

INTRODUCTION

COLLIDING FUTURES OF HAWAI‘I STATEHOOD

Said moneys . . . being illegally expended are used to aid private purposes and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of statehood for Hawaii . . . to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers of the territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood.

—Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell, plaintiff in *Campbell v. Stainback et al.* lawsuit filed on January 17, 1948 (anniversary of the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom)

Contrary to the romantic images of Hawai‘i as an exotic American paradise, peddled globally by a multibillion-dollar tourism industry, heated political battles among groups armed with oppositional histories occur frequently in Hawai‘i. On the morning of August 19, 2006, for instance, State Representative Barbara Marumoto, dressed as the Statue of Liberty, and State Senator Sam Slom, waving a large American flag, led a group of around fifty people to ‘Iolani Palace to celebrate Admission Day. This group’s state-sponsored commemoration, however, was blocked by Kanaka ‘Ōiwi grassroots activists, also estimated at around fifty, who had previously asked Marumoto and Slom to hold their celebration next door at the state capitol. This group stated that ‘Iolani Palace is sacred ground and the site of the U.S. overthrow of the Hawaiian nation. It is also where Queen Lili‘uokalani was wrongfully imprisoned.¹ The two groups clashed when the group celebrating statehood continued with their program and

began to sing “The Star-Spangled Banner,” notably without accompaniment from the Kalani High School Band, which decided to leave the event and not get involved. The Hawaiian group countered by using a public address system to interrupt the U.S. national anthem. Verbal arguments and near-physical confrontations followed and continued for more than an hour, until the group celebrating statehood—tired and frustrated—decided to leave. The Hawaiian group formed a circle and prayed. In 2008, again on Admission Day, more than twenty members of another Kanaka ‘Ōiwi group from the island of Maui were arrested for occupying ‘Iolani Palace in an attempt to reinstate a Hawaiian government.

In 2009, on the fiftieth anniversary of Hawai‘i’s admission as a U.S. state, similar actions opposing U.S. statehood celebrations (like the action mentioned in the preface) took place in the months leading up to Admission Day. Concerned about protests on Admission Day and the possible impact on tourism, the state of Hawai‘i quietly commemorated its golden anniversary by holding a public conference, “New Horizons for the Next 50 Years,” to envision Hawai‘i’s future as a U.S. state. Meanwhile, Hawaiian groups and numerous non-Hawaiian supporters gathered outside to imagine a future world without U.S. imperialist influence. A twelve-foot-tall effigy of Uncle Sam, painted with dollar signs in his eyes and holding two large guns emblazoned with the words *GENOCIDE* and *IMPERIALISM*, led a march of more than a thousand people to the Hawai‘i Convention Center where the conference was being held. The march was organized by Lynette Cruz, of the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance (HIAA) also mentioned in the preface, and Poka Laenui, an attorney and expert on Hawai‘i’s international claims to independence. Two fellow activists and family members, Candace Fujikane and S. Heijin Lee, held up the *GENOCIDE* and *IMPERIALISM* guns, while Kealani Cook and myself helped to push the Uncle Sam effigy on a cart made to look like a U.S. military Stryker tank—a direct reference to a broad-based community struggle to oppose the military tanks being housed on the islands and the further contamination of lands used for live-fire training.²

Adding historical legibility and broader context to the protest, Uncle Sam’s hat was decorated with feathers inscribed with the names of different nations whose sovereignties have been violated by the United States: First Nations, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Iraq. In addition, around the Stryker tank were cutouts of bombs with the names

of sites in Hawai'i and elsewhere that have been devastated by U.S. war and military training: Kaho'olawe, Mākua, Bikini, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Vieques. Through striking protest art and mass mobilization, the march and demonstration disrupted the official histories publicized in the months leading up to Admission Day and expanded on these narrations' deliberate silences—specifically the genocidal history of U.S. territorial expropriation and military occupation, both processes productive of U.S. statehood.³ Outside the convention center, speakers addressed the consequences of the United States' presence in Hawai'i and its connections to other sites of U.S. empire. The portion of the demonstration that received the most public attention, however, was the cutting out and burning of the fiftieth star from the U.S. flag.⁴

The intensity of the protests on the fiftieth anniversary of U.S. statehood was not simply inspired by competing nationalisms, but shaped by a wide range of ongoing state-sanctioned assaults against Kānaka 'Ōiwi. Catalyzed by the 2008 global financial crisis, then Republican Governor Linda Lingle appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse a decision by the Hawai'i Supreme Court that had ruled that the state could not sell or transfer so-called ceded lands until claims on these lands by a future Hawaiian government had been resolved. These are Hawaiian crown and government lands that were seized by the United States—never ceded—at the time of alleged annexation, and then turned over to the state of Hawai'i through the 1959 Admission Act. On March 31, 2009, the High Court ruled that the 1993 Apology Resolution regarding U.S. “participation” in the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as a congressional “resolution” requiring a simple rather than a two-thirds majority vote in Congress, did not sufficiently constitute a legal stop to the state's titles to the lands in question.⁵ The absurdity of such a decision is that the U.S. annexation over all of Hawai'i was based on just such a resolution, the Newlands Resolution, which was passed by Congress in 1898.⁶

Because such acts of settler accumulation by Native dispossession are central to the economic and political governance of the settler state, state-sanctioned assaults against Kānaka 'Ōiwi have been met with a growing and resilient stand for Native resurgence on numerous fronts. These different fronts include continued desecration by corporate, military, state, and residential developments on Hawaiian sacred sites and burials, such as the proposed construction of a Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna a

Wākea; the poisoning of communities by multinational agricultural corporations' GMO (genetically modified organism) and pesticide testing in the islands; the continued use of Pōhakuloa for live-fire military training; the various iterations of the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, or Akaka Bill, which aims to federally recognize Kānaka 'Ōiwi as a Native government, but a nation with no land guaranteed, and potentially precludes future claims to autonomy from the United States; and an unaffordable rental and real estate market responsible for a growing diaspora and tent cities filled primarily with "houseless" Hawaiians who line areas that tourists are told not to visit.⁷ Although this is far from a comprehensive list of ongoing issues that continue to proliferate, it shows how the circulation of official state histories and exotic images of Hawai'i function to distribute a violent economy of occupation—domination through subjugation, profit through desecration, leisure through exploitation, and the articulation of conservative and liberal notions of U.S. civil rights that attempt to render the U.S. occupation of Hawai'i a logical impossibility.

Despite being under constant threat by entities whose interests directly conflict with Hawaiian political, ecological, and spiritual associations, Hawaiian protests of these exotic images and official state histories on Admission Day are often dismissed as ahistorical and politically contrived. Those who make charges of ahistoricism argue that Kānaka 'Ōiwi alive during the 1940s and 1950s wholly embraced statehood and played crucial roles in its achievement.⁸ Such disavowals from positions of presumed omnipotence, however, are not without their own truths. One of the primary reasons U.S. statehood took nearly sixty years to accomplish was Hawai'i's largely nonwhite population. Southern congressmen were said to have passed around photographs of people from Hawai'i—Asians and Hawaiians—in order to sway other white congressmen to oppose statehood.⁹ White racist exclusion, combined with the rise of imperial Japan in the early half of the twentieth century, created an inflated fear that Japanese communities in Hawai'i were scheming to "take over" the islands on behalf of the Japanese Empire. In response to such consistent instances of discrimination against Hawai'i's people, many in Hawai'i, including many Kānaka 'Ōiwi, did support a state-led movement to gain their civil rights as "first-class American citizens." Such support advanced a liberal and antiracist ideal that U.S. citizenship and democracy should

not be limited to haole (foreigners, often specifically whites) only. Often referenced is the June 1959 congressionally mandated plebiscite, which revealed that of the 155,000 registered voters, seventeen to one were in favor of statehood (132,773 to 7,971).¹⁰

In the decades leading to the 1959 plebiscite, however, statehood proponents monopolized taxpayer monies to finance a protracted opinion campaign targeting a local and national population to support statehood. This campaign's control of public resources, as well as its volume and visibility, aimed to silence the opposition, even actively blocking Kānaka 'Ōiwi who, despite an atmosphere of intimidation, courageously spoke out against statehood. As Mililani Trask—former Pacific representative to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues—has argued, the 1959 statehood ballot used in the plebiscite was written to limit the vote to either statehood or territorial status, and did not include the United Nations–mandated options for “independence” or other “separate systems of self-government.”¹¹ In 1998, United Nations Rapporteur Miguel Martinez found Hawai'i's admission as a U.S. state to be in violation of international law, and he recommended to the United Nations that Hawai'i be placed back on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.¹²

If nations are themselves narrations, as cultural critics argue, then the government-led movement for statehood tells a familiar American story, a narrative of Western settlement and the linear evolution of the old into the new.¹³ Yet, Hawai'i's statehood movement also narrates an American tale that is closely related to but distinct from the settlement stories told on the U.S. continent. Hawai'i's narrative tells a story not just of white settlement but of Asian settlement. This narration describes Hawai'i as a place where Asians, who were largely seen as “perpetual foreigners” by the American public, helped to settle an exotic territory in the middle of the Pacific Ocean—a place where the seemingly oppositional cultures of the East and West were reconciled to create what former President Barack Obama, who grew up in Hawai'i, has referred to as a “true melting pot of cultures.”¹⁴

For many in Hawai'i, the history of statehood is an antiracist, civil rights victory preserved in popular memory, simultaneously a tale about a long struggle to oppose haole racist exclusion of Hawai'i's nonwhite communities and an expression of self-determination that was democratically and definitively settled. In this way, statehood is narrated as

an important testament to multicultural forms of U.S. citizenship. Cold Warriors argued that such notions of liberal multicultural citizenship—articulated at the historical intersection of the Cold War, anti-Asian immigration and naturalization legislation, the African American civil rights movement, and federal termination of tribal nations—were going to have implications for world peace. Since the history of Hawai‘i statehood is understood as a liberal moral allegory about the important inclusion of nonwhite groups into the United States, the idea that the civil liberties achieved through statehood came at the expense of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi human rights to self-determination is cause for major contemporary conflict and animosity.¹⁵ Moreover, the idea that statehood actually facilitated the growth of white supremacist power and privilege that was under threat is even more unimaginable to many.

In other words, despite the fact that statehood is primarily remembered as a moment when Hawai‘i’s nonwhite residents proved themselves American, and thus worthy of U.S. statehood, a deeper look into the propaganda commissions and the cultural politics of statehood reveals that business and state leaders had already determined statehood as their aim. It was congressional representations of Hawai‘i as an “Asiatic” territory that served as an obstacle to achieving this; thus, proponents of statehood aimed to Americanize the nonwhite population only insofar as they were no longer seen as obstacles. The general public was not meant to participate in making these decisions; if judged by the criteria of a democratic free exchange of ideas and opinions, which is how statehood is often remembered, then these leaders failed Hawai‘i into statehood. Democracy and debate about statehood, commonwealth, independence, or nonstatist forms of decolonization, were viewed as disruptions to the decisions that had already been made by supposedly superior minds, whose energies were spent less on including the voices of Hawai‘i’s different nonwhite citizenry than on “manufacturing consent” and rendering U.S. statehood immune to disruption.¹⁶ Thus, stories of American egalitarianism, besides silencing Hawaiian opposition, obscure how economic crises and desires for capital expansion largely produced U.S. statehood.

Unsustainable Empire: Alternative Histories of Hawai‘i Statehood thus offers a genealogy of the complex interplay between Kānaka ‘Ōiwi, different Asian groups, and haole elites in historical flashpoints of interaction

shaped by opposing versions of history. Organized around moments of U.S. economic crisis and capital expansion, each chapter examines how state agencies or propaganda commissions framed the rules of discourse for civil society through a range of state-sanctioned opinion campaigns that reveal affective settler statecraft and the extractive economy of the settler state. In thinking about settler statecraft and economic crises together, I defamiliarize the familiar narration of Hawai'i statehood by tracing how this narrative was produced. I present a genealogy of different propaganda commissions and concomitant series of knowledges of history, gender, and race that were deployed often with economic purposes, to materialize the historical domination that produced statehood. This book examines the organization of knowledge that facilitated economic imperatives, which took shape in various forms of accumulation via settler colonialism, labor, and U.S. militarism.

Building on the archive formation of Kanaka 'Ōiwi scholars who write about Kanaka 'Ōiwi resistance against U.S. occupation in the nineteenth century, I offer sources in the twentieth century that reveal Kanaka 'Ōiwi and non-Native opposition to the admission of Hawai'i as a U.S. state and cite this same history of occupation in the process. Instead of a political history examining powerful individuals and repressive institutions, I pursue a discursive approach to the historical study of statehood. I question the ways in which knowledge and power define and limit not only what is considered "sayable" in a given historical moment but also why certain voices achieve wide circulation and publicity, while still other voices are ridiculed, silenced, and censored.¹⁷

Kānaka 'Ōiwi did not all either embrace or reject statehood uniformly, but rather adopted a range of responses based on astute political assessments of changing conditions and possibilities occurring in Hawai'i at the time. Accordingly, I examine an asymmetrical discourse on statehood that censored or dismissed Hawaiian resistance as irrelevant to the present to reaffirm colonial power in the past, present, and future. Thus, instead of focusing on the usual suspects—canonized men who fought for statehood such as congressional delegates Joseph Farrington and John Burns, labor organizer Jack Hall, and Senator Daniel Inouye, all men who have been written about over and over again in the official histories of statehood—I aim to expand our political imagination of this moment

by proliferating divergent stories and unexpected individuals who were largely dismissed as deviant: historical revisionists, unruly women, subversives, communists, con men, gays, and criminals.

The lesser-known but no-less-important agents of history include Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, Abigail Kawānanakoa, Alice Kamokila Campbell, Sammy Amalu, George Wright, Koji Ariyoshi, John Reinecke, and others, many of whom were in conversation with each other and acted as a kind of cultural front—artists, politicians, writers, activists, and performers—who make up the kind of “unexpected” historical “anomalies” that may not be anomalous but, instead, representative. By recovering and examining the frequency of these “secret histories” we become better equipped to challenge historical characterizations and ideological assumptions that portray Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as passive during the drive for statehood and write complex and transformative histories informed by or in relation to Kānaka ‘Ōiwi cultural politics.¹⁸ An engagement with such culturally grounded politics is critical, as many of these individuals went beyond criticizing imperial violence and aimed to preserve, protect, and enact ‘Ōiwi alternatives to the settler state.

NORMALIZING U.S. OCCUPATION

Hawai‘i’s territorial period (1900–1959) is often imagined as a moment so thick in American ideology and patriotism that U.S. statehood was discussed without mention of the U.S. overthrow in 1893. This book shows that not only was the 1893 overthrow frequently invoked but it was persistent in shaping, even haunting, different moments in the decades leading to presumed statehood in 1959. As such, settler colonialism is critical to understanding the process by which the U.S. occupation in Hawai‘i becomes normalized and, just as importantly, how this normalcy allows for forms of incredible violence to operate hidden in plain sight.

Unsustainable Empire thus breaks down the sharp divisions between analyses of occupation and settler colonialism. As the research and legal actions of numerous legal scholars have shown, the Hawaiian nation may have been overthrown, but subjects of the constitutional government had, in fact, never officially relinquished their national sovereignty.¹⁹ The political consequence of this reality is that it places past and present Hawai‘i under the formal category of “occupation,” rather than a “colonized”

territory, a status with equally different legal implications. Hawai'i's treasonous white settler community articulated their interests with that of the United States and, amid Hawaiian national protests, overthrew the government; then they purported to annex Hawai'i in 1898.

I contend that “occupation” and “settler colonialism” are not two irreconcilable polarizing frameworks; rather, these are actually both pertinent to an understanding of the uniqueness of Hawai'i's situation and the multiple tactics that the United States has utilized to occupy Hawai'i. Thus, the legal framework of occupation, which examines international law, sovereignty, and the law of occupation at an international level, provides a cogent understanding of the illegitimacy of the occupying United States, while at the level of power relations, a discussion of settler colonialism can help to describe the form of power that normalized such occupation. This is to say, if occupation answers the “what” question—What is Hawai'i's political relationship with the United States?—then settler colonialism answers the “how” question—How did the United States normalize the U.S. occupation of Hawai'i? Hawai'i's patterns of settlement and legal and sovereign legacies, and the colonial discourses of dominance that enabled them, share characteristics of both settler colonialism and nation under occupation. Moreover, these forms of power were also used to establish a violent rationale set during the move for U.S. statehood through which Hawaiians are relegated as permanently “unfit for self-government.” At the same time, different settlers who cannot be equated and who are contentious with one another are afforded the masculine and intellectual capacity to turn “primitive” Hawaiian lands into “modern” and “democratic” societies.

SETTLER COLONIALISM FAILS FORWARD

In *Unsustainable Empire*, I argue that U.S. imperialist ventures in Hawai'i were not the result of a strong nation swallowing a weak and feeble island nation, but rather a result of a weakening U.S. nation whose mode of production—capitalism—was increasingly unsustainable without enacting a more aggressive policy of imperialism. If we think of forms of white supremacy, such as settler colonialism and capitalism, as emerging from positions of weakness, not strength, we can gain a more accurate understanding of how the United States came to occupy Hawai'i. As such,

settler colonialism “fails forward” into its various imperial formations, including what is intimately known as statehood.²⁰

This framing highlights how the present failures of capitalism have long been imagined to be resolved through settler futures. Political thinkers in the early nineteenth century imagined that the establishment of white settler colonies, particularly in North America, would resolve the poverty capitalism produced in Europe.²¹ Thus, European civil society was neither stable nor sustainable without relying on the external establishment of settler colonies. Karl Marx argued that such actions to resolve the contradictions of capitalism through emigration and settler colonialism only extend these problems globally, to other lands. That is, such forms of poverty will be reproduced, not resolved, in the settler colonies: “Notwithstanding California and Australia, notwithstanding the immense and unprecedented migration, there must even, without any particular accident, in due time arrive a moment when the extension of the markets is unable to keep pace with the extension of British manufactures, and this disproportion must bring about a new crisis, as it has done in the past.”²²

In this way, the failures of capitalism are most apparent from the colonies rather than the imperial metropolises. Such crises, caused by underconsumption and overproduction, reoccurred long after the initial colonization schemes of Europe. At the same time that Frederick Jackson Turner argued that the U.S. frontier was settled in 1890, an economic depression led to mass-scale labor unrest throughout the United States. Thus, Benjamin Harrison’s administration initiated a U.S. foreign policy that Walter LaFeber calls “depression diplomacy,” targeting colonies for access to markets to alleviate a glut of industrial goods.²³ Again, more land and markets were sought after, which violently incorporated Hawai‘i and other island nations into the United States to alleviate such crises.

While the fail-forward pattern of capitalism often relies on colonial and imperial dispossession to resolve economic crises, such acts of state violence have a theatrical and discursive component to them. The state often relies on theatricality and opinion campaigns to legitimize such forms of violence, as the coup d’état necessitates legitimization and must be represented publicly as a means to capture public opinion. In this way, the birth of the economist is said to happen simultaneously with the birth of the publicist, since the economy and public opinion are each triangulated elements that correlate to government.²⁴

Opinion campaigns or propaganda as forms of state theatricality are an important element in the affective work of settler statecraft. In other words, the political work of public opinion recruits subjects emotionally so as to achieve the structures of feeling necessary to sustain the conditions of settler colonialism.²⁵ In *The Question of Palestine*, for instance, Edward W. Said writes that the colonial project of settlers seeks to “cancel and transcend an actual reality . . . by means of a future wish—that the land be empty for development by a more deserving power.”²⁶ That a present population can be designated for replacement by a “future wish” reveals how settler-colonial theft can be achieved through temporal and spatial tactics. Native peoples are continually made to suffer the present consequences of settler futures. In this way, we can understand the galvanizing power of a “future wish” but also simultaneously the dangerous possibilities of future-oriented abstractions that allow for escapism from Indigenous issues in the present.

Using tactics of theatricality and futurity, the settler state both imagines and propagandizes itself as a more deserving power, which seemingly absolves the settler state and its citizens from present accountability. As a more deserved power, bodies of laws, treaties, sovereignties, ethics, histories, ideas, or consistent failures are simply seen as being in the way of achieving this glorious “future wish.” Both settler states and markets rely on such future-oriented abstractions. Advertising strategies utilize “abstraction” to produce a place or state of being that escapes from the present toward an imagined future where consumers are promised things that they will have, or lifestyles they can take part in.²⁷ Thus, non-Native subjectivities, though widely diverse, are often both in a state of incompleteness and in transition to one’s future self, escaping to a future place seemingly devoid of imperial violence and difficulties. For instance, white settlers in the 1930s came up with a catchphrase that celebrated their settlement of Hawai‘i as a simultaneous act of forgetting: “Hawaii . . . ! I forget what I came here to forget.”²⁸

Hawai‘i’s U.S. statehood movement functioned in particular as a “future wish,” a kind of settler abstraction of what Hawai‘i could become if it were a state, and the American lifestyle one would have as a “first-class citizen,” all of which positioned Kanaka ‘Ōiwi forms of sovereignty, governance, foodways, and relations in Hawai‘i as outmoded and a less deserving power than the emerging liberal settler state. To be sure, attempts

to resolve the economic crises of the white settler elite in Hawai'i actually furnished them with the possibility of insulating and, in fact, expanding their power that had been under constant threat.

While economic reasons should not be seen as overly determining the motivations for annexation and statehood, they offer important context to the official narrations of the settler state. The economic depressions of the 1890s and 1930s motivated settler leaders to form propaganda commissions with the purpose of “incorporating” Hawai'i into the United States—in other words, attempting to solidify U.S. occupation—via alleged annexation and statehood. Settler planters saw this as a means to protect their markets for sugar in the United States. The battle over public opinion gained urgency, however, when it came to the possibility of eliminating tariffs through incorporation. As such, the Hawaiian Bureau of Information (1892–93) used “imperial advertisements” at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago to shape public opinion around the 1893 overthrow and early attempts at annexation, as I recount in chapter 1. After the Great Depression, another propaganda commission, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935–47), attempted to regain profitable tariffs by capturing consent for statehood, as we will see in chapter 2. By the end of World War II, Hawai'i's economy slowed as military personnel left the islands. By the 1950s, however, business leaders sought to capitalize on a growing tourism industry and national postwar boom thus driving the economic desire for statehood.

Corporate indentures prohibited large U.S. banks and insurance companies from issuing sizable loans as long as Hawai'i remained a U.S. territory.²⁹ This lack of investment capital inhibited businesses from profiting from record numbers of tourists visiting the islands. Consequently, territorial leaders formed the Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947–59) to lead a more aggressive campaign for statehood, as I recount in chapter 3. But, this book does not end in 1959; I resist a settler temporality that would position the 1959 admission of Hawai'i as a U.S. state as a moment of apogee. Instead, I pose statehood as a moment of profound economic and cultural transition, one where the institutional workings of the settler state became further streamlined to respond more quickly to the interests and investments of multinational neoliberal capital. Certainly, such fail-forward processes of settler state formation require not only seizing land and resources but also incorporating diverse populations.

WHITE SUPREMACY AND LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM

In a moment largely defined by the reemergence of white supremacy, Donald Trump's presidency illuminates why, more than ever, we need a politics other than liberalism. Liberal multiculturalism works in tandem with white supremacy, allowing for forms of racism, settler colonialism, and militarism to be insulated from large movements seeking their end. Indeed, the capacity for liberalism to sustain such forms of white supremacy, to insulate them from disruption—especially when the political climate deems white nationalism unpalatable—allows for its future reemergence.

As such, each chapter of this book attempts to navigate an often unwieldy history of statehood by referencing four coordinates: white supremacy, liberal multiculturalism, settler colonialism, and imperialism.³⁰ White supremacy and liberal multiculturalism, which structure the tensions of our current Trump climate, are often thought of as historical moments that swing in a pendulum-type fashion, transitioning from one historical moment to the next. As a means of tracing and yet complicating the clean transitions between these moments, the first chapter of this project examines the forms of white supremacy evident at the 1893 Columbian Exposition, popularly named the White City, while the last chapter examines the liberal multiculturalism of the Kepaniwai Heritage Gardens built in the 1960s. I bookend my project with these two chapters to show that forms of white supremacy and liberal multiculturalism coexist in earlier and later times, often working in concert, not contradiction. This is not to flatten critical differences between historical moments defined by white supremacy and those defined by liberal multiculturalism. Rather, the seemingly smooth transition from white supremacy to liberal multiculturalism, which is the official narrative of Hawai'i's admission as a U.S. state—from haole-dominated racist territory to racially harmonious fiftieth state—functions to disavow how white supremacists used liberal multiculturalism to their benefit, facilitating the structural necessity for violent extractive projects of settler colonialism, labor exploitation, and militarism to continue at a time when internationalist movements were pursuing labor rights and decolonization.

To make this a bit clearer, we might look to the specific way that Hawai'i's racial diversity was used to the benefit of the United States

during the Cold War. For the majority of the first half of the twentieth century, Congress deemed Hawai'i unqualified for statehood because it was considered a largely nonwhite territory. In order to make Hawai'i statehood more attractive in the eyes of Congress, proponents of statehood began to use Hawai'i's diversity, its alterity, in the service of Cold War politics. In the post–World War II moment, when decolonization was transforming an international order, Cold Warrior ideologues realized that Hawai'i's multiracial population had ideological value in winning the “hearts and minds” of newly decolonized nations—an opinion campaign developed by the “father of public relations” Edward L. Bernays.³¹ This U.S. liberal multicultural discourse—articulated through a multicultural “nation of immigrants” narration—helped achieve seemingly permanent control of Hawai'i through statehood while creating a multicultural image of the United States that facilitated the establishment and maintenance of U.S. military bases throughout much of Asia and the Pacific.³² Specifically, U.S. ambitions for global hegemony during the Cold War found a discursive alliance with portrayals of Hawai'i as a racially harmonious U.S. state and selected narrations of Japanese American loyal military service, setting state-led antiracist narratives to public memory through global circulation, entertainment, and publicity, while colonial narratives of Hawai'i's occupation by the United States were designated for historical deletion.

Despite attempts to maintain white settler hegemony, a new political force emerged that gave birth to a new arrangement of racial power in Hawai'i. The emergence of various labor movements of plantation- and dockworkers, changing demographics and their impact on voting, and the disenfranchisement of rights through martial law during World War II all altered Hawai'i's political landscape.³³ Indeed, various and diverse Chinese, Japanese, Okinawan, Filipino, and Korean communities in Hawai'i, most of whom immigrated to work on Hawai'i's plantations, had every reason to agitate as they were violently exploited for their labor and simultaneously excluded from political participation. Many different Asian groups would have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation. In 1936, University of Hawai'i sociologist and proponent of the “immigration assimilation model” Romanzo Adams predicted that by 1944, two-thirds of Hawai'i's Asian population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the “non-

Caucasian majority” and leading to a redistribution of power.³⁴ Realizing that a previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, many Asian Americans helped form the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party’s control over the legislature. Roger Bell explains, “New forces, which ultimately achieved statehood, were identified with the burgeoning Democratic Party. Supported largely by the descendants of Asian immigrants, who had long been denied equality in island life, the Democrats fervently believed that equality as a state in the Union would pave the way for genuine democracy and equality of opportunity at home.”³⁵ By 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act, making it possible for the first-generation Japanese to naturalize and vote; by 1954 Japanese Americans were the largest voting bloc in the territory, and the Democratic Party, with the support of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), dislodged the Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai‘i the Democratic Revolution.

Indeed, during the territorial period it became evident that white supremacy was no longer capable of governing a heterogeneous nonwhite population, and a liberal multicultural state began to emerge. Ronald Takaki, who grew up in Palolo Valley, notes that Asian American struggles and resistance against the haole oligarchy formed a new consciousness, “a transformation from sojourners to settlers, from Japanese to Japanese Americans.”³⁶ Takaki, in his seminal books *Strangers from a Different Shore* and *Pau Hana*, was one of the first to argue that Asian Americans are “settlers,” challenging notions that Asian Americans in the United States are perpetual foreigners akin to “sojourners.”³⁷ Takaki goes on to argue that Asians in Hawai‘i, “by their numerical preponderance . . . had greater opportunities [than on the U.S. continent] to weave themselves and their cultures into the very fabric of Hawaii and to seek to transform their adopted land into a society of rich diversity where they and their children would no longer be ‘strangers from a different shore.’”³⁸

In fact, the opportunities afforded to Asian groups because of their “numerical preponderance” were key to shifting power away from white supremacists, who dominated through coercion by haole racism, to a hegemonic multicultural democracy that was still organized by hierarchical notions of whiteness, Orientalism, and primitivism. This shift, however, was not without other social and political consequences. If

Takaki celebrates a history within which the children of Asian immigrants in Hawai'i were no longer made to feel like "*strangers* from a different shore," Roger Bell, historian of Hawai'i's admission as a U.S. state, notes that after U.S. statehood Kānaka 'Ōiwi "had become . . . *strangers*, in their own land, submerged beneath the powerful white minority and a newly assertive Asian majority."³⁹ In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the counterhegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against haole supremacy challenged, modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic, U.S. settler-colonial system.

While Takaki utilizes the term *settler* to oppose racist characterizations of Asian Americans as "perpetual foreigners," he never considers the implications of the term *settler* in relation to Native people. Scholar, activist, and poet Haunani-Kay Trask's article "Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawai'i" has been the starting point for much of the work on settler colonialism in Hawai'i.⁴⁰ Arguments that an analysis of settler colonialism emerged, instead, from non-Native scholars are erroneous, at least in the context of Hawai'i.⁴¹ Trask's work has helped many to think of identities or subjectivities as pedagogical, in that they offer bits and pieces of insight into the historical moment within which we find ourselves. At the same time, the subjectivities that one inherits require political mediation that addresses new historical understandings and possibilities for resistance. This calls for us to critique and redefine the terms of identity within which we are born, and it challenges each of us to become literate in other histories and struggles, which then helps to show how our current strategies for resistance can come at the expense of other marginalized groups.

In her essay, Trask gets at the ways that one can be oppressed while simultaneously participating in the oppression of another. An alternative to binary analyses of power where one is either oppressed or oppressive, this kind of relational thinking requires an examination of the processes of settler colonialism that often lead to difficult and uncomfortable questions. In this way, Trask's use of the term *settler of color* is meant to unsettle not only the entrenched identities comfortably used in Hawai'i—Local and American—but the paradigms of colonial thought and structures of feeling that uphold them. Local is not only a geographical marker in Hawai'i but a working-class cultural identity formed in Hawai'i's plantations and set in direct opposition to haole racism. But the

limitation of Local as a category for solidarity, which is how it is often invoked, is that it is premised around a shared victimization from haole supremacy, which flattens critical distinctions between Kānaka ‘Ōiwi and non-Native groups.⁴² Kānaka ‘Ōiwi face distinct forms of colonial oppression within which non-Natives are given every opportunity to participate and from which non-Natives can benefit.

While Hawai‘i’s predominant racial binary, haole versus Local, collapses Asians and Kānaka ‘Ōiwi together and configures haole as oppressive and Locals as oppressed, the distance between Asians and Kānaka ‘Ōiwi in the Local imaginary is quite clearly illuminated in the common saying among Local Asians that it is better to not get involved in “Hawaiian issues” because “it’s the haole who overthrew their nation, not us.”⁴³ This illustrates how culpability for Hawai‘i’s occupation by the United States is framed in relation to whites, not Asians. Because of this commonly held belief that it was them and “not us,” many cannot get past Trask’s use of the term *settler of color* to refer to Asian groups in Hawai‘i; they argue that she is reinscribing a binarism of Native and settler. Given that Trask does not argue that Asians are white folks, such criticisms of alleged binaries actually serve to replicate binary analyses of power. Trask’s use of the term *settlers of color* in Hawai‘i, in fact, challenges an either/or analysis, in which one is either oppressed or oppressive; in so doing, she reveals how such binaristic framings allow for what Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang critique as an ever-constant “settler move to innocence,” since people are imagined as one or the other but never both.⁴⁴ Asian groups, particularly East Asian groups in Hawai‘i, hold political and economic power distinct from most other Asians on the continental United States. This is not to argue that distinct forms of discriminatory power targeting Asian groups do not exist, but that the binarism produced in the Local category often obscures the complex power relations that permeate the islands. Seemingly in opposition to all forms of white supremacy, “Local” serves as an important liberal component in facilitating multicultural forms of settler colonialism in Hawai‘i while denying the fact that many non-Native peoples in Hawai‘i benefit from and many times facilitate forms of settler colonialism at the expense of Kānaka ‘Ōiwi.

Recent scholarship has generated productive debates around settler colonial critique and its efficacy. Jodi A. Byrd, for instance, argues, “It is all too easy, in critiques of U.S. settler colonialism, to accuse diasporic

migrants, queers, and people of color for participating in and benefiting from indigenous loss of lands, cultures, and lives and subsequently to position indigenous otherness as abject and all other Others as part of the problem, as if they could always consent or refuse such positions or consequences of history.⁴⁵ In a Hawai‘ian context, my sense of the efficacy of the work of Trask and others is not so much in the chiding of groups for the asymmetrical power relations that constrain agency and constitute marginalized positions. Rather, Trask’s critique emerges in a moment where certain Asian groups hold political and economic power and enact such power in a manner that actively opposes Hawaiian struggles for self-determination.⁴⁶ Trask invites non-Natives to support Native movements and politics, as opposed to only working within an American colonial system. In other words, Trask’s theorizing of settler colonialism goes beyond exposing complicity, offering instead new pedagogies—different ways of knowing, being, and responding to—the living force of the colonial past in the present. Pushing beyond binary conceptions of power—oppressor/victim, white/nonwhite, settler/Indigenous, settler/migrant—the intricate *relationality* of power shows how multiple binaries organize and layer differences within the settler state. As Trask has argued: “The color of violence, then, is the color of white over Black, white over brown, white over red, white over yellow. It is the violence of north over south, of continents over archipelagoes, of settlers over natives and slaves. Shaping this color scheme are the labrinths of class and gender, of geography and industry, of metropolises and peripheries, of sexual definitions and confinements. There is not just one binary opposition, but many oppositions.”⁴⁷

As one of the first scholars to utilize relational analyses of settler colonialism, Trask’s work is not easily reducible to a settler/native binary. In the above quote, Trask does not collapse enslaved peoples with settlers nor deny systems of anti-Asian violence.⁴⁸ Instead, she highlights the existence of multiple binary oppositions underpinned by a structure of white heteropatriarchy to show that differential locations relative to white supremacy and its ongoing effects *un*-settles supposedly natural or inevitable alliances between historically oppressed groups.

And while Trask’s political style is to both call out and call in, her critique is still more relational than Othering, tracing liberal strategies of past movements against white supremacy and their damaging impact on

contemporary Hawaiian politics. Trask argues about the dominant ideology that underpins statehood:

Ideology weaves a story of success: poor Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino settlers supplied the labor for wealthy, white sugar planters during the long period of the territory (1900–1959). Exploitative plantation conditions thus underpin a master narrative of hard work and the endlessly celebrated triumph over anti-Asian racism. Settler children, ever industrious and deserving, obtain technical and liberal educations, thereby learning the political system through which they agitate for full voting rights as American citizens. Politically, the vehicle for Asian ascendancy is statehood. . . . Because the ideology of the United States as a mosaic of races is reproduced in Hawai‘i through the celebration of the fact that no single “immigrant group” constitutes a numerical majority, the post-statehood euphoria stigmatizes Hawaiians as a failed indigenous people whose conditions, including out-migration, actually worsen after statehood. Hawaiians are characterized as strangely unsuited, whether because of culture or genetics, to the game of assimilation.⁴⁹

What the history of Hawai‘i’s admission as a U.S. state thus demonstrates is how opposition to white supremacy without an analysis of settler colonialism can often renew and expand a structure of U.S. occupation initiated by white settlers. In the poststatehood moment, the rise of liberal politics green-lights large-scale land development projects, which heightens displacement and desecrations against Kānaka ‘Ōiwi as I write about in chapter 4. The Democratic Party, indeed, relies on a master narrative of anti-Asian oppression on the sugar plantations and valiant military service during World War II, which all too often serves as an alibi for continued acts of Native dispossession and marginalization. By reflecting on the failures of liberal strategies for resistance, we can see how settler colonialism often shapes and constrains our political imaginations in ways that allow for movements seeking reprieve from white supremacy to, sometimes unknowingly, collude in Native dispossession.

In thinking through capacious strategies for co-resistance, I look to the work of Grace Lee Boggs, who as a part of the Black radical tradition argued against imagining racialized groups as “oppressed masses” and sought to instead see them as empowered communities capable of making moral

choices.⁵⁰ Boggs along with her comrades stated that movements require not only resistance, but *reflection* and challenged those concerned with radical transformation to do the hard work of beginning with themselves. Through a notion of dialectical humanism, they aimed at both an individual and a collective level for a way of becoming a “more ‘human’ human being,” primarily so that one’s politics and strategies for resistance do not solidify into a trap for oneself or others. Together they created space for growth by being open and vulnerable to challenge, to demand another mode of being than the good citizen-subject defined by the state.

A problem of Asian settler colonialism, however, is that it leaves no political space for people who want nothing to do with the term *settler*.⁵¹ I critically identify as a Filipino and Japanese settler—and doing so pales in comparison to living as a Native person under occupation. Ultimately, though, I believe that one’s political identification is one’s own personal choice.⁵² Current debates around settler colonialism often revolve around positivist questions or arguments: Is this a settler? Is this an arrivant? Such framings adjudicate these arguments through a kind of moral hierarchy of competing identities that can elide the very structure of settler colonialism, which remains the same regardless of what term one uses. Thus, how is it beneficial to us all, regardless of how you self-identify, to question the political and pedagogical work that relational analyses of settler colonialism do to open one’s political imagination to the genocidal consequences of aligning oneself with the settler state? As such, interrogating one’s relationship to a system of settler colonialism might have more efficacy by questioning what one is doing, rather than how one identifies.

While non-Natives are engaged in debates about whether we are settlers and what we should or should not be called, Native people’s material struggles over land, resources, and governance continue. Trask argues that a preoccupation with identity is most often a concern for non-Native peoples living on seized Native lands, while a Kanaka ‘Ōiwi movement is concerned with struggles to regain these lands. As Trask contends, “The distinction here between the personal and the national is critical. Hawaiians are not engaged in identity politics, any more than the Irish of Northern Ireland or the Palestinians of occupied Palestine are engaged in identity politics.”⁵³ Indeed, positivist discussions over who is and is not a “settler” often dissolve into arguments where one cites one’s oppression

like a badge of honor to shield oneself from having to contend with settler colonialism. Recent scholarship arguing that Asian Americans are “arrivants,” for example, voices the important differences between Asian arrivants and white settlers, while remaining oddly silent on the relationship of Asian arrivants to Native peoples. Such forms of escapism often take us everywhere but ultimately nowhere, sanitizing the critique of settler colonialism while sidestepping the important questions posed by scholars such as Trask. This is not to be mistaken for a dismissal of the term *arrivant*, but rather a challenge to those who invoke this term to not mistake “arrivant” as an invitation to “innocence.”⁵⁴ While an arrivant subjectivity has traveled in such circles, the phrasing is tied to what Byrd theorizes as “arrivant colonialism,” a relational component to her overall argument that remains conveniently absent in most framings.⁵⁵ Regardless of what terms one deploys, forms of affinity and possible kinship might be better grounded in place-based Native histories and struggles, thus foregrounding Native forms of knowledge and governance and movements toward Indigenous resurgence.

INDIGENOUS RESURGENCE

In this way, *Unsustainable Empire* also means to describe the particular historical moment we find ourselves in today. Not only is capitalism unsustainable as an economic system but we are currently in a critical moment where the planet itself can no longer sustain such human-centered ways of living.⁵⁶ Extreme weather patterns, rising sea levels, the warming of the planet, and nonhuman extinctions all tell us that the fail-forward pattern of settler colonialism and capitalism has hit a limit, even as arguments for the colonization of other planets proliferate. This calls for a critical engagement with the past and present as a means to produce alternative futures to the settler state. It means to understand economic crises as an abstraction that makes the primacy of the ecological crisis seemingly secondary. Such alternative futures are critically important as we are living in a moment when a refusal of settler governance is a refusal of climate change, as Native movements and Indigenous sovereignty are often at the front lines blocking extractive industries.⁵⁷ The 2016–17 Stand at Standing Rock against the Dakota Access Pipeline showed us just this.

Settler abstractions, as theorized by Said's "future wish," have long set the ideological conditions for capitalism and its accompanying environmental degradation via ongoing forms of primitive accumulation—divorcing Native peoples from the means of production and the "material conditions of resistance"—and its seemingly permanent structure, a kind of settler accumulation by Native dispossession. As Noenoe K. Silva and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller point out, a key difference between Western and Indigenous notions of sovereignty is that Indigenous epistemologies describe the human and nonhuman divide not as a binary, but rather as interdependent familial relations.⁵⁸ As such, the United States has often sought to make Native peoples vulnerable by disrupting those familial relations through the elimination of one or more sets of human-to-nonhuman relations. This is a tactic of Native dispossession, whether it is targeting kalo (taro) in Hawai'i through water expropriation; the U.S. Army's elimination of the buffalo, numbering fifteen million in 1871 and only thirty-four by 1903; the genetic modification of corn, wild rice, taro, and salmon in the Pacific Northwest; or military tactics that target the elimination of food sources and ecosystems, as was done in the Philippine-American War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War, the latter two using herbicides such as Agent Orange.

Our present moment *is* the afterlife of this "future wish," which has targeted nonhumans for elimination to make the "material conditions of resistance" impossible, to literally produce so-called domestic dependent nations or underdeveloped nations. In the death of these nonhuman relations is the continual birth and rebirth of capitalism, the particular mode of production that has evolved to set the current environmental conditions of climate crisis. Given this, the renewal and protection of Native relationality to nonhumans and land can move us toward a more sustainable, healthy, and equitable system for all currently vulnerable than can ever be imagined in this current system: Indigenous, immigrants, refugees, racially subjugated communities, incarcerated peoples, the undocumented, people with disabilities, non-gender-conforming and queer peoples.

Many Indigenous movements aim to cultivate noncapitalist relations and plant the seeds for Indigenous economies to reemerge by imagining ways to use settler colonialism against itself. Where Haunani-Kay Trask begins by revealing the forms of knowledge and subjectivities that uphold

Asian settler colonialism in Hawai'i, the work of Noelani Goodyear-Ka'ōpua builds on Trask and marks a turn in this field by offering a plurality of possibilities that might emerge when diverse settler groups work in place-based affinity with Kānaka 'Ōiwi. Goodyear-Ka'ōpua illustrates in her book *The Seeds We Planted* just how Native movements and educational work address current problems. By rebuilding Hawaiian governance, foodways, and economies they create and imagine alternative power relations to settler colonialism: "The marginalization and suppression of Indigenous knowledges has gone hand in hand with the transformation and degradation of Indigenous economic systems and the ecosystems that nourish us. Conversely, settler-colonial relations might be transformed by rebuilding, in new ways, the Indigenous structures that have historically sustained our societies."⁵⁹ Goodyear-Ka'ōpua's work aims for nonstatist forms of deoccupation, which help cultivate mutual respect by setting the conditions of possibility to be determined by the land, urgently critical in a moment of ecological crisis.⁶⁰ Candace Fujikane, through community and activist work, has theorized the term *settler ally* to be capacious, as opening ways of being in Hawai'i that co-resist settler colonialism and occupation: "The term 'settler' roots us in the settler colonialism that we seek to rearticulate so that we never lose sight of those conditions or our own positionality or the privileges we derive from it. At the same time, however, the term encompasses the imaginative possibilities for our collaborative work on ea and land-based decolonial nation-building. For there is joy, too, in these practices of growing ea: 'Ohohia i ka hana 'ana aku e.' We rejoice in the practice, we move ourselves to the decolonial joy of practicing ea."⁶¹

As the work of these scholars and activists illuminates, when we recognize that empire relies on imperialist expansion to respond to the failures of capitalism, we can also identify such *problems* as *possibilities* for replacement. Placing Asian diaspora and Native histories together opens new lines of inquiry, allowing for their different historical and geopolitical forms of oppression to be understood as interdependent in ways that produce possibilities outside of the constrained logics of U.S. empire. As ethnic studies scholar Roderick N. Labrador has argued, the subjugation of Kānaka 'Ōiwi and the oppression of Asian immigrants continues to serve as the foundation for U.S. colonialism in Hawai'i.⁶² Asian American studies and Native studies thus offer relational ways to analyze an important

assemblage of U.S. empire, where diaspora and indigeneity, settler colonialism and U.S. imperialism geopolitically convene. Understanding that power does not simply target historically oppressed communities but also operates through their practices, ambitions, narratives, and silences offers a way to examine other dynamics of power—labor exploitation, anti-immigrant laws and sentiment, and imperialist wars—that have historically shaped Asian groups, without misrecognizing the context for framing an Asian diaspora on Native lands seized by the U.S. settler state. Asian diaspora and Kanaka ‘Ōiwi histories have the potential to be transformative when assembled intersectionally, and can be done without diminishing the complexities of each. This signals a need, as articulation theory argues, for an attempt to situate these different histories in complex unity—not flattening difference and assuming these groups are in solidarity, nor falling into the pitfalls of difference and framing them as always in opposition.⁶³

In different colonial situations, historical examples of groups liberating themselves from being used as agents in a system of colonial violence help illustrate alternative ways of being under conditions of occupation.⁶⁴ During the Philippine-American War, for instance, many Black soldiers of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Colored Regiment who had been deployed to the Philippines defected from the U.S. military to fight alongside Filipino “insurgents.”⁶⁵ Critical Filipinx scholar Nerissa S. Balce traces the work of Apolinario Mabini, who lost the use of both legs to polio at the start of the war and was a critical intellectual during the Philippine Revolution against both Spain and the United States. Mabini wrote letters addressed specifically “To the American Colored Soldier” that were dropped in villages that U.S. soldiers were passing through. Mabini, who was eventually captured and exiled to Guåhan, asked Black soldiers to consider fighting on the side of Filipinos: “You must consider your situation and your history, and take charge that the blood of Sam Hose proclaims vengeance.” At the time that the Twenty-Fourth Infantry were deployed to the Philippines, Sam Hose had been violently lynched in Georgia in April of 1899. What’s more, prior to arriving in the Philippines, members of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Regiment caused a race riot in Tampa, Florida, after they saved the life of a young Black boy who had been forced to hold a can atop his head as target practice for white soldiers.⁶⁶ Critical ethnic studies scholar Dylan Rodríguez argues that through complex political

and creative acts, those whose every day is constituted by the genealogies of genocide—“Manifest Destiny, Middle Passage, racial chattel plantation order, Philippine-American War”—are able to reckon and create within this genealogy by embracing the impasse between themselves and a “racially genocidal state.”⁶⁷ This is to say that under conditions of genocide, liberation is not to reform the state from corruption but, rather, to urgently liberate oneself from the state.

Refusal to participate in such colonial violence is a form of affinity-based politics that creatively orchestrates interdependency. Black soldiers “defected” from service to a genocidal state, turning themselves into “fugitives” and identifying their life chances as better served in affinity with those who were also the targets of a genocidal state. In this way, learning how one is being used and then refusing to be used as such in a system of violence is a form of both radical affinity and self-care. Manu Vimalassery considers such forms of radical affinity by tracing the movement of Harriet Tubman across territorial dispossession and enslavement and theorizing the position of the “fugitive”: “Tubman moved against police powers that protected and served the interest of property claims in her flesh. She moved against declarations of independence, efforts to secure slavery and colonialism that operate under the rules of occupation. . . . The fugitive position is itself a crime against property.”⁶⁸ This tactic of identifying and recognizing other peoples who refuse the terms of property and a national identity that would otherwise bolster the U.S. settler state’s permanent conditions of war and occupation informs my current presence as a Filipino and Japanese settler on Native lands, living in the assemblage of multiple genocides and a continued historical moment when Native people in struggle call on others to defect and support their movement to build alternatives to U.S. empire.

NAVIGATING THE BOOK

The first part of this book examines moments where white supremacy resorts to further acts of settler and imperial violence to mediate its failing system. As my starting point, I identify the 1893 U.S. military-backed overthrow, but I broaden my approach to this moment by looking at Hawai‘i from Chicago at the World’s Columbian Exposition. Such a wide framing allows me to contextualize the overthrow within the major

economic crisis and labor unrest that occurred in the United States at this time. The crux of chapter 1, “A Future Wish: Hawai‘i at the 1893 Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition,” questions how a global celebration of white supremacy could exist in a moment when the U.S. economy was on the verge of collapse. I argue that such seemingly contradictory acts were instead concomitant strategies, where settler state theatricality at the White City represented white supremacy as a “more deserving power” over Native nations and economies in order to justify the historic and ongoing seizure of Native lands and resources. With their eyes set on other sites for imperialism, such future-oriented colonial and imperial processes were necessary to keep a capitalist and white supremacist system from collapsing on itself.

Chapter 2, “The Courage to Speak: Disrupting Haole Hegemony at the 1937 Congressional Statehood Hearings,” examines the beginnings of a genuine state-led movement for U.S. statehood. This moment is often wrongly described in official histories as a period where Hawai‘i was unified in arguing for statehood. As a result of the Great Depression in 1929, the federal government altered Hawai‘i sugar tariffs while also protecting the rights of workers to organize unions. As such, settler planters aimed to alleviate such crises by initiating a serious movement for statehood. This chapter asks: How did the settler state make its heterogeneous population knowable? Many of the University of Hawai‘i sociologists who produced such racial ideas were first trained at the University of Chicago, on the actual grounds where the 1893 Columbian Exposition stood. Furthermore, scholars rooted in a white supremacist discourse of eugenics were also at the University of Hawai‘i. Despite the best efforts of the settler elite and propaganda commissions to engineer consent, the 1937 statehood hearings show how white supremacist forms of governmentality were no longer capable of reproducing white settler hegemony.

While the first half of the book contends with the ways in which white supremacy disqualified Hawai‘i from statehood because it was considered a largely “Asiatic” territory, chapters 3 and 4 examine how Hawai‘i’s racial diversity made it more attractive in the eyes of Congress and in the service of U.S. imperial politics. In his intricate study of Hawai‘i statehood, *Last among Equals*, Roger Bell shows how Southern senators blocked Hawai‘i’s bid for statehood, as they wished to keep congressional control for the Democrats and also felt nervous that new liberal Asian sena-

tors might facilitate the passing of civil rights legislation. In *Completing the Union* John S. Whitehead compares the movements for statehood in Hawai'i and Alaska and their particular utility as military posts during the Cold War.⁶⁹ It is at the intersection of civil rights and the Cold War that we can gain a more expansive view of Hawai'i statehood.

Chapter 3, “‘Something Indefinable Would Be Lost’: The Unruly Kamokila and *Go for Broke!*,” traces two mutually constitutive but competing projects in the post–World War II period: the racial project combating the exclusion of Japanese Americans from a U.S. national polity deemed “ineligible to citizenship,” and another project where Kānaka Ōiwi sought to combat their colonial designation as “unfit for self-government.” Together, the Office of War Information, the War Relocation Authority, and the MGM film *Go for Broke!* publicized the devastating casualties sustained by Japanese Americans in World War II, which softened white perceptions of them as foreign threats and even rendered opposition to statehood for Hawai'i as a racist affront to the war record of Japanese Americans. Ultimately, such efforts aimed to reconcile the imperial relationships between Japan and the United States. This chapter juxtaposes such projects with the cultural politics of Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell, who is quoted in the epigraph. I argue that she protested statehood and effectively stalled its passage for decades by strategically playing to the racism of Congress. Kamokila, as she was publicly known, further pushed and investigated other options for Kānaka and Hawai'i besides statehood, particularly in a moment when elites aimed to deliberately contain Hawai'i's political status to statehood.

Chapter 4, “The Propaganda of Occupation: Statehood and the Cold War,” first examines the public relations strategy for achieving U.S. statehood in the context of the Cold War. In a moment when criticism of Western imperialism was the dominant international sentiment, the leading public relations expert Edward L. Bernays argued that if Hawai'i were made a U.S. state, its multiculturalism could aid the Cold War by disproving communist charges of U.S. colonialism and demonstrating to Americans that racial harmony was possible.⁷⁰ This public relations work was picked up by novelist James Michener and the person most often given credit for achieving statehood, George Lehleitner, a businessman from New Orleans, Louisiana. The chapter then moves to highlight the oppositional movements that invoked the 1893 overthrow—a range

of anticapitalist, anticolonial, and antiwar politics—that reveal different vulnerabilities to both a U.S. imperialist and a settler state: first, by those communists (the Hawai‘i Seven) accused of using “force and violence” to overthrow the U.S. government, and second, by Kathleen Dickenson Melten, whose public scholarship narrated the history of the U.S. overthrow of Hawai‘i to oppose statehood. I end by examining Sammy Amalu’s 1961 multimillion-dollar hoax on the tourism and real estate industries that turned the tragedy of statehood into a comedy. Disguised as a Swiss investor, all the while living destitute on the outskirts of Waikiki, Amalu offered to buy numerous hotels, ranches, and other properties in culturally significant places. Covered by the national and international media, Amalu widened political possibilities in a moment when Kanaka ‘Ōiwi futures were seemingly nonexistent.

Chapter 5, “Alternative Futures beyond the Settler State,” traces the afterlife of the aforementioned future wish, but aims to identify and highlight those who work outside of the constrained logics of the settler state. The Kepaniwai Heritage Gardens on the island of Maui, a county park that features recreations of “traditional” Asian, Pacific, and European houses and gardens, narrates Hawai‘i as a racially harmonious state. A manifestation of the University of Hawai‘i sociologists’ “racial melting pot” discourse, the park’s design and architecture materializes a form of liberal multiculturalism that is a vestige of the 1893 Columbian Exposition. During the park’s planning in the early 1950s, Kānaka ‘Ōiwi protested its construction as they explained that the land contains burials of Hawaiian ali‘i (royalty) and was also the site of a major battle. In fact, Kepaniwai translates as “damming of the waters” caused by the bodies of slain Maui warriors. The purported racial harmony represented in the gardens was used in the service of both the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i and military expansion during the period of the Cold War. In addition, this valley is a part of Nā Wai ‘Ehā (the Four Great Waters) which was once the largest contiguous taro-growing area in all of Hawai‘i. Indeed, contemporary appeals by kalo farmers have led to the replenishing of the rivers to promote more sustainable ways of living and a return to an economy organized around Hawaiian notions of value.

Taken as a whole, this book illustrates the complex ways that Hawai‘i’s admission as a U.S. state—narrated as an official antiracist, liberal, and state-led civil rights project that excluded an analysis of occupation and

settler colonialism—has facilitated and normalized projects of empire. Through a discursive approach to U.S. statehood, and a critical reconsideration of the ways that propaganda commissions framed the rules of discourse to normalize the presence of the United States in Hawai'i, we are better able to understand how Hawai'i statehood became expected, how it came to be considered an inevitable outcome of history, and how ideas about history and race were arranged so as to invalidate and silence opposition to statehood.

Hawaiian demonstrations on Admission Day challenge the state's narration of itself, and, in doing so, also illuminate the hidden aspects of the ideological forces underpinning U.S. occupation. The unearthing and retelling of systemically and deliberately buried histories thus reveal how the state's present power was taken historically by illegal force, and at the expense of Hawaiian birthrights to self-determination. What the settler state has done with this power is revealed in the present and possibly future realities of rising sea levels, environmental degradation, increased militarism, and growing social and economic discord. Hawai'i and its diverse people are tied to a long tradition of resistance to all manners of oppression, across many sites of U.S. empire. This book is an incomplete rendering of a small piece of this resistance.