situation, the sensory-motor circuits are paralyzed. Instead of allowing us to act, an optical and sound situation "makes us grasp, it is supposed to make us grasp, something intolerable and unbearable" (1989, 18). In this "visionary" state, the spectator is forcibly *disinterested*, in the sense that he or she is unable to act, unable to respond, unable to bring the vision in relation to himself or herself, unable to be equal to its extremity. The compulsion that Deleuze is describing might seem to be leagues away from the free exercise of the faculties that characterizes the aesthetic state according to Kant. But Deleuzian compulsion and Kantian freeplay alike are states in which the subject's "interests" play no part, because the subject experiences, and is brought into intimate contact with, something that is irreducibly distant from itself, something that exceeds any possibility of actualization.

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ways remains *apart* from me, outside of my control. It is something superfluous and supplemental, yet inescapable. I pursue my passions without regard to my interests and needs, and even to their detriment.[4]

At the same time that passion is divorced from need, it also does not have the grandeur and seriousness that we commonly associate with desire. Kant is quite explicit about the difference between "the power of desire" (as theorized in the Second Critique) and the "feeling of pleasure and displeasure" that is the main topic of the Third (Kant 1987, 16). He defines desire as "the power of being the cause, through one's presentations, of the actuality of the objects of these presentations" (ibid.). This is a difficult formulation, but it is worth unpacking. Desire, for Kant, is what determines the will. It cannot be understood in terms of negativity and absence, for it is an active, autonomous power of the mind. The "object of desire" is not something that the subject lacks; to the contrary, it is what the subject imagines and creates. The act of desiring is the cause, and the existence of the desired object is the effect.

4. In thus relating passion and disinterest, I am drawing a parallel between the paralyzing vision of the intolerable described by Deleuze (see previous note) and Andy Warhol's self-described "affectless gaze" of "basically passive astonishment" (Warhol 1975, 10; cf. Shaviro 2004, 138). These might seem like opposites, but they both turn on the "aesthetic" suspension of ordinary self-interest. In other words, they both involve a "lure" which impinges on a previously constituted subject, and forcibly ejects it from its self-constituting, and self-confirming orbit. The ultimate form of aesthetic disinterest or passion would be the so-called Stendhal syndrome, in which the encounter with a beautiful work of art leads to swooning and hallucinations (cf. Dario Argento's film *The Stendhal Syndrome*, 1996).

Passion or disinterest is, of course, the dimension of human experience that is entirely left out of consideration by cognitive psychology, and by "rational choice" theory in economics and political science. If (neoclassical) economics is the "science" of how people make "choices" when faced with scarcity or limited resources, and if it is based on the assumptions that people "basically aim to fulfill their self-interests," and that they "are rational in their efforts to fulfill their unlimited wants and needs" (Investopedia 2008), then passion and aesthetic disinterest are excluded from economics *a priori* and by definition. They belong, rather, to what Georges Bataille calls *expenditure* (1985, 116–129), or the "accursed share" not reducible to the demands of utility (1988).

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In short, *desire produces the real.*[5] Kant insists that the empirical existence of failed and unfulfilled desires does not contradict this formulation. For even when a desire turns out to be "insufficient," so that the corporeal forces it calls on are unable to fully actualize its object, there is still a positive "causal relation" between the desire as a mobilization of force, and the effect toward which it was striving (ibid., 17). This is also what links desire to morality. In its pure form, the power of desire is Reason and universal Law: it legislates, and produces, the categorical imperative. Of course, just as empirical actions never fully conform to the categorical imperative, since they have other motivations than that of respect for the Law, so empirical desires are never pure, but always "pathological," or tinged with interest. Nonetheless, even the most limited and pathological desire, far from compromising the Law, bears witness to it, as a sort of "evidence of things not seen."

We can thus oppose desire to passion, reason to feelings of pleasure and displeasure, moral disinterest to aesthetic disinterest, the concerns of the Second Critique to those of the Third. Desire is autonomous, absolute, and universalizing, whereas passion is heteronomous, gratuitous, and singular. Reason transcends all interests; aesthetic feeling subsists beneath or before any interests. Desire is active and expressive: it comes out of the subject and legislates

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5. Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 25) are rigorously Kantian when they assert that desire produces the real, in opposition to Hegelian and Lacanian definitions of desire as "lack." They are closer to Whitehead than to Kant, however, in that they place the subject not at the beginning of the productive process of desire, but at the end. "The subject is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines . . . a conjunctive synthesis of consummation in the form of a wonderstruck 'So *that's* what it was!' " (ibid., 17–18). In this sense, the subject is defined as a supplemental torsion in the field of desiring production, a self-reflexive twist that produces self-enjoyment. "Even suffering, as Marx says, is a form of self-enjoyment" (ibid., 16). This accords with Whitehead's doctrine that the subject is always also a *superject* (1929/1978, 29), coming after the process of creation rather than before, and experiencing "satisfaction" (25–26), or "self-enjoyment" (145, 289), precisely to the extent that it is itself a product of this satisfaction. For both Whitehead and Deleuze and Guattari, this inversion implies a movement from the world to the self (rather than, as in Kant, from the self to the world), and implicitly privileges passion/disinterest over desire.

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for the world. Passion, in contrast, emerges out of the world and approaches, or proposes itself to, the subject. More precisely, passion is not just passive (as its etymology suggests), but hyperbolically more-than-passive. The subject is not so much acted upon as it is incited to re-create itself. Desire is how the self projects itself into, and remakes, the world; aesthetic feeling is how the world projects itself into, and remakes, the self.

These differences correspond to Kant's doctrine of the faculties. "All of the soul's powers or capacities," he says, "can be reduced to three that cannot be derived further from a common basis: the *cognitive power*, the *feeling of pleasure and displeasure*, and the *power of desire*" (1987, 16). The doctrine of the faculties has little currency today; but even if it is just a fiction, it is a useful and illuminating one. For the doctrine of the faculties allows Kant to draw crucial structural distinctions. Whereas cognition and desire are powers (*Vermögen*), the aesthetic capacity is a feeling (*Gefühl*). Cognition and desire *go out from* the subject to the world, while the pleasure of beauty *comes into it*, from elsewhere. In desire, as in cognition, experience begins with the subject; in aesthetic feeling, experience begins outside, and culminates, or *eventuates*, in the subject.

All this can also be stated in terms of Kant's distinction between concepts of understanding and ideas; and among ideas between aesthetic and rational ones. "Ideas, in the broadest sense, are presentations referred to an object . . . but are such that they can still never become cognition of an object" (Kant 1987, 214–215). So many of our thoughts are not statements of matters of fact; so many of our utterances are not constative. And these noncognitive "presentations" are themselves of two sorts. *Aesthetic ideas* are "inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate" (182–183); "an *aesthetic idea* cannot become cognition because it is an *intuition* (of the imagination) for which an adequate concept can never be found" (215). In contrast, "a *rational idea* can never become cognition because it contains a *concept* (of the supersensible) for which no adequate intuition can ever be given" (215). Aesthetic ideas are "*unexpoundable* presentations," whereas rational ideas are "*indemonstrable* concepts" (215). An aesthetic idea is a singular intimation of beauty; it "prompts much thought," but "no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it" (182). A rational idea has to do, rather, with the sublime; it resists and subdues thought, yet thereby seems to prompt an excess of language. I cannot understand a

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sublime experience, but I am impelled to speak endlessly about my failure to understand it.[6]

Kant famously writes in the First Critique that "thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (1996, 107). This is supposed to mean that intuition and concept must always go together. But now, in the Third Critique, he discovers the actuality of contentless thoughts and blind intuitions. For rational ideas are precisely thoughts that no content can fill; and aesthetic ideas are intuitions that admit of no concept. Once we leave the realm of the understanding, we discover a fundamental asymmetry between concepts and intuitions, such that each of them exceeds the powers of the other. In the Second Critique, we are obliged to affirm—and indeed to live by—certain concepts, even though we know them to be undemonstrable. But at least we still have concepts, and the will that legislates these concepts is still, ultimately, our own. The Third Critique goes much further, as it dispenses with concepts altogether, as well as with an active, orginary self. Aesthetic ideas are no more moral than they are conceptual. Beauty is felt, rather than comprehended or willed. Intuition is decoupled from thought.

In *Process and Reality* Whitehead cites Kant's famous statement about intuitions and thoughts twice, in order to point up this disconnection. He ironically accepts "Kant's principle," only to apply it "in exactly the converse way to Kant's own use of it" (1929/1978, 139). Whitehead suggests that Kant's system is founded on the "suppressed premise" that "intuitions are never blind": that is to say, that all apprehension is, in principle and in fact,

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6. This approach to the sublime would seem to be the strategy of deconstruction, which I largely regard as a footnote to Kant. Jacques Derrida's lifelong task as a philosopher was basically the Kantian one of critiquing what Kant calls *transcendental illusions*: "sophistries not of human beings but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest among all human beings cannot detach himself from them; perhaps he can after much effort forestall the error, but he can never fully rid himself of the illusion that incessantly teases and mocks him" (Kant 1996, 380–381). Derrida follows Kant's program in that he ceaselessly interrogates these illusions that are built into the very nature of rationality itself, and endeavors, patiently and carefully, to undo them, while remaining aware that such an undoing will never be definitive or final. In sum, Derrida is the great twentieth-century thinker of the Kantian sublime, whereas Whitehead and Deleuze are (more interestingly to my mind) thinkers of the Kantian beautiful.

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already governed by concepts. But this premise must be rejected, once we have rejected Kant's "obsess[ion] with the mentality of 'intuition,' and hence with its necessary involution in consciousness" (ibid.). Some pages later, Whitehead accepts Kant's claim that "in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge," objects that, in principle, *can* be known. But Whitehead immediately adds that there is no reason to assume that these objects actually *are* cognized, or that cognition actually *is* involved, in any given experience. Most of the time, it is not. "The inclusion of intellectual functioning in th[e] act of experience" is in fact quite rare; "no knowledge" is by far the most usual case (155–156).

Whitehead describes the difference between his own philosophy and Kantian critique thus: "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world—a 'superject' rather than a 'subject' " (Whitehead 1929/1978, 88). Kant's greatness, Whitehead says, is that "he first, fully and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of experience as a constructive functioning." But the problem is that "for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a passage from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience" (156). Whitehead thus presents his own philosophy as the inversion, correction, and culmination of Kantian critique: "a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant put his *Critique of Pure Reason*. This should also supercede the remaining *Critiques* required in the Kantian philosophy" (113). In this way, he performs a philosophical "self-correction" of the "initial excess of subjectivity" of Kant's own critiques (15).

Whitehead continues to ask the Kantian question of "constructive functioning," of how the subject arises in and through experience. Kant and Whitehead do not presuppose a subject existing outside of, and prior to, experience, as Descartes does; but neither do they dissolve the subject into the flux of experience, as Hume does. However, Kant assumes, in the First Critique, that experience is fundamentally conscious and cognitive. Whitehead says, to the contrary, that "in general, consciousness is negligible" in subjective experience (1929/1978, 308). Most of the time, even for human beings, let alone for other entities, experience is "implicit, below consciousness, in our

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physical feelings" (229). These "physical feelings" precede the subject; the latter is best described as the integration (in a quasi-mathematical sense), or as the "end" (both sequentially and causally), of the former. The subject is solicited by the feelings that comprise it; it only comes to be through those feelings. It is not a substance, but a process. And this process is not usually conscious; it only becomes so under exceptional circumstances. This is why Whitehead devalues knowledge, inverting the Kantian relation between subject and object, self and world.

This is also why Whitehead says that the subject is not self-perpetuating, but must be continually renewed. The subject does not outlive the feelings that animate it at any given moment. "The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses the same river twice' is extended," Whitehead says; "no thinker thinks twice; and, to put the matter more generally, no subject experiences twice" (1929/1978, 29). Each new experience, even each repetition of what we think of as the "same" experience, implies a fresh creation, and a new subject. To say this is not to deny the sense of continuity that we actually feel from one moment to the next. Such a sense of continuity is easily explained, in Whitehead's terms, by inheritance. For the "datum" of any new experience is largely composed of the remnants of immediately past experiences, located in the same bodily mass, or in the same close neighborhood. But Whitehead's crucial point is that this sense of continuity is not self-evident, not given in advance. We cannot presuppose it, or take it for granted. It is rather what most urgently requires explanation. For the default situation of the subject, as of everything that exists in time, is to perish. Locke's phrase, that time is a "perpetual perishing," runs like a leitmotif through the pages of *Process and Reality* (e.g., 29, 147, 208ff.).

I have already mentioned that, for Whitehead, the subject is also a *superject*: not something that underlies experience, but something that emerges from experience, something that is superadded to it. This doesn't mean that Whitehead abolishes the subject, as "postmodern" thinkers are often accused of doing. Indeed, for Whitehead, just as much as for Kant, there is nothing outside of experience, and no experience without a subject. "The whole universe," Whitehead says, "consists of elements disclosed in the experiences of subjects" (ibid., 166). There is always a subject, though not necessarily a human one. Even a rock—and for that matter even an electron—has experiences, and must be considered a subject-superject to a certain extent. A falling

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rock "feels," or "perceives," the gravitational field of the earth. The rock isn't conscious, of course; but it is *affected* by the earth, and this *being affected* is its experience. What makes a subject-superject is not consciousness, but unity, identity, closure, and transcendence. Each subject is "something individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actuality" (ibid., 88). It is different from everything else; nothing can be substituted or exchanged for it. "The term 'monad' also expresses this essential unity at the decisive moment, which stands between its birth and its perishing" (Whitehead 1933/1967, 177). In the moment of its actualization, a subject is entirely, irreducibly *singular*. Right afterward, of course, the moment passes, and the subject is "objectified" as a "datum" for other occasions; but that is another story.

I have been dwelling on Whitehead's self-proclaimed inversion of Kant, because I want to suggest that Kant himself already performs something like this inversion, or self-correction, in the Third Critique. For there, Kant proposes a subject that neither comprehends nor legislates, but only feels and responds. The aesthetic subject does not impose its forms upon an otherwise chaotic outside world. Rather, this subject is itself *informed by* the world outside, a world that (in the words of Wallace Stevens) "fills the being before the mind can think." Being thus informed, the aesthetic subject is *contemplative*: it is neither active nor quite passive, nor even really self-reflexive, but best described grammatically in the *middle voice* (which unfortunately doesn't exist in German or English). In aesthetic contemplation, I don't *have* particular feelings, so much as my very existence is suspended upon these feelings. The only "causality" of an aesthetic presentation, Kant says, is "to *keep* [us in] the state of [having] the presentation itself. . . . We *linger* in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation reinforces and reproduces itself" (1987, 68). It is a kind of auto-affecting short circuit. The contemplated object perpetuates itself in, and for, the contemplating subject; the subject subsists only to the extent that it resonates with the feelings inspired by that object. We can say, somewhat paradoxically, that the subject is *auto-affected by* the objectified "datum" that enters into it. The feelings cannot be separated from the subject for whom they exist; yet the subject itself can only be said to exist by virtue of these feelings, and in relation to them.

Expressed in this auto-affecting short circuit, and without any concept to determine it, beauty is always singular. An aesthetic judgment responds to a unique situation; it cannot be repeated, generalized, or codified into rules.

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In Kant's terms, we are faced with "the universality of a singular judgment" (1987, 144): the claim to beauty is absolute, and yet at the same time limited to just this one instance. Each encounter with beauty is something entirely new; each aesthetic judgment responds to a contingency. This is why beauty is *incommunicable*: it cannot be copied and imitated, just as "it cannot be couched in a formula and serve as a precept" (177). Rather, Kant says, beauty is *exemplary* (175). An artwork of genius, for instance, "is an example that is meant not to be imitated, but to be followed by another genius. . . . The other genius, who follows the example, is aroused by it to a feeling of his own originality, which allows him to exercise in art his freedom from the constraint of rules" (186–187). That is to say, although we cannot mimic or replicate what we find beautiful, or explain it to others (or even to ourselves), it can inspire us to an act of emulation. And where we cannot communicate the inner sensations of beauty, or the grounds for any particular judgment of taste, the only things that do remain "universally communicable" (157) are "the subjective conditions for our employment of the power of judgment as such" (155). In short, there are no rules, methods, foundations, or criteria for the creation and appreciation of beauty. All we have are examples of what is beautiful, and the "subjective conditions" for striving to equal or surpass them.[7]

Kant's aesthetics is just one part of his system. He insists that aesthetic judgments are noncognitive, in order to differentiate them from judgments of understanding (which concern matters of empirical fact) and from moral judgments (which are categorical obligations or commands). This attempt to distinguish different sorts of judgment, and to circumscribe the powers and limits of each, remains crucial today. For it warns us against the totalitarianism of reason, or (to express the point more modestly) against the endeavor of scientists, philosophers, political despots, and religious fanatics to impose a unified field of assessment, in which the same fundamental critical standards

7. Derrida's frequent discussions of *exemplarity*, of the noncoincidence between the example and that of which it is an example, of the way that "an example always carries beyond itself" (1994, 34), are very much written in the margins of Kant's discussions of exemplarity in *The Critique of Judgment*.

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would apply across all disciplines. Such an imposition could only have catastrophic consequences, for it would mean the end of any sort of novelty, creativity, or invention. Needless to say, this dream of totalizing reason is as incapable of realization as it is undesirable in principle. But it is also a dream that never goes away, since it is what Kant calls a "transcendental illusion," a self-deception built into the very nature of reason. Since we are always being lured by this illusion, like moths to a flame, we always need Kant to warn us against it. In the end, of course, the mania for reason, truth, foundations, and universally valid criteria is as singular, as gratuitous, and as intractable as any other passion. As Whitehead says, "the primary function of theories is as a lure for feeling" (1929/1978, 184); and we cannot do without such theories and such lures.

The *Critique of Judgment* might seem to play merely a marginal role in Kant's system. But when Whitehead says that philosophy should begin with a "critique of pure feeling," instead of reason, this amounts to putting the Third Critique first. For Whitehead, affect precedes cognition, and has a much wider scope than cognition. Understanding and morality alike must therefore be subordinated to aesthetics. It is only after the subject has constructed or synthesized itself out of its feelings, out of its encounters with the world, that it can then go on to understand that world—or to change it.

Such a revision or "correction" of Kant is more relevant today than ever. Kant was trying, among other things, to separate science from art, in order to define the proper limits of each. In practice, this meant preserving the arts and humanities from scientific encroachment, something that is still important today. But we also live in an age of astonishing invention and relentless innovation, when, as Fredric Jameson puts it, "aesthetic production" has become the "dominant cultural logic or hegemonic norm" (1991, 4–6). Even positivistic science finds itself approaching ever closer to the condition of aesthetics. Theoretical physics, for instance, seems to leave questions of empirical verification behind, as it pursues an ever-receding "final theory of everything," whose sole justification lies in the beauty of its theorems, the elegance and internal self-consistency of its mathematics.

Genetics and biotechnology are even more perplexing, since they are less about understanding the external world than they are about experimenting on—and thereby altering—ourselves. We are on the verge of developing the ability to clone ourselves, to tweak our genetic makeup, to hybridize ourselves

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through gene splicing, to incorporate silicon chips into our brains, to interface machinery directly with our nervous systems, and to reset our neurotransmitter and hormone levels at will. Such practices are inherently risky and unpredictable. How can we come to terms with forms of "knowledge" whose very effect is to change who "we" are? How do we judge these disciplines, when they undermine, or render irrelevant, the very norms and criteria that we use to ground our judgments? What will we do when advances in these practices force us to redefine, ever more radically, what we mean by such basic notions as self, life, humanity, and nature? The new biology, as much as any new work of art, requires us to abandon everything we think we know, and make singular judgments that cannot be subsumed under preexisting criteria. Aesthetics precedes cognition in such cases, because we are dealing with practices that can only be comprehended through the new categories that they themselves create. The question we should be asking, therefore, is not: How can we establish valid criteria and critical standards? but rather: How can we *get away* from such criteria and standards, which work only to block innovation and change?

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