

2. MEXICO, CHINA, AND THE POLITICS OF TRUST

1. Eradicating prejudices through cultural awareness is also a goal of the Chinese Ministry of Education's Confucius Institutes, five of which are operating in Mexico at the time of writing. The Chinese newspaper *People's Daily* reports that the institutes and related educational programs play a dual diplomatic and educational role: "China hopes to dissolve the misconception of its development as the 'China threat,' by making its traditional value systems known to the world" ("'China Threat' Fear Counteracted by Culture" 2006).

3. HAVANA'S CHINATOWN AND THE QUEST FOR SYNERGY

1. According to Ernesto, Carlos, and Jorge Alay J6 (2002), the first Chinese arrived in Cuba in approximately 1830, from the Mandarin-speaking Chinese community in the Philippines. Generally able to speak Spanish, these "Chinos de Manila" worked primarily as domestic servants and later as florists and horticulturalists.
2. While Ortiz wrote little on Chinese heritage in Cuba, classic Cuban ethnologists such as José Baltar Rodríguez (1997), Antonio Chuffat Latour (1927), Jesús Guancho (1983), Juan Jiménez Pastrana (1963 and 1983), Juan Pérez de la Riva (2000), and Gonzalo de Quesada (1946) documented the social practices and demographic characteristics of Chinese communities throughout Cuba. Building on this foundation, a new wave of Cuban scholarly interest in Chinese Cuban heritage has emerged. Pedro Cosme Baños (1998) and Ana Valdés Millán (2005), for instance, have published ethnographic studies of Chinese-descended communities in Regla and Guantanamo, respectively. The University of Havana's

Catedra de Estudios sobre la Inmigración China en Cuba (Center for the Study of Chinese Immigration to Cuba), directed by María Teresa Montes de Oca Choy, has produced a multimedia CD-ROM on Havana's Chinese ethnic associations (Montes de Oca Choy 2007). Yrmina Eng Menéndez, former director of the Grupo Promotor de Barrio Chino, wrote a master's thesis on Chinese civic integration in Havana and a chapter on Barrio Chino for the volume I edited on community development in Cuba (Eng Menéndez 2008). A description of Barrio Chino in the early twentieth century by the historian Federico Chang (2007) appears in a volume on Cuban multiculturalism by Raimundo, Gómez Navia, and Graciela Chailloux (2007). The two most comprehensive historical analyses of Sino-Cuban cultural and political interaction are by Mauro García Triana (2003), former Cuban ambassador to China, and the historian Mercedes Crespo Villate (2004).

Recent years have also witnessed a flourishing interest in Chinese Cuban history from scholars outside Cuba. Joseph Dorsey (2004), Evelyn Hu-DeHart (1993, 1999, 2005a, and 2010), Moon-Ho Jung (2006), Kathleen López (2004, 2008, 2009, and 2013), and Lisa Yun (2008) have each made original contributions to the historical record of the coolie trade, describing both the difficulties faced by its victims and the ways they tried to organize and raise their community out of poverty. Earlier publications include Duvon C. Corbitt's ethnographic history, *A Study of the Chinese in Cuba, 1847–1947* (1971), and Beatriz Varela's account of Chinese linguistic influences in Cuban daily life, *Lo Chino en el Habla Cubana* (1980). *The Chinese in Cuba: 1847–Now* (García Triana, Eng Herrera, and Benton 2009) presents the reflections of Mauro García Triana and the Chinese Cuban revolutionary leader Jesús Pedro Eng Herrera in their own words, with annotation by Gregor Benton. Autobiographical accounts of Chinese integration into Cuban revolutionary society are also presented in *Our History Is Still Being Written: The Story of Three Chinese Cuban Generals* (Choy, Chui, and Sío Wong 2006). Emerging at a time of intensifying Chinese engagement with Latin America and the world, this literature provides a historical framework for understanding the significance of Chinese presence in Cuba for both countries.

3. The declaration is now inscribed on a monument in Central Havana, visited by twenty-first-century visitors interested in tracing the tribulations of Chinese immigrants through Cuban history.
4. The Casino Chung Wah keeps meticulous records of the number of Chinese association members in Cuba. Jorge Chao Chiu, who maintains these records, reports that many who left Cuba in the 1960s were not association members and that it is therefore impossible to determine their numbers. The records show a sharp increase in the number of Chinese nationals adopting Cuban citizenship at the time, most likely so they could then enter the United States.
5. The absence of such ties in cases as diverse as Salvador (Brazil), Georgetown (Malaysia), and Madras (South India) has manifested in poor civic participation,

political apathy, and conflicting interpretations of local cultural heritage (Crook 1993; Kahn 1997; Woolcock 1998). Black markets and informal rules often take root in such contexts, posing challenges to institutions seeking to assert economic governance and discourage social fragmentation (Armony 2011; Hilgers 2008).

6. A similar process is evident in Cholon Chinatown in Ho Chi Minh City, where the Vietnamese government has attempted to selectively revive those aspects of Hoa (ethnic Chinese) heritage that attract tourism and portray multicultural harmony. Hoa residents' affinities with traditional and even contemporary Chinese culture, however, are tenuous at best (Yu 2006).
7. For details of the *Kwong Wah Po's* origins and history, see Garcia Triana, Eng Herrera, and Benton (2009, 32–33, 40).

4. TRUST AND TREACHERY IN MEXICO'S CHINESE DIASPORA

1. Chinese production of Mexican artisanal handicrafts is perceived as piracy in Mexico. It began with the imitation of wooden products from the state of Michoacán and has extended to *rebozos* (traditional Mexican shawls), *tapetes* (decorative rugs), embroidered dresses, *talavera* (traditional pottery from Puebla), baskets, *hojas de lata* (tin plates), and silver and stone jewelry sold in tourist centers and markets around the country. This has outraged Mexican artisans, who claim that their sales have diminished by 70–80 percent. See Cruz García 2003; González Alvarado 2008; Noticieros Televisa 2005.