

Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present

The United States of America has never been a uniform or unequivocal geopolitical entity. This is not merely a consequence of prevailing forms of federalism, demographic heterogeneity, or regional particularity. This is not simply a matter of an unavoidable gap between empirical description and the ideal form of the nation-state. Rather, the United States encompasses a historically variable and uneven constellation of state and local governments, indigenous nations, unincorporated territories, free associated commonwealths, protectorates, federally administered public lands, military bases, export processing zones, *colonias*, and anomalies such as the District of Columbia that do not comprehensively delineate an inside and outside of the nation-state. The heterogeneity of this condition is not exceptional to the United States. But even with a burgeoning scholarship scrutinizing U.S. empire and calls for a postnationalist American studies, a critical analytic lens that takes into account the significance of colonialism for the various ways in which the geopolitical configuration of the United States has changed over time remains largely absent.

Rather than simply advocating a comparative approach that centers colonialism, this collection cumulatively argues that analyzing U.S. colonialism demands understanding U.S. empire and the imperial nation-state as itself a comparative project and mode of power. Always already shaped by fluctuating interimperial rivalries and counterclaims against the peoples it subsumes, U.S. colonialism has been neither monolithic nor static. The United States nevertheless remains reliant on the ever-expanding dispossession and disavowal of indigenous peoples, global circuits of expropriated labor,

economies of racialization, and its expansive network of military bases—that is, on people and places remade as things in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power. By refusing to designate one particular form of U.S. colonial rule—or one decisive historical moment, such as 1898, 1848, 1831, or 1787—as categorically expressing and definitive of U.S. colonialism, however contingently produced, this volume contests the disciplinary periodization common within comparative studies that would ascribe an origin, culmination, and subsequent decline or end to U.S. colonialism. As Walter Benjamin argues, “Overcoming the concept of ‘progress’ and overcoming the concept of ‘period of decline’ are two sides of one and the same thing.”¹ The essays collected here do not subscribe to a mode of comparison whose objective is to establish a norm of colonial power and practice by which different historical cases can be comparatively juxtaposed and evaluated. Instead this book argues that it is precisely the complex reciprocities, seemingly opaque disjunctures, and tense entanglements evident in the diversity of U.S. colonial pasts and presents that reveal the epistemological antagonisms and affinities that offer new insights for anticolonial struggle and new possibilities for critical inquiry.

Bridging the study of North American settler colonialism and U.S. overseas occupation provides a means with which to address both the incongruities and fault lines of the U.S. nation-state and the determined construction of national singularity, coherence, and continuity. Debates about globalization over the course of the last four decades have grappled with an increasing sense of the diminished sovereignty of nation-states, while historical studies of nationalism and nations have similarly highlighted the ways in which the political, economic, and cultural forms of society are porous and contingent. Nevertheless, as contemporary conflicts over immigration reveal with particular intensity, popular investments in the modular nation form and claims to a discrete and territorially delimited political community have definite material force. Likewise, escalating state and municipal fiscal crisis has been paralleled by the proliferation of the U.S. military-surveillance complex throughout the world. The nation-state need not actually be unitary or cohesive in order to decisively enact juridical power “domestically” and exercise coercion “at home and abroad.” In this sense, the United States serves here as a volatile assemblage and shifting empirical configuration that cannot adequately contain or circumscribe scholarly inquiry, but that has nevertheless insinuated and asserted its authority in ways that resist being undone by mere exposure or repudiation.

The overlapping, sedimented, and variable conditions and practices of

colonization are in this regard fundamental for understanding the complexity and specificity of the United States historically and in the present. To forgo a linear and nationally bounded reading of U.S. history from east to west is to allow the palimpsest of Spanish, British, French, and Dutch colonization, and the *longue durée* of indigenous peoples, to emerge intermittently from beneath the veneer of naturalized borders and periodizations. Progressive chronological narratives of national history rely on such seemingly discrete social and political categories as colonizer, native, and coerced or intentional migrant all blending over time into one people—unified as they are transformed by liberal pluralist equivalence—even as these distinctions in effect are neither transient nor absolute. Likewise, rather than instantiating a decisive narrative of domination and resistance, dynamics of power under colonial rule have always been complicated by discrepant alliances, the aspirations of elites, and social antagonisms that precede and exceed the colonial situation.² Yet, colonialism persists as a never fully repressed or entirely manifest structure, especially as settlers aspire to extinguish indigenous peoples and variously affirm and naturalize their own status as native to America. United States colonialism is a continuously failing—or at least a perpetually incomplete—project that labors to find a workable means of resolution to sustain its logic of possession and inevitability by disavowing the ongoing contestation with which it is confronted and violent displacement that it demands. As Audra Simpson argues, “It is in these complicated relationships to the past, to territory, and to governance that Indigeneity is quite simply a key to critical analysis, not as a model of an alternative theoretical project or method . . . but simply as a case that, when considered robustly, fundamentally interrupts what is received, what is ordered, what is supposed to be settled.”³ Jodi Byrd points out, however, that scholarship on U.S. imperialism often readily acknowledges and perhaps even underscores “the annihilation of indigenous nations, cultures, and languages” only to unequivocally “relegate American Indians to the site of already-doneness that begins to linger as unwelcome guest to the future.”⁴ It is precisely this temporal closure, necropolitical teleology, and complicit blindness to the sustained political, social, cultural, and legal contention by indigenous peoples in the United States that so often continues to diminish and hinder the capacity for scholars, activists, and legislators to productively examine the consequences and interconnections of U.S. colonialism as they have varied across time and place, but never in fact been fully concluded or resolved.

The chapters in this book thus consider the multifaceted claims, exclusions, and disavowals of the United States as it has been constituted with

respect to colonialism. The distinct contribution of the collection is to place U.S. overseas empire and settler colonialism into the same analytic frame—not only as a means of comparison, but as sometimes mutually constitutive and sometimes conspicuously disjointed formations. Collectively the essays argue that addressing the multiple histories and present-day formations of colonialism in North America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific are essential for coming to terms with how and why the United States is what it is today. In this sense, this volume revisits the historian Albert Bushnell Hart's early twentieth-century contention that the United States has comprised "nearly every variety of colonies known to history," and, more than this, that this multiplicity must be reckoned with as a significant feature of the present.⁵ Contributors build on the insights of recent critical indigenous and ethnic studies, postcolonial theory, critical geography, ethnography, social history, and social, cultural and legal analysis to insist on the enduring significance of colonialism as a vital analytic framework for understanding the imbricated and enmeshed histories and current political conjuncture of the United States. Rather than approaching U.S. colonialism as either a fleeting aberration or a passing stage in the nation's historical development, this collection considers how the social, economic, and political conditions of possibility in and in relation to the United States have been overdetermined by past and persistent formations of colonialism. At the same time, however, the volume's focus on colonialism is not a claim for the absolute primacy or determination-in-the-final-instance of colonialism or an effort to diminish the significance of other axes of antagonism and dispossession. It is intended instead to critically complement and engage projects of non-normative comparative critique attuned to these inconstant and multiple conditions.⁶

This book underlines the complicities, adaptations, and antagonisms that interconnect global, national, regional, and local relations of power. Indeed, the exigencies of our present moment provide an especially auspicious occasion through which to reconsider colonial formations within and with regard to the United States. From this vantage point we can generatively think through a series of questions. How might the diversity of colonial pasts, settler claims, territorial annexations, and overseas occupations be understood in relation to one another? How have specific normative forms of jurisprudence, racialization, violence, militarism, politics, property, and propriety served to at once facilitate and delimit the conditions of colonial dispossession? How and why do these formations matter now? Addressing these questions, this volume examines the specific iterations and conse-

quences of U.S. colonialism as a dynamic historical assemblage with significance for understanding current conditions of social and political possibility.

Michel Foucault's theorization of *genealogy* is particularly useful for addressing U.S. colonialism because of the ways in which it "rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies," turning instead to the analytic of *descent* as "an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers that threaten the fragile inheritor from within or from underneath."⁷ The claims and vectors of descent—entwined as they are with the composition and transaction of property and the calculus of race, resemblance, and self—are crucial for understanding colonialism with regard to the United States. Genealogical accounts can gesture toward the outer limits of knowing and familiarity where there is no certain beginning or end. There is also no overarching causality, only lineal associations, amalgamated intimacies, the speculative horizons of kinship, and insinuated exclusions, inclusions, and indifferences. As a method, genealogy both elucidates the proprietary claims to descent and the lineages of settler nation building and potentially destabilizes claims to an immanent and unilinear history. In the colonial context, as Mark Rifkin argues, genealogy as a corollary to specific indigenous kinship principles that are modes of governance upsets the liberal division between public and private and unsettles the heteronormative colonial imposition of conjugal domesticity over and against kinship as an indigenous political relation.⁸ Yet as a biological and biopolitical truth claim, genealogy can serve as precisely the evidentiary logic for parsing inclusion and exclusion that it can call into question as a method.

Within colonial systems of acknowledgement and accountability, such regimes of historical truth claims are problematic not only for the ways in which they demand their own universal priority, but also for the impossible framework of recognition and origin they require of indigenous peoples. As Joanne Barker argues, Native peoples are placed in the untenable position of having to prove an origin, sustained authentic difference, and ontological coherence that precedes and survives colonization while at the same time conforming to these superimposed systems of recognition as a prerequisite to securing their legal status and rights as defined within the system of colonial rule. Barker insists that it is not enough to unsettle the colonial systems of historical knowledge that predominate; it is also necessary to understand the promise and appeal of these systems even for those who are subordinated and dispossessed by their logics. She points out that from this perspective the desire for the truth claims of origin likewise follow from

the profound brutalizations, dislocations, and dismemberments perpetrated by colonization and genocide.⁹ Genealogy is methodologically useful in this regard insofar as it indexes the predicaments of history's normative binds. But, as Jean O'Brien argues, genealogy as descent can also be the means by which settlers appropriate indigeneity as their "birthright" and render "native" as "non-Indian."¹⁰

For the contributors to this collection the historical force and convolutions of colonial normalization thus remain paramount. These essays work against the ways in which colonialism is too often used as a generally applicable metaphor or analogy for all forms of domination.¹¹ This facile ascription does violence to the actual conditions it allegorizes and conflates. As already briefly discussed, conventional forms of comparison entail a similar problematic analytic gloss. According to Johannes Fabian, "There would be no *raison d'être* for the comparative method if it was not classification of entities or traits which first have to be separate and distinct before their similarities can be used to establish taxonomies and developmental sequences."¹² Rey Chow notes how "this hierarchal formulation of comparison, which may be named 'Europe and Its Others,' remains a common norm of comparative literary studies in North America today." Comparison in this sense reaffirms the self-referentiality of Euro-American epistemology and authorizes an "asymmetrical distribution of cultural capital and intellectual labor."¹³ There is also the danger, as has been noted in early criticism of Edward Said's *Orientalism*—criticism to which Said subsequently responded¹⁴—and certain variants of "whiteness studies," of making the study of colonialism ultimately about the colonizers or the colonial imaginary. Moreover, the institutional division of knowledge into discrete academic disciplines is itself a legacy and effect of the ways in which the U.S. state and polity both justified empire and sought to profit from and order a haphazard system of racial governance while occluding the ongoing the violent material dispossessions that underwrite its conditions of possibility. Nevertheless, Chow points out, comparison can be productively rethought in ways attuned to incommensurability and disparity, that weigh the reciprocities, co-constitutions, and uneven dynamics of power; and it is precisely a project of this kind to which this volume aims to contribute.

In order to provide a provisional point of departure for considering the salience of colonialism in the U.S. context, in what follows I briefly discuss the terms *colonialism*, *imperialism*, and *empire*. I explore what seem to me to be among the most salient elements and significant conjunctures for addressing the "colonial present"—by which I mean the ways in which the

current moment is shaped by the fraught historical accumulation and shifting disposition of colonial processes, relations, and practices.¹⁵ The following section considers the colonial geographies of authority and historical trajectories of colonization as they have aspired to various forms of confiscation, occupation, removal, and extraction. Addressing the constitution of sovereign power as it asserts control over specific places and populations, I sketch the configuration of U.S. nation building as a project that has always been in some sense colonial. I then consider some of the key juridical, political, and conceptual mechanisms that underwrote this project and how and why these changed over time. Here I am especially interested in the idea of national founding, and the accounts of temporality with respect to colonialism that serve to foreclose the past or justify inequality and dispossession as a consequence of the dialectical division of what Elizabeth Povinelli calls the “governance of the prior.”¹⁶ In conclusion, I outline the organizing editorial logic of the volume and the chapters that follow as an attempt to stage the resonant dynamism of U.S. imperial constellation and formation.

COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM, EMPIRE

To insist on the significance of colonialism raises the question of an etymology and working definition of the term. However, as Raymond Williams writes of imperialism, *colonialism*, “like any word which refers to fundamental social and political conflict, cannot be reduced, semantically, to single proper meaning. Its important historical and contemporary variations of meaning point to real processes which have to be studied in their own terms.”¹⁷ Rather than rehearse the debates on terminology in the voluminous literatures on colonialism, imperialism, and empire, my intention in this section is to examine, in at least a preliminary manner, the ways in which ideas about what colonialism is and what it is not have been central to social and political conflict within and in relation to the United States, as well as how these dynamics have changed over time.¹⁸ Vicente Rafael argues in his contribution to this volume that linguistic diversity has historically accompanied the insistence that the United States “has always been, was meant to be, and must forever remain a monolingual nation.” Rafael points out that American endeavors to “improve and perfect” English, to “Americanize” and thus translate English into a national language, were also efforts to distinguish the United States from the ostensible decadence and despotism of British colonial rule. Language thus registers what Nicholas Thomas underscores as “differences between competing models of colonization.”¹⁹

What specific historical processes, assertions, and distinctions are evident in the etymology of *colonialism*? *Colony*, *colonial*, and *colonization* all precede *colonialism*, which in the sense of a “system of colonial rule” does not appear until the 1880s, in association with the European frenzy to establish interimperial peace while imposing territorial divisions for the systematic plunder of Africa and elsewhere. *Colony* has its roots in the Latin word *colōnia*, which during the Roman empire referenced violence and displacement by indicating the settlement of Roman citizens in recently conquered territory. Yet *colōnia* is also associated with *colōnus*, which can mean colonist, but also simply inhabitant, peasant, or farmer. David Kazanjian observes that the meaning of the term *colonial*, as referring to “a person from a colony,” does not appear until the late eighteenth century, and that in the context of the American Revolution and since, the American “colonist” became categorically detached from the expropriative process of conquest and colonization and situated in opposition to British rule.²⁰ Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan draw attention to what they call the “social etymology of *colonie*”—that is, “the enduring social relationships of power that remain buried and suspended in political terms”—as its inflections shifted across the nineteenth century variously designating “imperial expansion and modes of confinement, resettlement of delinquents, pauper programs, and the recruitment of empire’s pioneers.”²¹ Social etymology in this sense might also highlight the ways in which the British valorized a Lockean pursuit of “colonization by plantation” in contrast to Spanish New World colonization, which they disparaged as crudely extracting wealth rather than improving the land through cultivation.²²

What would later be described as modern European colonialism emerged during the sixteenth century as developments in oceanic navigation and transportation provided the basis for increasingly extensive networks of conquest, control, and commerce across the world. Modern colonialism entails techniques and institutions that maintain foreign control over a people or peoples and territory through varying degrees of imperial occupation and settlement, depriving those subjugated of autonomy and self-determination, and justifying this imposition in terms of the (religious, moral, cultural, or racial) superiority of the foreign power. The colonial administration of populations operates in tandem with the juridical, political, military-strategic, economic, and cultural production and control of property, territory, and resources.²³ Slavery, peonage, and labor migration under shifting regimes of racial capitalism have each been essential to the making of the U.S. imperial nation-state.²⁴ Likewise, colonial expansion inaugurates new histories

of violence that saturate all aspects of life and cycles of brutality that exceed conquest.²⁵ As Achille Mbembe observes, “the colony is a place where an experience of violence and upheaval is lived, where violence is built into structures and institutions . . . [and] insinuates itself into the economy, domestic life, language, consciousness.”²⁶ In this sense, U.S. militarism and militarization both establish the conditions of the nation-state and claim justification for their further imperial expansion as the defense and redeployment of those conditions and calculated disposal of national sacrifice zones.²⁷

To underscore the ways in which colonialism is constitutive for the United States is to attend to how and why colonialism marks its founding, historical development, and uneven heterogeneity. An exclusive focus on imperialism and empire with regard to the United States risks losing sight of how territorial seizure, the legal justifications for occupation, the unofficially sanctioned or tolerated illegalities that further underwrote expansion and occupation, and differential modes of governance—including liberal democracy and citizenship—remain the very conditions of possibility for its more indirect forms of rule and the sprawling networks of military encampments and global economies. Settler colonialism is thus an especially significant historical condition for the United States. Patrick Wolfe defines settler colonialism as a “logic of elimination” wherein settlers strive to replace indigenous peoples by force and assimilation and assume priority as native to the land rather than aim mainly to extract value to be accrued by a distant colonial metropole.²⁸ Yet, settler colonialism in what is now the United States changes over time, shifting in disposition variously from accommodation to annihilation to inclusion of indigenous peoples, while never being reducible to the encounter between “settler” and “native” positionalities. Although the descriptor “settler colonialism” useful for highlighting how the presumption of irrevocability and permanence renders autochthonous certain people settling from elsewhere under the auspices of colonial rule, it can also serve to obscure the forms of heterogeneity and incommensurability that trouble simple binary oppositions.²⁹ U.S. settler colonialism is likewise necessarily part of a broader interrelated historically mutable collection of practices, institutions, and conditions. As Jodi Byrd points out, the “settler colony’s national construction of itself as an ever more perfect multicultural, multiracial democracy” depends on relegating colonialism and slavery to the past while adamantly denying their continued significance—as the ongoing exploitation of land and resources and the racialized justification for dehumanization and expendability—as the

material foundation for U.S. global empire.³⁰ Thus to emphasize colonialism is to acknowledge that continental conquest and the diverse forms of unin-corporation, inclusion, and partial sovereignty perpetuated by the United States remain incomplete, unsettling, unresolved, and ongoing.

Imperialism in the broadest sense is the deliberate extension of a nation's power and influence over other peoples or places by military, political, or economic means. Imperialism is the practice of establishing, maintaining, and expanding an empire. As such, imperialism is the overarching category of which colonialism is but one particular strategy linked to specific forms of territorial occupation. The word *imperialism*, like *colonialism*, does not appear until the mid- to late nineteenth century. It is derived from the much older term *imperial*, which comes from the Latin *imperium*, meaning to command, and *imperō* ("command, order"), with the root *parō* ("prepare, arrange; intend"). In his influential 1902 treatise *Imperialism: A Study*, John Hobson argued that a specifically modern form of imperialism was the result of the emergence of monopoly capitalism and the oligopolistic organization of power on which it relied.³¹ While Hobson considered this concentration of power antithetical to free market doctrine and a deviation deserving reform, V. I. Lenin drew on Hobson, as well as Rudolf Hilferding's analysis of finance capital, to argue that imperialism was the culmination of the insatiable global trajectory of capitalist development and crisis.³² In their widely cited 1953 essay "The Imperialism of Free Trade," John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson contend that since the nineteenth century the foreign policy of free trade has increasingly served as a lower-cost and more diplomatically palatable way to achieve imperial control. First Great Britain, and then other European countries and the United States, began to move away from formal modes of imperialism, such as the administration of colonial empires and commercial monopoly, emphasizing instead that former colonies and other non-Euro-American countries open their markets, resources, and labor to the presumably equitable forces of comparative advantage and the ostensibly self-regulating equalizer of global trade.³³ William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson subsequently made a similar argument about the role of decolonization as a less expensive means of hegemony and profit by the former colonial powers following the Second World War.³⁴ Scholars such as David Harvey and Giovanni Arrighi describe the "new imperialism" of the twenty-first century as characterized by ever escalating U.S. unilateralism and militarism, as well as an intensified economic pursuit of "accumulation by dispossession."³⁵ But rather than emphasize only the informal or liberal character of U.S. empire, as many commentators do,

it is essential to understand this multivalent informality as fully articulated with both the historically accumulated traces and persistent reconfiguration of colonialism in the more delimited and formal sense—whether in agencies such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Bureau of Land Management, or the interstitial political status of “free associated state.”

The “absence of empire in the study of American culture” that Amy Kaplan identified more than twenty years ago is clearly no longer the case.³⁶ Indeed, as many observers have pointed out, debates and discussions on U.S. empire have become ubiquitous throughout scholarly and popular forums in the years since the United States declared its so-called global War on Terror in 2001. Yet, for all the recent talk and analysis of empire—perhaps because such considerations were in part prompted by exigencies of contemporary war and militarism targeting the Middle East and Islam—the particular historical conditions of colonialism, and their complex persistence and ongoing reconfiguration in North America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, have rarely been placed at the center of current mainstream debates.³⁷ Even such an important recent effort to underscore the centrality of colonial empire for the United States as Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano’s collection *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* does not substantially include continental colonization and conquest within its frame of inquiry.³⁸ Interestingly, a century earlier, at the very moment when many observers perceived the United States to be a colonial power—reluctant or not—in regard to Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawai‘i, debate between proimperialist and anti-imperialist advocates explicitly foregrounded the historical specificities of U.S. continental colonialism as a condition through which to address overseas expansion in the wake of the 1898 Treaty of Paris.

In a 1899 *Atlantic Monthly* article in support of U.S. colonial rule, the legal scholar and future president of Harvard University Abbott Lawrence Lowell contended that such territorial acquisitions were both indispensable for future national prosperity and in keeping with U.S. continental expansion historically. He argued, “Until admitted as states . . . [territories have] not differed in any essential particular from that of the North American colonies of England before the outbreak of the Revolution,” and thus “there has never been a time, since the adoption of the first ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory in 1784, when the United States has not had colonies.”³⁹ Likewise, in 1903, Albert Bushnell Hart insisted that American Indian reservations were among “three very distinct types of legally-defined territorial governments [administered by Congress]. . . . In

any other country such governments would be called ‘colonial.’”⁴⁰ Indeed, in another essay Hart similarly asserts: “Notwithstanding that the Revolution was a protest against a colonial regime, the model for the original American Territorial system, which has so far been little altered, was the previous colonial administration of Great Britain.” He concludes: “What light does this experience of the last century and a quarter throw upon the future of American colonization? It shows, in the first place, that the idea of national colonies is as old as the republic, and that during the last fifty years the nation has grown accustomed to outlying dependencies.”⁴¹ As the historian Walter L. Williams has since demonstrated in his 1980 *Journal of American History* essay, this perspective on the continuities between U.S. continental conquest and overseas colonialism was common among both proimperialist scholars and legislators during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁴² In the context and aftermath of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Third World Left emphasized the rapacious global interdependencies of U.S. expansion, and this emphasis was taken up by scholars such as Richard Slotkin, Michael Rogin, Richard Drinnon, and Patricia Limerick.⁴³

Whereas both journalistic and scholarly reference to U.S. empire has today become commonplace, similar discussion of U.S. colonialism as a contemporary formation remains relatively infrequent outside of Native American studies and leftist or anarchist critique. To a certain extent this has to do with specific developments in U.S. foreign policy discourse between the First World War and the mid-twentieth century. From President Woodrow Wilson’s championing national self-determination among his “Fourteen Points” in 1918 to U.S. Cold War rhetoric addressed to the nonaligned world, longstanding claims that the American Revolution was the first anticolonial uprising in modern history were promoted with increasing fervor. In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, for instance, declared, “We ourselves are the first colony in modern times to have won independence. We have a natural sympathy with those everywhere who would follow our example.” Furthermore, Dulles contended that, contrary to Soviet charges, “when the fortunes of war gave the United States responsibilities in relation to non-self-governing peoples, such as Cuba and the Philippines, we quickly went about the business of developing full self-government in total freedom. Puerto Rico is already self-governing, within our political system, and President Eisenhower has said he would seek its complete independence if it would prefer to go its separate way.”⁴⁴ It is significant that Dulles saw no need to speak to the circumstances of American Indians—although certain policy makers did seek to characterize the federal government’s contempo-

aneous efforts to terminate its treaty responsibilities to Indian tribes in Cold War terms by associating collective tribal landownership with communism.⁴⁵ For him, as for many diplomatic historians and international relations scholars today, colonialism was strictly an overseas affair carried out by Europeans.

Indeed, Dulles's statement paralleled U.S. lobbying to insert the "blue water" doctrine (also known as the "salt water" thesis) as a categorical limit on United Nations policy for decolonization. On December 16, 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 637 (VII), which stated that member states of the United Nations "should respect the maintenance of the right to self-determination" and "shall uphold the principle of self-determination for all peoples and nations."⁴⁶ The United States and several other UN member states sought to amend the resolution so that to be eligible to request recognition as a "non-self-governing territory" under Chapter XI of the UN Charter—a prerequisite for initiating the decolonization process—a people must be separated from the colonizing country by "blue water" or, at least, have geographically distinct boundaries from the colonizing country. This amendment was included as part of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) on December 15, 1960, the day after the GA adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. To disqualify the claims of territorially contiguous peoples for independence, justifying their enclosure and placing them beyond the definitional parameters of colonialism, was an enormous victory for settler colonial states that underscores the elasticity and potential instrumentality of territorial taxonomy.⁴⁷ In 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples undermined the assertion of settler colonial prerogative in this regard, especially as efforts to implement the declaration in U.S. law and policy have accelerated since the United States begrudgingly became one of the last UN member states to endorse the international instrument in 2010.⁴⁸

TERRITORY, JURISDICTION, TEMPORALITY

In her study of local histories of New England, Jean O'Brien argues that these nineteenth-century texts contrive two principal metaphors—"firsting" and "lasting"—as a way to craft "an origin myth that assigns primacy to non-Indians who 'settled' the region in a benign process involving righteous relations with Indians and just property transactions that led to an inevitable and . . . lamentable Indian extinction."⁴⁹ The trope of "firsting" (in which, as mentioned above, settlers displace indigenous peoples in order to become

“native”) sought to convey that “Indian peoples and their cultures represented an ‘inauthentic’ and prefatory history.”⁵⁰ Although Native peoples persist—continue to be “lasting”—despite the retroactive confirmation of their death and disappearance in non-Indian narrative—with ubiquitous stories of the “last” and final Indian—these local histories of “first” settlers and their families clear the ground for another inaugural effacement not discussed by O’Brien. This first, touted as new beginning and epochal shift, was the constituent power of settler sovereignty to declare independence and found a new nation.⁵¹ Thus, Thomas Paine concludes “Common Sense” (1776) with the pronouncement that by embracing “the legal voice of the people in Congress . . . we have every opportunity and every encouragement before us, to form the noblest, purest constitution on the face of the earth. We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”⁵² The contradictions of a people who found and inaugurate themselves has been extensively analyzed, but it is precisely this originary founding that allegedly makes history, place, and politics anew, and renders the past extraneous and foreign.⁵³ Yet for all the mystical splendor of founding, the new nation continued to confront and contend with the “lasting” of indigenous peoples, in both senses suggested by O’Brien, especially as conflicts over territorial claims, jurisdiction, alliance, and the questions of expansion and incorporation became increasingly manifest.

The interval between the late eighteenth-century juridical design for territorial integration into the Union and the early twentieth-century invention of the category “unincorporated territory” separates two logics of U.S. colonialism.⁵⁴ Each of these logics, along with the idea that the American Revolution definitively instituted a postcolonial United States, has also been central to claims that the United States is fundamentally *not* a colonial power. The first rationale contends that the territorial system provided for eventual statehood and citizenship, and therefore continental colonization—made natural, virtuous, and ineluctable in the rhetoric of “expansion”—merely extended the promise of freedom and democracy. A territory, in the legal sense, is a geographical area recognized as being under the jurisdiction but not fully part of a country and subject to distinct laws and governance. William Connolly evocatively points out, “‘Territory,’ the *Oxford English Dictionary* says, is presumed by most moderns to derive from *terra*. *Terra* means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium, solid, fading off into indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the *OED* says, suggests that it derives from *terrere*, meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And *territorium* is ‘a place from which people are warned.’ Perhaps these

two contending derivations continue to occupy territory today. To occupy territory is to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. Territory is land occupied by violence.”⁵⁵ The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 first delineated the process for the transition of territories to states and the admission of newly created states into the Union, as well as stipulating that new states would be equal to the original thirteen states.⁵⁶ As Anders Stephanson notes, Thomas Jefferson’s “Empire of and for Liberty” portrayed the United States as “a perpetually growing space for the demonstration of the higher historical purposes of humankind as such, all in the name of self-determination and autonomy. It is a timeless, physically indeterminate space of movement and colonization.”⁵⁷ The territorial system displaced the geography of conquest and dispossession into a temporal liminality of transformation and deferral—removing indigenous peoples when possible and postponing the question of slavery.⁵⁸

The series of Supreme Court decisions known collectively as the *Insular Cases* (1901–22) devised “unincorporated territory” as a political status in response to island nations seized in the Spanish-American War whose capture was sanctioned by the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The first unincorporated territories were Puerto Rico (1898–1952, and a U.S. Commonwealth or “free associated state” since 1952), Cuba (1898–1902), Guam (1898), and the Philippines (1898–1946), with later additions including American Samoa (1899), the Panama Canal Zone (1904–79), and the U.S. Virgin Islands (1917). The long-term U.S. military occupations of Nicaragua (1912–33), Haiti (1915–34), and the Dominican Republic (1916–24) did not rely on distinguishing political status in this way but instead convey the strategic distinctions mobilized on behalf of U.S. power. In 1947, the UN transferred to the United States the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which included what is now the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau; a number of these islands later transitioned from trust territory to unincorporated status. The Northern Mariana Islands became a U.S. Commonwealth in 1978, as did the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia in 1986. Palau gained independence under international law in 1994. The Panama Canal Zone was also governed as an unincorporated territory from 1904 until 1979, when Panama assumed joint control. Panama assumed full authority over the canal zone at the end of 1999.⁵⁹

Christina Duffy Burnett argues that the salient feature of the *Insular Cases* was that, with the bloody toll of unification by the Civil War partially in mind, the decisions fashioned “a doctrine of territorial deannexation,” a

new territorial category for U.S. constitutional law that created “a domestic territory that could be governed temporarily, and then later, if necessary, be relinquished.”⁶⁰ Whereas the promise of statehood supposedly rendered colonization a provisional condition en route to inclusion and equality, “unincorporation” had the effect of positioning the U.S. island colonies as an anomaly, a deviation from the preceding continental development of the nation that could be remedied by returning to or aligning with earlier national precedents and values. United States policy makers cast this allegedly temporary relation as a tutelary project aimed at preparing otherwise incompetent, effectively infantile populations for self-government. In this sense, although claiming to initiate opposite trajectories—one toward inclusion, the other toward independence—the doctrines of territorial incorporation and unincorporation each professed to affirm the benevolent intent of U.S. dominion while justifying particular strategies for territorial acquisition and control.

Both forms of territorial status, nonetheless, were conceived as endeavors to defuse and contain challenges to federal authority involving various configurations of contestation by settlers, land speculators, states, and indigenous and other colonized peoples. Three important aspects of territorial status and the juridical construction of territory more broadly should be emphasized in this regard. First, categories of territory were created without regard to already operative indigenous conceptions of place, belonging, or autonomy, and as a deliberate means of legal justification for asserting to every extent possible federal authority over land and indigenous or subject peoples. The federal government’s capacity to do this varied significantly over time. Taking into account, for the moment, only the late eighteenth century: between 1783 and 1786, U.S. officials argued that a majority of Indian peoples had forfeited any rights to their land by siding with the British; however, the Northwest Ordinance signaled a general retreat from this position and an effort to ameliorate sustained indigenous resistance to the imposition of U.S. rule; the Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1790s sought to restrain the states and assert federal authority over commerce, land transactions, and political relations with indigenous peoples.⁶¹ Yet, even if ignored by U.S. legislation and treaty, indigenous perspectives on place and space persisted and changed over time in relation to normative colonial categories. Considering the ongoing depiction of indigenous peoples as “transitory, dying communities, despite the reality of vitality and strength of Native people who refuse to give ground to the forces of settler-colonialism,” Mishuana Goeman argues for the importance of conceiving of “space as

not bounded by geo-politics, but storied and continuous,” and sustaining “symbolic relationships and obligations rather than inherent rights bounded through nation-state models of borders and citizenship.”⁶²

Second, the initial U.S. territorial system was largely a continuation of the distribution and delimitation of governance established during the British colonial period. Julian Go observes that “the territorial governments [of the United States] were directly modeled after Britain’s own colonies.”⁶³ After independence from England, not only were territorial boundaries of the new states inherited from the colonial period, but the doctrine of state succession maintained that the acts of the preceding colonial governments—except for the “unconstitutional” infringements that precipitated the Revolution itself—remained in force. According to Peter Onuf, this both eased the anxieties of the new nation’s propertied classes and “implied that the new states, like their colonial predecessors, were part of a larger community and should be subordinate to a higher authority. American experience in the [British] Empire remained paradigmatic after independence, and state succession theory provided the link.”⁶⁴ Article IV of the U.S. Constitution (the Territorial Clause) asserts that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States” without any provision for representation in the national government.⁶⁵ The consolidated power of Congress operated much as a de facto colonial government, something that separatists and other critics of federal authority at the time were quick to suggest. The terms of the Northwest Ordinance compounded this dynamic. Every new state would undergo a time when, as James Monroe wrote, “it would ‘in effect’ be under ‘a colonial government similar to that which prevail’d in these States previous to the revolution.’”⁶⁶ Continental conquest would recapitulate the conditions of colonialism, even if subsequent slogans such as “manifest destiny” insisted on the inexorability of expansion and if the conceit of national founding asserted originary virtue and naturalized settler habitation. Beginning with the infamous “domestic dependent nation” status for American Indians concocted by Chief Justice John Marshall in *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), and especially after the Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 unilaterally ended U.S. treaty making with indigenous nations, the doctrine of plenary power combined authority over territories and tribes under congressional rule.⁶⁷

Third, the shifting inflections of territorial status index federal strategies for control—intended to secure consolidation or differentiation depending on the exigencies of the moment—and the negotiation of this control at

distinct historical conjunctures. Sanford Levinson and Bartholomew Sparrow argue that the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 revealed the inadequate provisions and deliberate silences of the Constitution with regard to U.S. expansion, thus forcing into relief fundamental contradictions in the U.S. political system, including “the continued existence of U.S. territories in a nation of states; the discrepant definitions of and rights accruing to ‘citizens’ of the territories and those of the states; and the problematic constitutional status of the territories in a United States to be governed of, by, and for the people.”⁶⁸ The 1803 transaction prompted heated debates as to whether republican government could be sustained in the context of expansion, and how the racially diverse and non-English-speaking inhabitants of the Territory of New Orleans—many of whom were Catholic and an increasing number of whom were refugees from Santo Domingo in the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution—were, from the U.S. standpoint, fit for self-government.⁶⁹ While Thomas Jefferson sought to allay criticism by placing the new territory under a military governor, this was the first time that the United States explicitly incorporated “aliens” included within the United States involuntarily.⁷⁰ The purchase, nevertheless, also allowed Jefferson to devise plans for removing eastern Indian tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River. The War of 1812 interrupted any full-scale implementation of land exchange as a means of displacement, but unremitting pressure by non-Indian settlers, speculators, and states contributed to the ratification of the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the often genocidal relocation of tribes westward.⁷¹ This was context for Chief Justice John Marshall’s invocation of the doctrine of discovery and invention of the “domestic dependent nations” status for American Indian peoples. These were the circumstances that established “Indian Territory” in 1834 and the reservation system subsequently authorized by the Indian Appropriations Act of 1851.⁷² The Louisiana Purchase also linked the questions of slavery and expansion, a correlation that became fully articulated with the Missouri Crisis of 1819–20, Wilmot Proviso of 1846, Compromise of 1850, Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and the 1857 *Dred Scott v. Sandford* ruling.⁷³

Treaties were a necessary accompaniment to territorial acquisition as a means of securing title and possession, and for aligning the foreign and domestic. Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman note that “The requirement for statehood was . . . necessary to render the acquisition of Louisiana constitutional as a matter of domestic law, but a treaty provision was necessary to convert that domestic requirement into a norm binding as a matter of international law. The extension of domestic legal requirements into international law is

one of the central functions of treaties.”⁷⁴ With regard to indigenous peoples, after the Seven Years War effectively ended French and Spanish competition for North American territory, British and subsequent U.S. treaty making with Native Americans proceeded in the following way: accommodation and compromise (1763–68); a gradual shift from accommodation to a system for transferring land from (1768–75); acknowledgement of indigenous land rights and acquisition by purchase (1786–95); the consolidation of a treaty system characterized by U.S. preponderance that culminated in 1871 with the prospective refusal to officially recognize indigenous peoples as “an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty” (1796–1871).⁷⁵ Robert Nichols thus argues that “social contract theory has developed in a dialectical relationship to the political practice of excluding indigenous peoples from the international realm.”⁷⁶ In *United States v. Kagama* (1886) the Supreme Court affirmed the 1871 act, holding that Congress had plenary power over all tribes within its borders and asserting with racialized condescension, “The power of the general government over these remnants of a race once powerful . . . is necessary to their protection as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.”⁷⁷

Yet, if in the history of colonization, treaties have often served imperial powers as mechanisms calculated to affirm indigenous consent to contract, dispossession, and displacement, they have also provided evidence that indigenous sovereign capacity to make treaties under international law was acknowledged and detailed the agreements often subsequently disavowed or neglected by the United States. Scott Richard Lyons writes about the “x-mark” as the indigenous signature on treaties, which he describes as a “coerced sign of consent made under conditions that are not of one’s making. It signifies [of the signer] power and a lack of power, agency and a lack of agency. It is a decision one makes when something has already been decided for you, but it is still a decision.”⁷⁸ Moreover, Lyons characterizes the “x-mark” as indicating indigenous peoples’ assent to adapt and transform themselves—to assume the modern political form of nations—in response to colonial incursion. Treaties sustain the double movement of what Kevin Bruyneel calls “colonial time”—a temporal location that situates “tribal sovereignty as a political expression that is out of (another) time, and therefore a threat to contemporary American political life and political space”—as at once indexing tribal acquiescence in the past and asserting tribal sovereignty in the present.⁷⁹

Unintended consequences also follow from the *Insular Cases*, particularly as the cases offered alternate political and economic forms of affiliation in

the context of decolonization as sanctioned under UN protocols since the mid-twentieth century.⁸⁰ Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall argue that the “unincorporated territory” status “born of colonialism has been appropriated by colonial subjects,” with the many of those who live in such places now rejecting “both statehood and independence, the options denied the inhabitants of the territories by the *Insular Cases* at the turn of the last century.” Burnett and Marshall observe that, without endorsing colonialism, “the idea of a relationship to the United States that is somewhere ‘in between’ that of statehood and independence—somehow both ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ (or neither)—has not only survived but enjoys substantial support.”⁸¹ This would seem to have been precisely the point, when in a 1998 referendum on the island’s political status, Puerto Ricans overwhelmingly selected “none of the above,” rather than vote for independence, statehood, or their current form of free associated state. “In supporting *ninguna de las anteriores* [none of the above],” Frances Negrón-Muntaner proposes that Puerto Ricans were rejecting “the way the status question itself was posed, the very idea that the U.S. Congress, Constitution, and/or local political parties could conceive of a single solution to address the complexity of Puerto Rican (trans) locations.”⁸² This repudiation likewise suggests the limit of democracy as the ever-heralded justification and decisive promise of inclusion in settler states more broadly.

Much as the proponents of U.S. continental conquest touted equality and citizenship as the irreproachable telos of territorial expansion, champions of American exceptionalism often insist that liberal democracy is based on the consent of the governed and, as such, the United States is constitutionally opposed to the tyrannies of colonial rule.⁸³ Modern constitutional democracy was, from this perspective, an altruistic gift generously extended to indigenous peoples and others subjected to U.S. colonial rule on a supposedly interim basis.⁸⁴ Indeed, as James Tully argues, “The right of the self-proclaimed civilized imperial powers to extend colonial and international modern constitutional regimes around the world correlated with a ‘sacred duty to civilize’ the indigenous peoples under their rule.”⁸⁵ Yet, as Jacques Derrida observes, “the question of calculation, of numerical calculation, of equality according to number” are in certain respects constitutive of “the question of democracy.”⁸⁶ If “domestically” the settler colonial logic of elimination tacitly underwrites the numerical presumptions of U.S. democracy, internationally and in the wake of decolonization, Derrida contends that the “lack of an established majority for the United States and its allies (for what are called ‘Western democracies’) [at the United Nations] has no

doubt become, with the end of the Cold War, the setting and stage for this rhetoric of rogue states.”⁸⁷ Although anxiously projected abroad as a counter to a diminished confidence in numbers, the rogue state attribution nonetheless continually threatens to unsettle legitimacy “at home.” Audra Simpson argues in this sense: “The cornerstones of democratic governance—consent, citizenship, rule by representation—are revealed to be precarious at best when the experiences of Indigenous peoples are brought to bear on democracy’s own promises and tenets.”⁸⁸ She maintains that sovereignty as asserted by “Indigeneities that move through reservations and urban locales, persistent and insistent ‘survivals’ (descendants of treaty signatories, descendants of the historically recognized, as well as the unrecognized, in collective or individual form) . . . are nightmarish for the settler state, as they call up both the impermanence of state boundaries and the precarious claims to sovereignty enjoyed by liberal democracies such as the United States.”⁸⁹ The sense in which the conceit that majoritarian consent mandates historical and political closure thus remains at most an elusive claim that scholarship such as the work included in this book serves to trouble.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

This book’s title deliberately invokes the notion of *formation* as it has been used by Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan, who argue that “imperial formations are politics of dislocation, processes of dispersion, appropriation, and displacement,” while also emphasizing “the active and contingent process of their making and unmaking.”⁹⁰ This introduction is not intended to suggest a single perspective or set of terms shared among all the essays that follow. Readers will find numerous connections and frictions throughout the volume that signal possibilities for further debate and discussion. Valuable analytic tensions and disagreements remain prominent across the thirteen studies that follow in their different assessments of the utility of specific conceptions of colonialism, imperialism, empire, and postcolonialism, even as the essays complement and contribute to the collective endeavor of theorizing formations of U.S. colonialism. It is not the purpose of this volume to be comprehensive or exhaustive in ostensibly identifying or accounting for the primary elements of U.S. colonialism. Rather the collection’s aim is to encourage readers to approach the U.S. colonial present genealogically, and to consider the relationships between and across the essays included in a manner similar to the formations they study, as making up what Walter Benjamin calls a *constellation*—a spatial and temporal

ensemble akin to montage that, when considered as such, can generatively destabilize and defamiliarize conventional practices of reading and perception that underwrite the comparative project of U.S. empire.⁹¹

The three sections of this book are intended to provide initial thematic points of entry that can be read sequentially or multidirectionally. The first section, “Histories in Contention,” is organized around the requisites of historicity itself and seeks to call attention to and denaturalize the agonistic colonial conditions of possibility for historical claims, evidence, archives, legibility, and discrepant epistemologies. This section underscores the ways in which the past is disputed and deployed with regard to particular claims to sovereignty and belonging. Critical accounts of colonialism have often drawn attention to the politics of temporality and periodization as they have been enunciated through the self-aggrandizing Euro-American terms of civilization, universal history, rule of law, and modernity. Joanne Barker, Berenika Byszewski, Manu Vimalassery, and J. Kēhaulani Kauanui each address specific aspects of how this invented epistemological machinery and the legitimating logics of U.S. colonialism confer and retract the capacity for claiming land and securing historical legibility. Barker examines the ways in which the Delaware Tribe of Indians (the Lenape) have contended with the mutually constitutive logics of imperialism, scientific empiricism, and federal recognition policy. She studies the claims and controversies surrounding the Wallam Olum—an ostensible tribal history that momentarily appeared to bear the inordinate weight of U.S. recognition criteria and substantiate Delaware historical continuity and cultural distinction. In her account of Chaco Canyon, Byszewski considers tensions between the instantiation of territorial and discursive boundaries through maps and the practice of cartography. Her chapter examines the ways in which the mapping expedition led by Lieutenant James H. Simpson after the Mexican Cession of 1848 imaginatively and militarily charted claims to antiquity, and initiated a sustained displacement of the history, politics, and succession of indigenous removal on which the making of Chaco has been predicated. Focusing on the speculative work of rumor documented in official historical accounts, Vimalassery explores what he terms the “archive of counter-sovereignty”—the authorized histories of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, congressional record, and archaeological evidence—for how these sources imagine the encounter between Paiute communities and Chinese migrant labors in the Great Basin and the Sierra Nevada Mountains during the mid- to late nineteenth century. He asks why these particular archives of settler colonialism, labor importation, and industrial expansion take the forms of rumor

and conjecture when addressing interactions between Paiutes and Chinese migrants, and what this tells us about the projects these documents. Finally, Kauanui analyzes the ways in which the congressional Apology Resolution of 1993 for the U.S. overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom a century earlier figured in the legal case *Office of Hawaiian Affairs, et al. v. State of Hawai'i*. Her chapter considers what colonial juridical regimes, sanctioned forms of historical acknowledgement, and compensatory politics of regretful public sentiment do in the ongoing colonial dynamics of occupation in Hawai'i.

The second section of the book, "Colonial Entanglements" (a phrase borrowed from Jean Dennison), endeavors to problematize the terms and trajectories of colonial "encounter" by emphasizing the entwining of diverse colonial pasts, anticipated futures, and uneven racializations. In this section, Barbara Krauthamer, Augusto Espiritu, Lorena Oropeza, Fa'anofo Lisaclaire Uperesa, and Dean Itsuji Saranillio examine episodes of material interaction, association, and exchange under circumstances of underlying coercion, expropriation, and limited mobility. These essays develop nuanced and provocative inquiries into the multiple conditions and circuits of colonial collision and parse the variously overlapping and incongruent imperial histories that serve as the coordinates of identification and disidentification. Krauthamer focuses on the relationships between missionaries, slaves, and American Indians in the early nineteenth-century U.S. South to examine the complex and often competing goals and consequences of the federal government's colonial agenda. She argues that while there is a substantial literature on the alliances and conflicts between missionaries and southern Indians in their combined opposition to federal efforts to dispossess indigenous peoples, insufficient attention has been devoted to the complicated question of slavery and the role of enslaved people in this context. She thus looks to enslaved people as significant political actors in order to critically analyze the multiplicity of racisms and attendant power struggles in the early nineteenth-century U.S. South. Espiritu, in a decidedly different context, considers the multiple trajectories of and attachments to Hispanism cast through and against the vectors of U.S. empire. Focusing on the influential figures Pedro Albizu Campos, Claro Mayo Recto, and Ramón Grau San Martín, his chapter provides a comparative analysis of the racialized, gendered, and nationalist discourses of prominent political leaders and intellectuals from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In her chapter on Reies López Tijerina and the Alianza Federal de Mercedes (the Federal Alliance of Land Grants), Oropeza studies the ways in which Tijerina sought to build alliances with American Indians within New Mex-

ico and across the United States in order to challenge U.S. colonialism and the politics of property in the Southwest. She contends that understanding Tijerina's strident anticolonial critique requires addressing the complex and contradictory terms of the "Indo-Hispano" racial politics he articulated. Uperesa examines how and why the sport of football has provided material possibilities and aspirational identification for American Samoans in the context of U.S. political and economic preponderance. She considers the ways in which such possibilities are embedded in developmentalist and racial logics, as well as how these work in tandem with spectacles of mobility and prosperity to channel Samoans and American Samoa into the geopolitical circuits of U.S. empire. In his chapter on the ideological and material construction of the Kēpaniwai Heritage Gardens on Maui, Saranillio looks at the staging of liberal multiculturalism as a means of disavowing and displacing colonial violence. He argues for the persistence of Kanaka Maoli epistemologies and ways of life as a crucial recourse for contesting the imperial environmentalities, tourist economies, and military occupations that remake the past for the speculative future of colonial expropriation.

The third section of the volume, "Politics of Transposition," explores normative efforts to translate and render commensurate forms of knowledge and ways of being forced into proximity by colonial formations. Julian Aguon, Lanny Thompson, Jennifer Nez Denetdale, and Vicente Rafael each consider the fraught grid of intelligibility that U.S. colonialism and the technologies of empire aim to stabilize and through which presumably proper subjects are to be interpellated. The essays in this section underscore how subjugated knowledges, unruly genealogies, and epistemological incommensurabilities disrupt and destabilize the imperial ordering of peoples, places, and pasts. Aguon considers competing legal justifications for colonial occupation and the constitutive relation between colonialism and militarism. Emphasizing law's inability to accommodate Chamorro conceptions of the world, he situates escalating U.S. militarization of Guam since 2005 in relation to how international law separately frames the rights of colonized and indigenous peoples on the one hand, and the claims of states on the other. Thompson studies the techniques of power that discipline, divide, and document colonial subjects, spaces, and populations in Puerto Rico during the early twentieth century through the instruments of military cartography. Emphasizing the spatial politics of colonial governmentality, he examines the ways in which the military gaze projected imperial sovereignty and configured the geography and dispersed institutional apparatus of subjection. Denetdale uses debates over Lynda Lovejoy's candidacy for

president of the Navajo Nation in 2010 as a lens through which to scrutinize how competing definitions of “tradition” serve and challenge the normative gender, sexual, and racial politics of tribal nation formation. She examines competing articulations of tradition, and the forms of affiliation and exclusion that these invocations aim to justify, in order to critically elaborate on the erasures and gaps in Diné history and the normative constructs of modern Navajo government. Rafael’s chapter concludes the volume by situating the historical dynamics of U.S. colonial formation in relation to the conditions of permanent war undergirding U.S. empire in the twenty-first century. He studies the deployment and precarious utility of technologies of translation in the U.S. “War on Terror” and the occupation of Iraq, demonstrating how the early U.S. nationalist project of a unifying and equalizing idiom of American English and its opposition to linguistic heterogeneity and untranslatability informs today’s imperial ventures.

The thematic arrangement of the chapters that follow is intended to suggest initial conjunctures that are generative for an analysis of U.S. colonialism. Yet these groupings are not meant to be definitive. One significant aspect of the volume is precisely the wide-ranging and multiple points of contact and conversation broached by the authors. Alternate or complementary configurations readily present themselves and convey dynamic possibilities for further critical analytic reciprocity and comparison. For instance, Aguon, Thompson, and Byszewski address the specific ways in which cartography serves as a complicit and vested form of knowledge production and spatial governmentality fully encumbered and in the service of competing claims to space, territory, and control. Political economy and the colonially overdetermined relations of production are central to the essays of Vimalassery and Uperesa. Conflicting regimes of racialization are a primary concern for Barker, Krauthamer, Saranillio, and Espiritu. The imperial logic and deployment of law is a key analytic lens for Aguon, Kauanui, and Barker, while the interplay of translation and incommensurability are crucial for both Rafael and Barker. The specific inflections of tradition are a focus for Saranillio, Barker, and Denetdale. Oropeza, Denetdale, and Uperesa each take constructions of gender and sexuality as indispensable to their inquiry. The very heterogeneity and historical mutability of U.S. colonialism and the diverse instantiations of U.S. empire require creative and capacious critical approaches that destabilize the self-evident coherence and singularity of the United States even as they acknowledge its forceful and frequently violent, if also often liberal and incorporative, assertion of prerogative and exclusivity.

NOTES

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1. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, 460.
2. See, for example, Go, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning*.
3. A. Simpson, "Settlement's Secret," 209.
4. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*, 20.
5. Hart, "Brother Jonathan's Colonies," 319. This historical formation is not only a matter of the inequalities, exclusions, and injustices of colonial rule. Rather, these dynamics also work in tandem with the constitution of liberal freedoms and state formation. See especially Reddy, *Freedom with Violence*. Denise Ferreira de Silva makes a related argument, but with a focus on how the colonial conditions of possibility and raciality emerge in the ontological context of "globality," a spatial disposition that "fuses particular bodily traits, social configurations, and global regions, in which human difference is reproduced as irreducible and unsublatable" (xix). See Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race*.
6. See, for instance, the generative Hong and Ferguson, *Strange Affinities*.
7. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 140, 146.
8. Rifkin, *When Did Indians Become Straight?*
9. Barker, *Native Acts*, 223, 221.
10. O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting*, 51–52.
11. For critiques of this tendency toward analogy and metaphor, see Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*; Teaiwa, "On Analogies." For an excellent critical analysis of the formulation of "internal colonialism," see Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*, 124–46.
12. Fabian, *Time and the Other*, 26–27.
13. Chow, *The Age of the World Target*, 77. Also, see Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties"; Felski and Friedman, *Comparison*.
14. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*.
15. I adapt the term *colonial present* from Gregory, *The Colonial Present*.
16. Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment*.
17. R. Williams, *Keywords*, 160. Interestingly, Williams's entry on "imperialism" is symptomatic of precisely the sort of ambivalence toward where and how to situate the United States with regard to colonialism. This is evident in his example of "American imperialism" as indicative of the contemporary ambiguity of "imperialism" more broadly, as well as how it might pertain to the undifferentiated terms *ne imperialism* and *neocolonialism*.
18. Useful introductions include Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*; Osterhammel, *Colonialism*; Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*; Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore, *Lessons of Empire*; Veracini, *Settler Colonialism*.

19. Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture*, 9. For scholarship that similarly critically reappraised the turn to colonial discourse analysis, cultural studies of colonialism, subaltern studies, and postcolonial theory during the late 1980s and early 1990s, also see Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*; Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*; McClintock, Mufti, and Shohat, *Dangerous Liaisons*.
20. Kazanjian, "Colonial," 52.
21. Stoler and McGranahan, "Refiguring Imperial Terrains," 4, 36.
22. Greeson, *Our South*, 22.
23. Foucault's insistence on a historical shift from territory to population as the basis of governmentality is not substantiated in the colonial context. Instead, governance of territory and population remain mutually constitutive. See Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*. Mark Rifkin makes a similar critique of Giorgio Agamben's rethinking of Foucault's conception of biopolitics for the ways in which Agamben misses the significance of the geopolitical for colonialism (Rifkin, "Indigenizing Agamben").
24. E. Lee, *At America's Gates*; Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*; Jung, *Coolies and Cane*; Shah, *Stranger Intimacy*; W. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*. On the idea of an "imperial nation-state," see Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State*.
25. Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land*; Deer et al., *Sharing Our Stories of Survival*; Hämäläinen and Truett, "On Borderlands."
26. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, 174, 175.
27. Lutz, *The Bases of Empire*; Shigematsu and Camacho, *Militarized Currents*; V. Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise*; Khalili, *Time in the Shadows*.
28. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native"; Goldstein, "Where the Nation Takes Place"; Morgensen, *Spaces between Us*; A. Simpson, "Settlement's Secret"; Nichols, "Indigeneity and the Settler Contract Today."
29. On the limits of settler colonialism as an analytic, see especially Saldaña-Portillo, "How Many Mexicans Is a Horse Worth?" Guidotti-Hernández, *Unspeakeable Violence*; Jackson, *Creole Indigeneity*.
30. Byrd, *Transit of Empire*, 122–23. Also see Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*.
31. Hobson, *Imperialism*, 1902.
32. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," 1916; Hilferding, *Finance Capital*, 1910.
33. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade."
34. Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization."
35. Harvey, *The New Imperialism*; Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing*.
36. Kaplan, "Left Alone with America."
37. An important exception to this tendency is Moon-Kie Jung's argument that the United States has been since its inception an "empire-state" shaped by the historically adaptable perspectives and practices of white supremacy (Jung, "Constituting the U.S. Empire-State and White Supremacy"). Jung derives the category "empire-state" from Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 153–203.
38. McCoy and Scarano, *Colonial Crucible*.
39. Lowell, "The Colonial Expansion of the United States," 145.
40. Hart, *Actual Government as Applied under American Conditions*, 368. For a less overtly proimperialist stance that nevertheless reaches similar conclusions, also see Snow, *The Administration of Dependencies*.
41. Hart, "Brother Jonathan's Colonies."

42. Walter Williams, "United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation." However, as Lanny Thompson notes, policy directives associating the colonial administration of American Indians and the Philippines were not necessarily put into practice by local bureaucrats such as David Barrows, head of the Philippine Commissions' Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (Thompson, *Imperial Archipelago*, 212–13).
43. Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence*; Rogin, *Fathers and Children*; Drinnon, *Facing West*; Limerick, *Legacy of Conquest*.
44. Dulles, "International Unity," 936. Also see J. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment*.
45. Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America*, 12–13.
46. Rauschnig, Wiesbrock, and Lailach, *Key Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly*, 113.
47. Thornberry, *Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights*, 874–75. Also see Anaya, *International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples*. Jeff Corntassel notes, "As early as 1949, states began drafting a *Special Report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia* in order to establish a clear distinction between 'internal' and 'external' self-determination. According to this logic, one could differentiate between 'historical subjugation of an alien population living in a different part of the globe and the historical subjugation of an alien population living on a piece of land abutting that of its oppressors'" (Corntassel, "Toward Sustainable Self-Determination," 127).
48. Pulitano, *Indigenous Rights in the Age of the U.N. Declaration*. Also see Xanthaki, *Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards*; Goldstein, *Poverty in Common*, 233–43.
49. O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting*, xv.
50. O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting*, 52–53.
51. The new nation may be aspirational, but it is equally defensive and exclusive. In constituting the "we" in whose name it is proclaimed, the Declaration of Independence specifies among the tyrannies wrought by King George III against the colonists that he "endeavoured to bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions" ("In Congress, July 4, 1776," 169).
52. Paine, "Common Sense," 45.
53. Frank, *Constituent Moments*; Parker, *Common Law, History, and Democracy in America*, 67–116; Honig, "Declarations of Independence." Also see Espejo, *The Time of Popular Sovereignty*.
54. On the logic of "territory" more broadly, see Elden, *The Birth of Territory*.
55. Connolly, "Tocqueville, Territory and Violence," 144.
56. See especially Onuf, *Statehood and Union*.
57. Stephanson, "A Most Interesting Empire," 255.
58. On the territorial system, see Farrand, *The Legislation of Congress for the Government of the Organized Territories of the United States*; Pomeroy, *The Territories and the United States*; Eblen, *The First and Second United States Empires*; Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic*; Lawson and Seidman, *The Constitution of Empire*.
59. On the United States and the trustee system, see Pungong, "The United States and the International Trusteeship System." For more on the Panama Canal, see McGuinness, *Path of Empire* and Greene, *The Canal Builders*.

60. Burnett, "Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation," 797. Also see Ramos, *American Colonialism in Puerto Rico*.
61. Jones, *License for Empire*; Rockwell, *Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century*; Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations*.
62. Goeman, *Mark My Words*, 87, 117, 118. Glen Coulthard likewise argues that it is a "place-based imaginary that serves as the ethical foundation from which many Indigenous people and communities continue to resist and critique the dual imperatives of state sovereignty and capitalist accumulation that constitute our colonial present" (Coulthard, "Place against Empire," 82).
63. Go, *Patterns of Empire*, 47.
64. Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic*, 22. Also see Hsueh, *Hybrid Constitutions*; Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*; Horsman, *Expansion and American Indian Policy*; R. Williams, "'The People of the States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies.'"
65. U.S. Constitution, Article IV, § 3, clause 2.
66. As quoted in Onuf, *The Origins of the Federal Republic*, 44.
67. Wilkins and Lomawaima, *Uneven Ground*, 98–116. Kevin Bruyneel contends that, after the end of the Civil War, 1871 represents "the moment when the renewed American nation and state expressly made its colonial impression by imposing boundaries to restrict and subsume the spatial, historical, and political life of indigenous nations and tribes" (Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty*, 66).
68. Levinson and Sparrow, Introduction, 13.
69. G. Hall, *Africans in Colonial Louisiana*; Dawdy, *Building the Devil's Empire*.
70. Levinson and Sparrow, Introduction, 5–8.
71. Prucha, *The Great Father*; Rosen, *American Indians and State Law*; Rifkin, *Manifesting America*.
72. Ronda, "'We Have a Country'"; Trennert, *Alternative to Extinction*; Sutton, "Sovereign States and the Changing Definition of the Indian Reservation."
73. Mason, *Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic*; W. Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams*.
74. Lawson and Seidman, "The First 'Incorporation' Debate," 34–35.
75. Also see Deloria and Wilkins, *Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations*.
76. Nichols, "Realizing the Social Contract," 44.
77. *United States v. Kagama* 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
78. S. Lyons, *X-Marks*, 2–3.
79. Bruyneel, *The Third Space of Sovereignty*, 171. On the temporal logics of settler colonialism, also see Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment*.
80. Burnett and Marshall, "Between the Foreign and the Domestic." On decolonization more broadly, also see Kelly and Kaplan, "Legal Fictions after Empire"; C. Lee, *Making a World after Empire*.
81. Burnett and Marshall, "Between the Foreign and the Domestic," 2.
82. Negrón-Muntaner, Introduction, 5. For scholarship that underscores the coercive and counterinsurgent practices of U.S. colonial rule, see also Malavet, *America's Colony*; Bosque-Pérez and Colón Morera, *Puerto Rico under Colonial Rule*.
83. Fletcher, "Tribal Consent."
84. On related logics of the liberal "gift," see Nguyen, *The Gift of Freedom*.
85. Tully, "The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy," 331. For a useful comparison, see Chatterjee, *The Politics of the Governed*.

86. Derrida, *Rogues*, 29–30.
87. Derrida, *Rogues*, 98.
88. A. Simpson, “Settlement’s Secret,” 209.
89. A. Simpson, “Settlement’s Secret,” 211.
90. Stoler and McGranahan, “Refiguring Imperial Terrains,” 8.
91. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, 456–88.