

Experiments between Anthropology and Philosophy:
Affinities and Antagonisms

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■ The guiding inspiration of this book is to explore the attraction and the distance that mark the relation between anthropology and philosophy. How are the dividing lines drawn between these modes of inquiry? Or, to pose the same question differently: What constitutes a philosophical undercurrent or moment in the practice of those who do not claim to be professional philosophers? In his influential “Questions in Geography,” Michel Foucault (1980b: 66) wrote with a hint of impatience, “And for all that I might like to say that I am not a philosopher, nonetheless if my concern is with truth I am still a philosopher.” For its part, anthropology, with its multiple origins and manifold subfields, has maintained a comparably uneasy relation of distance from and affinity with philosophy. In France Durkheim wanted to establish sociology as a discipline within philosophy, and in India the earliest departments of sociology grew out of social philosophy—yet an engagement between these two disciplines is neither easy nor assured. It is not that philosophers and anthropologists do not engage common issues. For instance, an abiding concern in both disciplines is an engagement with the limits of the human. In most cases, though, philosophers turn to thought experiments about these limits, and descriptions of actual human societies and their diversity are bracketed on the grounds that empirical data cannot solve conceptual questions. Anthropologists from different subfields and styles of thought would measure their distance from and affinity to philosophy very differently. Perhaps one should turn, then, not to philosophy and anthropology as two fully constituted disciplines but

to their encounters in the singular and see if there is something to be learned from these encounters.¹

With such a project in mind, in April 2011 the four editors of this volume invited twelve anthropologists to reflect on their own mode of engagement with philosophy. Our aims were modest. We were not trying to stage an interdisciplinary dialogue between anthropologists and philosophers, though this might emerge in an anthropologist's struggle with a specific problem. Our questions were simple and posed in specific terms: What kinds of questions or pressures have made you turn to a particular philosopher? What philosophical traditions (whether from West or East, North or South) do you find yourself responding to? We wanted to investigate specifically what anthropologists sought in these encounters, what concepts liberated thought, what wounded them, and how this engagement with a particular region of philosophy changed their own anthropological thinking. That said, to measure the different contours of this relationship in anything resembling its entirety would be an encyclopedic endeavor. Our aim was not to cover all or even most anthropological and philosophical traditions. Rather we asked a small number of scholars to reflect on their practice, in the hope that this would yield interesting ways of looking at the relation that anthropology bears to philosophy through singular encounters. Singularity does not, of course, exclude multiplicity; rather, as Lévi-Strauss (1971: 626) uses the term in connection with his study of myths, *singularity* is the nodal point of past, present, and possible events, the intersection where phenomena become manifest, originating from countless contexts, knowable and unknowable. In this sense, the particular scholars stand for themselves but are also treated as "intersection points," where the contested nature of anthropological knowledge becomes visible. Our relation to the particular scholar, then, is both personal and impersonal, as singular trajectories that also express genealogies of thought.

We want to emphasize that we were not looking to philosophy to provide "theory," as if anthropology were somehow lacking this impulse. We were asking these scholars what is specific in their anthropology that attracts them to some regions of philosophy within the context and course of concrete projects of research and thought. The results of this exercise were surprising, first, as to which philosophers were found to be most attractive as interlocutors and, second, for the passionate engagement with particular texts these anthropologists read in relationship to their ethnography. As such, it seems that for philosophy to have value in our world, it must learn to respond to the puzzles and pressures that an ethnographic

engagement with the world brings to light. What we present in this chapter is a set of questions and puzzles that we hope will stimulate further reflections on what kind of place particular philosophers might have or have had in the making of anthropological knowledge.

As a starting point, we could perhaps accept that the philosopher's anthropology and the anthropologist's philosophy may mutually illuminate on some occasions but that it is also the friction between them that allows us to walk on our respective paths. A rush to theorize the relation between anthropology and philosophy in general terms has often led to vacuous generalizations that we want to avoid. Instead we suggest that this is a moment in which we might ask, What puzzles anthropologists and how does that relate to the puzzles in philosophy? Then the urgent issue is not to find solutions to our puzzles but to accept that to arrive at the right questions would be achievement enough.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first ask how anthropologists have rendered the problem of otherness not simply as a matter of cultural difference but as putting their own worlds into jeopardy. Is the matter of difference resolved by a strategy of overlooking the question of truth and reinterpreting what might be "true statements" in the world of one's respondents as "symbolic statements" in order to make them commensurate with our worlds? We then relate these questions to the many-worlds problem in philosophy and propose, as many of our contributors imply, that there can be no clear division between how one relates to the being of others and the modes through which we come to know the other.

Second, we take some pressing questions that have emerged anew in anthropology with regard to ethics and politics: Are there overarching transcendental concepts that anchor these fields, such as "obligation," "freedom," and "sovereignty"? In the case of ethics we propose that a closer look at habit as the site of both repetition and newness through an attunement to the world offers a different way to think of the relation between obligation and freedom than the stark opposition between these two modes that many recent works assume. Further, as the section on politics argues, rather than marking out a separate domain as that of "politics," the political frames many of the chapters that follow through the resonance of concepts of coercion and consent, belonging and falling out within collective habitation, as well as through an examination of myths and rituals of power and powerlessness.

Third, we ask, What is the image of thinking through the signal controversies on where thought is seen to reside? We focus on the figure of

Lévi-Strauss, whose debate with Sartre might be seen as an emblematic moment in which anthropology tried to wrest the claims of philosophical thinking on behalf of the “primitive” or “savage” mind. But has anthropology been able to learn from other forms of thought, such as that embodied in ritual or in the way that philosophers from other traditions, such as Islam, must render their philosophy as something other in the globalized world today?

Finally, we give a brief account of how these themes resonate in the following chapters, noting that the chapters cannot be neatly organized around one theme or another; rather it is the overlapping of these themes that makes up the rich tapestry of this book. Might it be that concerns common to philosophy and anthropology, such as those of asking what is it to be awakened to our existence within the context of life as it is lived, might be inhabited “differently” or inhabited “otherwise” in these two disciplines—much as how such terms as *confession*, *prophecy*, *world*, and *subject* were inherited from theology but made to mean otherwise in philosophy? We suggest that what is important in this book is the absence of settled positions with regard to the importance of “philosophical thinking” for anthropology or the perils of such thinking; rather it is in the course of our investigations or when we are in the grip of a situation that the questions we ask of philosophy arise.

WAYS OF WORLD MAKING

Is there one single neutral world that can serve as an arbitrator of difference so that the plurality of worlds can be rendered simply as different versions through which reality is represented? And if cultural differences are a matter not simply of different representations but of different assumptions about the being of, say, different kinds of humans or of gods and animals (Wittgenstein would call such differences noncriterial differences), then how is any communication across these worlds possible—a question that haunts Crapanzano’s chapter. For many scholars (e.g., Descola 2006), these issues of difference cannot be uncoupled from questions about how we conceive nature as a universal category. They argue rightly that Western conceptions of “nature” as something that stands apart from culture provide only one model—but having made this very nice move, they make a quick jump from representations to ontologies. Descola, for example, argues through a thought experiment that because there are different kinds of bodies (e.g., human bodies, animal bodies) and different interiorities that can be sub-

jected to different permutations and combinations, one ends up with different ontologies rather than simply different representations of the world. His basic premise is rooted in phenomenological understanding that uses the basic building blocks of bodies and intentionality. In this mode of thought the social is something added later to the mix—yet much of the analysis is based on such products of collective thinking (or imagination) as the repertoire of myths or shamanic practices. While all the authors of the chapters that follow are in implicit or explicit agreement that the social is not the ground of all being, the state of the human is seen as that of a “being-with,” of a thrownness together; there is no originary moment or foundational contract from which human relationships (including those between the anthropologist and his or her respondents) emerge. It is striking that in a lot of anthropological writing within the so-called ontological turn, questions of skepticism within human life or of the sense of being fenced off from certain experiences that offer a horizon of possibility but cannot be fully grasped are simply made to disappear. While the step to critique the manner in which statements that are held to be true in one world and not in another are “domesticated” and made commensurate within anthropology by making them appear symbolic or metaphorical is an important step, we cannot assume that the “real” is transparent and available in collective forms of representations. One might argue instead that experience cannot be derived from collective representations and that vulnerability and fragility of context is built into human worlds, as is the experience of being fenced off from certain experiences of oneself and of another (see Biehl, Kleinman in this volume; Boeck 2005; Das 2007).

We take only one example here to illustrate what kinds of puzzles arise when we take the thought of there being a plurality of actual worlds seriously and not simply as an intellectual game. We might ask if ontologies are well made or badly made. We might ask which worlds are genuine and which are spurious. What happens when these worlds are brought within competing frames of reference? The philosopher Nelson Goodman famously argued that there are not many different versions of one real world but that there are different actual (as distinct from possible) worlds. In one reading of Goodman, one could say that he is pointing to the fact that any description of the world needs a frame of reference. For instance, within one frame of reference the sun never moves, while within another, the sun moves from the East to the West. But do the terms *sun* and *moves* mean the same thing in the two sentences? Goodman is not proposing a complete representational relativism but arguing that there is no neutral

world with reference to which these claims can be adjudicated. Thus there is no way of aggregating pictures of the world described under different frames of reference to provide one composite picture. But neither is one entitled to say that no pressure is exerted among these different descriptions. But then, as he says, one never just stands outside as a judge would and asks, Which world is genuine and which is spurious? These questions arise because we are always thrown in the middle of worlds that are being made.

Goodman's contention that worlds are not so much found as made, and thus world making, as we know it, always starts from worlds that are *al-ready at hand*, clearly has an appeal for anthropologists since he breaks from the usual oppositions between realism and constructivism without succumbing to any notion of a direct and unencumbered access to the real. We shall see that even when not directly addressed as a "many-worlds problem," the questions of how anthropological modes of knowing confront the issue of different presumptions under which worlds are made or remade, communication occurs or fails, and how people belong to a world or sometimes fall out of it give an urgency to the anthropologist's quest for making his or her experience of intimacy and alterity available for both anthropology and philosophy.

The difficulties of reality and the difficulties of philosophy inform each other within the anthropological text whether the scene is that of an ancient ritual (Puett in this volume) or the failure of care in modern medical and economic regimes (Biehl, Kleinman). Then the anthropologist's work may have in common with philosophy the task of bringing experience nearer to reality by generating concepts from life rather than taking them from abstract discussions and thought experiments and fitting them to the flow of experience. There is a very interesting tension that runs through the volume on whether philosophy answers or can answer to our needs of being responsive to the worlds we encounter. While no straightforward answer does or can emerge, the pressures put by the anthropologists gathered here on the specific philosophers they engage with shows which paths of engagement might remain open. We imagine that no anthropologist would be comfortable today with Husserl's (1970: 16) contention that "European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type like 'China' or 'India.'" And yet, as Fischer and Puett both note in their chapters, there is a great difficulty in inheriting the modes of thought from other philosophies unless what we define as philosophy is itself put under question.

Recently Didier Fassin (2012) proposed the term *moral anthropology* to explain how moral questions are embedded in the substance of the social. Fassin draws attention to the differences in the Kantian genealogy through Durkheim, where the emphasis is on social norms and obligation, and an Aristotelian legacy, with its emphasis on virtue ethics. (In addition to Fassin 2012, see also Faubion 2006; Jackson 2004; Kleinman 2006; Laidlaw 2002; Lambek 2010.) An interesting tension marks those who think that the biggest obstacle to the emergence of an anthropology of ethics was Durkheim's Kantian legacy that reduced the understanding of ethics to that of following the moral codes of a given society, resurrecting the difference between the moral and the ethical.² However, the view of obligation is somewhat simplistic in these discussions as they do not take into account the rich philosophical literature following Wittgenstein on the gap between the formulation of rules and how they are followed. We get a much more complex picture of the interplay between obligation, coercion, and desire in the following chapters, as in the way that Das contrasts the two poles of action and expression, linking it to Austin's (1962) formulation of the illocutionary force of words, which Das, following Stanley Cavell (1996, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c), links to the order of law and perlocutionary force, which is then linked to the disorders of desire or, in Hage's chapter, that deepens our understanding of habit and dispositions as forms of attunement to the world.

Instead of assuming that the opposite of freedom is a slavish obedience to custom, a more sustained philosophical and ethnographic reflection on *habit* takes this category not as mere residue of repetition but as an intermediary within which two poles of the human subject—activity and passivity—are put into play. The notion of habit actually loosens the contrast between morality seen as submission to social obligation and ethics seen as exercise of freedom. In different forms this concern appears in a number of essays in this volume in which the mechanical aspects of repetition are countered by reference to the fragility of the everyday (Das, Han, Jackson), on the one hand, and the experiments with language and ritual that generate concepts from within the everyday, on the other (Singh, Puett). In anthropology Bourdieu ([1980] 1990) is credited with bringing back concepts of habit and practice to counter the overemphasis on cognition alone. However, Bourdieu inherits a particular lineage of thought, as Hage's chapter shows with the wonderful metaphor of “overhearing”

Bourdieu's philosophers. Thus he interprets Bourdieu's *habitus* as the principle behind the accumulation of being in the form of social or practical efficacy. He asks how it is that human beings, by repetitively engaging in or mimicking the behavior of people, animals, and even certain objects around them, end up being more than just automatons and develop a creative "generative" capacity out of what Aristotle called the "sedimentation" of previous experiences. In effect what is being proposed is a refutation of the easy opposition between obligation and freedom, bringing to light the double nature of habit as what Ravaisson (2009) called grace and addiction.

CONCEPTS OF THE POLITICAL

Anthropologists have long contested teleological accounts of modernity and politics, and yet the history of the discipline itself is often narrated in teleological terms as, for instance, moving from the study of "stateless" societies to postcolonial "new states" and thereafter to a "globalizing" present. Parallel to changes in political formations appears the narrative of anthropology as a succession of "isms," which risk assuming an equation of the old with the outmoded and thus of suppressing the multiplicity of a thought through false unities. For instance, in his chapter Singh argues that the term *poststructuralism* brings together sharply divergent, even opposing philosophical genealogies into a seeming unity.

We suggest that considering the attractions to and repulsions from particular philosophical figures and concepts might provide a different, nonteleological rendering of how the category of the political has been formulated in anthropology, provided we eschew a "before" and "after." For instance, it would vastly oversimplify matters if we were to render Marx's influence on political anthropology in terms of a unified school called Marxist anthropology rather than in terms of a multiplicity of tensions (see, e.g., Roseberry 1997). Concepts or moral imperatives from a particular philosopher's oeuvre might take new forms, even after the historical moment of that philosopher is supposedly over.

Another way into these questions is to ask how and when specific ideas, such as the concept of sovereignty derived from political philosophy, implicitly leave their tracks within anthropological thought, even when philosophy is disavowed. Consider the example of an antagonism but also a subterranean affinity to philosophy in a classic anthropological text, *African Political Systems* by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940), renowned for its sharp disavowal of Western political philosophy and the inauguration,

in some ways, of political anthropology. Radcliffe-Brown (1940: xxiii) begins his preface to the volume by undermining the idea of Europe as the bearer of ideal political norms and criticizing the notion of a state as having a unified will, “over and above the human individuals who make up a society,” which is, he argues, “a fiction of the philosophers.”

Comparably, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard’s (1940: 4) introduction to their work offers a sharp negation of philosophy: “We have not found that the theories of political philosophers have helped us to understand the societies we have studied and we consider them of little scientific value.” Turning to the well-known distinction in moral philosophy between the *ought* and the *is*, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard further argue that “political philosophy has chiefly concerned itself with how men *ought* to live and what form of government they *ought* to have, rather than with what *are* their political habits and institutions” (emphasis in original).

Toward the end of his preface, however, Radcliffe-Brown (1940: xxiii) must set out his own positive definition of what constitutes politics, and the definition he offers implicitly rehabilitates the very concept of sovereignty that he had seemingly rejected: “The political organization of a society is that aspect of the total organization which is concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force.” Similarly when Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940: 14) have to summarize the conceptual heart of the book, namely the difference between the two kinds of political systems they encountered—one in which order was maintained through a balance of power in “segmentary” systems of intersecting lineage and territorial units and one in which control is exercised through centralizing political institutions such as a ruling chief—they turn back to the language of philosophers: “In societies of Group B there is no association, class or segment which has a dominant place in the political structure through the command of greater organized force. . . . In the language of political philosophy, there is no individual or group in which sovereignty can be said to rest.”

This is not to say that *African Political Systems* is “secretly” a book of philosophy or simply “applies” a pregiven concept. The richness of the book reveals that there are indeed facets of the world that anthropological inquiry illuminates that cannot be gained even by the most sophisticated philosophical speculation, for example, the dynamics of power in these two systems and the conceptual move to recognize them as systems and not simply as “prepolitical” entities at the doorstep of modernity, as well as the sharp critique of the ways these political systems were being reshaped

by the coercive power of European colonial rule. In this sense it remains important to preserve the separateness of anthropology from philosophy, as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard contended, for no amount of philosophical gymnastics and thought experiments would have disclosed the deformation of these worlds.

At the same time, we sense the book's affinity to political philosophy. Even in its proclaimed disavowal of philosophy, *African Political Systems* inhabits, perhaps as its core issue, the constitution and reconstitution of sovereignty, which has returned as one of the central questions of political anthropology at present.³ The promise of "the political" in anthropology, it seems to us, is that while there may be certain continuities in the questions that are asked (and the overlap of these questions with philosophy), such as an interest in the myriad forms that relations of authority and of cohabitation may take (whether through obligation, by physical or ideological force, through relations of kinship or territory, or through more deterritorialized forms of exchange), the specific shape that these ideas take is unpredictable, in the sense that the old may unexpectedly reappear as the new, for instance in rituals and symbols (Geertz 1980; Kertzer 1988), fetishes (Taussig 1997), and forms of illegibility (Das and Poole 2004) and theodicy (Herzfeld 1992) that anthropologists have variously found animating the modern state.

The political in the chapters that follow might not be signaled as such, but it provides the frame within which we can understand the particularity of the descriptions. Consider Puett's chapter, which takes up a ritual of the transfer of sovereignty performed by a son following the death of his father, the ruler, through a series of what appear to be role reversals. Anthropological analysis, Puett contends, has often taken a "distancing" stance from the ritual it describes. He then daringly suggests that ritual theory here is as self-aware as we take modern philosophy or anthropology to be. It operates by assuming the conditions of its own "ultimate failure" and of a tragic disjuncture between the ritual and the dangerous energies that traverse the world outside of the ritual. The ritual works, then, by understanding its finitude and the temporary interventions it makes within these conflicting energies. We might read Puett's essay as an invitation to translate this insight into other times and places, as a way of understanding the relation between ritual and politics and the play of life forces.

Moving from ritual to the political significance of myth, Singh rediscovers a seemingly arcane text by Georges Dumézil on Vedic and Roman mythology as suggesting a concept of sovereignty different from Agam-

ben's (1998) and Schmitt's (1985). This concept, as Singh shows, names not simply an abstraction but specific forces of violence and welfare that an ethnographer may sense in everyday life, in the forms in which "power over life" is expressed. In a related but interestingly different mode, Das's essay illuminates a different region of the political within anthropology, taking up what she calls, citing Poe, "a series of mere household events" in the lives of the urban poor, such as getting a document or carrying gallons of water over hilly terrains perched precariously on a bicycle. It is through these events that the political is made to emerge.

In these senses, rather than offering a strict definition of "the political" within anthropology, the essays gesture toward a terrain that ranges from the explicitly philosophical to the implicit resonance of concepts of coercion and consent and collective habitation, to myths and rituals of power and powerlessness and the everyday as an uncanny and ordinary space of threats and possibilities.

WHAT IS THINKING? REVISITING LÉVI-STRAUSS

Among the chapters that follow we will find a lively debate on the conditions of possibility for a conversation between anthropology and philosophy, but the issue that was at the center of debate at one time—the difference between modern rational thought and primitive modes of thinking—does not arise here.⁴ Instead what counts as thinking figures in many of the chapters that ask how ordinary life itself gives rise to puzzles we might call philosophical or how we might treat other forms in which thought is expressed as coeval with anthropological thinking. This is a different view of knowledge than the assumption that there are "theory moments" in anthropology that make it turn to philosophy. An earlier debate on a similar issue that came to a head in the three-cornered discussion between Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Claude Lévi-Strauss on the question of "primitive thought" is well worth revisiting here.

For Lévy-Bruhl ([1923] 1985: 93), primitive thinking, while "normal, complex and developed" in its own terms, departed from modern habits of thought by its blending of the actual world and the world beyond, for primitive experience of time, he thought, "resembled a subjective feeling of duration, not wholly unlike the *durée* described by Bergson." Bergson (1935) himself responded to this claim by providing instances of "primitive mentality" within our own modes of thought, especially with regard to the way we treat the relation between necessity and contingency with

regard to illness, misfortune, and death.⁵ Lévi-Strauss responded sharply to Lévy-Bruhl's ([1923] 1985) contention that whatever its complexity, primitive mentality cannot be said to possess "knowledge" or "thought" since it is only "felt and lived" and does not work with "ideas and concepts." This sharp distinction between cognition and affect had led Lévy-Bruhl to characterize primitive thought as "exclusively concrete." Beginning with this very starting point of the concrete, or sense perception, Lévi-Strauss claimed a science and a knowledge practice for the so-called savage mind, one that was not based on mystical or nonlogical causation. Such knowledge, Lévi-Strauss contended, is not only prompted by organic or economic needs but is cultivated as a mode of curiosity about the world. Is this mode of curiosity somehow lower than that of the scientist and the engineer?

In the second half of *The Savage Mind* Lévi-Strauss (1966) confronted Sartre's contention that the "highest" form of human reason is "dialectical historical consciousness." What was at stake here was the status of collective products of imagination such as myths as representations that are acceptable to multiple subjects simultaneously. As with savage thought, Lévi-Strauss (1966: 262) attempted to break down historical reasoning into some of its constituent elements, describing how, within this form of thought, principles of selection were arrived at in the nature of a chronological code and its accompanying principle of a "before" and an "after," classes of dates and periods standing in relations of differentiation to one another, and varying scales and levels such as national, biographical, or anecdotal history and so on. Having unpacked this form of reasoning, Lévi-Strauss asked a more "prelogical," affective question about historical consciousness: Why do we set such store by our archives, personal or public? Would the past disappear if we lost our archives? These are, after all, only objects or pieces of paper. In what ways are objects marked and valued and stored? Here Lévi-Strauss turned to a much discussed object in older anthropology, the Churinga and its sacred character. What impressed him was not only the formality of sacred ritual but also the affective tie between the participants in the ritual and the Churinga. He quotes an Australian ethnographer to stress this point: "The Northern Aranda clings to his native soil with every fibre of his being. . . . Today tears will come into his eyes when he mentions an ancestral home site which has been, sometimes unwittingly, desecrated by the white usurpers of his group territory. . . . Mountains and creeks and springs and water-holes are, to him, not merely interesting or beautiful scenic features. . . . they are the handiwork of ancestors. . . . The

whole country-side is his living, age-old family tree” (Strethlow quoted in Lévi-Strauss 1966: 243).

Lévi-Strauss (1966: 244) understood these affects not as an expression of “prelogical” causation or a “lower” form of perception than historical reason but rather as telling us something about where historicity and modern archival practices themselves find their most genuine value: “Think of the value of Johann Sebastian Bach’s signature to one who cannot hear a bar of his music without a quickening of his pulse . . . [or] . . . our conducted tours to Goethe’s or Victor Hugo’s house. . . . As in the case of the churinga, the main thing is not that the bed is the self-same one on which it is proved Van Gogh slept: all the visitor asks is to be shown it.”

This affective relationship to knowledge practices and the claims made on behalf of primitive thought need to be understood in the context of the postwar period, when confidence in the superiority of European Enlightenment rationality had collapsed. The French philosopher Claude Imbert (2008, 2009) argues that Lévi-Strauss turns to anthropological knowledge as a mode of inhabitation in the world precisely in this scene of collapse. She considers three major constellations of ideas in Lévi-Strauss; first is the attempt to find a way out of the usual ideas of experience that assumed either transparency or an easy way to translate and make intelligible what one encounters in fieldwork. (See also Crapanzano and Caton in this volume.) Imbert points out that the two concepts of transformation and generativity in Lévi-Strauss were both mathematical concepts, aimed not so much to solve a mathematical puzzle as to go beyond the limits of a phenomenological first-order description of fact, form, and things.

The most important point Imbert makes, however, is on the undecipherable face paintings of the Caduveo women. In *The Ways of the Masks* Lévi-Strauss (1988) notes with astonishment that while generations of interpreters had been unable to decipher the face paintings of Caduveo women, the women themselves were able to render them graphically on the flat plane of the paper without the anatomical surface of the face. To Lévi-Strauss this meditation on the face as mask, with designs that are undecipherable to the anthropologist (as well as the missionaries who took these to be too beautiful to be anything other than the work of the devil), brings home the limit of anthropological knowledge. Imbert suggests that in the mutual acknowledgment of finitude, one might glimpse a relenting over the bitter observations on philosophy that he had made at the end of *The Naked Man* (1981).

Imbert invites us to go back to *Tristes Tropiques* and read it not as a reformist tract, as Geertz (1988) would have it, but as a meditation on survival. When, at the end of the book, in what might otherwise be an inscrutable statement, Lévi-Strauss ([1973] 1992) exclaims, “Yet, I exist,” he declares his existence as a protest. For Imbert this “awakening” is not from the Cartesian dream of imagining whether I am alone in the world but from a nightmare, to henceforth honor the open credit of survival. One might still wonder at the infamous passages on the dirt and squalor of Asian towns in *Tristes Tropiques*, but at the end of the day, Imbert provides us with a powerful reformulation of the importance of the anthropological project to philosophy, when she states that Lévi-Strauss returned at the end of the European brutalities to revive not theoretical anthropology but the pursuit of a double place of experience and theory as an ongoing confrontation of fieldwork and its assumption of shared intelligibility. As Jocelyn Benoist (2003, 2008), the French philosopher of phenomenology, shows in several of his papers on Lévi-Strauss, although “explanation” in Lévi-Strauss always consists in showing an “arrangement,” it constitutes finality without being finished. We can find freedom or *volonté*, says Benoist, at the level of the collective arrangement itself. Lévi-Strauss provides a very interesting figure through whom we can see several of the themes we have discussed: ethics as both adherence to collective codes and the exercise of freedom as well as a political critique of Enlightenment rationality in its denial of the rationality of other modes of thought.

THEMES AND VARIATIONS

It is not our intention to give a summary of each chapter; instead we offer some signposts by tracing how particular philosophers are addressed by the different authors and also what themes overlap in the chapters. First of all, let us ask: What is a particular essay’s idea of itself, of its turn or return to philosophy? What image of writing and of reading animates these contributions? In an essay on Henry James’s return to America, Cavell (2005a) invites us to think of James’s image of writing as attesting to the possibility of the soil. But the divining of the secret of the garden that is not immediately visible can be made possible only by passing the lacerating hedge—as if, says Cavell, writing for James could not be done without touching blood. Or consider Emerson’s (1844) extraordinary essay on experience in which the philosopher father’s writing reveals itself as the grave in which the name of the dead son is buried and also the womb from

which categories of a more diminutive stature (use, surface, dream) rather than the majestic ones of Kant (time, space) will emerge (Cavell 1995)—here philosophy is an attempt to bring experience nearer to reality.

A fascinatingly varied picture of when and why one would turn to philosophy emerges in the essays of this volume, as each author sustains a different kind of relation to philosophy. This relation seems to be shaped not by the kind of intellectual puzzles that might arise in a scholar's study as he reflects on how he (the masculine pronoun is deliberate) can prove that he is not alone in the world but rather through existential questions that arose in the course of fieldwork or in auto-ethnographic moments. The authors' ethnographic sensibilities might have been formed by a deep immersion in fieldwork (Das, Jackson, Caton, Han) or by events in their own lives; the labels we might put on them may be of auto-ethnography (Kleinman, Hage, Crapanzano), philosophical biography (Fischer, Puett), or attraction to a particular form of thought (Biehl, Singh, Fassin), but the tracks of texts that have been held in the hand, copied with great exactitude, and perhaps shut down in sudden moments of despair are all visible. For example, while reflecting on the opposite trajectories of two brothers in Sierra Leone, Jackson finds himself drifting into the philosophy of Sartre, thoughts coming unbidden to him and yet animated very specifically by the questions that the two brothers pose, to themselves and to Jackson, about success and failure, freedom and fate, life chances, and the different turns one may have taken. Kleinman opens long-forgotten exercise books in which, as a young man gripped with great uncertainty during a time of war, he used to copy edifying passages from the philosophical texts of Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and others. But he finds that none of these texts consoles or shows a path forward in the face of his massive loss in the death of his wife and longtime companion, Joan Kleinman. Caton returns to old ethnographic diaries and to questions of violence and mediation that have long interested him and experiments with rewriting part of his ethnography differently, spurred by Bergson's notion of duration but also in part because something in the events he described in *Yemen Chronicles* had remained resistant to his writing. Textures and tones in the writing of all the chapters are awash with pictures of what it is to do philosophy in relation to the work's idea of itself as, for instance, melancholic (Kleinman), pedagogic (Puett), containing the poisonous (Das, Han), the playful (Fischer, Singh), mutually constitutive (Biehl), re-membering (Caton, Jackson), abusive fidelity (Fassin, Hage), or as in the grip of a skeptical tempo (Crapanzano). Together the chapters give expression to certain conceptual

puzzles but are also saturated with affects, which circulate in the mode of writing itself.

The originality of these essays lies not in a complete break from all earlier puzzles but rather in the deepening of some of the classic questions of anthropology and philosophy. For instance, a classic theme that explicitly emerges in many of the essays is the relation between concepts and life, or alternately, between experience and reflection, thought and being. Placed within a Kantian heritage of “philosophical anthropology,” the issue might be stated as that of finding criteria for defining what it is to be fully human. As we know, discussions in contemporary philosophy and anthropology are wary of any recourse to foundational criteria, such as the appeal to transcendental reason, or criteria rooted in facts of biology or nature. Nonetheless most scholars, whether philosophers or anthropologists, are also wary of making the opposite error of assuming endless plasticity in the possibilities of the human body or human action. John McDowell (1994) made the important move of conceptually recasting our acquired habits as well as the larger work of culture as the acquisition of a “second nature” with some resonance with Durkheim’s notion that society begins to appear as “*sui generis*” to the individual. McDowell’s notion of the condition of the human as one of being in “second nature” that can even overcome “first nature” departs from Durkheim in that McDowell would include the capacity to reflect on and evaluate one’s actions as part of this second nature.

From the anthropological perspective this formulation is important for the way it addresses the problem of “the myth of the given” in the construction of the human, but it is sparse on the work that needs to be done to understand how human beings move from “first nature” to “second nature.” Nor does it take account of the work of scholars in the tradition of Canguilhem (1989, 1994), Foucault (2001) or Esposito (2008), who have problematized precisely the issue of how biology as first nature is to be accounted for in the making of the social. In that sense, many of the chapters in this volume do the hard work of showing in what manner biological norms and social relations are mutually constitutive, as also ways in which the natural and the social mutually absorb each other within a form of life. This is a major theme in Fassin’s insightful essay as he delineates the distinction between “biopolitics” and “politics of life” in a gesture of what he calls abusive fidelity to Foucault. Exploring the trajectory of the relation between the biological and the social through the works of Canguilhem (1989, 1994) and Arendt ([1958] 1998, 1991), Fassin shows the opposite directions in which they take the problematic of the mutual inflec-

tion of biological and social norms. He then formulates the basic question underlying the politics of life as a tension between the abstract evaluation of life as sacred and the simultaneous indifference to the concrete inequalities that mark the conditions in which actual people live and the variable determinations of whose life is to be affirmed and who is allowed to “let die” (Foucault 2008) or even be killed.

Concern with biological norms enters in other chapters by other routes.⁶ Kleinman discusses how a neurological disease such as Alzheimer’s jeopardizes the security of relations that were taken for granted in states of health, creating a divided self in the caregiver. His essay is a profound meditation on what it is to acknowledge the claims made by the other, when one’s own place in the world has become precarious. The essay is one of the best refutations of the notion that to be fully human is grounded in the concept of personhood, which, in turn, is seen to depend on the capacity to rationally evaluate one’s first-order desires (Koo 2007). Instead Kleinman suggests that it is the ability to respond and to endure the baffling changes that a condition such as Alzheimer’s brings about, and thus to treat the *other* as fully human, that marks the *human* in the caregiver. His definition of caregiving as a *practical* ritual of love aligns with William James’s belief that a long acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser than the possession of abstract formulas (cited in Kleinman).

Hage too offers a fascinating example of how a particular impairment might attune one to the world in a different way. Thus, when Hage lost his hearing, he lost what he called a “hearing reality,” but on recovering his hearing through a transplant he did not simply recover this reality—he lost something too. What is this something that was lost? Here Hage makes an important point that goes even beyond Canguilhem’s (1989) conception of disease as the capacity to set new norms for oneself more adequate to the loss one has borne. Instead Hage argues that when he regained some of his hearing back, his world gained the symbolic sharpness that had disappeared for him, but he lost the capacity to be immersed in the world in the mode of a certain “subliminal jouissance.” Thus Hage offers us not only a fine-grained conceptual analysis of the genealogy of the concept of habitus and its relation to dispositions but also autographic reflections, which, like Kleinman’s attention to his own divided self, become the ground for conceptual innovation. In this vein, we might read Biehl’s ethnography as a different kind of investigation of impairment and the constitution and reconstitution of personhood as he attempts to re-compose his main interlocuter, Catarina’s words to constitute her person

differently from the ways she is written and overwritten by abandonment and institutional regimes. We find a different form of Kleinman's divided self, what Biehl calls "the split of the I," in his conversations with Catarina. Even as he attempts to recompose this I Biehl asks how ethnographic writing may try to express incompleteness, a question for which he turns to Deleuze's concept of becoming, asking further what forms of *becoming* anthropology might express, in ways perhaps distinct from philosophy.

Das and Han too engage the question of the biological through its absorption in the social, but their ethnographic contexts differ from those of Kleinman, Hage, and Biehl, in that they are concerned not with individual impairment and its impact on the mode of being but with survival as a collectively addressed project of everyday life in lower-income urban neighborhoods. Thus both think of "need" as a call for ethical action, not charity or welfare (see also Han 2012). Both take up instances where the lines between ethics and politics begin to blur, as does the distinction between "self-interest" and an orientation toward others. Das and Han both privilege the quotidian as the place where ongoing political and ethical action takes place, and both show an insightful engagement with philosophical theories of performative action. Das finds that her ethnographic work offers one direction in which Austin's (1962) unfinished project on the perlocutionary force of words could be taken to see how action and expression are stitched together in performative utterances. She further discusses Cavell's (2005b) subtle critique of Austin through his formulation of "passionate utterances" and argues that ethnography reveals how we might see a better integration of action and expression in performative utterances.

Han's essay takes these themes further in pressuring philosophical reflection to bear on the seemingly habitual or mundane actions undertaken by the poor to attain or maintain a particular sense of dignity so as not to appear to be recipients of charity. While sympathetic to the critiques of humanitarianism and its underlying foundational assumptions about the sacredness of life, Han gives a beautiful reformulation of the problematic; as she puts it, it is not the common vulnerability of the human that is at stake but rather those points at which the vulnerability of the other becomes "mine to respond to." In offering her rich ethnography of how people devise ways of helping their neighbors so as to both acknowledge their state of precariousness and preserve their dignity, Han shows how philosophical theories of excuses and pretensions, as in Austin (1969a, 1969b), can be enriched much more through ethnography than Austin himself might have imagined, while also deepening and challenging classic anthro-

pological ideas of the gift, and of giving and receiving, and contemporary debates on humanitarian aid.

Singh takes this discussion of giving and receiving in a different direction, asking if we may, on occasion, find the rigor of a philosophical concept in our ethnographic conversations. He encounters such a concept through the evocative ethnographic figure of Bansi Sahariya, a former bonded laborer, now a well-known ascetic in central India, known, among other things, for the large-scale village-level sacrificial potlatches that he organizes and oversees. In an extended ethnographic dialogue Singh draws out the conceptual depth of a crucial, albeit seemingly ordinary and habitual phrase in Bansi's lexicon, *lebo-debo* (give and take). Understanding this phrase in Bansi's terms requires a theory of sacrifice, sacrificial transactions, and ethical accounting and a discussion of how surplus capital is absorbed. Singh concludes, "Understanding Bansi's rise from a bonded laborer to a famous ascetic I realized that 'lebo-debo' was not just a throwaway phrase. It was a central concept in his lexicon, deeply attached to an understanding of life. Bonded and legitimate labor, power relations, marriage, sacrifice, kinship, intimacy, buying, selling, the very fabric of human relatedness depends on different understandings of the seemingly simple phrase 'give and take.'"

Putting these essays together, it seems that we could reformulate the issue of ethics as follows. A dominant mode of thinking of ethics is in terms of action that has public consequences and that stands apart from the habitual stream of practices. As we saw, for many philosophers, this capacity to evaluate and *reflect* is what defines personhood, which is then taken to be a fundamental premise of the claim to being fully human. An alternative genealogy of philosophical reflection (Wittgenstein [1958] 1973; Austin 1962; Cavell 1979; Laugier 2001; but other names could be evoked), on what it is to be human within practices that define one's participation in a form of life, contests such a view. Rather than a sharp contrast between moments of immersion in a lifeworld and moments of detachment at which practices are critiqued, philosophers within this lineage of thought consider agreement to be not agreements in opinions or deliberation but rather agreement in forms of *life*. It is not that philosophers in this lineage are assuming agreement or an automatic allegiance to one's culture as it stands; rather they understand that criticism is much more than an application of deliberative discourse or the capacity for detached reflection—for reason can turn demonic, or alternatively, the realm of everyday habits need not be unreflective or unresponsive to ethical impulses.

Some of the chapters in this volume (Das, Hage, Han) explicitly question the idea that habit is simple mechanical repetition, as discussed earlier. Others show how the world is critically constructed in moments of detachment, as in Biehl's example of Catarina's writing of words that might appear random or mundane unless one puts them in relation to her abandonment by her family and her experiences of the medical system, when they take on an uncanny critical force. Taking a different route, Jackson thinks of the relation between being and thought through the movements between immersion and detachment. He suggests that ethnography and philosophy might be rendered as corresponding to immersion and reflection, respectively. But Singh's chapter tries to unsettle what it is to think *critically* by emphasizing how habits of thought and reflection may themselves become ingrained into the flow of life, asking if we do not perhaps often confuse a particular mode of dialectical negation as thought itself. The richness of these tensions cannot move to an assured resolution, but in each case confronting these tensions creates more and better routes to understand anthropology's closeness and distance from philosophy.

In many of the other essays in this volume the theme of the relation between being and thinking, or the crafting of a world in which our moral aspirations can find expression and potential for action, is addressed in different registers. Following his thought on the double movement of immersion and detachment, Jackson continuously circles back to events that become deepened in his thought with each return. It is thus that he is able to think of the self not as a stable entity that endures through time but as the coming together of different potentialities—versions of the self that can be brought into being or discarded in the flow of life. Biehl too considers what it is to “return” to Catarina, as an anthropologist colleague challenges him to “put her to rest.” He wonders if it would be acceptable (or what the objection might then become) if he thinks of his return to Catarina not as or not only as a return to an ethnographic interlocutor but also as a return to a conceptually generative presence, to whom one turns and returns, as one might, say, to Arendt or to Wittgenstein. Yet there is a subtle difference between Biehl's notion that “not letting go” is a gesture of fidelity and Das's, Crapanzano's, or Caton's idea that they, the anthropologists, were after all only fleeting presences in the lives of their interlocutors (despite almost lifelong engagements with them), whose separateness they accept as a condition of their being anthropologists.

We step back to the question we started with: How do philosophical concepts figure in the making of anthropological knowledge, and what

constitutes philosophy for us nonphilosophers in this sense? And further: How might this question be tracked in the thinking and writing of particular anthropologists rather than in anthropology in general as a discipline? Here it is also important to pay close attention to the variation in tone and pitch of the essays in the volume. Consider Crapanzano's essay, which raises the famous philosophical question of the certainty and uncertainty regarding other minds and asks whether the social explanations we offer as part of fieldwork mask the opacity we feel about the other and about ourselves. Do the dialogues in the field, as in everyday life, have the character of shadow dialogues? At one point it looks as if Crapanzano is thinking not only of the situation of fieldwork but also of everyday life itself as a scene of trance and illusion, as a series of misreadings of the self and the other come to define the communicative milieu. However, he also thinks of social situations as consisting of other modes of knowing that come from being and working with each other. While Crapanzano cites Heidegger that it is in "concernful solicitude" that the other is proximally disclosed, he also faults Heidegger for sidestepping the subjectivity of the concrete other. It might be interesting to ask what pressures the desire for certainty exerts over our demand to know the other. What are the implications for anthropology of an open acknowledgment that the other (and by implication the self) is not transparent, and that even if the other were made of glass through and through we could not, or ought not, to be able to see into her? In different ways Caton and Das acknowledge that not only is their knowledge of the other incomplete but that this condition of fieldwork mirrors conditions of life in which, to use a phrase from Wittgenstein, "my spade is turned." As Crapanzano says, there is a difference between attitudinal knowledge and conceptual knowledge, between knowing about the other and knowing the other. In terms of a philosophical response to this impossibility of really knowing the other, Cavell's (1988) work, for instance, shows that it is not knowledge but *acknowledgment* that is often at stake in human relatedness, an acknowledgment that may itself remain uncertain.

A second theme that appears in many of the chapters is that of temporality and imagination. The defining question of Fischer's playful and provocative essay is how anthropology might be seen as a way of doing philosophy. Underlying his playful innovations, brought about by establishing a coevalness between different moments in time (his fieldwork in 1975 and 2004), different genres of writing (literary texts, anthropological dissertations, posters on walls), and the texture of different places, is the profound

idea that a desire to find an uncontaminated or pure philosophical tradition (say, Islamic philosophy or Buddhist philosophy) is almost a denial of what time has done to these traditions. On the other hand, to read them in company with a constellation of other texts marshalling critical apparatuses of debate, placing them within pluralist civil politics, is closer to the picture of what it is to do philosophy with these traditions. Thus playing with what is distant and what is proximate, or with different constellations, Fischer offers us a different way in which philosophy might be inhabited across cultures. Theory for him is like a sudden ray of light, quite different from Jackson's idea of theory as returning to the same story in first, second, or third reflections, or Kleinman's and Das's notion of learning to occupy a space of devastation again. Fischer repeatedly evokes the notion of living in the fleeting and the fugitive and the aspiration for "actual life," and through such a lens he produces a picture of "doing anthropology" as a mode of "doing philosophy." His weaving of style and content into each other produces a stunning and original text. Yet a nagging question remains: Does the form of writing that Fischer employs allow us to master the apparatuses needed to address texts and forms of knowledge that have disappeared because they were not part of contemporary circulations? What other forms would fidelity to such texts within a framework that acknowledges their contemporary status and perhaps even their inevitable "modernity" entail? How could anthropology become a mode of doing philosophy such that it becomes the site on which these different philosophies might be enabled to converse, even as we acknowledge that their differences cannot be distilled into "pure" forms? Or is the desire for "actual life" an admission that the presence of such texts will inevitably become metaphorical for our intellectual concerns? What bearing does the idea of many worlds have for these issues?

Other chapters, especially Puett's, approach these issues from a different angle. Locating himself right within ritual theory from Chinese philosophy that offers a reflection on relations between fathers and sons, rulers and subjects, as well as the transience of time, Puett argues that anthropology has distilled ritual theory into its own categories (e.g., rituals of reversal), thus making theory emanating from other places into objects of study or philosophical speculation but not allowing it to challenge our own theories or taken-for-granted assumptions. In both anthropology and philosophy the import of non-European forms of thought is deflected by relegating them to a stable picture of tradition, broken up only by the destabilizing pressures of "modernity."

Thus premodern Chinese philosophy is routinely represented as an ontology of “harmonious monism,” whereas Puett argues that the ritual he discusses takes for granted that the world is full of negative and conflicting energies and that ritual works to bring about small shifts through its own pedagogy. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Singh’s remarkable analysis of the movement of deities and spirits that allows him to treat events in fieldwork as coeval with fragments of myth in the Sanskrit epics and with the concept of sovereignty in Dumézil (1988). Marshalling the Deleuzian concepts of thresholds, potencies, and intensities, Singh contends that these concepts are helpful inasmuch as they signal potential routes of ethnographic attentiveness but not as “theory moments” that can be applied to ethnography. Or, as Hage puts it in his incisive manner, a critical anthropology does not simply receive its questions from philosophy; nor does it take reality as already philosophically questioned.

We have left a discussion of Caton’s essay to the last because it raises a deep question that goes to the heart of anthropological knowledge. In its most stark form the question might be posed as asking: Are anthropologists reliable narrators? After all, anthropological knowledge, as are all other forms of knowledge, is not only contained in the final book or chapter that is written; there are other things one writes—ethnographic diaries, letters from the field, personal memos. These are not, perhaps for any anthropologist, simply old “data” to be discarded. What relation do these writings have with what we end up producing as a book or a paper? Already in *Yemen Chronicle* (2005), Caton had experimented with time and memory. Now he asks: What impact does his recent engagement with Bergson ([1889] 1927, [1908] 1991, 2001) have on the kind of analysis and writing he did? Bergson’s ideas of our being as immersed in multiple durations, that the past is not a succession of nows but that the whole of the past is virtually given at once, and that the real involves a complex relation between the potential, the actual, and the virtual, challenge the rendering of an event in terms of chronological time and orderly succession. Yet as Caton tries to imagine what it would be to write field notes not only in the mode of a recording of events as *told* by those who were eyewitnesses but also keeping in mind the multiple durations in which the actors are themselves immersed, doubts besiege him. He gives us an example of two rewritten (or reimagined) paragraphs that were taken from his ethnographic diary and reproduced in the book *Yemen Chronicle*. In these rewritten paragraphs he gives us an imaginative rendering of what supposedly went on in the mind of the sheikh who challenged the guardian of the boy with whom two girls

from his family were alleged to have eloped. While earlier Caton had given us the meaning of the *gestures* that the sheikh produced, now he also gives us the rush of thoughts that might have been swirling in his mind. He then asks, Can such ethnography be written? What entitles the ethnographer to treat this other as if his thoughts were transparent to her? The issue circles back to the problematic of other minds.⁷ Yet we think there is a subtle difference when this reading of other minds happens from some universalistic assumptions about how human beings think and feel and when it happens when the grammar of interactions within a lifeworld has been internalized by participation in everyday life. At its heart this can be read as a difference between ethnographic and philosophically speculative forms of knowing. After all, Caton produces these readings not from somewhere outside that lifeworld but from the impressions and potentia that circulate within it. Then we may say that Caton's argument hinges on the very important idea that it is consciousness that provides the ground of subjectivity and not specific psychological states at moments of action in the world. One might also add that the dilemma of other minds is not limited to the question of ethnographic knowing, but in many instances it is no different from the doubts that besiege us in everyday life. But we do manage to continue to live with possibilities of trust and betrayal, flashes of understanding and misunderstanding, not simply because we are pragmatic beings but because in navigating the many layered relations between the sheets of time, as Bergson would say, we accept our fallibility and the possibility of error. Caton's work is an important demonstration of how a philosophical thought might be absorbed in anthropology not as confirmation of our methods through which we read experience and subjectivity but as an interrogation of our mode of thought that goes far beyond issues of reflexivity and ethnographic authority.

This book, then, is about individual anthropologists wrestling with particular philosophers: we argue that to understand their puzzles is the best route to understanding anthropology's philosophy; it is not about a canonical tradition or "classics." There is no single tradition in philosophy that the anthropologists in our book are engaging. We are sure that another group of anthropologists would engage different philosophers and distinctive themes. It is the radical fragmentation that restrains us from attempting any synoptic or authoritative statement of the kind that assimilates all other experiences and traditions of knowing within a single magisterial "we" making the parochial appear as the universal. For us, it is

our own era's human condition of multiplicity, diversity, and pluralism that shapes our own distinctive statement of a relationship between anthropology and philosophy that differs for each of us and invites our readers to experiment with their own engagement with particular philosophers and philosophical themes.

This is why this introduction to the book and the book itself are conceptualized as modest offerings on our part. It remains an open question for us as to what constitutes philosophy or a philosophical moment even within a practice that does not explicitly claim to be doing philosophy, whether in scholarly (or artistic or literary) domains or within the realm of everyday life. Even within a specific domain such as anthropology, we could name philosophical strands, affinities, and antagonisms that are underrepresented or absent from this volume. Perhaps it is a cause for hope rather than dismay that the potential for further discussion far exceeds what we actually offer here. We can only hope that others, within anthropology and perhaps in other disciplines, will continue and enrich the conversation that we have tried to initiate.

NOTES

1. We explicitly exclude from consideration the field of "philosophical anthropology" as it appears in German philosophers such as Kant and Heidegger since anthropology was for them a term for reflections on the question of the essence of man rather than an empirical inquiry into the differences among human societies. Similarly the examples of imaginary tribes in Wittgenstein were a device for allowing the voice of temptation to come into the text in order to show where the source of our confusion lay and had nothing to do with actually existing tribes.

2. The difference between the moral as located in the codes of the community and the ethical as constituted through social recognition has a complex history, but see especially Hegel (1952) and Habermas (1990).

3. For a useful summary of the "return" to sovereignty, see Hansen and Stepputat (2006).

4. The claim for the superiority of European thinking over other modes of thinking reappears, as in Levinas's (2001) comment that for all the claims made for primitive thinking it was left to a European to discover it.

5. Caton's chapter engages Bergson explicitly on the importance of his idea that the whole of consciousness is present at the moment of action rather than a single psychological state and its implication for ethnography.

6. Though a concern with life, nature, and biology occurs in most chapters, it would be misleading to place them within a "subfield" such as that of medical

anthropology, as if these concerns could be restricted to one or other subfield of anthropology.

7. Consider in this context Henry James's (1902) brilliant preface to *The Wings of the Dove*, in which he says that what he finds at the center of his work is the indirect representation of the main image—letting us get to know the central character by the ripples or storms it causes in others around her.