

INTRODUCTION, AND OTHER DARK MATTERS

“The CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request.” Sometime in the spring of 2011, I wrote to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to request the release of any documents pertaining to Frantz Fanon under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). At the time, I was interested in Fanon’s travels to the United States of America in 1961, possibly under the nom de guerre Ibrahim Fanon, to receive treatment for myeloid leukemia. He arrived in the United States on October 3, staying at a hotel in Washington, DC, where he was “left to rot,” according to Simone de Beauvoir, “alone and without medical attention.”¹ Fanon was a patient at the National Institutes of Health Clinical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, from October 10, 1961, until he died of pneumonia on December 6, 1961. He was thirty-six. I didn’t get any documents from the CIA except a letter citing Executive Order 13526 with the standard refrain that the agency “can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records,” and further stating that “the fact of the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified and is intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure.”

Fanon’s FOIA files that were released to me by the FBI consist only of three declassified documents: Document #105-96959-A—a clipping of a 1971 *Washington Post-Times Herald* article on Fanon’s “Black Power Message” and its continuing influence on the Caribbean island of Martinique, where he was born; Document #105-96959-1—a once “SECRET” memo on Fanon dated March 9, 1961; and Document #105-96959-2—a book review of David Caute’s 1970 biography *Frantz Fanon*, filed under “extremist matters,” which says of Caute that “his methodology bears the Marxist stamp” and that “he is no friend of the United States or of a free society.” Document #105-96959-A, the news clipping, names *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963)

as Fanon's most important book, stating, "its sales have run unusually high lately, especially among young Negroes." Document #105-96959-2, the FBI's own review of Caute's biography, describes Fanon as a "black intellectual," a "radical revolutionary," and "a philosophical disciple of Karl Marx and Jean Paul Sartre, [who] preached global revolt of the blacks against white colonial rule," and says that Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is "often quoted and misquoted by Stokely Carmichael and other black power advocates, both foreign and domestic." This review also claims that "Fanon's importance has been inflated into exaggerated dimensions by the need of black revolutionaries for philosophical justification and leadership." Traces of Fanon's influence appear in other declassified FBI documents where either he or his published books are named, including some documents that detail the bureau's surveillance of the Black Panther Party.

Although much of the information on the once "SECRET" FBI memo on Fanon, Document #105-96959-1 (figure 1.1), has been redacted, meaning that some of its information is censored, concealed, or otherwise covered up, this memo names Fanon as "the Algerian representative in Ghana for the Algerian Front for National Liberation (FLN)" and notes that he was, at the time, in Tunisia preparing to travel to Washington, DC, for "extensive medical treatment." This memo is from Sam J. Papich, the bureau's liaison to the CIA. It is interesting to note here that the redaction of Document #105-96959-1 took the form of a whiteout, concealing a good portion of the original text with white blocks, in this way deviating from the method of censoring the redacted data with opaque black blocks, rendering any information in the dark. We can think of the redaction here as the willful absencing of the record and as the state's disavowal of the bureaucratic traces of Fanon, at least those which are made publicly available. Here Frantz Fanon is a nonnameable matter. Now dead, yet still a "currently and properly classified" security risk, apparently, as "the fact of the existence or nonexistence" of Fanon's records itself is "intelligence sources and methods information that is protected from disclosure." With this, the redaction and Executive Order 13526 could be understood as a form of security theater where certain "intelligence sources and methods," if in existence, could still be put into operation, and as such could not be declassified.

Fanon's FOIA files form a part of the long history of the collection of intelligence on the many black radicals, artists, activists, and intellectuals who were targeted for surveillance by the FBI. This list includes Assata Shakur,

James Baldwin, Lorraine Hansberry, Stokely Carmichael, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, the Freedom Riders, Martin Luther King Jr., Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, Claudia Jones, Malcolm X, Fred Hampton, William Edward Burghart DuBois, Fannie Lou Hamer, Cyril Lionel Robert James, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Angela Yvonne Davis, Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison, Josephine Baker, Billie Holiday, the Black Panther Party, Kathleen Cleaver, Muhammad Ali, Jimi Hendrix, and Russell Jones aka Ol' Dirty Bastard of the Wu-Tang Clan, among many, many others. The declassified printed matter released to me by the FBI was not particularly revealing regarding any surveillance and monitoring of Frantz Fanon. I was disappointed. My own surveillance of the records of the FBI's surveillance of Fanon had apparently been stalled.

In the foreword to the 2005 edition of *The Wretched of the Earth*, Homi Bhabha describes Fanon's dying days as filled with delirium and with a love for liberation:

his body was stricken, but his fighting days were not quite over; he resisted his death "minute by minute," a friend reported from his bedside, as his political opinions and beliefs turned into the delirious fantasies of a mind raging against the dying of the light. His hatred of racist Americans now turned into a distrust of the nursing staff, and he awoke on his last morning, having probably had a blood transfusion through the night, obsessed with the idea that "they put me through the washing machine last night." His death was inevitable.²

Les damnés de la terre (1961) would be the last of his books that Fanon would live to see published. He was in the hospital in Maryland when he heard some initial reviews of the book and he reportedly stated, "That's not going to get me my marrow back."³ A letter to a friend penned from his hospital bed captures Fanon's rage "against the dying of the light" as both a battle of the body against disease and an anticolonial praxis:

During a night and day surveillance, they inject me with the components of blood for which I have a terrible need, and where they give me huge transfusions to keep me in shape—that's to say, alive. . . . What shocks me here in this bed, as I grow weaker, is not that I'm dying, but that I'm dying in Washington of leukemia considering that I could have died in battle with the enemy three months ago when I

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DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-23-2011

Tolson _____ b1
DeLoach _____ b6
Mohr _____ b7C
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
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Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

Per letter dated 8-10-2011
DATE: March 9, 1961

TO : Mr. L'Aillier *L*

FROM : S. J. Papich *SJP* ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: FRANTZ FANON
IS - ALGERIA

[Redacted]

(U) The captioned individual is the Algerian representative in Ghana for the Algerian Front for National Liberation (FLN). At the present time Fanon is in Tunisia preparing for a trip to the United States. He plans to receive extensive medical treatment at the National Institute of Health, Washington, D. C.

[Redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP:ban *ban*
(4)
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

MCT-19 *N* 105-96959-1
MAR 14 1961
REC-82

CLASSIFIED BY 3302elw/lt/tp
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)
per OIA letter dated July 16, 2001

52 MAR 17 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FIGURE I.1. "SECRET" FBI memo on Frantz Fanon, Document #105-96959-1.

knew I had this disease. We are nothing on earth if we are not, first of all, slaves of a cause, the cause of the people, the cause of justice, the cause of liberty.⁴

Fanon wrote much of the anticolonial *Les damnés de la terre* as his time was running out. He knew that his cancer was terminal, which brought writing the book “down to the wire,” as he put it.⁵ At the time he was in exile in Tunisia after being expelled from Algeria in January 1957 by the French authorities for his work with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). During his exile in Tunisia, home to the FLN’s headquarters, Fanon took on multiple roles. He worked at the FLN’s newspaper *El Moudjahid*, served in refugee camps run by the FLN near the Algerian border, was *chef de service* at the psychiatric hospital of Manouba, and was also the Algerian provisional government’s delegate to Mali and other African nations. While in exile, Fanon gave a series of lectures at the University of Tunis on surveillance, the psychic effects of war and colonialism on the colonized, and antiblack racism in the United States.⁶ In the notes from these lectures, Fanon speaks of the problem of racial segregation in the United States, or the “color bar” as he names it, where antiblack racism is constant and multi-layered, emotional and affective. He mentions the themes of escape and blackness on the move found in Negro spirituals, the haunting lyrics of blues music and social death, Harlem and the writings of African American novelist Chester Himes, the rigidity of the color line and its nagging presence, African American vernacular and code-switching (“quand un Noir s’adresse à un Blanc”) and repressive policing practices (“Quand un Noir tue un Noir, il ne se passe rien; quand un Noir tue un Blanc, toute la police est mobilisée”).⁷ Fanon’s lectures on surveillance at the University of Tunis were eventually canceled, by order of the Tunisian government.⁸

During these lectures Fanon put forth the idea that modernity can be characterized by the “mise en fiches de l’homme.” These are the records, files, time sheets, and identity documents that together form a biography, and sometimes an unauthorized one, of the modern subject. In a manner similar to the detailed case histories of colonial war and mental disorders found in the fifth chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth*, in a section of the notes on these lectures titled “Le contrôle et la surveillance” (in English “Surveillance and Control”), Fanon demonstrates his role as both psychiatrist and social theorist, by making observations, or social diagnoses, on the embodied effects and outcomes of surveillance practices on different

categories of laborers when attempts are made by way of workforce supervision to reduce their labor to an automation: factory assembly line workers subjected to time management by punch clocks and time sheets, the eavesdropping done by telephone switchboard supervisors as they secretly listened in on calls in order to monitor the conversations of switchboard operators, and the effects of closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance on sales clerks in large department stores in the United States. This is control by quantification, as Fanon put it. The embodied psychic effects of surveillance that Fanon described include nervous tensions, insomnia, fatigue, accidents, lightheadedness, and less control over reflexes. Nightmares too: a train that departs and leaves one behind, or a gate closing, or a door that won't open. Although Fanon's remarks on CCTV surveillance are short, they are revealing as he suggests that these cameras are trained not only on the potential thief, but also on the employee working on the shop floor who is put on notice that the video surveillance is perpetual. He also noted that workers displayed microresistances to managerial control in the way of sick leave, expressing boredom on the job, arriving late, and sometimes not arriving at work at all. Rather than being thought of as unproductive, such acts must be understood as disalienating, as they are strategic means of contesting surveillance in the workplace.

Although only the notes from these lectures remain, Fanon's observations on the monitoring of audio communications and CCTV are nevertheless instructive for the social diagnosis of alienation and the effects of modernity, surveillance, and resistance that he offers. If one were to read these lectures "optimistically," as Nicholas Mirzoeff has suggested, "had he lived longer, Fanon might have moved away from his emphasis on masculinity to imagine new modes of postrevolutionary gender identity, as part of this analysis of the racialized disciplinary society, a connection made by many radical black feminists in the United States from Angela Davis to Toni Cade Bambara and bell hooks."⁹ I enter *Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness* with this sense of optimism in mind: that in Fanon's works and in the writings of black feminist scholars, another mode of reading surveillance can be had.

Dark Matters begins with a discussion of my failed attempt to get my hands on any information from the CIA pertaining to Fanon, his FBI FOIA file, the short notes that remain from his lectures on surveillance, and an excerpt from his letter to a friend recounting the "night and day surveillance" that he experienced as he was on the brink of death as a way to cue surveillance in and of black life as a fact of blackness. My gesture to "The Fact of

Blackness,” one of the English translations of the title of the fifth chapter of Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks*, is a deliberate signal to the facticity of surveillance in black life. First published in 1952 as *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*, the book’s fifth chapter in the French original is “L’expérience vécue du Noir.” As Sylvia Wynter and others have noted, the translation of that chapter’s title into English as “The Lived Experience of the Black” in later editions offers a more accurate understanding. It is this slight difference between the two titles—“The Fact of Blackness” and “The Lived Experience of the Black”—that I want to signal here. The “Blackness” in the former could be taken to mean, as Wynter has put it, “Blackness as an objective fact” while “The Lived Experience of the Black” speaks to a focus on the imposition of race in black life, where one’s being is experienced through others.¹⁰ Wynter continues her discussion of Fanon and sociogeny to say that “The Lived Experience of the Black” makes clear that Fanon is dealing “with the ‘subjective character’ of the experience of the black, of, therefore, what it is *like* to be black, within the terms of the mode of being human specific to our contemporary culture.”¹¹

Sociogeny, or what Wynter calls “the sociogenic principle,” is understood as the organizational framework of our present human condition that names what is and what is not bounded within the category of the human, and that fixes and frames blackness as an object of surveillance. Take, for example, Fanon’s often-cited “Look, a Negro!” passage in *Black Skin, White Masks* on the experience of epidermalization, where the white gaze fixes him as an object among objects and, he says, “the white gaze, the only valid one, is already dissecting me.”¹² Epidermalization here is the imposition of race on the body. For Fanon, there is no “ontological resistance” in spaces, like that train he rode in France, that are shaped for and by whiteness, where “instead of one seat, they left me two or three,” he writes.¹³ *Dark Matters* takes up blackness, as metaphor and as lived materiality, and applies it to an understanding of surveillance. I work across multiple spaces (the airport, the plan of the *Brooks* slave ship, the plan for Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, Internet art) and different segments of time (the period of transatlantic chattel slavery, the British occupation of New York City during the American Revolution, post-9/11) to think through the multiplicities of blackness. This method of analyzing surveillance and the conditions of racial blackness brings historical documents, art, photography, contemporary popular film and television, and various other forms of cultural production into dialogue with critical race scholarship, sociological theory,

and feminist theorizing. For this study, I look to Pamela Z's multimedia project on travel and security, *Baggage Allowance*; Adrian Piper's *What It's Like, What It Is #3*; Caryl Phillips's epistolary story "The Cargo Rap" on prisons, politics, and slavery; and Hank Willis Thomas's commentary on branding and the afterlife of slavery in his *B®anded* series. Part of the argument presented here is that with certain acts of cultural production we can find performances of freedom and suggestions of alternatives to ways of living under a routinized surveillance. In this fashion, I am indebted to Stuart Hall's unsettling of understandings of "cultural identity" that does not see the black diaspora and black experiences as static or singular, but instead as "a result of a long and discontinuous series of transformations."¹⁴ Following Rinaldo Walcott here, my use of the term "blackness" is to "signal blackness as a sign, one that carries with it particular histories of resistance and domination" that is "never closed and always under contestation."¹⁵ Blackness is identity and culture, history and present, signifier and signified, but never fixed. As Ralph Ellison names it in *Invisible Man*, "Black is . . . an' black ain't."¹⁶

Fanon's "Look, a Negro!" his articulations of epidermalization, and his anticolonial thought have influenced the formation of this book. *Dark Matters* suggests that an understanding of the ontological conditions of blackness is integral to developing a general theory of surveillance and, in particular, racializing surveillance—when enactments of surveillance reify boundaries along racial lines, thereby reifying race, and where the outcome of this is often discriminatory and violent treatment. Of course, this is not the entire story of surveillance, but it is a part that often escapes notice. Although "race" might be a term found in the index of many of the recent edited collections and special journal issues dedicated to the study of surveillance, within the field of surveillance studies race remains undertheorized, and serious consideration has yet to be given to the racial subject in general, and to the role of surveillance in the archive of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade in particular. It is through this archive and that of black life after the Middle Passage that I want to further complicate understandings of surveillance by questioning how a realization of the conditions of blackness—the historical, the present, and the historical present—can help social theorists understand our contemporary conditions of surveillance. Put another way, rather than seeing surveillance as something inaugurated by new technologies, such as automated facial recognition or unmanned autonomous vehicles (or drones), to see it as ongoing is to in-

sist that we factor in how racism and antiblackness undergird and sustain the intersecting surveillances of our present order. Patricia Hill Collins uses the term “intersectional paradigms” to signal that “oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type, and that oppressions work together in producing injustice.”¹⁷ Indebted to black feminist scholarship, by “intersecting surveillances” I am referring to the interdependent and interlocking ways that practices, performances, and policies regarding surveillance operate.

The concept of dark matter might bring to mind opacity, the color black, limitlessness and the limitations imposed on blackness, the dark, antimatter, that which is not optically available, black holes, the Big Bang theory, and other concerns of cosmology where dark matter is that nonluminous component of the universe that is said to exist but cannot be observed, cannot be re-created in laboratory conditions. Its distribution cannot be measured; its properties cannot be determined; and so it remains undetectable. The gravitational pull of this unseen matter is said to move galaxies. Invisible and unknowable, yet somehow still there, dark matter, in this planetary sense, is theoretical. If the term “dark matter” is a way to think about race, where race, as Howard Winant puts it, “remains the *dark matter*, the often invisible substance that in many ways structures the universe of modernity,” then one must ask here, invisible to whom?¹⁸ If it is often invisible, then how is it sensed, experienced, and lived? Is it really invisible, or is it rather unseen and unperceived by many? In her essay “Black (W)holes and the Geometry of Black Female Sexuality,” Evelyn Hammonds takes up the astrophysics of black holes found in Michele Wallace’s discussion of the negation of black creative genius to say that if “we can detect the presence of a black hole by its effects on the region of space where it is located,” where, unseen, its energy distorts and disrupts that around it, from that understanding we can then use this theorizing as a way to “develop reading strategies that allow us to make visible the distorting and productive effects” of black female sexualities in particular, and blackness in general.¹⁹ Taking up blackness in surveillance studies in this way, as rather unperceived yet producing a productive disruption of that around it, *Dark Matters* names the surveillance of blackness as often unperceivable within the study of surveillance, all the while blackness being that nonnameable matter that matters the racialized disciplinary society. It is from this insight that I situate *Dark Matters* as a black diasporic, archival, historical, and contemporary study that locates blackness as a key site through which surveillance is practiced, narrated, and enacted.

Surveillance is nothing new to black folks. It is the fact of antiblackness. This book is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of the ways that black people and blackness have come under, or up against, surveillance. Of the scholars that have written about surveillance as it concerns black people, many have taken as their focus the FBI Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) that ran from 1956 until 1971 and that saw individuals and domestic political organizations deemed subversive, or potentially so, come under investigation by the bureau with the aim of disrupting their activities, discrediting their efforts, and neutralizing their effects, often through infiltration, disinformation, and the work of informants. Sociologist Mike Forrest Keen's study of the FBI's surveillance of sociologists such as W. E. B. DuBois and E. Franklin Frazier, David Garrow's *The FBI and Martin Luther King Jr.*, Theodore Kornweibel on the FBI's surveillance of the activities of Marcus Garvey and the United Negro Improvement Association through the use of informants and disinformation, or Carole Boyce Davies's writings on the intense FBI scrutiny of Trinidadian activist, Marxist, and journalist Claudia Jones, for example, form part of this scholarly work. Other research examines policing with a focus on racism, state power, and incarceration, such as the works of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Angela Davis, Joy James, Dylan Rodriguez, and more. James Baldwin, Toni Cade Bambara, bell hooks, and Ralph Ellison have all, in different ways, written on being looked at and on seeing black life. For instance, in *The Evidence of Things Not Seen*, James Baldwin describes black suffering under the conditions of antiblackness where, as he puts it, "it is a very grave matter to be forced to imitate a people for whom you know—which is the price of your performance and survival—you do not exist. It is hard to imitate a people whose existence appears, mainly, to be made tolerable by their bottomless gratitude that they are not, thank heaven, *you*."²⁰ Toni Cade Bambara's call for emancipatory texts to "heal our imperialized eyes" as well as bell hooks's naming of the interrogating, "oppositional gaze" as "one that 'looks' to document" form part of this critical take on black looks.²¹ Ralph Ellison's critiques and quarrels with what is taken as canonical sociology and the ways in which much of its early racial knowledge production was achieved by distorting blackness has been detailed by Roderick Ferguson. In *Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique*, Ferguson offers an analysis of an unpublished chapter of Ellison's *Invisible Man* where he examines the ways that canonical sociology made itself out to be a discipline through the "sociologization" of black sexuality by way of surveillance. On

sociologization, Ferguson writes, “canonical sociology would help transform observation into an epistemological and ‘objective’ technique for the good of modern state power. This was a way of defining surveillance as a scientifically acceptable and socially necessary practice. It established the sociological onlooker as safely removed and insulated from the prurient practices of African American men, women and children.”²²

As ethnography, tallying, and “statistics helped to produce surveillance as one mode, alongside confession, for producing the truth of sexuality in Western society,” when this mode concerned the measurement of black human life in the post-Emancipation United States, such racial logics often made for sociology as a population management technology of the state.²³ One example of how such sociologization functioned in relation to blackness is “The Conflict and Fusion of Cultures with Special Reference to the Negro,” Robert Park’s 1918 address to the meeting of the American Sociological Society in which he stated, “The Negro is, by natural disposition, neither an intellectual nor an idealist like the Jew, nor a brooding introspective like the East Indian, nor a pioneer and frontiersman, like the Anglo-Saxon. He is primarily an artist, loving life for its own sake.”²⁴ Park, who in 1925 would become president of the American Sociological Society, continued his address by saying, “The Negro is, so to speak, the lady among the races.”²⁵ Park’s address is instructive regarding the tenets of gendered antiblack racism that shaped the discipline of sociology in the early twentieth century. It is accounts of blackness like these that influenced Ellison’s quarrels with sociological discourse, or what he called in his introduction to *Invisible Man* “the bland assertions of sociologists,” where in observing, tallying, quantifying, indexing, and surveilling, black life was made “invisible.”²⁶

Dark Matters stems from a questioning of what would happen if some of the ideas occurring in the emerging field of surveillance studies were put into conversation with the enduring archive of transatlantic slavery and its afterlife, in this way making visible the many ways that race continues to structure surveillance practices. This study’s objects of investigation include the plan of the *Brooks* slave ship, the Panopticon, the *Book of Negroes* as a record of black escape from New York in the late 1700s, branding of enslaved people in transatlantic slavery, slave passes and runaway notices, lantern laws in eighteenth-century New York City that mandated enslaved people carry lit candles as they moved about the city after dark, a set of rules from the 1800s specifying the management of slaves on an East Texas

plantation, and the life of a young woman named Coobah who was enslaved in eighteenth-century Jamaica. If we are to take transatlantic slavery as antecedent to contemporary surveillance technologies and practices as they concern inventories of ships' cargo and the cheek-by-jowl arrangement laid out in the stowage plan of the *Brooks* slave ship, biometric identification by branding the slave's body with hot irons, slave markets and auction blocks as exercises of synoptic power where the many watched the few, slave passes and patrols, manumission papers and free badges, black codes and fugitive slave notices, it is to the archives, slave narratives, and often to black expressive practices, creative texts, and other efforts that we can look for moments of refusal and critique. Slave narratives, as Avery Gordon demonstrates, offer us "a sociology of slavery and freedom."²⁷ To paraphrase Gordon here, through their rendering of the autobiographical, the ethnographic, the historical, the literary, and the political, slave narratives are sociological in that they reveal the social life of the slave condition, speak of freedom practices, and detail the workings of power in the making of what is exceptional—the slave life—into the everyday through acts of violence.²⁸

Surveillance Studies

In this section, I provide a brief overview of key terms and concepts, some of them overlapping, as they relate to the concerns of this book. This is not meant to be a comprehensive review of the field of surveillance studies, but rather it is done to put this book into conversation with that body of research and writing and to also introduce the two main, interrelated conceptual schemes of this book: racializing surveillance and dark sousveillance. Research and writing that falls under the rubric of surveillance studies has come from a range of disciplines including sociology, geography, cultural studies, organization studies, science and technology studies, criminology, and critical theory. As an interdisciplinary field of study, the questions that shape surveillance studies center on the management of everyday and exceptional life—personal data, privacy, security, and terrorism, for example. In their introduction to *The Surveillance Studies Reader*, Sean Hier and Joshua Greenberg note that although "a qualitative shift in surveillance took place after 9/11," there still remains a certain absence in the literature "on the pre-9/11 forms of surveillance that made post-9/11 surveillance

possible.”²⁹ *Dark Matters* seeks to make an intervention in the literature by naming the “absented presence” of blackness as part of that absence in the literature that Hier and Greenberg point to. In the sense that blackness is often absented from what is theorized and who is cited, it is ever present in the subjection of black motorists to a disproportionate number of traffic stops (driving while black), stop-and-frisk policing practices that subject black and Latino pedestrians in New York City and other urban spaces to just that, CCTV and urban renewal projects that displace those living in black city spaces, and mass incarceration in the United States where, for example, black men between the ages of twenty and twenty-four are imprisoned at a rate seven times higher than white men of that age group, and the various exclusions and other matters where blackness meets surveillance and then reveals the ongoing racisms of unfinished emancipation.³⁰ Unfinished emancipation suggests that slavery matters and the archive of transatlantic slavery must be engaged if we are to create a surveillance studies that grapples with its constitutive genealogies, where the archive of slavery is taken up in a way that does not replicate the racial schema that spawned it and that it reproduced, but at the same time does not erase its violence.

Since its emergence, surveillance studies has been primarily concerned with how and why populations are tracked, profiled, policed, and governed at state borders, in cities, at airports, in public and private spaces, through biometrics, telecommunications technology, CCTV, identification documents, and more recently by way of Internet-based social network sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Also of focus are the ways that those who are often subject to surveillance subvert, adopt, endorse, resist, innovate, limit, comply with, and monitor that very surveillance.³¹ Most surveillance, as David Lyon suggests, is “practiced with a view to enhancing efficiency, productivity, participation, welfare, health or safety,” leaving social control “seldom a motivation for installing surveillance systems even though that may be an unintended or secondary consequence of their deployment.”³² Lyon has argued that the “surveillance society” as a concept might be misleading, for it suggests “a total, homogeneous situation of being under surveillance” rather than a more nuanced understanding of the sometimes discreet and varying ways that surveillance operates.³³ He suggests that we should look more closely at “sites of surveillance,” such as the military, the state, the workplace, policing, and the marketplace in order to come to an understanding of the commonalities that exist at these various sites. For Lyon, looking at contemporary sites of surveillance requires us to examine

some “common threads” including rationalization (where reason “rather than tradition, emotion or common-sense knowledge” is the justification given for standardization), technology (the use of high-technology applications), sorting (the social sorting of people into categories as a means of management and ascribing differential treatment), knowledgeable (the notion that how surveillance operates depends on “the different levels of knowledgeable and willing participation on the part of those whose life-details are under scrutiny”), and urgency (where panic prevails in risk and threat assessments, and in the adoption of security measures, especially post-9/11).³⁴

In *Private Lives and Public Surveillance* (1973), James Rule set out to explore commonalities within sites of surveillance as well by asking whether the “sociological qualities” of the totalizing system of surveillance as depicted in George Orwell’s *1984* could be seen in computer-mediated modern systems of mass surveillance in the United States and Britain, such as policing, banking, and national health care schemes.³⁵ Rule found that although the bureaucratic systems he studied did not function as malevolently as in *1984*, Orwell’s novel served as a “theoretical extreme” from which to analyze a given system’s capacity for surveillance, in other words, how near it comes to replicating an Orwellian system of total control.³⁶ Using this rubric, Rule concludes that a large-scale and long-enduring surveillance system could be limited in its surveillance capacity in four ways: due to size, the centralization of its files, the speed of information flow, and restrictions to its points of contact with its clientele. Although much has changed with regard to innovations in information technologies, machine intelligence, telecommunications, and networked cloud computing since the time of Rule’s study in the late 1960s and early 1970s, *Private Lives* is instructive in its understanding of the workings of centralized and diffused power by state and private actors and institutions, and for identifying earlier developments in what Gary T. Marx has called “the new surveillance.”³⁷

What makes “the new surveillance” quite different from older and more traditional forms of social control is laid out by Marx in a set of ten characteristics that these new technologies, practices, and forms of surveillance share to varying degrees: (1) it is no longer impeded by distance or physical barriers; (2) data can be shared, permanently stored, compressed, and aggregated more easily due to advances in computing and telecommunications; (3) it is often undetected, meaning that “surveillance devices can either be made to appear as something else (one-way mirrors, cameras

hidden in a fire extinguisher, undercover agents) or can be virtually invisible (electronic snooping into microwave transmission or computer files”); (4) data collection is often done without the consent of the target, for example with noncooperative biometric tagging and matching at a casino or a sporting event, or Facebook’s prompt to “tag your friends” using the photo tag suggest feature; (5) surveillance is about the prevention and management of risk through predictive or anticipatory means; (6) it is less labor intensive than before, opening up the possibility for monitoring that which was previously left unobserved, like the detection of illegal marijuana grow-ops by thermal cameras set to sense unusually high temperatures or the detection of illicit bomb making by collecting and testing chemical air samples; (7) it involves more self-surveillance by way of wearable computing or “electronic leashes” such as fitness trackers or other means by which people come to monitor themselves; (8) the presumption of guilt is assigned to some based on their membership within a particular category or grouping; (9) technological innovations have made for a more intensive and interiorizing surveillance where the body is concerned, for example, with voice analysis that is said to measure stress as a way to differentiate between lies and truths; and (10) it is now so intense and with reduced opportunities to evade it that “the uncertainty over whether or not surveillance is present is an important strategic element.”³⁸ With these developments regarding the scope and scale of surveillance, Marx has suggested that perhaps we have become a “maximum-security society.”

For Marx, the maximum-security society is a way to conceptualize how the surveillance that was once figured as contained inside the military base or the maximum-security prison (“perimeter security, thick walls with guard towers, spotlights, and a high degree of electronic surveillance”) now extends out to the whole society.³⁹ According to Marx, the maximum-security society is predictive, porous, monitored and self-monitored, and made up of computerized records and dossiers, where increasingly choices are engineered and limited by social location. In it, everyone is rendered suspicious at some time or another, while some individuals might be more often subject to what Marx terms “categorical suspicion” given their ascribed membership in certain groups. Notably, for Marx, the maximum-security society is also “a *transparent* society, in which the boundaries of time, distance, darkness, and physical barriers that traditionally protected information are weakened.”⁴⁰ Marx’s concept of “electronic leashes” and also what William Staples calls “participatory monitoring” are ways of understanding

how people, objects, and things come to be monitored in remote, routinized, and continuous ways—think of electronic ankle bracelets as a requirement of house arrest or car ignitions fitted with breathalyzers that measure a driver’s breath alcohol content before the engine can be started.⁴¹ People who are subject to such monitoring are also tasked with actively participating in their own confinement by partnering, in a way, with the overseeing body or agency in the check for violations and infractions.

Oscar Gandy’s “panoptic sort” names the processes by which the collection of data on and about individuals and groups as “citizens, employees and consumers” is used to identify, classify, assess, sort, or otherwise “control their access to the goods and services that define life in the modern capitalist society,” for example, with the application of credit scores by lenders to rate the creditworthiness of consumers or put to use for targeted marketing of predatory lending with high-interest loans.⁴² The panoptic sort privileges some, while disadvantaging others. These concepts—categorical suspicion, social sorting, maximum-security society, electronic leashes, participatory monitoring, panoptic sorting—along with Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson’s concept of the “surveillant assemblage,” are some of the ways that the field has come to conceptualize surveillance. As a model for understanding surveillance, the surveillant assemblage sees the observed human body “broken down by being abstracted from its territorial setting” and then reassembled elsewhere (a credit reporting database, for example) to then serve as virtual “data doubles,” and also as sites of comparison by way of, for example, credit scores or urinalysis drug testing, where one’s biological sample is collected and tested for drug use, or when “lie detectors align and compare assorted flows of respiration, pulse and electricity.”⁴³

I want to add to these understandings of surveillance the concept of racializing surveillance. Racializing surveillance is a technology of social control where surveillance practices, policies, and performances concern the production of norms pertaining to race and exercise a “power to define what is in or out of place.”⁴⁴ Being mindful here of David Theo Goldberg’s caution that the term “racialization,” if applied, should be done with a certain precision and not merely called upon to uncritically signal “race-inflected social situations,” my use of the term “racializing surveillance” signals those moments when enactments of surveillance reify boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial lines, and where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are negatively racialized by such surveillance.⁴⁵ To say that racializing surveillance is a technology of social control is not to

take this form of surveillance as involving a fixed set of practices that maintain a racial order of things. Instead, it suggests that how things get ordered racially by way of surveillance depends on space and time and is subject to change, but most often upholds negating strategies that first accompanied European colonial expansion and transatlantic slavery that sought to structure social relations and institutions in ways that privilege whiteness. Racializing surveillance is not static or only applied to particular human groupings, but it does rely on certain techniques in order to reify boundaries along racial lines, and, in so doing, it reifies race. Race here is understood as operating in an interlocking manner with class, gender, sexuality, and other markers of identity and their various intersections.

John Fiske shows the operation of racializing surveillance in his discussion of video surveillance and the hypermediation of blackness where he argues that “although surveillance is penetrating deeply throughout our society, its penetration is differential.”⁴⁶ Fiske argues that although Michel Foucault and George Orwell both conceptualized surveillance as integral to modernity, surveillance “has been racialized in a manner that they did not foresee: today’s seeing eye is white.”⁴⁷ Fiske gives the example that “street behaviors of white men (standing still and talking, using a cellular phone, passing an unseen object from one to another) may be coded as normal and thus granted no attention, whereas the same activity performed by Black men will be coded as lying on or beyond the boundary of the normal, and thus subject to disciplinary action.”⁴⁸ Where public spaces are shaped for and by whiteness, some acts in public are abnormalized by way of racializing surveillance and then coded for disciplinary measures that are punitive in their effects. Racializing surveillance is also a part of the digital sphere with material consequences within and outside of it. For example, what Lyon calls “digital discrimination” signals this differential application of surveillance technologies, where “flows of personal data—abstracted information—are sifted and channeled in the process of risk assessment, to privilege some and disadvantage others, to accept some as legitimately present and to reject others.”⁴⁹ In this way, data that is abstracted from, or produced about, individuals and groups is then profiled, circulated, and traded within and between databases. Such data is often marked by gender, nation, region, race, socioeconomic status, and other categories where the life chances of many, as Lyon notes, are “more circumscribed by the categories into which they fall. For some, those categories are particularly prejudicial. They already restrict them from consumer choices because of credit

ratings, or, more insidiously, relegate them to second-class status because of their color or ethnic background. Now, there is an added category to fear: the terrorist. It's an old story in high-tech guise."⁵⁰

To conceptualize racializing surveillance requires that I also unpack the term "surveillance." Surveillance is understood here as meaning "oversight," with the French prefix *sur-* meaning "from above" and the root word *-veillance* deriving from the French verb *veiller* and taken to mean observing or watching. The root word *-veillance* is differently applied and invoked, for example, with the terms "überveillance" (often defined as electronic surveillance by way of radio-frequency identification or other devices embedded in the living body), "redditveillance" (the crowdsourcing of surveillance through publicly accessible CCTV feeds, photographs uploaded to online image sharing platforms such as Flickr, and online discussion forums, such as Reddit and 4chan), and "dataveillance," to name a few.⁵¹ Lyon has outlined the "potency of dataveillance" in a surveillance society, which, he writes, is marked by "a range of personal data systems, connected by telecommunications networks, with a consistent identification scheme."⁵² The prefix *data-* signals that such observing is done through data collection as a way of managing or governing a certain population, for example, through the use of bar-coded customer loyalty cards at point of sale for discounted purchases while also collecting aggregate data on loyalty cardholders, or vehicles equipped with transponders that signal their entry and exit on pay-per-use highways and roads, often replacing toll booths.

The *Guardian* newspaper named "surveillance" and "sousveillance" as the words that mattered in 2013 alongside "Bitcoin," "Obamacare," and "binge-watching."⁵³ For Steve Mann, who coined the term "sousveillance," both terms—sousveillance and surveillance—fall under the broad concept of *veillance*, a form of watching that is neutral. Mann situates surveillance as the "more studied, applied and well-known *veillance*" of the two, defining surveillance as "organizations observing people" where this observing and recording is done by an entity in a position of power relative to the person or persons being observed and recorded.⁵⁴ Such oversight could take the form of red-light cameras that photograph vehicles when drivers violate traffic laws, or the monitoring of sales clerks on shop floors with CCTV, as well as, for example, punch clocks that track factory workers' time on the floor to more ubiquitous forms of observation, productivity monitoring, and data collection, such as remote desktop viewing or electronic monitoring software that tracks employees' non-work-related Internet use. Mann




FIGURE 1.2. Steve Mann's Veillance Plane and the "8-point compass" model of its directionalities. From Steve Mann, "Veillance and Reciprocal Transparency." Reproduced with permission.

developed the term "sousveillance" as a way of naming an active inversion of the power relations that surveillance entails. Sousveillance, for Mann, is acts of "observing and recording by an entity not in a position of power or authority over the subject of the veillance," often done through the use of handheld or wearable cameras.⁵⁵ George Holliday's video recording of the beating of Rodney King by police officers of the Los Angeles Police Department on March 3, 1991, is an example of sousveillance, where Holliday's watching and recording of the police that night functioned as a form of citizen oversight.

Mann's Veillance Plane (figure 1.2) places surveillance on the x-axis (uppercase S) and sousveillance on the y-axis (lowercase s). An "8-point compass" model, the Veillance Plane sees sousveillance and surveillance as "orthogonal vectors" or perpendicular, where "the amount of sousveillance can be increased without necessarily decreasing the amount of surveillance."⁵⁶ Other directionalities on this plane include univeillance (e.g.,

when one party to a telephone conversation records said conversation, making this action more aligned with *sousveillance*, rather than an approach closer to surveillance where a “nonparticipant party” to a conversation does the recording) and *McVeillance*. *McVeillance* would include an establishment that sets up a policy that forbids patrons from using cameras and recording devices on its premises, while at the same time recording those very patrons through CCTV surveillance, for example. *McVeillance* is surveillance minus *sousveillance* (S – s). Mann describes the “*sousveillance* era” as occurring prior to the increase and normalization of surveillance cameras recording in public and private spaces. He argues that although “the king or emperor or sheriff had more power” in the *sousveillance* era, during this era “the observational component of that power was more approximately equal than it is today,” where people are often prevented from recording entities in positions of power, for example, when signs are posted in government offices and business establishments warning visitors and patrons that the use of recording devices on the premises is prohibited.⁵⁷ On the *sousveillance* era, Mann further explains, “Before approximately 50 years ago—and going back millions of years—we have what we call the ‘*sousveillance* era’ because the only *veillance* was *sousveillance* which was given by the body-borne camera formed by the eye, and the body-borne recording device comprised of the mind and brain.”⁵⁸

I want to make a link here between Mann’s naming of the human eye as a “body-borne camera” and what Judith Butler terms the “racially saturated field of visibility” and what Maurice O. Wallace has called the “picture-taking racial gaze” that fixes and frames the black subject within a “rigid and limited grid of representational possibilities.”⁵⁹ In other words, these are ways of seeing and conceptualizing blackness through stereotypes, abnormalization, and other means that impose limitations, particularly so in spaces that are shaped for whiteness, as discussed above with reference to Fanon’s epidermalization and to Fiske on how some acts and even the mere presence of blackness gets coded as criminal. We can read a rigid framing in how Rodney King’s acts of self-defense during a traffic stop in Los Angeles as recorded by Holliday on March 3, 1991, were coded as aggressive and violent. When King raised his hand to protect himself from police baton blows, his actions were met with more police force. Within what Butler has called a “racially saturated field of visibility,” such police violence is not read as violence; rather, the racially saturated field of visibility fixed and framed

Rodney King and read his actions, as recorded by Holliday, as that danger from which whiteness must be protected.⁶⁰

Although the observational component of the power of the sheriff might have been equal to that of the citizen in the sousveillance era, in the time of slavery that citizenry (the watchers) was deputized through white supremacy to apprehend any fugitive who escaped from bondage (the watched), making for a cumulative white gaze that functioned as a totalizing surveillance. Under these conditions of terror and the violent regulation of blackness by way of surveillance, the inequities between those who were watched over and those who did the watching are revealed. The violence of this cumulative gaze continues in the postslavery era.

Extending Steve Mann's concept of sousveillance, which he describes as a way of "enhancing the ability of people to access and collect data about their surveillance and to neutralize surveillance,"⁶¹ I use the term "dark sousveillance" as a way to situate the tactics employed to render one's self out of sight, and strategies used in the flight to freedom from slavery as necessarily ones of undersight. Using this model, but imagining Mann's Veilance Plane as operating in three dimensions, I plot dark sousveillance as an imaginative place from which to mobilize a critique of racializing surveillance, a critique that takes form in antisurveillance, countersurveillance, and other freedom practices. Dark sousveillance, then, plots imaginaries that are oppositional and that are hopeful for another way of being. Dark sousveillance is a site of critique, as it speaks to black epistemologies of contending with antiblack surveillance, where the tools of social control in plantation surveillance or lantern laws in city spaces and beyond were appropriated, co-opted, repurposed, and challenged in order to facilitate survival and escape. This might sound like Negro spirituals that would sing of freedom and escape routes, or look like an 1851 handbill distributed by Theodore Parker, a white abolitionist from Massachusetts, that advised "colored people of Boston" to "keep a sharp lookout for kidnappers" who would act as slave catchers under fugitive slave laws that federalized antiblack surveillance (figure 1.3). In this way, acts that might fall under the rubric of dark sousveillance are not strictly enacted by those who fall under the category of blackness.

Dark sousveillance charts possibilities and coordinates modes of responding to, challenging, and confronting a surveillance that was almost all-encompassing. In the *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*, Fred-

erick Douglass carefully describes how surveillance functioned as a comprehensive and regulating practice on slave life: “at every gate through which we were to pass, we saw a watchman—at every ferry a guard—on every bridge a sentinel—and in every wood a patrol. We were hemmed in upon every side.”⁶² This sweeping ordering did not, of course, preclude escapes and other forms of resistance, such as antisurveillance “pranks” at the expense of slave patrollers by stretching vines across roads and bridges to trip the patrollers riding on their horses, or counterveillance songs, for example, the folk tune “Run, Nigger, Run,” which warned of approaching slave patrols.⁶³ Recalling acts of antisurveillance and counterveillance, ex-slave Berry Smith of Forest, Mississippi, tells of “the pranks we used to play on them paterollers! Sometimes we tied ropes across the bridge and the paterollers’d hit it and go in the creek. Maybe we’d be fiddling and dancing on the bridge and they’d say, ‘Here come the paterollers!’ Then we’d put out.”⁶⁴ Such playful tricks were a means of self-defense. These oral histories of ex-slaves, slave narratives, and runaway notices, in revealing a sociology of slavery, escape, and freedom, recall the brutalities of slavery (instruments of punishment, plantation regulation, slave patrols) and detail how black performative practices and creative acts (fiddling, songs, and dancing) also functioned as sousveillance acts and were employed by people as a way to escape and resist enslavement, and in so being were freedom acts.

As a way of knowing, dark sousveillance speaks not only to observing those in authority (the slave patroller or the plantation overseer, for instance) but also to the use of a keen and experiential insight of plantation surveillance in order to resist it. Forging slave passes and freedom papers or passing as free are examples of this. Others include fugitive slave Ellen Craft escaping to Philadelphia in 1848 with her husband, William, by posing as a white man and as William’s owner; Henry “Box” Brown’s escape from slavery in 1849 by mailing himself to freedom in a crate “3 feet long and 2 wide”; Harriet Jacobs’s escape from slavery to a cramped garret above her grandmother’s home that she named as both her prison and her emancipatory “loophole of retreat”; slave spirituals as coded messages to coordinate escape along the Underground Railroad; Harriet “Moses” Tubman and her role in the 1863 Combahee River Raid that saw over seven hundred people escape enslavement in South Carolina; Sojourner Truth’s escape to freedom in 1826 when she “walked off, believing that to be alright.”⁶⁵ Dark sousveillance is also a reading praxis for examining surveillance that allows for a questioning of how certain surveillance technologies installed

CAUTION!!

**COLORED PEOPLE
OF BOSTON, ONE & ALL,**

You are hereby respectfully CAUTIONED and
advised, to avoid conversing with the
**Watchmen and Police Officers
of Boston,**

For since the recent **ORDER OF THE MAYOR &
ALDERMEN**, they are empowered to act as

KIDNAPPERS

AND

Slave Catchers,

And they have already been actually employed in
**KIDNAPPING, CATCHING, AND KEEPING
SLAVES.** Therefore, if you value your **LIBERTY,**
and the *Welfare of the Fugitives* among you, *Shun*
them in every possible manner, as so many **HOUNDS**
on the track of the most unfortunate of your race.

**Keep a Sharp Look Out for
KIDNAPPERS, and have
TOP EYE open.**

APRIL 24, 1851.

FIGURE 1.3. "Caution! Colored People of Boston," handbill (1851). Library of Congress, Printed Ephemera Collection; Portfolio 60, Folder 22. 30.5 x 25 cm.

during slavery to monitor and track blackness as property (for example, branding, the one-drop rule, quantitative plantation records that listed enslaved people alongside livestock and crops, slave passes, slave patrols, and runaway notices) anticipate the contemporary surveillance of racialized subjects, and it also provides a way to frame how the contemporary surveillance of the racial body might be contended with.

The Chapters

If, for Foucault, “the disciplinary gaze of the Panopticon is the archetypical power of modernity,” as Lyon has suggested in the introduction to *Surveillance Studies: An Overview*,⁶⁶ then it is my contention that the slave ship too must be understood as an operation of the power of modernity, and as part of the violent regulation of blackness. Chapter 1, “Notes on Surveillance Studies: Through the Door of No Return,” considers the Panopticon (1786) and the plan of the slave ship *Brooks* (1789) for what these two schematic plans disclose about surveillance, race, and the production of knowledge. My intent in this chapter is not to reify the Panopticon as the definitive model of modern surveillance, but rather I want to complicate it through a reading of the slave ship. Both of these diagrams were published in and around the same time period, and they continue to provoke, in different ways, questions for both surveillance studies and for theorizing the black diaspora. Taking up David Murakami Wood’s call for a “critical reinterpretation” of panopticism, what I am suggesting here is that one of the ways that this reinterpretation can be done is through a reading of the slave ship.⁶⁷ Panopticism, for Murakami Wood, is understood as “the social trajectory represented by the figure of the Panopticon.”⁶⁸ Panopticism, then, is the Panopticon as a social practice. I interrogate the Panopticon and the plan of the slave ship *Brooks* to ask: What kinds of subjects were these two spaces meant to produce? How is social control exercised? What acts of subversion and resistance do these structures allow for? Also in this chapter, I explore the operation of disciplinary and sovereign forms of power over black life under slavery by looking at plantation management and running away.

In Jeremy Bentham’s plan for the Panopticon, small lamps worked to “extend to the night the security of the day.”⁶⁹ I examine this idea of the security of the day and surveillance by lamps at night in Chapter 2, “Ev-

everybody's Got a Little Light under the Sun: The Making of the *Book of Negroes*." In this chapter I discuss what I call "lantern laws," which were ordinances "For Regulating Negroes and Slaves in the Night Time" in New York City that compelled black, mixed-race, and indigenous slaves to carry small lamps, if in the streets after dark and unescorted by a white person. With this citywide mandate, "No Negro, Mulatto or Indian slave could" be in the streets unaccompanied "an hour after sunset" without "a lanthorn and lighted candle in it, so as the light thereof may be plainly seen" without penalty.⁷⁰ Here technologies of seeing that are racializing in their application and effects, from a candle flame to the white gaze, were employed in an attempt to identify who was in place with permission and who was out of place with censure. The title of this chapter is taken, or sampled, from the lyrics of funk band Parliament's song "Flash Light" (1977). I do this to hint at and imagine what it might mean in our present moment to be mandated to carry a handheld flashlight in the streets after dark, illuminating blackness. This chapter also looks to prior histories of surveillance, identification documents, and black mobilities through a reading of the archive of the *Book of Negroes*. Working with treaties, letters and other government documents, maps, memoirs, and fugitive slave advertisements as primary source data, I use this archive to examine the arbitration that took place at Fraunces Tavern in New York City between fugitive slaves who sought to be included in the *Book of Negroes* and those who claimed them as escaped property. The *Book of Negroes* is an eighteenth-century ledger that lists three thousand self-emancipating former slaves who embarked mainly on British ships, like *Danger* and *Generous Friends*, during the British evacuation of New York in 1783 after the American Revolution. The *Book of Negroes*, I argue, is the first government-issued document for state-regulated migration between the United States and Canada that explicitly linked corporeal markers to the right to travel. This linking of gender (often recorded in the ledger as "fine wench," "ordinary fellow," "snug little wench"), race ("healthy Negress," "worn out, half Indian," "fine girl, $\frac{3}{4}$ white"), labor ("brickmaker," "carpenter by trade," "formerly slave to"), disabilities ("lame of the left arm," "stone blind," "blind & lame"), and other identifying marks, adjectives, and characterizations ("3 scars in her face," "cut in his right eye, Guinea born," "remarkably stout and lusty," "an idiot") points to the ways that biometric information, understood simply as "bio" (of the body) and "metric" (pertaining to measurement), has long been deployed as a technology in the surveillance of black mobilities and of black stabi-

ties and containment. This chapter argues that biometric information technology—as a measure of the black body—has a long history in the technologies of slavery that sought to govern black people on the move, notably those technologies concerned with escape.

Chapter 3, “B®anding Blackness: Biometric Technology and the Surveillance of Blackness,” asks broader questions about early applications of biometric surveillance and its role in African American racial formation in particular, and in the black diaspora in general. I begin with a discussion of an 1863 *carte de visite* featuring “Wilson Chinn, a Branded Slave from Louisiana” as a way to locate my analysis of branding within plantation surveillance and punishment practices. To more clearly draw the links between contemporary biometric information technology and transatlantic slavery, I trace its archive, namely the diary of Thomas Thistlewood (an English planter and slave owner) that tells of plantation conditions in eighteenth-century Jamaica and the life of an enslaved woman named Coobah, other written accounts, runaway notices, and cartes de visite. I begin with a discussion of branding during transatlantic slavery as a marking, making, and marketing of blackness as commodity. Branding was a measure of slavery, an act of making the body legible as property that was put to work in the production of the slave as object that could be bought, sold, and traded. I argue here that the history of branding in transatlantic slavery anticipates the “social sorting” outcomes that Lyon’s work alerts us to regarding some contemporary surveillance practices, including passports, identification documents, or credit bureau databases.⁷¹ Through Frantz Fanon’s concept of epidermalization—that being the imposition of race on the body—I trace and provide a genealogy of modern, digital epidermalization by focusing on branding and the role of prototypical whiteness in the development of contemporary biometric information technology. I consider the way that what Paul Gilroy terms “epidermal thinking” operates in the discourses surrounding research and development (R&D) of contemporary biometric information technologies and their applications: the fingerprint data template technology and retina scans where the human body, or parts and pieces of it, are digitized for automation, identification, and verification purposes or, in keeping with what Haggerty and Ericson argue as the markings of the surveillant assemblages, “reduce flesh to pure information.”⁷² Epidermal thinking marks the epistemologies concerning sight at the site of the racial body.⁷³ I look at some R&D reports concerning race and gender within the biometrics industry, including one particular report that

uses images of actor Will Smith as the prototypical black male and actor Tom Cruise as the prototypical white male. This chapter also examines the branding of blackness in contemporary capitalism by looking at National Football League quarterback Michael Vick's postincarceration rebranding, artist Hank Willis Thomas's *B@anded* series, and blockbuster films starring actor Will Smith that feature biometric information technology. I argue in this chapter that the filmic representation of biometrics is one of the ways that the viewing public gains a popular biometric consciousness and comes to understand these surveillance technologies. I also explore the contemporary circulation of branding artifacts for sale online and take up visual artists Mendi + Keith Obadike's *Blackness for Sale*, where Keith Obadike put his blackness up for sale on eBay.com as a way to question the current trade in slave memorabilia and branding blackness.

Chapter 4, "What Did TSA Find in Solange's Fro?": Security Theater at the Airport," asks, broadly, what the experiences of black women in airports can tell us about the airport as a social formation. This chapter also examines art and artworks at and about the airport and popular culture representations of post-9/11 security practices at the airport to form a general theory of security theater. This is far from saying that security measures and security theater at the airport are a strictly post-9/11 formation. Between 1970 and 2000 there were 184 hijackings of U.S. commercial airline flights, while for foreign carriers during that period hijackings totaled 586.⁷⁴ Garrett Brock Trapnell hijacked one of those planes, Trans World Airlines Flight 2 from Los Angeles to New York on January 28, 1972, and during this hijacking he reportedly said: "I'm going to tell you exactly what I want. I want \$306,800 in cash waiting at Kennedy. I want the San Jose jail notified I want Angela Davis released."⁷⁵ Trapnell later claimed that his demand that Angela Davis be released was actually a ploy to garner the attention and support of the black nationalist movement. Trapnell's was one of twenty-six hijackings of U.S. air carriers in 1972, a peak in domestic aerial piracy that led to the introduction of new security measures by way of a Federal Aviation Administration Emergency Order on December 5, 1972.⁷⁶ This Emergency Order included preflight screenings of passengers and their carry-on baggage by way of magnetometers, or walk-through metal detectors, and the use of handheld metal detectors at many U.S. airports. This was not the first federal intervention into antihijacking efforts. On September 11, 1970, President Richard Nixon announced countermeasures to combat what he called "the menace of air piracy," including dispatching plainclothes armed

personnel, or sky marshals, onboard U.S. commercial flights and the expansion of the use of magnetometers at airports.⁷⁷ The rash of airplane hijackings in the early 1970s eventually led to the Anti-hijacking or Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, signed into law by Nixon on August 5, 1974, four days before his resignation from the office of the president. On February 22 of that same year, Samuel J. Byck attempted to hijack Delta Airlines Flight 523 out of Baltimore-Washington International Airport with the expressed intent to assassinate President Nixon by weaponizing the plane and crashing it into the White House. Byck killed two people during his failed attempt, including the plane's copilot. Byck died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound during a standoff with police. Delta Flight 523 never left the runway that day.

I recount this short history of hijackings and various countermeasures as a way to situate contemporary security measures in U.S. air travel as having a much earlier history than those measures taken and performances undergone after the tragic attacks by weaponized aircraft in New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. This history offers a counterframing to then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's comment during a press briefing in 2002 when, in reference to the 9/11 hijackings, she stated, "I don't think anybody could have predicted . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile."⁷⁸ At post-9/11 U.S. airports, passenger screening by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) fulfills the usual scripts of confession ("What is the purpose of your travel?" or "What do you do for a living?" and "Are you bringing any goods in with you?"). With increasing procedural delays due to antiliquid policies, pat downs, chat downs, opt outs, the application of trace detection technologies to check for residue of explosive making materials, and with Secondary Security Screening Selection for some, many travelers undergo a certain amount of ontological insecurity at the border, particularly at airports. While the airport is an institutional site where almost everybody is treated with suspicion at one time or another—by TSA agents, by airline workers, and by other travelers—some travelers may be marked as more suspicious than others. In Chapter 4, I introduce the concept of racial baggage in order to name the ways that race and racism weigh some people down at the airport. I also examine the discretionary power wielded by TSA agents and by airline workers by looking at cases of, mainly, black women who were subjected to invasive pat downs, hair searches, and other security theater measures. I do this as a way to question how black women are de-

ployed in narratives about airport security, for example, through representations in popular culture as uninterested, sassy, and ineffective TSA agents. This chapter suggests that we pay attention to the ways that black women's bodies come to represent, and also resist, security theater at the airport.

The epilogue brings together this book's key concerns around the question of what happens when blackness enters the frame, whether that be cameras that "can't see black people" or centering blackness when it comes to questioning the logics of surveillance.