

INTRODUCTION

Bodies as Evidence

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Tricksters or fakes, assistants or 'toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community.

—GIORGIO AGAMBEN, *The Coming Community*

In this volume, we propose that evidence is a key problem in the contemporary moment. Today, evidence-based knowledge is everywhere in demand. Indeed, one sees a veritable obsession with measurement, quantification and verification in areas as diverse as medical science, government decision making, global finance and security policy (see Merry 2011). Disturbingly, even the so-called Islamic State issued periodic corporate reports with metrics and key performance indicators, including the number of “knife murders” and “apostates run over” (Shore and Wright 2015, 440). Yet, at the same time, commentators suggest that this is the age of uncertainty, the post-truth era.¹ Thus, between the demand for evidence-based knowledge and the widespread anxiety that the truth is not what it used to be, we find shifting relations of cause

and effect, fact and falsehood, the observable and the occluded. We explore these shifting relations in security contexts.

In this volume, we focus on security contexts because problems of evidence are acute there and thus available for critical reflection. We discuss “bodies as evidence” as a way to explore biometric identification, borders and migration control, forensic knowledge, policing, and counterterrorism. By attending to bodies as evidence, we show how security discourses and practices target the body while also contributing to emergent configurations of knowledge and power. This volume, then, provides anthropological perspectives on the great technical, scientific, and expert efforts that characterize the drive to know and manage the complexities of security in the contemporary moment.

Of course, evidence has always been a problem in contexts of security and insecurity and especially in situations when political power must justify the use of force. Today, when so-called realists attempt to excuse imperialism, they often turn back to Thucydides’s *Melian Dialogue*, which details the Athenian effort to secure their empire at the expense of a free society. Their “suspicions about the future” justified the brutal suppression of others, while Melian appeals for justice fell on ears attuned differently—“Your hatred is evidence of our power,” the Athenian diplomats explained (Thucydides 1998, 404). Ancient Greece certainly provides us with many examples of conflicts that included battles over the truth, but one can find innumerable bodies of evidence buried throughout history. Some evidential regimes are distinctive; at other times, one can detect striking resemblances across cultural and historical lines.²

History certainly teaches us that there is a tendency in contexts of war to fabricate a reality in which to act. In the nineteenth century, for example, British interests in Southern Africa advanced through fraudulent “concessions,” carpet bagging, chicanery, and, occasionally, genocidal violence. Indeed, historian Robert Blake (1977, 55) describes Cecil Rhodes’s annexation of Matabeleland as a giant episode of *suppressio veri*—an attack on reality itself. Blake’s description could serve just as well in an account of the pretext for war in Vietnam or the push for “regime change” Iraq. As is well known, in the run-up to the second Gulf War, a White House advisor (probably Karl Rove) dismissed journalist Ron Suskind (2004) because of his emphasis on facts and evidence. The White House insider explained the situation succinctly: “We create our own reality.”

It seems, however, that arguments about evidence are becoming even more pervasive today. Dictionaries declared “post-truth” the word of the year in

2016, but it is just one term in a constellation that includes “truthiness,” “fake news” and “alternative facts,” terms that suggest the erosion of long-trusted evidential foundations. One cannot dismiss this as a hysterical moment in public culture. In Russia, top Putin aid and former theater student Vladislav Surkov—the Kremlin’s “gray cardinal”—openly combines Orwellian ideological techniques and performance art. In Great Britain, many of the discussions about Brexit politics center on a loss of faith in “experts from organizations with acronyms” (*Sky News* 2016). However, former White House deputy assistant Sebastian Gorka set out the situation in even clearer terms. During an interview with the BBC he explained, “We are not going to put up with people who believe they have a monopoly on the truth simply because they have sixty years of a letterhead above them” (BBC 2017).

Clearly, the recent U.S. presidential election highlighted the extraordinary shift in public discourse about evidence from the very outset. Anthropologist Maximilian Forte, one of the few public intellectuals to predict the rise of President Donald Trump, emphasized Trump’s theatrics during the election campaign:

Trump often emerges on stage from behind a dark navy curtain. That is a symbolically rich move, and it is a symbolism whose deeper meaning and importance throws others off. . . . This is the puppet master, the man behind the curtain, the campaign donor and buyer of favours and influence, who has suddenly decided to step out into the spotlight, and to not only be seen but to announce his role as a former puppet master. . . . The move is so deeply subversive, that one has to wonder just how many have truly appreciated its import. (Forte 2016)

The U.S. president may be famous for his failure to reference the usual norms of truth telling, but as Forte realizes, his political power operates off a particular, if deeply authoritarian, body-evidence relationship, namely, his “authentic” betrayal of insider knowledge communicated to an audience who “knew it” all along. Evidence takes the form of a trick revealed, as if the Wizard of Oz pulled back his own curtain. And what becomes possible alongside theatrical subversion is the fabrication of a new reality. In this striking and ritualized political performance, then, one sees no truth per se, but, rather, “the play of light and shadow, truth and error, true and false, hidden and manifest, visible and invisible” (Foucault 2014, 17).

Commentators will surely be preoccupied with matters of evidence in politics for years to come, but here our explicit focus is on security contexts. In

recent years, there has been steady flow of anthropological publications on security. Many of the contributors to this volume have added considerably to this literature. Ursula Rao (e.g., 2013; see also M'charek, Hagendijk, and de Vries 2013) explores how security manifests itself in efforts to identify the human body using biometric technologies. Daniel Goldstein (2016) and Ieva Jusionyte (2015) study local articulations and contestations of security in their ethnographic work in Latin America and the United States. Gregory Feldman (2012) and Mark Maguire (2014) write about the security apparatuses that are changing policy and policing. Among others, Antonius C. G. M. Robben (2010), Joseph P. Masco (2014), and Joseba Zulaika (2014) examine transformations in international security and warfare and the consequences of those changes. In short, anthropologists have been able to track security as it shifted the sands under people's feet in numerous field sites, and, from this granular level, they have been able to connect to broader transformations, even at the transnational scale.

The contributors to this volume attend to the extraordinary problems of evidence that manifest themselves in security contexts. Biometric security, for example, is precisely an effort to render the body as evidence for identification; and in the realm of counterterrorism, vast and shadowy security apparatuses scour the present and the near future for real and imagined threats. In short, problems of evidence are acute in security contexts, and yet, with just a few notable exceptions (e.g., Masco 2014), anthropologists have not dealt directly with evidence and security. Moreover, the contributors to this volume also attend to the extraordinary emphasis on the body as a source of evidence for and target of intervention. *Bodies as Evidence* moves back and forth between the analyses of different dimensions of the body-evidence relation. The different chapters show how bodies become sources for the production of evidence, the way bodies as evidence are organized and deployed to classify, recognize, and manage human life itself. We describe a circular motion in which bodies are both the origin of evidence and the target of evidence-based interventions. Rooting truth-making routines in new technologies of the body significantly influences notions of self and other, morality and crime, security and threat. Which assumptions and knowledge systems underscore the making of new security cultures? How do they shape who we are, what we do, and how we perceive of ourselves as physical and social beings? Here, we offer answers to these important questions. However, before formulating those answers, we first need to explore anthropology's approach to evidence.

Anthropology and Evidence

It is possible to narrate the history of sociocultural anthropology as a series of battles over evidence. For example, sociocultural anthropologists often teach students that disciplinary history began when heroes from long ago abandoned their university armchairs to gather evidence firsthand in faraway fields. Franz Boas used ethnographic evidence to challenge racism and evolutionism throughout his career. However, Bronislaw Malinowski's *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* offers an even more dramatic mise-en-scène. In the preface, James Frazer yields his armchair to the "young science" before him; then Malinowski ritually dispatches his predecessor for "wholesale generalizations" (Malinowski 1922, viii, 3). This tale of scholarly patricide centers on evidence, and, like all tales, much is omitted. In fact, Malinowski's scientific approach to "collecting, manipulating, and fixing evidence" offers few innovations (Malinowski 1922, 6; cf. Rivers 1912). Disciplinary historian George W. Stocking argues that the "ethnographer's magic" was less a matter of scientific evidence and more about a style of writing and narrative of adventure whereby "experience of the native's experience must become the reader's experience as well—a task that scientific analysis yielded up to literary analysis" (Stocking 1992, 53).

Analysis of the birth of ethnography reveals that anthropologists have long conflated matters of evidence and methodology. Even Matthew Engelke's recent *The Objects of Evidence*, one of the few anthropological volumes on this topic, foregrounds the following question: "How can we turn fieldwork experience—a highly personal, temporally-bound, and inter-subjective method for collecting data—into objects of evidence?" (Engelke 2009, 2; see also Csordas 2004; Hastrup 2004). Interestingly, one of the other volumes on evidence, *How Do We Know?*, is bookended by two contrasting answers to this question. Marilyn Strathern opens by eschewing the all-encompassing and reductive knowledge of other disciplines before flattering the style of analogical reasoning available in anthropology. However, Keith Hart concludes that the whole enterprise is indefensible, riddled with occult practices, and managed by people "who live in constant fear of being found out" (2008, 207).

Yet, social and cultural anthropology has long been open to self-criticism on these matters. The questions that animate recent volumes on this topic are also found in the contributions to James Clifford and George E. Marcus's *Writing Culture*, a response to the crisis of representation that swept the

humanities and social sciences during the 1980s in the form of postcolonial and feminist-inspired critiques of objectivism and the rhetoric of authority (e.g., Pratt 1986, 33). This was also an experimental moment, as illustrated by George E. Marcus's early discussion of multi-sited ethnography and Paul Rabinow's approach to studying how contemporary power and knowledge produce milieux or realities in which to act. In this volume, we are also interested in the bodily and evidential foundations of security reality. However, the question remains unanswered: what precisely is evidence in anthropology?

Battles over evidence and methodology have certainly raged throughout disciplinary history, but definitions have always been in short supply. The settlement that most anthropologists have reached is that evidence is not just *something*, a quality always-already present in the world; rather, evidence is also a question or argument.³ In short, it is relational, or as Thomas Csordas argues, "Evidence has to be *of or for something*" (2004, 475 [emphasis added]). This relational openness is important, first, because social and cultural anthropology tends to use the label ethnography for a rather ecumenical collection of theories and techniques, and, second, because it is difficult to operate using a single definition of evidence as one studies populations in which other ("local") definitions obtain simultaneously. In his last major book, *Anthropology and History*, E. E. Evans-Pritchard cast the problem of evidence in separate magisteria thus, "Myth and history are in important respects different in character, not just in the degree to which they can be substantiated by appeal to evidence or to the laws of natural science. Hence a story may be true and yet mythical in character, and a story may be false and yet historical in character. . . . Then, myth differs from history in that it is regarded differently by the people to whose culture both belong" (1961, 8). Here, again, we find the secret core of evidence as discovered by anthropologists: evidence is relational. If this is true, then the truth itself becomes, to borrow from political anthropologist June Nash, a "suspect category" (1997, 25).

Perhaps this is an obscene finding, because it resembles so closely the body-evidence relationship uncovered by those who witnessed and recorded the workings of totalitarian regimes. Take for example Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's harrowing three-volume account of Soviet forced labor camps, *The Gulag Archipelago*, in which the author realizes that "evidence is always relative." Indeed, he describes what passed for a criminal inquiry as a complex interplay between an interrogator's willingness to inflict cruelty, the physical capacity of the victim, and nebulous "moral forces" that included "party sensitivity" (1974, 179). However, it would be a mistake to read Solzhenitsyn as simply

documenting the moral relativity of totalitarian wastelands; rather, he appreciates that bodies as evidence are required to hold knowledge and power together. In short, evidence is not a thing-in-itself but, rather, an expression of broader configurations of power and knowledge. Seen in this light, security is a privileged site in which to study matters of evidence. At root, security concerns itself with fixity, certainty, and control, while never fully restraining mutability, uncertainty, and even chaos. The power-knowledge nexus here includes the ability to arbitrate about the usefulness of any information; accordingly the powerful not only establish the right to know but also the terms of “truth,” together with the right to obviate, ignore, or obscure. The process of creating evidence is linked to parallel processes of denying alternative knowledge status as evidence or even destroying material that could give alternative testimony.

Jean and John Comaroff are among the first anthropologists to work through matters of evidence and security ethnographically, though their efforts are concerned primarily with crime and policing. Their anthropological writing on the South African postcolony aims to explore the boundaries of post-Enlightenment humanity (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 281). From a purely economic perspective, South Africa certainly offers perspectives on “the enigma of . . . wealth: of its sources and the capriciousness of its distribution, of the mysterious forms it takes, of its slipperiness, of the opaque relations between means and ends embodied in it” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 298). However, the story they tell is larger than that of Voodoo economics after Apartheid. In the post-Cold War era, much of the world expected colonialism and socialist totalitarianism to vanish beneath an expectant wave of liberal democracy, but the perception in many parts of Eastern Europe and Africa is that crime and social disorder followed in the wake of change.⁴ Numerous other countries also witnessed the “deregulation of monopolies over the means of legitimate force, of moral orders, of the protection of persons and property” (2004, 2).⁵ Thus, in the gaps, interstices, and aporias of the contemporary one finds the flourishing of shadow banking, occult economies, spectral private armies, and deafening demands for security (see also Marcus 1999).

Like Jean and John Comaroff, we see the great technical, scientific and expert efforts that characterize the contemporary drive to secure individual identities, bodies, borders, and all sorts of boundaries as emergent in the mimetic impulses at the heart of modernity: the impulses to fix, define, secure and otherwise make certain a world that seems incapable of fully obliging.

Moreover, modernity also has its obverse in counterfeit versions of modernity, versions where fakes, tricksters, and frauds prevail. The Comaroffs (2004, 13, 15) explain:

Mimesis has classically been an attribute projected onto Europe's others, of course, marking the distance between civilization and its apprentices, those perpetually deemed "almost, but not quite," the real thing. Times, though, have changed. In the postcolonial era, copies declare independence as commodities and circulate autonomously. The electronic revolution has abetted this by democratizing the means of mechanical reproduction. It has demystified proprietary goods, whose aura can be mass-produced and flogged at a discount. These brazen simulacra, like counterfeit money, expose a conceit at the core of the culture of Western capitalism: that its signifiers can be fixed, that its editions can be limited, that it can franchise the platonic essence of its mass-produced modernity. . . .

Crime *itself* is frequently the object of criminal mimesis. Counterfeit kidnappings, hijack hoaxes, and bogus burglaries are everywhere an expanding source of profit, to the extent that, in the Cape Province of South Africa, where simulated claims are becoming epidemic, a Zero Tolerance Task Group has been created to put a stop to them. . . . The fetish and the fake. Each, finally, fades into the other.

Jean and John Comaroff (e.g., 2006a) continue to explore crime and the law as sites of battles over numbers and nonsense, mimesis and magic, fetishism and fakery. Indeed, they propose that the ethnographer, much like the detective, has always been a participant in these battles, bringing expertise on the elementary truths encoded in nods and winks and the skills to demystify the magical or even the bizarre (see also Boltanski 2014). Again, we make the point that security contexts are particularly good places in which to observe the contemporary. In this volume, we are interested in security rather than the policing of crime, and we are interested in exploring evidence in close detail.

Evidence in the Anthropology of Security

In recent years we have seen a growing body of ethnographic research on security and insecurity. There is already a large and well-respected anthropological literature on violence and warfare, the military and militarism, and

increasingly anthropologists have explored security and insecurity by focusing their ethnographic work (rather unsurprisingly) on everyday experiences. In this latter vein, ethnographies often depict security as a violent and disruptive intrusion. Other anthropologists focus their attention on new security assemblages by working adjacent to security expertise (e.g., Maguire 2014). Studying security agencies and expertise is enormously challenging. Access is often limited, if granted at all, and one often finds oneself lost in a dizzying world of paranoia within reason (see Marcus 1999). In the realm of security agencies, multiple layers and partitions separate and divide bodies as evidence and versions of “the truth.” Thus, one must understand configurations of power, knowledge, and evidence in order to understand this realm, and especially in order to understand performances of security. It is, for example, only by attending to power, knowledge, and evidence that one can appreciate the conditions for the possibility of security speech-acts (cf. Waever 1995), such as, for instance, the following statement by a key figure in the infamous U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC): “We’re the dark matter. We’re the force that orders the universe but can’t be seen” (quoted in Whitehead and Finnström 2013, 21).

However, before most anthropologists even get to explore the operations of security in their field site, they spend frustrating hours trying to answer the question: What is security? One quickly discovers that “security” is a semantically vacuous term that refuses definition. One also discovers that neighboring disciplines offer little by way of support. In the liberal philosophical tradition, for example, security is understood as the foundation stone of good government and even civilization itself—it is that which allows other things to happen, such as the flourishing of life (e.g., Mill [1859] 2002). Political scientists, international relations experts, and security studies scholars tend to draw upon this tradition in ways that naturalize security, and yet they still acknowledge that it is an “essentially contested concept”—in other words, it gains content from things other than itself and from how the concept is deployed (see Buzan 1991). How, then, do we grapple with this rascal concept?

Perhaps the very looseness of security is the key to unlocking it anthropologically. Security is not a thing-in-itself; it is, rather, relational, and so too is evidence. Therefore, security discourses and practices gain their solidity by producing their own, self-reinforcing “bodies”—bodies that always threaten to flee upon close inspection. There are many examples that illustrate the suspicious importance of evidence in security contexts. The contributions to this volume cover biometric security, borders and migration control, forensic

knowledge, policing, and counterterrorism. In every one of these domains, one sees great efforts to know, target, and make use of the human body; and we see emergent bodies as evidence that result from these great efforts to ground knowledge and thereby secure the contemporary. It is our contention here that *Bodies as Evidence* offers a way to explore security as efforts to fix and make certain a world while never fully closing off mutability, uncertainty, and the potentially chaotic underside of order.

Bodies as Evidence

It is not surprising that in the contemporary moment one sees a resurgent interest in the body as source of knowledge. Advancements in forensic science, DNA decoding, and biometric technology provide new pathways for the recursive reimagining of the social through the body (see M'charek, Hagendijk, and de Vries 2013). New technologies are nesting alongside established ways of scrutinizing the body through visual inspection (see Maguire 2009). Their common goal is fixity, because the extraction of precise information about identity enables history and projects into the future. Of course, feminist scholars have long argued against tendencies in sciences to reify their own models—such as DNA—by first developing the model and then mistaking it for all there is to know about life itself. However, today, the human and social sciences are placing great emphasis on “emergence.” Thus, Tim Ingold recently argued that “we can no longer think of the organism, human or otherwise, as a discrete, bounded entity, set over against an environment. It is rather a locus of growth within a field of relations traced out in flows of materials” (2013, 10; see also Foucault 1994).⁶ Such relativist accounts of life as dynamic, nonessential, and evolving threaten the self-assured fixity promised in the obsessive focus on bodies by new security technologies.

In this book, we follow the construction of body-evidence. What we know of a person is often the outcome of processes in which social actors are empowered to read cues and make inferences about identity, rights and duties, treatments, security, and insecurity. In a Latourian (1996) sense, anthropologists are often interested in entanglements between bodies, objects, and technology that lead to effectual interpretations. Annemarie Mol (2002) provides an illustrative example. She analyzes the making of atherosclerosis patients during hospital routines. Being an atherosclerosis patient means being a person with pain that can be related to specific kinds of observations gained

during diagnostics—visual inspection, touching, measuring of blood velocity or vessel lumen—and postmortem knowledge of atherosclerosis patients underpins this specific knowledge. The process of knowing about atherosclerosis and deciding about treatment is an uncertain journey of pitching together or discriminating between different (at times contradictory) sets of evidence. The processes of gaining knowledge and acting upon it is the result of specific and fateful relations created between patients, doctors, medical data, machines, hospital accounting, and so on. There is, in short, a specific body-evidence regime in operation.

Body-evidence in security contexts may take the form of identity constructions through biometric inspection, treatment decisions following the anamnesis of injured migrant bodies, the dead body as evidence of violent borders, gaps in forensic infrastructure, or evidence for historical truth-telling; then there are the various traces of criminality, and even the tortured body in the War on Terror. We propose that practices of collecting and collating of evidence about bodies shows the visceral dimensions of (in)security. Bodies as evidence (and knowledge-power) inform the processes by which people become migrants, welfare recipients, prisoners, targets, or victims. These fateful classifications inform decisions about treatment, thus creating the abject body of the torture victim, the targeted body of the terrorist, the hungry body of the noncitizen, the hiding body of the “illegal” immigrant, or the dead body at the border. Of course, a number of prominent theorists have foregrounded the body in theories of social order. Taboo breakers and “others” become figures of danger (Lianos and Douglas 2001), and political order creates its own shadow, bodies that do not matter (see also Agamben 1998). However, evidence matters clearly in the sense that processes are required to know people, to categorize, judge, determine, and even cast people out. Evidence is deployed to fix identity and avoid status ambivalence. If bodies can be linked through biometric technology to databases, assorted officials no longer depend on the narratives of untrustworthy others, who might be terrorists, illegal immigrants, beggars, or welfare frauds.

The first chapter in this volume, “The Truth of the Error: Making Identity and Security through Biometric Discrimination,” by Elida K. U. Jacobsen and Ursula Rao, deals directly with contemporary security technoscience. During the past two decades, the world has seen a mushrooming of biometric “solutions” to deal with everything from transit through airports to welfare disbursements. Today, India’s Unique Identity (UID), or *aadhaar*, scheme is an experiment in biometric security of global significance. Thus far, over one bil-

lion people have registered with a system that promises interoperable digital governance and is widely regarded as a model for emulation by other countries. However, for all the images of clean and efficient contact and circulation—and those images certainly saturate media and policy discourse—biometric security also promises to target the unwanted circulations of illegal migrants, criminals, and terrorists by exposing the fraudulent body. Jacobsen and Rao, however, focus specifically on error: the damaged fingers and eyes, and the failure to account for problematic names and unlikely kinships that lead to exclusions as “failure to enroll.” Instead of showing a neutral process of registrations, their ethnographic accounts tell of dense cultural processes through which authorities inspect, visualize, and question bodies, together with the numerous ways that Indian residents attempt to work around a system that now offers a passport to spaces and privileges.

Of course, “error” is a technoscientific concept within the field of biometric security: a tolerable margin of error is that which establishes a norm and thereby the truth of one’s identity. Jacobsen and Rao therefore propose that error is constitutive of evidence in the aadhaar scheme. In cases of technical failure, due to manual labor or military service rendering a body unreadable, residents must resort to private brokers that operate a black market in biometric enrollments. What’s at stake here, between a system that strives for universality through bodily evidence and a population excluded from benefits to which they are entitled, is a modern dream of a stable truth referent. Deploying the concept of a negative space archive, Jacobsen and Rao argue that the body will only act as a truth referent if historical and sociocultural contexts are excluded or at least controlled in the name of neutrality, and thus schemes such as aadhaar will always run the risk of excluding those persons who deviate from the norm. Biometric security thus has deadly consequences: a single older woman who is unreadable, they explain, becomes a marginal person who cannot claim her right to a food allowance, a victim of “good governance.”

Biometric registration in India is certainly one of the more extraordinary experiments in governance through security in the contemporary moment. However, there are many more laboratory spaces where new body-evidence relations are emerging. One such laboratory is the Mexico-U.S. border, an uneven zone of securitization in which one finds high-tech military gadgetry and the hostile landscape itself recruited to deter migration. In chapter 2, “Injured by the Border: Security Buildup, Migrant Bodies, and Emergency Response in Southern Arizona,” Ieva Jusionyte shows us the ways in which securitization produces new regimes of inclusion and exclusion and associ-

ated regimes of evidence. She begins with the shocking description of an injured man literally stuck in the border fence. Based on ethnographic fieldwork with emergency responders on both sides of the border, Jusionyte explores the regimes of power and knowledge that struggle over the contested body of the injured migrant. The increasing securitization of the border results directly in physical harm, as migrants break limbs and suffer from dehydration en route to the United States. But what does it mean to rescue migrants? In ways that are comparable with ongoing debates about emergency care for migrants crossing the Mediterranean (see Amade M'charek in this volume), in southern Arizona we see a redefinition of lifesaving treatment and a revaluation of human life. Migrants who call 911 are redirected to Border Patrol, and emergency responders are expected to differentiate between those deserving of help and “bad guys” who should be placed in custody immediately.

Of course, there are financial and resource allocation implications when Border Patrol or local emergency responders take charge of an injured body, but many decisions rely on the skill of reading signs of the bodies as evidence of illegal entry, or just a “gut feeling.” Matters are further complicated because, for example, traffickers force some migrants to carry drugs, blurring handy distinctions between the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” In part, Jusionyte’s argument is that the broad landscape of securitization is recruiting the skills of emergency responders, but, in part also, we see the different evidence produced by Border Patrol and emergency responders as suggestive of deep cracks and fissures in the realm of human security.

Félix Guattari once imagined a future world of security in which technologies would enable the spread of electronic borders throughout daily life, a world where everyone is expected to be in their “permissible place” (Deleuze 1988, 182). Jacobsen and Rao show us the powerful role of biometrics in India in establishing and sorting norms, access, and exclusions, while Ieva Jusionyte speaks to the violence of external borders and the intractable problems facing those attempting humanitarian responses. In chapter 3, “E-Terrify: Securitization and Biometric Surveillance in the Workplace,” Daniel M. Goldstein and Carolina Alonso-Bejarano contribute further to this discussion. The rapid rise and spread of U.S. “Homeland Security” as an institutional form, as a set of discourses and interventions, involves the conflation of undocumented migrants with potential terrorists and thus produces a vast suspect population. However, the border is no longer where the map suggests it is: Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano expose E-Verify, a workplace, web-based biometric technology that aims to square the U.S. reliance on cheap immi-

grant labor with securing the homeland. E-Verify turns the workplace into a space of immigration surveillance by allowing employers to check employees and job applicants against federal data to determine eligibility. In ways similar to the Indian aadhaar scheme, E-Verify promises neutrality and administrative efficiency; however, it delivers new regimes of exclusion and consequent precariousness for those already marginalized. Employers are relatively free to decide whether they should check a worker, which grants them power as immigration decision makers.

Drawing on several years of ethnographic research in New Jersey, Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano's work shows us the ways in which a biometric (and legal) security infrastructure nests in the material and spatial realities of everyday life. E-Verify contributes to exclusion and to self-disciplining—migrants caution one another as to how to avoid the gaze of the authorities. Indeed, taken in isolation, the ethnographic accounts of migrants' experiences read like descriptions of life under totalitarianism, where the slightest transgression results in dire consequences. "Don't litter," one migrant advises a friend! However, alongside the exclusion and self-disciplining one finds the emergence of shadow populations and, unsurprisingly, fake identities, the consequence *E-Terrify*.

The production of new regimes of evidence in security contexts is certainly striking where biometrics are deployed to manage marginal populations such as migrants. However, biometrics—from the Ancient Greek *bios* and *metron*, denotes the recognizing and measurement of life itself using intrinsic physical or behavioral traits—is closely connected to the contemporary drive for (and obsession with) forensic knowledge. At the Mediterranean borders of Europe, where many thousands of people lose their lives each year, forensic knowledge is both a technoscientific "solution" and a problem. In chapter 4, "Dead-Bodies-at-the-Border': Distributed Evidence and Emerging Forensic Infrastructure for Identification," Amade M'charek writes about the border security response to dead migrant bodies. Border security deploys high-tech solutions that seek to identify and police the frontiers of the EU with everything from biometrics to surveillance drones. But what of those who die en route? Dead bodies are both evidence of a failed response to a geopolitical crisis and a very specific set of problems of evidence for the forensic infrastructure of identification.

M'charek's detailed discussion of border forensics shows us the uneven distribution of forensic knowledge. In popular consciousness, forensics is an exact science, and police today even complain about the so-called CSI effect

whereby the public attribute enormous exactitude to forensics. Of course, in the wake of natural and other disasters that involve residents of wealthy countries, enormous efforts are made to identify remains. Not so with dead bodies at the border. Indeed, the bodies of migrants are a gap in knowledge and infrastructure. The geographical origin of a body is often unclear; there is no reference population against which to check a DNA or even a dental profile. Moreover, because bodies are recovered after long periods in the sea, the epidermis tends to have detached and with that goes the possibility of fingerprinting. “Forensics has to be invented anew,” a leading practitioner tells M’charek. What, however, will the emerging forensic infrastructure look like? M’charek argues that the hundreds of dead migrant bodies found at the shores of Europe will offer a new type of evidence for an emerging infrastructure: the dead-body-at-the-border is also evidence of the price paid in human lives for Europe’s border management regime.

In chapter 5, “The Transitional Lives of Crimes against Humanity: Forensic Evidence under Changing Political Circumstances,” Antonius C. G. M. Robben and Francisco J. Ferrándiz further explore the ways in which forensic evidence and truth-making activities are problematic and yet promise certainty to an uncertain world. Their specific example is forensic knowledge as embedded in public discourses on justice. They deploy two case studies: the recovery of evidence from historical Death Flights in Argentina and Civil War exhumations in Spain, showing the intertwinement of different types of evidence in efforts to reclaim the past and redeem the victims of crimes against humanity. In their analysis, we must also attend to the contested necropolitics of evidence. The early chapters in this volume attest to the drive to know human life in order to secure it and thereby produce an order of things, but the Death Flights in Argentina and civil war in Spain are episodes marked by great efforts to conceal, “disappear,” and distort evidence. As Michael Taussig remarked in his analysis of totalitarianism in South America, one sometimes finds “the chaos that lies on the underside of order and without which order could not exist” (Taussig 1986, 4).

In their chapter, Robben and Ferrándiz emphasize the enormous potential of forensic knowledge of the body as a basis for cultural recovery, truth, justice, and reconciliation. However, this emerging infrastructure in Spain and Argentina is not without its problems. Of course, here again we see the CSI effect of overly optimistic impressions of science, but these different cultural and legal contexts also inject politics into ostensibly neutral practices. They conclude that these new body-evidence relations have the capacity to disrupt

other ways to mourn, seek justice, and produce the truth without the “truthiness” of forensic science.

While the first five chapters deal with processes of fixing truth via the process of interpreting and manipulating materials and bodies, the remaining four chapters of the volume discuss (in)security produced by bodies of evidence that remain in the shadow of alchemy-like half-knowledge, prediction, gossip, or even lies. Future crime scenarios, classified information, and knowledge gained through spying, torture, or intelligence are mobilized as evidence for real or potential threats that demand action. The not-fully-realized-evidence of threat scenarios blurs the line between reality and delusion, while producing real material effects through targeted intervention or increased policing activities. Here power materializes as the ability to act also on unconfirmed or nonpublic information, creating security regimes that render insecure not only populations but also police officers, soldiers, and judges who must decide which leads to follow in a realm where information fades into fantasy.

Chapters 6 and 7 turn to contemporary policing in Europe and North America. Chapter 6, “Policing Future Crimes,” by Mark Maguire, opens with a discussion of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014 in order to highlight questions of evidence in police encounters with communities. Anthropologists continue to explore and expose the racialized and often-violent dimensions of urban policing around the world. However, the ethnographic focus on encounters that are observable to the naked eye tends to miss larger transformations in international policing that aim to police future events by cancelling them out before they occur. Today, around the world, important experiments are ongoing in what is termed predictive policing—a specific assemblage of anthropological theories, geographical information systems, and data science. Many police forces welcome these technoscientific experiments—seeing them as “silver bullets” (see Robben and Ferrándiz in this volume) targeting intractable problems—while in other jurisdictions these experiments are resisted or reconfigured in interesting ways. For some, predictive policing is a mask disguising older forms of discrimination and profiling. After all, they are based on social data gathering, mapping, and statistical reasoning that carry their own histories and biased assumptions, especially about what is essential or typical in human behavior. However, Maguire proposes that we should approach predictive policing on its own terms: as a technically mediated form of criminal anthropology with its own body of evidence. New algorithmically produced future scenarios create new forms of

evidence that position police personnel in a situation of having to contemplate the relevance of computer knowledge and whether indeed it is safe to hand over decision-making responsibly to mathematical models, or retain trust in personal experience and direct sensual data.

Issues about the status of knowledge and its usefulness as evidence are also the central concern for Gregory Feldman in chapter 7, “‘Intelligence’ and ‘Evidence’: Sovereign Authority and the Differences That Words Make,” an essay on the intelligence gathering of an undercover squad of European police dedicated to tackling human trafficking. These are individuals bonded together as they make real decisions on the ground, and in so doing they produce their own codes of action. These actions show an ethics as police bring intelligence forward as evidence, or they may leave it in its own category of what is known but not necessarily actionable. These are two very different studies of contemporary policing, then, but they are still complementary. For Maguire, predictive policing operates by means of an anthropological theory of human life itself, one sometimes disputed by the evidence of actual police work on the ground. For Feldman, evidence—that thing that police are expected to produce—cannot label the full range of knowledge and practices of policing. Both anthropologists are exploring ways to say more about the in/securities that drive decision making in contemporary policing, more than institutional studies or algorithmic innovations can possibly say.

The final two chapters of this volume concern the so-called War on Terror. In chapter 8, “The Secrecy/Threat Matrix,” Joseph P. Masco draws on his recent work on *The Theater of Operations* (2014) to again track the transformation of the U.S. Cold War national security apparatus into the counterterrorism apparatus. For Masco this transformation represents a shift in the “secrecy/threat matrix” and thus in evidential relations with the world. Masco shows us that evidence is of vital importance in the War on Terror because the “secrecy/threat matrix” renders knowledge and evidence as suspect categories (see Nash 1997, 25). In such a world only affect lives free—fear, desire, and fantasy are the ghosts driving the counterterrorism machinery.

“If you want to buy, I am selling!” exclaims a desperate prisoner at Guantánamo hoping to escape torture if he offers what the tormentor wished to hear. In chapter 9, “What Do You Want? Evidence and Fantasy in the War on Terror,” Joseba Zulaika replays this statement as a way to hammer home the catch-22 of security labor. The observer is caught in a web of delusional narratives produced in reaction to desperate security forces seeking to uncover the secrets of the dangerous Other. The violent search for hidden “truth” is cou-

pled with a culture of secrecy. The state protects its own knowledge and fails not only democracy but also its own desire for accuracy and well-informed decision making. Security agents make decisions based on a threat scenario backed by claims to secret knowledge, knowledge that will forever remain in the shadows and will thus never achieve the status of evidence per se.

The essays by Joseph Masco and Joseba Zulaika bring back to mind the specifics of the presentation made by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2003 to justify regime change in Iraq. In front of the United Nations and the world's media, he briefly lifted the veil of secrecy and showed the world the "veil of transparency" instead (West and Saunders 2003, 20), offering fragments of intercepted phone calls, poor-quality images, and inferences, all while intoning, "My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. . . . This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well-documented" (Powell 2003, 2).

To create the knowledge-effect, conflict or inconsistency must be avoided or, if necessary, denied. The demand for transparency is thus accompanied by a new culture of secrecy. And if Joseba Zulaika shows us in this volume the horror of extracting evidence from fantasy through torture, Joseph Masco's work explores the broader body of evidence, information, and secrets that the War on Terror has brought into play, and with it a phantasmagoria of security and fear, real and fake, terror and suspected terrorists. We are reminded thus of early anthropological inquiries. After all, Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough* was an effort to explore the human tendency toward "prying into the future" often by "pulling at strings to which nothing is attached" (Frazer [1890] 1994, 734, 55). Indeed, even the more sickening efforts to extract evidence during the War on Terror point directly to the space between truth and fantasy and the work that people might perform in that space. Having read Frazer's book, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarked that a person might stab the effigy of an enemy before battle but they also sharpened their blade—"We act like this and then feel satisfied" (Wittgenstein 1979, 14). Evidence in action brings a particular world into play but not necessarily the truth. As security performs its control over the shadowy phantasmagoria of threats to the world, it brings to light practical actions and evidence-making processes. Indeed, bodies as evidence in security contexts are not necessarily about the truth. As Masco (2014) reminds us, in the contemporary moment the war against terrorists is in fact the "War on Terror," a potentially never-ending conflict with an emotion.

Using evidence as a conceptual tool, all of the chapters in this volume cut to the heart of contemporary (in)securitization. The volume is composed of essays in dialog that show how the body has come to be the bearer and signifier of security itself, and how new bodies of evidence are growing and showing themselves to be powerful and transformative. Although the term “security” is often deployed with terminological inexactitude, this should not excuse it from critical anthropological analysis. Indeed, as we noted at the outset, security and insecurity name proliferating forms of governance and evidential regimes. By turning our attention to bodies as evidence, we are able to show how these ostensibly diverse aspects are indeed connected: the body as reference, as enemy, as carrier of insecurities, as the agent of irritation, and the ever evading and liquid focus of regulation. *Bodies as Evidence* shows that security, and all the politics and measures that surround it, is unthinkable without the content added by bodies. We must consider efforts to categorize the body and hence classify populations, efforts to thus know life itself sufficient to develop discourses on the nature of life and of death and predict how human bodies will behave in the future, and as a consequence rendering some lives as worthy and casting other lives to the insecure margins. The diverse examples in this volume will indeed show that the body is the substance of security and its unruly subject. Each anthropological contribution in this volume takes as its starting point that life will always exceed any assemblage of technologies or any governmental effort to work those technologies. Rather, an anthropological investigation of bodies as evidence—be they classificatory, expert-driven or imponderable—is an inquiry into the foundations of social arrangements. In short, then, conceptually and from the basis of ethnographic discussions of everyday life and experience, this volume will add to the growing literature on anthropology and security but also contribute to the overall bodies of scholarship on security in novel ways.

Notes

- 1 In their edited volume, *Modes of Uncertainty* (2015), Paul Rabinow and Limor Samimian-Darash explore the central problem of uncertainty in the contemporary moment, especially the forms of uncertainty that one cannot reduce to traditional notions of risk or danger.
- 2 Francis Fitzgerald (1972) gives us a curious example of what happens when ev-

- idential regimes collide: when the first French steamship visited the coast of nineteenth-century Vietnam, the local Mandarins dismissed it as unseen, because their texts indicated that it was just a dragon.
- 3 For an excellent treatment of the relational qualities of evidence in legal contexts, see Anthony Good's (2007) *Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts*.
 - 4 Jean and John Comaroff acknowledge the problems of perception versus reality in any discussion of global crime rates, especially seeing as the numbers can be run to different effects. A reasonably reliable summary is given by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC combine their own data with the World Health Organization's Mortality Database to provide three-year moving average homicide rates across the world from 1955 to 2012. One sees two clear trends. First, homicide is declining in many parts of the world, especially in prosperous societies with low levels of inequality. Second, where homicide levels are increasing, one sees major societal disruption (see UNODC 2013, 35). The point the Comaroffs make is that uneven crime rates and perceptions of criminality all speak to an underlying shift in societal divisions of labor and moral orders.
 - 5 Daniel Goldstein's recent *Owners of the Sidewalk* (2016) shows the extraordinary scale of the "informal economy" in Bolivia—up to 80 percent of the Bolivian population work in informal commerce. *Owners of the Sidewalk* is also about the "informal" security providers that have sprung up in cities and markets.
 - 6 The work of Foucault on the governing of life itself is heavily influenced by his teacher Georges Canguilhem's discontinuous history of science. Thus, "life has led to a living being that is never completely in the right place, that is destined to 'err' and be 'wrong'" (Foucault 1994, 15).

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