

This is a section of [doi:10.7551/mitpress/8179.001.0001](https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8179.001.0001)

Engineering a Safer World

Systems Thinking Applied to Safety

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Citation:

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DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/8179.001.0001

ISBN (electronic): 9780262298247

Publisher: The MIT Press

Published: 2016



The MIT Press

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This book was set in Syntax and Times Roman by Toppan Best-set Premedia Limited. Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Leveson, Nancy.

Engineering a safer world : systems thinking applied to safety / Nancy G. Leveson.

p. cm.—(Engineering systems)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-262-01662-9 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Industrial safety. 2. System safety. I. Title.

T55.L466 2012

620.8'6—dc23

2011014046

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