

Introduction

Gendering the Japanese New Left

In April 1970, at an event attended by antiwar activists, students, vagabonds, and other assorted left-leaning young Japanese in Tokyo, four young women stormed the stage. They wore the helmets then in vogue among radical street fighters, but in place of the names of existing factions, they had adorned their black helmets with the white letters s-e-x. The four women, student activists at Tama Arts University, had planned this debut for their new Thought Group s.e.x. as a challenge to the masculinist culture of the New Left. Their confrontation went awry, however, when someone turned up the volume on the ten TV screens at the venue and drowned out their voices, and the crowd turned to watch a teenage girl perform a nonsensical game of dancing rock, paper, and scissors. When the young woman began to strip, the men in the audience demanded that the helmeted women strip as well. They slunk off the stage, ashamed. In their reflections on this failed intervention, the women of Thought Group s.e.x. expressed anger at how male activists had isolated women and their concerns in the movement yet again.¹

The young women of Thought Group s.e.x. described how the campus struggles and barricades of the late 1960s had seemed like a place where relations between men and women could be rebuilt, how a coeducational revolution might have been possible in newly coeducational spaces. They too had shared in formulating a leftist critique of the world in which they lived, in challenging the state and capital. Hadn't they also built the barricades

and faced the shields of the riot police alongside male student activists? However, they noted in retrospect, “That struggle was certainly our struggle, but at the same time it wasn’t.”² This is the story of “that struggle”—the campus-based New Left in Japan. Here I explore the meanings created by the participation of female university students in radical protest in the 1960s, as young men and women battled police in the streets, challenged political institutions, and paralyzed the higher education system.

The leftist student movement in postwar Japan criticized how the Japanese state and economy benefited from a capitalist geopolitical order maintained through U.S.-led military might and also implicated them and their education in that system. But what made this movement a “new” Left was its break from the “old” establishment Left of the Japanese Communist Party and Japanese Socialist Party. What I identify as the campus-based New Left in Japan demanded a more expansive definition of politics and applied leftist insights about economic oppression to a broader range of dynamics. In the context of the civil rights movement in the United States, popular challenges to Stalinism in the Eastern Bloc, and third world nationalist liberation struggles—of which the Vietnam War became the most influential—activists began to consider how racism and imperialism intersected with the economics of capitalism, for example. This expansive idea of liberation struggles would inspire women’s liberation activists in the 1970s. Student activists’ sweeping critiques of power in postwar Japan promised to completely dismantle the hierarchies that undergirded various forms of domination and intimated a more radical call to reformulate various relationships: economic, social, political, and intimate.

Young women in particular often found that New Left activism offered them opportunities to formulate a revolutionary sensibility that could transcend social expectations based on sex. In the late 1950s, when the left-leaning student movement broke from the Japanese Communist Party, part of what marked this New Left as new for many observers was precisely the participation of female students. Along with gaining new access to the political realm through enfranchisement, women also entered formerly all-male spaces of higher education in the postwar period, as previously men-only universities were forced to become coeducational. Shifting definitions of politics and violence associated with the New Left map onto changes in popular representations of the female student activist and illuminate the potential of and limits to the movement’s politics.

While many women’s movements in modern Japan framed activism around assumptions about women’s domestic role, the New Left’s radical

understanding of politics promised to subvert the most basic assumptions about society.³ Young women involved in the campus-based New Left also thought it would offer them a rare chance to engage in activism away from gendered expectations and spaces, such as the home, and to participate as full equals with young men.

And yet various dynamics—within the movement and in the interpretation of the movement within the mass media—often foreclosed that opportunity. Portrayals of the New Left by activists and journalists alike applied a gendered script to postwar student activism, defining how women could participate in radical politics. The movement was unable to address, in a meaningful way, the critiques brought up by young female participants about continued exclusion based on sexual difference, and it came to celebrate a masculine ideal of political action. There is a tension within this history: the campus-based New Left in Japan was a radical movement that in many ways prompted its participants to consider how lived daily life intersected with larger political and economic structures, and thus it opened up spaces for consideration of the often invisible role of female labor within modern capitalism, while dynamics within the movement also foreclosed such discussions.

There is also a tension within the historiography of the 1960s, inasmuch as it often memorializes the New Left as primarily male. This is particularly pronounced in the Japanese case, but it is not exclusive to Japan. Susana Draper, writing on “the women of 1968” in Mexico, also identified a “masculine monopoly over the memory of the moment.” This does a great disservice to the profoundly unsettling nature of the radical New Left in the global 1960s. As Draper noted, “One gets the impression that, instead of actualizing a moment profoundly open to the destabilization of conventional roles, the liberatory potential of the moment was superseded by a memory that was consummated in reproducing the same system of hierarchy that they had previously contested, in terms of both social class and sexual difference.”⁴ Such a masculinist memorialization reproduces some of the strains of a masculinist culture that in many ways undermined the student movement in Japan and elsewhere. We could, instead, examine the expansive vision of politics that mobilized a generation of not only young men but also young women to recover a profoundly radical feminist genealogy from within the New Left, as young people questioned the status quo and sought a space to radically reconceptualize their relationships with all social expectations. On the level of the daily lived negotiations within radical movements in the 1960s, we can see how women and men

organizing together often revealed tensions about sexism but also troubled received notions about the proper social roles of women.

Not only have women's participation in and contributions to the New Left in Japan been ignored, but a great deal of energy has been expended to ignore them, and that process requires attention. Female participation in student activism was quickly and persistently policed both from within the movement and from without, through the actions of male activists and of the mass media. One of my goals here is to understand female contributions to the radical student movement and the contemporaneous operations by which these contributions were undermined, in order to uncover a dynamic tension within radical politics in postwar Japan. Emancipatory, radical, anticapitalist politics was at the heart of the global 1960s, and while activists may have had their own oversights and failings, it was a moment in which revolution against the status quo was on the agenda, and people were not afraid to point out the contradictions at the heart of their everyday lives.

But why write a history of the female student in the Japanese New Left when one of the fascinating things about the 1960s as a political moment was the way in which conventional roles were destabilized? One risks reifying the category of "woman" while narrating a kind of herstory of the postwar student movement. Rather than understand all female students as sharing the same experience of activism, however, I try to understand women within a relational system of social expectations attached to sex-based differences (following Joan Scott) and thus use gender as a tool to analyze status quo expectations.⁵ Not only is the category of woman relative, but it is also defined within hierarchies of power and intersects with other vectors of power and access in a society. This study touches on the gendered language and symbols available in postwar Japan to interpret political activism, and how individuals related to these symbols, by focusing on moments of contested politics and considering a movement that demanded a more expansive definition of politics. In that sense, what I am doing is a gendered history that attempts to understand how women—a category that actually contains a wide diversity of experiences—were configured in regard to labor and care in postwar Japan.

While I understand "women" as a social concept based on a constellation of expectations, I also understand that speaking of gender in the 1960s can be an anachronistic framing, since people living at the time did not use the term. For that reason, even while illuminating what I see as gendered dynamics at work in postwar Japanese society and in the student New Left,

I also try to reflect the vocabulary employed at the time, hence the employment of the term *coed* to refer to the female student.

The title of my study, *Coed Revolution*, emphasizes the newly coeducational character of many universities and of student activism in 1960s Japan, while also underlining that the female coed represented a potentially revolutionary figure. The English word *coed* also carries reactionary valences that make it my favored translation for the Japanese term *joshigakusei* (female student).⁶ This literally means “girl student,” which I translate as *coed* to emphasize the secondary status this term implies in contrast to “student,” or *gakusei*, which, because maleness is the assumed norm, was unburdened by the gendered qualifier. The postwar student movement in Japan was coed inasmuch as postwar higher education reforms encouraged integration of young women into formerly all-male institutions. This experience often tested the radical politics of student activists and exposed moments of persistent exclusion.

WHY FOCUS ON THE FEMALE STUDENT?

The female university student tested the radical politics of student activists at the same time as she was challenging general social and economic divisions that insisted on separate spheres for men and women. She was a middle-class identity in a time when the middle class was expanding and bolstering a myth of a classless, ethnically homogeneous nation in Japan.⁷ As Tessa Morris-Suzuki has pointed out, the postwar definition of the post-empire citizen “narrowed possible *ethnic* meanings” and thus excluded former colonial subjects from postwar citizenship. But it also “broadened the *political* meaning of nationality” by including previously oppositional political positions and also women.⁸ In this context, middle-class Japanese women, particularly politically radical middle-class women, tested the limits of access to citizen subjectivity from within.

My use of the English *New Left*, following Takemasa Ando, is not a literal translation of the Japanese term *shinsayoku*, which refers strictly to factions that splintered from the establishment Left of the Japanese Communist Party from the late 1950s onward and that demanded a high degree of commitment, organization, and adherence to a specific dogma.⁹ The term *shinsayoku* implies strict hierarchies and militancy and has become a loaded term in Japanese, implying almost sociopathic fanaticism. Many participants in the student movement in postwar Japan would reject

the label of *shinsayoku*, but their leftist activism reflected many concerns that can be identified as characteristic of a global New Left at the time, as university-based radicalism shaped its identity and concerns in reaction to liberal democracy, global capital, and the established Left. There was overlap in participants and in campaigns between New Left factions and more self-consciously nonhierarchical groups such as the loosely organized Zenkyōtō (short for Zengaku kyōtō kaigi, or All-Campus Joint Struggle Committees) and students who defined themselves as “nonpolitical” (*nonpori*) but still participated in activism. Using the term *New Left* highlights this global phenomenon, even as I detail here the specific genealogy and strategies of the postwar student movement in Japan, which responded to a distinct historical and political context.

Although it is possible, as Ando has done, to expand the definition of the New Left in Japan to include citizens’ and workers’ groups, I limit my project to the student movement.¹⁰ I seek to uncover a dynamic history in which a student movement shaped by postwar policies of coeducation negotiated rapidly changing—and gendered—ideals of political participation. Not only did the phrase *student power* become a powerful rallying cry among the growing university student population worldwide by the late 1960s, but examining a postwar student New Left across generations of activists and causes between 1957 and 1972 reveals significant shifts in the social meaning of activism as a whole.

Work on the mass demonstrations of 1960 often focuses on a paradigm shift away from ideologies of class struggle toward a new ethos of citizen activism. While female participants often contributed to these new social movements, such a focus de-emphasizes both the New Left’s radical challenge to postwar ideals of liberal citizenship and also the challenge New Left women posed to social expectations regarding female political participation.¹¹ Many women involved in civic activism participated in protests as wives and mothers.¹² Workers’ groups also often kept women’s units separate in the same period.¹³ In postwar Japan it was the student New Left that offered a real experiment in coed revolution.

Placing the experiences, interpretations, and representations of female student activists at the center of a history of the postwar student movement also insists on the challenges posed by female participation to the internal dynamics of the New Left in Japan. Works that mention the existence of sexism in the student New Left often treat that dynamic as a subcategory.¹⁴ I understand the meanings created by female student activist

participation as critical to the larger context in which a coed New Left was interpreted and also to the internal dynamics of the student movement.

Violent events involving female students symbolized the rise and fall of the New Left in Japan, from the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko in a mass demonstration to the 1972 murders committed under the leadership of Nagata Hiroko in a sectarian purge. Kanba became a kind of “maiden sacrifice” for Japan’s fragile postwar democracy in 1960, whereas Nagata came to represent the violent excesses of youth radicalism in the early 1970s. The same arc frames current narratives of the postwar student movement in Japan: from vulnerable to dangerous in the course of a decade. The female student coed as a radical activist played a distinct role in mass media reportage on the student movement; the media portrayed her as a figure of particular vulnerability or particular violence, a character to inspire sympathy or fear.

The expanding mass media of the 1960s in many ways defined the social meaning of the student movement, and the press was not a neutral observer. Particularly in a time of rapidly changing social expectations, the cultural debates that circulated in print media played a critical role in representing the New Left, often obscuring the debates most important to the participants themselves.¹⁵ Activists in postwar Japan often tried to counter the narratives of the mass media through their own *minikomi*—their shorthand for their minicommunications, in the form of mimeographed fliers and hand-stenciled posters countering the vested powers of mass communications and the mass media. Although I listen also for the voices of student activists, and female student activists in particular, my analysis devotes sustained attention to the mass media as an actor creating social meaning. The pervasive influence of mass media in the 1960s resulted also in an acute sense of the synchronicity of student power, particularly during the late 1960s as campus-based protests erupted worldwide and images of street demonstrations flew across the globe via print media as well as the moving images of television.

Another mass phenomenon traced in this study is the rise of mass higher education. By the late 1960s, not only had the postwar baby boom generation come of age, but they were also attending higher education institutions at an unprecedented rate.¹⁶ Being a university student remained a relatively privileged socioeconomic position, but in a society that increasingly defined itself as middle-class, it also became a critical part of the definition of the ideal Japanese citizen.¹⁷ In 1963 Japan was already third in

the world in the number of higher education institutions, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ While women's rate of continuing on to higher education lagged behind that of men in the postwar period, in 1969 women and men went on to tertiary institutions at almost the same rate: 22.3 percent of women and 24.1 percent of men continued their education beyond secondary school.¹⁹

It is difficult to estimate precisely how many young women participated in the leftist student movement, but it is clear that female students were active across factions and campuses in the late 1960s New Left. They joined for reasons similar to those of their male comrades: they felt compelled by the global situation and the paradoxes they saw in their society, and they understood activism as a natural part of being a student and a member of their campus community. One survey conducted in the early 1990s published the results of 529 questionnaires filled out by people who self-identified as part of the late 1960s student New Left at eighty-one higher education institutions across Japan. That publication included the testimonies of forty-three female respondents from twenty-four universities, each involved in a diverse range of activist activities with varying levels of commitment at the time and afterward.²⁰ As mentioned previously, histories of the New Left in Japan often characterize the New Left as male, which further obscures the complex legacy of female participation in the postwar student movement.

Even when considering how women within the New Left came to criticize the movement from 1970 onward, thus fueling a post-New Left women-only women's liberation movement, many scholars overemphasize a Left-to-lib break. Even when a women's movement is cited as a reaction to New Left male chauvinism, the arguments articulated by feminists do not seem to actually penetrate many of the influential analyses by male academics. Oguma Eiji offers an oft-cited and voluminous social history of the late 1960s New Left but in many cases seems intent on listing characteristics of the movement rather than engaging with the intellectual challenges and critiques launched by student activism. While drawing extensively on contemporary journalism, his history remains unconcerned with the nonneutral position of the mass media's reports, particularly when it came to female activists. In listing what he saw as the motivations for female students' participation in the New Left—along with “[the] same as the male students, a sense of dissatisfaction with the present conditions of the university and society and a sense of justice”—Oguma includes that, “as reported in the news at the time, ‘having just discovered a wonderful

boyfriend, they “without theory” ran to his sect.”²¹ To suggest that only women chose their political affiliations based on interpersonal relationships is historically false, and Oguma’s failure to read against the grain of the contemporary mass media reports replicates the sexist logic that tended to interpret all female political participation as irrational (unlike the male students, who ostensibly acted *only* according to their grievances and theoretical considerations). Further, as women’s lib activist Tanaka Mitsu pointed out in an article that originated in a blistering review on Japan’s Amazon site, Oguma described feminists like Tanaka in precisely the same terms as the tabloid media of the 1960s did, undermining their political positions by regurgitating sexist mass media rumors about eating disorders or sexual promiscuity or even their unbecoming fashion choices.²²

In contrast, coming from a leftist position, Suga Hidemi demands a more serious engagement with the theories of the 1960s—in particular, the late 1960s—and points out that discourses about women’s rights and also minorities’ rights and ecology, which emerged in the New Left at its dissolution, have in many ways come to serve neoliberal political goals and obscure a true reckoning with the New Left critique of capitalism.²³ Suga is particularly impatient with what he sees as the “insufficient” attention paid to economic angles by women writers associated with women’s liberation (Tanaka Mitsu) and even an earlier postwar generation of feminist writers (Morisaki Kazue).²⁴ He largely dismisses feminism in Japan throughout the 1970s and 1980s as a movement limited to demanding women’s increased access to a prosperous consumer society. What Suga does not do is engage critically with the writings and critiques of the women of the post–New Left women’s liberation movement, and he thus fails to see how feminism in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s made it possible to open up new questions precisely about the role of women—as producers and reproducers—in the projects of nation, empire, and global capital.²⁵

Both Oguma, from a “melancholy liberal” position, and Suga, from the left, replicate the coed logic in which female activists’ experiences in and analyses of the New Left are marginalized, regarded as somehow supplementary to the more rational and focused activism of New Left men. Oguma and Suga thereby reinforce what Draper dubbed the “masculine monopoly over the memory of the moment.” In their analyses, the two narratives—that of the campus-based New Left and that of the post–New Left women’s liberation movement—tend to be held separate, in constant tension, even as many activists involved in the 1970s women’s libera-

tion movement have written and spoken about the New Left genealogy of the post–New Left feminist movement, which included sexist marginalization but also many influences in terms of the framings of debates and strategies.²⁶

What would it mean to actually investigate how women figured in the radical postwar student movement? Ueno Chizuko, Japan's most well-known feminist scholar who also attended university in the late 1960s, has declared that women in the student movement in Japan had only two roles available to them: to act the part of a "cutie" and seek male affection or to internalize male values and become an aggressive female leader.²⁷ These gendered patterns of political activism certainly existed. But to dismiss all female participation in the New Left as mindless conforming to standards imposed by a sexist movement obscures the many negotiations among the movement's coed members and those between the movement and the mass media. Rather than dismiss women's participation in the New Left or dismiss the New Left altogether as irredeemably sexist, what would it mean to incorporate women's experiences and critiques of leftist activism *into* a radical leftist critique of global capitalism as it organized society in Japan in a period of unprecedented economic growth? The answer requires situating the New Left and its gendered politics in a broader political and social context.

THE "WOMAN QUESTION" IN RADICAL POLITICS

There is a longer conflicted history of women's participation in leftist social movements in Japan and elsewhere. A lingering question for many female socialists in modern Japan has been, which comes first: freedom from exploitation based on class difference or freedom from exploitation based on sexual difference? This question has come up in several movements that fought to expand the political and social rights of various groups throughout the process of modernization. Many activists—identifying variously as Christian reformers, anarchists, socialists, or imperialists—reflected the influence of the political ideas then shaking up the world and advocated for female access to education and political rights in the early twentieth century in Japan.²⁸ Women were active in organizations associated with leftist thought—the socialist Heiminsha (Commoners' Society) and labor groups—from their inception in the early twentieth century.²⁹ Their participation reflected the new social reality in which women

were incorporated into the industrial workforce, particularly as cheap labor for Japan's modern textile industry, on which the state founded its new export economy.³⁰ However, women were often relegated to support positions within the socialist movement throughout the prewar period.³¹ Women writers involved in socialist and leftist communities, such as Hirabayashi Taiko, who was active from the 1920s, penned critiques of the sexism women faced in those circles.³² While engaging in deep analyses of the state and political practices, the socialist movement in Japan often re-created the gendered divisions of labor seen in society at large and advocated by the state.

These debates occurred in a broader global context. Within leftist thought from the late nineteenth century onward, debates on the proper social role of women, and particularly the character of some future equality between men and women, occupied anarchists and socialists alike. Equality between men and women was ostensibly a goal of the radical social programs envisioned by modern revolutionary thinkers on the left. Anarchist thinker Emma Goldman considered sexuality alongside radical politics but encountered criticism from fellow anarchists, most famously from Pyotr Kropotkin, who insisted that sexuality was personal and not a suitable aspect of political discussion.³³ Many in the nineteenth century assumed that once a revolution in economic and political relations among all people came about, relations between men and women would become equal as well.

The achievement of an ostensible workers' paradise on earth with the creation of the Soviet Union precluded many open discussions about potentially modifying intimate relations and also eventually closed down discussions about continuing patriarchal attitudes and structures. Cinzia Arruzza has recently written of how the unified front presented by global Communism under the Third International following the success of the Russian Revolution in the early twentieth century contributed to an authoritarian orthodoxy that negated socialist women's contributions to politics and theory.³⁴ Although many socialists had been optimistic that restructuring economic relations between the sexes and educating young men and women alongside each other would resolve inequalities based on sexual difference, discussions of intimate relationships—the family, romantic love, domestic chores—were often dismissed as outside the realm of the political. This history influenced how national Communist parties in various countries defined “politics” and handled (or, more often, dismissed) inequalities among activists rooted in received ideas about gender.

New Left activism promised, but never delivered, a more expansive socialist politics than the orthodoxy of the established Left in the mid-twentieth century. However, many female activists' experiences in the New Left made them skeptical that prioritizing the revolution would improve their lives. Young women who came to activism through the postwar New Left in Japan found that their marginalization within the movement echoed similar exclusions in modern theories of capital and labor.³⁵ These young women who had become sensitive to analyses of labor, everyday life, and alienation found that the New Left still cut them out of the revolution. One of the young women who went on to be active in the women's liberation movement recalled male activists leaning on leftist theory to exclude her: "One boy said, 'haven't you read Marx? Women's labor in the home isn't labor.'"³⁶ Female activists countered such limited interpretations of labor and production, insisting that childbirth was also production and was far from a personal, private matter.³⁷ They concluded their observations on the supplementary and exceptional role played by women in the student movement and modern revolutionary movements with a call to reconnect the political struggle with private issues.

WHAT'S SO NEW ABOUT THE NEW LEFT?

Following the example of other scholars of the 1960s, I try to understand how New Left activists in Japan attempted to expand the notion of what constituted political action. In writing about art-based activism in the 1960s in Japan, William Marotti—drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière and Kristen Ross—points to how the radical political engagement of the period actually challenged the very definitions of what was considered political.³⁸ Carl Boggs Jr. coined the term *prefigurative politics* in a 1977 piece on what he identified as "one of the most troublesome dilemmas encountered by Marxist movements and regimes": how could they wage a battle for political power while also integrating what ought to be the "ultimate ends of the revolutionary process itself: popular self-emancipation, collective social and authority relations, socialist democracy"? Boggs dubbed negotiations over the internal dynamics and processes of a movement *prefigurative politics*, while he categorized the strategies employed to obtain political power itself *instrumental politics*.³⁹ Wini Breines, writing about the U.S. New Left, employed the term *prefigurative politics* to indicate how radicals in the 1960s insisted upon formulating their own coun-

terinstitutions and alternatives rather than operating within the existing political system to change it.⁴⁰ This attention to *how* one participated in politics drew on older political and faith traditions, and has sometimes been dismissed as simply expressive politics, defined only as opposition and limited to personal or cultural change.

The New Left emphasis on democratic participation wove together many people's very political concerns about class struggle and anti-imperialism with the observation that many of the contemporary organizations that claimed to fight such fights—namely, the established Left—did not necessarily present a real alternative in terms of political practices. As Francesca Polletta notes in the cases of many organizations in contemporary U.S. history, a focus on the process of radical democracy was not simply about fostering a more expressive style but also about understanding the politics of an organization's practices. They thus emphasized debate, encouraged the consensus necessary for radical actions, and attracted many people who would not otherwise have participated in a social movement.⁴¹ It is easy to dismiss youth activism as too idealistic or even reactionary, but youth in modern societies are often uniquely positioned to feel the pressures of socialization as they are subjected to them in economic, political, and educational situations. We can get a sense of the larger political stakes by listening to the voices of student activists and the ways they were interpreted and misinterpreted.

From within the Japanese New Left, Tokoro Mitsuko, a graduate student in biology and an activist leader, argued that it was absurd to employ the logic of capitalist rationalization to facilitate a movement against capitalism. In her analysis of the established Left of the Japanese Communist Party, she noted that in its rigid maintenance of hierarchy and rationalization of its members' activities, it "has not avoided the logic of capitalism: ranking humans by their production value."⁴² Many student activists, particularly female students who felt close to the everyday labor of caring for their families and friends, framed their activism in terms of a set of intimate practices, and I see this as an invitation to pay close attention to how the daily life operations of the student movement related to the movement's theories and larger social context.

At the same time, because many activists within the coed revolution of the campus-based New Left—both male and female—saw their political movement as transcending what they saw as the narrow bourgeois concerns of the usual women's issues groups, such as those involved in consumers' movements and the peace movement, I risk betraying their inten-

tions in insisting on a distinctly “female student activist” experience of the movement. Women within the New Left in Japan also often understood their work, which might be stereotypically “women’s labor,” as something qualitatively different when in the movement. As Katō Mitsuko, a female student activist at the University of Tokyo in the late 1960s, described it, she felt that the construction of the student-run barricades broke with the logic of the everyday world of society at large, thus allowing her to engage in nurturing and cooking for her comrades in their “commune” free from the historical and social gendered baggage attendant on care work in Japanese society outside of the barricaded campus.⁴³ Katō herself noted that this assessment may have been a bit premature, since the student barricades did not escape the larger logic of society, but if we dismiss the experiences and words of these women as self-deluded and complicit in their own exploitation, as some post–New Left feminists did, we replicate the gendered hierarchy of leadership as authentic activism and of “support work” as somehow less important.

Considering the way that women had figured in the unpaid labor structures undergirding modern capitalist societies, it should not surprise us that a political movement that attempted to occupy and liberate spaces to generate a more authentic set of everyday political practices would find that negotiating those spaces entailed confronting gendered ideas about labor. Again, this is not limited to Japan but is an issue of how women fit into larger, global structures of labor at the time. When Deborah Cohen and Lessie Jo Frazier discuss the barricades created and maintained by student activists in Mexico, they could also be writing about Japan:

When students occupied the universities, campus spaces were transformed into their political and physical home. In the classrooms, libraries, and cafeterias where men and women had studied economics, philosophy, and mathematics, they ate, slept, crafted propaganda, and held meetings. The new transformation of former classrooms into semidomestic spaces also required new logistical arrangements; women’s labor underpinned these reconfigurations. Both men and women took turns guarding the school buildings against the police; they maintained the sanctity of the movement’s home and fragile borders. In so doing, they drew on a pervasive twentieth-century war rhetoric of protecting hearth and home. In this sense, women’s presence in the occupied university was not anomalous, but rather necessary in order to regender this space as an embattled home front.⁴⁴

To return to Katō's words, "We can't talk about solving the problems concerning 'being woman' [*onna de aru koto*] without linking it to a big movement demanding revolution. But it's not a simple matter of extending a political movement, nor can we have a real revolution without solving those problems."⁴⁵ That is to say, a political movement that stopped short of complete socioeconomic revolution could not actually resolve the many contradictions women faced, as producers and reproducers of paid and unpaid labor. And the necessary socioeconomic revolution would need to grapple with the uneven distribution of not only resources but also voice and agency based on class and also gender.

That male chauvinism proved a defining characteristic of many women's experiences of New Left activism around the world undermines arguments that Japanese sexism is some kind of immutable and ahistorical feudal remnant handed down to the present unchanged over time. I understand female students as occupying a position in the New Left that exposed the unexamined categories of an otherwise wide-ranging critique of the often unseen operations of authority that undergirded Japan's economic miracle. In many ways, a very modern idea of the proper place of female labor within gendered hierarchies defined the New Left's sexism. Masculinist definitions of the ideal movement activist often colored the dynamics of the New Left and its commemoration in Japan and beyond.

In the United States, Marge Piercy's 1969 outraged takedown of the sexist New Left, *The Grand Coolie Damn*, described a momentary liberation within "the Movement" that nevertheless lapsed into a situation in which men continued to understand their status as defined by "the people whose labor one can possess and direct in one's projects"—people who often ended up being women as sexual partners, as "domestic-servants-mother-surrogates," and "constantly as economic producers." While Piercy acknowledged that too much "introspection and fascination with the wriggles of the psyche"—that is, constant consciousness-raising—can obstruct activism, she also noted that "there is also a point beyond which cutting off sensitivity to others and honesty to what one is doing does not produce a more efficient revolutionary, but only a more efficient son of a bitch." Piercy described how the men in the movement gained prominence, while "the real basis is the largely unpaid, largely female labor force that does the daily work. Reflecting the values of the larger capitalist society, there is no prestige whatsoever attached to actually working. Workers are invisible."⁴⁶

Piercy's account is interesting inasmuch as she very much kept her eyes on the larger economic picture of how women's labor figured in the New Left while she also pointed out a romantic, erotic economy that valued certain forms of not only action but also thinking in a way that privileged access for masculine voice and activities, as well as male sexual access to women. The catch for women in the campus-based leftist activism in the United States, as Piercy saw it, was that "by definition women are bourgeois: they are housewives and domesticators."⁴⁷ In a movement that sought to defeat bourgeois economics alongside the bourgeois family and moral codes, women became a target for revolutionary scorn. This is the case in the Japanese New Left as well, in which female labor reproduced much of the menial day-to-day organization of the movement—mimeographing fliers, cooking and cleaning in the barricades, providing jail support—and was often rendered invisible. Activists also came to reject what they saw as the bourgeois morality that underpinned such care work, as represented by the scorn they expressed for the figure of the mother and their attraction to a particularly aggressive manifestation of masculinity. The liberatory potential of "free sex" was also mitigated by the actual practices, which often defined free sex as unrestricted male access to female bodies.

The contested role of the female student activist in the New Left in Japan, then, is also part of a global story. Women-only radical movements emerged from many New Lefts in the late 1960s. This was also the case in Japan. There remains a need to understand what within the New Left—its theories and practices—convinced radical women who participated in campus-based activism that they needed to form a separatist movement. The contemporaneity of the New Left and the subsequent women's lib movement in Japan aligns it with similar movements at other sites, which actually requires bringing Japan's history of protest into a larger global history. Since there is a tendency to isolate Japanese national history along national borders, examining the history of a moment in which dissent took inspiration from global social movements offers a chance to frame events that occurred in Japan more broadly. There is something about the way that women figure into modern capitalist societies that defines women's labor—in both formal and informal economies—and that is shared across national borders. But the various negotiations and resistances to those formulations, and the extent to which they consider not only gendered divisions of labor but also racial, ethnic, and class-based oppressions, can be very different. Sara M. Evans has already noted the "interesting lacuna" in the historiography of the global "1968 generation," which has left out gen-

der analyses even as “feminism and dramatic challenges to gender relations were among the primary legacies of activism.”⁴⁸

In discussions of how such hierarchies based on gender can develop in ostensibly liberatory and radically democratic movements, however, it is also worth bearing in mind that, as studies of women-only movements have detailed, some power dynamics that existed in the New Left were also at work in ostensibly nonhierarchical women’s liberation movements, even as they became disconnected from sexual difference. Jo Freeman noted the potential for structurelessness within a group of activists to actually become “a way of masking power, and within the women’s movement it is usually most strongly advocated by those who are the most powerful (whether they are conscious of their power or not).”⁴⁹ Such conflicts emerged in various groups that organized explicitly to confront patriarchy: Kimberly Springer has noted the tendency for women who wrote in the Combahee River Collective (and other radical black feminist organizations) to gain prominence over those who did not; Setsu Shigematsu analyzes the same trend among the women’s lib activists who ran the collective Shinjuku Lib Center in the 1970s in Japan.⁵⁰ Post–New Left women’s liberation activists in Japan often spoke of the difficulty of undoing their own internalized disdain for forms of expression and types of labor coded feminine, and in many instances, care work—the invisible, daily labor of a movement—went unappreciated. So while a coed movement brought to the fore many previously underappreciated issues regarding how gender defined power and labor, the solution to such problems was not as simple as launching a women-only movement, even as women-only movements provided spaces in which women could better articulate how larger structures of social injustice intervened into daily life practices.

I am studying the roles and receptions of women in the Japanese post-war student movement to understand the possibilities and limits they faced in making radical, revolutionary demands on the society in which they lived. I employ three broader analytic categories: vulnerability, violence, and voice. These interact in various ways throughout the chapters. None is a fixed category, but all frame political action by student activists, and female student activists in particular. While the growing violence of the late 1960s student movement has been attributed to, among other factors, an “excess of ethics” that made student radicals feel justified in carrying out intensified attacks on police, university property, and each other, I track shifts in popular support of student activism to reveal a gendered dynamic of violence and vulnerability.⁵¹ The way violence and vulnerability

intersected with gendered expectations in the student New Left defined the movement's relationship to its members and to the public at large, as communicated in the expanding mass media of the time, which amplified certain voices and obscured others. For female student activists, as we will see, there was never a moment when their voices, as mediated by newspapers, magazines, and other activists, were free from expectations about feminine vulnerability or violence.

Chapter 1 explores the meaning created by the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko, a female student activist leader killed in mass demonstrations against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo). With her death, Kanba fit into a narrative forged in the mass media, of young, middle-class women as particularly vulnerable to state violence in the postwar period. Popular sympathy for Kanba as a maiden sacrifice for postwar democracy emerged in a context that encompassed broader discourses about legitimate forms of political expression, including what I call "naive politics." Various attempts to speak on her behalf and fit her death into shared frames of popular empathy silenced Kanba's own radical politics. While Kanba became representative of the fragility of postwar democracy, her writings underscore the discrepancy between her public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics. Kanba's case demonstrates how a gendered political discourse about vulnerability and victimization, while mobilizing popular sympathy for a New Left cause, also reinforced existing values and emotional standards at the time of the 1960 Anpo demonstrations.

Chapter 2 introduces the writings of Tokoro Mitsuko, a young woman who participated in the 1960 Anpo protests as an undergraduate student and continued to write on political themes as a graduate student. Her theoretical pieces on how to create a horizontal style of organization in a political movement, written in reaction to the strong hierarchical system of the traditional Left in Japan, influenced the organizational ideals of the late-1960s student New Left. Tokoro's analyses drew on her personal experiences in leftist activism and also on ideas about "women's logic" as a potential source of opposition to the rationalist logic of economic efficiency and war. Tokoro's articulation of women's logic forces us to consider both how a female student's ideas influenced the Japanese New Left and also how "women's issues" were erased in the course of the movement. While replicating many essentialist discourses about women as basically vulnerable and nurturing, Tokoro attempted to understand how a gendered subjectivity created meaning in society and how one could listen to those excluded from hierarchies of power.

Her writings on how the student Left ought to relate to both violence and its imagined (and likewise gendered) opposite, nurturing, proposed bringing nonviolent and nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole to challenge what she identified as the violence of postwar efforts to rationalize society, education, and the workforce. And although Tokoro and other female students rejected these rationalizations of labor, particularly the conservative division between male work in the public sphere and female labor in the private sphere of the home, such a gendered rationalization was in many ways based on the same gendered understandings of nurturing embraced by Tokoro, and it also influenced understandings of how women ought to configure in postwar education and work.

Although the student movement imagined itself as immune to the logic of the state and the mass media, the practices of the late 1960s campus-based student movement, examined in chapter 3, illustrate how larger societal assumptions about gender roles informed the gendered hierarchy of labor that emerged in the barricades. This chapter focuses in particular on the “everyday” as it was theorized and experienced in the late 1960s student movement. Sources produced by student activists, particularly those created by female student activists, describe how activists in the late 1960s built barricades at university campuses as part of their challenge to the everyday of the state and capital, which also opened up the time and space for young people to experience daily life outside of mainstream society and imagine potential political and personal alternative ways of living. State-led efforts to reorganize higher education in the service of the growing economy formed the larger context for a proliferation of campus-based protests and occupations and led many students to question the value system that bolstered an expanding middle-class lifestyle. Students felt that violence in nearby Southeast Asia contributed to the affluence they enjoyed in daily life, and they sought to disrupt the organization of the state and industry interests that contributed to war. However, the persistence of gendered definitions of labor in the student movement, as reflected in the daily practices in the barricades, led many female student activists to question the real-life limits of the New Left and to become aware of how sexual difference set limits on their political involvement.

Chapter 4 focuses on late 1968 and 1969, when the student movement faced not only rising state oppression but also increasing marginalization by the mass media. This chapter considers how New Left ideals of gendered action responded to a perceived crisis of masculinity in the postwar period and how those understandings linked with larger frames about po-

litical vulnerability and violence. The construction of a masculine identity became important to a New Left that wanted to project an image of invulnerability and strength; in doing so, it cultivated a culture that disdained expressions of vulnerability and understood femininity as such a vulnerability. This emphasis on a masculine vision of the revolutionary hero focused on a kind of personal liberation, rather than political or economic liberation. Masculinist ideas about the proper political subject resonated with similar concerns on the far right, and ostensibly liberatory practices like sexual liberation or confrontations with authority actually created new forms of gendered exclusion. While the mass media emphasized New Left spectacles of violence, the police turned toward community outreach, cultivating a new image of the friendly police officer.

Japanese students referred to their violent actions as *Gewalt—gebaruto*—to distinguish their “counterviolence” from the violence employed by the state. However, the mass media soon picked up on the term to frame the student movement as a dangerous threat to social order and to disparage the students’ actions. In this late 1960s moment, activist women, once considered particularly vulnerable to violence, became deeply associated with active incitement to violence. Chapter 5 explores how the mass media coded female student activism in particular as both terrifying and titillating through its imaginary construction of the “Gewalt Rosa” (Violent Rosa). The social meaning created by the relationship between female students and violence, as disseminated through the mass media, critically influenced public reception of student activism. When, in 1972, the mass media revealed a leftist group’s bloody internal purge, it marked a moment many saw as the death of the New Left. The female leader of the group, Nagata Hiroko, stepped all too conveniently into existing media formulations of the Gewalt Rosa, leading to both disavowals of the student movement among feminists in the 1970s and also to mass media narratives that attacked feminism as a potentially violent movement.

I conclude by considering the gendered nuances of the New Left legacy in Japan and what it means to understand the history of a radical movement and its reception through the figure of the female activist, particularly in a society in which so much desire and fear is projected onto young women but their voices are so rarely heard. We need a nuanced accounting of the New Left’s legacy now more than ever to understand the necessity of a feminist Left.