

INTRODUCTION

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REVOLUTIONS, NATIONS, AND  
A NEW INDUSTRIAL WORLD

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From 1500 to 1800, the Americas were a key part of a world of empires and global trades.<sup>1</sup> In the 1780s, New Spain drove silver production to new heights, concentrating wealth in Mexico City, by far the hemisphere's leading center of population and power. In the same decade, French Saint Domingue led the Atlantic world in sugar production and the concentration of enslaved laborers. Meanwhile, a fledgling United States was escaping British rule, building a republican polity, and searching for commercial prosperity—its free people enjoying solid well-being while a large enslaved minority saw bondage confirmed in a new constitution.

By 1850, the United States, having just claimed in war vast territories long tied to New Spain and then Mexico, was driving toward continental hegemony: southern cotton growers worked slave laborers to supply British mills that ruled a new industrial world economy; New England mills competed to

profit in that economy; and free settlers drove commercial farming across a vast Mississippi basin into lands taken from displaced native peoples. At the same time, Mexico, its once dynamic silver economy fallen in the face of war and insurgency after 1810, faced endemic political conflicts while it searched for a new economy in a shrunken territory. And Haiti, built by revolutionary slaves in once rich Saint Domingue, consolidated a society of family cultivation and limited exports—excluded from the new global industrial economy. All would face political conflicts in the decades to come. But in the United States, Civil War led to an expansive prosperity; for Mexico, Reform Wars led to growing dependence on U.S. capital and markets; and in Haiti, internal conflicts came with continuing poverty and commercial exclusion.

The dramatic changes that marked the emergence of the United States, Mexico, and Haiti as nations only begin to illustrate the depth and complexity of the larger and more diverse transformations that created new countries across the Americas during the decades after 1770. After centuries in which European monarchs claimed sovereignty, diverse Christianities shaped the lives of the powerful, the colonized, and the enslaved, and dynamic trades led by Spanish American silver and Atlantic sugar and slavery made the hemisphere central to global trades—everything seemed to change, creatively for some, destructively for others.

During the century after 1750 people across the Americas fought and negotiated, traded and labored to forge new polities and new economies—thus new countries. In some regions, insurrectionary movements forced new social relations: in Haiti, where revolutionary slaves ended slavery and took the land; in core regions of Mexico, where insurgent communities took new control of production; in diverse other places where indigenous peoples found new autonomies as nations struggled to find political stability and commercial prosperity. Elsewhere, old social relations endured: in expansions of slave labor in Brazil, Cuba, and the U.S. South; in continuing political exclusions of many native peoples across the hemisphere. Diverse peoples came out of old empires in unimagined ways. They built states with new boundaries, new citizenships, new social relationships, and new ways of production.

While making new countries, the people of the Americas saw their histories diverge in many ways. Many founded republics, yet Brazil became an empire and Cuba remained a colony. Some former colonies joined together to become United States; others fragmented into small nations, as in Central America. And while forging such diversity, the new countries of the Americas stayed tied to a rapidly changing world economy. They emerged during the rise of a new industrial capitalism forged in England after 1800 and soon replicated

in the northeastern United States. The rest of the Americas adapted. Some prospered while many struggled.

The aims and uncertainties of nation making are central concerns of every national history.<sup>2</sup> In this volume we analyze the emergence of nations (and Cuba's colonial persistence) across the hemisphere in the light of changing global relationships. Too often, the conflicts that led to the new American nations and the innovations that generated the British industrial revolution appear as simultaneous but separate—the definition of historical coincidence. We see them as simultaneous and inseparable. The Americas played key roles in the Atlantic conflicts that led to new nations and in the global transformation that led to industrial capitalism. We explore how New World peoples both joined in and adapted to key changes in the world economy after 1780, how they engaged in forging liberal and republican polities, and how eight new countries navigated times of conflictive change: four coming out of Atlantic slave colonies—the United States, Haiti, Cuba (a new country even as it remained a colony), and Brazil; four built in Spanish American societies with indigenous majorities—Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and Bolivia. We aim to understand how new countries emerged and how they diverged while industrial capitalism rose to shape the nineteenth-century world.

### *In Search of an Integrated History*

Too often, all this has been studied separately. Yet the founding dynamism of the early American silver and sugar economies, the late eighteenth-century challenges of war and political innovation, the revolutionary destruction of key colonies,<sup>3</sup> and the struggles to build nations in a changing global economy demand integrated analysis if we are to understand the transformation of the Americas after 1750—and how conflicts there contributed to the rise of British and later U.S. industrial capitalism.<sup>4</sup>

It is a tall order, of course, to integrate the global and the local, the economic and the political, along with social conflicts and cultural debates and innovations—across a diverse hemisphere. There have been illuminating attempts: In his classic study of *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826*, John Lynch linked hemispheric political processes and local conflicts in a work that included most of the continent and the majority of its peoples—those subject to Spanish sovereignty in 1800.<sup>5</sup> Robin Blackburn soon followed with the *Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848*, analyzing one pervasive conflict central to the era of independence across the continent.<sup>6</sup> Lester Langley took on the entire hemisphere in his ambitious *The Americas in the Age of Revolution*,

1750–1850.<sup>7</sup> Recently, in *Empires of the Atlantic World*, J. H. Elliott compared key regions of Spanish and British America from their colonial origins through independence,<sup>8</sup> and Jeremy Adelman offered *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*, engaging Spanish and Portuguese South America from Cartagena to Buenos Aires.<sup>9</sup> All make important contributions: Lynch by emphasizing the local complexities of the Spanish American conflicts; Blackburn by focusing us on the breadth and complexity of the problem of slavery; Langley by demonstrating the necessity of a hemispheric analysis; Elliott by insisting on a comparative vision set in a long historical perspective; Adelman by emphasizing that within Spanish and Portuguese domains imperial breakdown preceded the contested emergence of national goals and states.

Still, all remain limited: Lynch brought his regionally grounded and mostly political vision only to Spanish America; Blackburn emphasized the demise of slavery, downplaying its powerful expansions in nineteenth-century Brazil, Cuba, and the United States; Langley understood Spanish American economic systems and political processes but partially; Elliott compared the mainland colonies of Spanish and British America—the former pivotal, the latter secondary to the eighteenth-century world—leaving key Caribbean plantation regions aside; and Adelman remained in Atlantic South America, leaving others to integrate the often-conflictive Caribbean, Andean, and Mexican–Central American sequences. The search for an integrated vision of the transformation the Americas from 1750 to 1870 remains a challenge.

In recent years, the challenge has become more complex. Three key historical advances have illuminated and complicated analysis of an era too long seen either as an Age of Revolution or the Era of Independence: First, a turn to a global view of history combined with a rethinking of the trajectory of the global economy have combined to emphasize the centrality of Asia around 1500, the importance of the Americas in global trades from the sixteenth century, and the late rise of a European hegemony that only consolidated after 1800. Second, new understandings of the Haitian Revolution and of insurgent roles in Mexican independence have brought popular demands and the changes they forced to the center of key conflicts in the age of revolutions. Third, a new appreciation of the interplay of war, political conflict, and liberal innovation in the Hispanic world after 1808 has brought Spain and its Americas to the center of new analyses of the origins of regimes of popular sovereignty. Recognition of each innovation underscores the importance and the difficulty of the larger analytical challenge.

Through most of the twentieth century, economic history offered a clear and too simple vision: the industrial capitalism that shaped the world after

1800 was a natural, almost inevitable result of Anglo-European-Protestant culture and institutions. England, Western Europe, and the United States led—and the world followed. Then, in the context of the shift to globalization in the 1990s, new studies challenged the presumptive reign of Anglo-European primacy in global economic history. A series of studies, led by Kenneth Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, have shown that China led the world economically around 1500 and that European industrial eminence came after 1770—precisely during the decades of New World transformation.<sup>10</sup> Then economists Ronald Findlay and Kevin O'Rourke gave us *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium*, confirming the early dominance of China and India, the late rise of industrial Europe—and the importance of New World silver in linking and stimulating Asian and European economies after 1550. They, too, confirm the late rise of Europe—and emphasize the importance of the Euro-Atlantic wars of 1750–1830 in the rise of Anglo-American industrial hegemony.<sup>11</sup> And now Sven Beckert's *Empire of Cotton* details the rise of industrial capitalism during the same pivotal decades as a transatlantic process tying a long developing “war capitalism” built on empire and slavery to a rising industrial system in England, in the process transforming the world.<sup>12</sup>

Our analyses will suggest that to begin to grasp the radical reconstruction of the world from 1750 to 1850, we must see the collapse of the silver capitalism that was grounded in Spanish America and integrated the Americas, Asia, and Europe from 1550 to 1810.<sup>13</sup> We must also recognize the challenges to and persistence of the war capitalism of slave-based production and trades that continued to supply essential cotton and complementary sugar and coffee to industrializing Europe and North America past 1850. And we must see all that as linked to the technological innovations and capital accumulations that drove the industrial revolution beginning in western Britain.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, scholars have also been rethinking the historical importance and impact of popular revolutionary movements in Saint Domingue (as it became Haiti) and New Spain (as it became Mexico). Carolyn Fick began the process in *The Making of Haiti*, showing that armed ex-slaves forced not only the abolition of slavery, but also the collapse of the plantation economy so pivotal to French participation in Atlantic trade and European power politics.<sup>15</sup> In *Avengers of the New World* Laurent Dubois broadened and confirmed the emphasis that adamant and armed former slaves ended Saint Domingue's role as the largest and most profitable producer of sugar and the greatest purchaser of slaves in the Atlantic world.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, I began to understand that the silver economy of New Spain continued to soar at historic levels, stimulating

global trades (and funding wars) to 1810—when the Bajío, the leading New World center of silver mining, textile manufacturing, and irrigated commercial cultivation, exploded in a popular rising that lasted a decade. Insurgents undermined silver production and turned a commercial economy to family production (as did the slaves in Haiti).<sup>17</sup> Now, in *En el espejo haitiano*, Luis Fernando Granados has detailed how the popular power first forged in revolutionary Haiti proliferated across diverse American regions to culminate in the insurgencies that transformed the Bajío beginning in 1810.<sup>18</sup>

It is now clear that by 1804 Haitian revolutionaries had destroyed war capitalism in Saint Domingue and crippled France's chances to join in the early rise of industrial capitalism. The same revolution drove war capitalists working slave laborers to expand sugar production in Cuba, sugar and coffee in Brazil, and cotton cultivation across the U.S. South—the latter an essential component of the industrial revolution. Soon after, beginning in 1810, Bajío revolutionaries took down the silver capitalism that had long integrated global trades, bringing China to crisis and opening the way for the rise of the industrialism so celebrated for its British innovations—while so many try not to see its role in expanding slavery. On a global scale, silver capitalism and war capitalism rose together from the sixteenth century to shape early global commercial capitalism. Then when silver capitalism collapsed and industrial capitalism rose in the early nineteenth century, the war capitalism grounded in slave labor persisted to enable the transition. In the process, the economies of Spanish America saw global importance give way to the marginalities later called underdevelopment. Haitians grappled with new autonomies that locked them into poverty. Cuba and Brazil found new prosperities in expanding slave production for industrializing markets. And the United States mixed the expanded war capitalism of a South built on slavery with the emerging industries of an industrial North and a westward expansion of commercial cultivation into lands taken from natives and Mexicans to become the New World hegemon of a new global industrial capitalism.

While these fundamental socioeconomic conflicts and changes were under way, political movements, conflicts, and revolutions moved the Americas and the Atlantic world toward new polities. Empires of divine right faced challenges; nations proclaiming popular sovereignties rose to reshape the Americas after 1810. A vast scholarship on Europe and the Americas between 1765 and 1830 has focused on these important developments.<sup>19</sup> Yet too often, analysts imagine a derivative and imitative process in which political innovations forged in Anglo-American domains and reenergized in French revolutionary

worlds imposed themselves on Iberian Americans when they came late to nation making.

Since the 1990s, scholars have reanalyzed the histories of independence in Iberia and the Americas with new studies of the Hispanic political revolution that led to the Cádiz Constitution of 1812. That charter aimed to hold Spain and its Americas together in opposition to Napoleon's 1808 invasion and occupation of Spain. Mostly implemented in the Americas (most of Spain was occupied by the French), it contributed in complex and conflictive ways to the eventual rise of new republics. And while including some parallels with Anglo-American and French developments, the Cádiz process had deep roots in Hispanic traditions of popular sovereignty as old as those in England and France.

The new scholarship about Ibero-American independence began with François-Xavier Guerra's *Modernidades e independencias*<sup>20</sup> and culminated in Roberto Breña's *El primer liberalismo español y los procesos de emancipación de América, 1808–1824*.<sup>21</sup> The work came just in time to shape an explosion of studies focused on the celebrations of independence in the bicentennials of 1810. A vision of Cádiz liberalism as pivotal to Spanish American independence marked conferences often funded by national states implementing neoliberalism. At times, war and trade, strongmen and insurgents faded from view. Still, the scholarship on the rise of a deeply Hispanic liberalism within the conflicts that led to Spanish American independence was mostly positive—and further fueled the need to rethink the transformation of the Americas between 1750 and 1850.

From the sixteenth century, peoples across the Americas lived within European empires while tied to trades that spanned the globe. After 1760, they joined in unprecedented political conflicts shaped by new visions of popular sovereignty and electoral participation. Many broke with empires and built new polities—while an unprecedented industrial concentration rose in Britain and reshaped the world economy. Nation builders claimed different resources, engaged distinct indigenous and colonial traditions, and found uncertain opportunities in a world facing rapid economic change. Economic, political, and social outcomes diverged everywhere. How did broad hemispheric participation in shared economic and political challenges and opportunities lead to new countries with diverging trajectories in a nineteenth-century world driven by industrial capitalism? No one scholar is ready to take on that pivotal analytical challenge.

To accelerate the conversation a group of scholars who had already written deep studies of key regions and questions illuminating the era of independence across the Americas met at Georgetown University under the auspices of the



Americas Initiative. We began with a challenge: without losing sight of the political, social, and cultural dynamics of the nation making we knew so well, how had each region experienced the changing economic dynamics of the era? The chapters that follow emerged from a process of sharing, discussion, and revision. We engage common questions, but we offer no single thesis to explain the emergence of new countries across the Americas after 1750 and their diverse roles in the nineteenth-century world.

Common themes do link our studies: Imperial legacies shaped conflicts and debates everywhere. In Atlantic plantation colonies, slavery was always a key question: would it end, persist, change, or expand? In highland Spanish America, the role of the indigenous republics that gave native majorities land and limited self-rule, and held them in subordination, focused pivotal debates. And of course, imperial rule itself was debated. That it ended almost everywhere should not mask the enduring strength of groups that preferred to stay in the empires: Tories in the United States fled to Canada; Mexico's 1821 Plan de Iguala mobilized a coalition that led to independence by calling Spanish king Fernando to Mexico; Brazil, home to Portuguese regent and then king João from 1808 to 1821, became independent in 1822 by proclaiming his heir, Prince Pedro, emperor of Brazil. And Cuba remained the "most loyal" of Spain's American colonies.

Old regimes did not fall without a fight; wars were everywhere. They were international and internal, often at the same time. They were political and social, with popular risings sometimes furthering political leaders' agendas, sometimes limiting the fighters and resources available for state making. The U.S. war for independence was an international war; its rebels were backed by France and funded by Spain (with pesos from New Spain). The Wars of 1793 to 1815 set off by the French Revolution and Napoleonic expansion were inseparable from the Haitian Revolution, the U.S. acquisition of Louisiana, the flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil, the opening conflicts of the Spanish American wars for Independence, and the consolidation of U.S. independence in the War of 1812. Within the wars, popular insurgencies were most powerful in Haiti, Spain, and New Spain—yet they played roles nearly everywhere.

New visions of republican government and liberal institutions were also everywhere—discussed, debated, and fought about while variously defined. Famously, the first New World war for independence was fought to end British rule and forge republican governance in the United States. The Haitian Revolution began amid a search to bring constitutional order and universal rights to a French monarchy facing bankruptcy while deeply dependent on its hugely profitable and exploitative slave colony in Saint Domingue. And when



Napoleon's 1807–1808 invasion of Iberia sent the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro and deposed the Spanish Bourbons, guerrilla conflicts across Spain and debates about sovereignty there and in the Americas energized a traditional Spanish process of seeking sovereignty grounded in the *pueblos* (the towns). The resulting Cortes of Cádiz wrote the liberal charter of 1812; it was endlessly debated while it helped remake politics and governance in Spain, Portugal, and their Americas.

International and political wars mixed with insurgencies, all laced with movements for popular sovereignty in government, which stimulated demands for popular rights—freedom from slavery, access to land, and more. And all that combined in complex ways to promote a changing world economy—sometimes to force, sometimes to facilitate, sometimes to limit adaptations to an emerging industrial capitalism. The Haitian and Bajío revolutions took down the two American engines of eighteenth-century global trades. Haitians turned to family production and faced exclusion from the Atlantic economy; Mexicans tried to forge a nation while searching for a new economy—newly grounded in family production. Meanwhile, Cuba and Brazil took advantage of the commercial withdrawal and then exclusion of Haiti to expand production of coffee and sugar, importing more slaves to do the work. The United States drove the planting of slave-grown cotton across an expanding South to supply the rising industrial economy of England—and soon New England. Meanwhile, Spanish Americans from Mexico through the Andes struggled to make nations and find prosperity in a new world economy.

The common theme of our studies is divergence—on three different levels. Most obvious is the divergence that created more than a dozen new American nations out of lands long integrated into four European empires. And we must not forget that while the United States claimed independence, Canada and the British Caribbean did not; while slaves forced emancipation and independence in Haiti, Guadalupe and Martinique remained French and returned to slavery. While most of Spanish America broke away to become diverse nations, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, which had delivered New World silver to Asia, did not. And if all of Portuguese America became a Brazilian empire, it separated from Angola and other regions of Portuguese Africa that sustained the slave trade—while the trade carried on. National independence was neither universal nor inevitable. It led to diverse new nations while it left diverse other regions within old empires that had to change. Thus Cuba could both remain a colony and become a new country.

The second level of divergence was the rise of diversity—and sometimes of powerful separatist movements—within emerging American nations. Examples

are legion. The historic integration of the Andean highland core under Inca rule and Spanish colonialism broke apart to create Peru and Bolivia. The colonial Kingdom of Guatemala that ranged from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec to the Isthmus of Panama took independence as one—and then in decades of conflict broke into five nations and the Mexican state of Chiapas. The Guatemala that remained struggled to integrate three distinct social, cultural, and economic regions. The fragmentation of Spanish America is legendary, furthered by the economic challenges of the era. Brazil famously held together, but not without strong forces for separation in the Northeast and South—strong attempts suppressed by military force backed by British naval power. And it is worth remembering that Texas’s secession from Mexico spurred the war that took the vast Mexican North and its assertive indigenous peoples into the United States, in time leading the United States to split into two nations in 1860—only reunited by a devastating and deadly Civil War.

While nations struggled to consolidate and often fragmented, many indigenous peoples found new independence. The Comanche rose to become the dominant power for decades in western North America.<sup>22</sup> Once-colonized communities found new autonomies across Spanish American highlands. Our studies of the emergence of new countries detail how local innovation and enduring differences emerged from shared historical challenges. Against dreams of *E Pluribus Unum*, we found the opposite: from a hemisphere of four empires came a proliferation of diverse countries marked by divergences—and often by conflicts—within.

Their creation, with all their conflicts and diversities, contributed in fundamental ways to the third divergence we emphasize: the “great divergence” that brought the demise of China and South Asia; the collapse of the global trade in silver and new challenges to the sugar and slave economies that had long linked Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia; and the rise of a new industrial capitalism in which production and power concentrated in northwestern Europe and the northeastern United States, while the rest of the world was pressed to supply staples—pivotally, cotton grown by slaves in the U.S. South—and to buy manufactures—cotton cloth central among them. The creation of diverse new countries across the Americas was a foundational part of the history of the rise of the North Atlantic, Anglo-American axis that shaped the world in the century after 1800. The new countries of the Americas were born within—as both cause and consequence of—the great divergence that brought a new era of global history.<sup>23</sup>

### *Shared Challenges, Diverging Outcomes*

To analyze the emergence of diverging new countries across the Americas, we present ten studies. Part I offers two chapters on processes that impacted histories across the Americas. In “The Americas in the Rise of Industrial Capitalism” I outline how the silver economies of Spanish America and the sugar and slave economies of Atlantic plantation colonies became pivotal to global commerce after 1550. Silver, centered in the Andes from 1550 to 1650 and then soaring in New Spain from 1700 to 1810, made Spain’s Americas essential to trades linking China, India, the Islamic world, and Europe. Sugar and slavery, pioneered in the Spanish Caribbean, consolidated between 1570 and 1640 in Brazil, and dominating the British and French Caribbean after 1680 drove trades tying Europe and Africa to the Americas. Eighteenth-century competition led to wars and revolutions that began to destabilize the global economy around 1780. Revolutions in Haiti and the Bajío saw popular forces destroy the leading engines of New World economic dynamism after 1790. Meanwhile England, while fighting long wars to claim European, Atlantic, and global hegemony from France and Spain, built mechanized industries that took off and forced every New World region to adapt in the nineteenth century. Chapter 1 offers a framework to understand how diverse regions of the Americas lived that complex global economic transformation.

Amid the transformations driven by wars and revolutions, political actors and ideologues worked to design new polities based on rising notions of popular sovereignty and electoral participations. These designs and debates were essential to the Thirteen Colonies’ break with British rule to become United States; they were central to the French Revolution, which set the stage for the Haitian Revolution—which focused on more fundamental liberations. Coming out of European political debates since the seventeenth century and recent decades of enlightenment thinking, republican projects in Britain, the United States, and France are deeply studied and well recognized.<sup>24</sup> Less recognized and studied only recently are the parallel seventeenth-century roots of a Hispanic popular sovereignty that mixed with enlightenment innovations and revolutionary adaptations to generate the world’s first self-defined liberalism in Cádiz between 1810 and 1812—and to influence the debates of nation making across Iberia, Latin America, and beyond.<sup>25</sup>

Because most readers are familiar with the rise of regimes of popular sovereignty in Anglo-Atlantic and French domains (or can easily gain access to key studies), yet few will know the pivotal role of Cádiz liberalism in Spain, Portugal, and the Americas, we present Roberto Breña’s chapter 2, “The Cádiz Liberal Revolution and Spanish American Independence.” It explores the deep

and complex historic roots of Hispanic liberalism, its consolidation amid the struggle against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814, its limited role in Spain under French occupation, its wide if uneven implementation across Spain's Americas, its abrogation in 1814, and its return in 1820 in both Spain and its Americas. Designed to create a constitutional monarchy to hold Spain's empire together, Cádiz liberalism fueled debates about sovereignty that generated movements for regional autonomy. Many evolved into conflicts that led to national independence, in the process often limiting the sway of liberal ways as men on horseback took power. Breña's study of Cádiz liberalism underlines its transatlantic importance and contradictory reverberations to help frame our analyses of Cuba, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, and the Andes.

Part II presents four chapters analyzing the emergence of new countries in the slave societies of Atlantic America. We begin with Adam Rothman's study "Union, Capitalism, and Slavery in the 'Rising Empire' of the United States" because the mainland British colonies from New England to Georgia were the first to break colonial bonds, and because after decades of expansion and conflict culminating in the deadly war of 1860–1865, the United States held together to become the New World country that adapted most profitably to the world of industrial capitalism. Rothman brings a new hemispheric vision to the intensely studied and still debated process that forged the United States.

The war for independence that created the United States was most innovative in proclaiming popular sovereignty and opening electoral rights—rights limited by expanding slavery and enduring racist exclusions. Emerging from marginality in the first world economy, the United States latched onto British industrialization; southern states became key providers of cotton (raised by slaves while Britons proclaimed opposition to slavery). During Napoleonic wars (including the War of 1812 against Britain), northern states turned reluctantly to industry. To gain land to expand cotton and slavery, from the 1820s southerners colonized Mexican Texas. Texans seceded from Mexico in 1836, helping provoke the war that took the lands from Texas to California in the 1840s. The challenge of balancing slave states and free states in regions taken from Mexico led to the Civil War that kept the union together, ended slavery, and opened a diverse continent to rapid agro-industrial expansion—while deferring questions of justice for freed blacks, invaded Native Americans, and expropriated Mexicans. The making of the United States both opened and culminated hemispheric processes with global ramifications.

Carolyn Fick's "From Slave Colony to Black Nation: Haiti's Revolutionary Inversion" analyzes the second American society to break with imperial rule. Haiti did not copy the United States, but in many ways inverted its tra-

jectory. French Saint Domingue was the driving engine of the Atlantic sugar and slave economy after 1770. Its expansion led to extreme polarizations; its population included a huge majority of recently arrived African slaves, when in 1790 promises of popular sovereignty arrived from revolutionary Paris and set off conflicts among the few people of European, mixed, and African ancestry who were free and might claim rights proclaimed as universal and granted to Frenchmen. Fick details how slaves took arms to control the outcomes of years of debate and conflict—by 1804 ending slavery, French rule, and most plantation production. She goes on to offer an essential new analysis of how early national rulers committed to sustaining a state and military capable of surviving in a world of hostile powers faced a populace committed to household production and staunch in refusing plantation labor. The result was a nation of military rule, family self-sufficiency, and commercial poverty. Haitians rejected slavery, enabled family autonomy, and faced deep and enduring difficulties in a world shaped by rising industrial capitalism.

Cuba appears the antithesis of Haiti. David Sartorius's "Cuban Counterpoint: Colonialism and Continuity in the Atlantic World" shows how Cuba became new while remaining Spanish. It did not become a nation in our era of transformation, yet became a new country. It turned to sugar and slavery in the late eighteenth century. The Haitian Revolution opened new markets for Cuban planters and new access to slaves, including some brought from Haiti by fleeing planters. When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, Spanish Cubans remained loyal to the Cádiz liberal regime, gaining new rights and participations (which Cádiz liberals carefully denied to people of African ancestry). When mainland Spanish America turned to independence in the 1820s, Cuba held loyal to Spain—a reenergized slave country in a transatlantic Spanish nation. Sartorius shows that Cuban loyalty, strategic to planters' defense of sugar and slavery in a world of British antislavery, also came with deep engagements in debates about liberal rights and monarchical legacies. Cubans, at least free Cubans, joined the free peoples of the United States in prospering by expanding slavery between 1800 and 1860. The contrasts with Haiti—and the similarities with Brazil—are striking.

Brazil perhaps experienced the least conflict and the most seamless change of all the regions that broke with colonial rule before 1825. Yet it too became a new country, facing the conflicts and uncertainties of creating politics while facing changing links to the world economy. In "Atlantic Transformations and Brazil's Imperial Independence" Kirsten Schultz explores how Portuguese colonies that had proven the global possibilities of sugar and slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became leading producers of gold and diamonds

after 1700 (still relying on slave labor). Portuguese rule rested ever more on Brazilian production linked to British markets—and through the eighteenth century, Lisbon aimed to prosper by both limiting and taxing those links. When revolution cut Haitian exports of sugar and coffee and imports of slaves, sugar and slavery revived in Brazil's Northeast, while coffee and slavery began to remake Rio de Janeiro's hinterland. Rising Brazilian trades sustained Portugal and Britain in times of war after 1793. When Napoleon took Lisbon in 1807, the British navy helped ferry the Portuguese monarchy to Rio, tightening ties with England. With Napoleon gone in 1814, King João stayed in Rio—until Lisbon liberals turned to the Cádiz model seeking new ways to restore their transatlantic power. They began conflicts that drew João back to Portugal—and to Brazil's separation in 1822 as an empire under Prince Pedro, who would rule as Pedro I. Regional separatist movements faced military forces funded by strong export earnings and backed by British navies. Vast Portuguese colonies—and claims to a larger Amazon—held together within a Brazilian empire. By 1830 Brazil was an expanding continental country sustained by coffee and slavery, which were tied to rising British industry. Like the U.S. republic and still-colonial Cuba, imperial Brazil expanded slavery to prosper in the new world of industrial capitalism.

The former colonies that expanded slave-made exports after 1800 found commercial prosperity and relative political stability until the 1860s. Then all faced conflicts over slavery—none more destructive than the U.S. Civil War. In contrast, Haitian slaves claimed liberty and land in revolution; from 1800 they faced continuous challenges of state making and exclusion from the world economy—while former slaves and their families lived better for generations. The new countries made out of Atlantic slave colonies lived enduring contradictions.

Part II looks at nation making in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Before Europeans came, these were regions of strong indigenous states sustained by cultivating communities. After 1500 they were reshaped by disease and demographic collapse, Spanish rule and silver economies. The Andes led the mining that drove global trades from 1550 to 1650; New Spain, including Mesoamerica and regions north, dominated silver production after 1700. Across mainland Spanish America, the era of independence brought the fall of the silver economies and difficult searches for new ways to prosper in the emerging world of industrial capitalism, while elites sought new political systems and many communities, indigenous and mixed, pursued local autonomies. Social, political, and economic challenges and conflicts shaped diverse new countries across



Spanish America—countries that struggled for decades to find stable polities and prosperous places in the new industrial world economy.

In “Becoming Mexico: The Conflictive Search for a North American Nation” Alfredo Ávila and I explore the most radical economic transformation and one of the most complex and conflictive political transitions in Spain’s Americas. New Spain remained economically dynamic and socially stable to 1810; strong silver production stimulated global trades and funded European wars during the era of U.S. independence and the French and Haitian Revolutions. Napoleon’s 1808 invasion of Spain broke sovereignty across the empire, setting off political conflicts in New Spain, leading to popular insurgency there in 1810. From 1812 to 1814, authorities implemented Cádiz liberalism’s participatory openings aiming to counter insurgency; they offered local autonomy to regional elites and indigenous republics, aiming to hold loyalty to Spain in the fight against France. Scattered political insurgents refused the offer, fighting for greater autonomy and even independence until 1815. Popular insurgents in the key mining, manufacturing, and cultivating region of the Bajío remained in arms to 1820; pacification came with a collapse of mining and a turn to family production reminiscent of Haiti.

When Spain returned to liberalism the same year, men who had fought insurgents and independence for a decade led an alliance of the powerful calling Fernando VII to New Spain (unsuccessfully) and then proclaiming a Mexican monarchy in 1821. They imagined a continental empire reaching from Costa Rica to Texas and California. But the collapse of the silver economy left the imagined Mexico to search for both a polity (republican from 1824) and a new economy. The result was a mix of creative and conflictive politics (often rooted in Cádiz legacies), economic uncertainty, empty treasuries, political wars, and social instability—combining to favor independence in the provinces, the autonomy indigenous villages, and the prosperity of family cultivators. Texas seceded in 1836 to preserve slavery for waves of Euro-American immigrants growing cotton on rich coastal plains, aiming to profit by supplying British industry. Decades of conflict culminated in the 1840s when the United States invaded to take Mexico’s North, including California, where gold drew a westward rush and gave new capital to a newly continental United States. Mexico was left to search for a polity with shrunken economic potential; the United States (after the Civil War) found unprecedented hemispheric hegemony.

The colonial Kingdom of Guatemala extended from highland Chiapas to lowland Costa Rica. Far from centers of silver production, the Maya peoples of Chiapas and Guatemala held onto land and local autonomies in indigenous



republics; more mixed peoples to the south mostly lived by ranching. The one important eighteenth-century export was indigo, raised in Pacific lowlands around San Salvador and sent to Atlantic markets by Guatemala City merchants. As Jordana Dym details in “The Republic of Guatemala: Stitching Together a New Country,” the kingdom enjoyed limited prosperity and general stability to 1808. It engaged Napoleon’s incursion and the Cádiz experiment with only a few conflicts, political and social. Mexico’s turn to an imperial independence in 1821, which aimed to include the Kingdom of Guatemala and sent an army to press the point, brought the break with Spain—and then from Mexico in 1822.

Decades of political experiment followed. A Central American federation was possible (minus Chiapas, which stayed in Mexico) while many regional leaders pursued local interests. The indigo economy around San Salvador gave way to cochineal, a red dye raised by *ladino* (mixed) growers in eastern Guatemala. By the 1840s Guatemala began to consolidate, combining Maya western highlands, central valleys around the capital where merchants, landlords, and professionals concentrated, and the ladino eastern uplands that produced the nation’s only export. El Salvador separated—as did Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (while dreams of federation lived). Guatemala emerged from the kingdom of the same name, a new and smaller country with a Maya majority and great internal diversity, linked to industrial Britain by one valuable dye. Only the late nineteenth-century rise of coffee in Pacific hills and bananas in Atlantic lowlands built a Guatemalan state with the power to rule assertive Maya communities.

The Spanish Andes led the first global silver economy, centered at Potosí from 1550 to 1640, by mobilizing and commercializing indigenous ways of rule, production, and work. Silver revived in limited ways in the eighteenth century, while the Spanish regime took growing exactions in times of war and global competition. Social conflict escalated from the 1740s, culminating in the great risings led by Túpac Amaru and others in the 1780s. They were contained, yet left those who ruled wary of indigenous rights and participations for decades to come.

To explore independence and nation making in the Andes we offer two chapters, one on political processes, one on indigenous assertions. In “From One Patria, Two Nations in the Andean Heartland,” Sarah Chambers emphasizes that new countries were neither inevitable nor always grounded in traditional unities. As capital of the Inca empire, Cuzco had dominated and integrated the highland regions that are now Peru and Bolivia. When Potosí became the leading center of global silver production in the sixteenth century, Cuzco and

the nearby highlands became key sources of supplies and labor. When Madrid reformers kept Cuzco tied to Lima while assigning Potosí to a new viceroyalty at Buenos Aires in 1776, the separation inhibited the response to the 1780s uprisings that spanned the region. After pacification, while the formal split continued, the Andean heartland remained integrated in many ways.

The Napoleonic incursion and the Cádiz experiment set off local conflicts in the Andes, but no adamant risings, political or social. The powerful preferred stability—and feared another rising of the native majority. Yet the question of independence could not be avoided. Amid the liberal revival in Spain, San Martín led armies from Buenos Aires and Chile to liberate Lima in 1821; Bolívar came in 1822 with forces from Caracas and Bogotá to lead battles that finalized independence in Upper Peru in 1824—founding Bolivia. Chambers shows how during that process and for decades after, the separation of Peru and Bolivia was contested. A union of the heartland linking Cuzco and Potosí held possible. The ultimate division of Peru, ruled by more Spanish Lima, and Bolivia, with an indigenous majority in search of an economy, came out of uncertain conflicts. Peru eventually found political stability in an economy of wool and nitrate exports. Bolivia struggled to revive mining and lost the chance of coastal export development in war with Chile. It remains a nation with an indigenous majority searching for a role in the world.

Erick Langer's concluding chapter, "Indigenous Independence in Spanish South America," focuses on native peoples in the Andes and nearby lowlands. It explores an outcome also noted in Ávila and Tutino's analysis of Mexico and emphasized in recent studies of Comanche power in North America: while empires fell and new countries struggled, native peoples often claimed new independence in local rule, production, and trade—at times finding more effective independence than young nations facing industrial powers. Langer details how natives across Andean highlands took new control of local production and trade, and how people in eastern lowlands found a greater independence parallel to the Comanche and others in the North American West. He shows how they used that autonomy to their benefit for decades, until export economies tied to industrial capitalism solidified national regimes after midcentury. Then, native peoples faced rising threats to political autonomies and the lands essential to their economic independence. National consolidations under export economies ended indigenous independence. Still, for generations after 1820, native peoples across the Americas found relief from political powers and economic impositions. Deep contradictions shaped decades of transforming divergence.

In an epilogue, Langer and I outline how the rise of export economies after 1860 brought the consolidation of politically oligarchic and commercially

liberal republics across Spanish America along with the decline of indigenous independence there (and in the U.S. West)—while the longer flourishing Atlantic export economies faced the conflicts (most intense in the United States and Cuba) that ended slavery. New countries built in conflicts and contradictions from 1750 to 1870 finally consolidated—retaining polarities within, divergences across the hemisphere, and limited roles in the world of industrial capitalism. Only the United States claimed power in that world—and it concentrated in the Northeast. Many in the South, Midwest, and West saw themselves as struggling in export economies ruled by an industrial-financial core in a nation that was also a continental empire. The United States thus replicated within its expanding boundaries the larger relationships (including indigenous subordination and Spanish American dependence) that tied all of the Americas to the North Atlantic core of industrial capitalism after 1870.

Our histories link global processes, regional challenges, and local conflicts to understand the hemispheric divergences that created new countries. Across Atlantic America, we emphasize the close link between the expansion of export economies grounded in slavery and early political stability—often seen as “success” in the world of early nations. Brazil and the United States held together to expand as continental nations; Cuba remained in the Spanish empire. All expanded slavery to prosper as exporters tied to a rising industrial capitalism; all later faced difficult conflicts to end slavery—and deal with racial inequities. The contrast with Haiti is striking: there, armed slaves ended slavery and most export production; they lived better for generations while their insistence on farming for sustenance led to commercial “failure” and national poverty.

Across highland Spanish America, the collapse of once dynamic silver economies during the wars set off by Napoleon’s occupation of Spain and the opportunities of Cádiz liberalism led to republics that began in the 1820s. They faced openings to new polities while struggling to find new economies. Political conflicts persisted while the dimensions of new nations were contested and native peoples claimed new independence. Spanish Central America and the Andes broke into nations searching for coherence and new roles in an industrializing world. They consolidated after 1860, as they found export economies sending staples to England, Europe, and the United States.

Mexico held together (after losing Central America), experimented with industry in the 1830s, and then lost its North in war to an expanding United States—a conflict that also sealed the fate of the Comanche empire. Both North American nations faced civil wars in 1860s. It was only after Union victory held the nation together and ended slavery that the United States rose to continental and later global industrial hegemony. In Mexico, liberals triumphed in the

War of Reform and outlasted French occupation in the 1860s to rule a struggling nation increasingly tied to U.S. expansion in a new industrial world.

The new countries of the Americas faced many challenges in the internal, national, and global divergences that came with their conflictive origins. Amid the rise of popular sovereignty, politically, socially, and culturally complex nations (and enduring colonies) became part in a new industrial world. Long marginal mainland colonies of British North America become a hegemonic continental nation. The once pivotal silver economies of Spanish America and sugar and slave colonies of Atlantic America became uncertain and often contested nations searching for new futures. There are many histories in this history of new countries.

#### Notes

- 1 The importance of sugar and slavery is the subject of a huge literature, best synthesized in Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery* (London: Verso, 1997). The earlier and larger role of the silver economies of Spanish America is emphasized in Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), and John Tutino, *Making a New World: Founding Capitalism in the Bajío and Spanish North America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
- 2 Spain's war for independence against Napoleon and the importance of Cádiz liberalism have received their due in studies beginning with François Xavier-Guerra, *Modernidades e independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993), and culminating in José Gregorio Cayuela Fernández and José Ángel Gallego Palomares, *La guerra de independencia: Historia bélica—pueblo y nación en España, 1808–1814* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2008), and Roberto Breña, *El primer liberalismo español y los procesos de emancipación de América, 1808–1824* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2006).
- 3 The new history of the Haitian Revolution began with Carolyn Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), and culminated with Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
- 4 This wave was ably synthesized in C. H. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
- 5 John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1986).
- 6 Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery: 1776–1848* (London: Verso, 1990).
- 7 Lester Langley, *The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1850* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).

- 8 J. H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
- 9 Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- 10 Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 11 Ronald Findlay and Kevin O'Rourke, *Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- 12 Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (New York: Knopf, 2014).
- 13 See Tutino, *Making a New World*, in the context of Man Huang Lin, *China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
- 14 On war capitalism and industrial capitalism, see Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*.
- 15 Fick, *The Making of Haiti*.
- 16 Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*.
- 17 On the Bajío and New Spain's silver in the world economy, see Tutino, *Making a New World*; on collapse after 1810, Tutino, "The Revolution in Mexican Independence: Insurgency and the Renegotiation of Property, Production, and Patriarchy in the Bajío, 1800–1855," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 78:3 (1998), 367–418.
- 18 Luis Fernando Granados, *En el espejo haitiano: Los indios del Bajío y el colapso del orden colonial en América Latina* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2016).
- 19 On the politics of U.S. independence, Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), remains the classic; on the transatlantic rise of popular sovereignty, see Edmund Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York: Norton, 1989); and on the inseparability of slavery and nation making, see Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975). On the French Revolution, see François Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770–1810* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); on Haitian interactions with revolutionary France, see Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*.
- 20 Guerra, *Modernidades e independencias*, built on the pioneering work of Nettie Lee Benson, *The Provincial Deputation in Mexico: Harbinger of Provincial Autonomy, Independence, and Federalism* (published in Spanish, 1955; reprint, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).
- 21 Breña, *El primer liberalismo español*; on the complex mix of war and insurgency against Napoleón in Spain, see Cayuela Fernández and Gallego Palomares, *La guerra de independencia: Historia bélica*.
- 22 Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), and John Tutino, "Globalizing the Comanche Empire," *History and Theory* 52:1 (February 2013), 67–74.
- 23 To add another divergence to integrated global processes, if Europe and the Americas forged nations at the foundations of industrial capitalism in order to spread that capitalism, the European powers later forged a second generation of empires

- spanning the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. See Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*.
- 24 Again, see Morgan, *Inventing the People*, and Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*.
- 25 The last work of the great historian of Russia Richard Stites details the impact of Cádiz liberalism from Spain to Naples, Greece, and Russia. See *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).