

INTRODUCTION

FEMINIST SURVEILLANCE STUDIES

Critical Interventions

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At a recent roundtable of academics and privacy advocates discussing surveillance studies and inequality, the conversation variously turned to consumer surveillance, new technologies, and the weakened legislative climate on privacy in both the United States and Canada. While we share the interests of the discussants, we wonder at the place of feminist concerns about surveillance and issues of inequality. For instance, where were the presentations on the use of surveillance technologies by abusers to stalk their intimate partners, the surveillance of disability through the scrutiny of women on sick leave using Twitter and Facebook, the use of surveillance images of women in popular entertainment media, or the importance of penal abolition to surveillance studies given the surveillance and criminalization of women of color (the fastest growing demographic to be included in the prison industrial complex)?

In considering roundtables like these and conversations in surveillance studies generally, we feel the need for a feminist intervention into the burgeoning field of surveillance studies. Our book formally launches the area of feminist surveillance studies. The essays collected here do the groundbreaking work of bringing the insights of critical scholarship and feminist theory to surveillance studies, a field which has yet to fully benefit from major feminist interventions. By the same token, we address a

gap in critical feminist scholarship, a field that has not explicitly taken as a focus an examination of the implications of a rapidly expanding surveillance society.

Briefly, implicit in most understandings of surveillance is the idea of real people being watched, often unknowingly, doing real things. The term *surveillance* is generally used to identify a systematic and focused manner of observing, or in the words of David Lyon, “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (2001a, 2). Michel Foucault (1995) emphasized the productive potential of surveillance as a technology of statecraft—one by which the state produces the docile bodies essential to its functioning. In particular, he noted that this form of state scrutiny is not only the province of external forms of policing, but also of the internalized systems of discipline by which people come to police themselves. This form of internalized surveillance is often captured by the spatial landscape of the Panopticon, where prisoners are clustered around a guard tower in which they cannot see whether or not they are being watched (the guard may not be looking in their direction, or there may in fact be no guard in the tower). As a result, they learn to behave as if they are always under surveillance, since they can never know whether or not they are being scrutinized. Other useful descriptions of surveillance emphasize its broad aims, defining it as the “collection and analysis of information about populations in order to govern their activities”—a collection of information that is disaggregated and decentralized—a “surveillant assemblage” rather than a singular Big Brother (Haggerty and Ericson 2006, 8).

This collection highlights the contributions that scholarship on surveillance has made (and can make) to the fields of feminist theory, critical race theory, critical cultural studies, communication theory, media studies, critical criminology, and critical legal studies. We also emphasize the long-standing and existing roots these areas of study have in surveillance studies, even though these have not always been labeled and recognized formally as such. Part of the contribution of our project is to show that surveillance should be of wide disciplinary concern for critical scholars, and that it has in fact been an enduring concern in much existing scholarship in terms of gendered, sexualized, raced, and classed representations of bodies, including work committed to ending the institutions that facilitate criminalization. By drawing together disparate fields and placing the burgeoning field of surveillance studies in historical per-

spective, we find that surveillance is not a new phenomenon. In its most basic structure, the act of surveillance has always existed in some form as the action of observing or the condition of being observed, and has been theorized across disciplines—including ones that do not appear to explicitly engage questions of surveillance.

What are the implications of thinking about concerns related to surveillance specifically as critical feminist concerns using a feminist praxis? What new objects might this theoretical and methodological focus bring into view? The contributions to this volume are by no means exhaustive of the topics a critical feminist approach to surveillance can cover. This collection offers one possible approach to doing this kind of work, and we hope that it serves as a jumping off point for future scholarship. We group the chapters into thematic sections, ones that highlight the porous boundaries that exist in the study of surveillance, as the concerns raised by the authors overlap in so many important and rich ways—whether by theorizing the foundational structures of surveillance to examine specific instances of the scrutiny of individual bodies (Smith and Jiwani, this volume) or whether through an examination of particular bodies that helps to reveal the reliance of surveillance on deep structures of inequality (Dubrofsky and Wood, Moore and Currah, this volume). Nonetheless, the groupings help emphasize key themes in the collection.

Toward a Feminist Praxis in Surveillance Studies

Part of our task is recuperative: to point out that there has been work on surveillance done by feminists for quite some time. As well, we take as our charge to highlight areas where a focus on surveillance requires explicit attention to critical feminist concerns. The “critical” part of our project—which should be understood hereafter as implicit in our use of the term *feminist*—hails from a critical tradition that has at its core an activist and interventionist agenda, and a questioning of the taken-for-granted, of what is often mundane and seamless, with a profound sense that what goes unquestioned can be dangerous, particularly for disenfranchised bodies. Our critical feminist approach involves a feminist praxis that centers intersectionality. We argue that surveillance is inseparable from what feminist theorist Sherene Razack (1998) calls interlocking oppressions, ones that are often integral to the structures that underlie our culture. We understand a feminist praxis to “highlight the interaction between theory and practice that is greater than the sum of those two parts”

(Mahraj 2010, 17). A feminist praxis is not limited to gender issues, but rather sees gender as part and parcel of a number of contingent issues, such as race, sexuality, class, and able- and disabled-bodiedness, insisting that these cannot be viewed in isolation. Each essay in this volume exhibits a feminist praxis in its approach to the study of surveillance.

How we engage questions related to surveillance—and what can be left out in these articulations—is a key concern in this volume. For instance, we’ve seen scholarly trends toward an analysis of the role newer technologies play in surveillance more broadly (Andrejevic 2007; Gates 2011; I. Kerr et al. 2009), but with much focus on privacy issues. New database technologies, newer forms of information storehouses, as well as newer communication technologies, like cell phones and PDAs (personal digital assistants), have had pernicious implications for individual and group privacy. Privacy is, however, a limited lens for thinking about surveillance, since it is a right not granted equally to all, a fact that needs to be taken into account in such investigations. Of course, “new methods of authentication, verification and surveillance have increasingly allowed persons and things to be digitally or biometrically identified, tagged, tracked, and monitored in real time and in formats that can be captured, archived, and retrieved indefinitely” (Kerr et al. 2009, xxiv), so newer surveillance technologies do have implications for “informational privacy” — defined as “the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (ibid., xxvii). In light of these developments, we need to ask the larger questions: who is considered to have a right to privacy? Whose privacy is not a concern and why? And importantly, how might a focus on these questions shape the field of surveillance studies? For instance, many communities—including prisoners, those receiving certain forms of welfare from the state, people with disabilities living in institutional care, as well as immigrants and refugees—have historically had, and continue to have, their bodily privacy invaded, but there is almost no public discussion about the infringement of their rights to privacy. As Rachel Hall notes in her contribution to this collection, privacy concerns have not kept vulnerable communities safer in the case of patriarchal violence, which often happens in the “private” space of the home. Hall shows us that part of the project of a feminist approach to surveillance studies is to “shift critical surveillance studies away from matters of privacy, security, and efficiency to a consideration of the ethical problem

of combating new forms of discrimination that are practiced in relation to categories of privilege, access, and risk” (147).

This volume makes the case that the ways in which supposedly “neutral” technologies are used requires a feminist analysis to access issues of disenfranchisement. For instance, although whole-body imaging technologies are specifically marketed to emphasize that they do not profile individuals based on the color of their skin, these technologies nevertheless, in directly targeting particular communities (including working-class people, people with disabilities, and Muslim women) in ways that line up with the racist and Islamophobic imperatives of the U.S. state, serve to intensify existing inequalities. For example, backscatter x-rays continue the direct attack on the civil rights of transgender folks, as they can visualize objects including breast prostheses and dildos, and thus “out” trans people to airport screeners, and in doing so, make transgender travelers vulnerable to transphobic screeners. In some cases, particularly in small towns, these newer surveillance technologies result in the outing of transgender folks who pass in their communities, putting at risk their jobs as well as their relationships with their families and friends (Magnet and Rodgers 2012). These technologies also explicitly violate the religious prohibitions of many religious groups, including some Muslim women, and they have a disproportionate impact on people with disabilities, as they visualize urostomy and colostomy bags (*ibid.*).¹

One of the components of our feminist praxis is a commitment to self-reflexivity and attentiveness to the ways that feminist thought can be co-opted, for instance, for projects that dovetail with state interests. A few essays in this volume excavate the links that surveillance practices have to the burgeoning prison industrial complex—an important feminist concern since women of color remain the fastest growing demographic of people to be included behind bars (Fraden 2001; M. Alexander 2010)—highlighting how a wide range of practices, from news coverage of crimes by people of color to turning to the police in domestic-violence situations, often results in facilitating the incarceration of vulnerable bodies. Andrea Smith (this volume) demonstrates the ways that relying on police to place perpetrators of violence under surveillance only makes those who are being subjected to aggression also vulnerable to harms caused by the state. In fact, feminist interventions into the law that aimed to involve police have backfired (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence 2006). For example, mandatory arrest policies, whereby police must file charges

in cases of domestic violence, have regularly resulted in the women themselves being charged and ending up in prison (Pollack, Green, and Allspach 2005). Moreover, Smith argues that because we imagine the surveillance apparatus of the state to be a sufficient response to violence, we fail to think of other, more creative solutions. Discussing one woman who lived with a batterer in her apartment building, but feared calling the police, Smith is struck by the fact that “the only potential interveners in this situation seems to be ourselves as individuals or the state. It seems like our only response is either a privatized response to violence or a communal one that is state-driven” (36). The result is not only that we do not “see” other solutions to the problem of violence, but that we also become absolved from having to see the violence in the first place. Smith argues that we need to dismantle penal responses to violence and begin to imagine responses outside this punitive system.

Ummni Khan, in her contribution to this collection, argues that a certain type of feminist response to sex work—one that argues for the criminalization of johns—results in the disproportionate criminalization of vulnerable men. Asserting that there is a strand of feminist thought committed to abolishing prostitution that engages in what she calls “feminist surveillance practices” of male sex-trade clients, Khan shows that these are surveillance practices that continually lead to the disproportionate criminalization of poor men and men of color. Khan demonstrates the collusion between antiprostitution feminist thought and state agencies, which results in what Elizabeth Bernstein terms “carceral feminism” (2010)—a feminist politics that is entwined with criminalization and that fails to address the importance of penal abolition to any feminist movement.²

In addition to new theoretical frameworks and ideological commitments, we argue that a feminist approach to surveillance studies also needs new methodological tools. In their contribution to this volume, Kevin Walby and Seantel Anaïs propose that we introduce the pioneering methods of institutional ethnography, developed by feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith, to the practice of examining surveillance documents. An institutional-ethnographic methodological approach to surveillance, Walby and Anaïs illustrate, shows how the categories produced by surveillance documentation are, of course, gendered, racialized, sexualized, and classed.

Surveillance as Foundational Structure

A feminist approach to surveillance studies highlights the ways that surveillance is integral to many of our foundational structural systems, ones that breed disenfranchisement, and that continue to be institutionalized. In an extension of bell hooks's notion of "white supremacist capitalist patriarchy" (hooks 1997), we suggest the (clumsy, but illustrative) term "white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchal surveillance": the use of surveillance practices and technologies to normalize and maintain whiteness, able-bodiedness, capitalism, and heterosexuality, practices integral to the foundation of the modern state. Smith's contribution to this collection reminds that while the modern bureaucratic state is often the focus of surveillance studies, the surveillance of native peoples is a key foundational strategy of colonialism: technologies of surveillance were integral to settler colonialism. Smith calls for the centering of an anticolonial feminist analysis within the field of surveillance studies, as she recounts how the violence of surveillance through organized settler colonial practices transformed First Peoples into racialized communities, thus facilitating the bureaucratically managed rape of indigenous people, making them "rapeable."

State surveillance practices, which we might simply call state practices (since surveillance is so seamlessly embedded), are processes that are simultaneously about seeing and not-seeing—that is, some bodies are made invisible, while others are made hypervisible (see Smith, Moore, Jiwani, and Hall, this volume). The underlying structures of domination that created the conditions for violence in communities of color—such as the incarceration of indigenous peoples in residential schools or the institutionalized rape that accompanied slavery—are made invisible, while the cycle of violence that residential schools or that slavery created in terms of ongoing violence in communities of color are hypervisibilized, surveilled, and then subject to violent state intervention. As Yasmin Jiwani notes in her essay in this volume, which looks at how the commercial Canadian media covered the Shafia murders (four Afghan women murdered by family members in Canada), when violence happens in communities of color, it is understood as ordinary and expected—people from these communities are configured as always already criminals—whereas violence in white communities is imagined to be exceptional. This racist imagining of violence as key to communities of color justifies new forms of surveillance by the state in ways that facilitate the disproportionate

criminalization of communities of color. As Hall notes in her essay on body scanners in airports, whiteness is transparent—a racialization that does not require monitoring—whereas racialized bodies are opaque and therefore suspect. Similarly, Moore’s contribution to this volume examines the increasing reliance on a genre of institutional photography—photographs of battered women—by police in cases involving battery, under a system of white supremacy. Moore shows that women of color (particularly dark-skinned women) are not revealed through the mechanism of photography, especially their injuries, in the same way as white women.

Laura Hyun Yi Kang’s piece in this volume, about the history of anti-trafficking, highlights how subjecting female bodies to observation has long been a practice in the United States. She examines the surveillance of the “differentially stratified mobilities” of women across borders, noting that the surveillance and scrutiny of women immigrating to the United States bespeaks founding imperialist racist narratives in the United States. Focusing on trafficking in the League of Nations, Kang asserts that women were simultaneously hailed as objects and subjects of surveillance. The women were, on the one hand, seen as involved in the policing of other women, but on the other hand, at the borders of the nation where they were imagined to be trafficked, they were placed under greater surveillance which resulted in racialized sexist scrutiny.

As Lisa Jean Moore and Paisley Currah (this volume) show in their analysis of the birth certificate, gender and sexuality are inextricably bound to surveillant practices of documentation. Beginning with the binary system of gender imposed on babies born on U.S. soil, each of whom must be categorized and documented as a boy or a girl, living in the modern bureaucratic state is about the policing of gendered identities. Of course, as Moore and Currah demonstrate, the practice of documenting citizens via birth certificates is not a simple recording of bodily identities, but a process of surveillance that produces gendered identities in ways that do both epistemological and ontological violence to bodies that do not fit the male-female binary. In fact, statistics (including tracking and gathering information about gender) is intimately tied to the rise of statehood, as states gain the power to govern in part by collecting knowledge about their citizenry (Bowker and Star 1999, 110). Thus, in the words of the communication theorist Armand Mattelart, “measurement, computing, and recording have been the recurrent traits of the long process of construction of the modern mode of communication, starting

with the first manifestations of ‘statistical reason’” (1996, xvi). A feminist approach to surveillance studies demonstrates how the production of knowledge, when it comes to vulnerable bodies, is always already bound up with gendered and sexualized ways of seeing. The essays in part 1 make clear that surveillance practices are actually part of the founding mechanisms of many nation-states, as well as of the practices used to keep track of the citizens of these nation-states.

The Visual and Surveillance: Bodies on Display

Part of what we add to ongoing conversations about surveillance is the idea that surveillance practices do not only “dismantle or disaggregate the coherent body bit by bit” (Ericson and Haggerty 2006), but also re-make the body, producing new ways of visualizing bodily identities in ways that highlight othered forms of racialized, gendered, classed, abled, and disabled bodies, as well as sexualized identities. Surveillance studies can help to show that many surveillance practices and technologies were initially refined by focusing on the state’s most vulnerable communities, bringing into sharp focus how oppression is made functional in a given context. For example, biometric technologies (which are used to identify features specific to an individual’s body) were initially tested on prisoners who could not resist their use and were only recently used in a wider range of applications, such as fingerprint scanners on phones for consumer security. In her groundbreaking book *Terrorist Assemblages* (2007), queer theorist Jasbir Puar examines the move within the field of surveillance studies to focus on the “data body” or informational profile. Examining new security practices, including the x-raying of Sikh turbans at airports, Puar reminds that the body is never a cage of pure information, but rather always a racialized, gendered, and sexualized being. Puar asserts that while “surveillance assemblages” tend “toward discounting and dismissing the visual and its capacity to interpellate subjects . . . this discounting is simply not politically viable given the shifts around formations of race and sex that are under way in response to a new visual category, the ‘terrorist look-alike’ or those who ‘look like terrorists’” (2007, 229). A concern in this collection is the interaction between the informational profile (a statistical profile that contains information including age, social security number, and so forth), the surveillance of gender, race, class, and sexuality, and the implications of the visual when it comes to surveillance practices and technologies.

One entry point for discussing visualized displays of the body via surveillance is the rich tradition of feminist scholarship in media studies. This scholarship enables us to focus on the contingencies of the visual and how newer surveillance technologies both produce and are produced by new forms of pleasure in looking. While a camera filming an actor in a scene for a film is not conventionally understood to be an act of surveillance proper, the visual display of bodies inherent to films and other forms of visual media, and to many practices involving surveillance technologies, suggest the need to mine the valuable insights of the rich tradition of critical feminist media studies scholarship for what it has to offer the study of surveillance. Aligning surveillance studies with feminist media studies reminds of the necessity of grounding visualizing practices in a history of systemic discrimination, one helpfully theorized by feminist media scholars. Our aim is to bring this work into the conversation about surveillance and point out that issues key to surveillance studies have been of concern to critical feminist scholars for quite some time.

In a culture that consistently puts women's bodies on visual display, and where this display can have implications particular to their gendering, any analysis of a technology that has the possibility of achieving these ends needs to contend with the complicated intersection of gender and the politics of the visual. From hooks's (1992) analysis of the hyper-visibility of black female bodies, to Laura Mulvey's (1975) foundational work on the "male gaze," which examines how the film camera is used to invite the gaze of the audience to scrutinize female bodies, to the ways that bodies are made spectacular in racialized and gendered ways in science and medicine (Treichler, Cartwright, and Penley 1998), feminist scholarship dealing with issues related to surveillance has been around for decades. At the root of Mulvey's work are questions about the politics of looking—about the surveillance of othered bodies—for both the looker and the object being looked at, and the implications of the pleasures derived from this process. Integral to Mulvey's analysis are the gendered implications when the object looked at is a woman, a concern that needs to be carried over to any examination of how the surveillant gaze can make visible gendered bodies. Of course, as hooks (1992) insists, and as the work of Kang (2002) makes clear, racialized female bodies on display in visual media require particular consideration from critical scholars, something to which this volume is attentive.

As Moore, Jiwani, Hall, and Dubrofsky and Wood's essays in this vol-

ume make clear, central to much critical feminist media scholarship are questions about the contingencies of the visual display of disenfranchised bodies, a display that also often results from the use of technologies that behave in many ways like surveillance technologies. As Jiwani demonstrates in her contribution, surveillance technologies work to discipline certain bodies in particular ways, making some bodies hypervisible and others invisible, crafting regimes of intelligibility wherein what is rendered invisible is legitimized and taken for granted as an inherent part of the social fabric. Jiwani argues that visibility serves to heighten the focus on particular bodies by foregrounding their difference, and in the case of the coverage of the Shafia murders in the popular Canadian press, this logic of the visual situates Muslim bodies as beyond the purview of what it means to be and to look like a law-abiding Canadian.

While some of the surveillance technologies used to put bodies on visual display may be new, many of the ideas and forms of oppression associated with and reproduced by them are not and can be seen in longer standing forms of media. As Rachel E. Dubrofsky and Megan M. Wood show in their chapter, which examines tabloid coverage of celebrity use of Twitter, Twitter enables the articulation of women as placing *themselves* under surveillance by “voluntarily” posting photographs. Using critical feminist media scholarship, they show how women are framed as empowered and agentic, situating them as complicit in invitations to the male gaze. While new forms of social media are imagined to produce new possibilities for feminist agency online, Dubrofsky and Wood show how age-old sexist and racist tropes persist when self-fashioning in a consumer context is configured as a form of empowerment and active invitation of the male gaze is imagined as a form of agency. Dubrofsky and Wood highlight the racialized implications of such tropes: white women are presented as agentic through the hard work (exercise and diet) they put into making their bodies ready for the male gaze; women of color are always already gaze-worthy in ways that rely on racist sexism.

We are reminded of how narratives that emphasize the possibilities of the formidable potential of x-ray vision (such as Spiderman and Batman) may serve to shape technological development, as scientists internalize these cultural messages about consumer desires and attempt to actualize them in new technologies, an issue discussed by Hall in this volume, in her essay on whole-body imaging machines that visualize people’s bodies naked under their clothes. Surveillance technologies that visualize the body reference long-standing cultural and science fictional pre-

occupations with x-ray eyes, in which x-ray vision is imagined in media from comic books to news representations to be a form of seeing that is all-powerful and all-revealing, and thus an exciting and powerful technological development. In a culture that sexualizes the visual display of female bodies, this type of technology can have specific implications for female bodies. For instance, attendants of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in the United States encourage screeners to pay particular attention when hegemonically attractive women pass through these scanners (Hall, this volume), intensifying existing forms of sexual harassment. In this way, the technologies facilitate x-ray eyes that require security personnel to stare at certain bodies while obscuring the pleasure taken in rendering these bodies visible, as well as mystifying the process by which some bodies are made hypervisible and others invisible. This is a process Magnet has elsewhere termed “surveillant scopophilia” (2011)—that is, when new technologies provide opportunities for pleasure in looking in ways connected to surveillance. How the technologies capture the body can have significant implications, as Moore (this volume) articulates in her discussion of how police photographs of battered women create images in which the battered bodies of women of color do not translate in ways that reproduce the commonsense aesthetics of what a battered woman looks like.

A possible distinction between the use of surveillance technologies and images created by the entertainment industry for mass consumption is that the images and data created by the former are not necessarily or expressly used to construct consumable products for a mass audience, as is the case for the latter. However, in the most popular television genre of the last decade, reality TV, techniques that mimic surveillance practices are used to gather footage that resembles surveillance footage of real people doing real things—that is, not actors performing scripted lines—to create an entertainment product for mass consumption. The reality TV genre puts into relief a poignant concern for our project, one originally raised by feminists looking at the genre of pornography (L. Williams 1989; McClintock 1993), but which permeates media practices nowadays: how does the visual display of “real” bodies doing “real” things add a twist to a critical analysis of representation? What are the implications of saying, “But she really behaved that way. We caught it on film,” rather than “She was scripted in this way. The director instructed her to play her role in this manner”? The little existent feminist scholarship on this genre (Hasinoff 2008; Dubrofsky 2011a) is helpful in addressing these concerns, but there

is simply not enough, though there is a remarkable burgeoning and thriving field of critical scholarship on racialized bodies in the reality TV genre, all of which can be fruitfully brought into conversation with the work of surveillance scholars.³

Newer media suture the subject more personally, more directly, as a producer (not just a consumer) of culture, creating what some now refer to as a “prosumer” (blurring of the lines between the consumer and producer). While newer media can enable the reproduction of historical oppressive power relations existent in “older” media, they also add important new dimensions requiring investigation and understanding. For instance, what happens when we can no longer say about an image (as we might with a representation on a reality TV show) that it was edited and shown out of context? Witness the case of Natalie Blanchard in Quebec, who lost her disability insurance benefits (for depression) because she appeared “too happy” in Facebook photographs that she posted during her sick leave (Sawchuk 2010). Much was made, in particular, of a photograph of Blanchard in a bikini, with online discussions of how good she looked in the bikini and of this somehow attesting to her (sound) mental health. How do questions of empowerment and responsibility become articulated when individuals operate the technologies that functionally surveil them and are used to obstruct their right to the privileges of citizenship, including assistance from the state, as well as to get them fired, to socially ostracize them, and so forth? What are the particular implications of this for female, racialized, queer, and disabled subjects?

Biometric Technologies as Surveillance Assemblages

Biometric technologies are accompanied by a whole host of surveillance practices that specifically focus on the body as we are increasingly locked into what the sociologist Simone Browne calls the “identity-industrial complex,” where the body itself is the central target of surveillance practices (2009). As Hall’s work in this volume demonstrates, the failure of new technologies to keep people safe intersects with their race, class, gender, sexuality, and disabled- or able-bodied identities. One example of this is the ways that the surveillance of disability is facilitated by new reproductive technologies. For instance, the Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act mandates the collection of DNA information from every baby born on U.S. soil. The genetic information collected from newborn babies is subject to an increasing number of genetic tests—a number that has

dramatically expanded alongside new technological advances (Magnet 2012). Of course, this means the state increasingly screens for disabilities in ways that recall eugenics projects, as new technologies are used as a form of mandated surveillance by the state to facilitate the surveillance of disability. As Dorothy E. Roberts shows in her contribution to this volume, the increase in the number of amniocenteses performed is also part of the surveillance of disability, as “it is increasingly routine for pregnant women to get prenatal diagnoses for certain genetic conditions, such as Down syndrome or dwarfism” (176), even in cases where women do not understand what the test is for or its attendant risks.

Of course, new reproductive technologies have different implications for white women and for women of color, and for women in the Global South versus women in the Global North. Roberts reminds us that in 1985 the feminist theorist Gena Corea “predicted that white women would hire surrogates of color in reproductive brothels to be implanted with their eggs and to gestate their babies at low cost” (169), this prediction highlights the differential ways genetic technologies are likely to be accessed. Corea’s prediction has come true, as Sayantani DasGupta and Shamita Das Dasgupta show in their contribution to this volume, which looks at the growing surrogacy industry in India. DasGupta and Dasgupta demonstrate that, for the most part, wealthy women from the Global North, as well as some wealthy Indian citizens, pay to have impoverished or financially struggling Indian women implanted with an embryo via in-vitro fertilization. In this piece, we see how the bodies of women of color are literally put into the service of reproducing empire for another country (often North America, Australia, or Europe) by producing offspring for what is often a white couple, and placed under surveillance to make sure they are doing so properly. Like Smith, DasGupta and Dasgupta demonstrate the urgent need for an analysis of colonialism and colonial practices in surveillance studies. They argue that surveillance practices facilitated by the economic necessity of Indian surrogates pave the way for all kinds of gender, class, and imperialist violences.

In examining state attempts — with an orientalist and imperial gaze — to render “terrorist bodies” both pathological and animalistic — Hall illustrates that biotechnologies are deployed to turn these bodies inside out and make them transparent in ways that intensify systemic forms of violence already inflicted on marginalized communities. In her discussion of full-body scanners in U.S. airports, Hall looks at the centering of the notion that white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual passengers

should not have their bodily privacy invaded by TSA officials. Race issues are indeed often at the forefront in the marketing of the technologies—for instance, companies aiming to get state institutions to invest in identification technologies claim biometrics will circumvent persistent forms of racial profiling. Biometric technologies render the body in binary code, and industry manufacturers of these technologies claim this code reveals nothing about race, gender, class, or sexuality, instead representing bodies as anesthetized strands of ones and zeroes. However, it is increasingly clear that biometric technologies are in fact a high-tech form of racial and gender profiling that efficiently and quickly sorts people using criteria that often explicitly include race and gender. For example, in order to verify the identity of a particular individual, it would be faster to scan the individual against a smaller group of people with like characteristics, rather than against an entire database. For many biometric technologies, “like characteristics” include race and gender identities. Reifying race and gender in this way through their biometric categorization only serves to intensify existing forms of biological racialism and sexism, in which race and gender are imagined as stable biological properties that can be reliably read off the body.

New Perspectives

What does this book tell us that is new? Part of the “new” is the explicit placing of the field of surveillance studies in historical perspective, by taking a transdisciplinary focus and forefronting a feminist praxis. Another “new” is the overt framing of the concern with widespread surveillance as not a new phenomenon, by excavating and highlighting long-standing concerns with surveillance that pre-date the explosion of scholarship on the topic and precede 9/11 (a signal moment for much surveillance scholarship). This collection demonstrates the importance of thinking beyond contemporary developments in new technologies and the intensification of surveillance since the 1980s, tracing the history of surveillance back to organized forms of state control such as slavery, the management of women’s reproductive autonomy, the regulation of sexuality, and the institutionalized scrutiny of those living in poverty. Rather than rehashing arguments as to whether or not surveillance keeps the United States safe, we instead take an intersectional critical feminist approach to illuminate what constitutes surveillance, who is scrutinized, why, and at what cost. As we show throughout this introduction

and edited collection, surveillance continually impacts people of color, women, queer and trans people, and people with disabilities. From the ways that surveillance has facilitated the state-sponsored rape of indigenous peoples (Smith, this volume) to the ways that surveillance remains central to the policing of the reproduction of women of color (DasGupta and Dasgupta, this volume; Roberts, this volume), in asking what the conditions of possibility for the emergence and intensification of surveillance practices might be, we hope to show the connection of these practices to systemic forms of discrimination.

This collection demonstrates the theoretical significance of surveillance for other fields, from feminist media studies scholarship that looks at how women are put on display in visual forms of media, to critical criminological examinations of how photographic evidence is used in cases involving the battery of women in intimate relationships, to research in sexuality studies that examines the surveillance of transgender folks through new forms of identification and documentation practices. We hope this volume will encourage more cross-disciplinary conversations and alliances. How might we think about how to build coalitions across difference? A feminist approach to surveillance studies also argues for a reimagining of collective responses to the violence of state scrutiny, one that seeks to uproot and defy oppressive structural systems, envisioning collective forms of resistance to violence that do not involve state surveillance of those living either inside or outside its borders, and asks how we might make our communities safer while continuing to refuse surveillance practices. Additionally, we would like to facilitate the generation of new research interests on the topic of surveillance; for instance, to open up avenues for the examination of mediascapes that increasingly blur the lines between what have conventionally been understood as public and private spheres, and the concomitant implications of the use by private citizens of personal technologies to create publicly available and widely circulating images and bits of data. Above all, we contend that the critical implications of surveillance cannot be explored without attentiveness to issues of oppression. We would like this volume to encourage discussions about the implications of surveillance for disenfranchised bodies, conversations that engage long-standing concerns raised by critical scholars looking at the display of gendered, classed, sexualized, racialized, disabled, or able bodies.

Notes

1. There was discussion of removing backscatter x-rays from airports (they were moved to airports in smaller cities in 2012, however), but the Transportation Security Administration awarded the company American Science and Engineering (AS&E) a \$245 million contract to purchase its SmartCheck backscatter x-ray detection device for an indefinite period. These scanners remain in use. See “American Science and Engineering, Inc. Awarded \$245 million IDIQ Contract for SmartCheck Next Generation Advanced Imaging Technology,” press release, 9 October 2012, AS&E website, <http://ir.as-e.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=712149>.

2. Penal abolitionists are part of a mass-based movement committed to ending, rather than rehabilitating, the prison system, arguing that the prison-industrial complex is a fundamentally flawed system that entrenches existing inequalities (Davis and Rodriguez 2000). This movement aims to find alternatives to the prison system as a warehouse for women, poor people, people of color, queer people, and people with disabilities (Davis 2003; Smith 2008).

3. On racialized bodies in reality TV, see Dubrofsky 2011b; Kraszewski 2004; Orbe 2008.