

INTRODUCTION

Transpacific Cold War Formations and the Question of (Un)Redressability

Imperialism cannot be overcome by another imperialism, nor can it be brought to justice by one.

Takeuchi Yoshimi, "Kindai no chōkoku"

Justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical or political concept, opens up for *l'avenir* the transformation, the recasting or refounding of law and politics... Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is unrepresentable, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history.

Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'"

What returns to us in the wake of the scene of world order governed by restored hegemony is a political logic that we are all too familiar with and which develops in the very heart of democracies: that of enlightened despotism.

Jacques Rancière, "Overlegitimation"

One of the twentieth century's cultural responses to wars, military aggression, and other egregious violations of human lives and the international order has been the administration of transitional justice. The military tribunals, state apologies, corporate reparations, and more recently, truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), all intended for both international and domestic audiences, have offered different modalities for redressing past injustices.¹ With regard to World War II, the Nuremberg Military Trials are most commonly known to have set new conventions for prosecuting such heinous acts as genocide and abuse

of war prisoners under the judicial concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. On the Asia-Pacific front, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946–1948; IMTFE or Tokyo War Crimes Trial, hereafter), a counterpart to the Nuremberg Trials, adjudicated on Japanese “crimes against peace” of conspiring to wage a war of aggression (Class A). Prosecution of “conventional war crimes” and “crimes against humanity” included military atrocities, civilian massacres, and abuses against POWs and other internees (Class B and C). Numerous local war crimes trials also took place independent of the IMTFE at various locales where Japanese troops had surrendered.

Reparations for Japanese aggression and war crimes—including civilian forced labor, the maltreatment of Allied POWs, and other war-related damages between 1941 and 1945—have been regarded as officially but arguably prematurely and insufficiently resolved by the multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 (official name, Treaty of Peace with Japan), which was signed by forty-nine nations, who thereby relinquished rights to further reparations.² The Southeast Asian nations that suffered immeasurable losses from Japan’s military invasion and aggression in war—including Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Vietnam—four postcolonial states that achieved at least nominal independence shortly before or after the end of World War II—did not or only reluctantly agreed to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty; but each obliged Japan to offer formal state reparations through treaties that came into force during the 1950s.³ The San Francisco Peace Treaty and other normalization treaties and official agreements signed bilaterally over the Cold War decades—between Japan and Cambodia (1950), the Republic of China (1952, nullified after 1972), the Republic of Korea (1965), Singapore (1967), U.S.-Micronesia (1969), the People’s Republic of China (1972), and more—are considered to have resolved the basic terms of reparations, at least at the state-to-state level, through economic aid, supplies, services, and other forms.

The architecture of postwar settlement, which was arranged during the early-to-middle years of the Cold War, has to this day been steadfastly upheld by the signatory governments. This is not to say that the initial terms of settlement were uncritically accepted. Numerous important archival studies have shown that the Allied nations were far from unanimous in supporting the United States’ leniency toward Japan and its interest in rebuilding Japan as the major bulwark against Communism in the region. The Soviet Union, Australia, and the Republic of China, among others, questioned U.S. dominance and maneuvering over the IMTFE. Representatives of many Asian

nations, especially the Philippines, resented concessions forced upon the less powerful, newly developing postindependence states with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.⁴ While several European countries made reparations cases for the assets they had held in China but were lost due to the Japanese military invasion, the two emerging regimes representing the people of China, the Republic of China (1912–) and the People’s Republic of China (1949–), which had been at war against Japan, were excluded from the treaty; their reparations had to be settled through the subsequent bilateral negotiations and agreements.⁵ Strong opposition within Japan saw the San Francisco Peace Treaty as one-sided in its intensification of the Cold War and proclaimed in its stead a nonalignment position through the “four peace principles” of “no rearmament, no post-treaty U.S. military forces in Japan, an overall as opposed to separate peace, and permanent neutrality in the Cold War.”⁶ South Korea’s negotiations with Japan over terms of the 1965 Basic Treaty were distinctive and particularly contentious because its status as a former Japanese colony (1910–1945) ineluctably brought international attention to the question of colonial restitution. Moreover, because many of the reparations were aimed predominantly at stimulating industrialization and economic development, corruption and plutocracy involving state leaders and multinational corporations prevented a large portion of the already compromised war indemnity from reaching individual victims.⁷ Contentions and contradictions from the earlier postwar settlement thus remained an undercurrent for radical politics in many Asian nations, especially during the 1960s anti-Vietnam War protest and prodemocracy, antidictatorial movements in the successive decades.

Still, it was not until the 1990s that calls for redress took on a renewed and intensified international visibility and extensiveness. Demands for new and additional reparations in recent decades have involved multiple public venues and found different forms of expression in juridical, administrative, and legislative channels. Since 1999 the demands for redress, apologies, and reparations from the Japanese government and corporations have explicitly and vigorously involved the U.S. courts, American legislatures, and community politics. They have also incited many major public controversies through various cultural media such as museums, film, fiction, historians’ debates, and Internet activism. What is the significance of such contestations over previously concluded adjudication and reparations? What distinguishes redress activism that emerged during the post-Cold War years from earlier ones, and why do the differences matter? In what ways do the post-1990s developments challenge or not challenge prevailing memories and understandings about the war and its aftermath?

Settling accounts of wars involves more than calculating the losses and damages brought on by the defeated regime's aggression. Reckoning with the costs of hostility, postwar settlements also performatively define the war's meaning for the postbelligerence world. They offer answers to questions about the war's origin; how it was fought; by, with, and against whom; according to what periodization; for what purposes; and ultimately for whose and what justice. In observing post-Cold War attempts to "redress Cold War redress," so to speak, it is important to note that to challenge previously agreed upon terms of settlement is more than an act of correcting initial miscalculations. It calls into question the very cultural assumptions, intellectual premises, and relations of power, according to which history and its meanings have been narrated and accepted as truth. The resilience of the earlier adjudication and reparations arrangements notwithstanding, the post-Cold War moment in Asia and the Pacific appears to have brought forth significant changes to the ways in which the war and its trajectories have previously been known—or not known—to us. The culture of redress at the new century's turn thus calls our attention to the fact that the discourse on historical justice is inseparable from how we understand the region's modernity, liberalism, history of colonialism, nationalism, and decolonization.

The upsurge in yearning for justice concerning the Asia-Pacific War is by no means an isolated phenomenon. The decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union was a period of adjustment on a global scale of political-economic alignments, sense of belonging, and the epistemic foundations of the post-World War II order. Not only did the rebirth of Germany in 1989 necessitate new terms of reconciliation. The post-Cold War adjustment furthermore led to reevaluating the master narrative of World War II memories and the postwar national histories it authenticated. The 1995 milestone commemoration of the Vel d'Hiv Jewish roundup, followed by the famous prosecution of the Vichy regime's high official Maurice Papon, on charges of crimes against humanity, ushered in a full reassessment of the French state's accountability with regard to the pan-European Nazi Holocaust, challenging the post-World War II narrative of the French "resistance." Because Papon was also known for his role as police prefect in Algeria (1949–1958), and as the Paris police chief who ordered the 1961 roundup of over five thousand Algerians and other migrants which resulted in an estimated two hundred civilian deaths, the French reassessment of its accountability simultaneously evoked memories of the Algerian War and the legacy of colonialism. Not only could World War II no longer be remembered through the binary of

resisters versus collaborators. Much like the post-Cold War politics of remembering Hiroshima's atom bombing which I had also observed, the shift in the French discourse on historical justice marks a certain postcolonial condition in which any challenge to the orthodoxy of World War II remembering cannot but conjure up memories of colonial violence and challenges to present political and economic asymmetries rooted in the past. At the same time, as the transnational feminist scholar Fatima El-Tayeb reminds us: the "connection between colonial and metropolitan violence that Papon personified" is "persistently suppressed in European discourse."⁸ The post-1990s redress culture focusing on the Asia-Pacific War cannot be grasped apart from such a global milieu and its critique.

To capture the hemispheric reach of the political and epistemic shifts that seem to have taken place largely during the 1990s, I name that historicized historical moment the "post-Cold War." Such a nomenclature immediately proves strained when considering how U.S. foreign policy experts seem vexed when they ponder whether the post-Cold War era of unipolar U.S. dominance might have been short lived and, when they confront the possibility that the Cold War might have returned when faced with the obviously resurgent Chinese military and economic might.⁹ The term, moreover, reflects a geographical provincialism. To denote the period after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall as the "end" of the Cold War pertains only to the Western Hemisphere's temporality. The division of Korea into two political regimes persists as a regional cold war reality which remains as a legacy of the Korean War, the "hot" civil war. With respect to postwar settlement and normalization, Russia and North Korea remain two countries that have not signed full-fledged peace treaties with Japan. What appears to be history's telos, then, might be more appropriately understood as a structural cessation, a moment of rupture in the way we live through the continuing post-World War II/Cold War order. Rather than formal dissipation of the binary antagonism, the 1990s Cold War hiatus might best be posited as an epistemic rupture. It is at this critical juncture that the earlier unfulfilled, interrupted, or aborted attempts at transitional justice have resurfaced and become remobilized.

The twentieth century's reparations and adjudication efforts were in large measure a global Cold War enterprise, in the sense that they were pursued by States as primary agents with their territorially bound nationalist historical sensibilities, which were at the same time regimented by the U.S.- or Soviet-led East and West blocs. In contrast, redress and reparations demands at the twenty-first century's end increasingly attend to more than

the injury brought on by one nation against another. They have increasingly foregrounded losses that have been left unaddressed by their victims' peripheral status within the national community, previously marginalized by imperial policies, during the war, or in the process of decolonization. More often than not, those who assert their rights to reparations have had to struggle against their own governments and official policies while relying on subnational and supranational spaces where alternative discursive parameters have allowed such juridico-historical claims to be heard. The emergent redress efforts have thus begun to seek not an international but transnational historical justice.

Furthermore, while state apparatuses necessarily present reparations demands and settlements as reflective of the collective will of a nation-state, understandings about historical justice have not been shared or pursued uniformly within national borders. Deep schisms run through not only national communities on the question of historical accountability, victimization, and loss. In so many cases the primary agent-subjects of post-Cold War redress culture have also been gendered and racialized minorities, colonial and transcolonial subjects, migrants and diasporic peoples, so-called collaborators, and the economically and politically disfranchised—namely subjects ambiguously or multiply positioned by their national and ideological affiliations who have had often precarious relations to the national polity and its free market.¹⁰ Memories of war and its aftermaths remembered by the newly politicized subjects of the postnineties redress culture have thus increasingly become transborder. Even in the early eighties, as I have observed in earlier works, presentiments of change began to unleash previously untold stories of loss, violence, betrayal, unlikely alliances, alternative and fluid identities, and even hopes, which have long been suppressed or marginalized within the national and global historical narratives that have dominated most of the post-World War II decades.¹¹ This shift has critical ramifications on the politics of knowledge production, the book's primary concern.

To put it differently, the post-1990s redress culture highlights the inability of the State to fully represent its own subjects. It newly articulates the idea that the rights to reparations neither originate in nor are protected by the State. The State-centered argument that the reparation issues pertaining to Japan's war of aggression were resolved at least legally by postwar arrangements, mentioned above, has been the foremost obstacle to virtually all ongoing legal battles for new or additional reparations from the Japanese government and corporations. This globally sustained official position has

preempted judicial solutions. Increasingly, activism that seeks to obtain belated reparations for the violence long forgotten by Cold War historiography has advanced the juridical argument that, even in those cases where standing international treaties have relinquished the government's rights to reparations, such state-to-state settlements do not preclude individuals' legal rights to compensation.¹² The interpretive schism in juridical views reflects the intellectual and ideological contestation over the State-mediated reparations and other conventions of international order that have contained claims of historical justice in previous decades. At the same time, transnational, post-Statist redress has become an integral part of the turn-of-the-century global political economy and its judicialization. In the global judicialization process, the transnational capital, often armored with powerful corporate legal teams, can also extend its reach over state sovereignty. Paralleling such developments, some of the new redress demands have been pushed into the privatized realm of moral accountability.¹³

Cold War Ruins concerns just such critical and not-so-uniform historical sensibilities, transnationality, and the emergent knowledge that the post-1990s redress culture has elicited as its own condition of possibility. The efforts to repair the wounds of past violence and the manner in which such reparations are sought are intimately tied to questions of society's vision for its future, how it envisages this future within the broader landscape of collective alliances, and what political subjects will be integral to this process. *Cold War Ruins* argues therefore that redress and the broader discourse on violence and justice of which it is a part are inseparable from the (re)constitution of self, sociality, and history. To the extent that the post-1990s discourse on historical justice disturbs the normativity of modern nation-states and their authentic belonging, the heated public debates and the memories of violence within redress culture have necessarily been transnational. Here, transnationality means much more than mere movements across nation-state borders or exchanges among multiple national actors and locations. It comprises insurgent memories, counterknowledges, and inauthentic identities that have been regimented by the discourse and institutions centering on nation-states. Transnationality, in other words, points to the presence of excess in the hegemonic post-World War II/Cold War epistemic and material formations.¹⁴

Not surprisingly, therefore, many postnineties redress cases and the memories of violence they evoke have instigated intense cultural struggles—or what some have called “culture wars”—over the question of what constitutes the authentic contours of national, gender, racial, and other important

organizing categories. It goes without saying that “culture wars” does not refer to a Huntington-like clash between two or more discrete and mutually exclusive cultural entities or value systems. While they are symptoms of old and new colonial-modern contradictions of capitalism, they cannot be reductively considered surrogate class wars. Rather, “culture wars” symptomatically manifests the contradictions of capitalist colonial modernity in which capital’s transgressive nature and disregard for normative identities imperils the State’s function to discipline and regulate surplus populations—in other words, the State’s desire to protect “the sanctity of ‘community,’ ‘family,’ and ‘nation,’” to borrow from the sociologist Roderick A. Ferguson.¹⁵

Specifically, the book situates the failure of transitional justice at the threshold of U.S. Cold War ascendancy and the Japanese empire’s collapse. It argues that the post-1990s redress culture centering on the discourse on Japanese imperial violence contains profound critiques of the way the transpacific arrangement of Cold War justice has set the parameters of what can be known as violence and whose violence, on which bodies, can be addressed and redressed. As will be discussed in the following pages, the redress culture since the end of the Cold War cannot be understood adequately unless we take into consideration the *longue durée* of violence as the anthropologist Allen Feldman has done provocatively in another context.¹⁶ Moreover, recent works in American Cold War studies have stressed that U.S. foreign policies during these decades not only aimed to contain the Communist advance; crucially for our context, they also undercut anticolonial and other struggles for a radically transformed world order that was to come. This post-World War II containment of decolonization, as Randall Williams has shown with immense insight, is inseparable from the then emerging international human rights protocols. The secret intimacy Williams exposed between the Declaration of Universal Human Rights and containment of anticolonial struggles and aspirations is one that also haunts many ongoing projects for historical justice.¹⁷

It is my contention that redress demands of the past two decades can and should be understood as part of a continuing struggle over still powerful political, legal, and intellectual Cold War formations. As a Cold War trace, the Asia-Pacific redress culture conjures up the specter of the postwar arrangements that came into existence during the early Cold War years, while signaling the possibilities of moving beyond its recalcitrant legacies. More than a study of individual war reparations cases, *Cold War Ruins* explores the ways in which some of the central redress debates have been figured

through their traversals across Asia and the Pacific Islands, with each constituting critical sites of transborder memories, newly politicized political subjects, and transpacific critiques of the foundational collusion of law, geopolitics, and historical knowledge.

Repoliticizing Justice

Cold War Ruins makes five general observations with respect to the intimate relations among justice, violence, and the sovereign. Primarily, the book argues that the project for historical justice in the Asia-Pacific region needs to be situated within the *longue durée* of decolonization. As I hope to demonstrate, redress and adjudication cases emerging in the post-Cold War years cannot be grasped adequately without acknowledging the long history of political and social engagements with the post-World War II institutional architectures of transitional justice. It is through various oppositional challenges to the structure of Cold War neocolonial ordering that a certain loss came to be perceived as a loss deserving redress. This decolonizing approach will allow us to see that the pursuit of historical justice and redress could not have begun without the unrelenting history of social activism, even in its apparent failures and historical invisibility. Such earlier moments of justice—whether failed, accomplished, interrupted, or partial—have all contributed to shaping the institutional structure and culture of postnineties redress.

Central to the book's decolonizing approach is the idea that the universalism of rights, liberty, justice, and the concept of the human they underwrite are enmeshed in a geohistorical politics of knowledge. The cultural theorist Lisa Lowe, among others, identifies what she calls the "economy of affirmation and forgetting" in the Euro-American political philosophy's formalization of modern humanism.¹⁸ As Lowe succinctly puts it: "Colonial labor relations on the plantations in the Americas were the conditions of possibility for European philosophy to think the universality of human freedom, however much freedom for colonized people was precisely foreclosed within that philosophy" (193). This economy of "affirmation and forgetting" further lends itself to the uneven geographical imaginary which maps out the modern world into those cultural spaces that are assumed to have progressed into embracing modern humanism and those that have not.¹⁹ It is also against and through this association of geography and culture that the viability of human rights practices is measured and explained. The critical legal scholar Leti Volpp questions, for instance, the asymmetrical ways in

which the international women's human rights regime, while blaming religious culture for violence against Muslim women, does not similarly link the Christian far right's violations against sexual minorities and the exercise of reproductive rights to particular cultural beliefs and practices.²⁰ Violations and violence against women that take place in the United States, moreover, are hardly considered a human rights issue. While constituting subjects of good will who can act through their empathetic identification with the suffering of others, the women's human rights regime nevertheless tends to locate women in need of rescue as victimized exclusively by patriarchal culture, religion, or the polity to which they belong, while leaving the human rights law and practice unmarked by their cultural, racial, national, and geographical affiliations. The discourse on gender justice and the universal humanism of which it is a part center abstracted individuals as normatively free and modern subjects through such dialectics.

The critique of asymmetries as seen above exposes the epistemic violence of the universalist human rights discourse and the way it institutes the intimate relation between power/law and knowledge. It unveils that the unevenness of the human rights regime may not stem from the differential *application* of human rights law, as often assumed, but its discursive logic and assumptions. To be sure, the idea that human rights originated in the West made cultural relativists suspicious of its application to the other parts of the world. But the problem of unevenness derives from not only the provincial origin of human rights discourse, but also the assumptions of its universal applicability and translatability. Such universalism makes it possible to blame factors deemed particular to specific geohistorical and cultural locations for the failure of human rights enforcement. The common assumption is that, if indeed it were applied in a truly universal manner without the encumbrance of—mostly non-Western—cultural impediments and mistranslations, international human rights law can do only good. The global telos of human rights, then, leads to the pernicious, historically and geographically rooted asymmetries between universalism and particularism, such as the one we have known for some time as Orientalism. Critical reflections on the universalist extension and enforcement of human rights as a regime necessarily beg the question of knowledge production. We need to ask, which and whose sufferings are known to us as human rights violations, and for whom and for which suffering is human rights justice practiced? Who has the power to represent them legitimately? Redress activism that exploits the hegemonic power of universal human rights discourse must thus negotiate between, on the one hand, the global visibility and authen-

ticity the discourse renders to the vulnerable and the victimized and, on the other hand, the geohistorically rooted contradictions of modern humanism and its universalism.

Second, *Cold War Ruins* considers the predicaments of instrumentalized justice and their implications on the practice and subject of redress, apology, and reparations. In large part inspired by the TRC in post-Apartheid South Africa and the two international military tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, much has been written over the last twenty years about various cases of TRCs, war crimes courts, restitutions, and other forms of transitional justice for postdictatorial, postconflict societies. The pursuit of justice is often advocated to mollify unsettled sentiments and volatile memories of traumatic pasts that might lead to future conflicts, disorder, and cycles of vengeance. While some are more cautious than others about the premature foreclosure such pursuits could bring to overcoming the past, scholars of transitional justice tend to see their merits for ushering in reconciliation, harmony, and normalcy.²¹ In contrast, Jacques Derrida famously warned against the global exportation and proliferation of an “industry of forgiveness” that utilized a Judeo-Christian formula to produce an institutionalized language of reconciliation.²² State-sponsored reconciliation, according to his view, instrumentalizes forgiveness in exchange for legitimating the sovereign State and the suprastate institutions that oversee the process of reconciliation and amnesty.

Insofar as redress is pursued as a politics of recognition and State-mediated redistribution, apologies, compensations, and even forgiveness for historical injustices become converted into objects of equitable exchange within institutionalized spheres.²³ One is not hard put to find instances in which justice was easily instrumentalized in given political, juridical, and other spheres. During the immediate post-9/11 months, when the U.S.-led war machine acted as the sovereign subject of justice to save Afghani women from the Muslim fundamentalists’ abuse of women’s rights, the Feminist Majority Foundation also became the subjects of war and bolstered the home front through the discourse of gender justice.²⁴ The U.S. Feminist Majority’s assimilation to the state policy was possible because its agenda fit the latter’s liberal language of equality, freedom, individual rights, and parity. Historical dispossession, however, is not the same as inequity and unfairness in a given collective whole. The quest for historical justice must then be theorized at least provisionally as that which is heterogeneous and unassimilable to the institutional, often State-centered language of distribution, equity, and just decisions.

Borrowing from Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida aligned the notion of justice with absolute alterity—the Other and the Future (*l'avenir*, “to come”).²⁵ Justice conceived as an alterity to existing law, rules, and rights becomes an aporia, or a kind of “undecidability” that is different from simply oscillating between different options. For Derrida, justice is realized in the moment this aporia deconstructs the political and judicial. The experience of justice must then be sought in aporia itself. In fact, we have always possessed our own familiar images of justice that are at once within and outside the existing realm of law and politics. Popular superheroes and heroines must always present themselves as anonymous and superhuman because the justice they embody, like Walter Benjamin’s divine violence, is not meant to be assimilable to secular politics, law, language, or the existing social apparatuses and identities. The figures of modern superheroes and heroines who appear against the backdrop of monopoly capitalism and malfunctioning representative democracy generate small catastrophes in various places as they expose injustices that cannot be heard within given corrupt political systems or legal procedures. Usually our superheroes and heroines live ordinary bourgeois lives. Masked and anonymous, they sometimes appear to be among our neighbors and friends, yet their identities are never fully disclosed. True heroes and heroines of justice must thus suspend their worldly affiliations and desires. They are forever placed in a state of suspension between their otherworldly, superhuman power (read justice as absolute alterity) and their secular desires toward specific significant others (read justice’s assimilation to the existing process of politicization, instrumentalization, and institutionalization).

The true subject of justice is thus left in a state of suspension. The superheroes and heroines have not always occupied the position of justice’s sovereign but have stood by its side, remaining no more than its “ally.”²⁶ However, the fact that the experience of justice must remain beyond law, as Derrida would have it, is not tantamount to their nonaction. It does not mean to opt out of the existing realm of politics, law, and human rights regimes. For justice’s otherness—as either the aborted or that which is “to come”—can only be known as a threshold at a moment when one confronts the limits of a given language of adjudication, reconciliation, and representations. The subject of our transborder redress culture, then, must first subject itself to the available juridical, legislative, and other processes to be reckoned as a legitimate speaking subject; but in doing so, whether in victory or defeat, it also exposes what is left of justice that defies the instrumentalization and the assimilation into the hegemonic order of knowledge.

In Derrida's words, "Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is unrepresentable, but it is the chance of the event and the condition of history."²⁷

Transitional justice, moreover, has tended to focus on how to manage disturbing pasts and to secure the globalized system of liberal economy. My investigation will attend to what Allen Feldman saw as "post-violence reason" specific to post-World War II/Cold War transitional justice and the problematic ways it has shaped the knowledge about the history prior to, during, and after the Asia-Pacific War. Feldman problematized the ways in which the spectacularization and moralization of the medico-therapeutic ideas of "trauma," prevailing at the post-Apartheid South African TRC, generated the sense of a clean break between the past and present. By defining "post-violence reason" as deriving from "a moment in which reason divides itself in two, exiling its double through convenient periodization" while producing moral oppositions between the two periods, Feldman provocatively asks: "If traumatic intrusion presumes a non-traumatized prior self that was not disfigured, how is the imputed homeostatic concept of the state of self and society prior to traumatic intrusion reconciled with what we know of colonial and postcolonial histories, the *longue durée* of structural violence of racial, gender, sexual, and ethnic inequities, the historical norm and routine of Walter Benjamin's state of emergency?"²⁸

This leads to the third major observation I wish to make in *Cold War Ruins* with regards to why and how justice needs to be urgently repoliticized and dejudicialized. The global rush toward juridical forms of redress and reconciliation may well be seen as a symptom of the pervasive retraction in liberal societies of the political that takes the form of parapolitics. The Marxist critic Slavoj Žižek saw parapolitics as "the attempt to de-antagonize politics by formulating the clear rules to be obeyed so that the agonistic procedure of litigation does not explode into politics proper."²⁹ In relation to the disavowal of "the proper logic of political antagonism" in the modern history of political thought, Žižek indicated that the apparatuses of the liberal public sphere, such as law, often depoliticize conflicts by translating them into recognizable forms of divergent interests and representative groups competing over the supposedly even terrain of an open forum. "The political struggle proper," as Žižek put it, is "never simply a rational debate between multiple interests but, simultaneously, the struggle for one's voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner."³⁰ For Žižek, depoliticization commences at the moment of recognition and legitimation. Even more illuminatingly, Jacques Rancière saw in France during the period leading up to the first Gulf War "a proliferation of legislative activity:

the creation or development of rights and norms.”³¹ He summarizes the process as follows: “To the extent that the law comes to blanket every situation and every possible dispute, it is more and more identified with a system of guarantees that are first of all guarantees of power” (253). In France and subsequently in the spectacular global alliance against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, law functioned to fulfill purposes other than justice in the sense of Kantian morality. The sovereign States, international law, and power were mobilized, as Rancière observed, according to the long-standing European way of mapping others onto colonial spatial knowledge to realize the desire of the superpower and to reconsolidate the world order prior to Iraq’s “criminal” disruption. I suggest that the “happy identification between justice and equilibrium” (255) and juridico-political realism Rancière found in eighties France is what needs to be problematized in any administering of postconflict transitional justice. To the extent that transitional justice concerns management of the destabilizing elements in postviolence societies, whether international or domestic, the concept also expects reintegration of the violence-torn society without disturbing the structure existing prior to the upheaval. In exploring the Asia-Pacific War redress culture, we need to remain suspicious of whether such judicialization of justice might indeed reflect the overall incapacitation of effective political movements in the existing public spheres.

Insofar as the practice of redress and reparations inherently holds out as its telos some form of closure, settlement, and sublation, the official acknowledgment of and accounting for past wrongs within a given institutional venue could risk relegitimizing the very establishments that offer reparations and apologies. Law’s liberal premise moreover individualizes the issues. While attending to the need to restore presupposed wholeness to the injured bodies, it falls short of addressing the enduring regime of unredressability—Feldman’s “*longue durée* of structural violence of racial, gender, sexual, and ethnic inequities”—that is indexed by the very presence of justice as trace. The notion of transitional justice, furthermore, tends to presuppose that once the societies have established liberal organizations and formal democracy they are no longer in transition. What might be a productive way to confront the predicament of transitional justice? Here, I turn once again to Rancière who offers important correctives to the logical critique of the metaphysics of modern politics, which is radically unsettling in and of itself yet tends to be unworkable for transformative politics unless situated in a specific geohistorical context. Commenting on scholarship that considers modernity’s operative terms increasingly through the

concepts of states of exception and bio/necropower, Rancière questions the absencing of arguments for politicization in such analyses.³² He amends Giorgio Agamben's provocation of the intimacy between sovereignty and life in modern politics by pointing to a way of countering what he sees as the "ontological trap" to which the biopolitical theory of the pure logics of state of exception might lead (301). Without undermining the radical core of Agamben's critique, I highlight Rancière's reminder that the metaphysical line drawn between bare life and qualified life is not inevitable or universal, but one that is *politically* constituted (and thus can be reconstituted). As Rancière puts it, "Political predicates are open predicates: they open up a dispute" (303).³³

Post-Cold War redress culture, as I hope to show throughout the book, can and ought to be seen as an integral part of the politicization of justice that "open[s] up a dispute" on the terrain of knowledge. In other words, post-Cold War redress engages in another politicization of the struggle over not only the demarcation itself between the redressable and unredressable but the very premises upon which such a line is made possible. And these premises, I suggest, need to be sought first and foremost in the geohistorical specificities of the enduring Cold War knowledge formations. This methodology, above all, will enable us to discern the makeup of the il/legibility of violence—to not only expose, but to undo the way borders are drawn between those subjects of modern humanity deserving of proper redress and those whose racial, sexual, gender, colonial, and other civilizational attributes make them inviolable and disposable, thus keeping violations against them invisible and unredressable in the realm of law and humanity. By repoliticizing the terms of redress through *and* beyond "the struggle for one's voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner," in Žižek's phrasing, the testimonials at the TRCs, courts of law, and other sites of post-Cold War redress can potentially reintroduce proper antagonism over the hard-fought questions of structural inequity, values, ethicality, and ways of being.³⁴ Put differently, the redress activism concerning the Asia-Pacific War can be productively viewed as a process of repoliticization that begins to challenge what Feldman saw as the problematic "boundary line between violence and post-violence."³⁵ Seen in this way, the post-1990s redress culture then begins to call into question the triumphalism and automatism undergirding any notion of transitional justice.

Fourth, by shedding light on Cold War knowledge production about the Asia-Pacific, *Cold War Ruins* places the inquiry in relation to the question of why and how U.S. war crimes, even when perceived as such, remain

unredressable.³⁶ In what way does the unredressability of American injustice need to be understood conjunctively as a problem inseparable from the failure to bring thoroughgoing justice to Japanese war crimes? One common answer to this question has been that transitional justice in the aftermath of World War II was no more than “victor’s justice.”³⁷ *Cold War Ruins* extends and complicates this acknowledgment by considering the oversight’s broader and longer ramifications within the American transpacific imaginary. During the U.S. military invasion and occupation of Iraq, I argued that the reason why so many U.S. war crimes, especially those in Asia, remain unredressed might be found in what can be most appropriately called the American imperialist myth of “liberation and rehabilitation.” According to this myth, the losses and damages brought on by U.S. military violence are deemed “prepaid debts” incurred by those liberated by American intervention. This myth, which presents both violence and liberation as “gifts for the liberated,” has serious implications for the redressability of U.S. military violence.³⁸ The injured and violated bodies of the liberated, I wrote at the time, do not seem to require redress according to this discourse of indebtedness, for their liberation has already served as the payment/reparation that supposedly precedes the violence inflicted upon them. This economy of debt, I further suggest, is what sustains the regime of unredressability pertaining especially to colonial injustices.³⁹

This brings me to the final general observation I wish to make in this book. Though with varying degrees, the growing critical literature on justice, redress, and reconciliation shows that there are competing notions of justice that cannot be subsumed uniformly under one overarching project. The U.S. decision to attack Afghanistan revealed how the equal-rights feminists’ idea of gender justice could be instrumentalized to support the U.S. military empire, even as it helped mobilize powerful support to end certain violence against some women. This instance revealed that universalistic gender justice is not necessarily compatible with the idea of historical justice specific to particular geopolitical wrongs. The conundrum of justice also appeared when “comfort women” redress found its articulation in the global discourse on women’s rights. When the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations began to press for an end to the impunity of gender and sexual violence against women in war and other military conflicts, they brought immediate international visibility to the wartime history of the Japanese military comfort system and created pressure on the Japanese government. Yet in that process other equally important questions asked by many feminists in Korea, the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Okinawa, and

elsewhere in Japan about the lasting colonial legacy and the state violence in the sexualized transpacific military-political-economy have been muted. Moreover, while the U.S. legislators' increasing involvement in the wartime "comfort women" issue can effectively discipline Japanese revisionist ventures, the same righteousness may inadvertently fuel the American claim to stand in as the world's adjudicator.

How are we to approach the multivalence inherent in the discourse of justice? Vigilance toward the coequality of justice is required to grasp productively the language and practice of redress that at times appears univocal with respect to ultimate objectives, while at other times setting off contradictory and even contentious visions and politics. Yet, if the idea of coequality points to the condition of cotemporaneity with a difference, merely acknowledging the simultaneous diversity of competing claims to justice will not do. These seeming antinomies, instead, call for critically situated historical thinking—that is, an ability to perceive different appeals for and failures of justice as incommensurable and yet interlinked as they have unfolded on a global scale within specific historical moments. The myriad calls for justice and their competing assertions should not and cannot be reduced to a universal global history, or sacrificed in the name of the progress of a uniform civilization and humanity. What we are asked to do, then, is to deploy what might be called a conjunctive cultural critique in order to discern the deeply entangled geohistories of violence and their shared yet localized genealogies.⁴⁰ They remain hidden in the familiar frame of knowledge with which we speak of justice.

The Cold War Frame of America's "Good War"

The United States would not stand for irresponsible meddling in Japanese industrial recovery through some "frivolous" reparations programme while she was paying out \$500,000,000 a year to get Japan on her feet again.

—George Kennan, June 3, 1948, quoted by John Price in *Oriental Canada*

Most Americans can't locate Indonesia on the map. This fact is puzzling to Indonesians, since for the past sixty years the fate of their nation has been directly tied to U.S. foreign policy.

—Barack Obama, *The Audacity of Hope*

Echoing the postnationalist turn in American studies, scholarship on Cold War U.S. politics and culture has increasingly become attentive to the intimate interplay between the international and the domestic.⁴¹ Especially

pertinent to our concern for redress's *longue durée* is the Cold War competition over racial and colonial discourse. With regard to domestic race relations, the U.S. historians Derrick Bell, Mary Dudziak, and Thomas Borstelmann, among others, have demonstrated that Cold War confrontations made the thoroughgoing realization of civil rights and the desegregation of African Americans imperative. Rather than viewing U.S. history as the fulfillment of the great American promise of liberty and equality embedded in the unfolding national essence of the republic, these scholars have shown that national security interests in the Cold War rivalry against the Soviet Union and the demand for the United States to improve its image in the eyes of the Third World and other international audiences led U.S. policy makers to cultivate and exploit racially tolerant self-portraits. This in turn produced a number of significant institutional changes, including racial desegregation and the extension of civil rights and eligibility for naturalization to racial minorities and immigrants. By exploring the Cold War dialectics between U.S. foreign policies and their often contradictory ramifications on American culture and politics, much of this scholarship has illuminated, in Christian G. Appy's apt phrasing, that "the Cold War was, as much as anything else, a competition over discourse."⁴²

If domestically, the image of racial harmony and equality was crucial, the disavowal of formal colonialism was equally critical in the international arena for winning the Cold War "competition over discourse." The American historian Jonathan Nashel put this dimension of the Cold War most succinctly: "two of the most vexing foreign policy problems facing the United States during the Cold War: how to ensure that the newly independent countries of the third world became integrated into a capitalist network of market relations, and conversely, how to prevent these desperately poor countries from becoming communist."⁴³ In her analysis of the interplay between U.S. foreign policies over the Middle East and American popular cultural production, the American studies scholar Melani McAlister focuses on the 1951 term "benevolent supremacy," coined by the right-wing politician Charles Hilliard, to understand U.S. efforts to present itself as an alternative to formal colonialism in its Middle East policy.⁴⁴ As McAlister put it, the term captured "a broadly diffused construction of the United States as a 'World Leader' that refused to behave like a colonial power" (82–83). This American self-portrait became crucial in securing its position in the Middle East. Stressing the consensual nature of American Cold War hegemony in the Middle East, she stated, "The operative terms were the American refusal of empire, the right of 'free peoples' to choose their destinies, and the

consensual partnership between U.S. power and a subordinated third world nationalism” (82).

Remarkably, recent Cold War studies that stress the productive power of international performativity and the geopolitical importance of the rhetoric of racial and colonial justice tend to overlook the transwar continuities. They pay little attention to the fact that the United States had been engaged in a similar “competition over discourse” during the war against Japan. This oversight may simply be a technical one; after all, for U.S. foreign affairs the Cold War did not start officially before 1945. And yet, this overall indifference to the racialized and anticolonial dimension of the Asia-Pacific War, of which the U.S. war against Japan was but one phase, and to how the discursive transformation during the transwar years made the postwar Americanization of racial justice possible, raises many important questions about history, the meaning of the war(s), and Japan’s significance in the production of U.S. Cold War knowledge. The Cold War Americanization of racial justice, as I will briefly consider below, would not have been as effective, if even possible, without the discursive production of the U.S. relation with the enemy of color that had earlier championed the rhetoric of racial justice. If we take into account that U.S. blueprints for the post-cease-fire world had already begun to be drawn up during the war years, we begin to realize the extent to which the U.S. ascendancy to power in the postwar world critically hinged on the Americanization of justice as it sought to settle memories of the U.S. war against Japan. It is therefore imperative that we consider the implications of not reckoning with this earlier moment of “competition over discourse” for world justice and the stakes such a critique might have in the discussion of post-1990s redress culture.

Historical studies have shown that during World War II the United States’ repudiation of the powerful rhetoric of racial emancipation, which Japan had advocated before and during the war, became a military strategic imperative. In analyzing the 1940s recruitment of Japanese American soldiers from the internment camps, T. Fujitani compellingly demonstrated the extent to which American officials paid attention to the implications the war against Japan would have on issues of race and colonialism.⁴⁵ Colleen Lye likewise pointed to Pearl Buck’s keen wartime awareness that racism was “the Achilles’ heel of U.S. military strategy against Japan.” Buck feared and publicly declared that the United States was losing the global war of propaganda vis-à-vis Japan due to American white supremacy and racism.⁴⁶ According to Lye, Buck’s concern not to lose the “hearts and minds” of nations of color in the war against Japan was by no means isolated. Moreover, as Gerald Horne

revealed in his unconventional historiography, Japan's propaganda for racial and colonial emancipation gained special verisimilitude, particularly in areas under British colonial rule.⁴⁷ What these historical accounts indicate is that the United States had been competing with Japan's own imperial modernity and its universalist assertion of racial equality and liberation from European colonialism *prior* to the Cold War campaign against the Soviet Union. To be sure, the American claim to racial freedom, democracy, and equality has a much longer and complex history: crucially, it was advanced *domestically* by relentless activism for racial justice within and against State violence and law. But the credibility of such assertions *internationally* had to be won initially during the Asia-Pacific War as a response to its racialized enemy in an explicitly racialized war. Still, most American Cold War studies do not attend to the Cold War's prehistory, during which Japan had manipulated an anticolonial and antiracist discourse in the interests of furthering its own imperial aspirations against its Euro-American counterparts. Such studies tend to locate the exploitation of the U.S. rhetoric of liberation and racial justice at a much later stage—that is, in the Cold War confrontation. The transwar significance of Japanese imperial practices in the making of Cold War America is largely lost in such accounts.

This indifference, I suggest, stems in large part from the master narrative that regards World War II as a “good war” and the powerful American political unconscious it undergirds about modernity and its belatedness in Asia. The “good war” narrative, disseminated in the Cold War years as a post-victory reprocessing of wartime propaganda, remembers that the United States fought the just war against the evil of fascism to liberate the Jews and other Europeans from the terror of Nazism. On the Pacific front, the United States fought against Japan to rightly defend “American soil” and to rescue Asia and the Pacific from Japanese aggression. Significantly, the “surprise attack” narrative on Pearl Harbor that remains the mainstay of America's just-war narrative conveniently erases the fact that Hawai'i was an American colony at the time. Such an elision disavows the history that the Japanese attack on the U.S. colonial military outpost was an instantiation of Japan's own liberal just-war propaganda for racial and anticolonial emancipation. Refiguring these and other histories, the “good war” narrative produced during the Cold War years remembers that the United States fought a just war for the liberation of the people of Asia and the Pacific region, including the Japanese themselves, from Japan's barbaric militarism and racial backwardness. Because this narrative has so powerfully shaped understandings about the U.S. war against Japan and its aftermath, the war-

time “competition over discourse” between the two countries on the issue of racial and colonial justice has easily gone unnoticed, along with what this elision meant for the postwar American self-portraiture.

Even more important for our current discussion, therefore, the “good war” narrative is not limited in its coverage to only the period of belligerency, but extends to American conduct in the war’s afterlife. The narrative recounts that Japan before the war was a nation lagging in its modern development, and that it had failed to cultivate its latent potential to embrace liberal ideals until it was vanquished and then reborn under U.S. “benevolent supremacy.” As I will discuss further in chapter 1, area studies’ anthropological knowledge about Japan produced during the transwar decade gave academic credibility to this dimension of the “good war” narrative. In the “good war” narrative, Japan was to be racially rehabilitated as a biopolitical space of American governmentality.⁴⁸ With regard to the U.S. disavowal of formal colonialism and white supremacy in the Cold War “competition over discourse,” which was aimed at an audience made up primarily of postcolonial nation-states and domestic minorities, the fact that the defeated and rehabilitated enemy was a nonwhite, non-Western nation took on special significance in a way that was unfathomable on the Atlantic front. Presenting the United States as a magnanimous victor, the “good war” master narrative lent truthfulness to the image of the United States as the benefactor of equality, freedom, and democracy to nations of color in its Cold War rivalry. Again, perceptions of how, by whom, and for what purposes the war was fought have had grave implications for how to envisage historical justice.

To this day, the Cold War narrative of the “good war” and the credibility it conferred on America’s “benevolent supremacy” in the war’s aftermath continue to find use value. Shortly after the U.S. military’s seizure of Baghdad in April 2003, the *Rocky Mountain News* featured an article on a lecture by Beate Sirota Gordon. Entitled, “Japan’s Women Could be Model in Postwar Iraq,” the article read, “Japanese women who lived through the reconstruction of their country after World War II could help the United States rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan, says the woman who helped Gen. Douglas MacArthur write the Japanese Constitution.” At the age of twenty-two, during the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945–1952), Gordon had joined the committee that drafted the Japanese Constitution and worked specifically on the women’s rights clause. According to the newspaper’s account, Gordon maintained that Japanese women who “had no rights” prior to the new Constitution are successful in “politics and business” today. As “a colored people,” Gordon reportedly noted, they could “bolster U.S. credibility with Iraqis and Afghans”

by demonstrating that the U.S. military occupation “did not run their islands into a colony.”⁴⁹ During the occupation Gordon served as an interpreter for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). She was fluent in Japanese since she had been raised in Japan prior to the war’s outbreak. She was a daughter of an accomplished Ukrainian Jewish pianist who had fled from Russia to Austria, and then to Japan in the 1920s. It is not clear whether U.S. policy makers at the time consciously intended to utilize Gordon for the management of postcolonial space. But the significance of her narrative, as well as the timeliness of its public resurgence, should be located in the discursive force the “good war” narrative continues to exert in making and justifying America’s new racialized wars. This story encapsulates the lasting performative effects of the Americanization of racial and gender justice that gained particular exigency during the U.S. occupation of Japan. Chapter 2 considers how the representation of Japanese women’s enfranchisement under the U.S.-led Allied occupation became a paradigmatic “frame of war” that continues to shape the American notion of just war.⁵⁰ As Gordon’s interview illuminates, the discourse on women’s liberation from Japanese patriarchy was an essential enabling element of the transpacific Cold War complicity in suppressing a different reordering of the decolonizing world.

Yet for such a Cold War discourse of American racial and gender justice to gain authenticity and historical verisimilitude, it also had to strategically write out another important past: the history of Japanese colonialism and U.S. advancement into the postcolonial space that emerged after the Japanese empire’s collapse. If Japan was reconstituted as the site of the “successful” American project of liberation, rehabilitation, and integration, such a depiction omitted all but the metropolitan core of the vast prewar Japanese empire. As social anthropologist Heonik Kwon aptly put it, for most of the new nation-states that emerged in the postcolonial space, “the onset of the cold war meant entering an epoch of ‘unbridled reality’ characterized by vicious civil wars and other exceptional forms of political violence” (6).⁵¹ Fierce insurgencies and armed resistance to the old and new occupying forces as well as the outbreak of civil war continued to fill the region Japan had vacated. For instance, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945 but it was not until 1949 that it received UN recognition. For the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, nine years passed between the 1945 proclamation of independence and the 1954 Geneva Accords. In China the armed conflict between the Nationalist and Communist Parties resumed immediately following Japan’s surrender and did not conclude

until the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. And the People's Republic of Korea was established as a transitional regime as early as September 1945 and drafted a radically democratic constitution but was immediately engulfed by the conflicts that developed into the Korean War.⁵² That the Korean War is remembered in the United States and Canada only as a "forgotten war" suggests the degree to which the memories of violent trajectories of postcolonial Asian nations in the immediate aftermath of World War II have been marginalized in the dominant North American geographical imaginary.⁵³

This absencing of knowledge about Asia's necrohistories is especially illuminating when considered in relationship to an anthology on violence put together by two U.S.-based anthropologists. *Violence in War and Peace: Anthology* is a compilation of cultural critiques on violence of various forms, symbolic and physical, manifest and latent. In part responding to the post-9/11 milieu, *Violence in War and Peace* makes an important intervention by urging the discipline to self-consciously foreground questions of structural violence, histories of imperialism, and such political upheavals as war, anti-colonial insurgencies, and revolution. Curiously, while the anthology covers vastly different geopolitical spaces, there are no contributions among its over fifty articles that consider violence in Asia, excepting one on South Asia.⁵⁴ In other words, the areas that appeared as postcolonies in the aftermath of Japan's defeat have been perceived for the most part as unproductive sites for anthropologically theorizing "violence in war and peace." It is certainly possible that the editors' limited scholarly network did not permit them to consider anthropological observations on violence in this region. Since anthropological studies of Asia often ask historical questions, it is also possible that they were considered less central to the discipline. Yet, given that the representation of others in the discipline of anthropology is always already a statement about the anthropologists' own cultural and ideological assumptions, and when considering that most officially recognized twentieth-century U.S. wars were fought in North and Southeast Asia, this excision is too conspicuous to be dismissed as simply a technical matter or a lack of scholarly expertise. This absence, in my view, expresses and reflects the power of the American geohistorical imaginary of Asia in which the immediate U.S. military violence may be acknowledged but also disavowed.

Christina Klein's observations on American middlebrow culture may be helpful in understanding the historical context behind this lacuna in American anthropological knowledge.⁵⁵ In contrast to previous scholarship that emphasized the "containment" side of Cold War policies, Klein underscored

the working of “integration” as an equally important U.S. Cold War project. Arguing that the idea of “containment” alone could not have mobilized the majority of Americans, Klein demonstrated that musicals, films, travel writings, and other popular texts contributed to the image of the early Cold War American presence in Asia cleansed of violence and brute force. The image of cooperation, intimacy, familial metaphors, and sentimentalism, as well as the inclusionary view of multiethnicity disseminated through these texts, made it possible for the middlebrow American to imagine Asia as integrated into Cold War America through the cultural tropes of “voluntary affiliation” (146) and positive incentives for consensus building. We could further read Klein’s discussion alongside Aimé Césaire’s historicized remark on the Cold War “Yankee risk.” Césaire famously described the emerging U.S. hegemony in the post–World War II decolonizing world as the “American domination—the only domination from which one never recovers.”⁵⁶ The “positive incentives” of the American material glamour and the romanticized visions of freedom and democracy disseminated through official venues and popular culture seized many people’s “hearts and minds.” At the same time, it is equally important not to forget that Cold War America could in fact mobilize territories in postwar Asia and the Pacific Islands without concern for consensus or integration. What became insulated from the American imaginary of a harmoniously integrated world were the struggles for and the brutal suppression of the hopes and ideals for alternative sociality, justice, and polity in the postwar, decolonizing world.

The United States has thus ascended to hegemonic power across Asia and the Pacific region through its ability to define the terms of military, racial, and gender justice in the post–World War II transitional moment. That same process also dialectically helped secure the memories and meanings of the U.S. war in the region, even as the United States and its postwar allies prepared for the new war of the American century, namely, the Cold War. The post-1990s shift in the location of redress activism, from Asia and the Pacific Islands to U.S. juridical and legislative venues, is best viewed as an instance of the Americanization of justice. This process, however, is by no means new. The Japanese postwar settlement, as I have been arguing, has always been an *American* concern.⁵⁷ As much as I am invested in the practical resolution of redress issues in Japan, *Cold War Ruins* equally explores the decisive impacts the postwar settlements in Asia have had on culture, knowledge, social identities, and global imaginaries in the United States. As Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho remind us in their path-breaking anthology on the transpacific militarized cultures and histories,

“the United States [has] defined its national interests not along the borders of the continental United States but in Asia and the Pacific.”⁵⁸ The U.S. Cold War intervention on the postwar settlement for Japan left an equally serious imprint, even in its disavowal, on American understandings of the war and its place in the world.

Most urgently, as the inter- and intra-Asia scholarship attuned to anticolonial, antiracist critique has informed us, postwar settlements during the decades following the formal cease-fire successfully managed the terms of Japanese reparations in ways that served the purpose of containing the region’s attempts at thoroughgoing decolonization.⁵⁹ The book’s following chapters will make clear how profoundly Cold War America was and remains—in its enduring transpacific epistemological and institutional legacies—implicated in this process. A geohistorically situated critique of violence and justice, as I hope to show, will reveal the Cold War complicity of the United States and Japan and its indelible traces and wounds on the region’s political and intellectual landscape. But neither the earlier formation of Cold War America nor the Americanization of post-1990s redress and reparations is reducible to a single nation or its past state policy. In exploring the transpacific traversals of redress discourse, *Cold War Ruins* hopes to demonstrate how America as a multifarious presence has shaped and will continue to shape the discursive parameters that govern what we can know and say about the history of violence and the meaning of justice. The postnineties, post-Cold War redress culture ought to be read in its relationships to such power/knowledge matrices to which the initial postwar settlement was integral.

Decolonization and Redress’s Longue Durée

The post-1990s sensibility and sociality *Cold War Ruins* examines are in many respects new and specific to their own geohistorical milieu. Yet the recent redress culture and its underlying critique of the Cold War institutional and knowledge formations have several earlier emergences and trajectories. In the remaining pages I will briefly delineate this genealogy by focusing on two key arenas of knowledge production and contestation: the histories and memories of Japan’s wartime military comfort system and the diverse and conflictual intellectual challenges to the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (IMTFE).

A quick glance at the genealogy of inter- and intra-Asia redress discourse on Japan’s military sex slavery, or the “military comfort women issue” (*jūgun ianfu mondai*), will reveal how it emerged out of the decades-long trajectories of institutional and intellectual challenges to the region’s Cold War

edifice. The issue gained international publicity in 1991 when Kim Hak-sun became the first Korean woman to publicly testify on the history of the wartime Japanese comfort system. While the wartime military comfort system had sometimes appeared in postwar memoirs, fiction, and other representations, it was not until the 1990s that a solid consensus emerged around characterizing the system as the coercive trafficking of women into sex slavery—in other words, as a violation against women's human rights. This epistemic shift was a constitutive part of the 1990s consolidation of the international protocols that have come to stipulate wartime gender and sexual violence as war crimes. The timely reception of Kim Hak-sun's testimony by wide-ranging sections of the international community was enabled to a great extent by this nineties global milieu. At the same time, however, the manifold significance of the "military comfort women issue" cannot be grasped without calling attention to the *longue durée* of redress activism and the deeper critique of post-World War II, Cold War epistemic and institutional formations that preceded and provoked the re-remembering of the Japanese military's egregious violations against women in the occupied territories.

Prior to this well-publicized moment, however, Yun Chŏng-ok, professor at Ewha Women's University, had already organized the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Korean Council, hereafter) and initiated regular survivors' street rallies in front of the Japanese Consulate General in Seoul. Kang Duk-Kyoung (Kang Tŏk-kyŏng), the author of the book's cover art, "Punish the Responsible—For Peace," was a regular rally participant. Yun had also conducted research in the late eighties on surviving women. The Korean Council and others gave support to many survivors who wished to testify to the wretched condition of the Japanese military comfort system.⁶⁰ The Korean Council's redress activism over many years initiated a series of responses in Japan: national newspapers reported on historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki's archival findings that pointed to direct military involvement in the comfort system; and a number of high-ranking Japanese government officials, including then prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi, offered formal apologies to the South as well as North Korean governments. In response to the increasing number of testimonies, then Cabinet Secretariat Kōno Yōhei issued an official press statement in 1993. This was the watershed year when nearly four decades of rule by the pro-United States Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had been continuous since 1955, came to a close. In the statement Kōno admitted to the "coercive" nature of the wartime recruitment of women into the military comfort

system and offered “apologies and remorse.” The 1993 Kōno statement was no doubt part of post–Cold War realpolitik adjustment within the bounds of the post–World War II interstate system. Serious flaws notwithstanding, the Kōno statement remains the single official position upheld even by successive revisionist cabinets and prime ministers. It should also be noted that the Kōno statement promptly made a significant impact domestically on public education; immediately following the release of the statement, all seven government-approved textbooks uniformly included descriptions of the history of Japan’s wartime military comfort system. In response, conservatives, militarists, and the far-right historical revisionists began to form a united front against this national consensus, which was emerging in the post–Cold War milieu. The Kōno statement eventually led to the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund (Josei No Tame No Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin, 1994–2007). The Korean Council, however, immediately objected to the operation of the Asian Women’s Fund, arguing that its nonjudicial, moral solution would deter the Japanese state from facing its accountability. The Korean Council’s and its supporters’ insistence on reparation in the name of the law and the State continues to pose multivalent challenges to the immunity of the previously agreed upon state-to-state normalization treaties.

At the same time, South Korea’s “comfort women” redress activism, though hardly uniform, has engaged a wide spectrum of issues concerning the region’s postwar decolonization as well as post- and neocolonial formations. As Chungmoo Choi and C. Sarah Soh have shown, in denouncing the Japanese government’s obstinate evasion of state accountability, the activism also interrogated South Korea’s patriarchal and heteronormative ideals of proper femininity that had long marginalized the survivors of the comfort system and their histories.⁶¹ Memories of Japan’s wartime military sex enslavement have also simultaneously problematized the uneven decolonization and the postcolonial continuity of violence. The more the extent and conspicuousness of the violence perpetrated by the wartime comfort system became exposed, the more serious the initial failure of the U.S.-Allied prosecution of these crimes against women began to appear.⁶² Such reflections on the earlier postwar moment further resonated with the interrogation of the continuing neocolonial U.S. military presence in the region over the past six decades. From certain feminist perspectives, especially those aligned with Korean and Korean American transnational feminist critiques, the history of Japan’s military comfort system prefigured the military camp town and other continuing structures of violence against women that have been

sustained around U.S. bases throughout the region.⁶³ Redress activism concerning the military comfort system also emerged as an integral part of the interrogation of the antidemocratic legacies of Japanese colonial modernity in Asia. Elements of the colonial regime—for example, police state apparatuses, military forces, and heteronormative, patriarchal social policies—had been put to renewed use by the postindependent, cold war surveillance state. When the late president Roh Moo-Hyun's regime (2003–2008) began to formally address the need for the Japanese government to offer state reparations and an apology to the former “comfort women,” it also echoed the growing critical reflection on the earlier regimes' insufficient dismantling of Japanese colonial legacies, which had been an effect of Cold War constraints.

Inter-Asian “comfort women” redress activism initiated by Yun and others can also be traced back to the 1970s campaign against sex tours, which was led by feminist activists in South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. This genealogy shows that the “comfort women” redress discourse is not only concerned to critique violence against women, but has addressed the problem of sexual and gendered violence as a constitutive part of postwar transpacific capitalist relations. The antisex tour movement of the seventies did not limit its campaign solely to the commercial practice of individual Japanese men buying women, but theorized the Japanese men's sex tours as an instantiation of the sexualized Japanese colonial relation and its neocolonial incarnation. In other words, the transnational feminist anti-sex tour activism censured the sexualized and classed condition of uneven inter-Asia economic development under the Cold War.⁶⁴ This and other transnational feminist networks became instrumental in organizing the 2000 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, or Women's Tribunal in short, a people's court that charged state leaders for wartime crimes against women (chapter 3).⁶⁵

Even earlier, Japan's wartime military comfort system came to the fore in negotiations for colonial reparations on the eve of the signing of the 1965 ROK-Japan Basic Treaty. The educational pamphlet issued by a group of Maoist-Leninist intellectuals at the Korea Research Institute (Chōsen Kenkyūsho) made an impassioned plea to halt the treaty's signing.⁶⁶ They saw it as leading to further entrenchment of the Cold War geopolitics that had placed Japan one-sidedly with the United States through the San Francisco Peace Treaty and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, both of which had come into force during the previous decade. Resonating with the PRC position at that time, these intellectuals problematized the ways in which the U.S.-

led Cold War political economy had been grafted onto the region's prewar Japanese colonial order and global capitalism. In their analyses, the Cold War architecture and colonial mentality as a legacy of Japanese imperialism were the two paramount impediments standing in the way of forging solidarities among the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese working people. What is most relevant to our discussion here is that this group of intellectuals and activists sought to rectify these wrongs by intervening in the question of how to narrate the past—that is, by focalizing on the production of historical knowledge. Censuring the historical memory prevailing in postwar Japan as “thieves’ memories” (100) inherited by “thieves’ offspring” (104), they recounted, in addition to the issue of military comfort system, the uneven processes of industrialization, the repression of progressive movements, and other historical sacrifices the working Korean people had to bear under Japanese colonial rule. The pamphlet concluded: “the deeds of Japanese imperialism ought to be met with some form of apology as well as reparations” (60–61). To date, this is considered one of the first explicit Japanese articulations of the concept of colonial restitution.

More recently, Itagaki Ryūta, a historical anthropologist of Korea, revisited the concept of colonial restitution in a recently published two-part essay (2005–2008). As early as the latter half of the forties, when the South Korean interim government under the Rhee Syngman regime (established in 1948) internationally insisted on participating in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, postcolonial Korean intellectuals began formulating the idea of colonial reparations from Japan as that which is “special in nature and different from the notion of war indemnity [negotiated between the victorious and the vanquished].”⁶⁷ Ultimately, South Korea was excluded from the signing of the peace treaty due to the two oppositional forces that objected to South Korean participation: Japan, which insisted that Korea had not been at war with Japan and also feared that Koreans in occupied Japan, the majority of whom were described as Communists, might gain privileges as subjects of a victorious nation; and the United Kingdom, which raised concerns that redressing Koreans for Japanese colonialism might have ramifications for its own colonies and which hoped to prevent the issue of colonial restitution from entering the stage of the peace treaty. Although it is far beyond the current study’s scope, Itagaki’s research alerts us to the importance of considering the British colonial legacies as well as the history of Anglo-Japanese interimperial alliances in shaping the postwar, postcolonial settlement in Asia. More immediately, his study identifies the way in which war reparations have in effect eclipsed colonial redress, paving the way for the

United States and its allies to act with impunity in their joint continuation of de facto colonization and neocolonization of much of Asia and the Pacific region. These and other new investigations into Japanese redress issues have recently begun to situate the shortcomings of postwar settlements ever more explicitly in relation to the overlapping and ongoing global processes of colonialism and racism.

The genealogy of “military comfort women” redress activism in Korea and Japan thus encapsulates the convergence of the multiple trajectories of critical thinking that have been calling into question Cold War institutional and epistemic structures, of which the postwar settlement was an integral part. *Cold War Ruins* considers the consensus, contentions, and negotiations over the meanings and memories of the “military comfort women” across national and other borders as paradigmatic of post-1990s redress culture. The Cold War order’s obfuscation of violence and the way it selectively addressed and redressed egregious violations during the Japanese war of aggression must then be grasped and revisited in its relationship to the way the emergent transformative possibilities were contained, precisely at the moment when it seemed that transitional justice might be attained. Crucially, the belated ways in which this particular historical injury came to be known as injury cannot but point to the lasting presence of the deeply entrenched, transnationally interlocking biopolitical normativities of capitalist colonial-modernity. Put differently, in interrogating the Cold War terms of transitional justice over half a century ago, post-1990s redress culture opens up an opportunity to critically remember earlier visions of reparations in relationship to the question of colonial extortion and the long deferral of decolonization. To paraphrase the sociologist Nakano Toshio, to query postwar Asia is to critique the continuation of colonialism and imperial geographies into the post-Cold War.⁶⁸

Rethinking “Victor’s Justice”

Along with the “military comfort women issue,” another important earlier trajectory of criticism that aided the post-1990s renewed redress culture was critical assessment of the IMTFE, or the Tokyo War Crimes Trial. While scholars differ in their assessment of the degree to which U.S. occupation policy planning for Japan remained consistent over the transwar years, experts who have examined the archival record have generally concluded that U.S. decision makers recognized the utility of retaining Emperor Hirohito for the purpose of rebuilding an anticommunist postwar Japan dur-

ing the war years, and that he was exempted from postwar prosecution for this reason.⁶⁹ Historians also agree that U.S. Cold War policy over northeast Asia initiated a decisive turn (e.g., NSC13/2, October 1948) during the IMTFE deliberations, a shift that was immediately followed by the 1949 “loss of China” to the Chinese Communist Party and the 1950 outbreak of the Korean War. Occupation policy toward Japan also became more explicitly antidemocratic and antilabor, culminating in General Douglas MacArthur’s crackdown on the February 1, 1947, General Strike and the subsequent purging of the members and supporters of Japan’s Communist Party from public offices. The U.S. occupation also remilitarized Japan through the introduction of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which was soon reorganized to form the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Paralleling the series of key decisions to remake Japan into a robust pro–United States, anticommunist regime open to free market capitalism, occupation authorities influenced the course of the IMTFE through exemption of a number of central figures from the trial, above all Kishi Nobusuke.⁷⁰ The cover-up of the Japanese Army Unit 731’s biological experiments in northeast China also took place in this context.⁷¹ Kishi, who was initially arrested on suspicion of A-class war crimes but was later released without trial, served as a high-ranking bureaucrat in Manchuria during the Asia-Pacific War. His powerful prewar transnational network of industrialists, financiers, and far-right nationalists in the region remained influential into the Cold War years. After the occupation Kishi led the pro–United States Liberal Democratic Party and as a prime minister signed the controversial 1960 United States–Japan Security Treaty. The latter formalized the military subordination of Japan, with the burden overwhelmingly carried by Okinawa, to American military and political hegemony and semi-extraterritoriality. Situated against this historical backdrop, the IMTFE and its legacy might well be assessed as showcases for the “Victor’s Exoneration” of the vanquished—as much as an instance of “Victor’s Justice” that overlooked war crimes committed by the Allied powers, which ultimately served to establish the Cold War U.S.-Japan alliance over far-reaching domains that included geopolitics, military cooperation, and the sharing of technology and science. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, regardless of internal dissents and contradictions, commenced the culture of impunity that would serve U.S. geopolitical interests in the Cold War Asia-Pacific.

During the eighties important critiques of the IMTFE emerged. They concerned the IMTFE’s Euro-American centrism and its laxity in prosecution of “crimes against humanity.” The historians Arai Shinichi, Awaya Kentarō,

and Utsumi Aiko, among others, pointed out the unevenness of the trial's attention to the different Japanese war crimes in the Asia-Pacific War. While some atrocities such as the Rape of Nanjing, which had been exposed early on by the Western media, were questioned as war crimes, the trial overall failed to interrogate many Japanese aggressions against the people of Asia and the Pacific Islands as crimes against humanity, including the military enslavement of women from this region. In an effort to redress the IMTFE's oversights, some of these scholars advocated the establishment of an "Asian People's Tribunal," an international people's court that would reopen cases that had not been addressed adequately in the trial.⁷² According to this view, the IMTFE punished and executed Japanese political and military leaders for disturbing the peace and order reserved for white European and U.S. domination and for violating their colonial entitlements, properties, and privileges, while disregarding the humanity of people who remained under their colonial control.⁷³ The trial's unwillingness to fully interrogate Japanese atrocities against tens of millions of people in Asia and the Pacific as "crimes against humanity" was thus understood to demonstrate the elisions and exclusions produced by the West-centric notion of "humanity," as well as the trial's geohistorical perceptions, which were rooted in colonialism. The West-centric idea of civilization, the U.S. Cold War presence, and the selective, uneven, and racialized notion of "humanity"—these are the three primary elements that progressive redress activists and critics have emphasized whenever they have critiqued the IMTFE's legacy.⁷⁴

The earlier leftist criticism of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial is rapidly being eclipsed by Japan's far-right historical revisionists who also criticize IMTFE, but for different reasons (chapter 3). Of late, partly in order to thwart the conservative revisionists' challenges, some liberal historians have attempted to redeem the trial's legacy. This line of argument underscores that, despite the Cold War compromise and marginalization of socialist countries, the IMTFE's prosecution in fact managed to record Japanese war crimes, including civilian massacres, sexual violence against women, and other human rights violations, more than has previously been understood.⁷⁵ It appreciates the IMTFE's universal significance and its contributions, paralleling the Nuremberg Trials, to the postwar advancement of new international legal protocols. The Nuremberg Trials' legal precedents, for instance, are deemed to have provided impetus for the subsequent development of the international criminal justice system. Such an assimilationist move, however, risks obscuring the previous anticolonial critique of the IMTFE that has tried to articulate the limits of West-centrism in international law and its colonial-

civilizational discourse. It also preempts potentially transformative efforts to connect the currently unfolding critical assessment of international law with the earlier critique of the IMTFE.

In light of the post-9/11 discussions on international law and sovereignty, which some critical legal scholars have reanimated, as well as the vigilant call by these scholars to reflect on what it means to adjudicate wars, the positive reappraisal of the Tokyo Trial's accomplishment as measured against the international protocols set by the Nuremberg Trials seems to require careful reconsideration. Danilo Zolo, among others, problematized the uneven application of the twentieth-century international doctrine that universally illegalized all wars waged against international peace and order.⁷⁶ Warning against what the international law scholar Antonio Cassese called "a 'Nuremberg syndrome' by which international criminal jurisdiction perpetuates the model of the 'justice of the victors'" (6), Zolo noted that neither the United States nor any of the other victorious major powers in World War II or their allies has been formally charged according to international law with the "supreme international crime" of waging a war of aggression, even when indisputable evidence has been present. At the same time, *jus in bello* has hardly been applied to prosecute aggression in colonial wars or the killing of political partisans (i.e., Carl Schmitt's "irregular enemies") during counterinsurgencies. Moreover, international criminal jurisdiction based on the model of the "justice of the victors" has serious ramifications that go beyond the adjudication of war crimes. By instating the victorious as overseers and protectors of besieged sovereignties, the latter of which are expected to transition from criminally belligerent status to those who act in accordance with the norm of the peaceful global order, "victor's justice" could legitimize prolonged occupations after cease-fire.

When reflecting on the Tokyo War Crimes Trial's historical meaning and its ramifications on broader configurations of knowledge about modernity and colonialism in Asia and the Pacific, we must then at the least consider the IMTFE and the Nuremberg Trials—the two military tribunals Zolo identifies, following Carl Schmitt, as "the real origin of international criminal jurisdiction" (23)—by situating them critically in the genealogy of the illegalization of war and the accompanying geopolitical predicaments we currently face. In his observations of the planetary epistemic shift that took place at the end of World War II in the way nations, territories, and wars have been perceived and governed, Schmitt famously pointed out that the 1945 London Charter, which set the protocols for the Nuremberg Trials, marked the demise of the European system of war.⁷⁷ According to Schmitt,

the idea of *justus hostis*, or “just enemy,” had undergirded the European system of war and served to mitigate the war’s escalation into *bellum justus*, the ultimate aim of which is to annihilate the absolute evil. The largely American effort to eliminate wars by illegalizing them—which was unevenly but continuously pursued during the interwar years punctuated especially by the two important developments of the 1924 Geneva protocol and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact—came to fruition when the new legal concept of “crime against peace” was adjudicated at the Nuremberg Trials. Politicized and judicialized, wars thereafter are fought as *bellum justus* until total victory is achieved over a completely vanquished enemy; for only at that point could the war’s political justness be legitimated.⁷⁸ In contrast, Achille Mbembe foregrounded the militarized history of slavery, conquest, and colonialism to point out that the “war of annihilation” was not a new phenomenon, but in fact a *constitutive* part of the genealogy of the European system of war.⁷⁹ Important to our inquiry, therefore, is a need to understand that Schmitt saw the total and annihilating character of wars as alien to modern Europe and that he perceived its *newness* in the post–World War II, Cold War international milieu, which coincided with the era of decolonization. Seen in this light, the international doctrine that criminalizes war against peace—what Carl Schmitt saw as the post–World War II *nomos* of the earth—can be regarded as a new postcolonial global apparatus of abstracting an absolute evil (e.g., Communists, anarchists, the anticolonial revolutionaries, terrorists, the axis of evil, etc.) which then must be vanquished to safeguard Anglo-American-centered international security and the status quo. The “Nuremberg syndrome” and its critique thus lay bare the problem of the uneven application of international law as much as what the law has enabled and sustained.

In the aftermath of the Iraq War, Sun Ge, a cultural critic who has written extensively on East Asian modernity, warned against the danger that uncritical celebration of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials may pose to China:

Now more than ever, the historical narrative with which we Chinese understand the IMTFE as proof of victory in the war of resistance against Japan, or as justice that adjudicated Japanese militarism must be met with skepticism. To be sure, this skepticism by no means suggests exoneration of Japanese militarism for its crimes or lending support to the Japanese right wing’s “anti-Americanism.” Nor does it mean to deny the Trial’s historical feat. Our skepticism ultimately needs to be directed at the hegemonic politics of America that forcibly claims to speak as the

representative of civilization, our Manichean modes of thinking, and the idea of “unitary civilization” that Takeuchi Yoshimi problematized half a century ago. The Manichean thinking and the idea of unitary civilization dictate the way we understand the Iraq War today. They continue to leave us external to the movement of history.⁸⁰

Sun’s reflection alludes precisely to the problem of *bellum justus* observed by Zolo and others which we currently face. At the same time, when she notes how the current U.S. unilateralism “continue[s] to leave us external to the movement of history,” Sun’s criticism also unveils the incommensurability between the transitional justice the United States had choreographed at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial and the Chinese people’s exasperations during the war of resistance against Japan. Sun thus succinctly captured the inter- and intra-Asian sensibilities that have long underpinned redress culture’s critical genealogy.

Sun’s above passage referred to the Japanese philosopher Takeuchi Yoshimi and his essay, published in 1959, concerning the famous wartime roundtable symposium titled “Overcoming Modernity.” This reference perhaps requires further qualification. The symposium, which took place in 1942, gathered together thirteen prominent intellectuals who largely shared an antimaterialist, romanticist politics, and who came from a wide range of fields, including literature, art, history, and philosophy. Though the participants’ views were far from uniform, today the symposium is generally understood to have given the outbreak of the U.S.-Japan War intellectual endorsement by lending it universalistic historical significance. It characterized the war largely as an epoch-making moment in world history and as an unprecedented attempt by a non-Western nation to overcome the normativity, representativeness, and contradictions of modernity that had originated in the West. Takeuchi reflected on the roundtable’s suggestion of a duality in what came to be named the Greater East Asia War: a war of invasion into China, on one hand, and a war against the Western imperial presence in Asia on the other. Takeuchi then concluded that “imperialism cannot be overcome by another imperialism, nor can it be brought to justice by one.”⁸¹

This oft-cited line, which I have invoked for this chapter’s epigraph, condenses Takeuchi’s indictment of Japanese imperialism as well as his critique of those intellectuals who gave theoretical and moral legitimation to the war as a challenge to Western imperialism. Though hardly mentioned by his critics, immediately following this statement Takeuchi went on to note that in order to adjudicate imperialism one requires such “universal values”

as “liberty, justice, and humanity as exemplified at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial” (306). From the vantage point of hindsight we can see how such an appraisal of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial ignores the gross exceptionalization of millions of people who were precluded from the category of humanity entitled to liberty and justice. To leave this oversight unproblematic begs the question of how the “universal values” Takeuchi found in the IMTFE’s adjudication of Japanese war crimes also came to proffer U.S. military, political, and economic expansion since the war’s end with ethico-juridical justification. When read along with the more recent critiques of the new imperialisms that increasingly extend their power through supranational networks and in the universalist language of human rights and humanitarian justice, a carefully situated reconsideration of Takeuchi’s indictment takes on ever greater urgency.⁸²

The notion of transitional justice concerns management of destabilizing elements in postviolence societies, whether international or domestic. The concept also expects reintegration of violence-torn elements of the society, but without disturbing structures existing prior to the upheaval. Transitional justice tends to presuppose that societies that have attained liberal organizations and formal democracy are no longer in transition. From this perspective, the postwar transitional justice administered for the Asia-Pacific War can indeed be seen as a “success”: it more or less ushered in a stable world order that is likely to continue into the future. Postwar transitional justice and the generous terms of reconciliation apparently precluded vengeance, while the former enemy was integrated, tamed, and rehabilitated into a prosperous, free, and peace-loving ally. Yet, if indeed “every society is in transition,” as the political philosopher Elizabeth Kiss reminds us, so is every world order restored in the war’s aftermath.⁸³ Any idea of a successful transitional justice must then embrace a critical awareness of Cold War legacies in the region, thus ultimately challenging the dialectics of redressable and unredressable as integral to the (in)justices sustained by post-World War II neocoloniality and the structures of American dominance. *Cold War Ruins* is one modest attempt to consider the intellectual ramifications such challenges might bring to assumptions about modernity in the Asia-Pacific region and the latter’s inseparable ties to the United States.

Cold War Ruins is divided into two parts. Part I, “Space of Occupation,” contains two chapters, each devoted to a distinct geographical location and/or

target population that came under the U.S. occupation in the aftermath of the dissolution of Japanese empire.

Chapter 1 considers the neocolonial condition of Okinawa in America's long "Pacific Century."⁸⁴ Situated at the geopolitical threshold of East Asia and the northwest Pacific, Okinawa became an increasingly important subject of knowledge in anthropology and area studies during the transwar 1940s. After the Allied powers' victory, Okinawa was both liberated from Japanese imperial rule and occupied by the United States until 1972. It has remained a crucial geopolitical site in the Cold War geography of what Eleanor Lattimore once noted as "security imperialism."⁸⁵ The chapter closely reads the Okinawan writer Ōshiro Tatsuhiro's novella, *Kakuteru pātī* (*The Cocktail Party*, 1967), alongside the disciplinary self-scrutiny of area studies and cultural anthropology since the 1990s. These critiques reveal how Okinawa's "liberated yet occupied" condition was produced by and then helped sustain the transpacific entanglements of Japanese and U.S. military-security concerns. Okinawa's liminality—produced out of the interimperial war, multiply overlapping colonialisms, the suspension of indigenous sovereignty, and continuing militarization resulting from the U.S.-Japan alliance—cannot be accounted for either within the postwar international conventions or the Cold War frame of war. The chapter hopes to show that Okinawa's liminality has been integral to the Cold War regime of unredressability and yet enabling of alternative politicizations of historical knowledge and justice.

Attending further to the midcentury as the emergent moment of the transpacific Cold War formations, chapter 2 analyzes the representation of Japanese women's enfranchisement in Japan's mainland under U.S. military occupation. Following the military victory in Asia and the Pacific, the United States became the supreme overseer of the region's progress, democracy, and modernization. The notion that the American occupation brought gender justice to racialized women of the vanquished enemy empire was integral to the process. The chapter examines the U.S. media's coverage of women's emancipation in Japan under General Douglas MacArthur's mandate. I will ask, in what ways did media representations and their discursive strategies help resolve for the American audience the contradiction that Japanese women gained rights, freedom, and equality but under the illiberal condition of foreign occupation? What are the implications of showcasing Japanese women's enfranchisement internationally, even as the disfranchisement and continuing dispossession of former Japanese colonial subjects were

left unacknowledged? By interrogating the rhetoric of liberation that the United States has circulated not only to Japanese women and their American watchers but throughout the postwar decolonizing world, the chapter traces the connections of America's *jus ad bellum* to the universalizing idea of gender justice.

Part II, "Transnational Memory Borders," explores the post-Cold War transborder redress culture by investigating the multiple publics' contestations over the ongoing issues of apologies, redress, and reparations.

Chapter 3 observes the latest manifestations of transpacific Cold War entanglements in the "military comfort women" issue. I will focus on Japan's historical revisionism and its inability to perceive the Japanese military and colonial injustices. By attending to the racial and sexual dimensions of the revisionists' narratives and the "culture wars" they have incited, the chapter considers several issues that the revisionists, wittingly or unwittingly, bring together as interrelated: textbooks controversy, state-sponsored apologies, the transnational feminist redress politics that resulted in the aforementioned Women's Tribunal, China's cold war leniency policy and expressions of contrition by former Japanese POWs (Chūkiren), and the aberrant feature in Japan's Constitution that renounces the sovereign right to wage war. Rather than simply a sensationalist politics pursued by reactionary extremists, I consider the current revisionism a discourse historically structured by the political unconscious of Japan's "client state" status in postwar U.S.-Japan relations.

If the above chapter highlights the latest manifestations of transpacific Cold War entanglements outside the North American geographical parameter, the next two chapters will discuss the way Asia-Pacific War memories leave indelible Cold War imprints on U.S. domestic cultural politics. Chapter 4 examines the new phase in the Americanization of justice by observing Asian/American engagements in the transborder redress culture at the new century's turn. I will focus on the increasing involvement of Asian/Americans and Pacific Islanders in American legislative and juridical redress cases over the past two decades (e.g., House Resolution 121, the California Code of Civil Procedure [§354.6], etc.) to consider the new meanings they confer on questions of unredressability. By demonstrating the not-so-uniform ways in which Asians and Asian Americans have become mobilized into redress culture within the U.S. public sphere, the chapter hopes to illuminate the contradictory effects their involvement produces on the discourse on American justice, militarism, race, and nationalism.

I will conclude the book with a final consideration of the perils and possibilities of a transnational critique of historical justice but by revisiting the immediate milieu of the end of the Cold War in the United States. Chapter 5 scrutinizes the American Cold War memories of the Asia-Pacific War that figured prominently in what came to be called “the Smithsonian *Enola Gay* controversy”—that is, the impassioned dissension that spread across the United States over the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum’s planned exhibit to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. The chapter examines academic discussions and media coverage that move across the national borders of the United States and Japan to elucidate what has fallen out of that process. Simultaneously a testament to the 1990s cultural wars, the controversy illuminated that the transnationalization of historical representations and their critiques can result in a kind of “warping” of politics. That is, when a critique travels from one location to another, it often inadvertently results in allying with intellectual and political positions that are at odds with those it endorsed in the original contexts. The predicaments of warped politics the chapter observes increasingly plague the ongoing transnational and transpacific citations, representations, and coalitions among the subaltern voices and calls for historical justice. By distinguishing critical transnationalism from transnational ventriloquism, the chapter addresses the possibilities of transpacific critique, which may prove vital to intensifying struggles in Asia and the Pacific Islands over the meaning of American exceptionalism, militarized security, justice, and decolonization.