6   Building Better Resilience in a Least Developed Country

You want me to tell you what the Haitians did to help Haitians after the earthquake? Not the NGOs? Well, nobody has ever asked me that! There is a lot we did, so much that has gone untold.

—Jean François, victim entrepreneur in Haiti

To this point in the book, we have focused primarily on developing the concept of spontaneous compassionate venturing, the way it fits into the broader conversations of disaster response, and the impact it has both on the entrepreneurs and on those being helped. To isolate our focus on those aspects, we developed three different studies focused exclusively on a single disaster context in Australia as this helped us develop a robust foundation for our main ideas concerning spontaneous venturing. Furthermore, our approach extends research that explores how actors in developed countries interpret and respond to crises through compassionate venturing.[1]

As we progressed in our thinking on the topic of spontaneous venturing, we began to wonder whether the phenomenon was limited to economically well-to-do contexts. Are compassionate ventures merely the product of a wealthy economic context? That is, were victims of the Australian bushfires who started ventures able to act because they were in a national context that was rich in resources? How would victims in less developed economies respond to a crisis? Would they be similarly well equipped to provide rapid, customized, and high-magnitude responses to disasters, or would they require more outside support? While considering these questions, we also noted some disheartening data on disasters, namely, that disasters tend to disproportionally affect the most economically vulnerable (UN 2015). A recent book (Guha-Sapir, Santos, and Borde 2013) summarizes the situation this way:

Since the turn of the millennium, more than 2.3 billion people have been directly affected by natural disasters—several of these have killed nearly 100,000 people within a matter of 24 hours. Moreover, the global alarm generated during the last decade by events such as the 2004 tsunami in Asia, Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, and more recently the 2011 tsunami in Japan … has renewed the policy and academic interest on understanding the … consequences of natural disasters. … Poverty remains the main risk factor determining the long-term impact of natural hazards. Furthermore, natural disasters have themselves a tremendous impact on the poorest of the poor, who are often ill-prepared to deal with the natural hazards and for whom a hurricane, or earthquake, or a drought can mean a permanent submersion into poverty. (p. 1).

Catastrophic disasters … can set the development process back for decades. In addition to the immediate effects, low-intensity asset loss and livelihood disruption over extensive areas where people and economic activities are exposed to localized hazard events, steadily erode the coping capacity of families and communities, pushing them into increasing marginalization.

Poor communities living in high-risk areas … [experience] permanent or temporary loss of the communities' productive base, aggravating their level of poverty, and, in some cases, triggering migration. … While death is often the immediate and tragic consequence of a disaster, economic losses and the inability of the underprivileged to recuperate over the medium and long term add additional burdens (p. vii).

One of the main arguments made for countries that are the "poorest of the poor" is that they generally lack the resources to adequately prepare for and respond to a disaster (Guha-Sapir, Santos, and Borde 2013). While we certainly agree there is merit to this argument in terms of poor infrastructure, inadequate disaster preparedness, and so forth, we were curious to see whether such countries might have other resources (similar to those described in chapter 4) that could be deployed to build or develop resilience (see chapter 5) in an underdeveloped context. This chapter explores the topic of compassionate venturing in an extremely poor context, Haiti. Specifically, we examine the local compassionate venturing that occurred after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti in 2010.

As we explore spontaneous venturing in this context, we hope to apply the insights and observations discussed in earlier chapters and also introduce new insights from the Haitian context that expand our knowledge. In particular, we introduce the concept of building resilience in a community, which extends concepts introduced earlier, including the nature of being local and launching a venture, the role of networks in the types and applications of resources, and the

performance of spontaneous ventures. We also discuss the potential drawbacks to creative resourcefulness. In earlier chapters, we talked about the benefits of bundling resources to achieve a new venture's goals. By exploring resourcefulness in the extreme setting of post-earthquake Haiti, we are able to pinpoint difficulties that may arise when ventures take resourcefulness too far.

Haiti is a country with a rich history and legacy. It had the first successful self-liberation of an enslaved population (from 1791 to 1804), which had a substantial impact on the history of the slave trade throughout the world. Despite this significant past, Haiti has gone from crisis to crisis throughout its entire history. These crises have inevitably drawn in external actors; a tradition that continues today. In a recent article exploring the role of external organizations in Haiti following the earthquake, Edmonds (2013: 440–441) explained the following:

Before the earthquake, Haiti was routinely referred to as the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere, the prototypical failed state—a little piece of sub-Saharan Africa only 750km off of the Florida coast. In the midst of all of these derogatory references, there has been little to no discussion in the media about how the "basket case of the hemisphere" has been predominately engineered through slavery, colonialism, genocide, economic terrorism, political manipulation and foreign military occupation.

After the success of the Haitian Revolution in 1804, the colonial powers of the time decided that an independent Haiti would pose a threat to the entire system of slavery and colonialism in the Americas. After numerous attempts to recolonize the newly established republic through military force alone were defeated, the international powers of France, the USA, England and Holland put aside their colonial rivalries in a determined effort to destroy the revolution in its infancy by bleeding it to death financially.

Facing extreme isolation, and with a French war fleet sitting offshore, in 1825 Haiti agreed to take out a loan from a designated French bank and pay compensation to the French plantation owners for their "loss of property," including freed slaves and stolen land. In effect Haiti was paying twice for its freedom; first with blood, and second with money. The amount of the debt totalled 150,000,000 francs. Today that amount would equal US$21b dollars (Schuller 2006).

Haiti may have been the first nation to escape colonialism through revolution, but Haiti also became the first 'third world' nation in the traditional sense, as it was poor and overburdened with debt. The Haitian Government could not build schools, hospitals or roads because nearly all of the available money went to pay France. In 1915, for example, 80 percent of government revenues went to debt service (Farmer 2003). Haiti did not finish paying the loans that financed this odious debt until 1947 (Regan 2005). Over a century after the global slave trade was recognized and eliminated as the evil it was, the Haitians

were still paying their ancestors' masters for their freedom ([Concannon and] Phillips 2006).

As illustrated by this brief historical account, Haiti has been exposed to obstacles from a number of fronts throughout its entire history. Beyond these historical accounts, Haiti endured a number of challenges during the twentieth century including years of instability in government from multiple coups, a nineteen-year occupation by the United States (ending in 1933), hurricanes and other disasters, the reign of multiple dictators, military rule, and so forth. The early part of the twenty-first century (2004) saw the arrival of UN peacekeeping troops, who remain in Haiti to this day.

In recent years, Haiti has seen a proliferation of outsiders—in particular, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign governments—seeking to "help" Haiti with its many challenges. However, as Haitian experts (Edmonds 2013; Schuller 2007) have noted, this outside help often does the opposite. As Edmonds (2013: 445) has suggested, "The reality of NGOs in Haiti and in the developing world in general is along the lines of a twisted, but suitable idiom which states, 'Give a man a fish, you feed him for a day. Allow a man to fish and you ruin a perfectly good business opportunity.'"

Despite the many efforts over the years to alleviate Haiti's impoverished situation, the situation remains difficult. As summarized in a 2013 U.S. government report:

Plagued by chronic political instability and frequent natural disasters, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Haiti's poverty is massive and deep. Over half the population (54%) of 9.8 million people live in extreme poverty, living on less than $1 a day; 78% live on $2 or less a day, according to the World Bank. Poverty among the rural population is even more widespread: 69% of rural dwellers live on less than $1 a day, and 86% live on less than $2 a day. Hunger is also widespread: 81% of the national population and 87% of the rural population do not get the minimum daily ration of food defined by the World Health Organization. In remote parts of Haiti, children have died from malnutrition. (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010: 23–24)

Interestingly, and as it relates to our discussion in chapter 2, much of the logic undergirding NGO and international governmental interventions in Haiti is consistent with the command-and-control theory of crisis management: central management by those in the know (outsiders) should take command and control of Haiti to provide the solution. However, this approach is not working. Klarreich and Polman (2012) explained the situation this way:

Welcome to the NGO Republic of Haiti, the fragile island-state born, in part, out of the country's painfully lopsided earthquake recovery. … Thousands of aid organizations came to Haiti with the entire international aid budget in their bank accounts (several billion dollars among them) and built a powerful parallel state. … [But] the Haitian people themselves [are] impoverished, unemployed, homeless and trapped in a recovery effort that has all too often failed to meet their needs. … Hundreds of thousands of people are [in Haiti] delivering aid, but they are doing functions that should be done by the Haitians. … The international relief effort after the 2010 earthquake [in many ways] excluded Haitians from their own recovery.

Because of this history and what we had learned from our other studies, our interest in studying the postearthquake venturing led us to focus not on what outsiders did but on whether and how Haitians organized to help their fellow victims. Is it possible that Haitians are and were part of the solution following the devastating earthquake of 2010, just as the Australians were after the Black Saturday bushfires?

In telling this story, we first discuss the impact of disasters on the "poorest of the poor." This is an important shift in the book because disaster often has its greatest impacts in underdeveloped economic environments. Therefore a thorough conceptualization of spontaneous venturing requires that the concept be tested in a variety of contexts. We then discuss the Haiti earthquake and the degree of destruction it caused. This helps highlight just how debilitated the infrastructure was, underscoring even more the incredible value of spontaneous venturing in coming to the rescue. Finally, we compare and contrast two different types of spontaneous ventures that emerged. Specifically, we explore how and why they differed in their approach to alleviating suffering and the consequences of these differences. This discussion builds on material presented in earlier chapters and offers yet another important perspective on differences in the performance of spontaneous ventures.

Disasters and Least Developed Countries

A select group of nations form what the UN categorizes as least developed countries (LDCs). These nations have the lowest levels of income and human capital and are considered the most economically vulnerable (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008; UN 2015). Helping LDCs overcome the tragic effects of poverty has been a priority for the UN as LDCs are home to nearly 900 million people, or 12 percent of the world's population. Efforts to help have involved both formal

government programs and extensive efforts from NGOs and, more recently, multinational corporations (MNCs). Despite these efforts, addressing risks and crises in LDCs remains a global challenge.

Similarly, natural disasters pose a challenge as they threaten human life, critical infrastructure, and economic stability (Shah 2012; USAID 2015). Global governments and organizations recognize natural disasters as a challenge, giving special attention to anticipating, avoiding, and responding to natural disasters. Though disasters occur all over the world, they most frequently (77 percent of the time) wreak their effects on LDCs (Strobl 2012), which are most vulnerable to the economic and social consequences of disasters, such as high mortality rates, loss of infrastructure, and economic and governmental failure (Guillaumont 2010; Peduzzi et al. 2009; UN 2015). Disasters in LDCs and their devastating consequences pose a grand challenge to society and have resulted in billions of dollars of aid dispensed (Norris et al. 2002), government programs (Drabek 2007), and NGO activities (Eikenberry, Arroyave, and Cooper 2007) designed to alleviate victim suffering. We wanted to understand how the broader global community can participate in identifying solutions to prevent losses when LDCs experience disasters, and to identify the best approaches for responding to crises in the moment.

As suggested by our brief historical review at the beginning of this chapter, the Republic of Haiti offers an extreme example of these grand challenges. Currently ranked as the twentieth LDC in the world (for gross national income per capita) (UN 2015), Haiti has gone from crisis to crisis for decades, with each crisis deepening divisions that result in economic, political, and social dysfunction (International Crisis Group 2013). Already suffering from widespread chronic poverty, in January 2010 Haiti was hit by a catastrophic earthquake that destroyed nearly 80 percent of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, killed hundreds of thousands of people, displaced hundreds of thousands of other people, and substantially increased Haitians' already high susceptibility to disease, poverty, and death (International Crisis Group 2013; Zanotti 2010). Because of Haiti's status as an LDC, outside governments and NGOs responded in full force to help victims recover after the earthquake. These groups donated billions of dollars, and volunteers from thousands of NGOs traveled to Haiti, providing an array of "solutions" to Haiti's problems. Many of these foreign governments and NGOs already had a substantial presence in the country and therefore simply took charge of various relief efforts.

The initial response thus differed substantially from the initial response to the Black Saturday disaster. While there was an outpouring of external resources from NGOs, foreign governments, and organizations after the bushfires, those resources were not already embedded in the context, and those aid organizations did not act in lieu of the Australian government in coordinating and distributing resources. In Haiti, however, the fragmented network of more than 10,000 NGOs and countless UN peace-keepers and foreign government actors simply took over, overseeing everything from security to transportation to temporary housing and other relief measures.

Because of the sheer size of outsiders' commitment of resources in responding to the 2010 earthquake, many investigators have used the Haitian example to examine the effectiveness of foreign government and NGO activities in LDCs following natural disasters. (Some instances of ineffective response are highlighted by Eikenberry, Arroyave, and Cooper [2007] and Jobe [2011].) By contrast, there has been little research on the actions of local people and organizations in these LDCs working to help fellow citizens. Specifically, evaluations of the earthquake response have largely assumed that LDC local residents are victims, are helpless, or lack the political and organizational infrastructure needed to respond appropriately (for reviews, see Tierney 2012; Zanotti 2010). This belief is consistent with the command-and-control logic we explored in more developed contexts (see chapters 2–5). Though this is the prevailing view regarding LDCs, in light of the prevalence of local venturing in other contexts (Drabek and McEntire 2003; Shepherd and Williams 2014), there is reason to believe that despite obstacles, LDC-led organizing efforts likely contribute to endeavors to overcome the major issues associated with widespread, disaster-related suffering. Indeed, a recent report on the crises in Haiti suggested that "the key to fixing Haiti is that Haitians have to do it" (International Crisis Group 2013: 14).

The above observations lead us to our research questions for this chapter: Did Haitians overcome incredible environmental challenges to engage in spontaneous venturing after the earthquake? If so, how did Haitian-initiated ventures identify and pursue potential opportunities to alleviate suffering, and to what effect? Owing to the lack of research and theorizing in this area, we used an inductive method to explore the activities and outcomes of six Haitian-led ventures that emerged to alleviate suffering after the January 2010 earthquake (Williams and Shepherd 2016a). While inductively exploring these ventures, we found each fell into one of two groups (three in each group)

with respect to how they alleviated suffering. Specifically, we explain how ventures identified potential opportunities to alleviate suffering, how these choices influenced the development and evolution of the ventures over time, and how these combined actions differentially influenced recovery. In developing an inductive model of local venturing after a disaster in an LDC, we hope to open pathways for the organization and management research communities to apply their collective knowledge of organizing and entrepreneurial action toward addressing the intersecting grand challenges of disaster response in LDCs. Further, building on material presented in previous chapters, we demonstrate the widespread applicability of spontaneous venturing following a disaster.

In this chapter we first discuss the literature on poverty alleviation and disaster response, to set the theoretical background. We then discuss the findings of our research and share many quotations from informants to illustrate our main findings. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this study.

Poverty Alleviation in Least Developed Countries

To further illustrate the context in which we sought to observe spontaneous venturing, we first highlight the various actors that are most active in alleviating poverty in underdeveloped countries and LDCs. Poverty alleviation as a subject has garnered increasing attention among a diverse set of global actors as wealthier nations have sought to eradicate suffering. These efforts often focus on providing basic services and amenities, such as medicine, shelter, food, and water. Again, these efforts are ongoing independent of natural disasters. However, when disasters strike, needs become even more pressing and draw a heightened response from external actors.

Research on poverty alleviation in LDCs focuses on three primary kinds of actors, governments, NGOs, and MNCs, which we now briefly discuss.

Government Actors and Poverty Alleviation   Research on the role of government actors in alleviating poverty is extensive and has focused primarily on the topic of foreign aid (Dickovick 2014; Mansur and Rao 2004, 2012). Foreign aid can include a wide range of resources, such as military (Peksen 2012; Pickering and Peceny 2006) and financial (Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014) support, the provision of goods and medical supplies (Annen and Moers 2012;

Knack and Smets 2013), and infrastructure development (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2015; Winters and Martinez 2015). It is estimated that in the last fifty years, more than $2.5 trillion has been given to developing countries (excluding private aid); however, the effectiveness of these donations remains very much in question (Easterly 2006; Easterly and Pfutze 2008), snd criticisms reflect many of the issues we discussed in chapter 2 relating to the command-and-control model of disaster response. Acknowledging these criticisms, recent research (e.g., Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2012) has highlighted the importance of community-based projects—programs that engage local participation in project design and implementation—as a way to sharpen "poverty targeting, [improve] service delivery, [expand] livelihood opportunities and [strengthen] demand for good governance" (Mansuri and Rao 2012: 1). This is again consistent with our discussions in previous chapters that emphasized the importance of local and customized responses to crises. Furthermore, it goes a step further by suggesting that engaging the receiver of a charitable donation as a participant in the process can provide significant benefits over simply providing resources. Most such programs focus on helping governments and organizations develop LDCs' formal institutions. Thus, while these programs acknowledge organic local organizing efforts, such efforts are typically not the focus of aid efforts (Gulrajani and Moloney 2012; Mansuri and Rao 2012).

Though disappointing, in light of what we discussed earlier in the book, this observation is not all that surprising: those "coming to the rescue" of victims often view the victims in a certain light—as helpless, incapable of taking action, and in need of outsiders who can efficiently provide food, shelter, employment, and so forth. This logic aligns closely with the faulty assumptions of the command-and-control model (for a review, see Jensen and Waugh 2014; see also chapter 2).

Nongovernmental Organizations   Often working in close collaboration with foreign governments (Batley 2006), NGOs play a prominent role in efforts to alleviate poverty in LDCs (Lecy, Schmitz, and Swedlund 2012; Smith 2012). As an example, prior to the January 12 earthquake, between 8,000 and 9,000 NGOs operated in Haiti. Research on NGOs in LDCs has focused on their role in such activities as statebuilding (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010; Zanotti 2010), developing a civil society to protect human rights (Bold, Collier, and Zeitlin 2009; White 1999), enhancing education (Newcomer, Baradel, and Garcia 2013; Rose

2009), providing health services (Brinkerhoff 2008; Palmer 2006), and improving economic development (Elbers, Knippenberg, and Schulpen 2014; Gazley 2008). In LDCs, NGOs often have the highest priority (over local government and citizen groups) for receiving foreign funding because of the trust and relationships they have built with donors and aid recipients. However, little is known about the effects of delivering services, developing societies, and state-building through NGOs in postconflict or postdisaster contexts (Zanotti 2010: 756) when needs are greatest and LDCs are flooded with foreign actors seeking to pursue various missions.

Multinational Corporations   The third major type of actor in LDCs is MNCs, which seek to provide goods and services to millions of individuals with unmet needs who are located at the "base of the pyramid" (Prahalad 2004; Prahalad and Hart 2002). Base-of-the-pyramid markets include LDCs as well as populations from developing countries. These markets represent nearly four billion people, or about 70 percent of the world's population, who live on roughly $2 a day (Hart 2005; Prahalad 2004; Webb et al. 2010). The primary approach of MNCs to base-of-the-pyramid markets has been to develop products and services that both generate profits (for the MNC) and alleviate poverty by providing individuals access to affordable products essential to health and well-being (London 2008; Seelos and Mair 2007). While the opportunities in these markets appear abundant, prior research has found mixed results in terms of the financial value created for MNCs and the social value created for recipients in base-of-the-pyramid markets (Kandachar and Halme 2008). MNCs face a number of challenges in these markets, including the necessity of navigating cultural and institutional environments (Kistruck and Beamish 2010), matching business models and products to local needs (Hart and Christensen 2002; London and Hart 2004), and realizing desired objectives (Easterly 2006). Though efforts to merge market-based thinking with the alleviation of poverty provide considerable opportunities (Brugmann and Prahalad 2007), there is an ongoing search for solutions that engage "participants [those in base-of-the-pyramid markets] in the design of a more inclusive process" (London 2007: 6) to understand the complex multidimensional nature of poverty (Sen 1999). Similarly, there is an increased focus on identifying longer-term market-based solutions that would allow the poorest of the poor to rise to the first rung of the economic development ladder (Sachs 2005).

Most of the literature on poverty alleviation in LDCs has focused on the role of external actors—governments, NGOs, and MNCs—in developing programs, investment portfolios, and business opportunities. While all three bodies of literature call for greater engagement with local actors, there is a noticeable gap in research on locally led efforts to alleviate poverty, especially in the aftermath of a disruptive event that, while devastating, provides numerous opportunities to transform communities and individual lives—or to "build back better."

Disaster Response

Despite what we have learned from the literature, as well as what we discussed in chapters 2–5, "much remains to be learned about the internal dynamics of these emergent response groups" (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead 2007: 147), especially with regard to responding to crises in LDCs. There is still much to learn about how venturing emerges to alleviate the large-scale suffering caused by a disaster in the most vulnerable economies. We discuss our exploration of these concepts in relation to spontaneous venturing in response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake.

Research Setting: The January 12, 2010, Haitian Earthquake Disaster

On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Port-au-Prince. This was the worst earthquake on record in Haiti. It led to widespread death (estimated at 316,000), injury (300,000), and displacement (1.5 million) and affected one-third of Haiti's entire population (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). The financial impact on Haiti was also catastrophic, with damage estimated at 117 percent of Haiti's annual economic output (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010), which led the Inter-American Development Bank to call the tragedy "the most destructive event a country has ever experienced" (Cavallo, Powell, and Becerra 2010: 3). After the earthquake, basic services, such as transportation, telephony, and electricity, were almost completely destroyed, and many homes, hospitals, schools, and government buildings collapsed (Margesson and Taft-Morales 2010). Out of Haiti's seventeen government ministries, fifteen were severely damaged, including the presidential palace, further weakening Haiti's already "thin layer" of administrative infrastructure (Zanotti 2010: 756). Because of the scale of the destruction and the Haitian government's call for assistance, nearly $14 billion in donations and other aid were sent to the shaken

nation in an attempt to alleviate suffering. However, most of this aid only indirectly reached the Haitians as it was directed through non-Haitian governments, NGOs, and international government bodies such as the UN.

Beyond the actual destruction of the earthquake, additional suffering also occurred do to "numerous man-made aftershocks which … seriously undermined the ability of the Haitian people to establish a state run in accordance with the demands of the poor majority." (Edmonds 2013: 445). In particular, the international policies of organizations involved in Haiti, such as the UN and USAID,

privileged NGOs as the favored recipients of international support … [which] contributed to the cacophony of aid and the lack of accountability of politicians to local constituencies in Haiti and that, by siphoning human and monetary resources from the [Haitian people], these NGOs have *de facto* jeopardized the building of sustainable institutions in [Haiti]. Furthermore, because of the rigidity of their mandate or administrative functioning some major international NGOs have ended up producing negative impacts on the local economy and on the durable and consistent availability of services to the population. (Zanotti 2010: 768)

For these reasons, while much of the literature has focused on the large international relief response to the earthquake, we focus on venturing to alleviate suffering that was initiated by local Haitians in the Port-au-Prince region in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. We sought to find examples of community building and development initiated by local residents because of LDCs' prominent need for such venturing.

Case Selection

To achieve our goals, we identified extreme cases that would help shed light on our research questions. Through a number of steps, including systematic internet searches, making connections through Haitian diaspora communities, and visiting Port-au-Prince, we identified six local compassionate ventures that emerged after the earthquake to alleviate fellow Haitians' suffering. In assessing these six different ventures, we found fundamental differences between two kinds (three ventures each) of venture. To facilitate writing about our findings, we created a fictional name for each venture: Sogeun, Seleco, Sagesse, Toujours, Tangage, and Travailleurs. Similarly, we provide a fictional name for each individual who served as an informant. In table 6.1, we provide details about the six ventures' core activities, total members, the informants for each venture, and additional data sources.

Table 6.1
Background Characteristics and Data Sources for Cases

Characteristic	Sogeun	Seleco	Sagesse	Toujours	Tangage	Travailleurs
Core activities	Food, shelter, tent city management, government activism	Food, shelter, part-time work, tent city management, government activism	Food, shelter, tent city management, government activism	Food, housing, career, job training	Food, housing, career, psychological services, job training, medical	Food, housing, career, psychological services, job training, medical
Members (at peak)	38	34	38	49	42	51
Venture life span	3 years/ongoing	3 years/ongoing	3 years/ongoing	2 years	2.5 years	3 years/ongoing
Informants (role) 41 in total (510 pages)	Founder 1 (Stephan) Founder 2 (Sebastian) Employee 1 (Spencer) Employee 2 (Sanders) Employee 3 (Sachin) Employee 4 (Suzanne) Customer 1 (Clint) Customer 2 (Seth) Customer 3 (Luanne)	Founder 1 (Lane) Founder 2 (Laren) Employee 1 (Lacey) Employee 2 (Leone) Employee 3 (Leslie) Customer 1 (Leigh)	Founder 1 (Adan) Founder 2 (Addison) Employee 1 (Akiva) Customer 1 (Aisley) Customer 2 (Alain) Customer 3 (Alba) Customer 4 (Alba)	Founder 1 (Tristan) Founder 2 (Tariq) Employee 1 (Tate) Employee 2 (Torrey) Customer 1 (Tianna) Customer 2 (Terrin)	Founder 1 (Gabi) Founder 2 (Gail) Employee 1 (Garuda) Employee 2 (Gili) Employee 3 (Glyn) Customer 1 (Gwyn) Customer 2 (Greta) Customer 3 (Gaymnor)	Founder 1 (Raine) Founder 2 (Remi) Employee 1 (Rio) Customer 1 (Rory) Customer 2 (TR-C2)

Note: Names have been changed to protect anonymity.
Source: Modified from Williams and Shepherd (2016a).

Introduction to Our Findings

Before discussing the details of our findings, we first summarize some major points. In answer to our first research question, we did identify instances of spontaneous venturing immediately after the Haiti earthquake. Second, all of the venture founders were local Haitians who were themselves victims of the disaster; that is, they had experienced loss of property or loss of a loved one. Third, the majority of these ventures sought to organize relief efforts around providing food, shelter, medical care, and access to water. Finally, these ventures differed in how they evolved over time and the approach they took toward those they served. We discuss the factors that shaped these differences and highlight how these influenced long-term outcomes.

Alleviation of Suffering: Primary Differences between the Two Kinds of Ventures

We found that Haitian victim-led ventures designed to alleviate suffering after the 2010 earthquake displayed distinct patterns in their identification of opportunities to alleviate suffering, their pursuit of these opportunities, and the degree to which they alleviated suffering. The most striking difference between the two kinds of ventures was seen in the alleviation of suffering. Ventures in one group promoted behaviors associated with *sustaining people* by providing systemic relief that helped victims survive postdisaster conditions. In the other group, the ventures promoted behaviors associated with *transforming people* by facilitating the transition from a state of crisis to one of autonomy, self-reliance, and advancement out of extreme hardship.

Sustaining Ventures

Three ventures alleviated suffering by sustaining people: Sogeun, Seleco, and Sagesse (hereafter referred to as sustaining ventures). *Sustaining ventures* were those that alleviated suffering by providing for victims' most basic needs and continually working toward achieving the venture's short-term objectives and delivering relief to victims. That is, sustaining ventures alleviated suffering in three primary ways. (1) First, sustaining ventures alleviated suffering by *providing for basic needs.* For example, one founder (Stephan) explained that in response to the crisis, "We organized ourselves to obtain necessary resources, such as food, water, and housing. … We continue to live in tent camps in unsatisfactory conditions. … People can live in temporary shelters

for three months, but they should not have to live in such conditions for three years (as we have) … but at least we have our lives." (2) Sustaining ventures also alleviated suffering by achieving *short-term objectives* related to improving victim survival. That is, these ventures were interested in addressing immediate and pressing needs, but not in evolving to meet other needs. Furthermore, these ventures had minimal concern for long-term planning, which led them to approach each day as a relatively isolated, discrete set of problems. For example, one founder (Adan) explained, "Each day we get up, look for resources, and seek to survive. … Then we get up and do it again the next day. We are stuck like this." (3) Finally, sustaining ventures alleviated suffering by *exclusively providing relief*, that is by coordinating activities to deal with the symptoms of problems instead of the sources of those problems. For example, Stephan, who founded an organization to provide long-term relief, said: "Instead of progressing and becoming richer, my people and I have become poorer … but our goal remains to provide at least one meal a day for those in the camp. … I will keep doing this even if it takes years to help people." As illustrated by these examples, sustaining ventures focused primarily on survival. While critical, this method of aid provision did not necessarily lead to a long-term ability for those receiving products and services to sustain themselves. This finding adds nuance to what we learned in earlier chapters in discussing the Black Saturday bushfire responses regarding the quality of a compassionate response. While some responses do offer help, we can question whether this help is in the best interest of victims in the long-term.

Transforming Ventures

In contrast, three ventures, Toujours, Tangage, and Travailleurs, alleviated suffering by transforming people. *Transforming ventures* addressed a broad and evolving set of causes of suffering by providing both longer-term solutions and aid in multiple stages of recovery that led to the transformation of victims' lives. That is, these ventures focused on addressing needs in stages, helping people overcome challenges until they became autonomous and self-reliant in meeting their physical, social, and psychological needs.

Transforming ventures alleviated suffering in three ways. (1) They provided for a *wide range of urgent and emerging needs* because although they understood the early need for basic survival resources, they eventually began helping victims move toward autonomy and self-reliance.

For instance, Raine, who founded a venture providing psychological services as well as food and housing, explained: "We analyzed people's needs so we could help them moving forward, including housing, jobs, and so forth." (2) Transforming ventures alleviated suffering by offering *long-term solutions* that included providing education and career opportunities to victims. This kind of aid not only brought postdisaster relief but often led to significant improvements from predisaster conditions. For example, one founder (Tristan) explained, "We had short-term and long-term projects. … Short-term included providing tents, hygiene kits, food, and medical care [first three months]. … Long-term involved plywood homes that they would help build—to maintain their dignity—job training, and psychological support." (3) Finally, transforming ventures alleviated victim suffering through their pursuit of *multiple stages of recovery,* including creating customized solutions that both met people's specific needs and enabled the progressive development of autonomy among those being helped. For example, after they reached their goal of helping individuals find housing, these ventures provided entrepreneurship training to individuals with limited education so they could sell goods on the street, and provided computer and language training as well as other opportunities to individuals with higher educational backgrounds. This approach demonstrated a staged model to addressing the problem by providing a use case for the venture both in immediate disaster response and in moving into the future once basic needs for food, water, and shelter were met.

As we considered these two starkly different groups of cases, we wanted to better understand why they had such different models for alleviating suffering. In evaluating the statements of founders, employees, and customers of these ventures, we found seven primary themes that appeared to explain the differences in outcomes: (1) social resources, (2) founding mindset, (3) potential opportunities (4) resourcefulness, (5) entrepreneurial action, (6) role emergence, and (7) deviance. Figure 6.1 shows a general model of how these themes worked together to shape outcomes. That is, differences in each dimension appeared to shape the trajectory of the spontaneous venture as it emerged in response to suffering. The goal of our modeling and analysis is to better understand how certain combinations of actions resulted in a more resilient, self-reliant community whereas other helping actions appeared to result in long-term dependence and stagnation.

Figure 6.1
Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Spontaneous Ventures in Alleviating Suffering

In this section, we discuss two different pathways based on the seven themes identified above. In doing so, we try to identify how various thematic groupings resulted in divergent outcomes.

Pathways of Sustaining Ventures in the Aftermath of a Disaster
Social Resources   Social resources denote social relationships that provide access to important resources for opportunities aimed at easing suffering. As highlighted in chapters 3 and 4, network relationships are important in facilitating quick action. This appears to be the case as well in an LDC. However, there were differences in the nature of the social resources between the two groups of ventures (sustaining or transforming), which shaped subsequent choices and actions. Sustaining ventures had a small (if any) endowment of social resources from which to draw. These ventures were largely isolated from both local and international communities and therefore identified transaction-based strategies as the most effective means of acquiring resources to help victims. It was evident that for all sustaining ventures, the earliest identification of opportunities for spontaneous venturing to alleviate suffering primarily reflected where founders were located at the time of the disaster. For example, one founder (Stephan) explained the following:

On January 12, 2010, I was right over there across the way [motions across the field]. The majority of these people lived across the street as well. … I was here

in this area right when the earthquake hit. … I led campaigns to bury the bodies—there was no time to sit around and reflect because we had a problem on our hands. … I had to perform amputations in the field. … Since all the people were around, I took initiative to form a committee to continue acting, and we are still here today.

Like other sustaining ventures, this venture's members started identifying opportunities not because previous relationships served as information sources (on available resources) but because the founders created new connections with individual victims. This was confirmed by one employee of another spontaneous venture, Sagesse, who explained, "We heard of other organizations by word of mouth as we had no prior contacts" (Akiva). Without established contacts with other groups, the transaction-only nature of relationships in the post-earthquake environment eventually took its toll: "Many organizations [NGOs] have come to visit us, but then we never see them again. We never see them, you understand? We need people to collaborate with us, but we don't have access to those people" (Adan). It appears that the lack of networks led to certain assessments about the strategic options of the new venture—they could only make do with what they had. While these ventures recognized the need to develop new local social ties, their efforts to connect with both local and international groups were only moderately successful. As a result of this lack of connections, sustaining ventures blamed outsiders for their inability to progress and grow the venture, viewing them negatively and with distrust, which in turn affected the ventures' subsequent resource acquisition approaches and the scope of the services they offered.

Founding Mindset   A founding mindset was also influential in creating sustaining spontaneous ventures. As a founding mindset, sustaining ventures possessed a strong sense of *patriotism*, feeding an "us versus them" inclination. For example, one founder explained, "My motivation was that I am a Haitian and I am a patriotic person. I couldn't stand there and watch my country in crisis" (Adan). Another founder introduced himself by detailing his ancestry, something he does whenever he describes his work to others. He explained, "I always introduce myself in the context of my ancestry because I am very proud of my country's history. … I will never become discouraged because my history does not allow me this. … This is why I was motivated to act" (Stephan). Because of this national pride, sustaining ventures often proclaimed that they would independently "do whatever it takes to

survive" (Adan, Lane, Spencer), just as their ancestors had. A national patriotism orientation, coupled with the social resource constraints, shaped how sustaining ventures operated: they sought to function independently, and viewed outsiders with distrust. This combination of features often led to deviant and aggressive behaviors, including seizing resources from "threatening" outsiders.

Although it motivated action, these individuals' patriotism was confounded by a suspicion of non-Haitians to the point that some victims began blaming non-Haitians for the earthquake itself, setting up an entitlement mindset. For example, one founder (Sebastian) asserted the following:

We are not here to start fights … but we demand that victims receive reparations for the injustices they have suffered [He saw the earthquake itself as a criminal act]. … The Haitian government along with foreign governments need to provide land on which those rendered homeless by the earthquake can resettle. … I have found that there is a lot of land and we demand that these people receive it for reparation.

Likewise, another founder noted, "There is no organization that takes care of us in reality. … If foreigners would just get us the supplies most necessary, the population's needs would be met" (Addison). This patriotic, entitled mindset led sustaining ventures to focus on demanding resources to alleviate the most pressing and visual forms of suffering with a short-term horizon for recovery (i.e., immediate relief issues). Thus, these ventures faced a paradox: on the one hand, they relied out outsiders for ongoing resources (food, water, etc.), which they accepted when donated; on the other hand, these ventures were unwilling to partner with outsiders for long-term investment and growth because oftheir resource structures and founders' mindset.

Identification of Potential Opportunities to Alleviate Suffering Ventures' social resources and the founders' mindset influenced their identification of opportunities to alleviate suffering through spontaneous venturing. First, sustaining ventures identified opportunities that offered perpetual relief to their community. That is, they saw an opportunity to be a long-term provider of services typically associated with emergency relief, such as burying the dead, acquiring water, and helping individuals obtain shelter. After these activities were completed, sustaining ventures moved on to gaining access to basic resources from donors indefinitely. For instance, one founder (Adan) trained individuals in how to talk with aid workers to facilitate

ongoing resource deliveries, and another founder (Spencer) instructed colleagues "not to rush the aid workers. … Rushing them will make them not want to come back." These most basic victim needs were the simplest to recognize, and they were always the most pressing. As one founder reported, "The first immediate need was water and food, but … people also needed shelter (tents), because they can't sleep with their young babies in the streets. … We recognized this need and continue to provide it today; this is why we organized ourselves" (Sebastian).

Second, sustaining ventures identified opportunities that provided additional power and improved social status for themselves (and their founders). After the earthquake, the Haitian government essentially failed to provide basic services, including policing, governance, and health care, which created numerous opportunities for enterprising individuals and ventures to fill the leadership void. For example, Stephan, the founder of Sogeun, said:

I had previous experience with campaigning and mobilization work before starting this organization, so it was not overly difficult for me to get the hang of organizing people in the camp. … I organized various groups of people here, seeing the government had a weakened capacity. … Now, whenever something needs to be done, they call me because I'm the boss.

Similarly, one employee (Akiva) described how he and other founders organized themselves by putting up shelters and then leading efforts to "obtain necessary resources. This helped us search for water, food, and supply kits. … Eventually, we were able to establish ourselves in the manner that you see today." In addition to helping others, sustaining ventures recognized opportunities to position themselves as informal ruling bodies of large tent cities. These ventures often made important decisions regarding food and water procurement, judged crimes in the community, hosted visitors, and so forth. It became clear during our interviews with these individuals and our observations of their situation that they had become conflicted. On the one hand, they sincerely sought to fulfill the needs of those they were helping. However, the nature of their help required that individuals *need* basic services of food, water, medical care, and security. They provided these things but did not offer a pathway for individuals to support themselves. As the founders and their teams took over these communities, they created new community-level titles that transformed them from creators of ventures to impromptu governors of tent cities.

Resourceful Behavior Consistent with the other themes identified for sustaining ventures, founders of these ventures engaged in high-level resourceful behavior to pursue and test the validity of their spontaneous venture ideas. This resourceful behavior eventually became perpetual and permanent, meaning it was their sole means of operating. This became problematic and further fueled the short-term orientation of the firm. Rather than identify new resources or invest in relationships, these ventures simply identified and consumed what they could every day. They did this in a number of ways. First, sustaining ventures cunningly seized non-owned resources for long-term use, which affected both their subsequent detection of opportunities and their entrepreneurial actions. For example, one founder (Adan) reported, "We faced a problem, which was that [our operations] were set up on private lands, and the landowners wanted to reclaim their lands. The proprietors started pressuring us to make all the people leave. … This was a big problem we faced and overcame by staying on the land." These ventures believed the appropriation of other peoples' land was "a right" that was "owed to us by the government and wealthy landowners" (this statement was endorsed by Stephan, Spencer, Lane, and Aisley).

Second, sustaining ventures maintained an enduring resourcefulness mindset—a perspective on resource gathering that relied on daily search for resources, the constant repurposing of readily available resources to new ends, and living exclusively in the immediate present. This way of thinking reinforced the identification of opportunities for sustaining themselves and those they helped and led to additional action. For example, one founder (Lane) told us the following:

[After getting settled on the land] we bought a truckload of water, put it in the container, and then sold it to the population at a low price. … This is a way to ensure that we will always have money for water to continue filling up the storage tank with water. … We sell it for 4 gourdes [$.08] a bucket, but on the street, it is sold for 5 gourdes [$.10] a bucket.

Similarly, an employee (Spencer) described the actions he took:

We constantly searched for food. The children do not get the kind of nutritious foods that they really should be eating, but we managed to eat regardless. … Every time you find someone who gives you a little something to tide you over, you are in a better situation … and you keep searching every day.

As people continued to search for food and other basic resources, as time passed, the subsequent identification of opportunities became

further entrenched in providing relief, forming the basis for a continuous cycle. Similarly, as long-term relief and the opportunity for power in a community deepened, ventures pursued even greater resourceful activities to meet basic needs and thereby provide victim relief. Taken together, these factors influenced entrepreneurial action.

Entrepreneurial Action   Sustaining ventures engaged in two primary forms of entrepreneurial action that influenced both venture roles as well as the nature of the suffering alleviated by those actions. First, although sustaining ventures focused on providing shelter, they also provided a location for entrepreneurial action in the form of a "space" for the creation and operation of new microbusinesses. Specifically, as sustaining ventures developed, they provided meeting "houses" for group gatherings (Stephan and Lane), "liquor shops" (in tents), where individuals could purchase bootleg alcohol sold out of old anti-freeze bottles (Sanders), and other microbusinesses. One founder described his intention to continue using non-owned land to provide basic resources: "We would like to build out a reservoir for water. … We also want to have a fish hatchery; we believe strongly in animal husbandry. People could use this fish hatchery as a business and also a source of food" (Lane). Although these ventures' efforts provided victims access to services that met some basic life needs, they also prevented people from moving out of the largely temporary setup, thus hindering their forward movement. For example, while eating a meal in a makeshift tent restaurant, a customer who was both a resident of the camp and a recipient of the venture's services said the following: "Where will we be in five years? … We will still be here in two, three, four, ten, even thirty years from now [living the same way on this land]" (Luanne).

Second, sustaining ventures were involved in considerable government, NGO, and foreign national lobbying as a key entrepreneurial action. This is understandable in light of the large presence of NGOs and MNCs in the region. Indeed, an important part of the entrepreneurial process is acquiring resources to exploit potential opportunities and to organize and grow the business (Webb et al. 2009; Winborg and Landström 2001). For example, one employee said, "A big part of what we do is bringing people [NGOs, government agencies, others] to the camp to provide resources" (Sanders). Similarly, a founder (Adan) explained the combination of lobbying and organizing needed for resource delivery:

We tried to help people find activities and programs to participate in. … We helped people learn about where to get aid, including food, money for leaving tents, and so forth. … We helped people get food in an orderly way. … We even did this with vaccinations. We had an organized system for distributing all types of materials and supplies.

Over time, sustaining ventures became more complex, structured, and committed to providing housing and meeting basic needs while increasing the number of microbusinesses in the tent cities and lobbying everyone within earshot (including one of the authors and a research assistant) to exploit their potential opportunities to alleviate suffering.

Venture Roles   Sustaining ventures established their role as a relief provider as a result of early success in finding and delivering resources to meet victims' most basic needs. As time progressed, this role of providing basic resources became further entrenched and resulted in additional entrepreneurial action focused on sustaining people's lives with basic resources.

First, the sustaining ventures developed symbols and representations that reinforced their *authority and power* in the new communities. For example, one employee (Akiva) explained the following:

We have a logo and coat of arms. … A gold crown over a shield representing Haitian pride behind two crossed swords symbolizing the struggle for a better tomorrow. … Two lions represent the potential of young people. … Finally a mosaic of red, blue, and black colors combining past and present Haitian flags. … These symbols are recognized in our community and give us authority to direct others.

Similarly, another employee (Spencer) described his organization's symbols this way: "Our flag symbolizes that we will always be the rulers and lords over our territory. … The guinea fowl symbolizes guile and prudence because it is always difficult to find a guinea fowl's nest, and it is even more difficult to kill a guinea fowl if you spot one." He went on to explain that all individuals in his organization had an identification badge with this guinea fowl on the back to reinforce their venture's position in the community as they walked about. The authority role represented a new sense of community importance and power, connecting a strong sense of patriotism with current actions. One founder (Sebastian) explained, "In my new role here, I am channeling my Haitian spirit going back to our ancestors who survived crossing the Atlantic without food [on the slave ships]. … We are

still standing today, and now I am a leader of thousands in this big community!"

Second, in expressing their role of authority, sustaining ventures typically exaggerated their importance and accomplishments.[2] For example, one founder (Stephan) estimated that his venture had helped 32,000 people, even though only 15,000 or so had lived in the community since its inception. Similarly, another founder (Adam) stated, "We indirectly helped 11 million people," an incredibly high estimate insofar as the total population in Haiti was less than ten million at the time of the earthquake. Actions and perhaps the (over) statement of impact reinforced the ventures' authority role. As one founder (Sebastian) explained, "Since we did our part to take action and search for resources, people gradually gained hope until everyone who had initially been discouraged was eventually filled with hope [in our ability to help]." This authority created and sustained victims' dependence on these ventures and victims' expectation that the venture would continue to provide basic resources. As such, the role resulted in an increased focus on seeking basic resources, which further solidified the ventures' static role of basic resource provider.

Third, sustaining ventures created new rules and pressured others for basic resources, which reinforced and even enhanced their role as "the" relief provider. For example, two founders (Adan and Addison) produced a complex organizational structure that depicted organizational members responsible for community management, governance, document preservation, security, and so forth, all of which fell outside the established structures of the Haitian state. These roles were designed to be rigid and limited in scope (i.e., fulfilling basic needs), and they contributed to ongoing dependency among victims. In doing so, sustaining ventures reinforced their position of authority and systematized entrepreneurial activities, including resource gathering and lobbying. As one employee (Akiva) explained:

We formed a core team to respond. … I assigned people responsibilities. This helped me to manage the venture more easily because when I need to speak, I don't call everyone; I just call the leaders of each group. … I have experience managing people; I have a system that I use for organizing people so that things stay under my control.

Finally, as sustaining ventures were in a position of power, they could pressure both their members and (current and future) resource

providers into giving them what they asked for. As one employee (Leslie) explained, "We do not vote [for our leaders] because ever since the venture was founded, there has been a leader, and everybody knows that individual is the leader. … If this person gives instructions to do something, it will really happen." Ventures formed committees and assigned tasks, many of which involved procuring resources "at all costs." Other times, founders did the lobbying themselves. For instance, one founder (Lane) explained, "We currently are pressuring and lobbying the government to implement a water project in our area."

Deviant Behaviors Sustaining ventures' venturing activities often involved deviant behaviors: nonsanctioned or illegal activities to accomplish their ends. We observed two primary modes of deviant behavior, namely, deception in resource acquisition and property seizure. As an example of deception, one founder (Adan) explained the following:

I dressed in a manner similar to a military personnel and went to the military to get gasoline. … They assumed I was part of the military. … I told them I needed gasoline, and they told me no problem, they had a lot of gasoline. There were obstacles, but I overcame them. … Many people were afraid of the military … but not me. I told others I'm not afraid of the military because I am in the military too! I did this often to get resources.

Deception is also noticeable one employee's (Spencer's) description of his actions to procure water:

I found gallons of water in destroyed stores and broke down the walls with a tractor I took. I then took the gallons and brought them back. … We had to act quickly and resourcefully because we felt a sense of responsibility to find solutions to all of these problems.

Other stories included details of confiscating water tanks (Lane), tricking foreign NGOs into leaving food trucks (Addison and Stephan), and stealing vehicles and other resources to survive (Sanders and Adan). Some founders (Adan, Stephan, Laren) explained how they threatened to harm NGOs, border agents, and other individuals unless they handed over food containers. These types of actions allowed them to gain access to the basic resources they needed.

Sustaining ventures also acquired and retained land that they did not own and continued to fend off attempts by landowners to reclaim their land, as one founder (Sebastian) explained:

We want to take advantage of the resources the government already has [i.e., land]. … Only 5% of privately owned lands in the country have titles to the land … so many of these lands are under the government's jurisdiction. … It is OK for us to occupy these lands because they are under the control of the rich elite. … All of us here are children of the land, and we all should have the right to a place to live.

Similarly, after sidestepping an owner who brought police to evict their group from the land, one founder (Lane) explained, "We are on the land [going on three years], but it is an injustice for the landowner to take us off the land!"

As we have illustrated above, sustaining ventures combined their existing resources, motivations, and skills to launch spontaneous ventures. While these efforts resulted in the alleviation of suffering, it did so in a way that led to dependence. This is an important addition to our conversation so far, demonstrating how not all actions provide concrete benefits and may, in fact, be detrimental if maintained over the long term. In the next section, we compare transforming ventures across the same seven dimensions above. In doing so, we highlight how differences across these seven dimensions appeared to significantly alter the nature of the spontaneous ventures that emerged as well as the outcomes they realized.

Pathways of Transforming Ventures in the Aftermath of a Disaster

Social Resources Those involved with transforming ventures explained the importance of social relationships, describing their use of and heavy reliance on *local ties* and their access to and use of extensive international ties in facilitating the identification opportunities for spontaneous venturing. This contrasted significantly with sustaining ventures. These connections resulted in multinational teams in which locals and outsiders were viewed as important collaborators, which enabled individuals from these ventures to harness their existing personal relationships for new purposes. For example, one founder (Tariq) described how access to local ties positively affected his ability to identify and fund potential opportunities to alleviate suffering:

We used a lot of local contacts. For example, there was a man who had helped with previous construction projects, including working on all of our church buildings, and he has an engineering company. This man opened up his house for our use in relief efforts, and we housed groups of foreign volunteers there when they came to Haiti to help out. … He also had a large depot full of construction materials that he lent to us for our use. We used the depot as a receiv-

ing point for all of the food trucks that came from the DR [Dominican Republic], and we stored the food supplies in the depot after unloading the trucks.

A different founder (Gail) explained that his personal international network opened up access to needed resources: "I was already friends with these people [from the United States] since before the earthquake. … After the earthquake, they just asked me what they could do to help. I told them what to do, and they went right into action." Similarly, a customer detailed one transforming venture's collaborative approach and the ways it helped ease suffering: the venture collaborated with "the Americans, French, and Canadians, who genuinely showed interest in learning who we were as a Haitian people and what we needed before they got to work," resulting in the generation of opportunities to help victims recover" (Gwyn). As these examples show, social resources played a critical role in helping founders launch new ventures. Furthermore, they provided access to a variety of important inputs, including ideas and resources, that could help shape the scale, scope, and direction of the new organization.

Founding Mindset   Transforming ventures described their founding mindset primarily in terms of doing the right thing for the community and assisting others in achieving self-reliance. This prosocial mindset influenced the identification and resourcing of spontaneous ventures. For example, one employee (Rio) explained, "I have a passion for helping people; it is what I love to do. I am not someone who will only help others out for money because I feel that if I am getting paid for what I do, I am not really helping the person. If I'm going to help someone, I need to do it with all my heart." Similarly, one founder (Tristan) described his mindset as an example of the overall venture mindset in this way:

I should have died [when the roof collapsed inches from my head]. … This has been pretty hard to deal with. However, no matter what obstacle is presented. … This [helping others] always gives me strength and drives me. … This mentality is shared by those in our organization.

Importantly, these ventures helped others in ways beyond simply giving victims materials or resources; these ventures had goals to ensure those receiving aid retained their "dignity through work" (Raine, Tristan, Gili); that is, they maintained self-reliance through work. For example, one founder (Raine) described how his desire to help his fellow community members become autonomous influenced

his venture's actions and how he is now seeing some of the positive outcomes of those actions:

Although we are coming up on three years since the earthquake and there haven't been any huge changes or improvements, we are still better off than we were in January 2010, and I know that things will continue to get better. Today, more people have jobs and businesses than back then, and this was the motivation I had all along! … This is something that Haiti and Haitians want—a chance to find a job and to be independent instead of constantly having to ask for food and other forms of international aid.

Transforming ventures' founding mindset led these ventures to draw on a wide set of social resources (local and international) to identify any opportunities linked to their resources. This mindset differed substantially from that exhibited by founders of sustaining ventures, who were motivated primarily by national pride. It appears that this deep motivation to help others and to do so while allowing victims to retain dignity and autonomy through participation was critical for generating a transformative outcome

Identifying Potential Opportunities for Spontaneous Venturing to Alleviate Suffering   Transforming ventures opportunities by transitioning the community through a staged recovery approach (rather than the single-step approach used by sustaining ventures). These spontaneous ventures were influenced by network connections as well as a mindset emphasizing victim autonomy and self-sufficiency as a long-term objective. Right after the earthquake, transforming ventures recognized the pressing need for immediate relief—that is, for food, water, shelter, and care for the injured—but they also understood that they could not and should not continue providing for people's basic needs in the long term. Rather, they knew they needed to encourage and help victims to "stand on their own feet" (Raine). For example, one founder (Tristan) stated, "Initially we gave people hygiene kits, food, and medical care. … This was intended to be done in the short term. … Our focus on everything [food, shelter, etc.] was transitional," that is, moving people from one stage of recovery to the next until victim autonomy was realized.

After addressing basic survival needs, as the second and third stages of recovery, the transforming ventures concentrated on providing job and career training, recognizing this would help victims not only recover but would perhaps put them in a better life situation than before the disaster. These ventures realized locals had numer-

ous opportunities to gain employment through the many international organizations seeking to help Haitians. Thus, instead of continuing to lobby donor organizations for additional resources, these ventures focused on positioning community members as workers (translators, laborers, drivers, caregivers) to provide not only a service to these international organizations but also jobs and potentially careers to local victims.

Finally, transforming ventures were drawn to opportunities that enabled them to fulfill a felt obligation to act and to improve the community. One founder (Gail) stated, "I knew it was my responsibility to help [those in my community]." Similarly, an employee (Gili), a nurse by profession, explained, "I took an oath to act, and I take that seriously." The ventures emphasized the obligation they had to look out for their communities after the disaster, which influenced subsequent actions. Indeed, informants from all three transforming ventures described their early decision to pursue venturing as an obligation to help those in need. As these ventures took action to help others, they undertook numerous activities that would later position them well for more comprehensive entrepreneurial action. These activities included searching for survivors in rubble (Garuda), burying victims who had died (Gabi, Gail), organizing work parties for NGOs in exchange for resources or salaries (Raine), and pursuing resources in the Dominican Republic (Tate, Tristan).

Resourceful Behaviors   Transforming ventures engaged in transitional resourcefulness behaviors, temporarily appropriating non-owned resources toward new ends. As these ventures harnessed existing organizational structures and resources in their initial resourceful activities, they recognized that this use was only meant to be temporary. As summarized by one founder (Tariq), "The church ground was supposed to be primarily a place of worship and not a long-term camp." Rather than appropriating resources as sustaining ventures did, these individuals accessed, used, and then returned non-owned resources in the early stages of opportunity formation, which in turn influenced their subsequent action. These resources included land, medical equipment and facilities, buildings, and even loaned helicopters and an airplane. In most cases, buildings were appropriated for new purposes, including food services, shelter, and medical services (e.g., surgical procedures were performed in the main chapel), and so forth, but this repurposing

of venues was always intended to be temporary, and the resources and assets were all eventually returned to their owners.

Furthermore, transforming ventures emphasized a transition from resource seeking to an investment mindset, which influenced entrepreneurial action and the alleviation of suffering. For instance, one employee (Tate) described how he and his team worked nonstop to help people gradually move toward autonomy, focusing on investing in the future through education and other efforts addressing the sources of victim suffering (including poverty). He stated,

Each time the problems or issues changed, we had to meet together to plan how we were going to resolve the root causes of the new problems that had come up. … We continued holding meetings with the needs evolving until our primary goal was met, which was people were again living in their own homes and on their own lands [living autonomously].

Similarly, one founder (Raine) said,

[Many other groups believed that] NGOs would continue giving them things for free [indefinitely]. … Because of this, there are groups of people who are still living in tents even to this day [on land they do not own]. … We did not function this way toward those we helped; we wanted them to be self-reliant by getting training, education, or what they needed to function on their own.

Sustaining ventures recognized that a state of perpetual, resourceful resource seeking would not lead to the long-term resolution of suffering. Therefore, an investment mindset bounded beliefs about opportunities by a respect for private property and motivated and provided for more extensive entrepreneurial actions. As such, ventures' initial beliefs about opportunities had a significant effect on the implementation of difficult transitions, such as urging individuals to leave temporary camps and start the challenging process of learning to live autonomously in order to eventually "build back better."

Entrepreneurial Action Transforming ventures engaged in two primary forms of entrepreneurial action: developing need-based solutions to housing and other basic needs and developing self-reliance-based solutions to enable victim autonomy. These forms of action influenced changes in the ventures' roles and subsequently the alleviation of suffering. First, transforming ventures took a customized approach to meeting critical basic needs, such as obtaining housing, food, and water, while focusing on helping people restore their lives in

such a way that their life circumstances would be better than they were before the earthquake. That is, rather than providing one solution for all (i.e., tents to anyone without housing), they explored different types of solutions based on victims' pre-earthquake life situations, such as whether these individuals were renters or home owners. This customization relates to our findings described in previous chapters but highlights an important extension: customization appears to facilitate transformative change as well as evolutionary change (staged and progressive) over time.

To accomplish the customized solutions, these ventures provided structural assessments of individuals' houses, which enabled victims to repair their homes when the damage was not too extensive (Tristan, Gabi). To address basic needs, transforming ventures took the long view; that is, they focused on helping people provide for themselves as soon as possible rather than relying on outside donors over the long run. This perspective resulted in sometimes difficult transitions from one living situation to another. While the victims making these transitions expressed difficulty with the "forced" change, they later recognized how important it was to move beyond surviving and immediate relief toward a higher level of well-being. For example, one customer (Terrin) explained, "It was hard leaving the tents; things were desperate … but I fixed up my house and later helped with other projects like delivering food and water. … This led to a job with an NGO, which would not have happened if I [had] stayed in a tent!"

Second, to help victims transition to long-term solutions, transforming ventures customized solutions based on individuals' baseline skill sets. All of these customized solutions were designed to enable self-reliance. For example, one founder (Tristan) described how his organization identified and provided for a variety of needs, such as loans for "those who couldn't read or write … [to] open a small business." One employee (Rio) explained that after initially providing basic resources, "We developed a partnership with a technical school and a language institute because computer skills and English language skills could lead to quality long-term careers." By enabling victims to ultimately achieve autonomy, transforming ventures helped build communities in a way that improved pre-earthquake life situations, or building back better (Tariq, Raine, Remi, Gaymnor).

Ventures' Roles   As transforming ventures acted to address evolving physical needs and enable autonomy, they developed fluid roles that

reinforced entrepreneurial actions. This stands in stark contrast to sustaining ventures, whose static roles as resource providers were reinforced through their successful actions of seeking and procuring resources to satisfy basic needs. Transforming ventures' fluid roles centered on enabling autonomy, adapting previous rules to new settings, and need finding.

First, one founder (Raine) explained how his primary role went from working as a local laborer before the disaster to working with his venture to enable others to be self-sufficient, which evolved over time: "All of the programs we [now] run are geared toward helping others be autonomous. There are people currently attending English classes, and other people attending computer literacy courses. There are people who have successfully launched small businesses, and they are now business owners." As illustrated by this founder's statements, transforming ventures' roles were fluid, from meeting basic needs and security to setting up career development programs, because of their focus on others' self-sufficiency. As one employee (Gili) explained, in working with others after the disaster, the venture had to fulfill a role that would "encourage victims and make them feel like they are capable." This focus on enabling others naturally led the ventures to alter and adjust their roles to best fit the evolving needs of those they helped. To realize fluid roles that best addressed victim needs, ventures negotiated roles for themselves, those on their leadership team, and the recipients of their services in collaboration with others, which enabled both role flexibility and victim autonomy. For example, one founder (Tariq) told us the following:

I didn't make decisions by myself … but everyone came to my home to coordinate. There were leaders from the different communities, as well as men and women over men's, women's and children's groups that came to plan. … I just started planning and doing things—I didn't really have a defined role as our roles were more need based. We simply met together as a committee and discussed problems and issues so that we could come up with solutions and action plans. … Then, we all got to work to accomplish them. … Our roles would change over time in line with the needs we uncovered.

As indicated by this comment, enabling autonomy was fundamental to the role of a venture's leadership team (enabling each member to be a contributing member) and to empowering those they helped. This stands in stark contrast to sustaining ventures, whose leaders held absolute power in decision making and actions within their communities and whose roles remained static.

Second, and in contrast to sustaining ventures that created new roles that fell outside Haitian community and legal systems, transforming ventures successfully built on and repurposed legitimate roles for new ends. Specifically, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, transforming ventures drew heavily on and adapted existing rules and routines associated with church and community leader roles to achieve their goals. However, these routines evolved as individuals (i.e., those being helped) progressed. For example, one founder (Gabi) explained that he used the existing role structure of his church organization to gather information on a range of needs as well as to prioritize his role in an appropriate response. As such, he "activated" his role as a church leader and the connections that it provided by adapting the "rules" governing those relationships to the postdisaster setting. By adapting roles from previous relationships, the venture was able to draw on existing leadership structures (and associated roles) to quickly develop new roles (and associated rules and routines), which continued over time.

Finally, and related to the previous point, transforming ventures prioritized identifying and addressing the root causes of problems as opposed to taking a lobbying role to provide relief to the symptoms of these underlying causes of suffering. One founder (Tristan) explained the following:

Our overall process was simple. The various members of the leadership committee [i.e., overseeing women, children, and all parties] assessed the needs and evaluated the necessary resources. They would sort out what families have what problems. Then, they presented those needs to us [the committee leadership], and we drew upon all our resources, including our international church infrastructure, to fulfill those needs.

Similarly, other venture founders (Remi, Tariq) described situations in which people wanted to wait for government assistance when moving from tents to homes but realized it could take a long time and would trap victims in a negative and unproductive mindset. To avoid such a dependency trap, transforming ventures forced hard transitions, which required ventures to align their next role with the subsequent phase of recovery (e.g., transition from providing basic resources to providing education). Achieving this objective required an openness to role fluidity. Another founder (Raine) explained that providing food or short-term solutions on a long-term basis (i.e., not altering activities and roles to alleviate suffering) actually masked the real issues:

We desired to help people more in the long term so that they do not continue relying on assistance in the future. … If you come to us and say that you do not have food, it is more likely that we will help you find a job [instead of giving you food only]. Thus, the next time you are hungry, you can just take the money you make from your job and buy food to eat. … [Otherwise] the root problem [lack of jobs] is eventually going to resurface.

Transforming ventures recognized that role fluidity was essential to achieving their objectives through entrepreneurial action. If the ventures failed to evolve their roles, they recognized that victims would be forever trapped in seeking and receiving relief for their most basic needs. The emergence of these fluid roles influenced and reinforced subsequent entrepreneurial action, which in turn influenced the ongoing fluidity of the ventures' roles.

Deviant Behaviors   Transforming ventures differed from sustaining ventures in that they employed both creative and legal techniques to access and distribute resources. First, transforming ventures engaged in legitimate resource acquisition—that is, acquiring resources through legal means. For example, one founder (Raine) explained that instead of stealing others' resources, such as food and water, his venture encouraged and enabled individuals to pool what few resources they had on hand to ride out the most trying times:

Imagine that you have flour, I have salt, and someone else has oil, and a fourth person has rice—it doesn't make sense for us to each try to make food with our limited resources. Instead, we pooled all of our food supplies together and cooked food for everyone; we distributed it equally among everyone even if each person got only one or two spoonfuls. … You have to know each person's talents and capabilities. … You need doctors to form a medical committee, and you need lawyers to form a legal committee. … We knew people's capabilities, so we could deploy them.

Transforming ventures were also creative in accessing and distributing resources through legitimate methods from outside the disaster area. One founder (Tariq) explained that his team would bring resources into Haiti from the Dominican Republic at night to avoid having the supplies taken or redirected (e.g., by sustaining ventures). He described a typical evening this way:

We traveled to another commune called La Vallée de Jacmel. We finally arrived at 4:00 a.m., dropped off the supplies, and then turned right around to go back without a break. We were so tired on the way back that we switched places every 10 minutes. … There was nobody around on the roads to see that

we were carrying valuable food supplies—we were able to travel with no hindrances.

With these creative resource-acquisition and distribution tactics, transforming ventures were able to access and engage their connections to obtain vital resources in pursuit of their potential opportunities to alleviate suffering.

Second, transforming ventures demonstrated a respect for private property in acquisitions. For example, one founder (Gabi) recalled how he helped establish a surgical center in a neighboring building to quickly treat individuals with severe and life-threatening injuries as hospitals were "overflowing and mostly full of dead bodies." The use of the building was temporary, however, as the venture worked toward long-term solutions (and corresponding roles) once the need for immediate medical relief lessened. Similarly, all three ventures explained that the use of non-owned buildings, property, and facilities was always meant to be temporary. As such, these ventures helped individuals transition out of camps in as few as three months, with no one remaining in tents after one year. They also helped people with property titles rebuild their homes and helped renters find available housing for rent.

In summary, transforming ventures differed greatly from sustaining ventures in their social resources, founding mindset, identifying opportunities for spontaneous venturing, resourceful behavior, entrepreneurial actions, roles, and deviant behaviors, which resulted in different outcomes in the alleviation of suffering. These differences highlight how there are likely considerable differences in the performance of spontaneous ventures. We anticipate that there is much to be learned about how to be efficient and yet customized in identifying needs for long-term and sustainable alleviation of suffering.

Discussion

In this chapter, we provided a unique examination of six ventures that emerged to alleviate suffering after a disaster in an LDC. This work adds to our broader discussion of compassion venturing and demonstrates that these types of ventures did (and do) emerge even in the most hostile of contexts. We showed that individuals who are already living in poverty before a disaster event and who endure even further resource loss through a disaster have much to offer in alleviating others' suffering. For example, one founder (Aidan) explained (and nearly all our informants reaffirmed), "Much of the story of the earthquake has

been about foreign aid … but what is missing is the Haitian story, the story of locals who rose up to help fellow Haitians in need. Please share that story with the world!"

Contributions to Research on Poverty Alleviation in Least Developed Countries

This chapter provides new insight into how individuals, organizations, and communities seek to alleviate poverty in LDCs, which is an ever-growing challenge. Scholars have presented a variety of (sometimes competing) perspectives on how governments and other organizations should involve themselves in addressing poverty, including work on foreign aid (Dickovick 2014), NGO–foreign government collaborations (Lecy, Schmitz, and Swedlund 2012), and base-of-the-pyramid investment (Prahalad 2004). As the observations in this chapter show, focusing on local venturing in the aftermath of a disaster extends our understanding of alleviation of suffering (including poverty) by directly considering the role of local venturing. Specifically, we found distinct differences between two groups of ventures that highlight the important actions of local ventures, the ways these ventures interact with outsiders, and the influence both have on the alleviation of suffering. Explaining how these ventures alleviated suffering has three primary implications for the literature on poverty alleviation.

First, recent studies have focused on governments' and NGOs' efforts to implement "community-based programs" (Mansuri and Rao 2012; Zanotti 2010) that engage local people in developing responses to poverty. Despite these efforts, many of these programs fail to achieve the desired outcomes (Mansuri and Rao 2012) and may even result in a victim dependence that proves destructive for local communities (Easterly 2006; Easterly and Pfutze 2008). While scholars have focused on community-based programs, they have largely ignored programs that originate in affected communities. Our findings show an important form of local response, venturing to alleviate suffering, that opens pathways for future research on ventures that originate in impoverished areas specifically designed to alleviate others' suffering. Consistent with the literature on poverty alleviation, we found evidence of both the benefits of international actors in collaborating with local ventures (i.e., transforming ventures' outcomes) and the potential risks (i.e., sustaining ventures' outcomes). Specifically, and counterintuitively, those ventures that engaged with international donors such as NGOs and government organizations as collaborators were able to

break the cycle of dependence from those donors as they built back local residents' autonomy. In contrast, those who did not actively engage with international donors as collaborators but instead treated them as transactional resource providers became increasingly dependent on them and eventually grew to actively despise them, seeing them as a necessary evil. This finding has implications for those hoping to invest in community-based programs as some investments aid in transforming victims by providing broad solutions to alleviate suffering and foster a more complete recovery and perhaps even growth (i.e., collaboration with transforming ventures), while others bring relief through satisfying basic needs, which can create dependence, stagnation, and resentment (i.e., providing resources to sustaining ventures). This finding contrasts with previous research focusing more on the actions of the donating party—an NGO, government agency, or MNC—as opposed to matching and partnering with local actors.

Second, in exploring how spontaneous venture opportunities were identified and exploited, we explained two different perspectives on alleviating suffering. One important mechanism driving differences in ventures' alleviation of suffering was that transforming ventures focused on a multistage response to recovery, whereas sustaining ventures focused on a perpetual relief state response toward providing relief. Specifically, transforming ventures anticipated and encouraged difficult transitions between different stages of recovery. These steps, though uncomfortable for victims, were critical in moving toward long-term recovery and the lasting alleviation of suffering by helping clients exit extreme poverty. In contrast, sustaining ventures drew on international resources to perpetuate a subsistence-oriented way of living for disaster victims. Rather than moving on to advanced stages of recovery, they held out for government payouts, free land and food, and other services, even three years after the earthquake. This created a dependency that, while enabling people to survive, limited their ability to make progress in their lives. This finding about sustaining ventures highlights why international organizations have a difficult time knowing how and when to transition individuals to subsequent stages, resulting in perpetual aid with disappointing results (Easterly 2006; Zanotti 2010). Subsequent research can focus on the transitional stages beyond relief and the ways donors can best recognize and connect with transitioning ventures. Focusing on moving people through the stages of recovery, as opposed to implementing one-size-

fits-all solutions for providing relief, is likely to improve the effectiveness of both local and foreign efforts to alleviate poverty in LDCs.

Finally, recent research has emphasized the importance of engaging participants to find more inclusive and appropriate solutions that address the multidimensional nature of poverty (London 2007; Sen 1999). While this research emphasizes the need to engage local residents, it does so primarily from the perspective of an external MNC attempting in a for-profit manner to deploy a product that is believed to have positive implications for poverty reduction. Our findings suggest that engaging local residents in recovery efforts is complicated, as those in LDCs have access to varying levels of resources and differing mindsets, which can influence success in poverty alleviation. Specifically, we found that local people who created ventures and possessed considerable social resources, including strong ties to other community members, were more likely to identify, pursue, and deliver transformative solutions for alleviating suffering. In contrast, ventures founded with limited social resources and that had primarily transaction-based ties were more likely to identify, pursue, and deliver a narrow range of solutions focused on meeting basic needs to provide immediate relief from adverse conditions. That is, transforming ventures were likely better able to engage foreign organizations (and governments) in developing long-term solutions.

Contributions to Research on Disaster Response

Researchers acknowledge the inevitable convergence of individuals on disaster areas in an effort to alleviate suffering (Quarantelli 1996; Waugh and Streib 2006), including local victim-actors (Drabek and McEntire 2003; Shepherd and Williams 2014). In exploring this phenomenon in an environment that was impoverished even before the disaster, we uncovered findings that make two primary contributions to the literature on disaster response (Drabek and McEntire 2003; Quarantelli 1996).

First, our findings extend research focused on relief from suffering by uncovering ventures that focused on transformation, or building individuals and communities back better than they were prior to the disaster. Traditional disaster research has focused on how disaster responders facilitate the restoration of order and normality following a crisis (for a review, see Drabek and McEntire 2003). As such, researchers have considered how to most rapidly respond to ongoing suffering, how to minimize subsequent suffering, and how to transition to clean-

up activities as soon as the crisis has passed (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985; Waugh and Streib 2006). This study highlights the importance of seizing opportunities for positive change when disasters disrupt people's lives and the ways in which local venturing can facilitate this process (i.e., transforming ventures). Similarly, we showed how not all local venturing efforts will result in these positive changes. For example, in Haiti, some individuals lived in worse conditions—in tent cities rather than in cinderblock houses—for several years after the disaster and have yet to transition from a surviving state to one of autonomy and self-reliance. This study opens up the possibility for deepening disaster research to focus on fostering and supporting transforming ventures rather than on simply sustaining ventures.

Second, our findings contribute to the emerging management literature on disaster response, including compassion organizing (Maitlis 2012; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead 2007; Shepherd and Williams 2014), by identifying variability in ventures' roles, the habits of mind that influenced these roles, and the ways these roles affected the alleviation of suffering. Prior studies have demonstrated that an "ethic of care" is likely to influence the emergence of compassionate responses to negative events (Maitlis 2012) and that community membership can embody this ethic of care when actors perceive others' suffering (Shepherd and Williams 2014). Our work extends this compassion organizing literature by highlighting differences in ventures' founding mindsets. Specifically, while some ventures were founded on principles of helping others (transforming ventures), others took action to help out of a sense of patriotism and to obtain power (sustaining ventures). This finding underscores the variation in the ethic of care among local LDC ventures founded to ease victim suffering after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, which led to differences in their organizing the alleviation of suffering and the outcomes of such organizing. Similarly, prior research has emphasized the importance of narratives in fostering an ethic of care (Maitlis 2012). We found that sustaining ventures used symbols such as images, badges, and slogans to demonstrate national pride and its authority within local communities within the LDC, which reinforced a continuous focus on basic and short-term forms of relief from suffering. Disaster response scholars will likely benefit by further exploring roles, the uses of symbols and narratives, and how these influence the identification, pursuit, and outcomes of spontaneous venturing opportunity pursuit.

Practical Implications

The outcomes from this chapter generate a number of practical implications. First, we show that under certain conditions, actors in disaster-stricken LDCs can be best positioned to identify and address their own needs despite incredible resource loss and suffering. For this reason, we argue that disaster responders in LDCs need to assess how they can support and facilitate these actions. In particular, how can local transformative efforts be supported, rather than just sustaining efforts? In the context we studied, not all actors were positioned to work toward long-term recovery, which resulted in ongoing poverty and suffering for some community members. Second, transforming ventures focused their disaster relief efforts on building back better, allowing them to simultaneously address disaster-induced suffering and causes of long-term poverty (e.g., lack of career training, lack of education, lack of permanent housing). This is an important finding and suggests that as aid organizations converge on LDC disaster zones, there are likely to be local people ready, willing, and able to make substantial long-term change after the disaster that could result in building a better future. In this way, disruptive events provide a unique opportunity for transformative change, which may be difficult to achieve without a disaster as a catalyst.

Third, NGOs and foreign investors need to be mindful that they may potentially harm by their mode of helping: in some of the cases we studied, the parties' actions encouraged an environment of entitlement, resentment, and perpetual poverty. Thus, any relief effort by outsiders should first focus on developing NGO and foreign investment competencies in identifying and facilitating stages of recovery that help transition victims toward autonomy.

Fourth, we found that actors who possessed strong local and international connections before the disaster were more likely to take action resulting in transformative outcomes. This is consistent with our findings in chapters 3 and 4 and further suggests that outsiders need to find more effective ways to identify and support well-connected local residents.

Finally, we found that a prosocial mindset proved beneficial to actors in identifying transformation-focused opportunities to alleviate suffering. This again is consistent with our observations previous chapters and further exposes the need for organizations to learn how to develop a prosocial way of thinking to facilitate the development of ventures

that provide social benefits (e.g., alleviating suffering) in both disaster and nondisaster LDC environments.

The primary practical implications of this chapter are listed below:

1. When helping those in LDCs, do not assume they have nothing. The Haitians proved to have the most critical knowledge needed for real transformative recovery.

2. Actors getting involved in LDCs must constantly ask themselves, "Am I really helping, or am I creating long-term dependence?"

3. The standards of developed economies should not be applied to LDCs. For example, housing, food, and education solutions in LDCs will be very different from those in established economies. The key is to listen to the local residents and have them identify opportunities to help people advance in stages.

4. The human capacity for resilience is amazing. The Haiti earthquake disaster was one of the worst in modern history, yet we heard countless tales of resilience and innovation. This further demonstrates the validity of the ideas shared here and the need to better understand how to support and develop resilience.

5. The "best" technology or solution may not be the one needed. The best solution is the one that is managed by the locals and has local buy-in. These solutions will have greater capacity for sustainability.

6. Do not assume people who were exposed to extreme trauma are helpless.

7. Do not underestimate local people's creativity and resourcefulness. At the same time, be mindful that an expectation of extreme resourcefulness may lead to downstream challenges, such as distrust.

8. Determine how to identify subcommunities (see chapter 4). Do not blindly treat individuals in a similar neighborhood or physical location as a "community."

9. Encourage individuals to self-identify their communities. This will help reveal the tacit networks people actually use to get things done.

10. Outside resources do have a place in addressing locals' needs. Despite all the negative things that have been said about NGOs and foreign governments in Haiti, there is a way these groups can help. However, the key to success lies with the Haitians.