

2 Three Central Perspectives on Power in Global Supply Chains

This chapter lays the theoretical and empirical foundation of the book. It outlines the major research debates on globalization and governance. Based on a literature review, I derive three perspectives on power in global supply chains. Each perspective is outlined in two parts: first, a more descriptive part reflecting the state of research debates, and second, a part that defines a research task. The three perspectives deal with ongoing power dynamics in world trade and IR. As I outline ahead, power in IR is usually understood as *power over* (coercion and manipulation; see Berenskoetter and Williams 2007; Nye 2011). This helps to explain gridlock with regard to environmental and social problems in global supply chains. However, to study change dynamics over time—for example, through alternative forms of governance—I argue that acknowledging *power to* (empowerment and resistance) and *power with* (cooperation and learning) is essential (see table 2.1; see Partzsch 2017b). Ahead, I identify respective tasks for the study of power in global supply chains regarding “power shifts” (Mathews 1997) between public and private actors (Dauvergne 2018b; Green 2013), asymmetries between the Global North and South (Azubuike 2018; Brooks 2015), and universal norms and ethical values (Manners 2015; Renckens, Skogstad, and Mondou 2017). The appendix provides an overview of the three state-of-the-art perspectives and questions for empirical analysis in chapters 3 to 5 in the second column.

2.1 Globalization and Governance

Although economic globalization is often portrayed as something skillfully arranged by TNCs for their own benefit, a political integration actually

Table 2.1
Types of power

<i>Power over</i>	
Visible power (first dimension)	“A has <i>power over</i> B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 201).
Hidden power (second dimension)	“Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences” (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948).
Invisible power (third dimension)	“A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants” (Lukes 1974, 23).
Unconscious power (fourth dimension)	“Power postulates that subjectivity or individuality is not biologically given. Subjects are understood as social constructions, whose formation can be historically described” (Digeser 1992, 980).
<i>Power to</i>	
	“One man . . . may have power to do or accomplish something by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it may involve other people if what he has power to do is a social or political action, but it need not” (Pitkin 1972, 177).
<i>Power with</i>	
	“There are situations in which power is neither attributed solely to A nor to B, but to both. Power with refers to such processes of finding common ground among diverse interests, developing shared values and creating collective strength by organizing with each other” (Partzsch and Fuchs 2012, 360).

preceded the integration of markets and the formation of most TNCs. In fact, nation-state governments collectively adopted international trade rules that allow TNCs to invest globally and spall supply chains across jurisdictions (Strange 1997; Sassen 2009). In particular, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 led to the deregulation of international trade. At the same time, WTO rules impede efforts of environmental and social regulation at the nation-state level (Kulovesi 2014; Ponte and Daugbjerg 2015). Thus, a first perspective that I elaborate in sections

2.1.1 and 2.1.2 is this: *Globalization and the withdrawal of the state led to a new private power over nation-states at the expense of environmental and social considerations.*

2.1.1 The Withdrawal of the Nation-State

The WTO is formally charged with international regulation of all export activities. It replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which had regulated global trade since 1947. The GATT provided a negotiation context in which any country could extend tariff concessions agreed upon bilaterally to third countries. Yet by the 1990s, with the increase in global trade after the end of the Cold War, it had become increasingly unsuited to the purpose for which it was designed. States considered the need to individually negotiate every third-country contract too burdensome (Goldstein and Steinberg 2009; Sifonios 2018).

The WTO is a member-driven organization with 164 member countries. The member governments make all decisions, and WTO rules are the outcome of negotiations among members. The countries with the largest advanced economies—the Group of Seven (G7)¹ and the Group of Twenty (G20)²—have more resources to back their positions, whereas the majority of the WTO members are developing countries, including the Group of 77 (G77;³ see WTO 2019). For them, WTO membership is attractive because it signifies not only that specific trade rules are internalized, but also that a broader market-based mindset permeates the general approach to issues of macroeconomic management (Azubuike 2018). When China became a WTO member in 2001, this was a significant milestone and impacted many global supply chains, including cotton/textile, palm oil, and timber supply chains (Quark 2013; Cashore and Stone 2014; Schleifer and Sun 2018).

The structure of decision making at the WTO is based on the principle of “one country, one vote” (WTO 2019). In practice, however, these provisions are generally overridden by the requirement for members to agree to a package of reforms in its entirety for fear that if they do not, the ongoing round of multilateral trade talks will collapse (Azubuike 2018). There is no possibility of individual opt-out clauses. A package of reform is a single undertaking; that is, members can only decide whether they accept the whole package. As governments negotiate agreements at the international level, legislators (parliaments) at the national level are forced to make a

single, take it or leave it judgement, like the several-thousand-page Uruguay Round that led to the creation of the WTO (Azubuike 2018; Green 2005).

International trade disciplines affect national-scale social and environmental efforts. Scharpf (1999) distinguishes between a *negative integration*, the dismantling of trade regulations in the course of globalization, and policies of *positive integration*, which establish new market-correcting regulations. While the WTO and regional trade organizations, such as the European Union (EU), pushed the *negative* integration of national markets for both traded goods and financial flows, they simultaneously impeded *positive* environmental and social regulations (Scharpf 1999). In consequence, large numbers of corporations began to spall supply chains across jurisdictions. Corporations are now participating in foreign markets, through trade, direct investment, and subcontractor relationships (Dauvergne 2018b). Examples include JP Morgan and Exxon Mobile, with annual revenues of USD 118.18 billion and USD 230.06 billion, respectively (in July 2018; see Murphy et al. 2019; see figure 2.1).

Although they usually prioritize economic benefit over environmental and social considerations, TNCs are able to decide whether they converge standards at a high or low level (Bloomfield 2017; Fuchs 2007). In this context, we also observe increasing power of individuals—for example, Mark Zuckerberg as CEO of Facebook (Partzsch 2017c). Facebook tended to apply data security standards at the lowest possible level. This ultimately led to Zuckerberg testifying to US lawmakers in April 2018, and appearing before European Parliament in May 2018, on his company's global influence and use of personal data following the Cambridge Analytica scandal. The scandal involved the collection of personally identifiable information that might have been used to attempt to influence voters' opinions in the 2017 US presidential elections (Osborne and Parkinson 2018).

In this vein, critics of globalization have argued that, in an ever more integrated global market, nation-states and subnational units increasingly compete with each other for the most mobile factor of production: financial capital (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999; Sassen 2005; Eliasoph 2015). They warned that TNCs and “mobile capitalists” prefer lax regulation and less government intervention, leading to the so-called Delaware effect, named after the US state with the lowest corporate taxes. As all states follow this logic, there is a race to the bottom and a continuous lowering of protection standards (Scharpf 1999). Fuchs (2007) explains that TNCs do not even




Figure 2.1

Global commodity trade flows in (a) 2000 and (b) 2016. *Source:* Chatham House 2019.

need to voice demands; only the implicit threat to shift investments abroad influences political decisions in their favor. Environmentalists and social justice activists therefore have argued that, in consequence, expanded trade leads to competitive pressure, which pushes down environmental and social standards (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999; Green 2005; Sassen 2005). The fear of the 1970s that TNCs are an arm of foreign governments has been complemented by the general concern that TNCs and other nonstate actors are generally eroding nation-states' sovereignty and bypassing public regulation, even in their own countries of origin (Dauvergne 2018b; Lucier and Gareau 2015).

The alternative dynamic is the California effect, the name of which is inspired by the state of California's 1970 Clean Air Act (Vogel 1997). As California was by far the largest US market for new cars, the entire US automobile industry had to comply with the state's (higher) standards. Therefore, the state did not suffer competitive disadvantages from adopting stricter environmental regulations. To the contrary: as other states followed, the Californian industry benefitted from first-mover advantages. Jänicke (2005) emphasizes that new environmental regulation obliges domestic industries to an earlier implementation of standards that will be required elsewhere at a later date (see also Cashore and Stone 2014). In a similar vein, Bloomfield (2017) argues that firms in which leaders adapt early to activists' demands benefit from mitigating reputational risks (see also Mattli and Woods 2009, 8; Sarfaty 2015, 459). At the same time, these firms may push for (stricter) regulation in those countries in which they already operate and aim to expand their operations (Risse, Börzel, and Draude 2018; Vogel 1997). However, in terms of public regulation by the nation-state, this logic only applies to product standards (Green 2005; Kulovesi 2014).

The WTO allows states to adopt regulations defining what process requirements must be met to ensure that end products are safe to consume or use—for instance, rules on the environmental conditions in fuel-processing plants to prevent toxic emissions when refueling. These production process methods (PPMs) have an impact on the physical content of the product. Other production processes, referred to as non-product-related PPMs (npr-PPMs), do not leave traces that are materially evident in the end product but may nevertheless affect its perceived consumption value or its classification in relation to regulatory standards—for example, deforestation impacts. Npr-PPMs are not allowed under WTO rules (Sifonios 2018).

Furthermore, the WTO established a dispute settlement mechanism, which allows sanctioning nation-states in case of noncompliance (Azubuike 2018, 141–145; Widiatedja 2019).

The debate on PPMs originates from the product-process distinction applied in two US tuna-dolphin dispute settlement cases (Sifonios 2018, 2). The United States banned Mexican tuna imports because the Mexican fishing methods resulted in incidental dolphin deaths. In 1991, Mexico obtained a GATT panel decision declaring that the United States was in violation of its GATT obligations for imposing such a ban (the Tuna-Dolphin I case). The United States also enacted a secondary embargo applying to all third countries that did not prohibit imports of tuna from Mexico. The European Communities challenged this secondary embargo (the Tuna-Dolphin II case). In the latter case, the GATT panel rejected the possibility of justifying a PPM measure conditioning market access to the adoption of particular environmental policies by exporting members (Sifonios 2018, 2). The WTO has generally continued to prioritize free trade over environmental and social considerations. However, the product-process distinction, as expressed mainly in the US Tuna GATT Panel reports, has been largely undermined by different evolutions in case law (Sifonios 2018, 279). As such, we can observe a “juridical liberalization” at the WTO (Goldstein and Steinberg 2009, 213). The precedents of the Tuna-Dolphin II case have allowed for measures that influence free trade on the grounds of animal welfare or labor rights (Jakir 2013). In particular, the WTO has acknowledged in its rulings that member countries can implement “technical regulations,” such as the Dolphin Safe label for tuna products, so long as they do not discriminate against products with a different country of origin or form an unnecessary obstacle to free trade (WTO 2015). Moreover, voluntary (private) standards are not subject to the WTO rules, which only apply to its member states, not directly to private bodies (Du 2018).

With the creation of the WTO, globalization first appeared to produce incentives for large-scale territorial governance and nation-states alike in institutions and policies at the supranational level. The “postsovereign” system of the EU, which includes “positive” integration efforts of environmental and social regulation, served some scholars as the prime example of large-scale territorial governance (Sachs and Santarius 2007; Piattoni 2009). They suggested establishing a World Environment Organization or, at least, strengthening United Nations (UN) institutions, such as the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in order to outbalance the WTO at the international level (Biermann and Bauer 2016; Biermann and Simonis 2000). There were also suggestions to establish control schemes that could prevent world prices of agricultural commodities, such as coffee and cocoa, falling below a level that causes misery and poverty in producing countries (Barratt Brown 2007). However, environmental and social regimes have remained comparatively weak, and environmental provisions are included and hence subordinated to trade agreement (Biermann and Bauer 2016; Morin and Jinnah 2018).

Instead of further centralization and the development of large-scale territorial governance, we have increasingly witnessed fragmentation and polycentrism in international politics over the last three decades (Jordan et al. 2015; Ostrom 2010; Zelli and van Asselt 2013). In addition to the distribution of authority between the national and international levels of state governance, we can also observe the rise of activities by subnational actors, such as regions and cities, in transnational governance (Bansard, Pattberg, and Widerberg 2017). For example, Bulkeley and Betsill (2004, 472) argue that “networks of local government” are a “significant phenomenon in environmental politics.” The authors trace the emergence of subnational networks to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, including the development of Local Agenda 21 suggesting that cities are “key sites in the production and management of energy use and waste production, through processes over which local authorities have a (varying) degree of influence” (Bulkeley and Betsill 2004, 477; see also Bulkeley and Betsill 2013; Kahler and Lake 2009). Likewise, Bansard, Pattberg, and Widerberg (2017) argue that transnational municipal networks (TMNs) are a viable substitute for ambitious international action under the UNFCCC. Some of the city networks, especially in the context of climate politics, have become incredibly large. The C40 network consists of ninety-six cities and 25 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). The Global Covenant of Mayors engages over nine thousand cities, representing nearly eight hundred million people and 10 percent of the global population (Bansard, Pattberg, and Widerberg 2017).

In sum, nation-states are no longer the only actors in international politics. Many scholars therefore started to use the term *governance* rather than *government* (Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; Haufler 2010). Nation-state governments have been complemented by other state or public actors—that is, supranational organizations and subnational units—as well as nonstate or

private actors—in particular, TNCs and NGOs. We increasingly see global governance arrangements complementing *intergovernmental*, or *international*, relations.

2.1.2 New Private Power over Nation-States

As supranational organizations and subnational units have only partially offset the withdrawal of nation-states, globalization has caused a tremendous “power shift” (Mathews 1997) toward markets and civil society (Rugie 2013). In the wake of the WTO, individual states—in particular, states of the Global South—lost power over their own territories. On the other hand, the WTO gives private actors a new power over all nation-states. Scholars have developed different analytical frameworks on the power of nonstate vis-à-vis state actors at the global scale (Fuchs 2007; Holzscheiter 2005). These frameworks tend to be based on Weber’s definition of *power* as the “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will, despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber [1922] 1978, 53). Even if power is not simply perceived as a zero-sum game, actors are usually conceived of as subordinate to powerful agents, structures, or discourses.

Without facing the increasing power of private actors, following this perspective, state actors would not have needed to transfer governance functions to supranational organizations or subnational units in order to *re-regulate* environmental and social issues (Biermann and Bauer 2016; Mattli and Woods 2009). In the following sections, I illustrate the new private power over nation-states in the age of globalization, further differentiating along the lines of the four dimensions or four “faces” of *power (over)* that are well known in political theory: visible, hidden, invisible, and unconscious power (Digeser 1992; Fuchs 2007). (The fourth dimension does not understand power as a zero-sum game and can also be added to *power to*, as discussed ahead).

The first dimension is agent-based. It refers to *visible power over* another. Studies based on this perspective assess which actors or groups of actors prevail in political decision-making processes. Dahl (1957, 201, emphasis added) defines it thus: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Power can be measured in terms of votes in parliament (e.g., for and against environmental regulation). Following this understanding of power, scholars explore how nonstate

actors influence decisions made by formal political decision-makers—for example, via lobbying and campaign financing (Betsill and Corell 2008; Lund 2013). These scholars agree that nonstate actors have gained power over state actors in recent years, and this holds true for both TNCs and NGOs (Fuchs 2007; Arts 2003).

NGOs are usually seen as representatives of civil society (for a critique, see Kaldor 2003) and a counterpart to TNCs (Betsill and Corell 2008; Eliasoph 2015). They have special interests, albeit not ones motivated by personal profit. For instance, while TNCs are considered responsible for climate change, Walk (2008) presents NGOs as “climate savers” (author’s translation). Betsill (2006, 190–191) finds that without the presence of the Climate Action Network (CAN) in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations under the UNFCCC, Europeans might not have maintained the 15 percent reduction target and the Kyoto target may have been even lower. Thus, although NGOs have fewer resources than TNCs, they too are shown to have an impact on international negotiations. Although their political action is considered legitimate and urgently required—not only in climate politics but also in, for example, resisting nuclear power (Ho 2014) and genetically modified organisms (GMOs; see Andrée 2011)—these nonstate actors take over functions formerly performed by political parties and parliaments within nation-states. Hence, here there is again a zero-sum power shift away from state actors. At the same time, it is unclear whether NGOs can move corporate actors to improve their environmental and social performance.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) speak of “two faces of power,” emphasizing that some issues never even make it onto the political agenda and are dismissed before observable negotiations start. This is the case for many environmental and social problems in IR. For instance, forest and water policies receive far less attention than climate and biodiversity policies (Simonis 2006). Narain (2010) explains that in climate politics, negotiations about a temperature ceiling affect developing countries in a hidden way, although their emissions are officially not part of the political agenda: a global temperature ceiling leaves little leeway to developing countries for a carbon-rich course of development.

The traditional concept of structural *hidden power over* in the international arena addresses coercion resulting from the capital mobility of

transnational corporations. Scholars argue, with respect to the Delaware effect, that threats to shift investments abroad do not even need to be voiced to influence institutional politics in corporations' favor. More recent studies point to the fact that business also exercises structural hidden *power over* through self-regulation and coregulating institutions that allow business actors to actively set rules (Green 2013). As discussed previously, the WTO sets structural limits for non-product-related PPMs. Against this backdrop, self- and coregulating institutions are seen as a symptom, rather than a solution, of the new power of private actors over nation-states (Ponte and Daugbjerg 2015).

The amount of private regulation in the forms of self-regulation and coregulating institutions and the degree of autonomy and influence of nonstate actors in these institutions have risen dramatically over the last two and a half decades. Nonstates have created, implemented, and enforced rules to address problems, such as human rights violations and environmental degradation, on a global scale (Fuchs 2007; Green 2013). Until recently, international organizations were institutions of, by, and for nation-states, such as the WTO. Now, these organizations are often founded by private actors, competing with intergovernmental constituencies for funding and direct connections to the peoples of the world (Partzsch 2014; Pattberg, Betsill, and Dellas 2011). An impressive example is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) with its annual budget of over USD 4 billion (BMGF 2018).

In this context, again, we observe an increasing power of not only non-state collective actors, but also individual actors—for example, Bill and Melinda Gates as the CEOs of their foundation. Furthermore, some celebrities and social entrepreneurs matter as individuals in their own right (Richey 2016; Partzsch 2017c). However, state actors often promote private forms of regulation. Governments cooperate with Bill and Melinda Gates and follow their agendas in programs such as the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Partzsch 2014; Moravaridi 2012). Therefore, some scholars argue that while globalization has led to a delegation of authority to a greater range of entities, states still remain dominant actors and have the ability to revoke this authority at will. Bypassing domestic regulation is nearly impossible, at least at the stage of implementation (Bartley 2018). Delegation and transfer

of authority can be observationally equivalent, and thus it is difficult to distinguish who has power and authority in complex supply chains. For instance, when states create international dispute-settlement procedures, they may delegate authority to the new entity, allowing it to act on their behalf. Given that private actors usually prioritize their economic benefit, most scholars have remained cautious about whether such delegation of authority favors social justice and environmental sustainability (Dauvergne 2018b; Fuchs 2007). Sneyd argues that although certification schemes may have more vigorous environmental or social standards with NGO involvement, they are still left at the mercy of large corporations. The “very real threat” associated with market approaches such as certification is that “lowest common denominator, lowest cost approaches will dominate” (Sneyd 2015, 57). Only a few scholars have considered the possibility of “privatizing up” (Cashore, Auld, and Newson 2004, 5) existing public rules, which would consist of co- and self-regulating institutions pioneering environmental and social regulations (Börzel and Risse 2005; Esty and Winston 2009; Ruggie 2013; see chapter 3).

When identifying asymmetries between state and nonstate actors, scholars are increasingly focusing on *power over* relations linked to latent conflicts of interest. In a third dimension, *invisible* power comes into play as a result of norms and ideas (Lukes 1974). Such research analyzes discourses, communication practices, cultural values, and institutions, all of which work to shape relevant thoughts and actions. These provide actors with social properties to define their interests and ideals and to virtually follow them (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Berenskoetter and Williams 2007). Following this understanding of power, a shift in discourse led to a new trust in nonstate actors and their ability to obtain desired results, as well as in their intentions (Levy and Newell 2004; Holzscheiter 2005). These scholars deny an agent-based antagonism between state and nonstate actors, or TNCs and NGOs. In particular, the simple differentiation between the WTO as a “blocker” of and UN organizations (or the suggested World Environment Organization; see Biermann and Bauer 2016) as “advocates” of environmental and social regulations is immediately rejected. Bedall (2011) shows, for example, how dominant NGOs, such as CAN, secure neoliberal hegemony within a heterogeneous civil society community. If we only measure the power (over) of civil society in terms of how successful CAN was in a specific negotiation process (first dimension of visible power), we

may lose sight of how this NGO neglects issues beyond the agenda of inter-governmental negotiations (e.g., hidden emission targets for developing countries).

With reference to Foucault (1982) and Bourdieu (1987), we can capture links among knowledge, power, and politics in a fourth dimension of power (over; see Digeser 1992). Constructivist and poststructuralist approaches that deal with such *unconscious power* are increasingly prevalent in research on environmental politics and sustainability (Feindt and Oels 2005; Methmann, Rothe, and Stephan 2013). Through the production and reproduction of knowledge (seen in terms of shared understandings or dominant discourses reflecting categories like *climate change*), actors work mainly to reproduce systems and positions (Guzzini 2007). *Power over* in this fourth dimension means that subjectivity is only a social construct, and scholars aim to explain this construction genealogically (Digeser 1992; Guzzini 2007). In particular, scholars have shown that NGO participation relies on and produces particular forms of subjectivity. Although some forms of activist subjectivity are treated as normal, credible, and acceptable, others are constructed as undesirable and unacceptable (Tucker 2014). For example, Cheyns (2014) describes how the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a private certification scheme (see chapter 5), is based on a liberal format of participation. This format discredits voices of smallholders and local communities, who come with a desire to raise and solve critical issues of injustices and/or engage in the most familiar attachments of their daily lives, sometimes with strong emotions. Civil society groups that gain global attention for their causes often do so only by distorting their principles and alienating their constituencies for the sake of appealing to donors in the Global North (Bob 2005). In consequence, negative social and environmental on-the-ground consequences may not even be voiced, let alone regulated.

In sum, though economic globalization was effected by government decisions and enforced through the WTO, government decisions have (also) resulted from environmental and social problems not being present in the political agenda and from a neoliberal discourse that manipulated subordinate actors as much as the decision-makers themselves. In consequence, there has been a (zero-sum) power shift to a range of actors other than nation-states, which were long the dominant form of political organization in world politics. Governance of the new private actors often is not

locatable only within the territory of one particular nation-state any longer; boundaries between international and external actors tend to blur (Lederer 2018). As much as supply chains have become more complex, so have governance structures. In consequence, it has become even more difficult for state actors to control private actors and enforce social and environmental rules. Initially, only a few scholars considered the possibility of environmentally and socially ambitious nonstate actors (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; O'Rourke 2003). More recent literature has elaborated on in which sectors and under which conditions nonstate actors adopt measures beyond the lowest denominator (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016; Schleifer, Fiorini, and Auld 2019). However, there is broad and persistent concern that the new private power comes at the expense of environmental and social considerations.

2.2 Asymmetries between Northern Consumers and Southern Producers

Although global market integration affects all countries, the emergence of globalization hot spots has been particularly prominent. Markets are centered on the most advanced industrialized countries, and poorer countries have fewer connections to these globalization hot spots (Sassen 2005). The European single market used to be the first destination of most goods and services (Damro 2012, 686). Meanwhile, China has overtaken the EU, but only in terms of total trade volume. The EU's share in commodity imports per capita is still twice as high as China's share. With 20 percent of the world population, China has a share of 20 percent in commodity imports, whereas the EU, with only 7 percent of world population, has a share of 14 percent (in 2016). The United States ranks similarly with 4.4 percent of world population and a share of 5.9 percent in commodity imports (see figure 2.1; Chatham House 2019).

Supply chains have become more complex and span over ever-longer physical distances. For example, the supply chain of an average t-shirt covers a distance of 50,000 km (Fairtrade 2017). Most scholars argue that, in consequence, asymmetries between actors in the upstream and downstream parts of supply chains are increasing, rather than decreasing, in the course of globalization (Hoskins 2014; Brooks 2015; Kalfagianni and Skordili 2019). *There are increasing asymmetries between actors in consuming countries of the Global North and actors in producing countries of the Global South.*

2.2.1 Divide between Consuming and Producing Countries

International trade still reflects the heritage of colonialism (Quark 2013). Colonial powers developed their manufacturing industry while they drew raw materials from the colonies in Africa and in America, and elsewhere in the Global South. The result was that countries in these regions could not develop their own industries (Barratt Brown 2007, 268; Brooks 2015, 116). In each colony, production of only two or three particular commodities was encouraged, with total dependence on the colonial power for manufactured goods and particularly for the equipment and financing necessary to achieve any kind of development. Still, the export sectors of many developing countries are oriented almost solely toward trade with either the EU or the United States (Barratt Brown 2007).

Emerging economies promise to change the rules of the game (Quark 2013). Countries with emerging economies have not yet reached a developed country's G7 status but have outpaced, in a macroeconomic sense, their developing counterparts among the G77. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are outstanding in this sense (Azubuike 2018, 141; Lederer 2018, 193). For example, China, as the world's largest manufacturer of textiles and other products (West and Lansang 2018), has also become the largest importer of cotton from Africa (36 percent; see Brooks 2015; Quark 2013). However, new Chinese manufacturers put an additional burden on less developed countries—for instance, duties from 5 percent up to 40 percent on cotton imported outside of fixed annual import quotas related to WTO obligations (Brooks 2015, 116). If we understand power to be a zero-sum game, in which the “winners” take it all, the rise of emerging countries like China hence comes at the expense of weaker countries, such as those in Africa. It does not directly disadvantage or harm the EU and North America at the downstream end of global supply chains.

The supremacy of the EU and the United States is preserved in diverse ways, including their dominance in the WTO. The credibility of the WTO is wholly dependent on keeping the EU and the United States on board and engaged as active participants. This gives them significant hold over the policy output of the WTO and allows them to pursue trade policies that are deeply hypocritical (Azubuike 2018). The WTO is often described like a star chamber or black box in which insiders take advantage of their access to the levers of power (Baldwin 2016; Sneyd 2015). The exposure of developing countries to the EU and US agenda-setting power has led WTO critics to

accuse it of inherent democratic deficit and to concertedly oppose its influence. The WTO Ministerial Conferences at Seattle in 1999 and Cancún in 2003 were subjected to massive protests from civil society groups. Utilizing dramatic tactics, activists forced the issue of corporate globalization into the news (Eliasoph 2015). While TNCs are seen as the main profiteers of economic globalization, these campaigns and related research finds smallholders and women in the Global South to be the major “losers” of the withdrawal of the state (Brooks 2015; Elder and Dauvergne 2014; Sachs and Santarius 2007).

In contrast to such civil society campaigns, however, Global South governments often interpret measures that require compliance with certain social and environmental standards, such as restrictions on fishing methods resulting in incidental dolphin deaths (discussed earlier), as forms of hidden protectionism (Biermann 2001; Ponte and Daugbjerg 2015). In this vein, some scholars argue that “dominant actors reconstruct rules to at once appease their challengers and protect their institutional privileges” (Quark 2013, 7). There are very few cases in which developing countries successfully turned against the EU or the United States in WTO dispute settlements (Biermann 2001; Sneyd 2015). While the WTO is resisting free trade in areas like intellectual property rights, in which developed countries benefit at developing countries’ expense, the EU and the United States are blocking free trade in areas like agriculture, in which the roles would be reversed (Azubuike 2018). Volatile world prices of agricultural commodities—cocoa, cotton, palm oil, tea, sugar, tobacco, bananas—often force farmers in the Global South to sell their products under production costs, compounded with smallholders’ lack of access to social infrastructure and services and, frequently, insecurity of land tenure (Barratt Brown 2007; Macdonald 2014).

As explained earlier, the WTO promotes and enforces the unlimited exchange of goods between countries, without controlling any adherence to human rights or environmental standards abroad. Due to this situation, TNCs may often be involved in harmful practices abroad with impunity in the producing and in the consuming countries (Dauvergne 2018b; Sachs and Santarius 2007). The case of Shell in Nigeria gained a lot of attention. The transnational oil and gas company, headquartered in the Netherlands and incorporated in the United Kingdom, was not held liable, although it was undoubtedly responsible, for human rights violations and the devastation of the Ogoni people’s lands through massive oil spills in Nigeria

(Kohl 2014). Remarkably, TNCs do not only stem from North America and Europe. Underlining the trend of countries with emerging economies becoming more powerful, two Chinese companies are currently topping the Forbes annual list of the world's biggest companies: Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China Construction Bank (ahead of JP Morgan, General Electric, and Exxon Mobile, as of July 2018; see Murphy et al. 2019).

Swilling and Annecke (2012, chapter 7) go as far as blaming China, the EU, and the United States for intentionally fueling armed conflicts to further access natural resources in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South. Hinting at *blood diamonds*—diamonds that are sold on the international market to finance wars—Swilling and Annecke invent the term *blood consumption*. This new term emphasizes the fact that not only the purchase of illegal diamonds, but also, more fundamentally, the resource-intensive lifestyles of developed countries contribute to resource depletion and (armed) conflicts in other parts of the world. Swilling and Annecke (2012) locate affected people in Africa and other countries of the Global South, in which unsustainable patterns of production persist. However, local elites of the affected countries often benefit from and participate in blood consumption, and there is an increasing number of disadvantaged people also located in the Global North (Hoskins 2014).

Especially against the backdrop of the WTO Ministerial Conferences at Seattle in 1999, which made the negative environmental and social impacts of globalization widely known, the international Jubilee 2000 campaign gained a lot of attention (Eliasoph 2015), similar to the current Fridays for Future movement (Hagedorn et al. 2019). The Jubilee 2000 campaign consisted of a broad coalition of civil society activists from over forty countries who demanded the cancellation of all developing countries' debts by the year 2000, which, as well as the turn of the millennium, was also the year of the Catholic Church's Great Jubilee (Easterly 2002, 1677). In particular, Oxfam, an international NGO, has continued to advocate for trade justice, including the Make Trade Fair campaign underway since 2001. Many celebrities are committed to this issue, including Bono, who is arguably the epitome of a celebrity activist (Busby 2007; Partzsch 2015). With celebrities thinking beyond the possible and wanting to create better societies, their attempts have become pervasive in the age of "everyday humanitarianism," which accounts for the "expansion of the willingness of humans

to incorporate the suffering and welfare of others into their everyday decisions" (Barnett 2010, 210). While the rhetoric and practice of humanitarianism and doing good becomes increasingly widespread in Western public life, it has not been without criticism, and scholars question its impact in the Global South (Huliaras and Tzifakis 2011; Richey 2016).

Most civil society campaigns and other voluntary institutions that address problems such as human rights violations and environmental degradation in the Global South are *proxy accountability* arrangements, in which NGOs and consumers in the Global North hold governments and TNCs accountable *on behalf* of affected communities (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013). In a similar manner, scholars have characterized societies in the Global South as "areas of limited statehood" (although the same scholars admit that law and order is also not always guaranteed in the Global North—for example, in case of natural disasters; Risse, Börzel, and Draude 2018). However, contradicting these studies, Bartley (2018, 41) demonstrates that there is rarely a true "regulatory void." Developing countries are no "empty spaces" (Bartley 2018, 34). All countries tied into global supply chains have their own sets of laws about land, labor, and the rights of citizens (Bartley 2018; see also Malets 2015; Li 2014; Silva-Castaneda 2012).

In this context, studies have questioned the legitimacy of NGOs speaking on behalf of others as they were "not elected by anyone" (Gebauer 2001, author's translation). Only interested and well-organized groups, especially from Anglo-Saxon countries, have been shown to accomplish participation in intergovernmental meetings and self-regulating bodies (Macdonald 1994; Wijaya and Glasbergen 2016). Coincidentally, Global North–South proxy arrangements have been found to be prone to generating policy instrument choices deviating significantly from those actually preferred by affected communities (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2013). In consequence, campaigns such as Jubilee 2000 tend to stabilize existing asymmetries among civil society groups in the Global North and South (Gebauer 2001, 103; Dieter and Kumar 2008). For Jubilee 2000, the most contentious issue was the conditionality of debt cancellation. Groups from the South had more radical positions, considering the debts as unlawful. When their positions were not accepted, the campaign split into Jubilee 2000 and Jubilee South, and Jubilee South received considerably less public attention (Gebauer 2001, 109).

2.2.2 The Global South's Power to Develop Sustainably

Most scholars demonstrate how power asymmetries have continued and even intensified in the course of globalization. Civil society movements such as Jubilee 2000, which can counterbalance global business and at least potentially strengthen the voice of the Global South, are often excluded from political negotiations. However, we also find resistance and empowerment. For example, besides the dominance of CAN, Bedall (2011) also discusses the formation of a counterhegemonic project in the context of Never Trust a COP (NTAC). NTAC turned against any kind of market-oriented regulative approach, against “green” capitalism and all forms of political representation; instead, activists advocated direct forms of participation. The NTAC activists mobilized against the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and organized demonstrations and street blockades (Bedall 2011, 78). More recently, the Extinction Rebellion and the Fridays for Future movements formed. Extinction Rebellion activists plaster the streets with posters and chain themselves onto government buildings (Brülls 2019). Fridays for Future activists resist compulsory education when regularly “striking for the climate” on Fridays (Hagedorn et al. 2019). They demonstrate their consciousness, the *power to* gather with each other and raise broader awareness. Although their resistance in the forms of street blockades and school strikes is illegal, many consider it legitimate as it serves the value of climate protection (Hagedorn et al. 2019).

Power to is a concept that refers to single actors and separate groups that take action; for example, producer groups in the Global South or activist groups in the Global North. Pitkin (1972, 177) emphasizes that “one man . . . may have power to do or accomplish something by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it may involve other people if what he has power to do is a social or political action, but it need not.” Based on this understanding of power, poorer countries can simply start a more sustainable development by, for example, prioritizing organic agriculture or conserving natural forests, without any permission or interference from others. Bhutan announced in 2012 that it would be the first country to fully convert to organic agriculture by 2020 (Neuhoff et al. 2014). Norway, in 2016, was the first country to commit to zero deforestation (Wanshel 2016).

Pitkin's understanding of *power to* assumes that actors are self-determined—that is, have the self-confidence and capabilities to pursue their decisions (Eyben, Harris, and Pettit 2006). The concept of *power to* is therefore linked

to Parsons's definition of *power* as the ability "to get things done" (Parsons 1963, 232). Parsons highlights productive agency despite structural constraints, especially in cases in which actors' goals are opposed or resisted. Research on civil society movements and NGOs is often (not always) based on this perception of power. For example, when Greenpeace confronted Shell in its Brent Spar campaign in 1995, some scholars drew parallels to the story of David versus Goliath (Roth, Semle, and Pötter 2001), highlighting the agency of David, or Greenpeace and environmental movements. Scholars taking a perspective of *power to* are less interested in exploring the confrontation (i.e., in killing Goliath) than in understanding the possibility of alternative ideas and values (i.e., in transforming Goliath societies).

However, as outlined earlier (fourth dimension of *unconscious power over*), constructivist and poststructuralist research has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, that every actor or group is defined "against" others—that is, through socially constituted relations that at least indirectly shape the actions of individuals (Wendt 1992; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Guzzini 2007). This means that structures define who the agents are and what they are able to do. For example, in many societies the industrialization of agriculture stands for modernization and progress. Exports of timber and agricultural products from deforested land serve to stabilize the national currency. The neoliberal discourse is prevailing in international politics (Levy and Newell 2004).

While constructivists have mainly been busy explaining how subjectivity is socially constituted and how NGOs, such as CAN and Greenpeace, are themselves effects of socialization to structures, many constructivists do acknowledge the (rare) possibility of agency (Wight 1999, 130). Mikhail Gorbachev, last leader of the Soviet Union, serves as an example of an agent who was crucial for system change. Wendt (1992, 419–422; see also Nye 2008, 8) explains how Gorbachev's new thinking about the nature of IR was the first stage of a process that flowed into a structural transformation, which was the end of the Cold War. There are situations in which both dominant and marginalized actors can initiate transformational change—by empowering and resisting structures and by not reproducing their own and others' positions and, hence, systems. This holds true for actors from both developed and developing countries in global supply chains.

Application-oriented development and environmental studies have already analyzed the self-determined aspect of subjectivity—the real

agency—to better understand and promote phenomena of sustainability transitions (Roth, Semle, and Pötter 2001; Eyben, Harris, and Pettit 2006). In this vein, we may study not only if asymmetries in global supply chains increase but also whether new forms of global supply chain regulation allow the Global South's *power to* develop sustainably and allow it to participate in IR on an equal basis with the Global North.

2.3 Universal Norms and Ethical Values

Globalization reveals diverse power dynamics, especially with regard to the withdrawal of the state and asymmetries between the Global North and South. While individuals' origins still define their legal (citizenship) rights and financial capabilities to participate in the global economy, their relative attachment to a particular nation-state is dissolving (Ruggie 2013). Nation-states may give priority to free markets, but there are diverse transnational movements that prioritize and pursue universal norms and ethical values others than the free-trade paradigm (Bartley 2007; Bloomfield 2017).

Acknowledging that ethical considerations sometimes become an end in themselves, rather than only serving as a means to increase the material interests of the home state, confirms the phenomenon of globalization (Manners 2002, 2015; Partzsch and Fuchs 2012). This acknowledgement, however, conflicts with the first power perspective formulated earlier, which says that the withdrawal of the state led to a dominance of private business at the expense of environmental and social—and, hence, ethical—considerations. Furthermore, as actors from the Global North are assumed to take not only selfish actions, this acknowledgment also contradicts the second thesis of increasing asymmetries between the Global North and South. *Power with* is a term that implies learning processes that allow actors to question self-perceptions and to actively build up a new awareness of individuals or groups (Eyben, Harris, and Pettit 2006; Allen 1998). Following this perspective, actors with a transformational orientation have substantial agency, if they act in concert, possibly across nation-states' borders. In this vein, a third perspective regarding power dynamics in a globalized world is thus: *State and nonstate actors are not continuously selfish but exercise power with others to pursue collective norms of environmental sustainability and social justice.*

2.3.1 Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice

An increasing number of scholars assume that the spread of particular norms can be a principal foreign policy goal (Niesen and Herborth 2007; Partzsch 2017b; Janusch 2016). Manners (2002) invented the term *normative power Europe* (NPE) in contradistinction to other powers. He argues that the EU's specific history "pre disposes it to act in a normative way" (Manners 2002, 242) with its "ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners 2002, 239) based on norms such as democracy, rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights. Empirical studies on normative or ethical power often put such universal norms in opposition to economic market interests (e.g., Afionis and Stringer 2012; Lightfoot and Burchell 2005). The concept therefore frequently has been criticized as reproducing Eurocentrism and hegemony (Diez 2013).

Poststructuralists emphasize that when putting specific "good" norms, such as democracy and sustainability, and interests based on supposedly inferior norms, such as free trade and national sovereignty, in opposition to one another, scholars themselves are "writing norms" (Engelkamp and Glaab 2015). When NPE scholars define an "ethical ideal-type of cosmopolitan normative power" (De Zutter 2010, 1106) and "spell out what kinds of norms are meant by 'the normative'" (Forsberg 2011, 1184), they participate in defining how Europe and other actors ought to act. Scholars take a normative stance themselves, at least implicitly. For example, using the NPE concept, Lightfoot and Burchell (2005) examine the claim that the EU played a leadership role at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Afionis and Stringer (2012) also study whether the EU is really pursuing sustainability with the Renewable Energy Directive (RED). By doing so, the scholars themselves prioritize sustainability over trade competitiveness and economic growth, to which both studies find the EU is giving precedence (Afionis and Stringer 2012; Lightfoot and Burchell 2005).

From a neo-Gramscian perspective, the EU takes rhetorical action to pursue cultural domination based on its material capabilities and constitutive norms (Diez 2013). Scholars argue that normative power hardly differs from soft power *over* others. Nye (2011) differentiates between hard power and soft power. *Hard power (over)* describes the capacity of a nation-state to make use of material resources (military or militarily usable resources, finance) to get another nation-state to do something that it would not otherwise do.

Soft power (over) stands for the co-optation of others based on nonmaterial incentives or threats. The combination of hard and soft power is what Nye calls *smart power*.

To this effect, Damro (2012) argues that we should understand the EU as a “market power,” which, due to its large common market and institutional features (regulatory expertise, regulatory coherence, and sanctioning authority) is able to pursue all kinds of norms and interests in international relations. In this vein, Swilling and Annecke (2012, 191) reject activist campaigns, such as fair-trade initiatives for higher and more stable resource prices to producers of developing countries, as “minor adjustments.” They stick to understandings of *power over* as a zero-sum game when they assume that Western governments (and China) simply secure their access to natural resources even at the price of military violence.

The relation between Europe’s normative and market power is controversial. Manners (2015, 307) himself clarifies that NPE is not “simply the absence of force [and material incentives]” and hence does not stand in contrast to the EU’s market power. Market power often allows the EU to be a potential norm leader as third (nonmember) states may comply with EU requirements to obtain access to the European market (Holzinger 2007). Foreign firms may even lobby their home governments to adjust policies upward to the EU level and impose the same regulatory standards on their domestic competitors that do not export to the EU, for which Vogel (1997) has coined the term *trading up* (see earlier discussion of the California effect). In addition, international demonstration effects and contagion among states may become more important than domestic dynamics that prioritize specific norms. Empirical studies suggest that one-third of total states in the system must accept a norm in order to “tip” a process of norm change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The major difference between coercive market power, on the one hand, and NPE based on market means, on the other hand, is the orientation of the state in action. Limiting market access may serve protectionism and collective norms; however, soft and smart power are distinct from normative and ethical power, in which norms are not a means but rather an end in themselves (Diez and Manners 2007). At the same time, this means that finding evidence of market asymmetries and of trading up does not falsify the priority of social and environmental over free-trade norms.

2.3.2 *Power with* in International Relations

In contrast to findings of a unidirectional exercise of power, a small number of studies demonstrate that persuasion and learning do exist in IR (Prittwitz 1996; Niesen and Herboth 2007). For example, Deitelhoff (2009) identifies “islands of persuasion” in the formation process of the International Criminal Court (ICC). She emphasizes the role of NGOs and other nonstate actors in this process. New transnational actors often have preferences over governance that are difficult to explain using a simple political economy logic—and preferences can change over time (Kemper and Partzsch 2018). Furthermore, modern media can make people suffer from a distance and engage them in ways that are different from those employed in the past (Boltanski 1999).

Manners’s concept of normative power is based on the assumption that persuasion and learning is possible in IR (see also Janusch 2016). The original NPE concept broke with an understanding of power as based on asymmetric relations. Manners defined the concept of a different kind of power, one that is constituted by nonhierarchical relationships among EU member states, as well as third countries (Manners 2002). Transnational human rights movements exemplify such joint processes of norm creation. In this vein, Arendt (1970, 44) defines power as corresponding to “the human ability not just to act but to act in concert.”

Habermas’s (1998) concept of communicative action builds on Arendt’s concept of power. Another concept linked to Arendt’s definition is the concept of *power with* (Partzsch and Fuchs 2012). *Power with* is a term that does not necessarily refer to the diffusion of already existing (predefined) norms. It does not mean the diffusion of but instead the generation of commonly shared (universal) norms. *Power with* implies learning processes that allow actors, including the EU, to question self-perceptions and to actively build up new awareness (Eyben, Harris, and Pettit 2006; Gaard 2010). It refers to “processes of finding common ground among diverse interests, developing shared values and creating collective strength by organizing with each other” (Partzsch and Fuchs 2012, 363). This implies processes of mutual learning that allow actors to actively build a new understanding of what is just and what is unjust. In this sense, for example, there is a need to commonly define organic/sustainable agriculture and fair trade, rather than promoting predefined concepts. Scholars of ethical and normative power Europe assume that such joint action is possible.

Power with deals with collective empowerment, whereas *power to* stresses the agency of individuals or separate groups to develop alternatives (Partzsch 2017b). From the perspective of *power to*, initially there is a clear opponent—for example, organic farmers opposing industrial agriculture. “Pioneers of change” or “agents of transformation” (WBGU 2011, 241, 287) are—at least for the time being—exceptional actors, such as NGOs as “climate savers” and countries such as Bhutan pursuing organic agriculture. However, in contrast to *power over*, from this perspective, an imperative for action does not follow from self-interest and competition; rather, it is based on values of a higher normative order. Actions and also specific discourses and structures are (first of all) not directed *against* others but stand *for* specific values and developments. When exercising *power with*, norms and values are commonly generated and shared.

However, as Partzsch and Fuchs (2012) argue, processes of *power with* are not independent from existing asymmetries—that is, the more capable actors’ coercion and manipulation of others in finding only supposedly common ground. Arendt’s (1970) definition of power is characterized by her understanding of the polity and should not be considered independently (Pitkin 1981; Göhler 2009). She refers to Aristotle and the ancient polis when she describes politics as a relation among equals who govern themselves. However, only citizens, those who presided over the household in the ancient world, had access to the public sphere of the polis. This means that Arendt’s power conceptualization is based on the exclusion and displacement of noncitizens such as women and slaves into the private sphere of the household, including in regard to supposedly nonpolitical issues such as economics and bodily health (Pitkin 1981). Today, similar forms of exclusion take place—for example, in WTO negotiations when the G7 or G20 dominate decision making due to their material predominance (Azubuike 2018). As Arendt simply assumes that people have basic capabilities at their disposal to act upon in the public sphere, her conception of power is often said to be based on a utopian or elite version of polity (Cavanaugh 1978). In a similar vein, Brunnengräber (2017) calls *power with* a normative concept that neglects material asymmetries, and Altmann (2017) warns that this neglect may further marginalize actors in the Global South.

As outlined earlier, China, the EU, and the United States alone import 40 percent of the world’s commodities, making those states significant commercial powers in the world (Damro 2012). When exercising *power*

with other countries, respective businesses, and NGOs, neither the EU nor the United States are operating from an equal position as their ethical actions are based upon their material capabilities, their “consumer power.” Although the EU and the United States may pursue universal norms, such as human rights and sustainability, their privileged material capacity creates an unequal relation to most partners (Damro 2012).

2.4 Summary

Links between globalization and governance are more complex and contingent than many observers claim. Although there obviously is a power shift from state to nonstate actors—including the emergence of new types of actors, which for the most part originate from the Global North—power dynamics are multifarious. By giving priority to economic liberalization, China, the EU, and the United States (and all other states) have generally accepted harmful practices of business actors outside their own borders over the last decades (or even longer), especially in the Global South. However, this “triad of omnivores” (Sachs and Santarius 2007, 36)⁴ is no uniform actor that is intentionally fueling armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere to further access resources at “discounted prices” (Swilling and Annecke 2012, 188). There are many movements and NGOs that are advocating for political change (Bedall 2011; Betsill and Corell 2008; Kemper and Partzsch 2018).

If we hold on to assumptions of power as being zero-sum, the ever-growing power of TNCs and the increase of Global North–South asymmetries become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The free-trade paradigm will dominate more and more areas of life. Moreover, from this perspective, by committing to ethical values, the EU risks its powerful position in IR, and “it will indulge in quixotic moral crusades—with the attendant risk of hubris leading to nemesis” (Hyde-Price 2008). Instead, we can decide to seriously challenge those assumptions about power dynamics currently made in the literature. New forms of supply chain regulation invite us to do so.

When studying new forms of global supply chain regulation in the following chapters, challenging the first perspective outlined earlier, I will analyze whether their emergence does or does not support the new private *power over* nation-states. If yes, we should scrutinize whether the power shift is indeed discouraging environmental and social regulations. As outlined earlier, most scholars have shown that a neoliberal agenda contradicts

environmental and social objectives (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1999; Strange 1997). However, a few scholars have considered the possibility of global market integration trading up (Vogel 1997; Jänicke 2008) or privatizing up (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004, 5; Ruggie 2013) existing public policy rules—that is, private actors pioneering change with regard to environmental and social issues. Complementing these studies, a research task is hence to study whether globalization and the withdrawal of the state led to a new private power over nation-states at the expense of environmental and social considerations.

The second perspective on power derived in this chapter concerns Global North–South asymmetries. Most scholars agree that asymmetries between the Global North and South have increased with economic globalization. It is uncontroversial that this comes at the expense of environmental and social regulations, especially in the Global South (Brooks 2015; Quark 2013). A research task is thus to better understand how actors in the Global South can empower themselves from an unfair-trade system and exercise *power to* develop sustainably. When studying new approaches to regulate global supply chains, I will thus analyze whether these approaches are decreasing or increasing asymmetries between actors of consuming countries in the Global North and actors of producing countries in the Global South.

The third power perspective deals with universal norms and ethical values in IR. An increasing number of scholars acknowledge that norms of environmental sustainability and social justice matter in global supply chains (Manners 2002, 2015; Janusch 2016; Aggestam 2008). A research task is hence to analyze whether state and nonstate actors are not continuously selfish but exercise power with others to pursue collective norms of environmental sustainability and social justice.

In the following chapters, I use these three perspectives on power to discuss the effects of new forms of private regulation (chapter 3), public supply-chain-related laws (chapter 4), and transnational hybrid governance (chapter 5). Each of these chapters includes a case study: voluntary cotton certification in Ethiopia, conflict minerals and timber supply chain laws in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and transnational hybrid governance of palm oil in Indonesia. Each chapter will elaborate that global economic integration is producing a new fabric of global governance that displays many variations and shadings of power in IR.

