

## Acknowledgments

Writing a book like this would not have been possible twenty-five years ago. Back then, the legal academy was only beginning to toy with the idea of “theory.” Anti-theory was not on the charts. Law and economics were still embryonic. Critical legal studies had yet to be invented. Jurisprudence was busy playing out its variations on the natural law/positivism debate. Legal philosophy consisted mainly of plumbing the depths of “reflective equilibrium” and keeping up with the Warren Court.

So, until recently, writing a book like this would have been unthinkable. One result is that I am in the position of having way too many people to thank. Here is the short list.

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