

## INTRODUCTION

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This book originated in a desire to call out empire, which has all too often slunk out of view as nation-centered histories have opened up to the world. The nationalist fervor of recent years has only underscored the value of both the *trans* and the *imperial* approaches brought together in this volume. In such times, it is worth recalling that no polity has ever gone it alone, whether rising or declining in might, and that only-us nationalism has a long history of entwinement with imperialist impulses. Times of unraveling likewise make us take heed of the unraveling, reminding us that global connections have never been inevitable, that our own global moment is the contingent product of high-stakes struggles over power. The fabric of our times has been knit together over millennia, unevenly, with plenty of dropped stitches and new threads. Some of the strands may have torn over time, but we are still enmeshed in the residual filaments of the past.

One such filament, heralded with great acclaim in its day, was the first transatlantic cable. Laid from Ireland to Newfoundland in 1858, this cable enabled electrical impulses to be sent via a copper wire from one shore of the Atlantic to the other. Policymakers at the time saw this and subsequent cables as strategically valuable technologies and as conduits for diplomatic dispatches. Recognizing the usefulness of cables for state purposes, officials helped negotiate cable arrangements and offered subsidies to cable firms.<sup>1</sup> Cable communications affected *international* relations by reducing the likelihood of major battles being fought after the declaration of peace and reducing the autonomy granted by foreign offices to their diplomats. They also accelerated the pace of

diplomacy, at times heightening the pressure on policymakers to act hastily in response to inflamed public passions and hair-trigger military dynamics.<sup>2</sup>

Yet even as transatlantic cables affected *international* relations—that is, official relations between nation-states—most of the signals they transmitted carried market updates, syndicate news, and other nonstate messages. The potential for profit, not just state interest, motivated private-sector investment in cables. The greatest champion of the transatlantic telegraph was not a president or a prime minister but the Anglo-American financier Cyrus Field, the mastermind of the Atlantic Telegraph Company. Field recognized that monetary value could be extracted from the accelerated flow of information. By the 1860s, steam technology had reduced the time lag of news across the Atlantic by several weeks, to less than ten days.<sup>3</sup> The telegraph, however, transported information across the Atlantic in hours and for short messages, mere minutes. This new communications technology kept readers up to date on important developments in business, politics, even weather, thus bringing a range of markets on either side of the Atlantic into closer sync, feeling global capital more densely.<sup>4</sup>

Given that the first transatlantic cable did not so much connect nation-states as it connected a variety of nonstate actors and interests across national boundaries, enabling quicker U.S.-British connections via Canada, the resulting histories might seem to merit the label *transnational*. Though its roots can be traced back decades, indeed generations, in histories of migration, diaspora, movement politics, and the Atlantic World, the term *transnational* took off in U.S. history writing in 2002, with the publication of *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, edited by Thomas Bender. This anthology aimed to make sense of an increasingly interconnected world by breaking history out of the national containers that had come to structure understandings of the past. In his contribution to *Rethinking American History*, Akira Iriye distinguished between the terms *international* and *transnational*: “Whereas ‘international’ implies a relationship among nations, ‘transnational’ suggests various types of interactions across national boundaries. Extraterritorial movements of individuals, goods, capital, and even ideas would seem to be less international than transnational phenomena.”<sup>5</sup> Following this definition, the transatlantic cable appears to have resulted from *transnational* corporate relationships and facilitated *transnational* communications.

But even the term *transnational* does not fully capture the relationships stitched into being by the first transatlantic cables. Given that the cable bound the receivers in Valentia Harbor, Ireland, to those in Trinity Bay, Newfoundland, the crews of the cable-laying ships to the people in the coastal towns where they docked, the markets in London to those in New York, we could

regard the resulting relationships as more site-specific than the term *transnational* suggests. The word *translocal* can capture the smaller-scale nature of some of the links forged by the cable, but it still doesn't capture the entire array of the relationships brought into being when the cable-laying ship reached shore. For that, the more capacious term *transborder* might be more apt. We might even drop the *trans* prefix in favor of different conceptual vocabularies: communications revolution, capitalism, entanglements, globalization, Atlantic World, and the like. But all of these terms continue to obscure some of the most important political formations spliced together by these cables: the powerful empires of the day.

The transatlantic cable was a product of Victorian imperialism. The copper wires that formed the core of the cable were wrapped in an insulating layer of gutta percha. This substance—a rubber-like gum from the gutta percha tree—came from tropical rainforests in Siam; the British colonies of Malaya and Sarawak; the Dutch colonies of Java, Sumatra, and Borneo; French Indochina and the Spanish (and subsequently U.S.) colony of the Philippines. The final layer of wrapping, before the tar and pitch outer coating, consisted of jute yarn. Like gutta percha, jute came from the tropics, where it was grown mostly by colonial subjects in Bengal.<sup>6</sup> The rapid growth of global telegraphy in the late nineteenth century in turn intensified imperial control and resource extraction in these regions.<sup>7</sup>

Not only were the transatlantic cables literally wrapped in the stuff of empire, but they also traveled imperial routes. It is worth reiterating that the early transatlantic cable did not directly connect the United States and England. Rather it connected the British colonies of Ireland and Newfoundland. The newly laid cables fed into larger webs of empire, unspooling on the eastern side of the Atlantic to the southern tip of Africa or through the Red Sea to Aden, before going on to Singapore and Hong Kong.<sup>8</sup> One of the catalysts for the boom in British telegraphy was the major imperial crisis of the mid-Victorian era, the “Great Rebellion” of 1857 in India. Imperial officials, urged on by metropolitan telegraph boosters, vowed never again to be kept weeks away from news of colonial uprisings.<sup>9</sup> As the foregoing suggests, the new telegraph wires of the era were predominantly the products of British power and enterprise.

It was through the global circuits of its former colonial master that the United States came into telegraphic contact with Europe and its colonies. On the American side of the Atlantic, the cables fed into the expanding telegraph network that was helping the United States extend its power across the continent and onward in the hemisphere. The transatlantic cables thus joined different imperial geographies and forms. But no bond is permanent. The first transatlantic cable snapped shortly after being laid in 1858, widening once again the

distance between North America and the world during one of the great global crises of the nineteenth century, the American Civil War. The ensuing irregularity of Atlantic communications contributed to the destabilization of political relations and markets during the conflict. When transatlantic telegraphic exchange resumed in 1866, much had changed: the world's mightiest slave-holding empire had morphed into an industrializing behemoth whose imperial capabilities were evident in its breakneck colonization of the North American West and rapidly expanding influence in the Caribbean and Pacific.

TELEGRAPH CABLES WERE NOT the only things entangled in empire in the Victorian era, for empires played a fundamental role in the making of the modern world. Writing on the years since 1405, the British historian John Darwin has argued that “the default position so far as politics went was imperial power.”<sup>10</sup> The seeming rise of the sovereign nation-state by the seventeenth century hid the ongoing significance of imperial states in the modern world. Prior to the great age of decolonization in the aftermath of World War II, most of the world's people were incorporated into formal empires. Some of these—such as the Qing, Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian, German, and U.S. empires—were primarily land based, with a central state exercising control over Indigenous people or smaller nations. Even some polities without central state bureaucracies created land-based empires, as seen in the example of the Comanche empire.<sup>11</sup> Other empires—such as the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, British, Danish, Belgian, Japanese, and Italian—were especially notable for overseas colonies, stretching from New Zealand to Greenland. Some imperial formations, such as the American republics that emerged from European rule in the nineteenth century, have long been labeled as nations and yet existed in the gray zone where nations shade into empires, with central states exercising colonial forms of power over the Indigenous peoples within their borders and often pursuing expansionist policies at the expense of neighboring states.<sup>12</sup> In the global era of empire building that stretched from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries, some colonial subjects even had colonial subjects. Not only did settler colonists exercise power over Indigenous people, but Europeanized elites in places like the Philippines also exercised power over animist “tribes.”<sup>13</sup>

Historians generally define *empire* as a political unit that encompasses an extensive sweep of territory containing various peoples or polities. Empires are known for according varying degrees of autonomy and different rights, dependent on geography and population group. They are typically characterized by vast disparities in power, sustained by the use or threat of force, as

well as through asymmetric structures of economic and ecological exchange. Empires might extend their power through *settler colonialism*—meaning an influx of newcomers who dominate, displace, or kill Indigenous peoples, typically upending ecological systems as well.<sup>14</sup> They might be characterized more by *territorial annexation* without substantial demographic change or with substantial intergroup mixing. They might rely heavily on *indirect rule*, that is, the exercise of power without sovereign claims, through collaborators, economic dominance, or military intimidation. They might mix all of the above. The term *imperial formations* can serve as an umbrella for this wide range of definitions, in the process drawing attention to the making and unmaking of empires as an “active and contingent process.”<sup>15</sup>

Until recently, scholarship on imperial formations treated them much as historians treated nation-states prior to calls for transnational scholarship—that is, as well bounded. This particularly has been the case in the U.S. historiography, which has had to deal with a persistent case of empire denial. To navigate this peculiar terrain, historians of the United States have written brief after brief debunking the deniers. One of the leading surveys of U.S. foreign relations through 1865, for example, opens with a ten-point list as to why the United States should be classified as an empire.<sup>16</sup> The persistent struggle to “prove” the existence of U.S. empire to audiences fixed on nationalist narratives has had the unintended effect of cordoning off U.S. imperial formations from those established by other imperial powers. Historians have brought other empires into the U.S. picture mostly to add comparative angles to their unclustering efforts.<sup>17</sup>

To the extent that historians have understood various empires as bumping up against each other, clashing, or even collaborating, they long have emphasized official *interimperial* relations, though often labeling these relations *international*. They have, for example, paid ample attention to imperial rivalries, wars, and transfers of colonies from one empire to another. They have also studied interimperial collaborations such as the Berlin Conference that carved up Africa and the multi-imperial force that landed troops in China in 1900 to quell the Boxer Uprising.<sup>18</sup> Yet these latter relationships have been so overshadowed by the former that the historian Richard Drayton has come up with the term *masked condominiums* to describe the largely hidden partnerships between empires.<sup>19</sup>

Among these partnerships are those that thickened the network of nineteenth-century telegraph cables, described in a recent account as a product of “interimperial collaboration.”<sup>20</sup> Traceable to the early twentieth-century writings of J. A. Hobson, *interimperialism* is a useful concept for the interactions

between imperial formations.<sup>21</sup> Yet in our historiographical age, the term connotes official dealings of governments and armed forces in much the same way that *international* is taken to mean a focus on state-to-state relations. The term *interimperial* thus hides the types of nonstate relations brought to mind by the prefix *trans*, thereby perpetuating conceptions of empires as official units that interact with each other only as such.<sup>22</sup>

THIS VOLUME SEEKS TO bring sharper definition and meaning to an emerging historiography that is seeking to break free from the stand-alone paradigm to probe the connections between empires. Despite the particular dynamics driving inward-looking histories of U.S. imperial formations, there are counterdynamics that provide the background to this volume. As national histories have opened up so as to encompass border crossings of various kinds, it has become increasingly difficult to contain the imperial. In keeping with the turn toward more transnational scholarship, histories of empire have begun venturing into *transimperial* terrain. In some cases they have done so explicitly, using the term that appears in the subtitle of this volume. In a history of Pacific Rim settler colonies, Penelope Edmonds identifies the construction of Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism as a transimperial process across British dominions and the United States.<sup>23</sup> Paul Kramer has characterized U.S. colonial officials' adoption of the structures and practices of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines as "historias transimperiales."<sup>24</sup> Jesse Cromwell has written on the "trans-imperial lives" of mobile people; Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski have alluded to "transimperial networks of contact and debate"; Richard Drayton has analyzed "the trans-imperial campaign" to save natural resources; and Julian Go has used the term "trans-imperial" in reference to Irish nationalism's influence on Puerto Rican anticolonialism.<sup>25</sup> The term *transimperial*—sometimes hyphenated, sometimes not—has popped up in other contexts too, ranging from the connections between the Venetian and Ottoman empires to the character of the "Greater Caribbean world."<sup>26</sup>

The scholarship that inspired this volume traces its genealogy back to the transnational turn and its predecessors and also to the boom in global, imperial, and postcolonial history. Much of this work has been produced by scholars outside of the United States. Studies of the "British world," for example, have foregrounded the connections between imperial center and specific colonies, as well as the *intra-imperial* or *transcolonial* networks that linked various British colonies to one another, whether as parts of entire webs, as the former term suggests, or as the linked peripheries brought to mind by the latter.<sup>27</sup> Studies

of “imperial careering,” institutional networks, and labor mobility have been particularly successful at uncovering these dimensions of the British Empire.<sup>28</sup> British imperial scholars also have called for more “connected histories of empire” that extend beyond the British world to consider the synergies and frictions between different empires.<sup>29</sup> Such a connected imperial history can find inspiration in global histories of empire and more regionally specific studies of oceanic “worlds,” such as those of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific.<sup>30</sup> This rapidly growing body of transimperial research runs the gamut of lines of inquiry. “Migrant workers, missionaries, social reformers, highly educated professionals, and humble pilgrims, as well as money, commodities, technologies, and even diseases, moved among imperial systems,” Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton point out in an influential study that traces the development of what they label “imperial globality.”<sup>31</sup>

This emerging transimperial scholarship signals a more geographically capacious and politically aware approach that offers much to historians of U.S. empire. It invites further investigation into border-crossing relationships in which imperial formations figure prominently and in which the main dynamic is not the affirmation of boundaries through official state-to-state relations but the blurring of them through mobility, connectivity, exchange, and adaptation. Far from being just interesting sideshows, such transimperial processes are key to our understanding of the origins, development, and erosion of imperialism in modern history. Awareness of the bridges between empires and the traffic they have carried also brings into focus the countervailing construction of barriers and walls. Approaching the past with connectivity in mind can help us place interimperial rivalries and conflicts in the larger context of coexistence. Rather than appearing the norm, wars stand out as times of conspicuous disruption that have severed some connections across empires, even as they have forged new ones, not least of which were the anti-imperial movements that swept across the globe during and after the world wars of the twentieth century.

Much of the emerging scholarship on transimperial connections has focused on the high age of empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These are the years that even the most vociferous deniers of U.S. imperialism grudgingly cede as an aberration, due to military interventions, occupations, annexations, and financial control in places such as Hawai‘i, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Virgin Islands, and numerous so-called guano islands (some of which are now administered as refuges by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). These years marked the consolidation of U.S. control over Indigenous peoples within its newly fixed North American borders. They were also the hey-

day of a European-dominated global imperial order, spanning the time from the so-called scramble for Africa to the rise of national self-determination as a fundamental liberal principle, the invigoration of anticolonial nationalist movements amid the crisis of World War I, and the seeming promise of communist alternatives to colonial rule following the Bolshevik Revolution.<sup>32</sup> Histories of this thoroughly imperial—yet highly contested—span of time are beginning to reveal hidden dimensions of the American past: those of an imperial formation in an imperial world.<sup>33</sup>

Our efforts to track down the mobility of organisms, goods, and capital and the systems that made such mobility possible first drew our attention to imperial crossings. As the example of the transatlantic cable suggests, the United States and its expanding empire became increasingly integrated into the imperial structures and systems of the European powers. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. From the nineteenth century into the twentieth, American companies traded and invested in European colonies, seeking, for example, rubber, oil, bauxite, and tin, as well as export markets in Southeast Asia. Corporate agents linked their own interests to European colonial power (especially in the face of Japanese assertiveness in East Asia and the Pacific), even while professing anticolonial commitments.<sup>34</sup> Transimperial ties can be found in histories of consumption as well as production. The sugar, teas, bananas, tropical hardwoods, Oriental rugs, and cashmere shawls so relished by U.S. consumers were among a wide array of products that arrived through imperial routes.<sup>35</sup> Many of the animals that populated U.S. zoos in the late nineteenth century likewise came from imperial snares.<sup>36</sup> In ports around the world, U.S. steamships voraciously consumed foreign coals, particularly those mined in Britain and its imperial possessions.<sup>37</sup> One of the editors of this volume started thinking about the value of an anthology following research on bioprospecting, salt pork, and curry. The other editor came to this topic through his research on the transimperial passageways of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company.

Some other early glimmerings that the word *transnational* was distorting the past emerged from mappings of human mobility. American slave traders, like their European partners and rivals, coursed in and out of imperial outposts in their nefarious dealings.<sup>38</sup> The migration from the U.S. eastern seaboard to California in the mid-nineteenth century is traditionally presented as a national story. Yet more migrants traveled to the goldfields via Central America than in the overland covered wagons of American folklore. Such transit routes, especially the world's first transcontinental railroad in Panama (completed in 1855), facilitated the exchange of people, goods, and services across a number of empires.<sup>39</sup>

Numerous accounts reveal the inadequacy of strictly national frameworks for understanding labor migrants and other mobile people.<sup>40</sup> These include histories of the British colonial subjects from Barbados and Jamaica who worked on the Panama Railroad and, later, the Panama Canal.<sup>41</sup> Histories of human mobility across the Pacific have also tracked the ways in which imperial circuits threading through South Asia, Japan, China, the Philippines, Hawai'i, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa became enmeshed with settler colonialism in places such as British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon.<sup>42</sup> Borderlands accounts of Native Americans who moved back and forth between U.S., Mexican, and Canadian jurisdiction further trouble the assumption that cross-border mobility can be contained within histories of nation-states.<sup>43</sup> Missionary histories also cross imperial domains, for most of the missionaries who set forth from the United States for “heathen” lands in the long nineteenth century (stretching through World War I) landed in European colonies, where they depended on European power for security and access.<sup>44</sup> Stories of individuals likewise reveal imperial crossings, as seen in writings on Mary Leiter Curzon, the Chicago-born heiress who became vicereine of India; Santukno Hiramura, an Ainu woman who found some common ground with a native Patagonian woman at the 1904 St. Louis Fair; and the Filipino nationalist José Rizal, who named his anti-Spanish movement “los indios bravos” after the Native Americans he had seen performing in a Wild West show.<sup>45</sup>

Once we started thinking about transimperial connections, still more examples started jumping out in our readings on colonial governance. British imperialists looked to the United States as a potential model for imperial federation, and twentieth-century German and Japanese expansionists also referenced the United States.<sup>46</sup> Anti-Asian immigration policies were not just a matter of national, much less transnational politics—they played out across the British, U.S., Japanese and other empires.<sup>47</sup> Ideas about coolie labor circulated among the sugar planters of the British West Indies, the Spanish colony of Cuba, and Louisiana, with consequences for U.S. migration policies, naturalization law, and racial politics.<sup>48</sup> Colonial state builders in the U.S.-occupied Philippines and other island territories looked to European colonies for ideas.<sup>49</sup> And European colonial administrators looked back. The German colonial government in Togo, for example, brought in cotton-growing experts from Tuskegee Institute in Alabama to enhance the productivity of their African labor force, and hence the profits of German planters.<sup>50</sup>

These kinds of affinities and connections also appear in histories of anti-colonial resistance. Pan-Africanist politics connected black intellectuals and activists in the Caribbean, Central and North America, Europe, and Africa.<sup>51</sup>

Anticolonial and antiracist movements crossed the Pacific as well.<sup>52</sup> Mobilizing more on the grounds of colored cosmopolitanism than diasporic affinities, African American activists joined South Asian nationalists in professing common commitments to antiracism and decolonization.<sup>53</sup> Pan-Asianist advocates positioned themselves in opposition to an entire network of interlaced powers.<sup>54</sup> People subject to changing or overlapping colonial rulers can also be seen as acting transimperially. The Trinidadians who used the U.S. presence during World War II to advance anticolonial struggles against the British may have positioned themselves *interimperially* (meaning between empires), but they also navigated two layered empires so as to advance their own interests.<sup>55</sup>

With our antennae attuned, we picked up more evidence of transimperialism in histories of imperial transfer and succession, including the U.S. acquisition of one-time Spanish holdings and the growing U.S. footprint in one-time European colonies during the Cold War.<sup>56</sup> Allusions to U.S. nationals and imperial subjects as peripheral or bit players in other empires began to register as further evidence of transimperial pasts. Our forays outside of our main field in U.S. history persistently reminded us that there are plenty of transimperial histories—whether written or yet to be told—in which the United States only hovers off stage, if it is present at all.<sup>57</sup>

Recent scholarship on the history of capitalism has played a particularly significant role in busting open nationalist frameworks so as to better reveal the workings of power. The new literature on the U.S. South in the nineteenth century has illuminated the many ways in which the economic vitality of slavery rested upon the transimperial processes that enabled Indian removal and field clearing, international commodity market development, transoceanic transportation, industrial capitalist production, and global consumption of southern staple crops, particularly cotton.<sup>58</sup> The southern slave empire was less a distinctly American phenomenon than it was the product of the expansion of Victorian capitalism, which produced a wave of “second slavery” in the New World, as well as coercive labor regimes within the colonial world more generally.<sup>59</sup> Recent work on the various forms of political economy that underwrote nineteenth-century capitalist development also have highlighted connections to imperialism. Take the case of debates over protectionism versus free trade. These were framed in relation to national development but also, crucially, with imperial market rivalries in mind.<sup>60</sup> New infrastructures of empire owed much to emerging imperial states, which lavished subsidies upon steam transport companies arms-race-style.<sup>61</sup>

Historians also are returning to an older literature probing the links between imperialism and capital flows that can be traced back to J. A. Hobson’s writ-

ings around 1900. This literature positions the late nineteenth-century United States as both an upstart, imperialist exporter of capital and, paradoxically, a satellite within the orbit of the powerful financial empire based in London.<sup>62</sup> Recognizing the ways that traders, investors, resource extractors, managers, workers, and corporations navigated multiple imperial formations can help us grasp the larger politics of economic connections. This recognition has particular significance for understandings of the U.S. role in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the world systems writings that took off in the 1960s analyzed the role of the “developed world” in forging Latin American dependency, more specific studies focused on either U.S. or European penetration of the Latin American periphery. As a result of this either-or bilateral approach, the foreign relations historians who have focused on U.S. financial and military power have argued for U.S. hegemony, even in the years leading up to World War I, when European rivals still exercised considerable clout. Approaching the history of this region with transimperialism in mind can thus do more than power up relations previously described as transnational—it can better explain the workings and extent of U.S. power in the historical stomping grounds of European empires.<sup>63</sup>

The more we thought about the range of scholarship outlined above, as well as the propensity of scholars to stamp it all with the transnational label, for lack of a better term, the more we became convinced that historians need to be more explicit about the political formations and power dynamics that shaped the border-crossing histories they tell. They need to stop using *transnational* as a default term and call out empire when it appears. Assuming all border-crossing histories to be transnational in nature writes the contemporary prominence of the nation-state anachronistically into the past, collapsing power relationships into national frames. Even terms such as *translocal* and *transborder* can hide important structures of power. Opening up beyond *transcolonial*, the term *transimperial* also encompasses imperial centers, geographies of indirect governance, and nonsovereign forms of power. The words we choose do analytical work—hence our efforts to define so many. Misleading terminology keeps us from understanding the politics of transimperial pasts.

The essays in this volume do not ignore national formations. They recognize that empires and nations are tangled up in all kinds of messy ways that sometimes defy clear distinctions. But they all start from the assumption that making imperial formations visible can help us to recognize the many asymmetric power relations that have crisscrossed over time and space. The point is larger than just labeling empires as such when relevant, however. It is to follow the admonition to ask what empire does.<sup>64</sup> How can recognizing imperial

formations enhance our understandings of particular circuits, connections, and paths? How can it sharpen our analyses of power? Our appraisals of globalization and the makings of the modern world? These are some of the questions that drive this volume.

THE ESSAYS THAT FOLLOW probe these questions. Rather than attempt to provide an overarching narrative of transimperialism as it has related to U.S. history, the chapters in this volume paint a more pointillist picture, showcasing cutting-edge research on the topic. The contributors are joined together by their interests in globalizing U.S. history, in understanding empire, and in historicizing the global. But they come from a variety of subdisciplines, including the histories of business, diplomacy, the environment, gender, Indigenous peoples, labor, material culture, medicine, migration, politics, and race and ethnicity. Their work scrambles the old historiographic divides between traditional diplomatic history and newer work deeply inflected by social, cultural, transnational, and postcolonial approaches. Of particular note, it helps us avoid the seeming inevitability suggested by impersonal broad-brushstroke histories and advance the “histories from below” perspectives that have figured so prominently in postcolonial studies. Though attuned to structural considerations, these essays foreground agency and individual experience in ways that remind us of the possibilities for social and political change as well as of the ways that the most intimate and small-scale matters have been formed by vast fields of power and vice versa. If microhistories contain the global, the reverse is also true: the power lines and force fields of the global can be truly grasped only through their fine-grained constituent parts. We welcome this volume’s commingling of approaches, geographies, concerns, and scales because of the resulting insights into the power relations that have forged the modern world.

Part I opens with essays by John Soluri and Stephen Tuffnell that reveal how the pursuit of profit unsettled imperial boundaries, as well as accelerated the exploitation of labor and resources. Part II, comprising essays by Michel Gobat, Julian Go, and Anne L. Foster, examines political ideas, practices, and institutions that straddled imperial borders. This subject is further developed in the essays by Nicole M. Phelps, Marc-William Palen, and Oliver Charbonneau in part III, which assess the structures of governance that sought to order transimperial relations and commerce. The essays of part IV, written by Ikuko Asaka, Julie Greene, and Genevieve Clutario, zoom in on the migrants, laborers, and colonial subjects whose experiences were conditioned by transimperial interactions and successions. The final section, part V, comprising essays by Moon-Ho

Jung and Margaret D. Jacobs, considers how resistance to imperial power has gathered momentum through transimperial crossings.

Taken together, these essays de-exceptionalize the study of U.S. imperialism by weaving the strands of empire involving the United States and U.S. actors into world history. This makes it harder to deny the history of U.S. imperialism, for to do so would mean to rend the fabric of global history; it also illuminates the workings of empire and the processes of imperial formation. Historians researching across present-day boundaries have always faced plenty of hurdles (financial, linguistic, and otherwise). Only a collective effort can begin to bring the larger landscape of transimperial histories into view, and these essays do that well. They relegate the term *transnational* to specific relations with specific (mostly European) states, at least prior to decolonization. For border crossings elsewhere, they bring state power out of the shadows and give it form. They are sensitive to moving borders, to changes in sovereignty in particular places, to bird's-eye and ground-level views. They navigate the fuzzy lines between inter- and trans-; between colonial, national, and imperial. Joining with global historians who have rejected the premise that change only radiated outward from imperial centers, they map its multidirectionality.<sup>65</sup> Recognizing the divisions and hierarchies within imperial formations as well as across them, they track lateral and vertical vectors in multiple fields.

Just as important, this attention to imperial formations helps illuminate the borders and barriers that inhibited movement and connection, that channeled transiness in particular directions.<sup>66</sup> These essays, in other words, are alert to the ways that cross-border interactions and processes served the interests of imperial regimes, as well as undermined them, often in unexpected ways. Along with helping us to understand the specific routes and limited-access lanes traveled by people, ideas, and things, these essays draw attention to the overlaid experiences of empire found in particular communities and places. Together they provide a better accounting of the imperial roots of the world system we inhabit today. Their sensitivity to the limits of U.S. power, as well as to moments of rupture and reconfiguration, makes them especially timely.

In unearthing these previously hidden imperial histories, this volume seeks to do more than simply slot the United States into Europe-centered frameworks of global history and empire. Indeed this volume has emerged from postcolonial critiques of core and periphery models.<sup>67</sup> Integrating America's entangled imperial past into global history matters not simply because it de-exceptionalizes the United States but also because it provides new possibilities for understanding the origins of what we now call *globalization*. When viewed through a transimperial prism, globalization looks different than when seen as an outgrowth of

individual colonial regimes. The formal trappings of colonialism—the color-coded maps and metropole-periphery binaries—recede in importance, giving ground to a more Jackson Pollock-like world of mobile labor, cross-border political negotiation, and multifaceted exchanges, that, however random they may seem at first glance, still reveal patterns and power.

Although this volume focuses on the years before the United States could call itself a superpower—the years in which it had to carefully navigate between other empires as it laid the groundwork for its future might—the sensitivity to power found in these essays can help us understand the origins of the post-1945 sphere presided over by the United States. For what were the international institutions constructed by the United States after 1945 other than transimperial configurations of governance, economy, and defense? Even in the supposed American century, the border-straddling infrastructures that knit the transatlantic alliance and larger anticommunist bloc together advanced more global cross-border phenomena. The economic liberalism and material exchanges of this era did more than consolidate wealth, especially across the so-called Global North. As mass migrations and ecological transformations dramatically reveal, they also linked North to South, East to West, aligned to nonaligned, urban to rural, rich to poor, in thoroughly encompassing ways, still shot through by power as before. Even after the great wave of decolonization in the second half of the twentieth century and the rise of new non-Western configurations, transimperial girders from the prewar past continued to structure the modern world. The current fracturing of the post-World War II order is exposing transimperial trusses among the I-beams of self-interested states. The more that postwar structures teeter, the more apparent it becomes that the United States has never been as hegemonic as both celebrants and critics of the Pax Americana have maintained.

Although the essays in this volume provide the backstory to the age of U.S.-led globalization, they pick up the story midsentence. Historians of the eighteenth century have long written transimperial histories, even if not using that term. This volume extends their approaches to the post-1815 period, but much more could be done in this respect. Other future lines of inquiry might venture into historical terrain in which the United States does not figure largely, if at all, and to imperial formations beyond the scope of this launch-stage volume. A short collection such as this could not possibly do justice to every topic, and we must confess to egregious gaps. We look forward to more transimperial histories centering on groups such as women and Indigenous people; topics such as slavery, black radicalism, science, and agriculture; nonhuman animals and organisms; reinterpretations of global institutions such as the United Nations

and World Bank; and places such as borderlands, enclaves, and military bases. We believe that studies of the Anthropocene must keep an eye on the transimperial ledger sheets of benefits, costs, and culpability. Truly there is much work to be done. But to see the possibilities that might follow from putting empire into greater conversation with transiness, these essays are a great place to start.

#### NOTES

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4. Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, *Communication and Empire: Media, Markets, and Globalization, 1860–1930* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), xvii.

5. Akira Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, edited by Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 51. An earlier usage of this term can be found in Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994). For some examples of scholarship that provided transnational analyses prior to *Rethinking American History*, see Frank Thistlethwaite, *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959); Ian Tyrrell, *Woman’s World, Woman’s Empire: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880–1930* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). For assessments of transnational approaches that critique U.S.-centrism and highlight the need for more attentiveness to power, see Louis A. Pérez Jr., “We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International,” *Journal of American History* 89 (September 2002): 558–66; Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J. T. Way, “Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis,” *American Quarterly* 60 (September 2008): 625–48.

6. Steven C. Topik and Allen Wells, "Commodity Chains in a Global Economy," in *A World Connecting, 1870–1945*, edited by Emily S. Rosenberg (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 740; Tariq Omar Ali, *A Local History of Global Capital: Jute and Peasant Life in the Bengal Delta* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
7. John Tully, "A Victorian Ecological Disaster: Imperialism, the Telegraph, and Gutta-Percha," *Journal of World History* 20 (December 2009): 567.
8. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon*, 46; Martin Redfern, "Wiring Up the 'Victorian Internet,'" *BBC News*, November 29, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4475394.stm>.
9. Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 99.
10. John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2007), 491. Chris Bayly makes a similar point in a recent roundtable conversation: "Before 1850, large parts of the globe were not dominated by nations so much as by empires, city-states, diasporas, etc. . . . To designate 'global history' as 'transnational history' would not be very useful before 1914, if then." He goes on to say that global and transnational historians have "continued to grapple with the problem of modeling the element of power into the concept of circulation," C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 111 (December 2006): 1442, 1452.
11. Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). See also Anne F. Hyde, *Empires, Nations, and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800–1860* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).
12. Krishan Kumar, "Empires and Nations: Convergence or Divergence?," in *Sociology and Empire: The Imperial Entanglements of a Discipline*, edited by George Steinmetz (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 279–99.
13. Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 380.
14. Margaret D. Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880–1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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21. For Hobson, see the conclusion of Steve Tuffnell's essay in this volume.

22. After his initial call for transnational histories, Thomas Bender wrote an essay, "An Empire among Empires," that briefly touched on imperial crossings. But this essay dwelt more on categorization (what might it mean to label the United States an empire?) than transiness, and as one chapter in a larger work titled *A Nation among Nations*, this essay did not dislodge the nation as the main unit for border-crossing histories. Thomas Bender, "An Empire among Empires," in *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 182–245.

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