

Introducing the Pariahs of Yesterday

 Every age has its pariahs, and in 1898 the Breton was declared “the pariah of Paris.” This disparaging sobriquet, most closely associated with the Paris historian Louis Chevalier,¹ spread as far as the Bretons’ home, the western peninsula of Brittany. Often newcomers suffer under pariah status, assigned not by their family or their own compatriots but by members of their host culture, as do some of today’s Latin Americans in the United States, North and West Africans in France, and Moroccans in the Netherlands. The status can be temporary—outcast newcomers can gain a foothold, blend with the native-born, and form vital communities of their own. It is the historians’ task to investigate and understand the evolution of life at the newcomer’s destination.² Indeed, history carries the burden of explanation because historical change is at the heart of both migration and perceptions of outsiders. This book analyzes the history of Bretons in Paris during the Third Republic (1871–1940). It will be a vehicle for investigating internal migration, the integration of national minorities, and the state’s inclusionary and exclusionary policies, setting migrations to the national capital in a long-term and global context.

I seek to connect internal migration with its implications for national integration and identity in France. After reading Eugen Weber’s pioneering *Peasants into Frenchmen*, the noted French migration scholar Gérard Noiriel observed nearly twenty years ago that “very few historians have been interested in the history of national assimilation”; behind this lack of interest, he observed, lies the idea that the nation is considered not a historical construct but a given, populated by “our ancestors, the Gauls.”³ Since this path-breaking observation, many scholars have addressed the exclusive nature of the citizenship philosophy forged in the Revolution

and after. They have established that colonial status, race, and gender set many people apart despite longstanding claims that French citizenship, and therefore identity, are universal and nonexclusive. The legacy of Republican citizenship from the revolutionary era is an inclusive yet gendered and racialized principle that constituted the French identity as a unitary one.⁴ Nonetheless, internal migration has not yet received the kind of renewed examination that it deserves as part of this larger story of French nation building; I will address this deficiency with a focus on the Breton experience in Paris.

Attention to French identity and citizenship has increased along with the study of immigrants in France, in response to a lack of immigration histories and the realities of renewed immigration after the Second World War. Scholars produced incisive and vigorous studies, beginning in the 1980s with general ones such as Yves Lequin's *La mosaïque France* and pioneering, more specialized studies like Janine Ponty's *Polonais méconnus*. Case studies such as Pierre Milza's *Voyage en Ritalie* about Italians in France and edited collections like *Toute la France: Histoire de l'immigration en France au xx^e siècle* followed in the 1990s. This century began with the publication of Marie-Claude Blanc-Chaléard's *Italiens dans l'est parisien*, Nancy Green's *Repenser les migrations*, and Philippe Rygiel's *Destins immigrés*, each of which investigated the immigrant experience from another angle. Books in languages other than French have included the more recent Mareike König's *Deutsche Handwerker, Arbeiter und Dienstmädchen in Paris* and Mary Dewhurst Lewis's *Boundaries of the Republic*. In combination with studies of contemporary immigrants, these historical studies provide a diversity and depth to the history of France and its peoples.⁵

The attention to foreign immigration has changed the discourse about the French nation—a most important consequence. Migration, in the words of Laure Teulière, “has also been discussed in terms of the concepts and models of integration in the nation-making process, acculturation, adaptation, cultural differences and multiculturalism, etc. As a result, all of these notions have shaken up the ‘French model’ of integration and challenged the traditional vision of France.”⁶ The working assumption of national histories that has operated to the detriment of understanding the rich variety of peoples within each nation is on the wane, in favor of what Dirk Hoerder, Christiane Harzig, and Adrian Schubert call “the historical practice of diversity.” Hoerder writes that “the powerful simplification or master narrative of ‘national identity’ and ‘nation-state

history,⁷ in *longue durée* perspective, hides a complex interactive past, hides in particular the worlds the slaves made, the migrants built, the women created.⁷⁷ Europe has not become a nation of distinct cultures only in the past five decades; rather, European history is a long story of cultural meetings and conflicts within nation and empire.

Yet as a consequence of the emerging and very fine scholarship on international immigration, we may know more about twentieth-century Italians or Poles in the capital city than about French provincials, as the historian of Paris Alain Faure has observed.⁸ Provincials made the nation, however. Over 120 years ago, in 1882, Ernest Renan gave the significant and well-known address at the Sorbonne, “What Is a Nation?” pointing out the connections between provincials and national identity. While calling the nation a soul, Renan also stated clearly that the nation is a construction rather than an organic whole. A notable and controversial figure, Renan was from the coastal Breton Côtes-d’Armor and left studies for the priesthood in Paris in 1845 to turn to philosophy. This extraordinarily pious agnostic published the widely read *Vie de Jésus* in 1863, assessing Jesus as a historical figure. Virulently attacked by the church, Renan was nonetheless selected for the Académie Française and held a chair at the Collège de France. Renan asserted that the nation of France was not formed of one dynasty, race, ethnographic group, language, or geographic unit,⁹ noting that “all Gallic consciousness had perished by the second century AD, and it is only from a purely scholarly perspective that, in our own days, the individuality of the Gallic character has been retrospectively recovered.”¹⁰ He understood that the French nation had been formed from distinct ethnic and linguistic groups, but also believed that the melting pot had done its work by the 1880s: “A Frenchman,” Renan wrote, “is neither a Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. Rather he is what has emerged out of the cauldron in which, presided over by the King of France, the most diverse elements have together been simmering.”¹¹

Eugen Weber agreed that the French comprised many nations, and he made the case in *Peasants into Frenchmen*, as Noiriel later did, that the state was the primary instrument of inclusion—not the “King of France,” as Renan wrote, but the Third Republic. While Weber recognized long-standing traditions of temporary migration that brought peasants to new fields and cities, his emphasis was on the state: The Republic built the roads, laid out the railroads, created the primary school system, forced

children to attend—and to speak French while they did—and then sent young men away from home if they were conscripted into the army.¹² Although Weber did not use the analogy of the melting pot, he wrote as if the state had the pot over a hot fire while the Third Republic was hard at work making Frenchmen out of peasants.

In response to this somewhat dichotomous view of peasants and the French, scholars have come forward to present a more nuanced picture of relations between the Third Republic and the people. James Lehning stresses the importance of the discourse about rural people by those urban, educated citizens who defined themselves as French, both to point out that this was a largely Parisian discourse and to argue that those who were peasants were also French.¹³ The people of France—and certainly of the France that included Bretons, Basques, Flemish, and Provençals and would again include Alsatians and Lorrainers—did not fit easily within the dichotomy of peasant and French because they were too complex culturally, economically, and linguistically. “Frenchification,” concludes the historian of the Third Republic schools Jean-François Chanet, took a more complex and twisting path than once thought.¹⁴ Although the national project of creating a French-speaking, literate, and patriotic populace required great vigor on the part of the state, as Caroline Ford demonstrates in her study of Breton politics, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France*, a subtle two-way process did the work rather than an active and heavy-handed imposition from Paris.¹⁵ Those provincials who left home are missing from these studies.

Scholars of migration within France have set the stage for linking issues of internal and international migration by regarding human mobility in its own terms. Since the posthumous publication of Abel Châte-lain’s *Migrants temporaires en France* in 1976 and Abel Poitrineau’s *Remues d’hommes* seven years later, it has been clear that migration has been part of French life since the old regime. Likewise, the connections between rural migrants and city life were highlighted in the 1970s by Alain Corbin’s early work *Archaïsme et modernité en Limousin* and then by Jean-Pierre Poussou’s *Bordeaux et le sud-ouest* in the subsequent decade. The focus on Paris that began with Françoise Raison-Jourde’s *Colonie auvergnate de Paris* in the 1970s has been both broadened and sharpened by studies of foreigners in Paris such as Blanc-Chaléard’s *Italiens dans l’est parisien* and by the masterly comparative study of the French who move to Paris by Jean-Claude Farcy and Alain Faure, *La mobilité d’une généra-*

tion de français. More recently, Faure followed numerous studies of the processes that create Parisian life with a sensitive study of the housing possibilities for newcomers, *Une chambre en ville*. Each of these endeavors highlights the connections between migration and settling in Paris, opening the door to a more theoretically comprehensive view of migrants in the city that can encompass both native-born and foreigner.¹⁶

A TRIO OF NARRATIVES

This book signals a key element of “Frenchification” and national integration overlooked in many discussions—internal migration, and in this case the migration of Bretons to Paris, and their lives in the city. The recognition of ethnic diversity which has come from attention to foreign immigrants allows us to turn our attention to French groups such as the Bretons. As Teulières writes, “in relation to the consequences of a nationally centered historiography, there is a patent lack of studies which cover the regions of origin and the settlement areas, regardless of state frontiers.”¹⁷ This investigation of Bretons will have the advantage of addressing a distinct group in France, thereby weakening the barrier between studies of internal and international movement. If we are to understand migration as a historical as well as global phenomenon, we must discard the idea that different intellectual frameworks apply, and rather strengthen and emphasize the common intellectual frameworks, instead of separating migrants depending on whether or not they cross an international border. We should employ widely applicable theories and concepts, any of which work at the group level, attending to such phenomena as migration systems, networks, and migrants’ demographic traits.

To write migration histories that include groups like the Bretons or Basques is to take up the opportunity to relate studies of internal migration to those of inclusion and exclusion from the nation, and to scrutinize the role of the state as an instrument of inclusion as well as exclusion. We must give up the widespread idea that the state is only active in matters of transnational emigration and immigration, even though when scholars turn to migration politics, they usually do so to investigate international migration.¹⁸ Yet inclusion and exclusion work at the same time. Indeed, just as the French state was seeking to identify, regulate, and exclude foreigners with registration laws, employment restrictions, and citizenship laws between 1889 and 1899, it was taking inclusive measures as well.

Scholarship and family lore have demonstrated how children were being encouraged, if not coerced, and taught to use the national language in schools. The most acute memory in many quarters is one of loss. As Mona Ozouf writes, “The French school tried to persuade little Basques, Bretons or Catalans that the renunciation of their original identity, stamped with insurmountable inferiority, would be the price to pay for their emancipation.”¹⁹ Moreover, French-language newspapers were disseminated more than ever before, and conscripts and schoolchildren both learned loyalty and the national language.²⁰ This inclusion was experienced as something of a rough one but it was nonetheless a state-inspired effort. Inclusion and exclusion were two sides of the same process that produced both loyal French people and foreigners. Here the forces of inclusion and exclusion created different possibilities for Bretons than for foreigners in twentieth-century Paris.

This book investigates and explicates the view of Bretons as outsiders to French culture and society on one hand and part of the French nation on the other; it creates the opportunity to see how some characteristics and patterns of behavior of distinct internal migrant groups like the Bretons set them apart. These include use of the Celtic Breton language, extraordinarily faithful religious practice, distinctive coloring (in particular their light hair), work as unskilled laborers and domestic servants, and self-identity. At the same time, internal migrants have much in common with transnational immigrant outsiders in the ways they are treated by members of the host society. One unfortunate tendency in the last two decades, noted by many scholars, novelists, and journalists, has been to identify newcomers by their culture and religion and to see them as people who cannot be assimilated.²¹ And here, historical memory is short. In *The Immigrant Threat* Leo Lucassen shows that our contemporary views of migration underestimate the suffering of newcomers in the past and overestimate that of their counterparts today.²² We ignore or misunderstand the situation of past migrants—particularly those who move within their own nation like the Bretons, who were derided for their religion and language. This is not a new phenomenon.

Migration scholars are increasingly taking a global perspective and seeking to understand large-scale and long-term continuities and discontinuities in migration patterns. To these ends, two outstanding histories of world migration have been published in the last few years: Dirk Hoerder’s *Cultures in Contact* and Patrick Manning’s *Migration in World*

History.²³ The broadest works on migration depend on detailed case studies for the micro- and meso-level information that explains much about the experience of human migration. These studies are most useful when the experience of one group is situated in several broader histories, as is the experience of the Bretons—participants in the “First Empire” in North America; soldiers, nuns, settlers, and priests of the French empire in Africa; latecomers to the capital city at the peak of urbanization; and now skilled entrepreneurs in the global market for luxury dining. I will frame the Bretons who go to Paris in these global contexts.

This book joins three historical narratives, the first of which is the story of inclusion and exclusion that produces national identity, as discussed above. The second narrative relates the role of the Bretons of Paris to the long-term history of the labor force. We have understood for some years that the history of urban workers is also the history of proletarianization, since in many regions the industrialization of the city came on the heels of the deindustrialization of the countryside and the loss of property for peasant and artisan alike, making the property-less most likely to join the urban labor force.²⁴ Students of this narrative have traced the entry into waged labor of rural people; some have explored the key role played by domestic service in the lives of newcomers to the city, particularly women.²⁵ Scholars see domestic service as temporary employment—normally either a life-cycle stage or a mode of entry into urban life. It is atavistic because live-in servants who receive room and board as part of their pay are on call and dependent on their employers in ways atypical of the modern workforce. Until the 1970s domestic service was on the wane as waged labor became the norm, but with the increased entry into the labor force of married women, in combination with new waves of immigrant women, this occupation has come to be part and parcel of the twenty-first-century labor force in Europe and North America.²⁶ The Breton labor force in Paris during the Third Republic was varied, but in general it included domestic servants, unskilled day laborers, skilled laborers, and white-collar workers. Over time, Bretons moved into more secure waged work, marking a point in labor history that comes under our purview. In our own time the landscape is changing yet again, as employment is moving beyond the age of secure wage labor that flowered after the Second World War. As Geoff Eley points out, “Today the social relations of work are being drastically transformed in the direction of the new low-wage, semi-legal, and deregulated labour markets of a

mainly service-based economy increasingly organized in complex transnational ways.” In the present, “new forms of the exploitation of labour have been accumulating around the growing prevalence of minimum-wage, dequalified and deskilled, disorganized and deregulated, semi-legal and migrant labour markets, in which workers are systemically stripped of most forms of security and organized protections.”²⁷ In this book we meet the Bretons as they move from agricultural and small-town work toward more secure and protected occupations in the twentieth-century city, occupations albeit currently on the wane.

These Bretons also characterize a particular phase in the history of the people of Paris, the third narrative. They highlight a paradox about that history best articulated by Louis Chevalier, who depicted a city with lively and distinct regional subcultures in the mid- to late nineteenth century in *La formation de la population parisienne*. In the better-known and notorious *Dangerous Classes and Laboring Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, first published in the late 1950s, he portrayed a city which devoured newcomers by reducing them to poverty, criminal degradation, and sexual misery.²⁸ This vision of historical Paris has been remarkably sturdy, despite the work of fine historians whose systematic research contradicts Chevalier’s image of newcomers.²⁹ The sources employed by Chevalier—such as doctors’ reports and bourgeois fiction—depict Bretons in direly negative terms. Indeed Bretons come off very badly in all portrayals, including Chevalier’s first book, in which, as noted earlier, they are called “the pariahs of Paris,” and in Raison-Jourde’s fine study of Auvergnats in Paris, in which the Bretons are set up as a contrast with the successful migrants from the Central Highlands.³⁰ They fare poorly even in the most fair-minded study of Parisian mortality.³¹ In these depictions Bretons are the exception proving the rule that newcomers do quite well. This book is a corrective: it attends to the integration of newcomers over time, examining the image and realities of Bretons in the hierarchy of Paris over a period of some fifty years in the life of the Third Republic.

Remarkable changes in both image and reality mark this period, and the lives of Bretons changed dramatically from their days as domestics in the city and day laborers in the industrial *banlieue* of Saint-Denis. Time, as Nancy Green has pointed out, is a key element in studies of integration and assimilation; historians’ and sociologists’ time frames have shaped their assessment of the success of newcomers.³² This historian’s study will give Bretons a half-century of time.

Neither time nor space is a simple entity in historical studies of movement. It is very difficult to know when individual migrants arrived or how long they remained—or even whether they remained. In the past twenty years it has become apparent that historical migrations are not necessarily marked by a single move. On the contrary, fruitful records outside France and nuanced readings of French information have made it clear that people often move not just once, but many times and also back and forth between two or more destinations.³³ And the rural exodus, seen as most problematic in the interwar period and again after the Second World War, is not the historical reality that was once imagined. Paul-André Rosental has capped recent scholarship showing that the countryside is not static but alive with human mobility, and that the French did not leave rural areas en masse in response to crises.³⁴ The Bretons pose a special problem because they were apparently newcomers at a given time—beginning to move to Paris in large numbers only during the Third Republic—and because they were notorious for retaining country ways. In many cases this generation was the first to live in an urban area. Consequently, Bretons of these years look like quintessential “rubes” or country bumpkins, newcomers fresh from the countryside. What grain of truth there is to this—and how it may have changed—is part of this book.

Bretons in Paris also join the new global histories of migration centered in Europe. Those Bretons who, along with other French people from the provinces, joined urban life during the Third Republic and after the Second World War contributed to the growing urban population; they were part of the urbanization of the highly developed countries in Western Europe. It was these French (and other Europeans) who became the city’s secure workers, shopkeepers, artisans, white-collar workers, and elites. Although this history emphasizes Bretons’ initial decades in Paris, over time they took on the white-collar and skilled positions, leaving a vacuum in positions such as those of *terrassier*, construction worker, domestic servant, and hospital aide that would be filled in turn by workers from abroad. Thus the Bretons are part of the great shift from a native-born to an immigrant labor force—especially visible in unskilled and unattractive jobs—that has transformed Europe since the 1950s.



Although Bretons had come to Paris since the Middle Ages—and certainly during the Revolution, when a separate Breton deputation and a Breton Club existed in 1789—the number of Bretons was small. During

the nineteenth century they were no match for compatriots from the Auvergne, Limousin, or Savoie, whose numbers grew to give Paris a picturesque and hard-working rural element. In the 1830s there were only about 11,000 Bretons in the city.³⁵ Mass migration to Paris came later, as I describe below, so that by 1891 nearly 69,000 men and women from Brittany lived in the city, and over 88,000 in the greater Paris that included its suburbs.³⁶

Distinct landscapes coexisted in the richly varied landscape of greater Paris, and I have chosen to study two of them as sites of settlement and potential Breton community. The first is the Fourteenth Arrondissement, the area beside the Montparnasse railroad station where Bretons disembarked when they arrived; known as a Breton area, it had retained marks of Breton institutions and even now continues to do so. The second is the industrial banlieue of Saint-Denis, just north of the city limits, once called “the Manchester of France” for its heavy industry and unrelieved industrial landscape. Saint-Denis too had the reputation as a place for Breton settlement, although like the Fourteenth Arrondissement it was home to locals and newcomers from other provinces and eventually from the colonies and abroad (see map 1).

Not all Bretons in Paris—no matter when they arrived—were alike, of course. Bretons, like most newcomers, saw themselves as being from a particular town or region, from the Trégorrois in the Côtes-d’Armor or the Cornouaille in the Finistère; it was at their destination that they took on or were assigned the more general identity of Breton. I have sought to pay special attention to several points of distinction among them, the first of which is gender. In the realities of the labor force, Breton men an experience quite different from that of women, since most jobs in Paris were gender-specific. Moreover, and more visibly, the reputation and image of Breton women was distinct from that of men—each humiliating in its own way, despite the common image of the unsophisticated rural newcomer. Moreover, Breton men and women perceived and articulated their urban experience differently.

That experience also depended on where one was from, because Brittany itself has never been homogeneous. In the first years of mass migration to Paris the *département* of the Côtes-d’Armor to the north sent the most newcomers to Paris of the five départements of Brittany, giving way to migration from the Finistère to the west and the Morbihan to the south only by the 1920s. Yet the most crucial distinction among Bretons



MAP 1. The Arrondissements and Suburbs of Paris


was whether they were from “Basse Bretagne” (lower Brittany, farther from Paris, where the Celtic Breton language was spoken) or “Haute Bretagne” (upper Brittany, closer to Paris, and home to the French dialect of Gallo rather than to a distinct language). The majority of Bretons who moved from the Côtes-d’Armor to Paris during the Third Republic came from the inland, western half of the department, which was Breton-speaking and Bas-Breton. The Finistère at the tip of the peninsula is altogether in lower Brittany, as is most of the Morbihan. As Marc Dutertre wisely notes, the distinction between Basse Bretagne and Haute Bretagne is one of experience, of the spoken language, that does not correspond to any administrative unit. And the definition of Haute Bretagne is purely a negative one, because it is the area where Breton is not spoken.³⁷

Breton—evolved from the language of the British conquerors of the late Middle Ages—was never spoken in eastern Brittany but remained the language of western Brittany and had an especially long life in rural areas, where according to the Breton scholar Fañch Broudig the majority of the adult population was monolingual until 1914.³⁸ Village children learned French in the schools of the Republic.³⁹ Urban people learned French

throughout Brittany. The departments of the Ille-et-Vilaine and the Loire-Atlantique (including many of the largest cities of Brittany, the provincial capital of Rennes, and the port cities of Nantes and Saint-Malo) make up the lion's share of upper Brittany, linguistically and culturally closer to national norms than lower Brittany.⁴⁰ Language scholars confirm earlier impressions that there are two Brittanys because the language frontier separates two peoples—the “real Bretons,” with a distinct language, more rural culture and folkways, and greater isolation from the rest of the metropole, from the upper Bretons, who more closely resemble other provincial French. At the same time, they confirm that the linguistic frontier has a transient quality and that Breton continues to be spoken and understood in rural areas, in the cities of Brittany, and also in cities where Bretons gather, including Paris.⁴¹ The distinction between upper and lower Brittany is important enough that I mention it throughout this book as I discuss the origins of Bretons in Paris (see map 2). The Bretons in greater Paris—men and women from town and country, upper and lower Brittany—have much to demonstrate about how “diversity occurs and operates.”⁴²

The Bretons' lives in the city and Parisians' views of Bretons—as these evolved across the history of the Third Republic—constitute my focus. One major source of information about the fortunes of newcomers is the *Actes de Mariage* of Bretons in Paris, because for Bretons—especially for relative newcomers in their twenties—weddings were a major Parisian event, whether or not they resulted from a Parisian courtship. The wedding records are far from a perfect source, for the many reasons discussed in the Appendix, but they reveal a good bit: they situate brides, grooms, witnesses, and parents—if still living—in a specific neighborhood of Paris, in the Paris basin, or beyond, and in the local economy. And the records give a social context to Bretons in Paris by revealing informal social ties.

For more direct reportage I have turned to the rare published family memoirs of Breton migrants to Paris: one of Yvonne Yven, who arrived in Paris in 1882 from the Finistère; the other of François Michel and Marie Lepioufle, who arrived over twenty years later from the Morbihan. Each memoir is told through the eyes of a son who gathered family documents and took care to relate a detailed story. Although the sons, like other family authors, may not reply to precisely the questions that I would ask, they wrote about their parents' work, family, and social contacts, as well as how their parents felt about their Parisian lives. These memoirs are



MAP 2. Brittany

colored by family feeling, and so they lack the regimented quality of a sociologist's survey, but they nonetheless provide valuable insight into the Breton experience in Paris. The memoir of Emma Girard, who came to Paris from the Côtes-d'Armor in the mid-1920s, provides a more direct expression of this experience, although like all life writings, it is an outcome of Girard's own perspective. Interviews by Françoise Cribier, Alain Faure, Catherine Omnès, and Didier Violain, as well as those by Guy Barbichon and Patrick Prado, yield the words of newcomers in response to direct questions about their experiences of migration and life in greater Paris; these allow us to hear the voices of Bretons who arrived after the Great War.⁴³ I am aware, as Paul-André Rosental has indicated, that the focus on the individual migrant carries the risk of reversing what he calls "the black legend" of misery and failure, transforming this legend into an equally schematic image of triumph. We will see that a core narrative of failure was often assigned to Bretons, but the individual experience visible in memoirs and marriage records can nonetheless give life to the full range of experience without whitewashing the difficulties of migrant life.⁴⁴

The social networks of migrants provide crucial aid—aid highlighted by Charles Tilly's typology of networks, which elucidated especially the chain migration that connects origins to specific destinations where compatriots gather. Scholars understand that networks of contact are the

linchpin of success for newcomers and the material from which migration systems, whether local, national, or transnational, are made. Durable networks accrue the resources that have been identified as social capital by Pierre Bourdieu. Yet as we shall see, not everyone travels to join a supportive network that can offer protection and employment. Many new arrivals lack contacts, arrive with only general information about employment, and then form contacts and friendships after arrival, relying on what Mark Granovetter calls “the strength of weak ties.” Although social capital is often used to characterize what newcomers possess or can acquire, marriage records allow a more refined view that can distinguish longstanding and new relationships, neighbors and kin.⁴⁵

Research based on these sources suggests that state policies only provide part of the explanation for the integration of newcomers. Because Bretons were French and crossed no international border at which their papers were checked, they could gain entry to Paris, but their community, networks, friendships, and employment depended on human ties and economic opportunity. In the words of Paul-André Rosental, a host of considerations “between macro and micro” were at work.⁴⁶ The state played a role, as it does today, but human and economic factors went a long way toward shaping the life of the newcomer, and in the long run lifting the label of pariah from the Breton.