

NOTES

Introduction

1. Besteman 1999b; Besteman and Cassanelli 2000.
2. Here and throughout the book I use pseudonyms for those who are not public figures.
3. Anderson 2009; *BBC News* 2008; *Foreign Policy* 2008, 2009; Menkhaus 2008; Refugees International 2011. See also Fergusson 2013; Garvelink and Tahir 2011.
4. See Besteman 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1999b and Besteman and Cassanelli 2000, where Banta is called Loc.
5. Van Lehman and Eno 2002.
6. Huisman 2011: n.p.
7. Hudson 2006.
8. Nadeau 2005.
9. Nadeau 2011.
10. Nyers 2006.
11. The UNHCR put the number of forcibly displaced people at 43 million in 2014, 27 million of whom were displaced by conflict or catastrophe within their home countries.
12. Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 253.
13. Bauman 2004; see also Agamben 1995; Horst 2006; Malkki 1995b, 2002; Nyers 2006.
14. Huntington 1993, 2004; Kaplan 1994. Thanks to Kristin Koptiuch for this insight.

I. Becoming Refugees

1. An audio clip of Cali reciting one of his poems is accessible at “Historical Audio Links,” The Somali Bantu Experience, <http://web.colby.edu/somali-bantu/images-and-audio/audio/>.

2. The meticulous portraits of communities sundered by civil wars provided by Beatriz Manz (2004) on Guatemala, Tone Bringe on Bosnia (Bringe and Christie 1993), and ethnographic historian Jan Gross (2001), who uncovered the secret of the July day in 1941 when half of the villagers of Jedwabne, Poland, murdered the other half, demonstrate how an intimate knowledge of localities and comprehensive knowledge of the global forces that impact localities combine to tell war stories of profound depth and complexity.
3. See Cassanelli 1982; Lewis 1988.
4. For detailed accounts of this history that draw on Italian and British colonial documents and oral histories, see Besteman 1999b; Cassanelli 1982; Declich 1987; and Menkhaus 1989.
5. Somali Bantus believe *ooji* comes from the Italian word for day, a reference to the stereotype that riverine farmers couldn't think beyond the time frame of a day. *Adoon* means slave.
6. Mohamed Eno (2008) offers a comprehensive overview of *jareer* status. See also Besteman 1999b.
7. See Lewis 1961.
8. Although the structure of Somalia's clan-based kinship system suggests rigidly defined patrilineal identities, in reality adoption by a clan different from that of one's birth was relatively common. For example, Bernhard Helander (1996) estimated that the majority of the members of the clan where he did his ethnographic fieldwork in the Baay region, adjacent to the Jubba Valley, started life in a different clan. People sought out adoption for a wide variety of reasons: to access land, for protection, to relocate to a new community.
9. Cali Osman and Sheikh Axmed Nur were both Ajuraan, a subclan with a distinguished history that became part of the Hawiye clan centuries ago. Caliyow Isaaq claimed membership in the Laysan branch of the Rahanweyn clan, although he had a Hawiye wife, and Sheikh Axmed Nur's eldest wife was Rahanweyn; their children Xawo and Mohamed married during my stay in Banta (the occasion of the wedding music recording that I played at the slide show reunion in Lewiston).
10. They were affiliated with the Bartire clan.
11. Rawson 1994.
12. Anthropological disagreements about the relative importance of kinship, class, inequality, and foreign aid in contributing to Somalia's civil war are outlined most clearly in my published debate with I. M. Lewis (Besteman 1996a, 1998; Lewis 1998). See also Besteman 1996b, 1999a.
13. Besteman 1994 analyzes land tenure reform in the valley.
14. The Jubba Valley farmers were certainly not the only group to suffer horribly during the civil war. See Kapteijns 2012 for a detailed account of the targeted "clan cleansing" violence in the greater Mogadishu area following the collapse of Siad Barre's government.
15. Menkhaus 1992.
16. As an account based on the recollections of dozens of people, the story of Banta told here reflects my efforts to cross-check every claim with numerous witnesses

- to each incident. I reviewed the story many times in individual and group meetings in Lewiston, Syracuse, and Hartford in 2006–7, and two friends from Banta read and offered further corrections to my written narrative. But as a compilation of memories recounted in the wake of trauma and displacement, it is entirely possible that details are fuzzy, misremembered, or transformed over many years of discussion by those who experienced these events.
17. Reports on the circumstances of Somalia's minorities during the war include Danish Immigration Service 2000; Eno 2008; Eno, Eno, and Van Lehman 2010; Hill 2010.
 18. The international intervention included Operation Restore Hope, launched in 1992 with the U.S.-led, UN-backed United Task Force, which concluded in 1993 and was followed by UNOSOM, another U.S.-led, UN-backed security effort that ended in 1995.
 19. Mbembe 2011: 117.

2. The Humanitarian Condition

1. Agier 2005: 3.
2. Agier 2005: 15, emphasis in original.
3. Agamben 1998. For a recent critique, see Magnus Fiskej  (2012), who suggests that the posited relationship between state sovereignty and homo sacer may be "a fictional reconstruction" (173) since prestate and nonstate societies practiced expulsion as well as the granting of refuge.
4. Malkki 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2002.
5. Daniel and Knudsen 1996; Nyers 2006; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005.
6. See Malkki 1995b.
7. There is a vast literature, some of which is cited here, outlining the moral implications for humanitarian action toward refugees emerging from the Enlightenment view of a "shared humanity." Fiona Terry's (2002: 19) succinct statement that "humanitarian action posits a universal ethic founded on the conviction that all people have equal dignity by virtue of their membership in humanity" captures the basic argument.
8. Fassin 2005: 366.
9. See Agier 2010; Fadlalla 2009; Finnstr m 2008; Gatrell 2013; Hyndman 2000; Nyers 2006; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005.
10. Gatrell 2013: 242. Gatrell is also critiquing assumptions about the dependency of African refugees on humanitarian organizations.
11. I did not conduct ethnographic fieldwork in the refugee camps. This chapter and chapter 3 are based on oral history interviews with refugees, former UNHCR staff, ethnographic studies, reports by humanitarian agencies, and news accounts.
12. Gatrell 2013; Sassen 1999 (also Nyers 2006). Sassen writes, "The first change appeared in the Third Edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* issued in 1796: 'refugee' was extended beyond that particular case of Protestants to anyone leaving his or her country in times of distress, a general term also covering specific cases like the word ' migr ,' applied to aristocrats who left France during the French Revolution" (1999: 35).

13. Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001.
14. Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Churgin 1996.
15. Sassen 1999: 83.
16. Gatrell 2013. See also Torpey 2000.
17. Arendt (1951) 1966: 267, 269.
18. See Haines 2010; Loescher and Scanlan 1986.
19. Brettell 2007; De Genova 2005; King 2001; Sanchez 2000.
20. Gatrell (2013: 88) notes that the International Refugee Organization focus on assisting those fleeing communism overlooked the concerns of the large number of refugees in South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East during this era.
21. Loescher and Scanlan 1986.
22. Einolf 2001; Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Malkki 1995b. An initial bill signed by Truman in 1948 limited the number of Jews to be accepted by the United States, although this concern was later softened as a greater concern with communism overtook the refugee debate.
23. Feldman 2007.
24. Loescher and Scanlan 1986.
25. Gatrell 2013: 109; Malkki 1995b: 499.
26. See Kennedy 2004 for a discussion of the legal debates around this issue.
27. Khosravi 2010: 70.
28. The phrase “murderous humanitarianism” comes from Robin D. G. Kelley (2000: 19). In their article on “methodological nationalism,” Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller (2002) note how social scientists began to accept the normativity of the nation-state structure by problematizing migrants as policy concerns during and after World War II.
29. Gatrell 2013: 241.
30. The UNHCR annual Global Trends report (see, for example, UNHCR 2012) shows the pattern of housing refugees in poorer countries in the global south.
31. Hyndman 2000: 17. See also Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005. On the charge that policies and practices of the global north prompt refugee flows in the global south, see, in addition to my argument in chapter 1, Bohmer and Schuman 2008 on Central American refugees; Shemak 2010 on Caribbean refugees; Agier 2010; and Bauman 2004.
32. Ethnographic discussions of these points are available in Agier 2005, 2010; Bauman 2004; Bohmer and Schuman 2008; Edkins 2000; Fadlalla 2009; Fassin 2005, 2007; Hyndman 2000; Nyers 2006; Turner 2010; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005.
33. Aleinikoff 1995: 263. See also Gorlick 2003; Hyndman 2000; Loescher 2003; White and Marsella 2007.
34. Edkins 2000: 15.
35. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005. Prior to the massive influx of Somali refugees in 1991, Kenya had not previously required its tiny number of resident refugees to live in confined camps.
36. Nyers 2006: 85; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 271; Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier 2004: 302.

37. Agier 2005: 45.
38. Agier 2010; see also Turner 2004 on Tanzanian camps.
39. Horst 2006: 112.
40. Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005.
41. Gourevitch 2010: 109; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 334, emphasis in original. See also Agier 2005.
42. Crisp 1999; Horst 2006: 91.
43. The processes of refugee resettlement and asylum differ in one critical respect. An asylum application is made after the applicant has already managed to cross the border into the country in which he or she wishes to request asylum. In contrast, refugee resettlement applications are negotiated only from afar, usually from the country to which a refugee has fled, for entry into a third country, and only under the auspices of UNHCR. The contemporary process of managing refugee admittance to the United States is based on minimizing the opportunity for asylum claims by ensuring that refugees are kept far away from American borders.
44. Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Loescher and Scanlan 1986.
45. Loescher and Scanlan 1986.
46. Peter Schrag (2011) reviews the long-standing tension in America between the need for immigrant labor to power economic development and the hostility toward immigrants as undesirable, diseased, and culturally dangerous.
47. Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan (1986) report that 800,000 immigrants arrived in the United States in 1980.
48. Haines 2010.
49. Boas 2007.
50. Boas 2007.
51. In 2004, when the first Somali Bantus began arriving in the United States, the P2 designation also included Cubans, religious minorities from Iran and the former Soviet Union, Baku Armenians, and American-associated Vietnamese (U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing 2004).
52. UNHCR 2002: 14.
53. UNHCR 2002: 2.
54. UNHCR 2002: 7.
55. Boas 2007: 438.
56. Boas 2007: 463, 455.
57. Barnett 2003.
58. Lacey 2001; UNHCR 2002; Finkel 2002.
59. Goffe 2004; Manning 2004; UNHCR 2002.
60. Swarns 2003a; Lovgren 2003.
61. Lacey 2001; Harman 2001; Lorch 2002.
62. Lorch 2002; UNHCR 2002; Swarns 2003a.
63. UNHCR 2002; Swarns 2003b; Barnett 2003: 12.
64. UNHCR 2002: 7; Lorch 2002.
65. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing 2004. See *Economist* 2003; Lacey 2001; Lorch 2002; UNHCR 2002.

66. U.S. Department of State 1999.
67. Frelick 2007: 34.
68. Frelick 2007: 47.
69. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Immigration Subcommittee 2002.
70. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Immigration Subcommittee 2002.
71. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, Immigration Subcommittee 2002.
72. U.S. Department of State n.d.
73. U.S. Department of State 2004.
74. The report comments that lengthy processing delays “allowed for misunderstanding and resistance to grow in some of the U.S. destination communities, among people who were uncertain of what to expect and who sometimes gave public voice to fearful worst-case scenarios that were widely off the mark.” Antirefugee activists in several cities selected for resettlement, including Hadley, Massachusetts, and Cayce, South Carolina, successfully blocked the resettlement of Somali Bantu refugees in their communities.
75. Haines 2010: 170; Bohmer and Shuman 2008; Kennedy 2004; Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Schrag 2011.
76. For example, Gibney 2004.
77. For example, Bauman 2004.
78. For example, Fassin 2005; Ticktin 2006.
79. Albeit, certainly, with a dimension of care.

3. Becoming Somali Bantus

1. In the sense, of course, of James Scott (1999).
2. Much of this chapter is based on oral histories recounted by my former Banta neighbors and others from the Jubba Valley as well as interviews with former UNHCR staff who worked in Dadaab and scholars who visited or conducted fieldwork in Dadaab. Thus, as with chapter 1, this chapter captures how those with whom I spoke narrate their memories of their experiences in Dadaab.
3. Other studies that explore refugee agency include Steven Robins’s (2009) description of a coalition created in South Africa by an HIV/AIDS activist group, NGOs, and refugees to use South Africa’s progressive constitution to promote a notion of transnational citizenship that would offer greater protections to refugees; Simon Turner’s (2010) and Liisa Malkki’s (2002) attention to the political activism of refugees in, respectively, Lukole and Mishamo refugee camps; Cindy Horst’s (2006) and Jennifer Hyndman’s (2000) descriptions of the forms of mobility and transnational networks maintained by Somali refugees in Dadaab to access resources; Fiona Terry’s (2002) and Peter Nyers’s (2006) reviews of the challenge to humanitarian visions posed by “warrior refugees”; Ilana Feldman’s (2012) work on how Palestinian refugees appropriate the language of humanitarianism to demand civil rights as refugees; Nell Gabiam’s (2012) analysis of how Palestinian refugees in Syria reject development schemes intended to reduce their suffering, a subjectivity they believe is important for maintaining claims to their right to return home; Rahul Chandrashekar Oka’s (2014) argument that refugees in Kakuma

- insist on consumption and marketing activities that camp administrators oppose because such practices offer a sense of dignity and normalcy; and Shahram Khosravi's (2010) autoethnography of his own experience as a refugee.
4. Menkhaus 2010: 93.
 5. Declich 2000: 31.
 6. See Besteman 1999b; Declich 1987; Menkhaus 1989.
 7. Menkhaus notes that Somali militias targeted food aid directed toward Bantus in Somalia during the early years of the civil war: "Now that they were dispossessed of all they had, the Bantu's destitution itself became a commodity to exploit" (2010: 98).
 8. Menkhaus 2010: 99.
 9. Menkhaus 2010: 99.
 10. Kenneth Menkhaus says this was Zimbabwean Leonard Kapungo, the UNOSOM director of the Department of Political Affairs from 1992 to 1995 (personal communication, March 20, 2011), as does Dan Van Lehman (personal communication, September 7, 2012).
 11. Omar Eno, interview, Portland, Oregon, July 18, 2007.
 12. Francesca Declich (2000), an anthropologist who worked in the Kenyan refugee camps, reported that *jareer* refugees arriving at the camps were expected to provide information about their lineage, ethnic group, village of origin, tribe, clan, and/or subclan on the UNHCR camp registration form, a form that provided new arrivals with an identity as refugees and camp residents. Declich noted that arriving refugees unable to offer a clear tribe or clan identity were designated "Bantu," whether or not they spoke a Bantu language or used the term to define themselves.
 13. Dan Van Lehman, interview, Portland, Oregon, July 18, 2007. See also Eno and Eno 2007.
 14. Dan Van Lehman, personal communication, November 18, 2012.
 15. Dan Van Lehman, personal communication, November 25, 2012.
 16. Tanzania eventually granted citizenship to about 3,000 Somali Bantu refugees.
 17. Van Lehman 1999.
 18. Several of my informants suggested the four major *jareer* groups that ultimately became the Somali Bantus were Mushunguli (Zigua speakers from the lower Jubba), Maxaway (Af-Maay speakers from the lower Jubba), Reer Shabelle (Af-Maxaa speakers from around the Bu'aale area), and Elye/Rahanweyn (Af-Maay speakers from Saakow-Baay region). In Somalia, the last considered themselves somewhat superior to the first three groups, a distinction my informants claim disappeared after the consolidation of Somali Bantu identity in the camps and the diaspora.
 19. Abdulle, interview, Hartford, March 25, 2007.
 20. U.S. Department of State 1999.
 21. *Economist* 2003. See also the description of the three-day bus journey in Chanoff 2002.
 22. See, for example, Bohmer and Shuman 2007, 2008; Khosravi 2010; Malkki 2007; Ordoñez 2008.

23. Bohmer and Shuman 2007: 609. See also Fassin 2013.
24. Writing about an applicant who was denied asylum because his life trajectory meant he did not speak the language his interviewer believed he should, Jan Blommaert notes, “The dominant reflex to increases of hybridity and deterritorialization, unfortunately, too often appears to be a reinforced homogeneity and territorialization” (2009: 425).
25. Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 281–82. Malkki adds, “We should be ready to consider the possibility, at least, that contemporary asylum seekers and immigrants are de facto being forced to convert the psychic trauma of impoverishment and hopelessness into a performed psychic trauma of formulaic political violence” (2007: 341).
26. In apartheid South Africa, state authorities pushed a pencil through a person’s hair to confirm African ancestry for identity documents. “African” hair was thought to offer greater resistance to the pencil.
27. I learned that other countries with refugee resettlement programs besides the United States also subscribed to a racialized understanding of Somali Bantu identity as verifiable through physical characteristics when a representative of the Australian government asked me to analyze photographs of Somali Bantus applying for asylum and provide an authoritative statement about whether or not they were Somali Bantu based on their physical appearance. Instead I sent him a copy of “American Anthropological Association Statement on ‘Race,’” (May 17, 1998, <http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm>).
28. Van Lehman and Eno 2003.
29. Dan Van Lehman, personal communication, March 1, 2007.
30. Reported in Briggs 2005. According to the article, after the mother arrived in Burlington, Vermont, she was able to pursue the case through DNA testing, which proved the family relationship.
31. Sanders and Zucchini 2006.
32. Peter Nyers (2006) and Peter Gatrell (2013) analyze the use of images of nameless refugees to depict destitution and dependency by humanitarian agencies, insights that could be enhanced by research on the public audiences to whom these images appeal.

II. Introduction

1. Images of Somalis uneasily confronting an escalator have become a meme. The scene in the film *Rain in a Dry Land* showing a Somali Bantu family arrayed at the base of the escalator in the airport after arriving for the first time in the United States makes a dramatic impression on viewers. At one large meeting of social services providers I attended in Portland, Maine, participants described this scene as the most impactful moment in the film for them. A YouTube video made in Sweden of two Somali women poised at the top of an escalator in a shopping mall, unable to screw up the courage to step onto the stairs as other shoppers pass by them, has been reposted on Facebook and Somali and racist websites, generating hundreds of comments from people either sympathetic to the women’s

- uncertainty, making fun of their own parents for their fear of escalators, or nastily castigating Somalis as intellectually and culturally inferior and unfit to live in modern society.
2. Stated in “2012/13 State of Maine ORR Funded Programs,” Office of Refugee Resettlement, November 28, 2012, <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/ffy-2012-13-state-of-maine-orr-funded-programs>.
 3. Sudanese “lost boy” Valentino Achek Deng, in his autobiography written with the assistance of David Eggers, poignantly recalls his dashed hopes for education under the burden of working in the back room of a furniture showroom: “The job kept me in the back of the store, among the fabric samples. I should not feel shame about this, but somehow I do: my job was to retrieve fabric samples for the designers, and then file them again when they were returned. I did this for almost two years. The thought of all that time wasted, so much time sitting on that wooden stool, cataloguing, smiling, thanking, filing—all while I should have been in school—is still too much for me to contemplate” (Eggers 2007: 20).
 4. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2010.
 5. Haines 2010: 163. Haines notes that the reductions in refugee assistance that began in the 1980s in response to concerns about “refugee dependence” resulted in “limited overall improvement in the economic situation of Southeast Asian refugees” during 1982–85 (2010: 162). The extension of direct assistance to refugees has continued to decline since then.
 6. In 2000, Mary Waters wrote that immigration scholars had been slow to draw on scholarship about race in their analyses of immigrant experience, reflecting an uncertainty about how to analyze the sometimes tense relations between native-born and immigrant people of color. Philip Kasinitz (2004) and Nancy Foner (2005) are among the scholars now investigating the relationship between immigrants of color and native-born African Americans.
 7. Nadeau 2011.
 8. From 2006 to 2010 I spent one to four days a week (and in 2011–12 several days a month) in Lewiston doing participant observation, conducting interviews, volunteering in schools and social services agencies, attending committee meetings for local NGOs and community organizations, and engaging in advocacy and public education projects with local activists and refugee community members. In addition to traditional participant observation (afternoons visiting refugee friends in their apartments, sharing tea with friends in the Somali café or in their community offices), my research in Lewiston included oral history interviews with refugees (chapters 1 and 3); formal interviews with officials and staff in city and state government, local schools, NGOs, medical offices, and other agencies charged with assisting and building programs for refugees from 2001 to 2006 (chapter 4); informal conversations with a wide spectrum of Lewiston’s non-Somali residents in forums ranging from stores to office waiting rooms to community meetings where residents shared their concerns about changes in their city (chapter 5); advocacy work with activist and community networks and NGO boards from 2006 to 2011 (chapters 4 and 6); and participation in public outreach projects in collaboration

with Somali and Somali Bantu community leaders and local organizations (such as public panel discussions and an exhibit at Museum LA) (part III). Besteman 2010 provides additional information about my field research, methodology, and advocacy activities.

9. Macdonald 2012a.

4. We Have Responded Valiantly

1. I often use “refugee” and “immigrant” interchangeably in this chapter and the next because as secondary migrants Somalis were both refugees and immigrants. Many of the professional leaders of the Somali community preferred the term “immigrants,” which they felt more accurately captured their social status in Lewiston.
2. Unlike many other states, Maine has allowed people, including noncitizen refugee immigrants and asylum seekers, to request GA help the day they arrive. This form of welfare support is under attack by Governor LePage, who claims it attracts welfare dependents.
3. A new concern with immigrant integration is reflected in the production of policy documents and how-to manuals, such as GCIR 2006.
4. Phil Nadeau, interview, January 14, 2010. Also see Nadeau 2005, 2011.
5. Nadeau 2005: 120.
6. “A Letter to the Somali Community,” ImmigrationsHumanCost.org, October 1, 2002, <http://www.immigrationshumancost.org/text/raymond.html>. The Letter is also the subject of a documentary film called *The Letter* (Hamzeh 2003).
7. These stories and others are collected in Somalis in Maine Archive, Scholarly Communication and Research at Bates, http://scarab.bates.edu/somalis_in_maine/.
8. See interviews in the film *The Letter* (Hamzeh 2003). Nadeau (2005) shows that the percentage of the local share of property taxes that went to support immigrant and refugee programs was .97 percent in 2003 and the total cost to the city of GA for immigrants and refugees was \$145, 979.
9. Phil Nadeau, interview, January 14, 2010.
10. Nadeau credits Mark Grey (2000) for inspiring this phrase.
11. These estimates are from an informal census conducted in 2010 by the Somali Bantu Community Mutual Assistance Association.
12. Another particularly notable exception to the business-as-usual attitude was the New American Sustainable Agriculture Project created after the arrival of Somali Bantus by a local nonprofit, Coastal Enterprises. Through this project, dozens of Somali Bantu men and women began cultivating small plots, selling their produce to farmers’ markets and local restaurants. The project was later absorbed by a local nonprofit called Cultivating Community (accessed February 26, 2014, <http://www.cultivatingcommunity.org>).
13. Nadeau 2007: appendix D.
14. News articles reported similar complaints in Boston (Vaznis 2009), Pittsburgh (Smydo 2006), and Springfield, MA (Glater 2006).
15. Interview, May 6, 2010.

16. According to Nadeau's 2007 report to Maine's congressional delegation, "NCLB [No Child Left Behind] states that students must be tested and held to the same standards in math as their English speaking peers as soon as they enter the county. In reading there is a one year grace period. Thus, if a 12 year old, comes to us from another country with no prior schooling, after one year, he/she is expected to meet the same standards as English speaking peers in reading, writing and science" (2007: 18). The report also notes that because of Maine's comparatively high standards, many ELL students are "failing" who would be passing in other states.
17. The high school principal weathered complaints that some students washed their feet in the lavatory basins at prayer time, informing concerned parents that according to the school nurse, foot washing is not a health hazard. Several teachers laughed in conversations with me at their recollection that he told them, privately, that he wished more students would wash their feet.
18. Pollock 2004.
19. Brown 2006: 13.
20. Brown 2006: 46.
21. Ellison 2009.
22. See Gilbert 2011; Jones-Correa 2011.
23. On the history of refuge, see Rabben 2011.
24. Jackett 2004. See also Manning 2004; Wagner 2003.
25. Povinelli 2011.
26. For example, Governor LePage introduced in his 2012 budget a sixty-month cap on benefits, identifying immigrants dependent on benefits as one of his targets. People who reach the sixty-month cutoff but still need help could seek it through the GA programs in their local cities, but in 2014 Governor LePage instituted a new rule that GA staff could no longer provide assistance to immigrants who had not yet achieved citizenship (including asylum seekers). The governor also attempted to scale back the amount of state aid provided to cities for GA. Some cities, such as Portland, refused to obey the new rule, and community action groups throughout the state protested it. As of this writing the rule is being reviewed in court. Lewiston's Mayor Macdonald staunchly supported the governor's actions.

5. Strangers in Our Midst

1. Since the myths encompass both Somali and Somali Bantu immigrants, in this chapter I use "Somali" to include both groups.
2. Meyer 2010.
3. Ellison 2009; Jones 2004.
4. See Ellison 2009.
5. The CPHV prepared a myth-busting memo to use in their community dialogues and school programs that challenged claims that local schools provided Somalis with a separate prayer room, removed pork from school lunches out of deference to Islam, and distributed money to Somali families. The superintendent of schools told me that he had also written a myth-busting letter in response to parental complaints about unfair special privileges for refugees.

6. In an article about resurgent public expressions of racism in Britain and their iterative presence in the online arena, Paul Gilroy (2012) addresses the importance of social media—blogs, Facebook, YouTube videos—as a space of public commentary and interpretation for which researchers have yet to fully develop adequate interpretive tools. He is particularly interested in the resonance between such expressions and the public statements about multiculturalism and race by British politicians. In Lewiston, I was struck by how often people critical of the immigrant Somali population cited online comments posted in response to news articles about Somalis as the basis for their “facts.”
7. This chapter departs from the more chronological structure of the previous chapters to capture the reigning sentiments of confusion, insecurity, and racism that characterized some conversations, editorials, and blogs in Lewiston from 2006 to 2011. My discussion is not intended to stereotype residents who are hostile to the presence of refugees—all of whom remain anonymous here with the exception of public figures and those who identified themselves by name in their published comments in the newspaper—but rather aims to highlight resonances between localized concerns in Lewiston and broader concerns in American popular and political culture about insecurities introduced by immigrants. The story I tell here shows how the current American mythology of dangerous immigrants gains particular footholds in Lewiston’s cultural and economic context.
8. Ahmed, Besteman, and Osman 2010; Besteman and Ahmed 2010.
9. Staff Sergeant Thomas Field was from neighboring Lisbon, Maine. Master Sergeant Gary Gordon, of Lincoln, Maine, was also killed in the battle.
10. Macdonald 2012a. This sentiment appears regularly in local editorials. A few random selections from editorials in spring 2010 include the following: Roland Morin wrote, “As a Franco, I find the comparison insulting! The people from Quebec came here to work—not to live off welfare!” (*Twin City Times*, March 18, 2010); Jacqueline Smith wrote, “The only comparison between the French-Canadians and the Somali is that neither is native to this country. Don’t try to excuse one by down-grading the other” (*Twin City Times*, April 8, 2010).
11. Rachel Desgrosseilliers and Karla Rider, interview, June 17, 2010.
12. Besteman and Ahmed 2010; Cullen 2011; Goad 2002.
13. Because I used the DHHS category “noncitizen residents,” the number could include some non-Somalis as well. The figures would not include Somalis who have naturalized, although the process of applying for citizenship in the Somali population was just beginning in 2009. I am grateful to David Maclean in Lewiston’s DHHS office for his kind assistance.
14. Since Governor LePage assumed office, the link to “The Real Facts” on the DHHS website has been removed.
15. Rector 2008.
16. Nadeau 2008.
17. Mary LaFontaine, interview, May 20, 2010.
18. After providing seasonal employment in Lewiston for several years, in 2009 the wreath-making company failed to return because it lost its contract

- with L.L.Bean, although 150 Somalis put their names on the sign-up sheet just in case they decided to hire again.
19. Mamgain with Collins 2003.
 20. Bates College Department of Anthropology 2008.
 21. L.L.Bean accommodates non-English-speaking immigrants to meet the company's need for seasonal labor. Workers can pray during break time, use the bathroom sinks to wash their feet before prayers, and wear whatever clothing they prefer so long as it is safe, according to refugees who have worked there; see Toner and Hough 2011.
 22. Work Ready job training programs require an eighth-grade diploma, which prohibits most adult Somalis even though local teachers tell me off the record that they suspect many white Lewistonians in the Work Ready program cannot read at an eighth-grade level.
 23. In May 2012, the RefugeeWorks website announced a transition to a new organization called Higher, which would focus on "supporting businesses in developing workforce solutions and by creating welcoming workplaces through on-site cultural competence training." See RefugeeWorks, May 17, 2012, <http://refugeeworks.blogspot.it>.
 24. Seele 2009: 3.
 25. Meyer 2010.
 26. Supervisors at the social services agencies with whom I spoke about this problem complained that the local schools and community colleges were failing to ensure that Somali refugees graduated with writing skills adequate for independent report writing. They noted that their slim budgets made it difficult to support extra training.
 27. *Twin City Times* 2011.
 28. Taylor 2011.
 29. Because Mayor Macdonald won his first term by the slimmest of margins against a man who died days before the election, friends in Lewiston unhappy about Macdonald's policies cheer each other up by saying, "Remember, he barely beat a dead man!"
 30. Jim Dowling, interview, June 7, 2010.
 31. Shortly after moving to Lewiston, Isha and her youngest son were chased through the city park by a dog whose owner stood laughing and urging the dog on as, panicked, they tried to outrun it. Later, the police arrested four Somali boys after they fought back against a white man whose unleashed dog chased them in the park. Kim Wettlaufer, who witnessed both incidents, was furious, wondering why the men with the illegally unleashed dog were not arrested.
 32. Personal communication, December 18, 2009.
 33. Gilbert 2009.
 34. But the price of citizenship is nearly prohibitive. In one of his many op-eds designed to rebut pernicious myths, Mayor Larry Gilbert wrote about the rising cost of citizenship to help Lewiston residents realize just how expensive the process is. In 2010, the cost of a green card was \$985; the naturalization test cost \$675; and the fingerprinting and biometric data tests cost \$85.

35. *BBC News* 2012.
36. Macdonald 2012a.
37. One conversation I overheard in the courtyard of Trinity's day shelter offered a slightly different angle from non-Somalis on Somali gender norms. As I walked past a small group, a woman gesturing furiously exclaimed to her interlocutors, "That shit's illegal here!" A man in the group responded, "Yeah, four wives to one man! Four hens in the kitchen! Who needs that?"
38. Seele 2010.
39. Lauren Gilbert (2009) reports the refusal of the city council to allow Ismail Ahmed to serve on the Downtown Task Force after the mayor appointed him because he was not a citizen, an account confirmed by Ismail.
40. Honig 2001: 76.
41. Echoing the desire for gratitude as a response to the (perceived) extension of charity, Achille Mbembe mimics a popular view of immigrants in France in a passage from which this chapter's epigraph is taken: "These people are in France for personal gain; they treat the French state like one 'big insurance company.' The republic undertakes enormous sacrifices and receives in return only hatred and jeers. Herein lies their radical difference, the demonstration that they have never been, and never will be, a part of us" (2011: 109).
42. Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000; see also Khosravi 2010; Nyers 2006.
43. Herzfeld 1993: 171.
44. Katerina Rozakou (2012) describes an interesting case of a group of activists in Greece who attempted to assist refugees squatting in urban areas by positioning themselves as guests, thus making the refugees into hosts as a form of political activism and refugee empowerment.
45. About the extension of hospitality to the refugee foreigner, a practice that "has existed since the beginning of civilization," Paul Ricoeur says the refugee "assumes the role of 'beggar' in relation to the host society" (2010: 44, 41).
46. Lidwien Kapteijns and Abukar Arman (2004: 19) note that Somalis' "distinctly assertive culture" can be challenging to host communities who expect quiescence and conformity.
47. Macdonald 2012a.
48. Jonathan Xavier Inda (2006) analyzes the popular and political representations of illegal immigrants as ethically irresponsible, criminals, job takers, and consumers of public resources not meant for them. See also Ho and Loucky 2012.
49. A scene in the documentary film *Rain in a Dry Land* (Makepeace 2006) shows several Somali Bantu families dividing their food purchases in the driveway of their Springfield, Massachusetts, apartment building while other residents watch and comment that they would like to be able to share and work together like the Somali Bantus do.
50. Honig 2001: 102.

6. Helpers in the Neoliberal Borderlands

1. None of this work took the form of fieldwork oriented toward the production of an ethnography of schools or social services agencies, but rather followed the tradition of action anthropology in which volunteer and advocacy work is a logical extension of ethnographic participant observation, especially with marginalized or vulnerable communities. Although this is not the place to discuss action anthropology, some of my works discuss my engagement as a researcher-advocate (Besteman 2010, 2014). My volunteer work also meant close involvement with the development and activities of the Somali Bantu community association, SBYAM, and Somali activists, about whom I write in chapter 7.
2. The neoliberal borderlands, of course, are also, in a way, the neoliberal front lines. In this chapter I employ the term “borderlands” because of my focus on the collaborative struggles shared by those who provide assistance and those who seek assistance. Those studies that illuminate the antagonistic struggles include Luhrmann 2010 and Kingfisher 2007 on homeless shelters; Collins and Mayer 2010 on welfare reform and workfare programs; Kingfisher and Goldsmith 2001 and Kingfisher 1998 on welfare officers; and Ong 1996 and 2003 on social workers who work with refugees; also Vertovec 2011; Brodwin 2013.
3. Halfway through his first term he lambasted state workers, calling them “about as corrupt as can be” for withholding enthusiastic support for his reforms (Canfield 2012).
4. The people profiled here are quick to promote the hard work and accomplishments of their staff and colleagues and resist any suggestion that they are somehow more devoted than others doing the same work.
5. Interview, February 26, 2010.
6. Cawo M. Abdi (2012: 98) reports that Somalis in the United States have the highest poverty rates of all newcomers, at 51 percent, which is four times that of the United States and twice that of African Americans.
7. Available at <http://larrygilbert.typepad.com> (accessed May 26, 2015).
8. Larry Gilbert, interview, May 20, 2010.
9. Malone 2010.
10. See, for comparison, Andrea Muehlenbach (2013a) on what she calls “the moral style” of neoliberalism in Lombardy, where a Catholic philosophy shapes local action by emphasizing the importance of mutual love, compassion, and ethical behavior within the neoliberal economy.
11. Marc Robitaille, interview, May 20, 2010.
12. Federal agents raided a Somali-owned butcher and grocer in February 2010 without first informing the local police and without publicly revealing the reason for the raid.
13. Lead levels among Somali Bantu children living downtown were extremely high, prompting a public health investigation into the causes (see Lindkvist 2003a). By 2013, several tenements were razed because of excessive lead.
14. A note on methodology: in 2009–10 I spent time in two local schools as a volunteer (and not a researcher). Descriptions of classroom activities are based

on my experiences as a volunteer and were not part of a school-based research project. Most of this section is based on the many interviews I conducted outside of school with ELL teachers, school staff, community members, and other social services providers who engaged with schools and agreed to be interviewed for this project.

15. When presented with these statistics, a school official protested that the numbers reflected number of incidents rather than number of students, presenting a skewed picture by failing to reflect that some students were repeatedly suspended. Their alternative data show that in the middle school that year, Somali students were 35 percent of students suspended.
16. Bus suspensions also often led to school absences, because someone with a car must be located to drive to and from school each day. No one was able to provide statistics for bus suspensions, information that is not collected by the state.
17. Noguera 2008: 132.
18. Pollock 2008. At a meeting organized by community advocates about the high suspension rates of Somali students, the teachers, social workers, and counselors noted that what appears to be an effort to assert a zero-tolerance policy regarding behavior and the desire to be seen as applying the same disciplinary expectations and punishments for Somalis as non-Somalis rejects an acknowledgment that background issues might be relevant to children's behavior. A woman from Maine's parent advocacy organization pointed out that the language of "no special treatment" and "conformity by all" sounds similar to things she heard back in the 1970s about special needs students and the refusal by many schools to alter their normal way of doing things to accommodate difference. "If they fail it's their fault!" she mimics.
19. For example, the model that presents the background of refugee children as one of deficiency (see Foley 2008; Roy and Roxas 2011).
20. The point was made that the school already partners with the local Adult Education program to review grades with parents and teach them about the online system, and that a school official had just formed the first ELL parent advisory committee, with handpicked participants. Hopeful about this news, I asked at Adult Education about their program and learned that there was, in fact, no organized school-sponsored information session. When I located participants in the school-sponsored parent advisory group, I learned that it was discontinued for the year after only one meeting.
21. From Caroline Sample's private blog, April 15, 2010, quoted with permission.
22. See, for example, Amin 2013; Besteman and Gusterson 2009; Khosravi 2010; Papasterdiadis 2012; Thomas 2009; Weston 2005.
23. Hardt and Negri 2009: 45, 49.
24. Muehlenbach 2013b.
25. Muehlenbach 2011: 67. Her argument echoes an earlier argument by Hardt that affective labor produces "social networks, forms of community, biopower" (1999: 96).
26. Hardt 1999: 100.
27. Povinelli 2009: 98, 97.

28. Ahmed, Besteman, and Osman 2010; Cullen 2011.

29. Povinelli 2009: 98.

30. Such tempered advocacy reveals the limits of the welfare state as well, of course.

But while those profiled here are reluctant to act locally in ways that might blow back on their ability to raise money for their organizations or that might get them fired for insubordination, they do exercise the option to lobby the government for policy changes. Legislative hearings in January 2014 about proposed changes to welfare eligibility that would deny new immigrants access to General Assistance, for example, provided an opportunity for about a hundred people to protest the proposed reductions (see Billings 2014).

III. Introduction

1. Al-Shabaab formed from the remnants of the Islamic Courts Union government that was ousted by the U.S.-supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. The group's initial mandate was to contest foreign intervention.

7. Making Refuge

1. An example from a local agency with the mission to make local mental health services more accessible to poor and marginalized residents is instructive of the task faced by Somali and Somali Bantu cultural brokers. At a meeting where the agency decided to hold focus groups with New Mainers to learn about their mental health concerns, someone brought up the possibility of also conducting focus groups with service providers to hear about their experiences of working with New Mainers. The project director suggested this would be problematic because service providers are busy and would expect a concrete result from their participation, provoking the Somali Bantu caseworker to gently suggest that Somali Bantu focus group participants also want concrete results from their participation. The project director had the good sense to be chagrined about her assumption that immigrants are objects of study whose participation does not merit action.
2. Ironically, the selection process modeled administrative disorder rather than precision. A meeting in Lewiston to explain the grant and invite applications was announced via e-mail to only a few people a few days beforehand, followed by frantic phone calls the morning of the meeting to collect refugee representatives. Two hours after the appointed starting time, the project administrator had assembled an audience of about a dozen bewildered people from Lewiston's refugee population, to whom he explained that the program would offer "comprehensive capacity building within communities," "leadership development," "strategic planning and mission development," "networking opportunities," and training about "the development of organizational structure to leverage support." At the conclusion of the meeting, the administrator announced that the applications, which consisted of five essay questions on organizational goals, projects, successes, and failures, and five organizational profile questions, would be due immediately, that very afternoon. Not an auspicious beginning for a project that purported to offer bureaucratic and administrative capacity building.

3. Over time, many Somali translators and caseworkers developed excellent relationships with their clients. Some Somali translators from Kenya and Ethiopia earned special trust from Somali Bantus because, as I was told, “They are innocent.” Innocent of what? I asked. “Of crimes. Of abuses. Of killings. They stand with their tribe, but they weren’t there during the war and that makes a big difference. The others—we don’t know what they did during the war.”
4. I asked many friends from Banta about the possibility for a rapprochement between Somali Bantus and Somalis in resettlement and was often told that while the two groups may live together in the United States, trust will always be an issue for Somali Bantus. One man responded, “We cannot forget what happened to us. I just look at my hands, where I was stabbed, at the scars from the beatings and stabbings, from when I was tied up, and I can’t forget that. We are different people [he put the backs of his hands together and pushed them apart to demonstrate]. We can’t forget what Somalis did to us.”
5. The extraordinarily busy Somali cyberspace, anchored by several major online forums, offers a heartbreaking display of ongoing anti-Bantu racism, where discussions about the significance of Somali Bantu identity regularly invoke ugly and degrading racist language and stereotypes. Sadiq has been the subject of several racist diatribes in these forums, and my use of a pseudonym for him and other community leaders is in recognition of the threats that they have received through diaspora networks.
6. Because I worked with Somali Bantu community members on projects of self-representation (through creating an informational flyer, a website, museum exhibitions, and panel presentations), I was also pilloried for supporting divisiveness. A prominent businessman wrote a letter to the CEO of a local hospital denouncing the request for Somali Bantu translators and attacking me for my involvement, and I received threats because of my collaboration with Somali Bantu leaders.
7. See McCabe 2010.
8. A refugee friend suggested to me that such pervasive petty suspicions about money started in Kakuma, where English speakers got paid jobs translating, teaching, or working in the health care sector and everyone else was jealous that the new world of interacting with officials and outsiders meant cultural mediators could get resources that they could keep hidden.
9. Lokua Kanza, remarking ruefully on the thirty-five-minute time slot for his portion of the Africa Now! concert at the Apollo Theater, New York, March 16, 2013.
10. Drawing on fieldwork in Copenhagen and London, Nauja Kleist (2010) notes that Somali men in the diaspora feel their authority has been superseded by the welfare state while women have become more empowered, a loss they attempt to overcome through deeper engagements in Islam, return visits to Somaliland, and community associations.
11. See also Abdi 2014.
12. Since polygyny is illegal in the United States, only one wife is recognized as the legal wife, and the other will have her children’s paternity registered with the state as her assurance of legal recognition.

13. One task many women are reluctant to cede is their control over the kitchen. Although some men began to take on responsibility for cleaning tasks, nearly everyone agrees that men cannot get involved in the kitchen. One man tells me, diplomatically, “If I try to do something in the kitchen it will only be a big argument. I avoid that.” His wife nods emphatically, indicating that he has learned the limits of his contribution to domestic life. Even high school students agree: one of my most spirited conversations with a group of high school students involved rules for men and women in the kitchen. The boys insisted that the Quran says men should help their wives, but the girls uniformly dismissed their claims, insisting that men have no business in the kitchen.
14. Holtzman 2000.
15. Somali understandings of how money should intersect with morality received additional public attention when Museum LA offered a public program on Islamic banking to accompany the *Rivers of Immigration* exhibition. In the presentation by a representative from a local bank about the research on Islamic banking she undertook with Bates College anthropology students, the assembled non-Somali audience members and even the bank representative herself remarked that a banking structure with transparent fees rather than interest would be widely embraced beyond just the Muslim community.
16. See Ahmed 2011; Gilbert 2009. Ihotu Ali (2009) expresses concern that Somali community associations in Minnesota are oriented toward internal support structures and promoting cultural and religious accommodation in schools and workplaces rather than integration with the host community, wondering if self-isolation will be harmful in the long run.

8. These Are Our Kids

1. One day Idris told me about a new program called Safe Children, inaugurated by the humanitarian agencies that run the Kenyan refugee camps that everyone was talking about. The program’s mandate is to stop early marriage and arranged marriage. I was amazed to learn that the agencies in charge of the camps were attempting this sort of social reform on displaced refugees and asked Idris what he thought about it. He responded without hesitation, “I think it’s about time.”
2. Ali 2007.
3. LaFlamme 2009.
4. Some women struggling with the universal shit storm participate in home visit programs from public health or social workers that are intended to provide support for overwhelmed parents, but even these programs can introduce stress because mothers do not want to appear incompetent in front of authorities. If a social worker observes a parent in an unguarded moment slapping a child, the social worker is obligated to report it as child abuse, and the news whips around the community because so many parents feel so vulnerable in the face of the possibility of losing their children to the government. At one collaborative meeting, Somali and Somali Bantu caseworkers explained to white social workers the challenges experienced by Somali and Somali Bantu parents involved in home

visit programs. The parents want to model good parenting and demonstrate that they are capable by cleaning and preparing for the home visit, but sometimes the effort is too great, and a parent cannot pull it together to feel presentable for the social worker and cancels the visit at the last minute. Everyone present knew what happens next: those who cancel get labeled “treatment resistant” or “noncompliant,” earning another blot on their parenting record.

5. See Brettell 2007; Foner 2005; Foner and Fredrickson 2004; Foner, Rumbaut, and Gold 2000; Itzigsohn 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Suárez-Orozco et al. 2010; Waters 1994; Zhou 1997.
6. Zhou 1997; Portes and Zhou 1993; Foner 2005.
7. Portes and Rumbaut 1996.
8. Waters 1994: 801.
9. Kasinitz 2004: 287.
10. See Foner 2005; Itzigsohn 2009.
11. Forman 2005: 51; Kapteijns and Arman 2004; Samatar 2004.
12. Kapteijns and Arman 2004: 24; see also Al-Sharmani 2007.
13. Hammond 2011: n.p.
14. Shepard 2008: 236, 231.
15. While this is not the place for a discussion of African conceptions of personhood, anthropologists have demonstrated that the Western model of the individual contrasts in fundamental ways with the understandings held in many non-Western cultures that people are constituted through their relations with others. People, as individuals, are thus composites of their social relations. See Besteman 2014; Pina-Cabral 2013; Sahlins 2011a, 2011b.
16. Moore 2004.
17. See also Kleist 2010.

Conclusion

1. Macdonald 2012b.
2. The growing literature on Somali remittances estimates that Somalis remit \$1–2 billion per year (Hammond et al. 2011; Sheikh and Healy 2009), probably making Somalia the largest per capita recipient of remittances (Hammond 2010). See also Lindley 2010.
3. Abdirisak experienced this prohibition firsthand. When he drove up to visit Idris during the year Idris was in Job Corps in northern Maine, he somehow missed the turnoff to the school and drove over the bridge into Canada by mistake. He immediately turned around and tried to reenter the United States, but since his accidental border crossing violated his probationary status, he was jailed for three days while Immigration and Customs Enforcement sorted out his story. “I hate jail!” he told me vehemently after he was freed. But three days of jail was certainly better than the other possible outcome, which was deportation.
4. Idris uses a recording of his father’s flute music that I made in 1988 as his cell phone’s ringtone.

5. Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist (2012), Nicolas De Genova (2005), Peggy Levitt (2012), and Nina Glick Schiller (2012), among others, discuss how scholars must move beyond the binaries of stranger/member, foreigner/citizen, immigrant/resident, and so forth, to investigate instead spheres of belonging and engagement, phenomenologies of emplacement, and special localities as constituted by social relations.
6. Horst 2006.
7. Nyamnjoh 2006: 230–31.
8. Papasterdiadis 2012: 402.
9. Amin 2013; Hall 2013; Hardt and Negri 2009; Honig 2001.
10. Honig 2001: 101.
11. Hardt and Negri 2009.
12. Hall 2013: 51 is discussing Amin 2013.
13. Hall 2013: 52.
14. Thanks to Britt Halvorson for this insight.
15. Besteman and Gusterson 2005.