INTRODUCTION

Francisco Alayza Paz Soldán, the director of the Escuela de Artes y Oficios (School of Arts and Crafts) of Lima, in his 1927 valedictory address to the assembled audience of worthies and graduating students argued:

> Peru has entered an industrial age. The number of industries that it possesses and the quality and quantity of manufactured goods that it produces increases year by year. . . . I will outline the evolution and characteristics of modern industry, of great industry, and show the progress achieved by machines and the immense good that civilization has brought us. I will finish by discussing some ideas about the consequences of industry and about the dissolvent social doctrines derived from progress that have absolutely no reason to exist in this country.[1]

Of course, Alayza Paz Soldán was wrong: Peru had not entered an industrial age and would not do so, in a significant way, in the whole of the twentieth century.[2] His assertion was an expression not of an observable reality but of an aspiration shaped by two key beliefs—shared by progressive members of the elite—regarding the economic and political development of the country. First, these elites believed that Peru needed to industrialize if it was to become a modern and civilized nation. All modern civilized nations in the world were industrial, they observed. They concluded, perhaps naturally, that until Peru industrialized

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there could be no such thing as a civilized Peruvian nation. The editorial of the first issue of *Industria*, the newspaper of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (SNI, National Society of Industries), proclaimed in 1915: "We propose to demonstrate that to have industries is not to have an object of luxury or an object of vanity. . . . Without industry there is no nation."[3] Second, these elites agreed, although industry was key to nation building, industrialization had a dark side. The experience of industrial nations in Europe and North America demonstrated that industrialization invariably brought about the spread of subversive ideologies, which led to social unrest—what came to be called, in Peru as elsewhere, "the labor question."

Alayza Paz Soldán and other social progressives recognized that they faced a dilemma. Industrialization could transform Peru into a forward-looking civilized nation but, at the same time, it could sow the seeds of the nation's destruction. For these "modernizing" elites, this was a risk worth taking. In fact, as I show in this book, as far as they were concerned there was no choice. The reason was represented graphically on the cover of the second issue of *Industria Peruana*, the revamped and renamed periodical of the SNI, published in late 1931. The image on the cover, by A. G. Rossell, is of a worker wearing overalls and heavy boots standing next to a seated "Indian" figure wearing a poncho and a *chuyo* (an Andean woolen hat) and holding what look to be coca leaves in his hand. The worker, who is represented as being of white/mestizo phenotype, has placed his left hand on the Indian's shoulder and stretches out his right hand to draw the Indian's attention to the background, which consists of a factory with chimneys belching black smoke and fronted by cars and trucks. The image itself is flanked by more representations of industry, including other factories, oil derricks, and sugar cane, as well as a ship in the far background. To complete the allegory the caption "To protect national industry is to contribute to the country's prosperity" runs vertically on either side of the image.[4] To be sure, the editorial of 1915, Alayza Paz Soldán's speech, and the image of 1931 reflected and expressed the particular sectoral interests of Peru's industrialists. But they also illustrate more broadly, and more interestingly, the ways in which Peruvian elites in the early twentieth century understood the functions of industrialization, and the promise of an industrial future, in racialized ways.

These various "texts" combine to present an unambiguous elite proj-

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FIGURE 1 Cover of the second issue of *Industria Peruana*, November 1931, revamped periodical of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (National Society of Industries). Drawing by A. G. Rossell. Source: Courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional del Perú.

ect of national redemption and civilization through industrialization and, more specifically, through the effect of industrialization on the Peruvian population. Industrialization, more than an economic project, emerges as a cultural aspiration. As the 1931 image suggests, Peruvian elites understood industrialization primarily as an embodied project of racial improvement. Like the propaganda posters of the European fascist and Soviet regimes, the image expresses the identification of national progress with the creation of a new man.[5] In the case of Peru, elites identified national progress with the creation of new *homo faber* expressive of a highly racialized understanding of "industrialization as progress." The image of the Indian and of the worker, as representing the past/present and the future, articulates the elites' belief in the transformative power of industrialization but clearly locates that transformation not in the sphere of the economy but in the sphere of race/culture. The power (magic?) of industry, the image suggests, resides in its capacity to transform Peru's backward indigenous peoples into civilized white/mes-

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tizo industrial workers. The image thus makes a claim for the nature, and conditions, of citizenship: it is nonindigenous, and therefore white/mestizo. The Peruvian nation would only constitute itself once industrialization had transformed Indians into workers. Put differently, the emergence of the industrial nation would bring about the elimination of the Indian.

The contention at the core of this book is that Peruvian labor policy in the early twentieth century reflected, and was shaped by, assumptions that were the product of a racialized understanding and construction of Peruvian society. Although it drew on transnational processes common to many countries in the first half of the twentieth century, labor policy in Peru was subject to particular local inflections and can only properly be understood when placed within a broader analysis of Peru's racialized process of nation-state formation. Specifically, labor policy in Peru was shaped by racialized ideas about the nature of work and the nature of workers and in particular by the racialized assumption, indeed the widely held and often expressed belief, that industrialization and the emergence of an industrial workforce would bring "civilization" to Peru. More specifically, this book argues that labor policy in early twentieth-century Peru was expressive of a set of beliefs that, at once, associated Peru's future progress and civilization with industrialization and the labor question, warts and all, and, in turn, associated Peru's present backwardness with the predominantly rural and indigenous character of its population and, consequently, with its inferior racial makeup or what came to be known as the Indian question or the Indian problem. Labor policy in Peru, in short, came to play a central role in a broader process of nation-state formation because of the way in which labor in Peru was racialized: in some ways, the labor question in Peru came to be seen as a solution to the far more worrying Indian question. This was the allure of labor that this book's title refers to.

With this book, I aim to contribute to and, in turn, suggest new ways to study Peruvian labor history, a field largely neglected in the last couple of decades. *The Allure of Labor* challenges the binary construction of Peruvian society as two worlds, unconnected and antagonistic, one coastal and white/mestizo, the other Andean and indigenous; a construction that, for the most part, historians of Peru, particularly those working on its twentieth century, and particularly those working on its labor history, have left unchallenged. Although it has made a major historiographical

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contribution in some respects, the growth of local or regional studies since the 1980s has helped to further this apparent disconnection between the "two Perus" because of its tendency to focus on either Andean regions or coastal ones.[6] Drawing on the work of anthropologists such as Deborah Poole and Marisol de la Cadena, who have shown how ideas about "race" firmly articulated these supposedly separate worlds, I argue that labor policy reflected racialized assumptions that were the product of ideas about the Peru of the coast *and* the Peru of the Andes, about urban Peru *and* rural Peru, about the white/mestizo *and* the indigenous.[7] *The Allure of Labor* explores the ways in which Peruvian elites envisioned and developed labor policy, and statecraft more generally, as a way to overcome the binary nature of Peruvian society by "incorporating" (both figuratively, and as the *Industria Peruana* cover image suggests, literally) the Andean into the coastal and the indigenous into the white/mestizo through the industrialization of the country and the making of "modern" workers.[8]

LABOR POLICY

The empirical core of the book consists of the analysis of four state "agencies" created to address the labor question in the 1920s and 1930s and to implement new labor laws and the labor provisions of the 1920 and 1933 constitutions. These agencies were (a) the Sección del Trabajo (Labor Section) of the Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry of Development), an agency set up in 1920 to grant official recognition to unions and to institutionalize conflicts between labor and capital through state-mediated arbitration and conciliation tribunals; (b) the "barrios obreros" or state-funded worker districts built to provide cheap and "decent" housing to workers; (c) the "restaurantes populares," a group of state-funded eateries whose function was to provide cheap food for a working-class clientele; and (d) the Seguro Social Obrero or worker social insurance law of 1936, which, through the Caja Nacional del Seguro Social (National Office of Social Insurance), provided workers with near comprehensive social insurance and access to free hospitalization. In my analysis of these agencies, I draw on a broad range of sources to examine both the official and celebratory narratives produced by these agencies and their intellectual architects and the critical counternarratives produced by varied actors, including workers, employers, political parties, "experts," and interested commentators. Drawing on an extensive com-

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parative literature, I pay particular attention to the ways in which these agencies and the labor policies they were created to implement were, at once, part of a broader transnational "social politics" or processes of "social reform" reshaping "the social" in much of the early twentieth-century world and, in turn, expressive of particularly Peruvian circumstances.

Historians have paid limited attention to these state agencies and have tended to see them as little more than hollow "populist" measures of the authoritarian governments of the 1920s and 1930s aimed ostensibly at coopting organized labor. Several historians suggest that their function was not, say, to provide cheap and nutritious food, as in the case of the restaurantes populares, or affordable and decent housing, as in the case of the barrios obreros, but rather to undermine the growing popularity of new political parties of the Left, such as José Carlos Mariátegui's Partido Socialista (later Comunista) del Perú (Peruvian Socialist [later Communist] Party) or Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre's Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance—Peru's historic "populist" party).[9] According to this influential interpretation, the authoritarian governments of the 1920s and 1930s coopted workers by offering material benefits through these state agencies in exchange for political quiescence while at the same time, through repression, they broke up militant unionism and the political parties of the Left, thus neutralizing alternative political projects. Certainly, as contemporary documents reveal, both APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party saw the social measures of the governments of the 1930s as a thinly veiled strategy to weaken their political appeal to organized labor. APRA, in particular, claimed (with some justification) that many of the policies implemented by the governments of Luis M. Sánchez Cerro (1931–33) and Óscar R. Benavides (1933–39, his second term of office) had been lifted from its 1931 electoral program, while the Peruvian Communist Party denounced the policies (and the governments) as "fascist."

However, such an interpretation is incomplete. As several historians of labor in twentieth-century Latin America have shown, populism in the "classic period" was a dynamic process, shaped from above and below, and cannot be adequately accounted for by approaches that focus narrowly on "cooption" or "incorporation."[10] Populist politics in the 1920s and 1930s, and later, were the outcome of complex negotiations between leaders and clients, negotiations that involved the distribution

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of both material and, just as important, symbolic benefits. As I argue in the following chapters, workers were not simply duped into participating in collective bargaining, applying for worker housing, eating in the restaurantes populares, or registering for the Seguro Social. More generally, through their engagement with the state agencies, workers influenced and made their own the discourse and praxis with which the state sought to reshape labor relations. But the conventional interpretation of these state agencies is also incomplete because, by restricting their analysis to the agencies' supposed political function (the neutralization of the Left), historians have failed to recognize, or have underplayed, other equally important functions. In particular, as I show in this book, these agencies reflected and in turn constituted assumptions, practices, and projects of state formation shaped by the allure of labor, that is, by the belief that labor was an agent of progress and civilization, or, which amounts to the same thing, a means to overcome the Indian problem in Peru.

THE LABOR STATE

In Peru as elsewhere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, industrialization was consonant with civilization and progress. But, as Alayza Paz Soldán's speech made clear, industrialization was also consonant with social and political (and, indeed, biological) pathologies. The rise of the so-called labor question, or what Jacques Donzelot calls the invention of the social, reflected a growing perception among elites that the contradictions internal to capitalism (the fact that the gains of capitalist growth were unequally distributed) were creating social and political "forces" that appeared to be undermining capitalism and could end up destroying it.[11] These elites concluded that it was therefore necessary to protect labor from pernicious influences (anarchism, socialism, etc.). At the same time, driven by transnational ideological currents such as positivism and social Catholicism, they also believed that it was necessary to address the factors that made labor susceptible to these influences (such as low wages, poor housing, poor nutrition, and poor health). The labor question in Peru and elsewhere was therefore expressive of the way in which labor came to be seen as a problem (at once social and moral) that required a solution; a solution, an increasing number of commentators agreed, that in light of the scale of the problem could not be provided solely or indeed primarily by benevolent employers or charitable institutions. By the early twentieth century, social reformers viewed the state as

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the entity to be called upon to address the labor question both by protecting labor from pernicious influences and by improving the conditions that labor faced, in the workplace and in the community, and that made it susceptible to those influences. In so doing, an expanded social role was created for the state.

Historians who have documented this process, particularly in the European and North American contexts, emphasize that the responses to the labor question, that is, the emergence of social politics and the beginnings of the welfare state, amounted to more than the simple cooption of labor.[12] Instead, they argue, these responses typically involved a transformation in how the state and its role in regulating society were made sense of. This literature is characterized by an epistemological shift away from conceptualizing the state and social policy according to either modernization or Marxist paradigms. It is marked by two competing if not necessarily exclusive approaches: (a) an institutionalist (i.e., neo-Weberian) literature attentive to the role played by gender (and to a lesser extent, race) in shaping social policy and the origins of the welfare states (the so-called maternalist approach at once influenced by and in turn reacting to feminist interventions in debates on social policy); and (b) a culturalist literature that conceptualizes the state and social policy as a manifestation of what Foucault calls a new art of government or governmentality, that is, a project of rule focused on "the way in which one conducts the conduct of men."[13] Although Foucault viewed governmentality as originating in the eighteenth century, historians and other scholars concerned with the rise of social politics in the nineteenth and, increasingly, twentieth centuries have been particularly drawn to this approach because of the evident resonance for these periods of Foucault's key and influential insight that the end, or goal, of government was "certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity and its health."[14]

Most studies of the emergence of social politics and the beginnings of the welfare state in Latin America have tended to privilege the institutional approach (in the sense that they typically envision the state as a more or less autonomous bureaucratic apparatus) and focus on the interplay between gender and the state (hence a tendency to view the state as a paternal or patriarchial state).[15] Such studies, which typically focus on labor, have done much to demonstrate the importance of gender to understanding the social and political history of several Latin American

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countries, and specifically, the gendered character of state formation in Latin America. However, with some exceptions, they have tended to pay relatively little attention to race and racialization.[16] In this study, I have privileged the governmentality approach for two reasons. First, governmentality provides a useful analytical framework for moving beyond the cooption or incorporation paradigm. From the perspective of governmentality, the state agencies I study are neither mechanisms of cooption nor simple expressions of autonomous bureaucratic rationalities or elite interests. Instead, from the perspective of governmentality, the agencies, and the state they constituted, are best understood as elements in, or dimensions of, a project of rule, or a governmental aspiration, invested by a broad range of social actors (elites but also workers) whose goal was to protect workers from pernicious influences and improve the immediate and mediate conditions workers faced in order to enhance the capacity of workers to contribute to the project of industrialization that would beget civilization and progress.

Governmentality therefore usefully captures the process whereby workers came to be seen as a valuable resource that needed to be protected and enhanced. Governmentality substituted concepts that Foucault had introduced earlier in his life, namely pastoral power and biopower. All these concepts expressed a similar insight: at some point, Foucault suggested, state reason, the rationality or "art" of government, became the management of the population and no longer its police (i.e., its disciplining): "It is now a matter of ensuring that the state only intervenes to regulate, or rather to allow the well-being, the interest of each to adjust itself in such a way that it can actually serve all."[17] In thinking about how these "regulating" agencies may be usefully approached through the analytical lens of governmentality, that is, through a perspective that envisions them as mechanisms to regulate and allow the well-being of workers for the benefit of all, Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose's distinction between rationalities of government and technologies of government is particularly useful.[18] By rationalities of government, Miller and Rose refer to the ways in which certain "objects" of government become knowable, calculable, and administrable and are rendered amenable to intervention and regulation. Once known and understood as amenable to management, such objects can become subjected to technologies of government, that is to say, to physical and symbolic mechanisms that operationalize rationalities of government. This is clearly discernable with regard to

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labor in early twentieth-century Peru. The rationalities and technologies of government reflected and in turn constituted by the state agencies I study here served to identify, and in the process to constitute, labor as an agent of progress.

The creation of the Sección del Trabajo, for example, was the culmination of a series of proposals that can be traced back to the late nineteenth century to make labor "legible": it identified, monitored, classified, and registered "labor"; it "inscripted" labor, as Miller and Rose put it. In so doing, it constituted labor, brought it into being, and framed it as an object of state action and intervention, a development that was reflected in the 1920 constitution, which contained a series of articles that identified labor as an object of statecraft and made its management a key concern of the state. At the same time, the Sección del Trabajo, like the other agencies I study, the barrios obreros, the restaurantes populares, and the Seguro Social, reflected and in turn constituted technologies of government. As a close reading of the agencies' own narratives reveals, their function extended beyond coopting labor to functioning as physical and symbolic mechanisms that were intended to "improve" Peru's laboring peoples through the disciplinary inculcation of specific values and habits but also, and perhaps primarily, through the governmental management of their immediate and mediate environment (examined here in relation to work, nutrition, housing, and health) in order to reshape them into modern homo fabers: that is to say in order to make them into self-regulating subjects of what I call the labor state, the conjunction of rationalities and technologies of government that composed a broader project of governmentality that placed labor, and the construction of a modern homo faber, at the center of Peru's quest for civilization and progress on the basis of industrialization.[19]

Of course, these agencies, and the labor state more generally, "failed" in the unsurprising sense that no modern homo faber was produced in Peru. Workers were not uniformly "improved" along the lines envisaged by the agencies' architects: the services that these state agencies were supposed to provide (modern industrial relations, cheap and nutritious food, hygienic and morally uplifting housing, decent health services and social insurance) proved highly deficient and inadequate even if some benefits accrued to some workers some of the time. The agencies proved incapable of addressing the opposition to their interventions from employers (who argued that the interventions were unnecessary and harm-

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ful to capital) and, in the 1930s, from new political forces on the left (who argued that the interventions were ineffective and harmful to labor). Moreover, targeted workers were not idle bystanders in these projects of improvement. The labor state, I argue, was mutually constituted by labor and the state: workers' reaction to projects of improvement was not one of simple or outright resistance; workers viewed the labor state as an expression of their own aspirations but felt betrayed by its failure to meet them.[20] Workers' engagement with the labor state combined acquiescence, accommodation, and occasionally resistance; all reactions that helped inflect the project of governmentality manifested in the labor state, at least momentarily. Finally, the project of governmentality failed more generally in the sense that the broader transformation that the state agencies were intended to bring about, the industrialization of the country, and the transformation of Peru into what elites envisioned to be a "modern" and civilized nation, proved to be more an aspiration than a reality.

RACE

The "failure" of the project of governmentality manifested in the labor state should not be taken to mean that governmentality as an analytics is flawed. Governmentality, by definition, is an unrealizable project, a utopian aspiration. As Miller and Rose note, "Government is a congenitally failing operation."[21] What is useful about interpreting the social politics of the early twentieth century as a project of governmentality is that it enables us to better understand how ideas about labor's role in inaugurating a new era of industrialization and civilization reflected broader racialized ideas about the sources of progress and backwardness in the country. This is the second reason for privileging the governmentality approach in this study. In contrast to much of Europe, North America, and some Latin American countries such as Argentina or perhaps Brazil (or São Paulo more precisely), where a sizeable proportion of the population was represented in the "labor" invoked by similar rationalities of government and targeted through analogous technologies of government, in Peru "labor" represented a very small proportion of the laboring population and of the population more generally. Why, then, did such agencies and the labor state more generally come to be? Why were resources, intellectual and material, expended on such a small sector of the population? Why did labor come to be seen as particularly amenable

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to improvement? This requires us to ask what the governmentalization of labor meant in the Peruvian context or, to put it another way, how particular social and cultural configurations prevalent in early twentieth-century Peru shaped the project of governmentality manifested in the labor state.[22]

In his now famous Collège de France lectures, Foucault suggested that governmentality had emerged as a form of power distinct from sovereignty, which he saw as having territory as its target, and discipline —or what he calls police—as its chief apparatus. Governmentality is perhaps best understood therefore as an *overcoming* of police in that the management of the population seeks not to maximize the power of the sovereign but rather that of the population, by extending, and guaranteeing, freedom in the spheres of the economy and civil society.[23] Although Foucault's genealogy of governmentality suggests a teleological or "stagist" (as well as Eurocentric) process, in fact sovereignty and governmentality are better understood as forms of power that coexist in all types of societies.[24] For this reason, although Foucault, and others, see governmentality as exclusive to liberal societies characterized by free subjects and free market economies (in some ways governmentality is a liberal form of power or the form of power that liberalism assumes), in practice, as David Scott and Mitchell Dean among others suggest, governmentality is eminently transposable to (as an analytics), and evident in (as a form of exercise of power), colonial and authoritarian or, more generally, illiberal societies.[25] Foucault acknowledges as much in his discussion of Nazi Germany in his 1976 lectures, where he explores the interplay between the disciplinary and regulatory dimensions of biopower (the management of life or power over life—a concept first introduced in the *History of Sexuality*, vol. 1), that is, between the apparatuses of sovereignty and biopower (what he will refer to later as governmentality) and where he pays particular attention to biopower's "dark side."

In envisioning governmentality, in short, Foucault gave particular importance to racism as that which inscribes biopower/governmentality as a key mechanism of state power. As Ann Laura Stoler suggests, although the Nazi regime exemplified for Foucault "the sovereign right to kill and the biopolitical management of life," he recognized that racism was "intrinsic to all modern, normalizing states and their biopolitical technologies."[26] Although the development of labor policy and its coalescence in what I call the labor state in the early twentieth century echoes

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transnational responses to the rise of the "social" and the labor question, this process had specific characteristics in Peru, which Foucault's thinking on racism and governmentality illuminates particularly well. Both the idea that industrialization was equivalent to civilization and progress and in turn the idea that labor was a valuable resource that needed to be protected and enhanced because it was essential to the project of industrialization were inflected locally by Peru's particular social and cultural configurations; namely, by the fact that Peru's predominantly white elites viewed the country's predominantly indigenous population as culturally and racially backward and as an obstacle to progress. As suggested above, and as I examine in detail in chapter 1, in early twentieth-century Peru the idea that industrialization was consonant with civilization existed in counterpoint to the idea that Peru's current lack of civilization, its backwardness, was a product of the predominantly rural and indigenous, and necessarily nonindustrial, character of its population and consequently of its inferior racial makeup. For this reason, in Peru labor came to be understood in racialized terms to a greater extent than in many other countries: labor was defined typically in terms that excluded the indigenous from the sphere of labor for the simple reason that if labor was commensurable with progress and indigeneity was commensurable with backwardness, it followed that labor was incommensurable with indigeneity.[27]

As I discuss in the chapters that follow, the racialization of labor in Peru is evident in the ways in which labor policy was devised. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly legislation and praxis excluded the indigenous from the sphere of labor policy. The incommensurability between labor and indigeneity is clearly expressed in the 1920 constitution, which established separate constitutional regimes for labor and for the indigenous. But this separation was also reflected in specific labor policy and in the activities of the agencies that dealt with labor. The Sección del Trabajo, for example, did not recognize or seek to intervene in disputes that involved the indigenous; a separate Sección de Asuntos Indígenas (Indigenous Affairs Section) existed for that purpose. Of course, indigenous Peruvians took their labor grievances to the Sección del Trabajo but they did so as workers, not as Indians. Similarly, the Seguro Social Obrero, at least at the beginning, explicitly excluded the indigenous from its coverage, not by virtue of the fact that the indigenous were not worthy of inclusion, but by virtue of the fact that as Indians they were not consid-

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ered workers and therefore not amenable to coverage. Finally, both the barrios obreros and the restaurantes populares reflected implicit racialized understandings of workers (assumed to be nonindigenous) as agents of progress to be protected and improved through the provision of better housing and nutrition for the benefit of the nation. In short, all of these agencies constructed labor, implicitly or explicitly, as necessarily and inevitably nonindigenous. Labor in Peru was governmentalized because, as elsewhere, it was seen as an agent of progress. But in Peru, to a greater extent than in other countries, the governmentalization of labor was racialized.

To be sure, as historians of Peru and elsewhere have shown, like workers, Indians were also deemed amenable to redemption and were also subjected to a project of governmentality manifested in education, public health, and, indeed, labor policies. However, unlike redeemed or govermentalized workers, in Peru or in Mexico, Bolivia or Ecuador, Nicaragua or Guatemala, redeemed and governmentalized Indians (or, indeed, Afro-Latin Americans, the Chinese, etc.) were never envisioned as agents of progress.[28] Whereas workers were governmentalized in order to enhance their contribution to the industrial nation, Indians were governmentalized in order to reduce or eliminate the obstacle that they represented to the industrial nation.[29] The allure of labor in Peru coexisted with, indeed was conditional upon, the repulsion of indigeneity. As they had done since the colonial period, when the category Indian and its associations with backwardness were first established, throughout the period under study the indigenous in Peru challenged their exclusion and negotiated their governmentalization.[30] They continued to do so for the rest of the twentieth century, even after the allure of labor waned and new "alluring" solutions to Peru's backwardness were formulated (Odría's migrant squatters, Belaúnde's roads, Velasco's "revolution," Sendero's "time of fear," and Fujimori's entrepreneurial cholos; in addition, of course, to APRA's many ideological and programmatic iterations).[31] That such challenges and negotiations continue to this day reveals that despite the "failure" of the project of governmentality manifested in the labor state its underpinning racist fictions are powerful and resilient and continue to shape Peruvian nation-state formation.

Labor policy in the early twentieth century, this suggests, can only properly be understood when placed in a broader analysis of Peru's racialized process of nation-state formation. For even though the indige-

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nous were excluded from the sphere of labor, they remained immanent to labor policy precisely because of the fact that labor was, discursively and in practice, conceived as not indigenous. This reveals how labor policy in Peru reflected a broader process of nation-state formation premised on the exclusion of the indigenous from a national project: the governmental projects of improvement that targeted labor need to be read not only as expressive of ideas about, and practices reflective of, labor's role in the attainment of progress but also as expressive of ideas about, and practices reflective of, the nonrole of indigeneity. They illustrate how the labor state was also, a fortiori, a racial state.[32] The analysis of labor policy explains the fundamental character of Peruvian nation-state formation in the twentieth century: the exclusion of the Indian, the Indian's evacuation from, and incommensurability with, conceptions of Peru's future. What I argue in this book, and what the study of state agencies that targeted labor counterintuitively reveals, is that the exclusion of the Indian from projects of nation-state formation was not the consequence of the Peruvian state's "failures," as is often argued. Rather, the exclusion of the Indian has been and is immanent to the project of Peruvian nation-state formation, which was and in many ways continues to be premised on the *overcoming* of indigeneity, that is to say on the de-Indianization of Peru.

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