

Indexing Korean Popular Culture

At a K-pop concert in the United States, thousands of young Americans scream as American pop performer will.i.am of the Black Eyed Peas joins the Korean act 2NE1 onstage to sing and dance to their Korean-language tune. Moments of cultural intersection such as this shed light on a new and often contradictory Korea. On the one hand, it is still a country—both North and South—that decries its lack of political legitimacy in the international community and dwells on the continuing aftereffects of its colonial occupation by Japan (1910–45), the Korean War (1950–53), and the ensuing partition. Because many Koreans on both sides of the border feel that Korea's postcolonial identity was neither completely nor coherently achieved, nationalism is still extolled in most social sectors. On the other hand, the South's remarkable economic development and democratization have enabled the country to produce and disseminate a cast of cultural output. Its music, dance choreography, television dramas, and films have appealed well beyond its borders and even to the U.S. market, a country from which it received "billions of dollars in aid" merely a few decades earlier.¹

Korean popular culture has come a long way over the last decade and a half, especially considering that its most profitable export item even as late as the 1990s was the popular American sitcom *The Simpsons*, a show that relied on subcontracted Korean animators. However, the tide started to turn rapidly, and the Korean Wave (*hallyu*) began. The film *Shiri* was a smash success at the box office in Japan in 2000. Yon-sama (the nickname for melodrama male actor Bae Yong-jun) generated sky-high ratings for the television series *Winter Sonata* in Japan and other parts of Northeast Asia during the early part of the first decade of the twenty-first century. And idol groups such as TVXQ, Super Junior, Wonder Girls, and Girls' Generation

have routinely claimed top spots in pop charts of Asia over the past five years. *Hallyu* accounts for an astonishing figure of US\$4.8 billion in Korea's annual export revenue.² This "soft power" in entertainment—which also encompasses games, sports stars, and cartoons—churns out profits for South Korea as its "cool" image helps to brand the nation's many corporations, tour industry, food, and cultural commodities.

Culture can serve many purposes, but one function it has always served is ideological. Culture informs and helps to produce exchanges of power, autonomy/dependence, and hegemony. South Korea's prolific economy and regional cultural power do not necessarily remove it from the list of client states to the American popular culture hegemony. American films, television programs, sports stars, popular music, and musicals can easily be identified in the streets of Seoul today—as they have been since the U.S. military occupation that began immediately after Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945. Seoul's globalizing economy and glitzy urban landscape have made their presence even more widespread than before. Despite the appearance of Korean music acts such as Psy, Rain, and the Girls' Generation on American talk shows; the viral popularity of some of these idol acts' YouTube videos; the public respect that American celebrities—from septuagenarian Martin Scorsese to teenager Justin Bieber—show for Korean pop culture; and the Asian American communities' growing fascination with Korean dramas, the cultural exchange between the United States and Korea is nowhere near equal. It should therefore come as no surprise that many critics, commentators, and even fans marveling at the success of K-pop, K-drama, or Korean cinema over the past decade would feel it necessary to address questions about Korean popular culture's authenticity. On the Al Jazeera network, a thirty-minute special aired that was devoted to discussing the reasons behind the success of Psy's "Gangnam Style." The music video was extremely popular, attracting more than 100 million views on YouTube within a mere three months of its release. One of the questions posed to the panelists on the program was: "Is there something distinctive about K-pop?"³ A cynic may argue that pop music, films, games, animation, television programs, and sports stars from Korea possess just as much authentic Korean flavor as, say, a Samsung mobile product, which was judged by a San Jose federal court to be an imitation of Apple's smartphones and tablet computers.

However, the task of understanding the attraction of K-pop and other cultural phenomena associated with Korea does not simply entail separating the good from the bad, the modern from the anachronistic, and the authentic from the mimicked. For this is the language of the culturally hegemonic

and thus it simplifies a complicated part of the problem when dealing with a culture of a country that has undergone colonial and neocolonial experiences during the twentieth century. Culture, as Homi K. Bhabha once described it, must be “transnational and translational,” not in order to thrive in mimicry but in order to simply survive.⁴ This transnational and translational rule applies to cultural productions in a colonial and postcolonial setting such as Korea and also serves as a matrix for globally dominant postwar cultural industries. Hong Kong martial arts films and the French Nouvelle Vague (New Wave) cinema have reshaped Hollywood at various moments, and it would not be at all an exaggeration to say that American popular music would not have established its dominance had it not been for the major influx of Southern blacks from the 1920s to the present. As the essays collected here demonstrate, Korean popular culture is now on an international stage and can no longer be understood narrowly through a model of national identity. Critics in these following pages were encouraged to analyze a note, a frame, a taste, a run, a swing, a spin, a dribble, a scribble, a letter, or even a blog reply without necessarily identifying it as either Korean or foreign.

The Korean Popular Culture Reader, while not undermining the surprising success of *hallyu* and the fandom it was able to establish in many corners of the globe over the past decade, takes up a formal analysis and a historical discussion of Korean popular culture that departs from the “intra-Asian cultural flow” model that had been proposed by media studies scholars who tended to rely on primarily data-driven, audience- and fan-oriented research.⁵ What joins these chapters together is the renewal of the importance of content analysis that expands the study of *hallyu* that previously has overused vacuous terms such as the “right chord of Asian sentiments.”⁶ While this turn toward form and production does not aim to dismiss all reception-oriented research, it reengages the political nuances of images and sounds that reveal Korean popular culture’s capacity to deepen and widen popular cultural studies globally. Consequently this volume should be a first step toward a renewed commitment to diversify the interpretations of values set by the most obvious ideologies that determine image creation and is certainly a step beyond the superficial endorsement of the mass-media driven numbers game (that is, “How much did it sell in Japan?”) and sensational headlines that dominate the Internet after a single K-pop concert in Europe.

To theorize the popular culture of an emergent nation outside the conventional framework of the traditional cultural capital is to disclose the way the discourses of the West construct the center-periphery divide and reassign the values of popular culture studies thus far affordable almost exclu-

sively in the West. In this volume, chapters by Sohl Lee, Steven Chung, and Michelle Cho, for instance, deftly deploy Roland Barthes's concept of indexicality to argue against the danger of theory vanishing from the study of non-Western culture.⁷ Lee's discussion of tour photographs taken in Pyongyang during Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy era, Chung's chapter on fashion photographs and women's magazine covers in 1950s Seoul, and Cho's focus on contemporary screen stars such as Won Bin and Kim Hye-ja all contend that the saturation of images in modern and contemporary culture requires an intellectual intervention that probes images' layered referentiality.⁸ Indexicality, in the words of Tom Gunning, is "a physical relation between the object photographed and the image finally created."⁹ An appropriate index of Korean culture suggests new ways of engaging referentiality, iconography, and signifying systems that extend far beyond the register of banality and political feebleness that sometimes undergird popular culture. When applied, for instance, to popular music, indexicality can yield a greater meaning for a song (the equivalent of a photograph) that is heard on the streets, on the radio or television, or on a YouTube channel. A familiar pop song draws from our own cultural reservoir (the equivalent of the original object photographed) via various psychic signals that are put to work (like light-sensitive celluloid emulsion reflecting off the photographed object). Like a classic *yuhaenga* (popular song) that is assigned to a young singer to be reinterpreted for a challenge in vogue Korean television programs such as *I Am a Singer* [*Na nŭn kasu ta*] or *Superstar K* [*shusŭk'e*], the notion of indexicality allows us to reinterpret and reexperience a sign that constantly renews itself by detaching itself from its original time and place.

The emergence of cultural studies in South Korea can be traced back to the late 1980s, when cultural politics gained ground in the movement for social democracy, and then to the early 1990s, when Korean cultural industries began to gain global prominence. However, it was during the early part of the Japanese colonial era (1910–45) that the first instantiation of the popular emerged. As Michelle Cho reminds us, the word *popular* has its etymological roots in Latin (*populus*, or *the people*); in Korean the translation is *minjok*, which since then has gone on to be synonymous with Korean nationhood or people. Of course, this description is not to suggest that popular culture or the people's art, as evidenced by *p'ansori* (mask dance) and the choreography of martial arts, was not present prior to the twentieth century in Korea. "Popular culture" is also an idiom that is just as impossible to translate into Korean. It is often translated as *taejung* (mass) *munhwa* (culture). But because *taejung* connotes "public" rather than "popular" or "entertainment," a more apt translation would be *inki* (popular) or *yuhaeng*



Figure 1.1. Seoul streets and subways are plastered with images of young K-pop stars. Photo by Kyung Hyun Kim

(trendy) *munhwa*. Though this phrase sounds awkward and anachronistic in Korean, the word *inki* suggests a commercial aspiration that distinguishes it from *taejung*'s association with activism and a sociological notion of the people. Also, interestingly, while *taejung* (mass or public) signifies agendas and assumptions that are steeped in democracy, cosmopolitan ideals, and protests that reimagine resistant forms of political collectives, *inki* and *yuhaeng* stand for the very opposite: individualism, crass, market-driven merchandise, and star icons that sometimes belie the interests of the masses. Taking this distinction one step further, Jung Hwan Cheon in his chapter writes, "The concept of the 'popular' theoretically borders on schizophrenic, and even moves in the opposite, neurotic direction, that of *minjok*." But, as Cho observes, "the contemporary era no longer admits a clear distinction between the mass and the popular." Many of the essays gathered here locate the pulse of Korean popular culture between these two correlates, and the lexicons of *taejung/inki/yuhaeng* run parallel to the discourse of modernity. This is the reason Youngmin Choe, my coeditor, and I have decided to forego the discussions of almost all cultural phenomena predating the era of colonial modernity that took place during the early part of the twentieth century.

Though almost twenty years have elapsed since the inaugural issue of *positions: east asia cultures critique* selected "colonial modernity" as its central

theme and the first conference held at UCLA on the subject of Korean colonial modernity by Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson that later became a platform for their edited volume *Colonial Modernity in Korea*,¹⁰ the complexities that seek partly to contest the rigidity of the binary relationship between the colonizer and the colonized through colonial modernity have not gained steam in Korean Studies in the United States. While no single-author monograph in the United States has fully taken on this topic, in Korea colonial modernity has become not only a hot intellectual item but a subject of broad public interest as well.¹¹ After the 1999 publication of Kim Chin-song's *Sŏul e ttansŭhol ūl hŏhara* [Grant Dance Halls a Permit in Seoul], which was based on his research of popular culture and everyday life in colonial Korea, many books dealing with social life including dating and popular cultural consumption during that era have come into print. Boduerae Kwon's *Yŏnae ūi sidae: 1920-yŏndae ch'oban ūi munhwa wa yuhaeng* [Age of Dating: Culture and Trends of the Early 1920s], Jung Hwan Cheon's *Chosŏn ūi sanai kŏddŭn p'utppol ūl ch'ara* [If You Are a Man of Chosŏn, Kick a Soccer Ball], and Minjung Son's *T'ŭrot'ŭ ūi chŏngch'ihak* [Politics of T'ŭrot'ŭ] are some of the books that contributed to making the study of the colonial era less didactic and essentially nationalist.¹² Choe and I are extremely pleased to include essays from Kwon, Cheon, and Son, which are revised translations of their works originally published in these Korean monographs. These chapters survey literature (Kwon), sports (Cheon), and popular music (Son) and offer ways for the reader to think about the time and space of Korea simply divided between *minjok's* collective resistance against the Japanese colonial supremacy and the perpetuations of an automatic celebration of individual subjects at the dawn of modernization during the 1920s and the 1930s. Dwelling on modern emotions behind expressions of *yŏnae* (romance) in early epistolary novels, the fantasy of restored national manhood in the radio broadcast and the newspaper coverage that followed Sohn Ki-jung's victorious marathon run during the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and sorrowful yearning in 1930s *yuhaengga*, all of these chapters on colonial modernity reinscribe modernist aesthetics. It is within the regime of the sublime, either in the celebration of an athletic achievement or singing of a *yuhaengga*, where *minjok*, pure and uncontaminated, could fully denote the index of a fractured nation and where its past references were fully nullified and its subjecthood revoked.

The 1950s are often noted as a period in Korea most known for total war and destruction, political corruption, and the demise of indigenous culture. However, a closer inspection of the flow of popular music, film, and even clothing at the time belies what Steven Chung calls "the discourse of Americanization in 1950s South Korea." What is most striking about his essay

and Kelly Jeong's essay on screen star Kim Sŭng-ho's iconic persona during the Golden Age of Korean cinema (roughly from 1955 to 1972) are the ways in which they pay attention to gender terms. Their nuanced readings of screen surfaces monumentalize still images from movies, fashion magazines, and photo exhibits as an ultimately productive terrain of indexicality. While Chung pays attention to the unsung heroes of the 1950s (stylists such as Ch'oe Kyŏng-ja and Nora No and various glossy covers from popular women's magazines), Jeong traces the threads of confluence between the United States and South Korea. The complicit patriarchic discourse—necessitated by the former's tender, liberal democratic ideology, after the devastating war, and Washington's sometimes mischievous and corrupt client, Seoul, *and* the discomfiting ruptures attended by that government's insights—raises disturbing questions about South Korea's irresponsible cinematic treatment of women.

After the presidency of Kim Dae-jung in South Korea (1998–2003), whose legacy was partly established through his generous and liberal cultural policies, it is hard to imagine that culture was a low priority for other presidents before him. During Park Chung-Hee's presidency (1961–79), all segments of popular culture, as noted in various places in this volume (most notably in Hyunjoon Shin and Pil Ho Kim's "Birth, Death, and Resurrection of Group Sound Rock" and Kyu Hyun Kim's "Fisticuffs, High Kicks, and Colonial Histories: The Ambivalence of Modern Korean Identity in Narrative Comics"), were heavily censored for their failure to promote the ideas behind Park's rural revitalization campaign, anti-Communism, and export-driven economy. As Shin and Kim note in their chapter, the Park Chung-Hee regime took action against the new culture it deemed "vulgar" (*chŏsok*) and "decadent" (*t'oep'ye*). Popular culture during much of the 1970s was reduced to sanitary forms of entertainment that were sanctioned by the government.

It is probably not coincidental that the two chapters that cover the 1970s and 1980s are on the subjects of popular music on university campuses and in graphic novels. During this time of extreme political scrutiny, comics (*manhwa*) arguably emerged as one of the most significant cultural productions, providing both entertainment and social satire for the general public. One reason was at that time newspapers were spared from preproduction censorship, unlike the television and film industries. Ironically, adult *manhwa* thrived during the two decades of military dictatorship, as serialized entertainment in newspapers and sport and entertainment dailies made cartoonists such as Ko Woo-young and Hur Young-man celebrity *auteurs*. Kim Kyu Hyun's close reading of two 1970s texts by these two art-

ists, Ko's *The Great Ambition* [*Taeyamang*] and Hur's *The Bridal Mask* [*Kak-sit'al*], cuts across various historical blocs. Not only are they relevant during today's *hallyu* because the work of these two artists continue to serve as treasure troves for adaptations for television, movies, and musicals, but their dealings with Korea's experience with Japanese colonialism continually end up subverting their own nationalist agenda "by rendering the question of ethnic/national identity unresolved and ambivalent."

The landscape of Korean popular culture begins to change radically during the early 1990s, when censorship relaxes and the so-called college underground music and protest culture such as *madang gŭk* (open-space theater) are no longer required to impose countermemory against the ruling forces. At a time when the binarism between officially sanctioned television stars and programs and protest culture germinated largely within college campuses begins to erode, it is Seo Taiji and several other aspiring singer-dancers who form the group Seo Taiji & Boys and become the darlings of mainstream media and social and cultural activists. Seo would perfect dance routines, write his own songs, and choose hip-hop outfits that would later strike a deep chord with Korean teenagers in 1992. It is probably not an exaggeration to say that Seo would single-handedly create a template for the idol mania that soon began to define the *hallyu* era. Roald Maliangkay's chapter helps to locate Seo Taiji, arguably the most important pop icon in Korean history, by contextualizing him within Korea's socioeconomic terms of the time: the increased purchase power of the middle class, the popularity of postauthoritarian consumerist items in teenage fashion, the CD industry boom, and the proliferation of *norae* (Korean karaoke) and *norae-bang* (karaoke rooms/and clubs).

One of the most troubling areas in a volume that attempts to comprehensively cover all aspects of Korean popular culture is, unsurprisingly, North Korea. The reason is partly that, as discussed above, the term *popular* is netted within the axioms of individualism, commercialism, and the star system, which are utilized to market and sell capitalist merchandise. Scanning across the urban landscapes of Pyongyang, it is impossible to locate any faces that actually market products of any kind; neither does the country's single-channel television nor its newspaper feature advertisements or product placements. But it is not as if Pyongyang lacks a star. The late Kim Il-sung, its Great Leader, and his late son and successor, Kim Jong-il, the Dear Leader, are popular icons who register profound resonances with the people of North Korea. Travis Workman, in his chapter "The Partisan, the Worker, and the Hidden Hero: Popular Icons in North Korean Film," repudiates the widely accepted notion that the consumption of socialist realism rests on



Figure 1.2. Pyongyang streets are plastered with images of dead Communist leaders such as Kim Il-sung.

a lack of viewing pleasure, and instead he urges us to rethink the bodily spectacle and emotional intimacy that North Korean cinema creates for its masses. Workman's main argument is that the "hidden hero" films from the North reverse Freud's famous dictum, "Where the id was, the ego must come into being," into "Where the superego was, the id must come into being," which then allows them to prefigure the Leader and his association with the hidden hero before even the ego is formed. This is an unusual way to think about the pleasure of viewing, which of course relies on the question posed above, "What is the indexicality of this image?" The prominence of either of the two Leaders presumably reduces any gap between the image and its referentiality. Why even bother figuring out the indexicality between the photograph and the actual object at which the camera is aiming when there is nothing deferred or subconsciously referenced?

This is precisely the question that is taken up by the South Korean photographer who spent several weeks in Pyongyang, Seung Woo Back, whose work, *Blow Up*, is the central concern in Sohl Lee's chapter. Her essay, as do the ones by Michelle Cho, Olga Fedorenko, and Stephen Epstein, continues to explore the complex exchange of the image's production and projected fantasy, which tend to overdetermine a cultural production's representational surface. What Lee notes in Back's work is how the photographer, who

initially had thought that the censored images he had captured while traveling in North Korea in 2001 at the height of Kim Dae-Jung's Sunshine Policy era had no value (for they failed to solicit capitalist pleasure, which must impinge on the intriguing set of index photographs usually serve), found that the opposite was true when he enlarged the same "uninteresting" photos. Michelle Cho similarly argues that a gap must be created between the semiotic content of the screen celebrities, such as *minam* (good-looking boy) and *omma* (mother), and the "true" characters that these stars sometimes depict before self-reflexive fun can take place. Cho's focus on director-screenwriter Bong Joon-ho's 2009 film *Mother*, which mounts South Korea's ceaseless projections of fetishistic properties and desires around stars' faces, bodies, and movements, extends the position raised elsewhere in this volume by Stephen Epstein. He, with the aid of James Turnbull, dissects not only the words and melodies of girl group songs but also their suggestive visual figurations in music videos and rejects the girl groups' empowerment argument (embraced by some local critics) and problematizes "a conscious manipulation of the male gaze, or narcissistic self-exploitation directed at same-sex peers that dismisses patriarchy only to careen into the similarly problematic dictates of consumerist late capitalism." Complicating this debate between the subversion of austere gendered conventions and reaffirmation of pre-existing patriarchal (and even nationalist) discourse are the performative and grossly exaggerated nature of the girl group music videos, which tend to naturalize conflicting messages.

The confluence of mixed messages in gender and national identity continue to dominate other chapters on contemporary popular Korean culture as well. Rachael Miyung Joo, Olga Fedorenko, and Katarzyna J. Cwiertka all have contributed essays that each specify sports stars, advertisements, and food. Ironically these topics make up second-tier subjects of *hallyu*, while K-pop, K-drama, games, and cinema usually round up most academic rackets on the subject of recent Korean wave. However, no one can argue that sports, advertisement, and food are deeply rooted in the actual material conditions and routines of quotidian life in South Korea. Joo's "'She Became Our Strength': Female Athletes and (Trans)national Desires" brings together issues of mass culture representation, transnational border crossing, and sexual discrimination raised elsewhere in this volume in a more concentrated fashion. While acknowledging the meteoric rise of Korean female stars in golf and figure skating even in the mainstream U.S. media as "new women," Joo raises questions on the sustained racist, sexist, and ultimately parochial nationalist ideologies that undervalue the trajectories of their arcs of success across the globe. Fedorenko's chapter also compel-

lingly draws on how advertisements make the alienation of work in a capitalist system not only natural but even worthwhile by encouraging enjoyment behind the consumption of commodities. Her astute ideological critiques against the seemingly benign advertisement campaigns that engage humor and humanism, while not completely abandoning new subversions that they potentially can realize, provoke the idea that all critiques of South Korea's recent economic success would now have to seriously consider a close analysis of mass culture. Cwiertka's chapter on *hansik* campaign examines culinary nationalism and the ways in which food intersects with Korea's economics, history, taste culture, and most importantly the desire to redefine national identity by repudiating its once-upon-a-time stereotype of pungent smell.

One of the most frequently used phrases to describe South Korea these days is "the most wired nation." Nearly every home in South Korea is connected to the Internet, and almost every living human being there owns a cell phone. But underexposed behind this high-tech-savvy image that provokes the envy of even the West is the unpropitious title Korea holds as the only country in the world where "Internet addiction" is a legitimate psychiatric disorder with a staggering number of 800,000 people or more at risk. If essays on earlier cultural productions (Shin/Kim or Chung) were concerned with readings that pegged textual matters either as ideological mimicry or aligned them as a resistant subculture that proposes an alternative to American cultural hegemony, the mimicry versus subversion debate vanished from almost all discussions on contemporary Internet culture. Both Inkyu Kang and Regina Yung Lee point to Internet sites for their research, and yet their articles diverge onto two completely different paths: Kang responds to the question of why game consoles have largely failed in a country where the game craze has caught on, while Lee attempts a Deleuzian interpretation of a unique U.S. fandom site that renarrates K-dramas through still recaps and commentaries. Kang attributes the immense unpopularity of game consoles and the popularity of the PC bangs in Korea to Confucianism. Youth culture, he suggests, can thrive only in a public space that is outside the remote reach of parental surveillance. The marketing of computers and Internet broadband in Korean homes as must-have learning devices rather than as gaming tools has also played a huge role in making South Korea an overwired nation. On this side of the Pacific, Lee probes the almost clandestine activities of cross-cultural translations on the web; from moving to still images, from aural sounds in Korean to English letters on monitor screen, and from Korean production to American reception, offering one final reminder that indexicality—and with it its photographic incarnation and modernist illumination—still matters in the age of the Internet.

John Whittier Treat explicitly wrote in the introduction to his edited volume of *Contemporary Japan and Popular Culture* that the “popular is the proprietary concern of nearly all the social sciences and the humanities, but is not the only object of study for any field.”¹³ In the Korean studies field, not unlike its Japanese counterpart, it is almost impossible to identify scholars who exclusively teach subjects on the popular. However, there is one fact that distinguishes Korean studies from Japanese studies: unlike Japanese Noh theater, Kurosawa films, and the literature of Yasunari Kawabata and Yukio Mishima during the postwar years that have become the anchoring points of Japanese studies in U.S. academia, Korean studies had a difficult time selling its tradition and modern aesthetics in course syllabuses until *hallyu* (Korean Wave) came along. Its churning out entertainment coveted by a huge number of young fans who happened to enroll in our classes in the universities has precipitated a demand-led research career change. While I hope this volume will find its way into many classrooms in the United States, I also admit to making the best of an awkward situation in which there is not yet a substantial branch of even a subfield called “Korean Popular Culture Studies.”

This is actually one of the reasons we compartmentalized the sections the way we did: along field demarcations rather than along the lines of historical chronology. This way, each and every section forces a dialogue outside its own historical specificities and can easily point to the affective power, genre, and stylistic mutations of each of the popular discourses over time. Much of the material gathered in this volume came together when all of the scholars working in the different fields of literature, art history, history, ethnic studies, anthropology, film studies, musicology, and social sciences realized that we had a common theme at hand, but the seeds for it were sown when students walked into our classrooms in the United States, ready to talk about the latest cultural sensations in Korea. This book has given us the much-desired opportunity to intellectualize and extend those discussions.

NOTES

1. Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 306.
2. “Content Exports to Be Raised Up to \$10 Bil. by 2017 . . . Gov’t,” *The Korean Economic Daily*, September 13, 2013. Accessed September 27, 2013. www.englishhankyung.com.
3. News segment from Al Jazeera network’s *The Stream*, “K-pop diplomacy,” published on September 3, 2012. Accessed May, 3, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYt813fDWTw&feature=plcp>.
4. Homi K. Bhabha, “The Postcolonial and the Postmodern,” in *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1992), 172.

5. Some of the most representative research that explores Korean Wave as cultural contents that *flow and exchange* in the pan-Asian region are Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi, eds., *East Asian Pop Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008) and Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, eds., *Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2011).
6. Eun-young Jung, "Transnational Korea: A Critical Assessment of the Korean Wave in Asia and the United States," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 31 (2002), 75.
7. It was Roland Barthes who continued to explore photography as a contingent determination of an index of a real object that is being photographed. See Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981).
8. During the Irvine conference in May 2011, where many of the essays featured in this volume were presented and discussed, Timothy Tangherlini, a discussant for the popular music panel, first foregrounded *indexicality*. Indexicality originates from *index*, which was used by American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce during the latter half of the nineteenth century to underscore less than clear-cut signs that bear little resemblance to their original objects. His examples included a footprint, a weather vane, the word *this*, and a photograph. See Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
9. Tom Gunning, "What's the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs," in *Still Moving: Between Cinema and Photography*, ed. Karen Beckman and Jean Ma (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 24.
10. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999).
11. In response to popular demand for stories and historical accounts set during the colonial period, the South Korean film industry spewed out several high-profile films during the first decade of the twenty-first century such as Yun Chong-ch'an's *Blue Swallow* (*Ch'onggyŏn*, 2005), Jeong Ji-woo's big-budget *Modern Boy* (2008), and Kim Ji-woon's *The Good, the Bad, the Weird* (*Choŭn nom, nappŭn nom, isanghan nom*, 2008).
12. Bodurae Kwon's *Yŏnae ūi sidae: 1920-yŏndae ch'oban ūi munhwa wa yuhaeng* [Age of dating: Culture and trends of the early 1920s] (Seoul: Hyŏnsil munhwa yŏngu, 2003); Cheon Jung-hwan's *Chosŏn ūi sanai kŏdŭn p'utppol ūl ch'ara* [If you are a man of Chosŏn, kick a soccer ball] (Seoul: P'ŭrŭn yŏksa, 2010); and Son Min-jung's *Politics of T'ŭrot'ŭ* [T'ŭrot'ŭ ūi chŏngch'ihak] (P'aju, Korea: 2009).
13. John Whittier Treat, "Introduction: Japanese Studies into Cultural Studies," *Contemporary Japan and Popular Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996), 3.