


# MANAGING MEANING IN UKRAINE

Information, Communication,  
and Narration since the  
Euromaidan Revolution

Göran Bolin and Per Ståhlberg



MANAGING MEANING IN UKRAINE

## Information Policy Series

Edited by Sandra Braman

The Information Policy series publishes research on and analysis of significant problems in the field of information policy, including decisions and practices that enable or constrain information, communication, and culture irrespective of the legal siloes in which they have traditionally been located as well as state-law-society interactions. Defining information policy as all laws, regulations, and decision-making principles that affect any form of information creation, processing, flows, and use, the series includes attention to the formal decisions, decision-making processes, and entities of government; the formal and informal decisions, decision-making processes, and entities of private- and public-sector agents capable of constitutive effects on the nature of society; and the cultural habits and predispositions of governmentality that support and sustain government and governance. The parametric functions of information policy at the boundaries of social, informational, and technological systems are of global importance because they provide the context for all communications, interactions, and social processes.

A complete list of the books in the Information Policy series appears at the back of this book.

MANAGING MEANING IN UKRAINE

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, AND NARRATION  
SINCE THE EUROMAIDAN REVOLUTION

GÖRAN BOLIN AND PER STÅHLBERG

The MIT Press  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
London, England

© 2023 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This work is subject to a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND license. Subject to such license, all rights are reserved.



The MIT Press would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers who provided comments on drafts of this book. The generous work of academic experts is essential for establishing the authority and quality of our publications. We acknowledge with gratitude the contributions of these otherwise uncredited readers.

This book was set in Bembo Book MT Pro by Westchester Publishing Services.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Bolin, Göran, author. | Ståhlberg, Per, author.

Title: Managing meaning in Ukraine : information, communication, and narration since the Euromaidan revolution / Göran Bolin and Per Ståhlberg.

Description: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2023] | Series: Information policy | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022033259 (print) | LCCN 2022033260 (ebook) | ISBN 9780262545563 (paperback) | ISBN 9780262374583 (epub) | ISBN 9780262374576 (pdf)

Subjects: LCSH: Mass media—Ukraine. | Meaning (Philosophy) | Information policy—Ukraine. | Narration (Rhetoric)—Social aspects—Ukraine. | Mass media and culture—Ukraine. | Ukraine Conflict, 2014—Mass media and the war. | Ukraine—History—Euromaidan Protests, 2013-2014—Influence.

Classification: LCC P92.U38 B65 2023 (print) | LCC P92.U38 (ebook) | DDC 302.2309477/09051—dc23/eng/20221206

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022033259>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2022033260>

## CONTENTS

Series Editor's Introduction vii

Acknowledgments xi

INTRODUCTION 1

1 CONTENTIOUS CONCEPTS 19

2 THE MANAGERS OF MEANING 47

3 FORMS AND ASSEMBLAGES 71

4 MEDIA EVENTS AND MEANING MANAGEMENT 95

5 THE INFORMATIONAL STATE IN TURBULENT TIMES 119

Notes 137

References 143

Index 163



## SERIES EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

SANDRA BRAMAN

Stuart Hall, the great Jamaican-born theorist of communication and culture, told a delicious story about what happened when he finally received an invitation to deliver a guest lecture at Oxford University. He opened by describing what it was like to come from the margins and then asked who in the audience came from the economic, social, and political elites with which the institution had always been associated. No one raised a hand, although one person confessed afterward that he had been embarrassed to admit his background in public. “When I got to the center,” reported Hall, “no one was there.”

As we learn in *Managing Meaning in Ukraine*, the same can be said of at least some versions of the informational state—the kind of state that specializes in the use of informational power rather than power in its instrumental, structural, or symbolic (“soft”) forms. Bolin and Ståhlberg’s analysis of Ukrainian information policy from 2013 to just before the Russian invasion in 2022 finds that it was not driven by the state, as policy analysts typically assume. Instead, it was driven first by private-sector entities interested in creating new markets for their communication products and then by international forces that provided direction and funding for small local groups that were shape-shifting and multifaceted. The combined effect was a perceived Ukrainian state that, in reality, neither was driven by the state nor had a center. With this insight, Bolin and Ståhlberg importantly move forward our understanding of the informational state, pointing out that there is more than one kind and presenting the challenge to identify others. Bernard Silberman’s 1993 book *Cages of Reason* undertook this task for the bureaucratic state, showing that, informationally, France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain operated very differently, even though all were categorized as having the same form of government.

This is not the only significant theoretical and conceptual contribution of *Managing Meaning in Ukraine*. Scholars and practitioners typically refer



to public diplomacy and related information policy as information management. These authors argue that it is the management of meaning that is really at stake—sense-making by those who receive messages, not the intentions of senders and/or the information sent. Those analyzing or involved in strategic communication talk about producing narratives, the telling of stories that unfold sequentially over time and involve causal relations. The reality, as Bolin and Ståhlberg point out, is that only fragments are circulated, incomplete narrative elements and snippets of heterogeneous information that the authors valuably refer to as *preforms* of narrative. These elements can be formed into assemblages in multiple ways that continue to change as they are mediated and remediated. Memes are examples, but fragments need not reach the meme level of common usage to be utilized as communicative resources. Multiple literatures have long distinguished between information and knowledge, or information and narrative. Today, these fragmentary preforms of narrative add a third, necessary category to all such distinctions.

Research and thinking on public opinion and persuasion have focused on reception, or what Stuart Hall refers to as the decoding phase of communication processes. To understand the creation, distribution, and effects of preforms of narrative, though, Bolin and Ståhlberg argue that Hall's concept of encoding—how messages come into being as meaningful assemblages—must receive the same kind of analytical attention. When Hall first introduced his ideas about encoding and decoding in the early 1970s, he was talking about the mass media, with a particular interest in television. The authors of this book take the position that the concepts are still valid today but need further development because the environment has changed qualitatively in terms of who is producing content, what media they use to distribute it, the number of points at which messages are remediated, and the number of directions in which messages flow.

Encoding takes place through the circulation of an ever-growing archive of image and text fragments. In their analysis of encoding, Bolin and Ståhlberg make three additional conceptual moves, two involving technologies and the third involving people. Going beyond the somewhat celebratory depiction of users who take part in remediation processes as involved in prosumption—the simultaneous production and consumption of content—they remind us how such practices serve the marketing and promotional activities of big capital and traditional mass media productions. They also extend our vision beyond content manipulation and distribution to include

presentation technologies that have an impact on the nature of the content circulating today. Tools such as PowerPoint, the authors point out, make it easy to take fragments out of texts for other uses—or to replace texts altogether, as slide decks may be all we have. As the authors put it, presentation media “play with discursive elements and narrative components without producing any stable or unified story that reaches narrative closure . . . [it] is a technology that offers assemblages of meaning rather than narratives.” On the human side, the book highlights the fluidity of roles, industry affiliations, and sector identities among those active in the effort to develop and promote Ukraine as a recognizable state with particular features. The industries are standard—public relations, marketing, journalism, fact-checking, public policy, and so on—but which individuals and organizations are doing what keeps changing.

*Managing Meaning in Ukraine* is a book for many audiences. Since Russia's 2022 invasion, Ukraine has “hardened” as a state, as any entity would in response to threats to its survival and explicit conflicts over its borders. It now has a center, although private-sector and voluntary activities of multiple types—by both domestic and international actors—remain important. Anyone seeking to understand what happened between Ukraine and Russia in 2022, which grew out of so much that happened before, will find this book essential reading. The case of Ukraine is key, as it is already apparent that these developments are pivotal to struggles over a global reorientation of power. This analysis contributes to our understanding of the evolution of all transitional states and pushes us to appreciate differences among informational states. From an international relations perspective, this history of the transformation of nation branding into public diplomacy into national information policy into information warfare offers profound insights.

The value of Bolin and Ståhlberg's work goes even further, with theoretical and conceptual innovations that open up a number of research agendas for the many fields involved. We are not all Ukrainians, but we all live in the communication world the authors have made so visible.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This is not the book we imagined we would write when we embarked on our joint academic journey a little more than a decade ago. We both had an interest in questions of nation, nationalism, branding, and popular culture. Our interest then was how popular culture—or culture more generally—was hijacked as a means to achieve other ends, most of which were commercial or political. In a way, you could say that this particular research topic came to us, rather than the other way around. We believe, however, that this serendipity has led us to regard our present object of inquiry—far outside our “comfort zone,” as today’s parlance would put it—from a somewhat different perspective. We hope readers of this book will also be confronted with a different set of concepts and terminology and perhaps a different way of approaching societal matters.

It is somewhat trite to say that a book is the product of more people than the two authors credited on the cover. But such statements become hackneyed because there is some truth to them. We were fortunate to have the support of funding institutions such as the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies, which generously funded the two projects on which this book is based: *Nation Branding: The Nation as Community and Commodity in Eastern Europe (2012–2015)* and *Propaganda and Management of Information in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict: From Nation Branding to Information War (2015–2018)*. We also benefited from seminars and workshops funded by the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University, as well as support from our colleagues in the university’s Department of Media and Communication Studies. We received some stimulating feedback from students enrolled in the master’s course on nation branding we taught jointly between 2015 and 2017, especially Karin Hallgren, Kateryna Boyko, Iryna Holovko, and Giulia Santori. Karin, Iryna, and Giulia took part in fieldwork during the Eurovision Song Contest held in Kyiv in May 2017, helping us gather empirical data and

discussing these data with us. Iryna also helped us with organizational tasks as well as translation during and after the fieldwork, and Kateryna provided valuable comments on the manuscript. The course benefited greatly from guest lectures by Katja Valaskivi, Nadia Kaneva, and Galina Miazhevich, with whom we have collaborated over the years.

We also received tremendous help from the three postdoctoral researchers involved in the two previously mentioned projects. Paul Jordan worked with us on the nation branding project, and his background in eastern European studies and enormous knowledge of the Eurovision Song Contest were invaluable. Having already done research on Ukrainian branding, Paul was instrumental in connecting us with key informants in Kyiv during the initial phases of the project. Yuliya Yurchuk and Liudmila Voronova worked with us on the information war project. Yuliya, a native Ukrainian and a historian by training, broadened our understanding of Ukrainian culture and society. As a native Russian, Liudmila provided the same insights into Russian culture, with a specific focus on journalistic practices. Both were energetic fieldworkers who contributed to amassing interview material and other empirical data for the project.

We would also like to extend thanks to two of our departmental colleagues. Fredrik Stiernstedt took part in the fieldwork for the Eurovision Song Contest in Kyiv. Roman Horbyk has been a valuable discussion partner, translator, and field guide over the years. Roman's vast network of contacts helped us track down empirical material, backtrack and map the Euromaidan events, and provide context to the Ukrainian media landscape.

We presented early versions of our work at various international conferences: the International Communication Association (ICA) conferences in Chicago, Fukuoka, San Diego, and Washington; the European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA) conference in Prague; and the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) conference in Stockholm. We also presented parts of our analysis at workshops and seminars at Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Tampere University, Aarhus University, Loughborough University, the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University, and the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies at Södertörn University. We wish to extend a collective thanks to all those who arranged these occasions and to the participants who commented on and challenged our propositions.

Of tremendous importance was our presentation at the Workshop Series for Information Policy arranged by Sandra Braman in May 2021. We benefited greatly from comments on drafts of the first two chapters. The workshop series also proved to be an excellent initiative for bringing our thoughts about information policy—in the widest sense of the term—together. We were enriched by discussions of other works in progress at these workshops. We applaud this interdisciplinary initiative and hope we contributed to a deepening of the discussion around policy and related matters. We also owe special thanks to Sandra for encouraging us to publish our work in the context of information policy in the first place. We would like to think that this tweaking of our initial points of departure made our discussion more original than it would have been otherwise. Whether this is the case is, of course, up to the reader to judge.

Two Ukrainian universities offered opportunities for academic encounters. The Journalism Department at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy welcomed us on almost every visit to Kyiv. In particular, Professor Yevhen Fedchenko provided invaluable insights into the field of fact-checking in Ukraine. At Taras Shevchenko National University, also in Kyiv, we had a chance to both engage with scholars and lecture to students.

Last but not least, we are incredibly indebted to our informants in Kyiv. A lot of people working in government offices, public relations companies, news agencies and outlets, and civil society organizations took the time to share information and ideas with us during extended and often repeated meetings. Many of these public individuals are named in the chapters that follow. Others, too numerous to mention, should know that we are tremendously grateful for their contributions.

Göran Bolin and Per Ståhlberg



## INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, attacking the country from several directions. The war, however, had started eight years earlier, in 2014, with Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea. But what had previously been a low-scale, regionally delimited war suddenly escalated to unthinkable dimensions. This book is concerned with events preceding the full-scale assault on Ukraine. The manuscript had been completed when Russian bombs started to fall on cities across the country, and the outcome of the war is still unknown as the final version of the book goes to press. Except for minor adjustments, we have not rewritten the study to acknowledge the most recent atrocities. Still, we are very much aware that this book will be framed by the context of the war, whatever direction it takes. And so it should. We believe the eight years preceding the 2022 Russian invasion are crucial for understanding the war, especially its communicative dimensions. Our initial impressions from the first few weeks of the war strengthened this belief, and as we watched the videos, images, and other communicative efforts produced in Ukraine and disseminated to the world, we could see that they were the results of a longer period of development among those who manage meaning in Ukraine. For the Ukrainians, the assaults that shook the world were not unexpected. This book is about Ukrainian preparations for a worst-case scenario, the fruits of which can now be watched on screens all over the world.

The period we are studying evolved in discrete phases. First, we examine communicative activities during 2013, just before there was any fear of war. Second, we refer to the three months of the Euromaidan Revolution in the winter of 2013–2014. Most of the book, however, is concerned with the long period of low-scale war and related information management from the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 to 2021, the year before the full-scale invasion. With the brutal escalation in 2022, a new phase of



history started for Ukraine, in many respects with completely different characteristics. However, nothing grows out of a void.

Theoretically, the book raises questions about communicative action in Ukraine and related to the country's specific situation since 2013. The wider context also concerns general developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union and how Ukraine has related to the Russian sphere of interest. How is it possible to organize information policy in times of deep national crisis? What roles do governmental, corporate, and civil society actors play in times of revolution when the state is in turmoil? How do these domestic actors respond to external aggression and propaganda? With the dramatic escalation of the situation in Ukraine, these questions have increased in relevance.

#### UKRAINE: IN SEARCH OF A NEW FACE

When we first decided to study communication practices in Ukraine, there was no war with Russia. It was early 2013, and we were interested in how government authorities in cooperation with public relations (PR) consultancies and the corporate business sector were trying to promote a favorable image of Ukraine to an international audience. Such nation branding campaigns have been widespread since the 1990s, not least in eastern Europe, where the end of the Cold War encouraged many states to rid themselves of their immediate Soviet past and show the rest of the world a new face. We chose Ukraine not because it had been particularly successful in its nation branding efforts. In fact, the opposite was true. Ukraine had launched several branding campaigns, but none of them had been notable, and Ukraine was rarely, if ever, mentioned in the field of nation branding research.

Ukraine is geographically the largest European country, and with about 45 million inhabitants, it is the most populous of the post-Soviet states in eastern Europe.<sup>1</sup> Despite its size, Ukraine was fairly anonymous compared with its neighbor Poland or the Baltic states. Like a number of other post-Soviet countries, Ukraine has a very short history of sovereignty. Although it enjoyed a brief period of independence after World War I as the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–1921), modern independence came with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Wolczuk 2000). Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had balanced on the border between the European Union and the Russian sphere of influence. Gradually, however, Ukraine started to build closer ties with the EU, and an association agreement between Ukraine

and the EU was supposed to be signed on 28 November 2013. We expected that established forms of nation branding practices could be rather difficult to implement in Ukraine.

Our first field trip to Kyiv took place in May 2013, with the aim of building contacts with public servants at government departments and marketing professionals in the PR industry who had been involved in previous nation branding campaigns. The government had commissioned some of these efforts, and private corporations had initiated others. The latest campaign had been conducted in cooperation with international broadcasters such as BBC World and CNN, just before the 2012 European Soccer Championship cohosted by Ukraine and Poland. In the local PR business in Kyiv, the commercial field of place branding (promoting cities, regions, or the country as a whole) was small, and it was easy to identify the bureaus and individuals involved in previous campaigns.

The marketing business in Kyiv was not large, and it soon became apparent that all the major players knew one another. As in all social fields, the relationship between actors can be described as both collaborative and competitive. Among branding consultants, one could also sense a notion of reflexivity and self-criticism. Several of the earlier campaigns had been met with harsh domestic criticism concerning both their content and the questionable use of public money. In fact, even those who had participated in these campaigns to improve Ukraine's international image regarded them as failures. Often, however, they blamed the government for a lack of proper coordination. They also expressed a sense of urgency—a sense of being at a crossroads. This concern was present among PR consultants and politicians but also in the media: Ukraine was perceived as almost invisible to the rest of the world and in need of a recognizable “face” (Ståhlberg and Bolin 2016). An article in the English-language magazine *Kyiv Weekly* stated that “the average European cannot imagine a Ukrainian because they have never seen one.” Or if they could imagine one, the author explained, it would be “a negative image of a ‘nation of bandits, prostitutes and migrant workers’” (Kabachiy 2013, 2).

At the time, we were definitely part of that ignorant foreign audience. Neither of us had visited Ukraine before, and our knowledge of the country was not much better than that of the average European. We were familiar with the names of the larger cities and some major events from recent history, such as the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the singer Ruslana's victory in the Eurovision Song Contest the same year. And we remembered

Yulia Tymoshenko, one of the leaders who became an iconic face of the revolution. But beyond that, we knew very little. Chernobyl was mainly a frightening metonym for human technological disaster, and if we associated it with any particular country, it was the Soviet Union. Most people in Sweden, our home country, would probably be unable to accurately locate this nuclear catastrophe in today's Ukraine. The same is true of the city of Poltava, which, as every Swedish primary school pupil knows, is where Swedish king Charles XII lost a battle against the Russian tsar in 1709. (It probably evokes the same connotations for Swedes as Waterloo does for French citizens.) Few Swedes would place Poltava in Ukraine, indicating that the worries of the Ukrainian branders were justified.

The people we met on our first visit to Kyiv were arguably not representative of the average Ukrainian citizen. They were professionals working in the PR industry, in government departments, or in the journalistic media. Most were fluent in English, and many had been educated at UK or US universities. They were clearly oriented to the West and were strongly convinced that Ukraine needed to move closer to Europe and the EU. In their minds, the main problem was that Ukraine was too close to Russian culture and values. When they talked about branding Ukraine, the implied audience was in the West, and they had great expectations for the upcoming association agreement with the EU. There were also ponderings about the new nation branding campaign commissioned by the Ministry of Tourism.

We returned to Kyiv to see the presentation of that new campaign, which was to be launched at the Second Kyiv International Tourism Forum on 10–12 October. The first day's events took place at the Club of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and was opened by the vice prime minister of Ukraine, Oleksandr Vilkul; the program included a number of domestic dignitaries, foreign diplomats, and representatives of the EU, UNESCO, and the World Tourism Organization. Talks were simultaneously translated into English, Ukrainian, and Russian. At the forum, Vilkul announced a new strategy to brand Ukraine as an international tourist destination. The ambitious goal was for it to become one of the ten leading countries in world tourism.

The opening ceremony was followed by a session where the new tourism campaign was presented. The contract for orchestrating this campaign had been won by WikiCitiNomika, a PR firm with previous experience in city branding in Ukraine. During the development of the campaign, it cooperated closely with the German agency GIZ (German Association of

International Cooperation), and WikiCitiNomika presented the campaign strategies and graphic design components together with the German ambassador to Ukraine and the local director of GIZ. The central message was that Ukraine was a country of cultural contrasts coexisting in peace. Ukraine was both East and West, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism, tradition and modernity, and so on. Graphically, this message was expressed with the letter *U* (for Ukraine), in which the font heights represented a binary contrast that, when conjoined, made a happy smile.

The second day was organized quite differently from the first day's opening speeches and presentations. The main Ukrainian tourist attractions were displayed in an exhibition at the Ukrainian House—a huge Soviet-style building near Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in the center of the city. Around the exhibition were demonstrations and displays of the cultural heritages of Ukraine: traditional music, folk costumes, and works of art. The artwork included Petrykivka ornamental paintings, a style originating in the village of the same name in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, for which Ukraine was applying to UNESCO for the status of intangible cultural heritage (later granted).

In addition to the displays of cultural heritage and commercial commodities, there was an exhibition booth for the promotion of EuroBasket 2015, which would take place in Kyiv, and another booth related to Ukraine's ambitions to host the Winter Olympic Games in 2022. Coming from Scandinavia, and not speaking either Ukrainian or Russian, we soon realized we did not belong to the primary target audience. There was very little information in English, and most of the commercial exhibitors addressed their displays of tourist destinations, facilities, and commodities to a Russian-speaking audience. As we had learned from the vice prime minister's PowerPoint slides the day before, tourism in Ukraine still meant visitors from Russia and other neighboring countries. The slides themselves were in Russian, and many of the guests came from former Soviet countries. However, as we walked around the displays, talked with exhibitors, and listened in on seminars, it was evident that many people had high hopes for an expanded tourist market.

Only a few weeks later, all these expectations were radically erased. At the last minute, President Viktor Yanukovich backed out of the association agreement with the EU in the hopes of building tighter trade agreements with Russia. A few postings on Facebook led to demonstrations at Maidan Nezalezhnosti, and the square was soon known internationally as Euromaidan.

The protests escalated rapidly and were followed by a violent crackdown by the police and special riot forces (Berkut). By February 2014, more than one hundred people had been killed.

Paradoxically, the clashes between protesters and police in Kyiv meant that Ukraine no longer needed a branding campaign to get international attention. Just like many other European citizens and other news consumers around the world, we followed the events closely on international and national broadcast news channels, as well as on Twitter and Facebook. The violence in Kyiv and other cities in Ukraine continued until late February 2014, when the president fled the country. This was followed shortly thereafter by Russian aggression, including the annexation of Crimea in March and a Russia-backed “separatist” war in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. Most sensational was the downing of Malaysian passenger flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July, killing all 298 passengers and crew.

Managing the domestic information around these events was a challenge for the government, which was quite weak at the time. And if it was difficult to control the flow of information domestically, it was even more difficult to do so internationally. The war has continued since then and escalated in February 2022, providing a continuous flow of news stories in the international media.

#### A NEW INFORMATION LANDSCAPE

The events following the Euromaidan Revolution brought us back to what was once a classic concern of media research: war and propaganda. Ukraine ended up in a situation that was increasingly understood as an information war with Russia, and scholars were soon paying attention to these events, which were increasingly framed in terms of propaganda, iWar, or hybrid warfare.<sup>2</sup> By far, the Russian side of this discursive conflict has received the most attention, both in news reporting and in research. The dominant perception was that Russia (often metonymically expressed as “Putin” or “the Kremlin”) was acting in an extremely well-organized and strategic way and making use of new communication technologies such as bots and social media manipulation (see Kuzio 2017). Furthermore, this development seemed to converge with a more general awareness of the communication patterns of populist regimes in various places around the world, their sometimes hostile way of relating to traditional media, and their relaxed distinctions between fact and fiction.

Concepts such as fake news and trolling—concepts with high rhetorical but little analytical value—became commonplace in discussions.

At this juncture, we became increasingly interested in other types of information policymaking besides nation branding. The communication situation in Ukraine also stood out as more interesting to us than Russia's activities. The way Ukraine managed its response to aggression and tried to control information flows was worth understanding: if there was a powerful, well-synchronized propaganda apparatus on the Russian side with the ability to disseminate a particularly biased image of the situation, how could Ukraine respond? What kind of counterimages could be produced, and by whom? In which forms and for which audiences?

Surprisingly, it soon became evident that the branding initiative in Kyiv was still alive. As one PR consultant stated, conflicts tend to blow over, while branding is long term. These professionals were biding their time until political conditions stabilized. However, more interesting from an information management perspective (Detlor 2010), several of our informants became deeply engaged in the Euromaidan protests and their aftermath, contributing their branding and communication skills to a number of initiatives with the explicit aim of responding to Russian propaganda.

This engagement was already apparent during those turbulent days in late November 2013. Notifications about the political situation started to appear on the Facebook and Twitter feeds of the PR consultants we had recently met. One of them was working at a PR bureau located a block from the Maidan, and he apparently went down to the square during his lunch break and photographed the crowd. From our interviews, it was clear that he had had great expectations about the EU agreement, but we were surprised that he joined the protests so soon and so openly. After all, nation branding professionals are highly dependent on their good relationships with state authorities, since they commission and pay for the campaigns. If the protests failed, these professionals would risk being out of business.

In the unstable situation that followed the ousting of President Yanukovich, an urgent need for information management was expressed. This was handled by private initiatives to provide foreign journalists with updated and reliable information about events in Ukraine. This was particularly critical when the situation escalated in 2014 and information started to appear from Russian sources offering their perspective. Much of the information being supplied to national and international news bureaus was from the

eastern front, where the Ukraine army was fighting Russia-backed “separatists” in Donetsk and Luhansk. A group of PR professionals we knew set up the Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC) in March 2014, with funding from a number of European and American organizations. The UCMC was launched with the aim of providing global media with “accurate and up-to-date information on the events in Ukraine.”<sup>3</sup> From its location in the Hotel Ukraine, situated at the top of the Maidan, the UCMC offered news briefings and information support to foreign correspondents reporting from Ukraine.

The UCMC was not the only initiative undertaken during these turbulent days of the Euromaidan Revolution. Many other activists—both within the country and from the large Ukrainian diaspora—formed groups that engaged in communications activities geared toward both a national and an international audience. Many of these initiatives, such as Euromaidan Press, worked through Facebook and other online social media, disseminating the latest news from traditional trusted media sources as well as user-generated information. Activists supporting the regime change believed the Russian media deliberately interfered by spreading false information. To address this problem, a group of faculty and journalism students at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy launched StopFake to debunk stories from various sources that were spreading speculative or outright false information. They disseminated this information on a webpage and through social media. Simultaneously, a group of academic historians who had participated in the Euromaidan protests formed an initiative called Likbez to control how Ukraine’s history was depicted in the media. As historians, however, their longer-term goal was to provide future generations of Ukrainians with history textbooks sanitized of a Russian bias (Yurchuk 2021).

A particularly noteworthy development in information management in Ukraine was the rapid launch of several new television channels that streamed continuous images from the Euromaidan Revolution. They provided many of the stock photos used by the international news media. Most successful was Hromadske TV, an initiative by young journalists in Kyiv that began broadcasting on the same day the demonstrations started. In fact, one of its reporters is thought to have instigated the protests by contacting friends on social media and telling them to gather at the square. Hromadske (Ukrainian for “public”) was, however, not alone in streaming the protests live. We, too, switched between two other channels while following the dramatic events: UkrStream and Espresso TV.

As the war in eastern Ukraine became permanent, the Ukrainian government under new president Petro Poroshenko felt the need to implement a policy related to how information about the armed conflict was distributed both domestically and to an international audience. A new Ministry of Information Policy (MIP) was launched. This was not an uncontroversial decision. Critics feared that the Ukrainian government was trying to control and censor information—or perhaps fabricate lies—just like Russia. However, Ukraine did not have the kind of resources necessary to do so. The MIP was quite small, consisting of one minister and two deputy ministers, a few information officers (state secretaries), and administrative staff. In effect, the MIP relied on the cooperation of voluntary organizations engaged in communication projects related to the war (usually financed by donations and funds from foreign development organizations). However, at the MIP's disposal were the national news agency Ukrinform and the state television streaming channel UATV, both of which produce news information about Ukraine. Some of the state secretaries had backgrounds in PR and branding, and the MIP would eventually launch its own nation branding campaigns.

The Euromaidan events were intriguing and encouraged us to widen our research interest extensively. Our initial project about the branding of Ukraine had been confined to a limited number of actors involved in specific campaigns. The aggression from Russia stimulated several more civil society initiatives, ranging from fundraising and cultural performances to volunteer battalions fighting in the war. Particularly surprising was the amount of space available for private and voluntary initiatives. In this, we noted a similarity to the nation branding business: state and government authorities seemed to have less influence over communication projects than one would have expected, and information was managed by a plurality of civic and corporate actors contributing diverse experiences and skills. The chapters that follow describe and discuss the implications of this method of implementing information management and policy.

The developments in Ukraine after the Euromaidan Revolution actualized some classic themes of mass communication and media research, especially since the information management related to the Russian aggression was most often understood in terms of a propaganda war. Propaganda, however, is somewhat problematic as an analytical concept for pragmatic, ethical, and theoretical reasons. Pragmatically, few Ukrainian informants would consider their communicative activities to be propaganda. That may not be



a complication for critical research conducted at some distance from the empirical world (the bulk of propaganda studies are also textual studies), but when interacting regularly with informants, the concept of propaganda is too negatively loaded. It is simply impossible to retain informants' trust if one calls the actions taken from the Ukrainian side propaganda. In common parlance (as well as in most but not all scholarly work), the concept has an entirely normative connotation. Propaganda is a practice of intentional deception that "others" engage in; it is definitely not something "we" do. Thus, the very use of the concept suggests a certain essentialist understanding of the studied phenomenon.

This brings up an ethical problem: it is dubious to discuss information and communication activities in "neutral" terms and then force the concept of propaganda on these activities in the analysis.

This circumstance is an apt illustration of the problem with propaganda as an analytical and theoretical concept: propaganda is usually understood as a form of communication that is orchestrated by a powerful propagandist (a state authority or political leader) to influence a target audience (of popular masses). Over time, its meaning has become more negative than it was in early research on mass communication. In their influential book *Propaganda and Persuasion*, Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell define propaganda as "the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (1992, 2). It is only to a limited extent that such a definition would be helpful for making sense of communication activities in Ukraine.

Importantly, though, the word *propaganda* is relevant within the situations observed in Ukraine, and it is frequently used by the actors in this field (for that reason, the word appears on many of the following pages). All the communicative efforts we studied were framed by a strong conviction that Ukraine was threatened by propaganda—in much the same sense suggested by Jowett and O'Donnell's definition. Our informants insisted that there was a deliberate, systematic attempt to manipulate the whole world through false or biased information orchestrated by Russia or Russian interests. In that sense, propaganda is used in much the same way as the concept of fake news (Farkas and Schou 2020).

The intention of this book is neither to dispute that conviction nor to expose or critically examine Russian propaganda. Our scope is broader: this is a study of communicative practices by actors who are framing their efforts

in relation to a threat they perceive as propaganda. Our interest is how that perception is articulated and acted on. Paraphrasing Clifford Geertz (who claimed that anthropologists are not studying villages but *in* villages), propaganda is “the locus of study [but] not the object of study” (1973, 22). We develop what this means theoretically for the analysis of information policy in Ukraine in the first chapter. In the remainder of this introduction, we present our aims and objectives and give an outline of the chapters to come.

#### CONTEXTS, AIMS, AND OUTLINE

This book describes and discusses the forms, agents, and platforms entangled in the complex political and communicative situation in Ukraine since 2013. The analysis is related to a specific historical context in which the combination of political tensions, commercial dynamics, and new communication technologies gives birth to novel forms of information management. A number of interested parties had a stake in the creation of Ukraine’s information policy—governments and governmental administration (e.g., the MIP) and commercial actors, entrepreneurs, and activists—forming new alliances and cooperations.

This book focuses on Ukraine and the informational, political, social, and cultural conditions that are unique to the country. Importantly, this is *not* a book about the relations between Ukraine and Russia, nor is it about information wars (which is a problematic concept), although both these conditions are contextual to our analysis. There is plenty of research on Ukraine–Russia relations, as well as on information wars with a focus on these relations, but our fieldwork was exclusively about Ukraine and was carried out in that country. We sometimes reference work on international relations, but our focus is on how agents engage in information management and strive to manage meaning in communication practice, the communicative tools they take advantage of, and the consequences this has for narrative construction.

Ukraine is, at the time of this writing, the only European country involved in a war on its own territory. This is a truly extraordinary situation. This particularity aside, Ukraine is similar to other European countries in many respects, not least with its neighbors in eastern and central Europe. Ukraine has, for example, a strong presence of oligarchs, which means that there is a high degree of overlap between political and corporate power.<sup>4</sup> Ukraine has

also scored high on corruption, like Bulgaria and other countries around the Black Sea.<sup>5</sup> As in these countries, Ukrainians have a very low level of trust in governmental institutions, including trust in politicians and the media.<sup>6</sup>

The strong oligarchy and its tight bonds to the Yanukovich government up until the Euromaidan events were also present in the realm of broadcast and print mass media. Five large media companies owned and dominated by five oligarchs controlled the media in Ukraine in what has been described as a system of “oligarch pluralism” (Horbyk et al. 2021, 42): Intermedia (Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin), 1+1 Media (Ihor Kolomoyski), Media Group Ukraine (Rinat Akhmetov), StarLightMedia (Viktor Pinchuk), and Ukrainian Media Holding (Serhiy Kurchenko).<sup>7</sup> In addition to their broadcast and print media activities, all five media houses were active on websites, and 1+1 Media owned a news agency (Unian).<sup>8</sup> However friendly these five media holders were to the Yanukovich government in the years before Euromaidan, their loyalty quickly waned during the protests, and most of them reported Euromaidan events in a “balanced way, without pro-government or anti-opposition slant” (Szostek 2014, 9). As Joanna Szostek suggests, these oligarchs, many of whom had business interests in Europe, were “buying themselves insurance for the future” by acting neutral in a turbulent situation with an uncertain outcome (2014, 12).

It was significant that these oligarchs had a very strong hold on the broadcast media, since television was the dominant news provider for the Ukrainian population at the time. However, among younger segments of the population, internet news was more popular: 89 percent of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds and 73 percent of twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds reported that online news was their main source of information (Metzger and Tucker 2017, 175ff.). This meant that another context for the Euromaidan Revolution and the unfolding of events was the structure of the digital media landscape in Ukraine. In 2013 internet penetration was around 42 percent in Ukraine, which seems small compared with the European average of 68 percent (Onuch 2015a, 175). However, most of these users (82 percent) lived in urban areas, so the internet penetration in Kyiv was rather high (Metzger and Tucker 2017, 175ff.). And, taking into account that internet penetration among younger segments of the population was much higher, we can assume that those involved in the Euromaidan protests and their aftermath were highly connected.

The aim of this book is to analyze the management of meaning in Ukraine and to discuss how information policy is formed at the intersection of state politics, corporate business, and civil society activism.<sup>9</sup> In chapter 1 we account for our points of departure and our specific perspective on the management of meaning. We argue that information management and policy must be understood as stories or narratives told by a plurality of agents—journalists, PR professionals, political administrators, and many others. Notably, these stories are often constructed and take shape within networks of cooperating actors.

Narratives are also central to the professional practices surrounding nation branding, and through the construction of stories (narratives), branding and information policy converge. In the development of narratives, PR agencies and brand designers are searching for “success stories” they can use to attract tourists and foreign investments. Such language is also used in policy discussions among military advisers to governments.<sup>10</sup> But how are we to make sense of these narratives and counternarratives? What frameworks should we use to understand the complex communicative context in which information policy—broadly defined—in Ukraine is formed? In chapter 1 we also present our own model for understanding the management of information by focusing on the management of meaning through stories, narratives, images, and the like, and we relate this to previous literature on branding, propaganda, persuasion, and information management as well as to concepts such as nation branding, soft power, and public diplomacy. Our cultural approach to communication is grounded in the fact that before messages can have effects, they have to become *meaningful*, as British Jamaican cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1973) argues in one of his most cited works on the communication process. What appears meaningless to us will not affect us, as we largely disregard things that are incomprehensible. This is why stories—that is, messages organized within an intelligible narrative structure—are important. We understand the world around us through such stories. In this study we try to grasp how meaning is made during turbulent times.

We also discuss the consequences of various terminological choices, such as *propaganda* and *information war*, since the choice of terminology leads our thoughts in specific directions rather than others. In that sense, terminology is often a stake in these discursive games. Hence, we argue that several of these concepts have poor analytical value and are of little help in understanding

the situation in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. We use the discussion on these concepts as a springboard to develop our own analytical model, based on communications and media theory and focusing on actors, media forms, and stories. This gives us a unique position to discuss the management of meaning and information from particular empirical entry points.

In chapter 2 we direct our attention to the *actors*, those who are “telling all the stories,” to quote the legendary Hungarian American mass communications scholar George Gerbner (2010). According to Gerbner, we are cultivated into society, formed by the mass of stories that are told. Therefore, it is important to know who the storytellers are, what their motivations are, and within what frameworks they formulate their narratives. We discuss some of the agents involved in information management on the Ukrainian side, narrating material in English for international audiences. We propose that Russia’s aggression has engaged an entirely new set of actors in the management of information, coming from the PR business, journalism, corporate finance, and, most notably, the voluntary sector. These new actors bring professional ideas and work routines from their fields of origin, which impact the practice and expressive character of what has been termed information warfare.

In chapter 3 we turn to the *forms* of information management and discuss how information is created in niche media before it takes form in mass media stories. We look at those communications platforms employed by the agents accounted for in chapter 2—that is, the media technologies and forms that precede the images and stories that are eventually relayed to international audiences. In a highly mediatized world, the mass media are also mediatized, meaning that there is a high degree of what Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin (2000) call “remediation,” where images circulate from niche media to mass media. This remediation of images means that the narratives are formed in contexts and circumstances under which the niche media operate before they meet a larger mass audience. In this chapter we follow some of these processes of remediation and discuss the implications for the narratives that eventually reach the mainstream media of broadcast television and the press (in both print and online forms). This involves social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and VKontakte, as well as streamed television services that deliver footage for international news broadcasters, which reframe the images for the commercial and international framework in which they operate. It also includes presentational media such as PowerPoint, where discourses

and images are formed and tested before being distributed more widely in advertising and mass media.

In chapter 4 we look at the actual *stories* and contents produced by the agents presented in chapter 2, with the help of the media forms discussed in chapter 3. We discuss the contents and information related to several particular events taking place between 2014 and 2017. Quite unexpectedly, many of these communicative efforts led up to and converged around an event that usually occurs outside the context of political controversy: the Eurovision Song Contest, held in Kyiv in May 2017. The international media attention surrounding this event was exploited by activist groups as well as by state authorities in both Russia and Ukraine. Our analysis builds on interviews with mass media representatives, PR consultants, political administrators, and brand designers but also on branding material, including the design of logotypes. In terms of policy, the events and communicative actions described are attempts to control narratives about Ukraine, and we discuss the nature and character of the actions as well as which domestic and foreign audiences the narratives were aimed at.

Chapter 5 summarizes our analysis of actors, media forms, and stories. Here, we widen the scope to discuss the fact that in a highly globalized world, information management and policy take new forms, involve new agents, and are managed on new types of communication platforms. This means that the power and control of information are increasingly diffused. The rise of large-scale media platform companies undermines the monopolies that nation-states once had on the control of information; access to media production technologies by civil society organizations makes it easier for them to bypass gatekeepers such as traditional news media outlets; and the flow of people between corporations and governmental departments introduces new practices and communication strategies. We conclude the chapter and the book with a discussion of how our study contributes to an understanding of the contemporary informational state and its specific characteristics.

#### NOTES ON METHOD

This book is based on more than six years of field research on branding, propaganda, and information and meaning management in Ukraine, from 2013 through 2019. Contextually, it also builds on our previous research on branding and soft power in India and Estonia. This may appear to be a rather

simple and straightforward background, but describing the methodology, methods, and research material of this study is a delicate matter.

Sociologist Robert Merton once described a fairly common experience in qualitative research. Sometimes during the research process, by chance or coincidence, something unanticipated, surprising, or anomalous happens that changes the original context of the project and sends the researcher in a new direction of inquiry. It piques the researcher's curiosity, leads him or her along unplanned paths, and provokes new insights. Merton called this unanticipated but important component of research the "serendipity pattern" (1948, 506–509). What Merton had in mind was primarily the effect of such empirical findings on sociological theory. During later decades, the concept has occasionally been recycled among anthropologists, usually as a strategy for taking advantage of unexpected happenings and following coincidental encounters or new paths that might occur during ethnographic fieldwork (Hardtmann 2009; Hazan and Hertzog 2011; Rivoal and Salazar 2013). Some would even claim that serendipity constitutes "the essence of field-work research" (Pieke 2000, 138).

The serendipitous moment in the early phase of our research is rather obvious. The dramatic and unexpected Euromaidan events took place less than a year into our research and offered a unique opportunity to study meaning management in turbulent times. It certainly changed the direction of our research radically. Furthermore, almost out of necessity, serendipity had to remain the most characterizing methodological approach for our continuing research in Ukraine. No one could anticipate what would evolve out of these tumultuous events. It was not possible to demarcate a stable research field, and there was no way to plan exactly where and when to observe, who to meet, and what material to study. We had to be open to whatever we encountered. The guiding principle during these years of field research was to follow up on things that aroused our curiosity. We often interviewed people, read documents, studied media contents, and made ethnographic observations in a rather improvised manner. Moreover, several accounts in this book come from experiences that took place on the way to a formal meeting in an office, a stroll around Kyiv on a Sunday afternoon, or even a visit to a restaurant after a long day of interviewing government officials. A list of "research materials" would be highly deceptive and would not be exhaustive. In the chapters that follow, we refer to these interviews and observations, but needless to say, although the material that appears in this

book follows our aims and our arguments, it does not reflect the totality of our empirical data.

Over the course of our study of information and meaning management in Ukraine, we made some decisive research choices. Most importantly, we deliberately focused on communication initiatives directed toward an international English-speaking audience. Our interest in these issues derived from the Ukrainian branding efforts around Euro2012 and the broadcast ads on BBC and CNN. Our initial interest was in analyzing nation branding efforts, which are, by nature, directed to an international audience of tourists, investors, and political stakeholders. Focusing on internationally oriented communication was also a choice of necessity, as neither of us speaks Ukrainian or Russian. To overcome our linguistic shortcomings, we worked with postdocs and students who are native Ukrainian and Russian speakers, and they assisted us with translations and cultural explanations. However, the politicians, media executives, journalists, PR consultants, academics, activists, and others we interviewed were well educated and, with few exceptions, spoke very good English. Many of the formal interviews we conducted were thus “elite” interviews with people in the capacity of their occupations or functions (Radway 1989), as distinct from interviews with everyday media users or audiences. Analytically, we treated the interviews as both “source” and “discourse”; that is, our informants contributed factual information and explanation, but equally important was how they phrased or formulated this information and how they characterized, for example, brand design or information strategy and policy (see Bolin 2003).

Although we were often close to the communication activities and actors in Ukraine, we also observed the events from a distance. For the most part, we followed the drama in and about Ukraine from Stockholm. This is, after all, a study of communication initiatives that are public and available through the internet or social media, and we followed the flow of news through regular channels as well as more specialized sources. Our frequent visits to Ukraine were usually instigated by something we learned about from a distance that prompted us to travel to Kyiv—only a two-hour flight from Stockholm—and get a closer look. Thus, during a period of six years, we traveled to Ukraine at least two or three times a year and met people involved in several organizations and particular communication activities. Initially, these meetings took the form of formal interviews, but after meeting repeatedly with the same people, the interactions became more casual.



Of course, our approach is also marked by our training in anthropology (Per Ståhlberg) and film and media studies (Göran Bolin), and most of our previous research has been qualitative and ethnographically inspired. Rather than being driven by theory-informed hypotheses, we were inspired by our own curiosity about branding and information and meaning management and the people involved in such activities. We see these practices as being played out in a complex field of social relations in the context of political tensions, international relations, and economic dynamics. This is also how we account for them in the chapters that follow, starting with the broader theoretical framework and approach in chapter 1.

## REFERENCES

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1991. "Habermas and Critical Theory: Beyond the Marxian Dilemma?" In *Communicative Action: Essays on Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action*, edited by Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, 49–73. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Aliyev, Husseyn. 2015. *Post-Communist Civil Society and the Soviet Legacy: Challenges of Democratisation and Reform in the Caucasus*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Andrejevic, Mark. 2007. *iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Anholt, Simon. 2005. *Brand New Justice: How Branding Places and Products Can Help the Developing World*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Anholt, Simon. 2007. *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Applebaum, Anne. 2017. *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine*. London: Allen Lane.
- Aronczyk, Melissa. 2007. "New and Improved Nations: Branding National Identity." In *Practicing Culture*, edited by C. Calhoun and R. Sennett, 105–128. London: Routledge.
- Aronczyk, Melissa. 2008. "'Living the Brand': Nationality, Globality and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants." *International Journal of Communication* 2:41–65.
- Aronczyk, Melissa. 2013. *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Åslund, Anders. 2014. "Oligarchs, Corruption, and European Integration." *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 64–73.
- Austin, John L. (1955) 1975. *How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Bakardjieva, Maria, Stina Bengtsson, Göran Bolin, and Kjell Engelbrekt. 2021. *Digital Media and the Dynamics of Civil Society: Retooling Citizenship in New EU Democracies*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Baker, Catherine. 2016. "The 'Gay Olympics'? The Eurovision Song Contest and the Politics of LGBT/European Belonging." *European Journal of International Relations* 23 (1): 97–121.

- Barber, Lynsay. 2014. "Ukraine Challenges Russian Media with Launch of International News Channel Ukraine Today." *City A.M.*, 21 July. <https://www.cityam.com/?s=Ukraine+Challenges+Russian+Media+with+Launch+of+International+News+Channel+Ukraine+Today>.
- Barthes, Roland. (1964) 1977. "The Rhetoric of the Image." In *Image—Music—Text*, 32–51. London: Fontana.
- Barthes, Roland. (1966) 1977. "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives." In *Image—Music—Text*, 79–124. London: Fontana.
- Barthes, Roland. (1968) 1977. "The Death of the Author." In *Image—Music—Text*, 142–148. London: Fontana.
- Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology*. Part III. *Form and Pathology in Relationship*. San Francisco: Chandler.
- BBC News. 2014. "Profile: Ukraine's Ultra-nationalist Right Sector." 28 April. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27173857>.
- BBC News. 2017. "Eurovision in Ukraine: Controversy over Russian Entry." 13 March. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39254404>.
- Bernays, Edward. (1928) 2005. *Propaganda*. New York: IG Publishing.
- Bezpiatchuk, Zhanna. 2011. "Branding Ukraine: Lip-synching a Happy Tune." *Ukrainian Week*, 20 December. <http://ukrainianweek.com/Society/38090>.
- Boli, John, and George M. Thomas. 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bolin, Göran. 2002. "Nationsmarknadsföring. Eurovisionsschlagerfestivalen som modern världsutställning." In *Hello Europe! Tallinn Calling! Eurovision Song Contest 2002 som mediehändelse*, edited by Staffan Ericson, 33–42. Huddinge, Sweden: Södertörn University.
- Bolin, Göran. 2003. *Variations, Media Landscapes, History: Frameworks for an Analysis of Contemporary Media Landscapes*. Huddinge, Sweden: Södertörn University.
- Bolin, Göran. 2006a. "Electronic Geographies: Media Landscapes as Technological and Symbolic Environments." In *Geographies of Communication: The Spatial Turn in Media Studies*, edited by Jesper Falkheimer and André Jansson, 67–86. Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom.
- Bolin, Göran. 2006b. "Visions of Europe: Cultural Technologies of Nation-states." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 9 (2): 189–206.
- Bolin, Göran. 2009. "Television Textuality: Textual Forms in Live Television Programming." *Nordicom Review* 30 (1): 37–53.
- Bolin, Göran. 2010a. "Digitization, Multi-Platform Texts and Audience Reception." *Popular Communication* 8 (1): 72–83.

- Bolin, Göran. 2010b. "Media Events, Eurovision and Societal Centers." In *Media Events in a Global Age*, edited by Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz, 124–138. London: Routledge.
- Bolin, Göran. 2014. "Television Journalism, Politics and Entertainment: Power and Autonomy in the Field of Television Journalism." *Television and New Media* 15 (4): 336–349.
- Bolin, Göran. 2016. "Afterword: The Construction of a Market for Place Branding and Public Diplomacy—A View from the North." *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 12 (2): 236–241.
- Bolin, Göran. 2017. *Media Generations: Experience, Identity and Mediatized Social Change*. London: Routledge.
- Bolin, Göran, Paul Jordan, and Per Ståhlberg. 2016. "From Nation Branding to Information Warfare: Management of Information in the Ukraine–Russia Conflict." In *Media and the Ukraine Crisis: Hybrid Media Practices and Narratives of Conflict*, edited by Mervi Pantti, 3–18. New York: Peter Lang.
- Bolin, Göran, and Galina Miazhevich. 2018. "The Soft Power of Commercialized Nationalist Symbols: Using Media Analysis to Understand Nation Branding Campaigns." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 21 (5): 527–542.
- Bolin, Göran, and Per Ståhlberg. 2010. "Between Community and Commodity: Nationalism and Nation Branding." In *Communicating the Nation: National Topographies of Global Media Landscapes*, edited by Anna Roosvall and Inka Salovaara Moring, 79–101. Göteborg, Sweden: Nordicom.
- Bolin, Göran, and Per Ståhlberg. 2015. "Mediating the Nation-state: Agency and the Media in Nation-Branding Campaigns." *International Journal of Communication* 9:3065–3083.
- Bolin, Göran, and Per Ståhlberg. 2021. "The Powerpoint Nation: Branding an Imagined Commodity." *European Review* 29 (4): 445–456.
- Bolin, Göran, and Per Ståhlberg. 2022. "Disruption and Transformation in Media Events Theory: The Case of the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine." *Nordic Journal of Media Studies* 4:99–117.
- Bolter, Jay David, and Richard Grusin. 2000. *Remediation: Understanding New Media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1983) 1986. "The Forms of Capital." In *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by John G. Richardson, 241–258. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *In Other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (2012) 2020. *On the State: Lectures at the Collège de France 1989–1992*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Braman, Sandra. 2006. *Change of State: Information, Policy, and Power*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Braman, Sandra. 2019. “Trumpean Nation Branding: Strange Attractions and Information Policy.” In *Fritt från fältet: Om medier, generationer och värden—Festskrift till Göran Bolin*, edited by Peter Jakobsson and Fredrik Stiernstedt, 149–167. Huddinge, Sweden: Södertörn University.
- Braman, Sandra. 2021. “Ecstasy and Entropy: Information Policy in a Punctuated Case.” In *Research Handbook in Information Policy*, edited by Alistair Duff, 40–55. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Brooke, James. 2014. “Putin Kicks off Eurasian Union, without Ukraine.” *Voice of America*, 29 May. <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-belarus-kazakhstan-agree-to-create-economic-union/1924941.html>.
- Bruns, Axel. 2006. “Towards Prodisusage: Futures for User-Led Content Production.” In *Proceedings: Cultural Attitudes towards Communication and Technology 2006*, edited by Fay Sudweeks, Herbert Hrachovec, and Charles Ess, 275–284. Perth, Australia: Murdoch University.
- Brunsdon, Charlotte, and David Morley. 1999. *The Nationwide Television Studies*. London: Routledge.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Business Ukraine*. 2015. “Ukraine’s Infowar Amazon: Minister Tetyana Popova Seeks to Make Ukrainian Army Media-Savvy.” 19 June. <http://bunews.com.ua/politics/item/ukraine-s-infowar-amazon-deputy-minister-for-information-policy-tetyana-popova-seeks-to-make-ukrainian-army-media-savvy>.
- Carey, James, ed. 1983. *Media, Myths and Narratives: Television and the Press*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Carlón, Mario. 2020a. “Between the Power of Enunciators and the Power of Discourses: The Hypermedia Circulation of Contemporary Images.” In *Networks, Societies, and Polis: Epistemological Approaches on Mediatization*, edited by Jairo Ferreira, Pedro Gilberto Gomes, Antonio Fausto Neto, José Luiz Braga, and Ana Paula da Rosa, 215–236. Santa Maria, Brazil: FACOS–UFSM.
- Carlón, Mario. 2020b. *Circulation del sentido y construcción de colectivos en una sociedad hipermediatizada*. San Luis, Argentina: Nueva Editorial Universitaria.
- Cassiday, Julie A. 2014. “Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay: Russia’s Trajectory to Eurovision Victory.” *Russian Review* 73 (1): 1–23.
- Castells, Manuel. 2009. *Communication Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Choo, Chun Wei. 2006. *The Knowing Organization: How Organizations Use Information to Construct Meaning, Create Knowledge, and Make Decisions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chraibi, Christine. 2016. "A Short History of the Ukrainian Greeting 'Slava Ukrayini.'" Euromaidan Press, 13 June. <http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/06/13/a-short-history-of-the-ukrainian-greeting-slava-ukrayini/>.
- Ciechalski, Suzanne, Caitlin Fichtel, and Rima Abdelkader. 2020. "New Video Appears to Show George Floyd on the Ground with Three Officers." *NBC News*, 29 May. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-video-appears-show-george-floyd-ground-three-officers-n1217476>.
- Claessen, Eva. 2021. "The Making of a Narrative: The Use of Geopolitical Othering in Russian Strategic Narratives during the Ukraine Crisis." *Media, War & Conflict*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/17506352211029529>.
- Corrigan, Philip, and Derek Sayer. 1985. *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Coticchia, Fabrizio, and Andrea Catanzaro. 2020. "The Fog of Words: Assessing the Problematic Relationship between Strategic Narratives." *Media, War & Conflict*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635220965622>.
- Couldry, Nick. 2000. *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age*. London: Routledge.
- Couldry, Nick. 2003. *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Couldry, Nick. 2006. "Transvaluing Media Studies, or, Beyond the Myth of the Mediated Centre." In *Media and Cultural Theory*, edited by James Curran and David Morley, 177–194. London: Routledge.
- Couldry, Nick. 2016. "Life with the Media Manifold: Between Freedom and Subjection." In *Politics, Civil Society and Participation: Media and Communications in a Transforming Environment*, edited by Leif Kramp, Nico Carpentier, Andreas Hepp, Richard Kilborn, Risto Kunelius, Hannu Nieminen, Tobias Olsson, Pille Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Ilija Tomanić Trivundža, and Simone Tosoni, 25–40. Bremen, Germany: Edition lumière.
- Couldry, Nick, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz. 2010. *Media Events in a Global Age*. London: Routledge.
- Crichton, Michael. 1993. "Mediasaurus." *Wired*, 1 April. [www.wired.com/1993/04/mediasaurus/](http://www.wired.com/1993/04/mediasaurus/).
- Cull, Nicholas J. 2019. *Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the Digital Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Dahlgren, Peter. 1999. "Television News Narrative." In *Framing Friction: Media and Social Conflict*, edited by Mary S. Mander, 189–214. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

- Das Ranjana, Jelena Kleut, and Göran Bolin. 2013. "New Genres—New Roles for the Audience? An Overview of Recent Research." In *Audience Transformations: Shifting Audience Positions in Late Modernity*, edited by Nico Carpentier, Kim Christian Schröder, and Laurie Hallett, 30–46. London: Routledge.
- Datskevych, Natalia. 2019. "New Ranking, Same Oligarchs: Meet Ukraine's Richest People." *Kyiv Post*, 31 October. <https://www.kyivpost.com/business/new-ranking-same-oligarchs-meet-ukraines-richest-people.html>.
- Davenport, Thomas H., and John C. Beck. 2001. *The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business*. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
- Dayan, Daniel, and Elihu Katz. 1992. *Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Delanty, Gerard, Liana Giorgi, and Monica Sassatelli. 2011. *Festivals and the Cultural Public Sphere*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Detlor, Brian. 2010. "Information Management." *International Journal of Information Management* 30 (2): 103–108.
- Dewey, John. 1916. *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Macmillan.
- Dinnie, Keth. 2008. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Drotner, Kirsten. 1994. "Ethnographic Enigmas: 'The Everyday' in Recent Media Studies." *Cultural Studies* 8 (2): 341–357.
- Drygas, Vita Maria. 2015. *Piano*. TV documentary. Drygas Production.
- Dyczok, Marta. 2014. "Information Wars: Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, Propaganda, the Use of Force, and Resistance." *Russian Journal of Communication* 6 (2): 173–176.
- Dyczok, Marta. 2016. *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Broadcasting through Information Wars with Hromadske Radio*. Bristol, UK: E-International Relations Publishing.
- Eco, Umberto. (1980) 1994. *The Name of the Rose*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace.
- Eco, Umberto. 1981. "Narrative Structures in Fleming." In *The Role of the Reader*, 144–172. London: Hutchinson.
- Eder, Jens. 2016. "Affective Image Operations." In *Image Operations: Visual Media and Political Conflict*, edited by Jens Eder and Charlotte Klonk, 63–78. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Eisenstein, Sergei. (1949) 1977. *Film Form: Essays in Film Theory*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Ellis, John. 1992. *Visible Fictions: Cinema, Television, Video*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. London: Routledge.
- Ellis, John. 2000. *Seeing Things: Television in the Age of Uncertainty*. London: I. B. Tauris.

- Ellul, Jacques. 1965. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Entman, Robert M. 2008. "Theorizing Mediated Diplomacy: The US Case." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 13 (2): 87–102.
- Ericson, Staffan. 2002. "Rösten från andra sidan: En kommentar till kommentaren." In *Hello Europe! Tallinn Calling! Eurovisionsschlagerfestivalen som mediehändelse*, edited by Staffan Ericson, 43–68. Huddinge, Sweden: Södertörn University.
- Farkas, Johan, and Jannick Schou. 2020. *Post-Truth, Fake News and Democracy: Mapping the Politics of Falsehood*. London: Routledge.
- Fedirko, Taras. 2021. "Liberalism in Fragments: Oligarchy and the Liberal Subject in Ukrainian News Journalism." *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale* 29 (2): 471–489.
- Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak M. Brudny. 2012a. No More Colour! Authoritarian Regimes and Colour Revolutions in Eurasia." *Democratization* 19 (1): 1–14.
- Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak M. Brudny. 2012b. "Russia and the Colour Revolutions." *Democratization* 19 (1): 15–36.
- Fiske, John. 1994. *Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political Change*. New York: Routledge.
- Fornäs, Johan. 2012. *Signifying Europe*. Bristol, UK: Intellect.
- Fornäs, Johan. 2017. "Europe Faces Europe: An Introduction." In *Europe Faces Europe: Narratives from Its Eastern Half*, edited by Johan Fornäs, 1–34. Bristol, UK: Intellect.
- Foucault, Michel. 2007. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at Collège de France, 1977–78*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Furhammar, Leif, and Folke Isaksson. 1968. *Politik och film*. Stockholm: PAN/Norstedts.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Genette, Gerard. 1997. *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gerbner, George. 2010. "Telling All the Stories: Children and Television." *Sacred Heart University Review* 16 (1): 37–54. <http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/shureview/vol16/iss1/2>.
- Gerdes, Stefanie. 2017. "Kiev Gets World's Biggest Rainbow to Promote Diversity." *Gay Star News*, 26 April. <https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/kiev-worlds-biggest-rainbow/>.
- Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. 2015. "At Point 18 in Eastern Ukraine, the War Grinds on, Night after Night." *Washington Post*, 15 August. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/at-point-18-in-eastern-ukraine-the-war-grinds-on-night-after-night/2015/08/15/fffcf2c0-405f-11e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/at-point-18-in-eastern-ukraine-the-war-grinds-on-night-after-night/2015/08/15/fffcf2c0-405f-11e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a_story.html).



- Gibbs, Anna. 2008. "Panic! Affect Contagion, Mimesis and Suggestion in the Social Field." *Cultural Studies Review* 14 (2): 130–145.
- Glander, Timothy. 2000. *Origins of Mass Communications Research during the American Cold War: Educational Effects and Contemporary Implications*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Goffman, Erving. (1974) 1986. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Goldman, Robert. 1992. *Reading Ads Socially*. London: Routledge.
- Graan, Andrew. 2013. "Counterfeiting the Nation? Skopje 2014 and the Politics of Nation Branding in Macedonia." *Cultural Anthropology* 28 (1): 161–179.
- Gray, Jonathan. 2010. *Show Sold Separately: Promos, Spoilers, and Other Media Paratexts*. New York: New York University Press.
- Grytsenko, Oksana. 2014. "Journalists, Free Speech Activists Protest against 'Ministry of Truth.'" *Kyiv Post*, 4 December. <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/reform-watch/journalists-media-rights-activists-demand-abolishing-of-new-ly-formed-ministry-of-truth-374003.html>.
- Gupta, Akhil. 2012. *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (1976) 1979. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" In *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, 1–68. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (1981) 1991. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. 1. *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. (1981) 1992. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Vol. 2. *The Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hall, Jamieson K. 2019. *Cyber War: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hall, Stuart. 1973. "Encoding/Decoding in the Television Discourse." CCCS Occasional Paper 7. Birmingham University/CCCS, Birmingham, UK.
- Hannerz, Ulf. 1992. *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hannerz, Ulf. 2004. *Foreign News: Exploring the World of Foreign Correspondents*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hannerz, Ulf. 2016. *Writing Future Worlds: An Anthropologist Explores Global Scenarios*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hardtmann, Eva-Maria. 2009. *The Dalit Movement in India: Local Practices, Global Connections*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hazan, Haim, and Ester Hertzog, eds. 2011. *Serendipity in Anthropological Research: The Nomadic Turn*. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

- Heftberger, Adelheid. 2015. "Propaganda in Motion: Dziga Vertov, Aleksandr Medvedkin, Soviet Agitation on Agit-trains, Agit-steamers, and the Film Train in the 1920s and 1930s." *Apparatus: Film, Media and Digital Cultures in Central and Eastern Europe* 1. <https://www.apparatusjournal.net/index.php/apparatus/article/view/2>.
- Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Horbyk, Roman. 2017. "Mediated Europes: Discourse and Power in Ukraine, Russia and Poland during Euromaidan." Dissertation, Södertörn University.
- Horbyk, Roman. 2019. "In Pursuit of Kairos: Ukrainian Journalists between Agency and Structure during Euromaidan." *Baltic Worlds* 12 (1): 4–19.
- Horbyk, Roman, Isabel Löfgren, Yana Prymachenko, and Cheryll Soriano. 2021. "Fake News as Meta-Mimesis: Imitative Genres and Storytelling in the Philippines, Brazil, Russia and Ukraine." *Popular Inquiry* 2021 (1): 30–54.
- Hoskins, Andrew, and Ben O'Loughlin. 2015. "Arrested War: The Third Phase of Mediatization." *Information, Communication & Society* 18 (11): 1320–1338.
- Hromadske TV. 2016. "Information Ministry Official Resigns over Mistreatment of Journalists." 5 August. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrkCVxuxwcs>.
- Imre, Anikó. 2020. "The Eurovision Song Contest: Queer Nationalism." In *How to Watch Television*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., edited by Ethan Thompson and Jason Mittell, 193–202. New York: New York University Press.
- Interfax Ukraine. 2014. "Poroshenko: Information Ministry's Main Task Is to Repel Information Attacks against Ukraine." 8 December. <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/238615.html>.
- Interfax Ukraine. 2016. "Jamala Becomes Honored Artist of Ukraine." 16 May. <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/343707.html>.
- Iser, Wolfgang. 1974. *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2016. "Far Right Participation in the Ukrainian Maidan Protests: An Attempt of Systematic Estimation." *European Politics and Society* 17 (4): 453–472.
- Jaffe, Greg, and Josh Dawsey. 2019. "A Presidential Loathing for Ukraine Is at the Heart of the Impeachment Inquiry." *Washington Post*, 2 November. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/a-presidential-loathing-for-ukraine-is-at-the-heart-of-the-impeachment-inquiry/2019/11/02/8280ee60-fcc5-11e9-ac8c-8ecede29ca6ef\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/a-presidential-loathing-for-ukraine-is-at-the-heart-of-the-impeachment-inquiry/2019/11/02/8280ee60-fcc5-11e9-ac8c-8ecede29ca6ef_story.html).
- Jansen, Sue Curry. 2008. "Designer Nations: Neo-liberal Nation Branding—Brand Estonia." *Social Identities* 14 (1): 121–142.
- Jansen, Sue Curry. 2012. "Redesigning a Nation: Welcome to E-stonia, 2001–2018." In *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the "New" Europe*, edited by Natalia Kaneva, 79–98. New York: Routledge.

- Jenkins, Henry, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green. 2013. *Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture*. New York: New York University Press.
- Jonsson, Stefan. 2013. *Crowds and Democracy: The Idea and Image of the Masses from Revolution to Fascism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jordan, Paul. 2011. "The Eurovision Song Contest: Nation Branding and Nation Building in Estonia and Ukraine." PhD thesis, University of Glasgow.
- Jordan, Paul. 2014a. *The Modern Fairy Tale: Nation Branding, National Identity and the Eurovision Song Contest in Estonia*. Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press.
- Jordan, Paul. 2014b. "Nation Branding: A Tool for Nationalism?" *Journal of Baltic Studies* 45 (3): 283–303.
- Jordan, Paul. 2015. "From Ruslana to Gaitana: Performing 'Ukrainianness' in the Eurovision Song Contest." *Contemporary Southeastern Europe* 2 (1): 110–135.
- Jowett, Garth S., and Victoria O'Donnell. 1992. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Junes, Tom. 2016. "Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity: A Case Study of Student Protest as a Catalyst for Political Upheaval." *Critique & Humanism* 46 (2): 73–96.
- Kabachiy, Roman. 2013. "Backwood Viewpoint." *Kyiv Weekly* 18:2–3.
- Kaneva, Nadia. 2011. "Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research." *International Journal of Communication* 5:117–141.
- Kaneva, Nadia, ed. 2012. *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the "New" Europe*. New York: Routledge.
- Kaneva, Nadia. 2018. "Simulation Nations: Nation Brands and Baudrillard's Theory of Media." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 21 (5): 631–648.
- Kaneva, Nadia, and D. Popescu. 2011. "National Identity Lite: Nation Branding in Post-Communist Romania and Bulgaria." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 14 (2): 191–207.
- Kasianov, Georgiy. 2022. "Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukraine as Cultural Memory: Comparison, Competition, Interaction." *Journal of Genocide Research* 24 (2): 216–227.
- Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. *Personal Influence: The Part Played by the People in the Flow of Mass Communications*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Katz, Elihu, and Tamar Liebes. 2007. "'No More Peace!' How Disaster, Terror and War Has Upstaged Media Events." *International Journal of Communication* 1:157–166.
- Kenez, P. 1985. *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kernbach, Sebastian, Sabrina Bresciani, and Martin J. Eppler. 2015. "Slip-Sliding Away: A Review of the Literature on the Constraining Qualities of PowerPoint." *Business and Professional Communication Quarterly* 78 (3): 292–313.

- Khaldarova, Irina. 2021. "Brother or 'Other'? Transformation of Strategic Narratives in Russian Television News during the Ukraine Crisis." *Media, War & Conflict* 14 (1): 3–20.
- Kjeldsen, Jens E. 2006. "The Rhetoric of PowerPoint." *International Journal of Media, Technology and Lifelong Learning* 2:1–17.
- Knoblauch, Hubert. 2008. "The Performance of Knowledge: Pointing and Knowledge in PowerPoint Presentations." *Cultural Sociology* 2 (1): 75–97.
- Kølvraa, Christoffer. 2015. "Affect, Provocation, and Far Right Rhetoric." In *Affective Methodologies: Developing Cultural Research Strategies for the Study of Affect*, edited by B. T. Knudsen and C. Stage, 183–200. London: Palgrave.
- Kremer, Arkady, and Yuli Martov. (1896) 1983. "On Agitation." In *Marxism in Russia: Key Documents 1879–1906*, edited by Neil Harding, 192–205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2017. *Putin's War against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime*. Toronto: University of Toronto.
- Kyriakidou, Maria, Michael Skey, Julie Uldam, and Patrick McCurdy. 2018. "Media Events and Cosmopolitan Fandom: 'Playful Nationalism' in the Eurovision Song Contest." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 21 (6): 603–618.
- Laar, Mart. 1996. "Estonia's Success Story." *Journal of Democracy* 7 (1): 96–101.
- Langley, Alison. 2014. "Ukraine Today Aims to Clarify Russian Media Misinformation." *Columbia Journalism Review*, 27 August. [http://www.cjr.org/behind\\_the\\_news/ukraine\\_today\\_russian\\_media.php](http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ukraine_today_russian_media.php).
- Lasswell, Harold D. 1927. "The Theory of Political Propaganda." *American Political Science Review* 21 (3): 627–631.
- Lasswell, Harold D. (1927) 1971. *Propaganda Technique in World War I*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lasswell, Harold D. 1941. *Democracy through Public Opinion*. Menasha, WI: Georg Banta.
- Lasswell, Harold D. 1948. "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society." In *The Communication of Ideas*, edited by Lyman Bryson, 37–51. New York: Harper and Row.
- Lasswell, Harold D., and Dorothy Blumenstock. 1939. *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1941. "Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research." *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9 (1): 2–16.
- Le Bon, Gustave. (1896) 1912. *Massans psykologi*. Stockholm: Bonnier.
- Le Bon, Gustave. (1896) 2006. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. New York: Cosimo Classics.

- le Carré, John. 1963. *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*. London: Gollancz.
- Lepore, Jill. 2019. "The New Americanism: Why a Nation Needs a National Story." *Foreign Affairs*, March–April. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-02-05/new-americanism-nationalism-jill-lepore?check\\_logged\\_in=1](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-02-05/new-americanism-nationalism-jill-lepore?check_logged_in=1).
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude. (1958) 1977. *Structural Anthropology*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
- Liebes, Tamar, and Elihu Katz. (1990) 1993. *The Export of Meaning: Cross-cultural Readings of Dallas*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Likhachev, Vyacheslav. 2014. "Pravyi sektor i drugie." *Forum noveishei vostochnoevropeiskoi istorii i kultury*, Russian edition, 11 (2): 75–116.
- Lippmann, Walter. (1922) 1946. *Public Opinion*. New York: Penguin.
- Lokot, Tetyana. 2021. "Ukraine Is Europe? Complicating the Concept of the 'European' in the Wake of an Urban Protest." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 18 (4): 439–446.
- Lotman, Juri. (1984) 2005. "On the Semiosphere." *Sign Systems Studies* 33 (1): 205–229.
- Lury, Celia. 2012. "Going Live: Towards an Amphibious Sociology." *Sociological Review* 60 (1 suppl): 184–197.
- Madianou, Mirca, and Daniel Miller. 2011. *Migration and New Media: Transnational Families and Polymedia*. New York: Routledge.
- Magocsi, Paul Robert. 2010. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. and expanded ed. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Manning, Chelsea. 2014. "The Fog Machine of War." *New York Times*, 14 June. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/opinion/sunday/chelsea-manning-the-us-militarys-campaign-against-media-freedom.html>.
- Marx, Karl. (1867) 1976. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. London: Penguin Books.
- McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. "The Agenda-setting Function of Mass Media." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36 (2): 176–187.
- Melissen, Jan, ed. 2005. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merton, Robert K. 1948. "The Bearing of Empirical Research upon the Development of Social Theory." *American Sociological Review* 13 (5): 505–515.
- Merton, Robert K. (1949) 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press/Collier-Macmillan.
- Merton, Robert K. 1995. "The Thomas Theorem and the Mettthew Effect." *Social Forces* 74 (2): 379–424.
- Metzger, Meghan MacDuffee, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2017. "Social Media and EuroMaidan: A Review Essay." *Slavic Review* 76 (1): 169–191.

- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-state." *American Journal of Sociology* 103 (1): 144–181.
- Miazhevich, Galina. 2014. "Russia Today's Coverage of Euromaidan." *Russian Journal of Communication* 6 (2): 186–191.
- Miazhevich, Galina. 2018. "Nation Branding in the Post-Broadcast Era: The Case of RT." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 21 (5): 575–593.
- Mihelj, Sabina, and Simon Huxtable. 2018. *From Media Systems to Media Cultures: Understanding Socialist Television*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mikos, Lothar. 2010. "Films, TV Shows, YouTube and the Creativity of Fan Communities." Paper presented at the 60<sup>th</sup> annual ICA conference, Singapore, 22–26 June.
- Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. 2013. *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*. New York: Routledge.
- Moldovan, Ioana. 2015. "What It's Like on the Front Lines of the War in Ukraine." *Huffington Post*, 2 September. [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ukraine-war-front-lines-photos\\_b\\_8079828?utm\\_hp\\_ref=world](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ukraine-war-front-lines-photos_b_8079828?utm_hp_ref=world).
- Münsterberg, Hugo. 1916. *The Photoplay: A Psychological Study*. New York: D. Appleton.
- Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor. 2012. *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nayem, Mustafa. 2014. "Uprising in Ukraine: How It All Began." *Voices*, 4 April. <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/uprising-ukraine-how-it-all-began>.
- Novick, Rebecca. 2014. "The Piano Extremist: Maestro of Euromaidan." *Huffpost*, 14 February. [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-piano-extremist-maest\\_b\\_4834523](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-piano-extremist-maest_b_4834523).
- Nye, Joseph. 2004. *Soft Power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, Joseph. 2010. "The Future of Soft Power in US Foreign Policy." In *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, edited by Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, 4–11. London: Routledge.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (1): 94–109.
- Nye, Joseph S. 2014. "The Information Revolution and Soft Power." *Current History* 113 (759): 19–22.
- Oliinyk, Anna, and Taraz Kuzio. 2021. "The Euromaidan Revolution, Reforms and Decommunisation in Ukraine." *Europe-Asia Studies* 73 (5): 807–836.
- Olins, Wally. 2002. "Branding the Nation—The Historical Context." *Journal of Brand Management* 9 (4–5): 241–248.
- Onuch, Olga. 2015a. "'Facebook Helped Me Do It': Understanding the Euro-Maidan Protestor 'Tool-kit.'" *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 15 (1): 170–184.

- Onuch, Olga. 2015b. "Maidans Past and Present: Comparing the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan." In *Ukraine's Euromaidan: Analysis of a Civil Revolution*, edited by David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills, 27–56. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Orlova, Dariya. 2016. "EuroMaidan: Mediated Protests, Rituals and Nation-in-the-Making." In *Media Events: A Critical Contemporary Approach*, edited by Bianca Mitu and Stamatis Poulakidakos, 207–229. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pamment, James. 2013. *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Pieke, Frank. 2000. "Serendipity: Reflections on Fieldwork in China." In *Anthropologists in a Wider World: Essays on Field Research*, edited by Paul Dresch, Wendy James, and David Parkin, 129–150. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Pike, Steven Louis. 2021. "The 'American Century' Is Over: The US Global Leadership Narrative, Uncertainty and Public Diplomacy." In *Public Diplomacy and the Politics of Uncertainty*, edited by Pawel Surowiec and Ilan Manor, 3–28. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka, and Richard Sakwa. 2015. *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*. Bristol, UK: E–International Relations Publishing.
- Plekhanov, Georgi V. (1891) 1983. "The Tasks of the Social Democrats in the Struggle against the Famine in Russia." In *Marxism in Russia: Key Documents 1879–1906*, edited by Neil Harding, 100–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polese, Abel, Thomas Ambrosio, and Tanel Kerikmäe. 2020. "Estonian Identity Construction between Nation Branding and Building." *Mezinárodní Vztahy: Czech Journal of International Relations* 55 (2): 24–46.
- Pomerantsev, Peter. 2019. *This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War against Reality*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Potter, Simon J. 2012. *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World 1922–1970*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pötzsch, Holger. 2013. "The Emergence of iWar: Changing Practices and Perceptions of Military Engagement in a Digital Era." *New Media & Society* 17 (1): 78–95.
- Price, Monroe. 2015. *Free Expression, Globalism and the New Strategic Communication*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Propp, Vladimir. (1928) 1968. *Morphology of the Folktale*. 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Radio Free Europe. 2014. "Ukraine Opposition Vows to Continue Struggle after Yanukovich Offer." <http://www.rferl.org/content/protesters-police-tense-standoff-ukraine/25241945.html>.

- Radway, Janice. (1984) 1991. *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Radway, Janice. 1989. "Ethnography among Elites: Comparing Discourses of Power." *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 13 (2): 3–12.
- Rantapelkonen, Jari, and Mirva Salminen, eds. 2013. *The Fog of Cyber Defence*. Helsinki: National Defense University.
- Raykoff, Ivan, and Robert Deam Tobin, eds. 2007. *A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest*. London: Ashgate.
- Reid, Anna. 1997. *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Reith, John. 1924. *Broadcast over Britain*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Renz, Bettina. 2016. "Russia and 'Hybrid Warfare.'" *Contemporary Politics* 22 (3): 283–300.
- Repnikova, Maria. 2022. *Chinese Soft Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rivoal, Isabelle, and Noel B. Salazar. 2013. "Contemporary Ethnographic Practice and the Value of Serendipity." *Social Anthropology* 21 (2): 178–185.
- Roberts, Geoffrey. 2006. "History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR." *Review of International Studies* 32 (4): 703–714.
- Robinson, Matt, and Pavel Polityuk. 2013. "Hedging their Bets, Ukraine's Oligarchs Sit above the Fray." Reuters, 5 December. [www.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-oligarchs-idUKBRE9B40MQ20131205](http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-oligarchs-idUKBRE9B40MQ20131205).
- Roche, Maurice. 2002. *Megaevents and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin. 2014. "Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understanding Soft Power." *Media, War & Conflict* 7 (1): 70–84.
- Ross, Sven. 2008. *Klasstolkningar. En receptionsanalys av hur klassaspekter uppfattas i Tre kärlekar, Falcon Crest och TV-nyheter*. Stockholm: Stockholm University/JMK.
- Rossiter, Ned. 2006. *Organized Networks: Media Theory, Creative Labour, New Institutions*. Rotterdam: NAI Publishers.
- Roth, Andrew. 2021. "Ukraine's Football Kit with Map Featuring Crimea Causes Outrage in Russia." *Guardian*, 7 June. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/07/ukraine-new-football-kit-russia-national-team-shirt-annexed-crimea>.
- Roy, Ishita S. 2007. "Worlds Apart: Nation-Branding on the National Geographic Channel." *Media, Culture & Society* 29 (4): 569–592.
- Ryabinska, Natalya. 2011. "The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine: Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism." *Problems of Post-Communism* 58 (6): 3–20.



- Ryan, Johny. 2007. "‘iWar’: A New Threat, Its Convenience, and Our Increasing Vulnerability." *NATO Review* 4.
- Schleifer, Ron. 2012. "The Enemy's Image: Propaganda in the Arab-Israeli Conflict." In *Enemy Images in War Propaganda*, edited by Marja Vuorinen, 107–126. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Schoenborn, Dennis. 2013. "The Pervasive Power of PowerPoint: How a Genre of Professional Communication Permeates Organizational Communication." *Organization Studies* 34 (12): 1777–1801.
- Schröder, Kim Christian. 2000. "Making Sense of Audience Discourses: Towards a Multidimensional Model of Mass Media Reception." *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 3 (2): 233–258.
- Schudson, Michael. 1982. "The Politics of Narrative Form: The Emergence of News Conventions in Print and Television." *Daedalus* 111 (4): 97–112.
- Schudson, Michael. 1994. "Question Authority: A History of the News Interview in American Journalism, 1860s–1930s." *Media, Culture & Society* 16:565–587.
- Schudson, Michael. 2005. "News as Stories." In *Media Anthropology*, edited by Eric W. Rothenbuhler and Mihai Coman, 121–128. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Schutz, Alfred. (1932) 1980. *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. London: Heinemann Educational Books.
- Searle, John. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Soules, Marshall. 2015. *Media, Persuasion and Propaganda*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Sparks, Colin. 1998. *Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media*. London: Sage.
- Stade, Ronald. 2017. "Introduction: The Social Life of Contentious Concepts." *Conflict and Society* 3 (1): 73–77.
- Ståhlberg, Per. 2017. "Från marknadsföring till propagandakrig." *Ikaros, tidskrift om människan och vetenskapen* 2:37–39.
- Ståhlberg, Per, and Göran Bolin. 2015. "Nationen som vara och gemenskap: Identitet, agens och publik i nationsmarknadsföring." *Nordisk Östforum* 29 (3): 289–312.
- Ståhlberg, Per, and Göran Bolin. 2016. "Having a Soul or Choosing a Face? Nation Branding, Identity and Cosmopolitan Imagination." *Social Identities* 22 (3): 274–290.
- Stark, David, and Verena Paravel. 2008. "PowerPoint in Public: Digital Technologies and the Morphology of Demonstration." *Theory, Culture & Society* 25 (5): 30–55.
- Stepinska, Agnieszka. 2010. "9/11 and the Transformation of Globalized Media Events." In *Media Events in a Global Age*, edited by Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz, 203–213. London: Routledge.

- Stepnisky, Jeffrey. 2020. "Staging Atmosphere on the Ukrainian Maidan." *Space and Culture* 23 (2): 80–97.
- Stolyarchuk, Bozhena. 2013. "A Brandless Country." *Kyiv Weekly* 18:3.
- Strömbäck, Jesper. 2008. "Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 133:228–246.
- Sukhov, Oleg. 2015. "Protesting Putin: Kremlin Starts Two-War Strategy in Syria, Ukraine." *Kyiv Post*, 1 October. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/protesting-putin-kremlin-starts-two-war-strategy-in-syria-ukraine-399117.html>.
- Surowiec, Pawel. 2016. *Nation Branding, Public Relations and Soft Power*. London: Routledge.
- Surowiec, Pawel. 2017. "Post-Truth Soft Power: Changing Facets of Propaganda, Kompromat, and Democracy." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 18 (3): 21–27.
- Surowiec, Pawel, and Ilan Manor, eds. 2021. *Public Diplomacy and the Politics of Uncertainty*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sveriges Television. 2013. "Det liknar en revolution." *SVT Nyheter*, 1 December. <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/utrikes/hundratuserentals-protesterar-i-kiev>.
- Szostek, Joanna. 2014. "The Media Battles of Ukraine's EuroMaidan." *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media* 11:1–19.
- Szostek, Joanna. 2018. "News Media Repertoires and Strategic Narrative Reception: A Paradox of Dis/belief in Authoritarian Russia." *New Media & Society* 20 (1): 68–87.
- Taylor, Charles. 2002. "Modern Social Imaginaries." *Public Culture* 14 (1): 91–124.
- The Telegraph*. 2016. "Eurovision 2016: Furious Russia Demands Boycott of Ukraine over Jamala's 'Anti-Kremlin' Song." 16 May. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/15/eurovision-2016-furious-russia-demands-boycott-of-ukraine-over-j/>.
- Thomas, William I., and Dorothy S. Thomas. 1928. *The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs*. New York: A. A. Knopf.
- Todorov, Tzvetan. 1969. "Structural Analysis of Narrative." *Novel: A Forum of Fiction* 3 (1): 70–76.
- Törnquist-Plewa, Barbara, and Yuliya Yurchuk. 2019. "Memory Politics in Contemporary Ukraine: Reflections from the Postcolonial Perspective." *Memory Studies* 12 (6): 699–720.
- Tribe, Laurence H. 1985. "Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?" *Harvard Law Review* 98 (3): 592–621.
- Tsybulska, Liubov. 2020. "Ukraine Uncovers Russian Propaganda: Will the Center for Countering Disinformation Succeed?" Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 3 November. <https://uacrisis.org/en/tsentr-iz-protydiyi-dezinformatsiyi>.

- Tufte, Edward R. 2003. *The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint*. Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press.
- Tumber, Howard, and Frank Webster. 2006. *Journalists under Fire: Information War and Journalistic Practices*. London: Sage.
- Turner, Victor, and Edith Turner. 1978. *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ukraine Crisis Media Center. 2017. "What Hindered the Coloring of a Soviet Monument into a Rainbow in Kyiv." 2 May. <https://uacrisis.org/en/55918-soviet-monument-rainbow>.
- Umland, Andreas. 2019. "Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the 'Azov' Battalion in 2014." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31 (1): 105–131.
- Umland, Andreas, and Anton Shekhovtsov. 2014. "Ukraininskie pravye radikaly, evrointegratsiya i neofashistskaya ugroza." *Polit.ru*, 21 May. <http://polit.ru/article/2014/05/21/ukraine/>.
- van Dijck, José, Thomas Poell, and Martijn de Waal. 2018. *The Platform Society: Public Values in a Connected World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Gennep, Arnold. 1909. *The Rites of Passage*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Van Ham, Peter. 2001. "The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation." *Foreign Affairs*, 2–6.
- Ventsel, Andreas, Sten Hansson, Mari-Liis Madisson, and Vladimir Sazonov. 2021. "Discourse of Fear in Strategic Narratives: The Case of Russia's Zapad War Games." *Media, War & Conflict* 14 (1): 21–39.
- Verón, Eliseo. 2014. "Mediatization Theory: A Semio-Anthropological Approach." In *Mediatization of Communication*, edited by Knut Lundby, 163–172. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Volcic, Zala. 2008. "Former Yugoslavia on the World Wide Web: Commercialization and the Branding of Nation-states." *International Communication Gazette* 70 (5): 395–413.
- Volcic, Zala. 2012. "Branding Slovenia: 'You Can't Spell Slovenia without Love.'" In *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the "New" Europe*, edited by Nadia Kaneva, 147–167. New York: Routledge.
- Volcic, Zala, and Mark Andrejevic. 2011. "Nation Branding in the Era of Commercial Nationalism." *International Journal of Communication* 5:598–618.
- Voronova, Liudmila. 2017. "Gender Politics of the 'War of Narratives': Russian TV News in the Times of Conflict in Ukraine." *Catalan Journal of Communication and Cultural Studies* 9 (2): 217–235.
- Voronova, Liudmila. 2020. "Between Dialogue and Confrontation: Two Countries—One Profession Project and the Split in Ukrainian Journalism Culture." *Central European Journal of Communication* 13 (1): 24–30.

- Voronova, Liudmila, and Andreas Widholm. 2019. "Broadcasting against the Grain: The Contradictory Roles of RT in a Global Media Age." In *Transnational Media: Concepts and Cases*, edited by Suman Mishra and Rebecca Kern-Stone, 207–213. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
- Vuletic, Dean. 2018. *Postwar Europe and the Eurovision Song Contest*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Vuorinen, Marja, ed. 2012. *Enemy Images in War Propaganda*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Wagnsson, Charlotte, and Costan Barzanje. 2021. "A Framework for Analysing Antagonistic Narrative Strategies: A Russian Tale of Swedish Decline." *Media, War & Conflict* 14 (2): 239–257.
- Walker, Vivian S. 2015. *State Narratives in Complex Media Environments: The Case of Ukraine*. Case 331. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University.
- Wallace, Anthony. 1966. *Religion: An Anthropological View*. New York: Random House.
- Wikicitynomika. 2014. *Guiding Principles of Ukrainian Tourism Brand*. Kyiv: National Agency for Tourism and Resorts. [http://prohotelia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ukraine\\_tourist\\_brand\\_brandbook.pdf](http://prohotelia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ukraine_tourist_brand_brandbook.pdf).
- Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. "Putting 'Traditional Values' into Practice: The Rise and Contestation of Anti-Homo Propaganda Laws in Russia." *Journal of Human Rights* 13 (3): 363–379.
- Williams, Raymond. (1958) 1963. *Culture and Society 1780–1950*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
- Williams, Raymond. 1976. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London: Fontana.
- Wolczuk, Kataryna. 2000. "History, Europe and the 'National Idea': The 'Official' Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine." *Nationalities Papers* 28 (4): 671–694.
- Woolley, Samuel C., and Philip N. Howard. 2019. "Introduction: Computational Propaganda Worldwide." In *Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media*, edited by Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, 3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wright, Charles R. 1959. *Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective*. New York: Random House.
- Yablokov, Ilya. 2015. "Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT)." *Politics* 35 (4): 301–315.
- Yablokov, Ilya, and Precious Chatterjee-Doody. 2022. *Russia Today and Conspiracy Theories: People, Power and Politics on RT*. London: Routledge.
- Yates, JoAnne, and Wanda Orlikowski. 2007. "The PowerPoint Presentation and Its Corollaries: How Genres Shape Communicative Action in Organisations."

In *Communicative Practices in Workplaces and the Professions: Cultural Perspectives on the Regulation of Discourse and Organisations*, edited by Mark Zachry and Charlotte Thralls, 67–92. Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing.

Yekechyk, Serhy. 2015. *The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yurchuk, Yuliya. 2021. “Historians as Activists: History-Writing in Times of War; the Case of Ukraine in 2014–2018.” *Nationalities Papers* 49 (4): 691–709.