

INTRODUCTION

People have always moved—whether through desire or through violence. Scholars have also written about these movements for a long time and from diverse perspectives. What is interesting is that now particular theoretical shifts have arranged themselves into new conjunctures that give these phenomena greater analytic visibility than ever before. Thus we . . . have old questions, but also something very new. —LIISA MALKKI

“Of all the specific liberties which may come into our minds when we hear the word ‘freedom,’” Hannah Arendt once argued, “freedom of movement is historically the oldest and also the most elementary. Being able to depart for where we will is the prototypical gesture of being free, as limitation of freedom of movement has from time immemorial been the precondition for enslavement.”¹ Accordingly, Arendt claims that freedom of movement is “the substance and meaning of all things political.”² This book aims at unpacking this claim by proposing an inquiry into the politics of motion.

We live within political systems that have an increasing interest in physical movement, or perhaps just an increasingly effective control over it. These systems are, to a great degree, organized around both the desire and ability to determine who is permitted to enter what sorts of spaces: Who may enter a national state, a gated community, a particular street, a playground? Who is permitted to reside in such spaces and for how long? The “guest” worker, for example, may stay, but only on the condition that she will leave when no longer needed. The “undocumented” immigrant, however, who is effectively in the same social position, is always already “illegal” by her very act of staying. These political systems also operate by determining who (or what) should be contained and constrained: young African American men in prisons, asylum seekers in detention camps, demonstrations within tightly policed enclaves. These political systems determine for which circulating good (or capital) a tax

must be paid; the exportation of what sorts of goods (or capital, or people) should be hindered or promoted. They also control which segments of borders, public spaces, and particular estates should be entrenched and which segments should be left breached.

As Foucault demonstrates throughout his work, these systems are the substance through which the modern subject emerges. From their early establishment as systems of confinement,³ to more complex modes of distributing bodies in space that Foucault identifies as the essence of disciplinary power,⁴ and to a later attentiveness to circulation that eventually becomes according to him “the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation,”⁵ these systems have functioned as the transmission medium for the formation of modern subjectivity. In other words, both subjects and powers take form via movement and its regulation. Different technologies of regulating, limiting, producing or inciting movement are therefore different “technolog[ies] of citizenship,”⁶ as well as of colonization, gender-based domestication, expropriation, and exclusion.

This book seeks to map several modes of configuring movement into different forms of subject-positions, and thus, into the production and justification of different schemas of governance. For this purpose, I will primarily consider movement as *physical change in the locations of bodies*. And even though I will allow this meaning to stretch and expand in ways that will eventually necessitate us to revisit not merely this concept of movement, but also the concepts of “bodies” and “location,” I nevertheless focus here mostly on motions of individual bodies.

The following pages wind between two main routes, which—I hope—can thereby be woven into a single one: (I) a reading in political philosophy, whose main foci are Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, but which circulates around many other protagonists, including Plato, William Blackstone, Elizabeth C. Stanton, John S. Mill, and Hannah Arendt; and (II) a spatial analysis of contemporary spaces. This scope means that the path I wish to follow here is bound to be full of gaps. It is my hope that these gaps will not turn into abysses, but will leave spaces for other contexts, texts, and political orders to echo. If the book has only one argument, it can be summarized—somewhat reductively—as follows: In a long tradition, that in political theory is often termed “liberal,” and within which we largely still live today, movement and freedom are often identified with each other. Movement, that is, is the material substance of a long-standing concept of freedom. Yet for movement to become so tightly interlaced with freedom, an entire array of mechanisms,

technologies, and practices had to be put in place so that this movement would become moderated enough (one could say tamed or domesticated). Movement had to become the order of freedom rather than a chaotic violation of order itself. Slightly more elaborately, I propose here four main arguments.

First, I argue that subject-positions (or identity categories) and the political orders within which they gain meaning cannot be divorced from movement. We cannot understand, for example, the formation of gender categories without understanding the history of separate spheres and the history of confining women of certain races and classes to the home. We cannot grasp poverty without thinking about a history of vagrancy, migratory work, or about homelessness (as a concrete situation or as a specter). We cannot account for racial relations in the United States without considering, on the one hand, the practice of mass incarceration and, on the other, the history of slave trade and the middle passage. We cannot explain the current legal situation of Bedouins in Israel—the repeated acts of house demolition, of expropriation, the systematic denial of tenure rights—without understanding the myth of nomadism. The history of movement as well as its images, the practices of controlling it as well as the fear of it, the tradition of cherishing it as a right as well as the many exclusions that are embedded into this tradition, all are crucial in understanding social and political hierarchies, practices of rule, and identities.

Second, I examine this claim in regard to one, historically privileged, subject-position: the liberal subject. The particular features of this subject have changed through history (including and excluding different groups), and there is little agreement in the literature on where this subject—and the discourse of liberalism more broadly—begins and ends. I have no stakes at this moment in marking these changes and disagreements. For the current purpose it is sufficient to say that this subject is nonetheless often characterized via endeavors to mark him as “universal,” and often as an abstract entity. In other words, it is a subject who is a mere anchor for rights and liberties, and whose essence is rationality or “mind.” Through a reading of liberal freedom as pivoting around free movement, I argue—counter to this understanding of liberal subjectivity—that at least until the end of the eighteenth century, the liberal subject was largely configured as corporeal. My point here is not merely to rehearse the well-established critique according to which this figure was in fact—despite efforts to pretend it is universal—racialized, classed, or gendered. My point is rather that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even *within the logic of liberalism*, the subject at the core of liberal theory had a corporeal dimension: the capacity of locomotion (and the relations between

this particular bodily facet and the other aforementioned facets—whiteness, masculinity, propertiedness, but also maturity and others—will be explored throughout this book). Moreover, even after the liberal subject underwent processes of abstractness, roughly at the turn of the nineteenth century, it nevertheless appeared as an embodied entity whenever it could be imagined as a moving body. Indeed, whereas after the eighteenth-century movement might no longer explicitly be proclaimed as one of the most important rights of liberal subjects, freedom of movement remains at the heart of liberal conceptualization of freedom. Albeit in different ways, throughout the history of liberal thought movement functions as a *pivot of materialization for the liberal body*.

Asking the question of the political meanings of movement is, perhaps above all, asking how our bodies affect, are affected by, become the vehicle of, or the addressees of political orders, ideologies, institutions, relations, or powers. Asking this question in regard to liberal discourses directs us away from the prevalent reading of this political tradition, contending that liberalism perceives and produces subjects as essentially reasoning judicial entities whose corporeality is constantly repressed or excluded from the domain of political relevance. Therefore, at its second layer, this book offers an alternative reading of liberal subjectivity, that does not simply bridge the Cartesian model with a later (predominantly nineteenth and twentieth century) understanding of the subject as reducible to its will, reason, decision-making processes, or a juridical status (a bridge that thereby erases alternative models of subjectivity). My purpose, however, goes beyond proposing a more nuanced understanding of the liberal subject. Eliding the moving body from liberal subjectivity obscures major modalities of the exercise of liberal power. Accordingly, the aim of this analysis is to bring these forms of power to the surface. It is done here not merely in order to show their historic operations, but also to echo contemporary political orders, to point to a political rationale that still governs contemporary political trends, and to expose some building blocks of our own forms of governing and of being governed.

For this purpose, I show how this liberal concept of freedom emerged in tandem with other configurations of movement, wherein movement was constructed as a threat rather than an articulation of liberty. Here we arrive at the third argument at the core of this book. The movement through which liberal subjectivity obtained material presence and through which liberty became a physical phenomenon was not unbound, unrestrained movement. Rather, this movement was given within many constraints and was secured by many anchors that provided it with some stability. Beyond questions of volition

and intention that themselves constrain movement, movement has been conceptualized and has materialized within sets of material, racial, geographic, and gendered conditions in a way that allowed only some subjects to appear as free when moving (and as oppressed when hindered). The movement (or hindrance) of other subjects has been configured differently. Colonized subjects who were declared to be nomads, poor who were seen as vagabond or thrown into vagrancy as they lost access to lands, women whose presumed hysterical nature was attached to their inability to control bodily fluids, all were constituted (or rather deconstituted) as unruly subjects whose movement is a problem to be managed. This configuration was the grounds for justifying nonliberal moments—and spaces—within liberal regimes.

This argument has two opposite trajectories whose causal relation to each other is not completely clear. On the one hand, we see an *inability to conceive* some movements as a manifestation of freedom, and on the other hand, an *active effort to deny* and thwart this freedom. There is a certain coproduction between these two directions but its nature changes across different discursive fields, ideologies, and times. By providing a reading of several means through which movement is produced as freedom or as a threat, as an iconography of self-regulation or as a proof of the impossibility to discipline this person or that group, this third layer also offers a critique of the modes of governance that crystallize around these two main configurations of movement: surveillance, enclosure, eviction, imprisonment, and siege.

The fourth layer of this book is an endeavor to show how this split in the configuration of movement, as well as the modes of governance that are formed alongside this split, are mapped into contemporary spaces. Within this mapping I focus on the regime currently at place in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). This regime's focal point of interest (and major political technology) is the movement of people and goods. In other words, it is a regime of movement. As one of the most perfected and elaborate systems of controlling a population via controlling its movement, this regime offers a condensed laboratory for examining technologies of regulating movement and the subject-positions emerging through these technologies. While abnormal in its radicality, this particular context is by no means privileged, but is rather one manifestation of a global trend that is far from new, but that has been critically intensifying in recent years.⁷ Thinking on and from this particular context is a way of marking some of the contemporary stakes of my theoretical analysis. As the argument unfolds, this context supposes neither to circumscribe these stakes, nor to suggest we can see here a single political structure

extending from seventeenth-century England to twenty-first century Israel/Palestine, or even a certain continuum. This context aims, rather, at opening many other points of resonance, that eventually demonstrate how different configurations of motion partake in justifying different modes of governing populations within the frame of liberal democracies.⁸

Finally, subtending these four arguments is an endeavor to understand the political bearings of movement; to chart the operations, roles, doings, and meanings of movement within our political lexicon(s). Hence, my account in this book is lexical more than phenomenological. Rather than examining the essence of movement, I analyze the political syntax within which the concept circulates and through which it takes form.

Regimes

Different forms and technologies of ordering movement were always central to the formations of different political orders and ideologies. From the tethering of serfs to the land under feudalism, to the modern territorial state and its demarcation of borders, political orders are in many ways regimes of movement. The modern state—to take what is perhaps one of the most relevant examples—especially after the invention of the passport,⁹ and increasingly with the evolution of technologies of sealing and regulating borders, is to a great degree a system of regulating, ordering, and disciplining bodies (and other objects) in motion.¹⁰ Adi Ophir further defines the sovereign state as an apparatus of closure: sovereignty is what consolidates (and then unravels) in efforts of closure—actual or potential, successful or failed.¹¹ It is important to note, already here, that alongside these apparatuses of closure and controlling movement, an elaborated ideology and theory of the state was developed that ties these modes of confinement to freedom. Enclosure, hindrance (or other modes of slowing things down), and hedges of various types, were seen as preconditioning freedom, rather than standing in an opposition to circulation, flow, and above all liberty. Most of the great thinkers of the state could not conceptualize freedom without the possibility of its management, without some form of closure that would render movement a principle of order rather than chaos.

This understanding of the modern state is perhaps most explicit in John C. Torpey's work. If Max Weber sees the formation of the modern state as a function of monopolizing the legitimate means of violence, Torpey follows this formulation to propose that the modern state consolidated also by mo-

nopolizing the “legitimate means of movement.”¹² While Torpey presents his analysis as parallel to Weber’s, I propose these two processes or ideologies are inextricably linked, and seek to explore how they work in tandem. Did one of these processes of monopolization condition the other? Is one a means for the other? Does one serve to justify the other? Can one be thought of in terms of the other (violence as movement; movement as violence)? Was violence but another movement to be monopolized?

State violence, moreover, has its own movements: invasion, infiltration, and conquest. And these often rest upon other movements—or myths thereof. John Stuart Mill provides a very lucid manifestation of this structure that will be delved into in the following chapters. For Mill, Europe is a site of motion. It has a “remarkable diversity” that constantly facilitates movement: “the people of Europe,” he writes, “have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who *traveled* in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to *travel his road*, their attempts to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any permanent success.”¹³

Mill’s Europe is a space in which people are in perpetual nonhomogeneous movements (to varied locations, using myriad roads and paths) that facilitate (perhaps produce) one homogeneous movement of society as a whole: progress. This progress is precisely what justifies Europe’s expansion to the “greater part of the world,” which has “become stationary.”¹⁴ “The tutorial and paradigmatic obsession of the empire and especially imperialists are all part of the effort to move societies along the ascending gradient of historical progress,” argues Uday Mehta. Accordingly, “the liberal justification of the empire” relies on the argument that since most of the world has lost its own capacity of movement, without Europe’s mobile (almost motorist) powers, the rest of the world would not be able to move (read: improve). Progress in its global articulation “is like having a stalled car towed by one that is more powerful and can therefore carry the burden of an ascendant gradient.”¹⁵

The combination of Europe’s movement and Asia’s stagnation stands at the base of Mill’s justification of the imperial project. This stagnation, which is perhaps best marked by the image of the bound feet of Chinese girls,¹⁶ threatens Europe itself. Mill warns us that “unless individuality be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, notwithstanding its noble antecedences and its professed Christianity, will tend to become another China.” Europe may, in other words, “become stationary.”¹⁷ To avoid this fate, Europe has

to endure in its motion—an endurance Mill seems to simply assume. (And it is quite striking that this assumption is made concurrently with his terrified warning that this endurance is about to fail.)¹⁸ One may speculate, perhaps, that the motion into the East was one way to guarantee Europe’s freedom-as-movement. This motion might be conceived of in general terms—terms so wide they might seem figurative or abstract: the movement of the entire body-politic (a movement that often takes military form—war—as we know from Plato¹⁹ or Hobbes²⁰). Alternatively, this motion might be detailed via the minute particularities of imperial administration.

Earlier in the seventeenth century, the portrayal of America as a site of excessive movement served to justify similar projects of expansion. The movements of armies, trading companies, private military powers, settlers, capital, and goods, constituted zones that were characterized by their own regimes of movement: the colonies. The colony—which Ann Stoler defines as a nonstable space for the management, retaming, confinement, containment, disciplining, and reforming of movement—came to *address*, but also *demonstrate*, and thereby construct, the presumably dangerous and wild movements of the colonized. As Stoler argues, this regime of movement was established in opposition to “the normative conventions of ‘free’ settlement, and [to] a normal population.”²¹ Hence, these oppositions embedded into movement were given within a wider regime of movement, that is often taken to mark a much later epoch but that, as Étienne Balibar reminds us, has a long history: “The process of globalization, which has been occurring for several centuries, has not simply been ‘capitalist’ in the abstract sense of the term—a mere process of commodification and accumulation. It has been capitalist in the concrete political form of colonization.”²²

If we are to understand regimes of movement, we have to examine also the subject-positions they simultaneously assume and constitute. Such an examination reveals that the above opposition, between settlement (stability, sedentarism, normality) and unbound movement, operated on two levels. The first was not a global, colonial setting, but rather the individual body itself. Within this level this “opposition” emerges rather as a balance: a balance between movement and stability that is also a balance between freedom and security. At stake, for liberalism, has always been the reconciliation of its concept of freedom with social order. The idea of the autonomous individual who must not be controlled despotically (who *no longer* needed to be controlled despotically) rested upon the assumption that this individual can control and self-regulate herself. Foucault’s work is a notable venture point from which

to study the articulations of this idea, but already in Hobbes, before the technologies of power explored by Foucault were put into effect or even systematically theorized, we find its kernel. Reading Hobbes's defense of absolutism via the prism of movement enables us to see that for him, the subject within the commonwealth is free even under the most tyrannical power not just since he is part of this power (this would be Hobbes's argument against republican notions of liberty). The subject's freedom is also a function of his willingness to control and confine his movements: once he agrees "not to run away"²³ and submits his actions to the will of the sovereign, the shackles imprisoning him can be removed, and this is precisely the meaning of his freedom. Given that Hobbes defines freedom as unimpeded movement, freedom emerges as the outcome of its very limitation, as long as this limitation is internal. Locke can be read as putting forth a different model that nonetheless obeys a very similar principle: freedom—as movement—is possible only within a system of enclosures. Ultimately, this combination of stability and movement enabled liberalism to craft the idea of an ordered freedom. The liberal subject was carved within "a certain 'epistemology of walking'": he was a subject "walking on his two feet" in a stable, and firm manner;²⁴ a subject whose stability came to define his body, as well as his social and material backdrop: a home, a homeland, an owned domain.

On the second level of the imagined balance between settlement and movement, we find that these notions are superimposed, time and again, on spatial divisions. Home, location, rootedness, and other factors that render movement desirable and free are in various ways preserved to very particular subjects. Notwithstanding varied models of localization, Africans, indigenous Americans, or Asians, as well as women and paupers, keep appearing in the texts of liberal thinkers as either too stagnant or too mobile. Thus, the balance presumably achieved within the body of the liberal subject becomes a schism, a contrast, between those who can control their movements, and thus rule, and those whose movement is hindered or excessive, and thus cannot. This mapping bisects the freedom of the movement of white, male, and propertied bodies, from the presumed threat carried by colonized ("savages"), poor ("vagrants"), or female (seen as either confined to the domestic sphere or as hysterical—or both) bodies.

Significant parts of this book return to the seventeenth century to explore this duality. This temporal focus has to do with three major developments converging roughly around this era: the body of work that would later become the foundations of liberalism begins to take shape;²⁵ the state begins

to consolidate the contours of its body by imagining a growing control over the movement of people into, out of, and within its borders (even if the bureaucratic apparatuses that could effectively control those movements were yet to be established);²⁶ and finally, the hands, as Hobbes would phrase it, of the stronger European states reach farther and farther out, expanding into territories beforehand unimaginable. The seventeenth century thus also marks some of the earliest systematic theoretical engagements with colonized subjects. But the pattern within which free movement is conditioned upon some assumption of stability—that is either presumed to be lacking in the case of colonized subjects and/or systematically denied from them—remains prevalent long after we have seemingly entered the postcolonial era. Tim Cresswell shows that this binary splitting movement stands at the core of liberal citizenship. Whereas the mobility of citizens is almost sanctified as a right, and is taken to construct “autonomous individual agents who, through their motion, [help] to produce the nation itself,” there are always “unspoken Others [who] are differently mobile”; others whose mobility is “constantly hindered”: “Arab Americans stopped at airport immigration, Hispanic Americans in the fields of American agri-business or African Americans ‘driving while black,’”²⁷ and we can add here Palestinians at checkpoints, but also anticapitalism demonstrators arrested on bridges.²⁸ Accordingly, even today, as a matter of general rule, the subject who is most mobile is the (Western) “citizen”: a subject-position that is often tied to stability and sedentarism.²⁹

In her *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, Wendy Brown identifies a similar tension between an ideology of open borders and an exponential increase in technologies of managing borders; between an ideology of free movement across borders and a reality of growing restrictions of movement: “what we have come to call a globalized world harbors fundamental tensions between opening and barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription. These tensions materialize as increasingly liberated borders, on the one hand, and the devotion of unprecedented funds, energies and technologies to border fortification, on the other.”³⁰ These tensions do not form as a result of two competing logics of governance.³¹ On the contrary, globalization must be seen as “government of mobility,”³² rather than as simple openness of borders.³³ “The reduced significance of the state border” should not be taken as the outcome of “a freer movement of people.” Rather, as Didier Bigo observes, “a differential freedom of movement (of different categories of people) creates new logics of control that for practical and institutional reasons are located

elsewhere, at transnational sites.”³⁴ “Mobility gaps” is Ronen Shamir’s apt term for the outcome of this logic.³⁵

Liberal democracies have always operated in tandem with regimes of deportation, expulsion, and expropriation, as well as confinement and enclosure, implementing different rationalities of rule to which colonized, poor, gendered, and racialized subjects were subjected, thereby “drawing a categorical distinction between those who should be granted the benefits of citizenship, however meager, and those who must be managed authoritatively, even despotically.”³⁶ Therefore, these tensions or oppositions are integral to a single order that couples within it different regimes of movement.³⁷ In a similar vein, we cannot simply contrast a “sedentarist metaphysics of rootedness” to a “metaphysics of movement.”³⁸ Indeed, rather than competing metaphysics, we have here complementary processes: First, citizenship has to rely on a process of “taming mobility,”³⁹ which serves to support the sedentarist ideology of the nation-state within a factuality wherein people are, and were, always mobile.⁴⁰ Second, once this image of stability is established for particular categories of now-“rooted” people, it serves to facilitate their growing mobility. Movement and stability thus precondition each other. Finally, these particular categories are formed vis-à-vis other groups, which are simultaneously presumably less rooted and yet constantly hindered. The immigrant, the nomad, and certain modes of what we have come to term “hybrid-subjectivity,” all represent subject-positions that are configured through their mobility, but that more often inhabit spaces of confinement: detention and deportation camps, modern incarnations of poor houses, international zones in airports.⁴¹ The flux that is frequently celebrated as subversive⁴² has repeatedly served to restrict movement-as-freedom, to facilitate nonfree movements (expulsion, slave trade, denial of land tenure), and ultimately to preclude movement.

Movements

Early in the twentieth century, in one of the first reflections on liberal theory, L. T. Hobhouse defined liberalism as a political critique whose main “business” is “to remove obstacles which block human progress.”⁴³ While liberalism also imposes *restraints*,⁴⁴ those are but means for a greater goal: the construction and sustainment of a liberal society, which is conceived by Hobhouse as an organism moving forward. It is not simply, adds Michael Freeden, that “concepts such as civilization, movement, and vitality turn out to be inextricably linked to liberal discourse and the liberal frame of mind”; what “sets

liberalism aside from most of its ideological rivals, whose declared aspiration is to finalize their control over the political imagination,” he argues, is tolerance, which “suggests a flexibility, a movement, a diversity—of ideas, of language, and of conceptual content.”⁴⁵ It does not matter, for the current purpose, whether this diagnosis is correct or not. It is enough to argue that there is a liberal-imaginary seeing itself as a moving body of thought which facilitates the movement of the political space itself.⁴⁶

Yet despite this appeal to movement as a defining criterion, “setting liberalism aside from most of its ideological rivals,” these rivals, too, have often appealed to the same phenomenon to define themselves. In his juridical account of the structure of the Third Reich, *State, Movement, People*, Carl Schmitt defines the National Socialist state as composed of three elements: the state (a static element), the people (a nonpolitical element), and the movement (which he later identifies with the party): the “dynamic political element,” which “carries the State and the People, penetrates and leads the other two.”⁴⁷ There are three crucial attributes of “the movement” in Schmitt’s account. First, it is the only political element in the trio. Both the state and the people may be political only through it. Second, it is the “dynamic engine” in it—the force vitalizing politics by moving it,⁴⁸ and perhaps we may say: the force that is political by virtue of its moving capabilities. Finally, it is the bearer of unity: through it the trio becomes a whole. This unmitigated nature of the movement, that comes to encompass the entirety of the political structure, is, Schmitt argues, precisely what distinguishes the German National Socialist state (together with its Fascist and Bolshevik allies) from liberal democracies.⁴⁹ Indeed, according to Giorgio Agamben, the systematic use of the term *movement* to refer to what we have come to term “political movements” emerged with Nazism.

Whereas Agamben merely notes that we begin to see the concept in the eighteenth century, around the French Revolution,⁵⁰ Paul Virilio shows in great details how movement—the mobility of the masses until nations themselves are conceived as movable, moving, and even obliged to move—runs as a thread from the revolutionary moment in France (if not earlier), to the Fascist regimes and to Communist dictatorships. Beginning with a revolt “against the constraint to immobility symbolized by the ancient feudal serfdom . . . —a revolt against arbitrary confinement and the obligation to reside in one place,” these revolutionary movements turned freedom of movement to “an obligation to mobility.” The “freedom of movement of the early days of revolution” was quickly replaced by “the first dictatorship of movement”: war, colonization, pro-

duction, and trade.⁵¹ All these forms of violence—mobilization into battle, into labor, an expansion of a state and a nation, circulation of capital, commerce and credit—“can be reduced to nothing but movement,” Virilio seems to be arguing.⁵²

Nazism and liberalism are therefore not unique in this appeal to movement as a defining criterion. I cannot survey all other orders, ideologies, or political strands here, but can briefly point to Marx’s identification of modernity with a powerful movement⁵³ and his effort to explain the operation of capital by delineating its laws of motion⁵⁴; to postmodernist appeals to notions of hybridity and to the image of the nomad as symbolizing modes of movement that work counter to modernist ideologies;⁵⁵ or to frameworks seeing globalization as a system typified by a growing flow of capital, culture, information, and above all people.⁵⁶ The point here is not to argue that these competing ideologies/orders share similar attributes. The point is rather to illustrate the appeal of the notion of movement to politics and to political thinking.

Some of these movements have quite different meanings. The physical motion of (individual) bodies is not the same as “the fascist movement” or the “flexibility, movement, diversity” to which Freeden refers when he talks about liberalism. Whereas I believe it is important to allow these meanings to sustain their differences, ultimately I will try to show that these differences are less stable than what may seem at first. To begin accounting for this fluidity of the term itself, we should perhaps begin by wondering about its wide appeal. It is not sufficient to dismiss the widespread use of movement by claiming that all these are, indeed, political or social movements. First, this would merely beg the question and call up another question: How did the term “movement” emerge to describe this particular social and political phenomenon? But more important, movement is used in many of the examples above as a defining (and hence supposedly unique) attribute: it supposes to create a distinction, to mark a difference, and not to point to a quality of taking part in a shared category: social/political movements.

Why “movement” then? One way to begin to form an answer would be to think of politics itself qua movement. Standing as an opposition to nature, to stable power structures, to a static state bureaucracy, politics brings the potential carried by instability: the potential of change, of widening the gaps allowing our agency, redistributing resources, and realigning power. A set of different (even if tangent) traditions of thinking about the meaning of “the political” conceptualizes it as that which moves, as the moment of movement, or as that to which movement is essential. The political is the domain in which

and upon which humans can act, which humans can change, and which is thus defined as inherently instable. Movement can take here the form of an earthquake—a radical and rare upheaval (as in the case of Rancière⁵⁷); of a repetitive, potentially slower, and more local operation of undoing in which the movement of the individual body produces a movement of categories—troubling the assumption of givenness and stability (as in the case of Butler⁵⁸); or of a space wherein the world is revealed as movable, a space in which and through which the world emerges as the substance, product, and target of action (as in the case of Arendt⁵⁹).

If we think of these social/political movements as *movements*, then movement appears in a multiplicity of meanings. These meanings are at times folded into one another and operate together, and include physical movements of individual bodies as a part of a social/political struggle for change (movement); as a site of (and act of) transgression that may have political meanings; as a particle in large-scale movements of political bodies: states, armies, trade. Accordingly, Schmitt and Hobhouse (but also many others, including Mill, Hobbes, and Hardt) see the political sphere as a moving body almost literally. It is a body of bodies that become a collective body. If we situate these particular moving political bodies (of Hobhouse, Schmitt, and Hobbes) within a historical, global context, we see that the movement of these collective bodies is, indeed, a movement in space: an expansion.

Earlier I argued that movement serves as a surface, a grabbing point for different forms of control; that its ordering and circulation are the organizing principle of different regimes; and that it is a privileged mode through which bodies and powers operate on and through one another. Now we can add that movement is also an iconography, an imaginary as well as a physical phenomenon that allows different bodies to take form.

Subjects/Bodies

Disability studies have long called our attention to the relation between ability and citizenship; between particular assumptions regarding the “normal” manners of carrying our bodies in space, and the construction of democratic spaces, which are, ultimately, spaces of accessibility of possible and impossible movements. Accordingly, the process of subject formation is, to a great degree, a project of “normalizing” movements. Indeed, a reading in political theory reveals almost an obsession with this need to educate the body in “proper” modes of movement.⁶⁰ So strong is this obsession that, according

to Andrew Hewitt, by the nineteenth century, walking became what embodied a “bourgeois self consciousness.”⁶¹

“How subjects move or do not move tells us much about what counts as human, as culture, and as knowledge,” argues Caren Kaplan.⁶² Indeed. But this is only part of the story. How the movement of subjects is described or imagined tells us almost as much. Movement is a technology of citizenship or subjectivity, as I noted above. Through the production of patterns of movement (statelessness, deportability, enclosures, confinement), different categories of subjectivity are produced. Regimes of movement are thus never simply a way to control, to regulate, or to incite movement. Regimes of movement are integral to the *formation of different modes of being*. But movement is also a lens through which to trace the models within which subjectivity is framed. Tracking reports on movement, the role of movement in political theories, the attempts to emphasize or sideline images of mobility or immobility, may teach us a lot about how subjectivity is—and was—perceived and constructed. Finally, movement is a perspective from which to think about subjectivity. In Erin Manning’s words, “A commitment to the ways in which bodies move,” is a commitment to thinking about the subject in particular ways. Manning, as many before her, proposes that such a commitment is a way to think against a stabilization of the body within “national imaginaries.”⁶³ As I briefly suggested earlier, I think this claim is somewhat rushed. The tendency to celebrate the deterritorialization effects of movement often “overlook[s] the colonial power relations that produce such images in the first place.”⁶⁴ Manning, however, makes another claim regarding this commitment that is worthy of further exploring: to think bodies through movement, she argues, is to think the subject against the nexus of identity, since “a moving body . . . cannot be identified.”⁶⁵ The question of movement is thus also the question of the contours and limits of subjects/bodies.

If movement is a way of thinking about a certain openness of these contours; if it eventually comes to contain a plurality of people in which, as Arendt portrays it, “each man moves among his peers”;⁶⁶ if it is through movement that a plurality becomes a body (a social movement, an empire, a state as an orchestrated collective movement), then a commitment to thinking on and through movement is more than a commitment to thinking of the flexibility, if not impossibility, of identity. It is also (and the two are intimately connected) a commitment to thinking the possibility of nonindividual bodies and to be attuned to the moments in which the impossibility of individual bodies is revealed. At times, movements injure us. Some movements open wounds in our

bodies. Others open wounds in our wills. Melville's Ishmael, the narrator of *Moby Dick*, probably describes it best. Situated on the deck of the ship, tied to Queequeg with a rope, he watches the motions of fellow crewman becoming his own: "my own individuality was now merged in a joint stock company of two . . . my free will had received a mortal wound," he describes it. At this moment he understands that we are all tied to "a plurality of other mortals" in some "Siamese connexion" that renders one's movements also the other's movements; that breaks the ties between individual volition and action;⁶⁷ but also: that opens up volition itself. At times movements fortify us. They enhance our own movements with a cohesive motion of other bodies, of a body larger than us. A collective movement of people—a march, a war, an occupy movement such as the ones we have seen recently from Tahrir Square to Occupy Wall Street—charges our individual movement with a meaning and power it could not inhabit and produce on its own. Importantly, movement also occurs between these two poles, injury and fortification. The wounds to our will and bodies (whose bleeding is a form of movement in and of itself—a flow) demonstrate the degree to which others can affect us, the fragility of our bodily boundaries or our individual volition. These wounds, and this affect, the undone volition, are the unavoidable effect of the opening of the bodily boundaries of individuality. However, therefore, they are both the outcome of and the precondition for the formation of collectivities. A plurality as a political body produces—or is produced by—the Siamese ties that render one's actions also the other's. In a more Arendtian formulation: this plurality is the substance through which action appears as something that happens *in between* people.

Nevertheless, thinking of subjects as moving bodies does not necessarily produce political ontologies that work counter to models of autonomous individualism. This book shows that whereas such models can be opened by thinking of and through movement, the autonomous subject of liberal discourse emerged as a figure of corporeal mobility.

A Brief Genealogy

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century it was the denial of free movement that was—and was thought of as—the primary negation of liberty. This was probably a function of two interlaced limitations: the limited technologies of monarchical power (which were largely limited to imprisonment and execution), alongside a limited comprehension of the modes through which power

operates or may operate. Accordingly, we have both a mode of power and a mode of thinking about power for which movement is quintessential. Thus, until the turn of the nineteenth century, liberty was largely seen as the freedom from unjustified external restraints that limited one's power of locomotion. While liberal freedom emerged as freedom of movement, while liberty is still tied to movement when freedom is attached to the body, and while the movements of some groups (that we can identify as standing at the core of shifting liberal and neoliberal discourses) is still maximized and largely protected, the idea of freedom as movement has been for the most part sidelined in liberal thinking.

Chapter 3 outlines in more details the first moments of this genealogy. Here I would like to very briefly and partially sketch the stages that follow the point with which that chapter concludes: an initial process of abstraction occurring roughly at the end of the eighteenth century, through which the will becomes the main bearer of freedom. What is significant about this process is not merely that the element within man to which freedom is attached changes; the important difference is that for many later liberals "man's will is himself."⁶⁸ The subject becomes reducible to will, rationality, or judicial status (or in other words: abstracted). Once again, Mill provides a telling example. In chapter 1 of *On Liberty*, Mill proposes a typology of power, whose contours would later be filled by Foucault. According to this typology, power has shifted its operation from the body to the soul. The power of the sovereign (imprisonment) can no longer be thought of as the single, even primary, threat for our freedom, he argues. As we are now faced with a more pervasive "social tyranny," our soul is subjugated to the yoke of public opinion and it is the freedom of ideas and thoughts that we must secure.⁶⁹ Significantly, movement remains attached to freedom even within this framework. However, this movement is only marginally the physical movement of bodies. Movement in Mill's account is first and foremost the movement of ideas, whose free circulation creates venues for a potential escape from the yoke of custom.⁷⁰ Second, as we saw, it is the movement of progress.⁷¹ And third, physical movement appears as a manifestation and illustration of freedom—or the lack thereof—in the case of women, whose oppression is often described by Mill via the metaphor of chains. At the margins of the discourse, describing those who are yet to obtain an equal, universal, perhaps abstract status, movement once again emerges as the meaning of freedom.

Already with Kant, the problem of freedom is attached to questions of autonomy, of judgment, and decision making, rather than to one's ability to ex-

ecute an action once chosen. This framework would become more and more central to liberal thinkers in the twentieth century. Yet while with Kant, as we shall later see, movement nonetheless plays a role in the configuration of political freedom, by the twentieth century his leading successor would replace the emphasis on movement with a craving for stability. John Rawls repeatedly declares throughout his second treatise that stability is precisely what is at stake in *Political Liberalism*. As far as possible, he aspires to take both time and change out of the equation and “fix, once and for all, the content of certain political basic rights and liberties.”⁷² According to Freedman, in so doing, Rawls joins Ronald Dworkin⁷³ in “prioritiz[ing] rules as stasis, equilibrium and consensus over rules of change.”⁷⁴ Both join in an attempt to bring to a halt (almost literally) the movement Freedman sees as essential to liberalism. Rawls sees freedom as resting not on one’s ability to move her body, but “on persons’ intellectual and moral powers.”⁷⁵ Indeed, Rawls is a paradigmatic example of the liberal configuration of the subject as largely abstract—or in his formulation: as a “basic [unit] of thoughts, deliberation, and responsibility.”⁷⁶

The freedom Rawls seems to have in mind is not a freedom that “can only mean . . . that if we choose to remain at rest we may; if we choose to move, we also may”⁷⁷—the concept of freedom so prevalent in the seventeenth century. Such a notion of freedom-as-movement does appear in *Political Liberalism*, yet it is not situated under what Rawls defines as “basic rights and liberties.” Rather, together with other “matters of distributive justice,” freedom of movement takes part in securing “institutions of social and economic justice” (in contrast to “just political institutions”).⁷⁸ Within the “basic list of primary goods,” freedom of movement appears in conjunction with “free choice of occupation against the background of diverse opportunities.”⁷⁹ The phenomenon that served as the kernel of freedom, if not formed freedom as such, is thus reduced to “occupation.” Movement, in other words, is depoliticized and becomes subjected to free market principles.

This reduction to free market logic is not just a reduction to principles of money, occupation, or trade. As Foucault identified in his 1977–78 lectures, this logic is entangled with questions of security (that can be translated, in their turn, to questions of circulation and movement). Ultimately, with this reduction and depoliticization, some movements become the hallmark of threat rather than freedom. “There are two chief reasons why movement of persons across borders can be more problematic than movement of products,” explains Loren Lomasky. These two reasons are “security concerns and financial entitlements. A widget purchased from abroad is inert; it lies there

until put to service that widgets perform. But immigrants exercise agency. As no one needs to be reminded post-September 11, 2001, some intend harm to the country they have entered.”⁸⁰

Two splits bisect movement-as-freedom in this account: a split between things and people, within which the second split is already assumed—that between residents (or citizens) and immigrants. Those who move—unlike the things that simply “lie there” (but we can add, also unlike those who remain within their own boundaries)—carry with them security hazards. Their agency itself appears as a risk in the quoted paragraph. And while Lomasky later admits that “it is simply not credible to maintain that the vast bulk of immigration poses any significant security threat,” poverty becomes a complementary facet of danger: “as with the potentially hostile, [the poor’s] exclusion is justified on grounds of self-interest.”⁸¹ Lomasky simply ignores the potential risks to our “self interest” that the movement of goods may carry. Unlike “poor, tired huddled masses” who attempt to cross borders of “well-off states,” things that can move freely across borders, enabling the relocation of manufacturing and jobs, the global robbery of natural resources, the impoverishment of entire classes or countries, the poisoning of soil by tainted produce, or cross-pollination through the introduction of new seed to previously pristine environments, do not enter Lomasky’s equation of fear.

Indeed, as many recent accounts of globalization have noted, it is commodities and capital, alongside a small group of privileged people, which are increasingly mobile—and hence “free.”⁸² What interests me in this equation, however, is not just the circulation of movement, as it were, but also the deployment of fear. Adriana Cavarero calls us to notice that the two are interlaced. Cavarero proposes that fear is a physical state: it is “the act of trembling,” the “local movement of the body that trembles,” as well as “the much more dynamic movement of flight.” In other words, “terror moves bodies, drives them into motion.”⁸³ At the same time, movement itself is often seen as the bearer of terror. Probably needless to say, this is not merely Lomasky’s approach. In the post-September 11th United States “any and all matters of immigration law enforcement, as well as all procedures regarding migrant eligibility for legal residence or citizenship, have been explicitly and practically subordinated to the imperatives of counter terrorism and Homeland Security.”⁸⁴ This subordination was institutionalized in 2002, with the move of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security. “Despite little evidence of the connection,” Brown writes, there is a routine identification of “unchecked illegal immigration with the

danger of terrorism.”⁸⁵ Nevertheless, as we can see with Lomasky, surprisingly, this securitization of movement does not detach movement from questions of freedom—almost as if the tie between the two is too deep to fully break. Rather, freedom—or in the above quote agency—is itself depoliticized with the depoliticization of movement, and becomes a threat. To return to the site that had initiated this project, the regime of movement in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) provides us with a striking manifestation of this process. The regime of movement, which drains movement into a security hazard to be tightly managed, is interlaced with the securitization of liberty. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable for most Israelis to imagine the Palestinian struggle for independence as anything but brute aggression. The regime of movement—the notion that control over land and population can be almost fully accomplished by regulating the circulation of people and goods—is the primary political technology of a regime that can see a struggle for self determination and national liberation only as “terror.”⁸⁶

Technologies

The logic I trace in the philosophical inquiry is both demonstrated by, and serves to explain, predominant trends in contemporary politics. This logic is further developed and refined by a close analysis of several sites in which movement is presently regulated, focusing especially on the checkpoints deployed by Israel in the Palestinian West Bank. This particular test case is to a great extent a function of my own intellectual—and personal—history. It was my endeavor to contribute to the understanding of this political order that set off my interest in the political significance of movement. My experience in several years of activism at and across the Israeli checkpoints in the oPt has shaped my understanding of movement as a central component within the formation of different modes of governance. Nevertheless, this test case is not idiosyncratic and enables us to see clearly what other cases may blur.

At a more general level we might say that the aim of projects such as this book is to rethink the relations between the abstract and the concrete; between the conceptual and theoretical on the one hand, and the particularities, the small details of reality on the other. Within this frame, the regime of movement in the oPt functions as the local field on which I look and from which I draw the matters that not merely enrich, but also provide the substance—as well as the method and orientation—for the theoretical analysis. In other words, the checkpoints are not merely where I find “materials” to be theo-

rized, or where I examine “reality” vis-à-vis theory. Rather, there is an attempt here, to propose a mode of inquiry that does not yield to these distinctions.

The “regime of movement” Israel employs in the oPt is an extensive bureaucratic system of permits, backed by a dense grid of physical and administrative obstacles, which fragments both the space and the social fabric, pervasively regulates the circulation of people and goods, and manages the Palestinian population by the means of this regulation. Since these many obstacles are situated also within Palestinian territories (and not only on some imaginary, nonexistent border between the oPt and Israel), this system prevents—or at least severely hinders—what many see as mundane, daily life: going to work, attending a relative’s wedding, shopping at the market, or going to school. All are simple routines for most people, but they are denied to most Palestinians or are purchased with the cost of valuable time; time that is robbed, as Amira Hass puts it, and “cannot ever be returned. . . . The loss of time, which Israel is stealing every day from 3.5 million people, is evident everywhere: in the damage it causes to their ability to earn a living; in their economic, family and cultural activity; in the leisure hours, in studies and in creativity; and in the shrinking of the space in which every individual lives and therefore the narrowing of their horizon and their expectations.”⁸⁷

In other words, “scarcity of time disables space.”⁸⁸ It narrows the land and disables the possibility of forming a political community. What thus emerges is a mode of controlling the space and the population inhabiting it by controlling the temporality and continuity of the movement within it.

Jeff Halper has termed this system “the matrix of control.” “It is an interlocking series of mechanisms, only a few of which require physical occupation of territory, that allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories. The matrix works like the Japanese game of Go. Instead of defeating your opponent as in chess, in Go you win by immobilizing your opponent, by gaining control of key points of a matrix so that every time s/he moves s/he encounters an obstacle of some kind.”⁸⁹

Writing in 2000, Halper could have seen only the seeds of the dense grid of checkpoints that would become the predominant component within this matrix. The checkpoints are valves wherein, first, individual moving bodies are inspected and allowed (or denied) passage; and second, the circulation of an entire population, as well as the goods it consumes and produces, is managed. Yet, I would like to propose that the regular operation of the checkpoints entails, in addition, particular and peculiar disciplinary practices. In one of their facets, the checkpoints are part of a network of *corrective technologies* that

are meant to fail. These quasi-disciplinary practices constitute the Palestinians moving through the checkpoint as the always-already failed products of a system that operates within a disciplinary logic, that has a disciplinary form, yet that is built to fail precisely because at stake is not the construction of normalized, self-governing subjects. What is at stake, rather, is the possibility of bridging nondemocratic modes of governance (occupation) with a framework that insists on its democraticity. A genealogy of circulation and of the political technologies regulating it may become, accordingly, a genealogy of the regimes and powers circumscribing it.

A genealogy of the “administration of movement” within Israel and the oPt reveals a change in the directions and circulation of people (labor force in particular) and in the technologies managing this circulation. From 1967, and for roughly two decades, two undertakings intersected that assumed (and were conditioned upon) the same project. The first was the “enlightened occupation”—the presumed improvement, triggered by the occupation, in the quality of life of the Palestinian general population.⁹⁰ The second was a change in the intra-Israeli labor market that became dependent on the cheap labor force of Palestinian noncitizens.⁹¹ Both projects relied on establishing disciplinary institutions (such as vocational schools to facilitate Palestinians’ integration to the Israeli labor market), as well as on the deployment of a biopolitical lattice that is similar, in many ways, to the one described in Foucault’s 1975–78 works: a multifaceted lattice that takes as its points of interest reproduction and mortality rates, diseases and vaccinations, quality of water, and so forth.⁹²

However, in the last ten years—and in a process that can be traced back to 1989⁹³—the operation of this biopolitical system has completely changed. Neve Gordon identifies in this transformation a shift from what he terms politics of life to politics of death.⁹⁴ I maintain that this shift can also be explained as a shift from politics of circulation—a liberal project, which is intertwined with disciplinary and biopowers⁹⁵—to a politics of halting, in which the subject of interest is no longer precisely the population, but a new entity of subjects-in-motion, which comprises single-dimensional, subject-like positions with the sole attribute of locomotion.⁹⁶ Most of the literature concerning the control over movement in the oPt sees this new form of control as working primarily at the level of population. Following the claim that contemporary Israeli power in the oPt has abandoned its complex disciplinary endeavors and is focusing on controlling the population as a moving body, this literature, too, seems to have abandoned the relationship between subjects and power.⁹⁷ This theoretical trend goes beyond the analysis of power in the oPt. One of

the pioneers of the field of mobility studies, William Walters, makes a similar argument regarding the camp. The camp, according to him, is no longer a disciplinary site, since states are no longer interested in producing a “positive kind of subjectivity” in regard to the populations inhabiting them: the deportable.⁹⁸ Similar arguments can be found in many other contemporary analyses of different regimes of movement. Departing from this literature at this point, this book endeavors to understand how a population that is controlled via movement is produced by technologies of subjectivation. In other words, I ask about the local and concrete apparatuses through which subjects become moving bodies that can be ruled primarily by managing their location and circulation.

The focus on checkpoints, closures, sieges, walls, deportations, and other measures regulating movement in the occupied Palestinian territories may be taken to be but one manifestation of my claim regarding the conjunction of freedom and movement. If movement is indeed the manifestation of liberty, and, moreover, is interlaced with notions of liberal subjecthood and thus citizenship, as this book sets out to argue, then it is almost trivial that a state of occupation—which is by definition an elimination of citizenship and a denial of most political rights—would incorporate a control over movement into its political technologies. Yet this case enables us to see much more. While de facto, the limitations upon movement in the West Bank are limitations upon the freedom(s) of Palestinians, free movement is given in this context primarily within the paradigm of security (as it is in contemporary assumptions regarding immigration and international traveling in general). Put in the words of the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, “Palestinian freedom of movement has turned from a fundamental human right to a privilege that Israel grants or withholds as it deems fit.”⁹⁹ Here we return to where the previous section ends: freedom itself becomes a security concern. This book, then, can be seen as an inquiry into the constant coupling and decoupling of freedom and security (or order), mediated by changing modalities of movement. The normalizing project through which disciplinary subjects appear; the technologies of movement through which such subjects are deconstituted; the maritime map through which both order and its disruptions are globalized.

The book’s structure aims at opening up a wider span, both historically and philosophically, through which the argument takes form and within which it echoes. It therefore moves (the pond may prove itself unavoidable) between

different contexts and fields. Whereas some anchors organize the book's argument around repeated themes and pivots (both in terms of the theory considered and in terms of the contemporary context from which the theoretical investigation emerges), the book digresses, at times, to what may seem as more eclectic assemblages. These digressions seek to point to the ubiquitousness of a particular logic, grammar, or a structure of movement and of thinking about movement, as well as to delineate variations within different articulations or implementations of this structure.

Chapter I, "Between Imaginary Lines" (cowritten with Merav Amir), focuses on Israeli checkpoints in the occupied Palestinian territory as a condensed microcosm for examining the relations between movement, violence, and the construction of different subject-positions. In discussions following talks, or in responses to the previous publication of this chapter, people have often referred to its analysis as part of an anthropological study. I was never trained as an anthropologist, and I have no pretense of reflecting on the boundaries of this discipline, but I believe that if there is anthropology here, it is an anthropology of power. The object of my inquiry is not Palestinians. In fact, one may say that the perspective of Palestinians is almost completely erased from my analysis, and to some degree at least, this would be correct. In the collective mosaic of theory concerning this subject matter, I feel I should not presume to represent the Palestinians' voice—being an integral part of the power occupying them. The object of my inquiry is rather the mechanism of justifying the form of rule imposed upon Palestinians—a form of power that by no means leaves its addressees passive, that by no means determines their subject-positions, and that by no means forecloses the possibility of resistance.

The chapter seeks to understand the mechanisms by which violence can present itself as justifiable (or justified), even when it materializes within frames presumably set to annul it (such as "liberalism," "democracy," or "peace process"¹⁰⁰). It is organized around two lines: an imaginary line, that pretends to organize, but in effect disrupts, the ordered movements of Palestinians at the checkpoint; and a white line, whose addressees are human rights activists, primarily Jewish, Israeli, upper-class women. These two logics of space-demarkation simultaneously assume and constitute two subject-positions: an occupied subject, external to the law regulating it, and a citizen, whose movement is freedom and can therefore be constrained only under particular limitations. Succeeding chapters are set to mark some points in the long history of the formation of these two subject-positions. After a short interlude, whose role is to situate the argument of chapter I within a wider

genealogy of ideas, chapters 3 and 4 are split, to a great degree, according to the positions contrived by the two lines at the focus of chapter 1. Both chapters seek to show how different assumptions regarding movement (as well as different modes of producing particular patterns of movement) are essential to the formation of these two subject-positions. Chapter 3, “The Fence That ‘Ill Deserves the Name of Confinement,’” focuses on the subject at the core of liberalism, and on the role of movement as freedom within this discourse. It shows the modifications in early liberal conceptualizations of movement, and with them, the changes in the assumptions regarding subjectivity, corporeality, and freedom. I show first, that movement was the materialization of freedom within this framework; second, that it was the privileged mode by which the liberal subject was embodied; and third, that it was also the corporeal condition for rationality.

The moving body, especially when it appears as a certain mode of corporealized rationality, both destabilizes and reproduces established dichotomies. It calls into question the accepted mind/body schism, yet at the very moment that it forces us to take the body into account even when we consider classic liberalism, it also renders the body insignificant. Within this frame, the body appears in a narrow, diluted form that is produced, precisely, by reducing it to a change of position between given coordinates. Hence, the centrality of movement also shows that “embodiment” alone does not guaranty attentiveness to particularity and difference (as many critical theorists seem to assume). Indeed, a further analysis of some canonical, liberal texts shows that the moving, “rational” body was of a particular kind: it was an able, firm (masculine?), target-oriented (rational?), and predominantly European body.

It is by now a common, established argument that liberalism and colonialism emerged together. The West has constituted itself by an “othering” process: it affirmed itself as civilized by the barbarization of colonized, sometimes enslaved (and in a different cross section, female) subjects, so that we can only speak of “an intrinsically colonial modernity.”¹⁰¹ Yet what is striking here is that this process of distancing took place by pushing to the extreme the very attribute that serves as a hinge of the enlightened, free, liberal subject: movement. Movement was at one and the same time the paradigmatic corporeal form of the abstract universal subject, and its edge, even its beyond. Chapter 4, “The Problem of ‘Excessive’ Movement,” focuses on this othering process. It follows changing conceptualizations of bodies in motion to show the production of differences between the liberal subject and “othered” subjects/populations. The argument is not merely that movement had to be restrained,

and that to be reconciled with freedom it had to be, at least to some extent, self-restrained. It is also not merely that such an ability of self-regulation was not assumed to be the share of all subjects. The argument is that some patterns of movement were constantly produced as unruly by the circulation of both images and concrete apparatuses that rendered movement excessive.

America serves here not just to examine the writings of seventeenth-century theorists on colonial spaces, but also to resonate with the analysis of the movements of Palestinians in chapter 1. Indigenous Americans are portrayed in these texts much like the configuration of Palestinians within the frame of Israel's occupation: their attachment to the land is at one and the same time denied and feared, in what seems to be a contradiction but is actually a coherent justification mechanism of projects of ongoing expropriation and occupation.

Chapter 5, "The Substance and Meaning of All Things Political," expands this relation between imperial violence and movement—or confinement. It also seeks to begin moving from the analysis of power that is at the focus of the first four chapters to an analysis of action and resistance, which is only partially developed in chapter 1. Looking at both the movement of the body politic itself and the meaning of movement within other collective bodies, this chapter analyzes movement as a collective political undertaking. The many different types—perhaps different meanings—of movement that circulate in this chapter (from emotions, to social movements) allow me to make more explicit some of the themes underlying this book in regard to the flexibility and spread of the concept. Movement ultimately appears as the material substance of political life, action, and association.