

## INTRODUCTION

MICHAEL K. BOURDAGHS, PAOLA IOVENE,  
AND KALEY MASON

The series of events that led up to the book you are now reading turned out unexpectedly to provide the editors with a new appreciation of the need to rethink the relationship of popular music to the Cold War(s) in Asia. This volume began in an international conference held at the University of Chicago Beijing Center in June 2014. The event was designed to bring together scholars from across the Asia-Pacific region, North America, and Europe to explore different aspects of popular music across Asia during the Cold War era. Originally, the conference also had an official cosponsor in China, but just days before our scheduled meeting, we were informed that that cosponsoring institution had abruptly withdrawn. No official reason was given, but it became apparent that the problem of the Cold War was politically too hot to handle in 2014 China—especially in the month that marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests. It was as if a wall had gone up around the Cold War, rendering it forbidden territory—at least for scholars in some parts of Asia.

This reinforced an impression we already had: that the Cold War continues today to take on a variety of different meanings in different locations. To paraphrase William Faulkner (a sometime cultural ambassador to Asia during the height of the Cold War), in Asia the Cold War past is not dead; it is not even past yet. As Odd Arne Westad has argued, our present global order is in many ways the living progeny of Cold War geopolitics.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, following Heonik Kwon, it makes more sense to think of the end of the Cold War as “a slowly decomposing process that involves a multitude of human actions arising from concrete, structured conditions within and across defined locales” rather than as a finished event that exists in a past discontinuous with

our present moment.<sup>2</sup> We are, we learned, still living in the long fade-out of the Cold War.

We received another jolt a few days later. The withdrawn cosponsorship took down with it a scheduled performance by local musicians that our former cosponsors had arranged. The local staff at the Chicago Beijing Center scrambled to find an alternative event to fill the gap in our schedule and came up with something even more interesting. In place of the canceled choral concert, we found ourselves sitting around two large tables in the East Is Red, a vast restaurant located on the Fifth Ring Road East in the Haidian District.

The restaurant was decorated with posters and banners from the Cultural Revolution, and the staff wore replicas of the uniforms of Red Guard youths. The waitstaff also doubled as singers and actors for the floor show, which consisted of re-creations of “red songs” from the Cultural Revolution, complete with slogans, choreographed routines, and condemnations of foreign imperialists. The climax was a staged resurrection of the people rising up into heroic action after the martyrdom of a young Chinese woman at the hands of Japanese imperialist invaders. But in this simulacrum performance, the most overly political of Cold War popular musics was seemingly drained of all politicality. We wondered if we were witnessing a remarkable demonstration of ironic kitsch—until we saw the responses to the performance by other audience members, mostly large family groups. They stood and danced and sang along; grandmothers and grandfathers enthusiastically taught the proper steps to toddler grandchildren. They were, of course, reveling in the soundtrack of their youths. Somehow, popular music made it possible to feel a warm nostalgic glow for what was officially the worst era in China’s Cold War. From the other side of the Iron Curtain, a soft and fuzzy version of the Cold War echoed toward us. The wall that blocked academic resurrections of the Cold War proved unable to stand up to the emotional attractions of popular songs.<sup>3</sup>

At the conference and the performance, we were learning that a different Cold War emerges when we lend our ears to Asia—and in particular to the popular musics of Asia. Westad argues that we need to heed the Global South if we want to grasp the Cold War, but we were discovering that we also need to head east. In Asia, even the basic parameters of what we know as the Cold War grow hazy. The notion that the Cold War began shortly after World War II, that it ended around 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, that its front line was the Berlin Wall, and that under its sway the so-called Iron Curtain separated cleanly two distinct global blocs: none of those ideas make much sense from the various perspectives of Asia. The commonly accepted narrative arc and internal periodizations of the Cold War also break down when the era

is approached through the perspective of Asian popular music: the “stagnant” 1970s, for example, do not necessarily seem discontinuous from the “turbulent” 1960s. Nor, for that matter, does the Cold War look particularly cold from the perspective of Asia. The Chinese Revolution, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Indonesian massacres, the Naxalite insurgency in India and Burma: these Asian wars ran more hot than cold. In place of the notion of the Cold War as a “long peace,” Bruce Cumings insists that we think of Asia’s Cold Wars primarily in terms of a “balance of terror.”<sup>4</sup>

When did the Cold War begin? Scholars often cite 1946, the year Winston Churchill gave his “Iron Curtain” speech, or 1947, the year Walter Lippman’s book *The Cold War* was published—but from the perspective of Asia, both dates seem too late. The battle lines between Communism and anti-Communism were clearly already drawn by the late 1920s across China and the Japanese empire (whose indirect rule by puppet state over Manchuria would provide a prescient model for the client state form that would emerge across the region after 1945), clouding any attempt to posit a 1940s start date for the Cold War in the region.

When did the Cold War end? From the perspectives of Asia, the more pertinent question seems to be, did the Cold War ever end? The continued military saber-rattling seen in Korea, Okinawa, and across the Straits of Taiwan calls into question the idea that we are living in a post-Cold War era. Moreover, the Bandung movement as well as socialist and other international fronts crisscrossed the region unevenly, opening up routes for transmission and crossing that sometimes halted at but other times leapt blithely under or over the Iron Curtain.

A number of important recent studies have traced the ways Cold War institutions in the West mobilized modernist art and a concomitant aesthetics centered on notions of freedom and spontaneity.<sup>5</sup> This politically mobilized aesthetic confronted the realism and class-based aesthetics that were the official line of the Soviet bloc. But while the aesthetics of modernism and socialist realism might provide blueprints to help us map out the competing official programs of the Cold War powers, popular music provides in many ways a much better, much messier, and more accurate map of how daily life was lived, with its pleasures and sorrows, across the global in the period. The Cold War in North America or Europe might have seemed an abstract matter of state geopolitics, but in much of Asia, “people had to live the cold war as part of their everyday lives and in their most immediate, intimate domains.”<sup>6</sup> In those domains, the soundtrack usually came from the mundane realm of popular song, not high classical or avant-garde jazz.

The many forms of popular music that were performed, recorded, banned, listened to, and danced to across Asia help us map out a less linear Cold War, one in which beginnings, endings, boundaries, and alliances take on more intricate, amorphous structures. Popular music traveled across multiple routes in the era: the network of US military bases and their concomitant apparatuses (including music clubs on and off base, Armed Forces radio networks, and PX stores stocking the latest records from the US and Europe); the international socialist youth festivals that gathered musicians and listeners from around the world; the trafficking in records, films, and television programs on both sides of (and sometimes across) the Iron Curtain, and so on. Songs and styles and performers traveled not only within these various networks but also across them in often unexpected manners.

Accordingly, Asian popular music provides an opportunity for mapping out a different version of the Cold War. We have to be wary, though, in taking this approach, because many of our methodologies and basic assumptions about Asia and popular music are themselves products of the Cold War period. As Lisa Yoneyama and many others have noted, academic area studies fields such as Asian studies are “enduring Cold War knowledge formations” that render certain kinds of information into “facts” while rendering other pasts and historical subjects illegible.<sup>7</sup> As we pursue what is clearly an Asian studies project, we have to remain vigilant of the unspoken presumptions about culture, tradition, nation-states, and modernity, to name just a few, that too often enclose the messy and fluid reality of modern Asia into categories of knowledge in the service of power by producing a version of the past that legitimates existing social and political hierarchies and unevenness. For example, as Yoneyama notes, Cold War Asian studies focused primarily on “the normative development of nation-states and statehood” so that “area studies scholars primarily produced studies of entities that were already constituted as, or were becoming, nation-states.”<sup>8</sup> But the activities surrounding popular music often take place through units larger and smaller than the nation-state. When, for example, Thai transgender performers perform cover dances of K-pop songs, they are simultaneously highlighting differences (of gender, sexuality, class, and ethnicity) within the nation of Thailand and mapping themselves onto a cosmopolitan, transnational vision of what Asian modernity might sound and look like.<sup>9</sup> Cold War popular music becomes, as many of the authors here argue, a form of vernacular cosmopolitanism that blurs multiple boundaries. As we rethink the potential of area studies following the critiques of Orientalism and of Cold War ideology, popular music studies potentially provide an entryway for exploring a more fluid approach,

one less respectful of the boundaries and periodizations we have inherited from the Cold War era.

Likewise, the academic study of popular music is also part of our Cold War legacy. Many of the professional music associations that would eventually legitimize research on popular music in the academy were shaped in response to Cold War alignments, beginning in 1947 with the International Council for Folk Music (renamed in 1981 as the International Council for Traditional Music [ICTM] in Seoul), followed in 1955 by the Society for Ethnomusicology (SEM). Writing about the complementary work of these organizations, Bruno Nettl recalls how “in the 1960s and 1970s, the cold war and the Iron Curtain played a major but unacknowledged part in defining these roles.”<sup>10</sup> Whereas the European-led ICTM emphasized the collection of rural music as the purest form of popular expression in modern socialist and capitalist nation-states, the US-led SEM was more concerned with advancing the holistic study of music cultures through fieldwork, which mostly took place in nonaligned “developing” countries of the Global South. Moreover, much of the funding for American research on non-Western music came from private foundations and the US Department of Education, two influential agents of Cold War-era knowledge formation closely aligned with the national security goals of the US Department of State. For example, in 1952 the Ford Foundation strategically opened its first international field office in New Delhi, India, one of several fronts where the US deployed cultural policy to counter the appeal of Communism in the new global order.<sup>11</sup> Over the same period, national Asian music societies were formed, including the Musicological Society of Japan in 1952 and the Indian Musicological Society in 1970. Founded in the shadows of the Cold War, postwar professional music organizations focused on preserving vernacular traditions that were increasingly competing with popular music for relevance in everyday life.

As rural populations moved to cities in unprecedented numbers after World War II, urban listeners were drawn to the modern aesthetic cosmopolitanism of pop-rock genres. Motti Regev usefully defines this broad category as “music consciously created and produced by using amplification, electric and electronic instruments, sophisticated recording equipment (including samplers), by employing certain techniques of supposed untrained vocal delivery . . . and by filtering all these through sound editing, modification, and manipulation devices.”<sup>12</sup> Thus a combination of accelerated urbanization, booming commercial music industries, competing cultural nationalisms (capitalist and socialist), and the priorities of research funding agencies encouraged music scholars

to privilege the study of art and vernacular music over electronically mediated, hybridized styles. Popular music was clearly more than a Cold War-era soundtrack; it was the elephant in the room for academic music organizations initially unsympathetic to the idea of including pop-rock as legitimate music in the academy.

The founding of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1964 at the University of Birmingham was a turning point for the academic study of popular music. Established in a climate of polarizing rhetoric and escalating geopolitical tensions in Europe, the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies pioneered the critical analysis of media and working-class cultures at a time of growing American influence in postwar Britain. Whereas Frankfurt School critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno disparaged popular music's use of standardized formulas and repetition to pacify listening publics, early cultural studies drew on the political philosophy of Antonio Gramsci as well as feminist, postcolonial, and poststructural theory to reframe popular culture as an arena of struggle in which both individual agents and structural constraints co-determine social life.<sup>13</sup> As a political and intellectual response to postwar conditions—including postcolonial liberation struggles, the specter of nuclear warfare, the weaponization of media in the cultural Cold War(s), and the inequalities of late capitalism—cultural studies was at its core a movement dedicated to examining the complexity of shifting power relations in highly industrialized capitalist societies.<sup>14</sup> This line of inquiry led to questioning how power operates through sound, including how popular music could be mobilized for domination and/or resistance. Cultural studies thus laid significant theoretical groundwork for the International Association for the Study of Popular Music (IASPM), which was founded by sociologists and musicologists in 1981. While initially limited to the study of music in Western capitalist societies, IASPM gradually expanded its scope to include research on non-Western culture industries by the late 1980s. At last, there was growing realization among music scholars that global popular music was worthy of study, including genres cultivated in Communist societies, where, as Peter Manuel notes in *Popular Musics of the Non-Western World*, star systems were less prominent and musicians faced bureaucratic and ideological challenges more than market pressures.<sup>15</sup>

Meanwhile, the Cold War era also witnessed the growth of sound studies as a separate stream of cross-disciplinary research. A response to the ocular centrism of Western epistemologies and limitations of music-centered disciplines, sound studies coalesced around shared interest in the sensory, ontological, material, and historical dimensions of sound, or as Jonathan Sterne cogently puts it: “what sound does in human worlds and what humans do in sonic worlds.”<sup>16</sup>

In addition to expanding the possibilities for using popular music to think about the historical and contemporary dynamics of the Cold War(s), sound studies also introduced more perspectives on how moments of human crisis and conflict shape “sonorous enculturated worlds” directly or indirectly.<sup>17</sup> Situated within a broader field of sound studies, the chapters in this volume not only offer a compelling, if inadvertent, response to Western musicology’s call to widen the scope of research on Cold War music to include popular and non-Western perspectives.<sup>18</sup> They also contribute to a growing body of literature in Asian sound studies by reaching beyond music genres to approach popular music more nimbly as sonorous worlds embedded in the politics of aurality.<sup>19</sup>

Although the idea of writing popular music histories through a Cold War lens is relatively new, recent work on Latin America, the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe has challenged the Western-centeredness of most research on the cultural Cold War(s).<sup>20</sup> Extending this initiative eastward across multiple Asias, some authors in this volume examine how songwriters and musicians perform Cold War discourses literally. Others take a portal approach to exploring how Cold War forces shaped broader aesthetic and social transformations through case studies of individual careers and creative works. The chapters also implicitly show how the discursive analytical frameworks and professional networks shaping Asian popular music studies themselves stem from “structures of feeling” inherited from the cultural legacies of Asia’s Cold War(s). Indeed, whether we adopt a Frankfurt School critical approach to the alienating effects of culture industries, a cultural studies emphasis on limited spontaneity and liberal notions of freedom, or state-sponsored condemnation of decadent yellow music, all are postures rooted in Cold War–era ideological struggles.

The various chapters presented here aim at a rethinking of Asia’s Cold War(s) through its popular music—and, simultaneously, a rethinking of Asia’s popular music(s) through the Cold War. Working from separate yet overlapping disciplinary backgrounds in places ranging from Maharashtra to the Ryūkyū Islands, they show how historical changes “remotely registered in history books, newspapers, or the pronouncements of politicians can appear in vivid relief and full complexity within products of the popular music industry—if we learn how to read them correctly.”<sup>21</sup> In this volume, reading “correctly” involves thinking beyond lyrical analysis to engage the verbal and nonverbal elements of performance as well as the lived histories that illustrate the social life and political force of popular music production, mediation, and reception in Asia’s Cold War(s). With this in mind, we have organized the chapters around three interconnected keywords that seem particularly useful in unpacking the complexity of popular musics in Cold War Asia: routes, covers, and fronts. In this

introduction, we pick up a few key musical examples from across Asia as a way to begin sketching in the stakes of each of the three concepts.

## Routes

The *routes* of popular music traced in the following pages are both material and metaphorical, human and nonhuman: they encompass tangible vehicles, circulation processes, and ephemeral events, and involve media such as sheet music, songbooks, radio, television, and cinema as well as acts of translation, mixing, and appropriation. Performers travel through these routes, but the performers themselves serve as routes. Seen through them, the popular emerges as an effect of (rather than as a precondition for) music's dissemination. There is always something dynamic and impure at the origin of popular music, a dynamism that invites approaches combining rather than contrasting routes and roots: as several of the contributions in this volume make clear, searching for the popular roots of a song often means discovering its previous routes, for "roots are not simply belongings, but re-imaginings and re-narrations of belonging that co-exist with the migrations and displacements of routes."<sup>22</sup>

As Nisha Kommattam shows in her chapter on Kerala cinema, film song in particular can convey a peculiar form of rooted cosmopolitanism, transcending boundaries of class, caste, and communities and serving as a vehicle for aspirations of utopian egalitarianism and social upward mobility. Another example to consider is Jia Zhangke's *Zhantai* (*Platform*, 2000), a film that provides a rich illustration of the diverse musical routes in 1980s China. About twenty minutes into the film, three young men sit in a barely lit room in a Shanxi provincial town. One of them tunes in the radio, and through scratchy sounds, the weather forecast informs, "A cold depression is forming in Ulaanbaatar." One more tiny turn of the knob and Teresa Teng's mellifluous "Coffee and Wine" seeps through, a southern breeze blowing away the chilly draft from the north. Jia has often commented on his teenage love for Teng:

I was born in 1970, so I was in my formative years in the early eighties when popular music really began to take root in China. I grew up with pop music. Popular music played an enormous role in the lives of people of my generation as we matured and came of age. At first it was all from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and only later did Western music start coming into China. One of the reasons popular music was so important was that before this, China really didn't have any "popular culture" to speak of. The closest thing we had were revolutionary model operas and things



made in that mold. I still remember so clearly the first time I heard the music of Teresa Teng. The experience was exactly as it was portrayed in *Platform*, where the characters listened to illegal shortwave radio broadcasts from Taiwan. At the time, I was quite young and couldn't really say what it was about her voice, but it was so moving—I was utterly hypnotized. There was a special time every day when they would play her songs and I would always tune in.

Later, when I went to college and reflected back on this time, I realized that her music represented a massive change in our cultural landscape.<sup>23</sup>

The director's statement that before the 1980s "China didn't have any 'popular culture' to speak of" urges us to reconsider what might have counted as popular music in Cold War China—an unresolved controversy that Qian Zhang addresses in this volume. The 1930s had seen the emergence of a "hybrid genre of American jazz, Hollywood film music, and Chinese folk music known in Chinese as 'modern songs' (*shidai qu*)" whose creation was attributed to the composer Li Jinhui and which was popularized by such pop music divas as Zhou Xuan.<sup>24</sup> Those tunes were then condemned as "yellow (i.e., pornographic) music" and partly displaced by "a new form of leftwing mass music (*qunzhong yinyue*) expressly designed to counter Li Jinhui's musical idiom in the urban media marketplace of Republican China."<sup>25</sup> From the 1950s to the 1970s, march rhythms, choral singing, and orchestral arrangements often drawn from Soviet models dominated the Chinese musical landscape. Huge state-sponsored efforts went into collecting folk music and folk songs, which were then readapted to fit the current political agenda, combined with new and foreign melodies, and widely disseminated through dance and musical performances, dramas, movies, and songbooks. Lydia Liu has coined the phrase *official popular culture* to emphasize both the role of the state and the broad appeal of such works as the musical film *Liu Sanjie* (*Third Sister Liu*, 1961), but the phrase could also be employed to describe the state-sponsored model works of the 1960s and early 1970s mentioned by Jia.<sup>26</sup>

Encompassing ten operas and four ballets (some of which were made into films), two symphonies, and two piano pieces that drew as much from Western symphonic music as from Chinese folk and traditional tunes, the model works were enjoyed by millions of people and constituted the core of Chinese socialist mass culture, but for Jia they do not qualify as "popular," perhaps due to their ideological content and state sponsorship, and also because by the late 1970s they had been too long in the air and failed to appeal to the youth.<sup>27</sup> In a context in which state media undercut the popular character of mass culture

by disseminating it too insistently, what counted as “really popular” was the clandestine music that seeped in through “illegal shortwave radio broadcasts from Taiwan” and captured young people’s hearts in an almost secretive manner, generating “a nostalgia for something that was beyond reach.”<sup>28</sup>

Popular music’s affective power is often enhanced by the fact that it travels through forbidden routes. The Chinese term for popular, *liuxing*, suggests an irresistible wave emerging from an undefined place and expanding everywhere—in the compound *liuxing bing*, it means “epidemic.”<sup>29</sup> Jia describes Teng’s songs as “moving” and “hypnotizing.” Underlying his recollections is a distinction between emotionally compelling sounds, on the one hand, and state-endorsed productions that do not appeal to audiences on the other, between vibes so personal and infective that they enter the body and transport it to some other space and time, and an impersonal voice imposed nationwide that does reach all spaces and yet remains distant, failing even to be heard. The film itself, however, undoes this dichotomy. By interweaving revolutionary songs and sentimental melodies, parodies of official hymns to the Four Modernizations and disco music, *Platform* shows that the infective power of songs is pervasive and not limited to any particular musical source, style, or genre.

*Platform* memorializes the function of cinema as one of the routes through which music became popular within and across national borders in late Cold War Asia. These routes partly reflected Cold War blocs—but only partly, for they were neither entirely determined by the socialist states nor fully integrated within a capitalist mode of production. As shown by Jennifer Lindsay’s chapter in this volume, songs traveled through the biennial World Festivals of Youth and Students organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, which gathered delegations from diverse countries, including nonaligned ones, and led to the development of folk regional and national styles informed by those transnational encounters.<sup>30</sup> The festivals functioned as crossroads of musical exchange, laboratories of musical invention, magnets of cosmopolitan aspirations, and grassroots alternatives to state-endorsed cultural diplomacy. Their lingering sounds bespeak desires for nonalignment and solidarity, the unfinished pursuit of a peaceful world unfractured by Cold War rivalries and safe from new nuclear threats. By considering what Lindsay calls the “socialist popular,” we discover cultural networks that encompass the then emerging Third World and challenge current definitions of popular music—definitions which are to a large extent still shaped by a Cold War dichotomy of socialist authoritarianism and free-market liberalism.

A focus on the routes of popular music, in other words, allows us to rethink the concept of popular music itself beyond the Cold War frameworks that

contrast the mechanisms of capitalist culture industries to those of socialist states. As James Clifford reminds us, “practices of displacement . . . [are] *constitutive* of cultural meanings rather than . . . their simple transfer or extension.”<sup>31</sup> Whether in melody, arrangement, rhythm, tempo, or language, nothing of a song remained the same when it was performed or broadcast elsewhere. Therefore, we treat popular music neither as the reflection of homogeneous nations nor as signifier of a universal global. In most of the cases we examine, songs were reinvented through traveling and at times returned to their place of origin in dramatically muted forms, generating new “cycles of feedback” that transformed the musical cultures of multiple sites.<sup>32</sup> A closer look at the soundtrack of *Platform*—particularly at one song in it, “Good-bye, Friend”—will help illustrate these points.

Titled after a 1987 pop-rock hit about a lonely heart vainly waiting for the train of love, *Platform* focuses on a performing arts troupe as its repertoire of socialist songs is replaced by rock, disco, and breakdance.<sup>33</sup> The soundtrack seems to punctuate the passage from socialism to capitalism, suggesting promises that neither can fulfill. Diegetic songs, however, also do much more. A song can instantly transform the atmosphere of a room, a square, or a street, though often such change turns out to be superficial or inconsequential. When, early in the film, “Awara Hoon” (I am a vagabond) from the Hindi film *Awara (The Vagabond, 1951)* bleeds out in the hall of the public movie theater, its boisterous tune seems to make fun of the austere portraits of Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong hanging on the wall, but obviously the structures and legacies of socialism will linger on.<sup>34</sup> Other songs underscore moments of quiet in domestic spaces temporarily sheltered from the violence that still pervades public life, as in the scene when one of the protagonists practices mainland pop hits from a songbook—early 1980s favorites such as “Early Morning at School,” “Clear Spring Water at the Frontier,” and “Nights in the Navy Ports”—right before a friend drops by to report that someone is being executed a few meters away.<sup>35</sup>

Another troupe member plays a cassette of Taiwanese singer Zhang Di on a tape recorder he has brought back from a trip to Guangzhou, suggesting dreams of social mobility and escape (not unlike those examined in Kommatam’s chapter) but also stressing the gap between the southern coastal cities where economic reforms and new forms of popular culture took off in the early 1980s and the inland where these young people are stuck. Songs sometimes define and often blur the boundaries between political and private spheres, cement friendships and romantic relations, offer comfort in separation, accentuate loneliness or keep it at bay. Each of them, Jia recalls, “represents a snapshot

of the social reality of the time.”<sup>36</sup> This is, first and foremost, a reality of new asynchronicities engendered by the economic reforms. Through its complex soundscape, the film shows how cultural change came messily and slowly to the inland rural areas, even though they were initially energized by economic reforms. Some of the change is imported, arriving by fits and starts through unofficial routes from the south coastal urban centers of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and some is generated locally, amalgamating the familiar and the new. Popular music, then, connotes change that does arrive, eventually, but with noticeable delay.<sup>37</sup>

There is one song, however, that interrupts the narrative of new expectations and disappointments generated by the passage from socialism to capitalism. It is around 1984: state funding has been cut and the troupe is being privatized. Some performers leave their hometown to go on a tour led by a newly appointed manager, and two of them are breaking up: the male protagonist is leaving with the troupe, while his (ex-)girlfriend stays behind. We first hear the lyrics, seemingly from offscreen, while a still camera shows the male protagonist in profile, sitting on the right of the frame, barely holding his tears; three other performers are viewed from the back. An engine roars. When the truck moves and the camera pans leftward to follow it, we realize that it is the troupe members themselves who are singing the song. The refrain, “A pengyou zaijian, a pengyou zaijian, . . . lalalala” (Good-bye, friend, good-bye, . . . lalalalala), now accompanied by the strumming of a guitar, continues to resound in the next shot, aligned with the viewpoint of those sitting on the truck looking backward at the streets and walls they are leaving behind. Commenting on the faded slogans on the walls, of which only the Chinese transcription of “Marx” is legible, Michael Berry argues that “this is not just a farewell to Fenyang and the friends and family of their hometown, but a farewell to the ideologies of yesterday.”<sup>38</sup> The song seems to function as a vehicle transporting these young people away from the socialist past, underscoring separation and change, but the complex history of “A pengyou zaijian” suggests something beyond a linear narrative of separation and change.

“A pengyou zaijian,” which literally translates as “Good-bye, friend,” is the Chinese version of “Bella ciao,” widely considered the most famous song of the Italian resistance movement during World War II. It is a fascinating example of a song that traveled in different guises through many routes. It is often sung with clapping, for instance, but in the Chinese version, the clapping is verbalized with the syllable “ba” following “pengyou zaijian” in the refrain. Tracing “Bella ciao” back in time, one does not find any definite point of origin. In the words of a historian who interviewed Italian partisans on their musical

memories of World War II, “the history of ‘Bella ciao’ is like a novel without an ending, because there is no unique text but several variants that underwent many transformations and interweave with multiple individual and collective stories.”<sup>39</sup> A hybrid vehicle of diverse sonic and textual materials ranging from rice field labor songs to children’s games, it has been translated into thirty languages and continues to be adapted by many protest movements to this day.<sup>40</sup>

In fact, in spite of the widely held assumption that “Bella ciao” was sung by all partisans, during the war its diffusion was limited to central Italy in 1944–45. The brigades fighting in the north mostly sang “Fischia il vento” (The wind whistles), which was based on the melody of the Russian “Katyusha” and whose text included such lyrics as “the sun of tomorrow” and “red flag” that directly referred to socialism.<sup>41</sup> In the early 1960s, “Bella ciao” was retrospectively chosen as the hymn of the resistance because it was a more inclusive song that “focused not on any particular army or brigade, but on a single man, a martyr of that continental tragedy that was Nazi fascism.”<sup>42</sup> Moreover, its growing international fame and dissemination through the media also contributed to its canonization. When “Bella ciao” was performed by a choir of former partisans from Emilia Romagna at the World Festival of Youth and Students in Prague in 1947, in Budapest in 1949, and in Berlin in 1951, thousands of delegates from seventy countries joined in clapping hands and sang along. The Italian Young Pioneers Association, a leftist youth organization for children up to fifteen years old, sang it at their camps and at international youth gatherings. It was sung in both Italian and Russian by Muslim Magomaev, a famous Azerbaijani singer dubbed the “Soviet Sinatra,” starting in 1964. In the same year, two differently worded versions, the first originating among rice field workers in northwestern Italy and the second dating back to partisans, were included in the concert “Bella ciao” at the Seventh Festival of Two Worlds in Spoleto (Italy), a controversial event that brought folk songs to the national stage and was broadcast on television.<sup>43</sup> Yves Montand’s interpretation in 1963 greatly contributed to its fame, paving the way for more recent versions, including those by Manu Chao, Goran Bregovic, and Marc Ribot and Tom Waits.<sup>44</sup> Over the past few years, it has been translated and adapted for various protest movements, including the 2013 Gezi Park protests in Istanbul.<sup>45</sup> Thanks to YouTube and other online video sites, the melody of “Bella ciao” continues to galvanize protesters across the globe.

It was the movie *Most* (*The Bridge*, 1969) by Yugoslavian director Hajrudin Krvavac that first served as the conduit for the crossover of “Bella ciao” to China. Along with *Valter Brani Sarajevo* (*Walter Defends Sarajevo*, 1972),

also directed by Krvavac, *The Bridge* was one of the most popular films in late-1970s China.<sup>46</sup> The actor playing the main protagonist in both movies, Velimir “Bata” Zivojinovic, was much beloved by Chinese audiences, who affectionately referred to him by the name of “Walter.”<sup>47</sup> *The Bridge* was dubbed in Chinese in 1973 but was initially distributed only internally, that is, to select audiences of politicians, elite military, and perhaps a few film specialists. It was widely shown in movie theaters and on television only from the late 1970s onward. The film dialogues were in Serbo-Croatian and German and the theme song was in Italian, but when the film was dubbed in Chinese, its multilingual aspect was lost, and many Chinese audiences came to believe that the song was from Yugoslavia. Film scholar Yuan Qingfeng writes:

There were very few kinds of popular entertainment and consumable cultural goods in 1970s China, and foreign works were even scarcer. Foreign cinema was limited to a handful of socialist countries like the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, North Korea, and Vietnam, and even nineteenth-century classical music was banned. *The Bridge* not only had a wonderful plot, but the soundtrack was also outstanding. So once it was shown, it strongly reverberated with audiences. For instance, the theme song “Good-bye, Friend” was repeatedly covered by musicians and broadly disseminated. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the “light music” coming from the west was considered ideologically problematic and was harshly criticized by officials as one of the symbols of capitalist culture. But covers of *The Bridge* theme song were considered safe, because it was a movie from a socialist country.<sup>48</sup>

“Bella ciao,” literally meaning “Good-bye, beautiful” and thus suggesting a romantic farewell, was translated as “Good-bye, friend” in Chinese, foregrounding friendship and comradeship instead of romantic love. Online Chinese commentators recall that they learned to whistle it and play it on the harmonica, suggesting that what stuck most was the melody and the refrain. From the late 1970s on, notations and text were reprinted in a wide range of songbooks, appearing among folk songs (*minge*) or listed as a popular song (*liuxing ge*). It was generally glossed as the soundtrack of the film, though in some instances its Italian origin was also acknowledged. In one of the earliest songbooks published in 1979, the title is simply “A! Pengyou” (Ah, friend).<sup>49</sup> A different, partial version, titled “Oh, Farewell, Dear Friends!” (*sic*), however, appears in *Yingyu gequxuan* (Selected songs in English, 1980).<sup>50</sup> Since the English text is printed above the Chinese, the song appears to be translated from the English, even though it is glossed as “Italian folk song.” The book includes

African American folk songs, English versions of Neapolitan folk songs, Franz Schubert's "Ave Maria," and such American classics as "Oh! Susanna" and "This Land Is Your Land." In addition to songbooks, "Good-bye, Friend" was also disseminated through flexi-discs produced by China Records. It was, for instance, included in the 1981 record *Waiguo dianying yinyuehui* (Concert of foreign film music), a collection of a surprising range of film soundtracks, all recorded in the original languages.<sup>51</sup>

Across all these routes, "Bella ciao" reappears alongside songs of different genres, reminding us that the diverse understandings of popular music, encompassing the music of the common people, music that is enjoyed by many, and music promoted by the mass media, are often intertwined. In early 1980s China, it was probably perceived as a song about friendship, heroism, and personal sacrifice. To some it might have suggested national dignity and freedom from oppression, carrying the sound of an alternative transnational left-leaning horizon—the sound of a socialism that was still unknown. In *Platform*, therefore, "A pengyou zaijian" does not simply connote separation but also disturbs the trajectory from socialism to capitalism underscored by the rest of the soundtrack, reminding us of the plural worlds within each of these systems, of the routes that breached their borders, and of routes not taken.

There were other important "routes" across the region, as well. Another group of songs traveled across East Asia, in particular along the networks and relays of American Armed Forces radio and clubs on military bases.<sup>52</sup> US military bases in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and elsewhere became nodes of circulation and transference, relaying pop songs from Tin Pan Alley, Nashville, and Southern California into new markets, so that they could be covered by musicians in Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul (but not Beijing, Pyongyang, or Hanoi). And yet at the same time, as Hyunjoon Shin notes in his chapter here, protest folk music also spread across the region, albeit outside the bases. In South Korea, it was a network of YMCA, YWCA, coffeehouses, and university campuses that opened a space for an avowedly non-commercial counterculture—a movement that began in translated covers of American folk music but that by the 1970s had moved on, as Shin argues, "to construct a distinct music culture for the nation (and its people) rather than merely imitating Western music."

Since the 1990s, moreover, a new network of routes has emerged, some of them carrying on legacies of the Cold Wars directly, others indirectly, and a new imaginary geography of the region is in the process of overwriting the versions that existed across the Cold War. As C. J. W.-L. Wee argues in his chapter, one of the carryovers from the Cold War division of a "security Asia" from

an “economic Asia” is the rise in practice and in imagination of a new fictive version of Asia characterized by a kind of “inter-Asian pop.” The Cold War practice across much of the region of listening to songs with English lyrics has been coupled with a new practice engaged in by a new middle class: listening to pop songs in non-English foreign languages, whether it is K-pop in Singapore or Tokyo or J-pop in Seoul or Hong Kong. The routes traced by popular music across Cold War Asia continue to reverberate and generate new paths in what Wee calls the “incomplete contemporary.”

The tangled, overlapping, and crisscrossing “routes” across Asia during the period were sustained by a particular practice that characterized much of popular music during the Cold War: cover songs. Understanding Cold War popular music in Asia requires an interrogation of the logic of covering, to which we turn next.

### Covers

In addition to *routes*, *covers* is another keyword that helps us map out the complex intertwining of popular music with the multiple Cold Wars that were experienced across Asia. As a practice, covers are crucial to popular music: there is an indiscriminate profligacy to the way pop songs allow themselves to be imitated, repeated, and recycled—and through that process to generate overtones that suggest new possible lineages and affiliations. As translated cover versions migrated across the routes crisscrossing Cold War-era Asia, they often evaded ideological disciplining, and as a result provide a remarkable tool for tracing the multiple imagined histories and futures that circulated through popular culture. Mapping out the convoluted pathways of cover versions is one way for us to see that there was not one Cold War in East Asia but several.

Four years after Jia Zhangke released *Platform*, Japanese director Izutsu Kazuyuki released another film that used popular music as a window for reflecting on the history of the Cold War. *Pacchigi!*, known in English as *Break Through!* (or, in another Cold War musical reference, *We Shall Overcome Someday*), achieved considerable critical acclaim, finishing in the top position of the prestigious *Kinema Junpō* Best Ten List of Japanese films in 2005. The movie depicts a Romeo-and-Juliet romance between a Japanese boy who attends high school in Kyoto and a Zainichi (resident Korean) girl who attends a nearby private ethnic high school, all set amid the turbulence of 1968 Japan. The opening scene provides a painstaking re-creation of a rock concert by Group Sounds sensations Ox, and as the narrative unfolds, we discover popular music interwoven into the story in multiple ways.



In particular, the film riffs off a legendary incident from Japanese pop music history: the 1968 cover version of the North Korean song “Rimjingang” (Imjun River) by the Folk Crusaders. That folk-rock trio had unexpectedly become a national sensation when radio stations began playing the novelty song “Kaette kita yopparai” (The drunkard’s return), included on its independently released 1967 debut album. Reissued in December 1967 as a single on a major label, “Kaette kita yopparai” soared to the top of Japan’s hit charts and sold more than two million copies. “Kaette kita yopparai” subsequently also provided the title for a 1968 film directed by Ōshima Nagisa, known in English as *Three Resurrected Drunkards* and starring the Folk Crusaders—a surreal Cold War narrative in which the band members inadvertently find themselves mistaken for South Korean soldiers who have illegally immigrated to Japan; they end up being shipped off to the battlefields of Vietnam, thereby highlighting the disparate roles South Korea and Japan played under the US security regime for East Asia.

After the success of that debut single, the band’s managers chose as the follow-up single a tune the band had been playing in its live set, “Imugin-gawa” (Imjun River), with lyrics by Matsuyama Takeshi. Matsuyama had learned the number as a Korean folk song from Zainichi friends. The band and Matsuyama believed the song to be an old Korean folk song, but in fact it was a propaganda ballad about divided Korea, originally composed in 1957 by Ko Jong-hwan with lyrics by the poet Pak Se-yŏng. The first verse in the cover was a translation of the original Korean lyrics, but the subsequent verses were Matsuyama’s own original composition, replacing the more explicitly political content of the North Korean original. The connection to Korea remained clear through the title and contents, but the cover version projected a different historical context, even as it preserved the haunting melody of the original.

The Folk Crusaders’ record company announced the new single in February 1968. Immediately, the label found itself flooded with complaints from Zainichi groups affiliated with North Korea, who charged that the Japanese-language version was not a true translation of the Korean lyrics, that the cover was a deliberate deception that aimed to mask the historical reality of Cold War geopolitics and of Japan’s own imperial past. Meanwhile, the record label and its parent company also began to fear that South Korean and South Korean-affiliated Zainichi groups would object to the introduction of any North Korean culture into Japan. Since the 1965 accord reestablishing diplomatic relations between Japan and its former colony of South Korea, Japanese corporations had viewed South Korea, rapidly industrializing under the authoritarian developmentalist policies of the Park Chung Hee regime, as a

lucrative potential market and were loath to take any action that might limit their access. Faced with objections from both sides of the Iron Curtain, the record company quickly withdrew the record from circulation. This led to the widespread belief that the song had been banned, a prohibition that of course only intensified the desire among young music fans to hear the recording. The phantom cover version became an absent presence, soliciting a forbidden mode of identification among a generation of Japanese music fans.<sup>53</sup>

“Imujin-gawa” provides a telling instance of what Kuan-Hsing Chen has described as the derailed processes of decolonization and deimperialism in Cold War Asia.<sup>54</sup> In this fragmented environment, cover songs could, as with the Folk Crusaders, suggest troubling historical connections and find themselves suppressed. But in another register, Cold War pop music covers also became sites for revitalized modes of (post)colonial mimicry. A figure like Japanese *enka* diva Misora Hibari, for example, provides a striking instance of how in Cold War pop music you could become an original by copying somebody else, how mimicking the foreign other becomes the process by which you acquire a sense of domestic authenticity as well as articulate new lines of affiliation. It was through her covers of “American” boogie-woogie numbers in the late 1940s that Hibari magically emerged as the most Japanese of *enka* singers, and even later in her career, when she claimed indigenous roots for her music in Japanese blood and critics celebrated her as the embodiment of Japanese cultural tradition, she continued to include brilliant covers of songs like “La Vie en rose” or “Lover Come Back to Me” in her repertoire.<sup>55</sup>

We see this same phenomenon, what Michael Taussig calls the figure-eight form of mimesis, across the region during the Cold War era.<sup>56</sup> The ways in which cover versions of what was supposed to be the same song could generate divergences in identity complicates any attempt to think of the period’s musical culture in terms of a simple East versus West, Communist versus capitalist, East/West or North/South divide. Imitation of others becomes a form of both co-optation and resistance, of domination and deviance: “Pulling you this way and that, mimesis plays this trick of dancing between the very same and the very different. An impossible but necessary, indeed an everyday affair, mimesis registers both sameness and difference, of being like, and of being Other. Creating stability from this instability is no small task, yet all identity formation is engaged in this habitually bracing activity in which the issue is not so much staying the same, but maintaining sameness through alterity.”<sup>57</sup>

For example, as Hon-Lun Yang argues in her chapter here, cover versions of Anglo-American pop songs in Hong Kong generated a “unique brand of cosmopolitanism,” a vernacular cosmopolitanism that signified a local identity, a

sense of Hongkongness. Likewise, Anna Schultz demonstrates how traditional songs of religious devotion could be covered in new contexts during the Cold War, translating them to meet shifting cultural and political needs. The musical performances of Sant Tukdoji Maharaj could sing to Gandhian nonviolence, Nehruian nonaligned socialism, international religious conference calls for pacifism, and Indian nationalist resistance to Cold War nuclear threats from neighboring China and Pakistan—sometimes, in the very same performance. As the chapters collected here demonstrate, an alternate history of the multiple Asian Cold Wars can be traced through the networks of mimicry that cover songs generated during the period.

This alternate history of traffic in cover versions complicates our understandings of Asia's Cold War(s). Standard histories of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in the era, for example, situate them as allies of the United States and part of the liberal-capitalist bloc that sought to contain Communism in the region. As one would expect from this standard line, South Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese popular music charts in the 1950s and 1960s were filled with cover versions of American hit songs, often with lyrics partially or wholly translated into Japanese, Mandarin, or Korean. Covering American pop music became one mechanism for drawing lines of affiliation and situating contemporary Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in a new vision of world history.

But the culture of covering produced unexpected outcomes as well. In Japan, one of the most popular performers of hit covers in the 1960s was the Peanuts, a singing duo composed of twin sisters, Itō Emi (1941–2012) and Itō Yumi (1941–2016). Managed by Watanabe Productions (a major force in Japanese popular music that had its roots in the economy of US military bases), they debuted in 1959 at age eighteen and soon became regulars on the Japanese pop music hit charts with their striking sibling harmonies. The Peanuts released seventy-six singles between 1959 and their retirement in 1975, selling many millions of records along the way. They also became stars on the new medium of television. They made a number of film appearances as well and are best known in the West today for their recurring roles as tiny fairies in the *Mothra* monster movie series—another popular cultural product through which audiences in Japan and elsewhere tried to make sense of the geopolitical history of the Cold War.<sup>58</sup>

The Peanuts' repertoire consisted of easy-listening mainstream pop songs, including many translated cover versions of Anglo-American hit numbers. These might be (and perhaps were) listened to as aural enactments of modernization theory, a key Cold War ideological framework that positioned Japan and other US allies in the region as pursuing a developmentalist logic of history,

in which liberal capitalist states in East Asia were said to be advancing toward modernity (defined as being the contemporary situation of the US and its allies in Western Europe) but always at a time lag and always sidestepping the need for violent historical change. Cover versions, with their appearance at a delay from the original version and with their respectful admiration of that original, provided a striking enactment of the model for modernization theory. The Peanuts' 1970 album *Firin Guddo: Pinattsu no atarashii sekai* (Feeling good: The Peanuts' new world) featured covers of such recent hits as "What the World Needs Now," "Raindrops Keep Fallin' on My Head," "Michelle," "The Look of Love," and "I Say a Little Prayer." The lyrics are kept entirely in English, a sign of faithful covering. It was this stance of loyal imitation, no doubt, that earned the Peanuts their 1966 bookings to appear on *The Ed Sullivan Show* and *The Danny Kaye Show* in the United States.

But while the act of covering a tune opens oneself to be appropriated to a certain "original" and its putative authenticity, it is at the same time an active act of appropriation: a kind of colonial and semicolonial mimicry, along the lines Taussig suggests. Each of the cover songs on the *Feeling Good* album is actively reworked; the original is easily recognizable, but much of the pleasure these cover versions produce comes from the degree to which those originals have been transformed. The vocal parts are rewritten to foreground the Peanuts' signature sibling harmony, and the velvety orchestral backing arrangements are complex, often featuring pronounced syncopation, striking instrumental fills, and other hooks not found on the original recordings. In other words, even as these Japanese covers of American and British pop songs seem to pledge allegiance to the originals, they also simultaneously demonstrate a pronounced degree of originality that opens up a distance through the act of covering.

Moreover, even as they frequently covered Anglo-American hit songs, the Peanuts cultivated an image that was more closely connected with Latin America and continental Europe, especially France, West Germany, and Italy. The Peanuts recorded many cover versions of French, Italian, and German pop songs, often singing lyrics at least partially in the original language. Even the original numbers composed for them by Japanese songwriters often conveyed, in both lyrics and music, a continental European flair: they were meant to sound like covers. The duo's album titles also referred to Europe: for example, their 1971 album, *The Glorious Sound of Frances Lai*, a tribute to the French chanson composer; or their 1965 album, *Hits Parade Vol. 6: Around the Europe*. On their 45 rpm single-record jackets, it was common for song titles to be given in both Japanese and a (non-English) European language, whether the songs were cover versions of foreign numbers or original Japanese compositions. Moreover, the

Peanuts frequently visited Europe to perform concerts, appear on television, and have recording sessions. Their recordings were marketed on the continent and apparently reached a fair degree of popularity, especially in West Germany and Italy, where they performed on concert tours and television specials. Their 1965 recording “Heut’ Abend” (released in West Germany under the moniker Die Peanuts) mixes Japanese and German lyrics in a playful manner that embodies the fluid cosmopolitanism of their image.

One of the best-known numbers by the Peanuts is their 1963 smash hit, “Koi no vakansu (Vacance de l’amour).” “Vacance de l’amour” won a Japan Record Award for its composer, Miyagawa Hiroshi (primary producer and arranger for the Peanuts). The lyrics by Iwatani Tokiko are in Japanese, except of course for the keyword *vacance* (French for “vacation”) from the title, also used in the chorus refrain. The popularity of the song helped *vacance* become a kind of buzzword in Japan. No doubt this has something to do with 1960s trends in fashion, film, and other domains in which France enjoyed a privileged status. The cosmopolitanism of the Peanuts’ cover songs produced a stylish image to their sound, lending an air of cultural sophistication that clearly sold well on the market: it was a kind of commodity branding. Michael Furmanovsky argues that the Peanuts were crucial figures in the introduction of a new Paris-centric upper-middle-class female fashion look in early 1960s Japan.<sup>59</sup>

And yet part of the reason the Peanuts’ covers achieved such popularity is that they spoke to real desires that existed in Japan for a certain continental lifestyle, one associated with commodity consumption—but also with relative autonomy within the Cold War global order. The desirability of mimicking French pop music, for example, seems in part linked up with a desire to be more like France, to occupy a less subservient role vis-à-vis the United States in global geopolitics. In 1966, when the Peanuts were at the zenith of their popularity, France withdrew its armed forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), complicating the Cold War binaries. In other words, this quasi-cover song was drawing alternative lines of affiliation, opening up possibilities for imagining Japan on a different historical trajectory—one not visible from the perspective adopted in more conventional histories of the Cold War period.

As this suggests, cover versions provide one mode for constructing alternative forms of historical consciousness in and of the present moment.<sup>60</sup> After the Peanuts’ success in debuting “Vacance de l’amour,” it quickly became a standard number in Japan and beyond. A cover version was released in 1963 by the Italian singer Caterina Valente and enjoyed success in Europe. Even more surprising, a Russian-language cover version became a hit in 1965 for

Nina Panteleeva in the Soviet Union. It eventually became a kind of standard number in the Soviet Union. Panteleeva would also record a Russian-language cover of the Peanuts' 1964 hit "Una sera di Tokio," another Miyagawa composition. In these instances, we see a cover song establishing a direct route between Japan and Western Europe and the USSR, tracing out lines of affiliation that do not pass through the United States. In these covers, we see both inside and outside Japan the outlines of an alternative historical consciousness to that which situated Japan simply as a loyal US Cold War partner.

We see this complexity of historical consciousness even more vividly in the Peanuts' many cover versions of South American, Central American, and Caribbean popular hits. If, as Gabriel Solis argues, a cover version is "not a matter of rehashing a song that had done well for a musician operating in some small market, but rather of establishing the credibility and authenticity of the coverer through the established cultural capital of the original," what kinds of tradition were the Peanuts inventing when they turned, as they so often did, to songs identified as Latin?<sup>61</sup> Their 1959 debut LP, for example, included "Aru koi no monogatari," a cover version of the bolero "Historia de un amor" by the Panamanian composer Carlos Eleta Almarán, which quickly achieved global popularity after being featured in a 1956 Mexican film of the same title. In the Peanuts' cover version, the lyrics alternate between Japanese translations and the original Spanish lyrics. The Peanuts would also record covers of, among others, "Quizás, quizás, quizás" (better known in English as "Perhaps, Perhaps, Perhaps"), "La novia," "Magica luna," "Moliendo Café," "¿Quién será?" and many others.

In other words, as cover artists and as covered artists, the Peanuts exist in a seemingly eclectic circulation of songs across the globe, one that opened up new lines of affiliation and new possibilities for imagining Japan's historical situation in the Cold War. Japan was one of the twenty-nine mostly Asian and African countries that sent official delegations to the 1955 conference in Bandung, Indonesia, an early effort to respond to the Cold War division of the world between American and Soviet blocs by creating a third force, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Japan's participation in Bandung was in many ways incoherent. Whereas Bandung was intended to form an alliance among nations undergoing decolonization, Japan participated as a (former) imperial power. As Kristine Dennehy has noted, its delegation included several figures who had played key bureaucratic roles in its pre-1945 empire.<sup>62</sup> But the decision to participate in Bandung suggests the existence of a desire for nonalignment across the political spectrum in Japan, in both the state and civil society. Cover songs became an important means for both soliciting and expressing

that desire. It hardly seems coincidental, then, that the Peanuts would sing the theme song for the soundtrack of the 1961 *Mothra* film in Indonesian.

After 1955, under US pressure, the Japanese state backed away from the Bandung movement. But Japanese intellectuals and cultural producers continued to look to the movement, seeking alternate forms of affiliation and cultural tradition. Japanese writers, for example, participated in the 1958 Tashkent meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers Union, despite efforts by the Japanese state to try to prevent them. Japan then hosted a 1961 emergency meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers Union in Tokyo, again in the face of opposition from the Japanese state. This meeting was held in the wake of the massive 1960 Anpo protests in Japan against the renewal of the US/Japan Security Treaty, the primary official apparatus of Cold War alliance between the two states. The participants in the meeting all saw the Anpo protests as a continuation of the Bandung movement. The standard histories of the 1960 Anpo demonstrations frame it within the tense relations of the US/Japan security relationship. But the 1961 Tokyo meeting and—in a quite different register—the cosmopolitan cover songs of the Peanuts suggest that the Anpo demonstrations need to be understood not just for what they opposed but also for what they were in favor of: what was called at the time “neutralism” but would increasingly through the 1960s be called “nonalignment” or “Third Worldism.” With the new logic of covers that arose in tandem with rock and roll music, recording a cover song of, say, “Historia de un amor” was a way for the Peanuts to retroactively assert the cultural (and implicitly political) authenticity of the original recording—but also then to associate themselves as Japanese performers with that authenticity, establishing a lineage and a sense of community with the original.<sup>63</sup>

That is, even in the most commodified branches of popular music in Japan and elsewhere across Cold War Asia, we can hear traces of a utopian desire to escape the official binaries of the Cold War. The cosmopolitan cover songs of the Folk Crusaders and the Peanuts represented an attempt to imagine what it might sound like if Japan were not a client state of the US, what Japan might sound like in alternative lineages of musical tradition. To borrow Carol Muller’s formulation, their covers of, for example, Korean or Latin songs “enabled an intimate identification between consumers/audiences and their geographically distant, but acoustically real and emotionally centripetal, musical cohorts,” and in doing so helped imagine Japan as something other than an American client state.<sup>64</sup> Through cover songs, regardless of their geopolitical spatial location, Asian musicians and their fans could identify themselves with American and English counterparts but also with the nonaligned Bandung spirit and with counterparts within the socialist bloc. The practice of covers as a form of

versioning helps us trace out alternative lines of history that necessarily complicate the dominant narratives of Cold War history.

## Fronts

Popular songs have shaped contentious political arenas in modern Asia since the mass mediation of recordings began in the early twentieth century.<sup>65</sup> Unlike musical traditions that stay above or out of the fray, the creative agents of popular music, including poets, singers, instrumentalists, songwriters, visual artists, arrangers, and sound engineers, have regularly found themselves on the front lines of ideological and geopolitical struggles. Due to widespread affection for their work and its relative accessibility, popular music artists typically exercise disproportionate influence in political life, either inadvertently or deliberately, and often their vocation involves considerable personal risk where and when dissent is stifled by authorities. A third keyword, *fronts*, thus complements the emphasis on circulation in our discussion of *routes* and *covers*, not least because the martial resonance of the term immediately evokes the specter of human conflict. Violence, threats, hostilities, censorship, persecution, and sacrifice—these themes too figure prominently in our accounts of popular music in Asia's Cold Wars.<sup>66</sup>

Fronts imply competing forces where routes may be blocked or fluid depending on allegiances or which side succeeds at imposing its interests on others. Fronts also hint at alignments, shored-up or contested, as well as alliances, nurtured, broken, or remade anew. Spatially, fronts invoke a field or sphere of competition, but they can equally be social subjects of history themselves, as in revolutions or countercultural movements. If we return to the most literal meaning of the word, however, fronts are foreheads (from the Latin, *frōns*) and faces, markers of visibility and by extension, identity, like when someone claims they “never forget a face.” The Hindi word for the recurring catch phrase (refrain) in North Indian film songs is *mukhṛā*, the face or front of the song.<sup>67</sup> As the stylistic and formal feature tasked with establishing a mood, lyrical theme, and stylistic identity, the *mukhṛā* is the sounded face, the hook or refrain, or catch phrase that listeners remember. But fronts can also be deceptively visible when they conceal more than they reveal, like songs, poems, or images that seem innocuous on the surface while working to stoke radical convictions and intentions for those in the know, those who hear preferred or subliminal messages beneath the face of a song.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, fronts can be covers for subversive actions, like the way tea stalls presented a legitimate front for debating and promoting radical socialist views in India during the 1950s, ideals that found



their most compelling expression through street theater and popular song.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, individuals who exude bold confidence in their actions are often said to have a lot of front (nerve), a valence that when braided with the idea of fronts as recognizable identity markers evokes an archetypal figure in global popular music: the charismatic front figure of a band.

These are some of the ways in which “fronts” expand our framework for examining popular music in Asia’s Cold Wars. In this section, we introduce the concept of “fronts” through a close reading of a celebrated South Indian songwriting team’s classic revolutionary anthem from 1957, “Balikudeerangale” (Monuments of martyrdom). This song is one of the most well known examples of how popular music in the Malayalam-speaking state of Kerala challenged the Republic of India’s official policy of nonalignment (see the chapters by Kommattam and Schultz). Its social history complicates any assumption that national forces alone define fronts, thereby bringing into relief interregional frictions and alliances. We choose this song to show how artists in a nascent theater and film music industry created enduring transnational socialist alignments and realignments in response to Cold War politics. Moreover, our example illustrates how a regionally specific front transcended, reimagined, and contested a nonaligned nation from its southern margins.

The song “Balikudeerangale” was written in 1957, two years after the Bandung Conference and the Warsaw Pact. The newly elected state government, led by the Communist Party of India (CPI), asked a songwriting duo to commemorate the martyrs who rose up against the British East India Company in the Indian Rebellion of 1857. The composer, G. Devarajan, and poet Vayalar Ramavarma responded with a bright, upbeat, group song with a catchy refrain and antiphonal verse structure.<sup>70</sup> The song was written only a few days before it was first performed publicly at a prominent traffic circle in Kerala’s state capital, Thiruvananthapuram (formerly Trivandrum). The occasion was the inauguration of a martyr’s column in the presence of two founding leaders: India’s first president, Rajendra Prasad, of the Indian National Congress (the nationalist party of independence); and the first chief minister of Kerala, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, of the Communist Party of India. Four months earlier, the CPI made history as the first state government of the region and as one of the first democratic Communist governments in the world (see Kommattam’s chapter). The performers included the popular singer K. S. George and other musicians recruited from the Kerala People’s Arts Club (KPAC), a branch of the Indian People’s Theatre Association.<sup>71</sup> These activist artists were prominent members of the Communist Party at the time and were therefore committed to a more radical socialist vision than the center-left policies of the Indian National

Congress. Nevertheless, for the inaugural performance at the Martyr's Column, the songwriters emphasized national unity and anticolonial struggle.<sup>72</sup> Shortly after the inauguration, however, the lyrics were swiftly repurposed to express solidarity with international labor and Communism.<sup>73</sup> By changing the color of the flag in the last verse from gold—the color of the Indian Congress party—to red, the songwriters realigned the song with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China: “You light the everlasting flames for generations. We now have a new red flag from the soil of Malabar [Northern Kerala], the very battleground where you stood in your armor.”<sup>74</sup>

Hence the revised verse honored two revolutionary struggles: the patriotic anticolonialist movement for independence and the anticapitalist front. The example thus builds on our earlier discussion of the many routes taken by the Italian resistance song “Bella ciao” by underlining how popular songs gather multiple, accumulative, and even contradictory meanings. Indeed, Thomas Turino argues that popular music's power to condense sense and experience is the key to understanding its emotional intensity and immediacy, a process he poignantly describes as semantic snowballing.<sup>75</sup> Thus a single word substitution in the last verse immortalized the song for a generation of democratic socialist listeners while also carrying forward the original emphasis on nationalist sentiment.

A year after the memorial performance, Devarajan and Vayalar adapted the song for *Visharikku Kattu Venda* (The fan needs no breeze, 1958), a socialist play by Ponkunnam Varkey. Recognizing the commercial potential, the Gramophone Company of India Limited subsequently produced a recording of the song in Madras (now Chennai) with K. S. George, the same lead singer who performed at the inauguration, along with popular actor-singer Sulochana. This is the song that was widely disseminated through radio and commercial sales under the record label, His Master's Voice (HMV). Thus “Balikudeerangale” did much more than commemorate the centenary of the first war of Indian independence; it also marked the first decade of Indian independence (1947), the election of the first democratic Communist government in Asia, and the birth of an enduring popular anthem in the southwestern corner of a key nonaligned state.

In his book on the political force of music, Barry Shank traces the evolution of anthems from their origins in ritual and religious experience to secular politics, where rulers and nation-states became the primary objects of praise.<sup>76</sup> According to Shank, these are traditional anthems, songs that are sung at formal occasions like rituals at places of worship or nation-building events. As Schultz reveals in her chapter, the devotional repertoire of a singer-saint like

Tukdoji Maharaj might span the gamut of Shank's traditional-popular spectrum.<sup>77</sup> Popular anthems share many of the same musical and social features as traditional anthems, but they also have an ordinary everyday presence in the lives of folks who share an implicit sense of equality. Like traditional anthems, popular anthems create space for reciprocal recognition of belonging, largely because they manage to instill a sense of fairness, which in turn can serve as a base for political action. Such popular anthems avoid engaging in overt political discourse but prepare the ground for widespread collective action around a common sense of purpose in the political public sphere. The role of the urban folk revival and Black congregational singing in the American civil rights movement is a convincing case of how popular anthems harnessed much of the political force of traditional anthems while creating a cultural context for sustained oppositional action.<sup>78</sup> For example, Shin's chapter in this volume demonstrates how the vernacular soundtrack of American resistance in the 1960s and 1970s migrated to South Korea, where Christian churches and singer-songwriters were instrumental in building an ordinary culture of resistance. Shin's account highlights how Korean artists indigenized and adapted the work of leading North American urban folk revivalists by writing original covers and new songs that became anthemic for a youth-led countercultural front that confronted increasingly authoritarian policies in the 1970s. To capture this subtle but significant distinction between traditional and popular anthems, Shank reaches for Lauren Berlant's concept of the juxtapolitical: actions that are neither antipolitical nor explicitly political but are nevertheless constitutive of a ground for collective engagement.<sup>79</sup> He notes that while popular anthems draw on many of the qualities of religious and national anthems, including their accessibility, limited pitch range, antiphonal structure, uncomplicated rhythm, and clear lyrical themes, they differ in one important respect. Namely, they circulate beyond the formal conditions that constrain individual creative agency in highly ritualized (formalized) musical performance. The pop anthem thus "entrains bodies otherwise stifled toward an awareness of the shared, the mutual, the collective that extends beyond the ordinary and the same," and in doing so, they "shift the way the world is heard."<sup>80</sup> Moreover, a song that was originally intended to serve as a traditional anthem—like the commission of "Balikudeerangale" to commemorate anticolonial struggle and sacrifice at an official event—could also later acquire new currency and polysemy as a popular anthem.

In addition to circulating across geographical space, some anthems also transcend their historically specific moment. Drawing on new media and stylistic features, they can be refashioned in ways that appeal to multiple age-based

cohorts, thereby fostering the intergenerational solidarity required to shore up artistic fronts in contentious political arenas. The creative process of revitalizing songs several decades after they were originally written is well demonstrated by the recent use of “Balikudeerangale” in the Indian Malayalam film *CIA: Comrade in America* (2017). Directed by filmmaker Amal Neerad, the film tells the story of a young South Indian communist leader, Aji Matthew, whose American-born love interest abruptly returns to Texas when her family finds out about their mutual affection. Determined to reunite with her in Dallas, Aji reveals his plan at the local Communist reading room in a late-night conversation with imaginary comrades: Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Che Guevara.<sup>81</sup> The next day he flies to Nicaragua, where he can purchase a visa on arrival. With the help of a local Communist party office and a Sri Lankan taxi driver in San Juan del Sur, he travels through Central America and Mexico to the border city of Reynosa, where he joins a group of irregular migrants from Latin America, China, India, and Pakistan. Together they embark on a dangerous journey to cross the US-Mexico border. Along the way, Aji gains firsthand knowledge of the hardships migrants face as they struggle to locate family members, escape the violence of homelands, or find better economic opportunities. As the film unfolds, the narrative moves beyond the romantic plotline to critique the anti-immigration and border security policies of the United States.

Long before the setting shifts from Kerala to Latin America, however, Neerad follows Indian cinematic convention by introducing main characters through the picturization of popular song genres. For example, filmmakers often intensify blossoming romances through “love songs” and amplify protagonists through elaborate “hero introduction songs.” Both genres are deployed in the opening scenes of *CIA*, but because of the social realist aspirations of the film, Neerad was especially concerned with the “hero introduction song.” It was crucial that the film’s protagonist represent more than the average South Indian action hero.<sup>82</sup> Aji would need to embody hypermasculine ideals and the legacy of radical socialism in Kerala as well as contemporary transnational solidarity with working-class people across the Global South. What kind of musical strategies did music director Gopi Sundar mobilize to express these associations?

In a conversation about the soundtrack at his recording studio in Kochi, Sundar recalled how the director insisted on leading with “an anthem type of song.” A public supporter of leftist political movements in Kerala, Neerad came up with the idea of reviving “Balikudeerangale.”<sup>83</sup> Working in collaboration with lyricist Rafeeq Ahmed, Sundar thus adapted the 1950s-era popular

anthem to figure prominently in a new hero introduction song called “Kerala Manninayi” (Out of Kerala soil). The song would provide the non-diegetic soundtrack for an opening dramatic scene depicting a violent confrontation between riot police and Communist protesters led by Aji. According to Sundar, the main challenge was finding a way to pay homage to a beloved Communist anthem for older generations while also capturing the energy and musical tastes of millennial youth.<sup>84</sup>

Sundar deployed three main strategies to boost the song’s intergenerational appeal. By rerecording “Balikudeerangale” with crackle effects and midfrequencies only, he created a lo-fi aesthetic to stir feelings of nostalgia among listeners who were familiar with the original. Moreover, instead of inviting a veteran classically trained playback singer to perform the lead vocal part, he recruited Vaikom Vijayalakshmi, a charismatic popular singer known for her unique quality of voice and personal narrative of struggle against ableism in the music industry. As a result, Sundar’s reconstruction of the song captured the spirit of the anthem while also functioning more like a sample of the 1957 recording rather than as a cover. Second, in his struggle to “crack the tune,” as he put it, Sundar felt the bright tonality of G major and smooth melodic motion in the original song would fall short of capturing the imagination of younger listeners. He decided to use “Balikudeerangale” for the hook and refrain in contrast with a hip-hop aesthetic featuring limited minor key intervals, rhythmic lyrical delivery, and a stronger beat in the verses. One of the musical problems that Sundar had to solve, however, was the task of bridging divergent styles—classic *filmi* group song and contemporary hip-hop—in a way that maintained the coherence of the song overall. He decided to use a clean blues riff on an electric guitar in the relative E minor key, a musical gesture that made it possible to layer and overlap the melodically oriented major refrains and rhythmically driven minor-inflected verses.<sup>85</sup> Finally, Sundar and Neerad felt that a multilingual dimension would capture the outward-looking cosmopolitan aspirations of South Indian youth. Their first idea was to contrast the flow of the Malayalam refrain with rapping in English, but they quickly decided that a “foreign” language associated with British colonization and American imperialism would undermine the patriotic socialist sentiment of the story. So they rejected the more common hip-hop practice of alternating English and local Asian-language lyrics, choosing instead to write the rap verses in Tamil, arguably the most global of South Indian Dravidian languages. For example, Tamil-speaking artists from Malaysia were instrumental in the development of a multilingual hip-hop scene as part of a broader pan-Asian pattern of affinity for Black expressivity and empowerment.<sup>86</sup> Thus to help write and stylize the

Tamil lyrics, Sundar engaged Yogi B—a Kuala Lumpur-based hip-hop artist and founding front figure for the Malaysian hip-hop group Poetic Ammo. The incorporation of the blues guitar riff as well as hip-hop elements, including breaks, syncopation, rhyming, flow, and layering, not only expanded the song's youth cultural resonance as a contemporary vehicle for reviving revolutionary ideals of martyrdom and social justice; it also demonstrated how fusing a reconstructed 1950s Indian anthem with Africanist musical aesthetics in a film about alliance building with Latin America evokes new routes, covers, and fronts. Like the Peanuts' cover versions of Latin American songs in Japan, these routes bypassed the United States. In the process, they realigned Asian, Latin American, and African diasporic interests along a millennial front of socialist solidarity with Latinidad at a time of escalating rhetoric and anxiety over speculation that Asia's "new" Cold War had already begun.<sup>87</sup>

This brief account of the historic and contemporary significance of a South Indian song's passage from traditional anthem to popular anthem anticipates the chapters gathered under *fronts*. Marié Abe's contribution focuses on contemporary Okinawan popular music from the southern Ryūkyū Islands in Japan. She argues that the music of Daiku Tetsuhiro reimagines the spatiality of the archipelago from a highly militarized front in American Cold War strategic policy to a node in a dense transpacific network of relationalities that stretch across time to link multiple forms of difference. Similarly, Anna Schultz's chapter explores how popular music connects people and difference transnationally through a biographical lens. Presenting a North Indian perspective on how popular music can both reinforce and challenge top-down narratives of Cold War fronts, she examines the complex life, art, and politics of Maharashtra singer-saint Tukdoji Maharaj, including his role as a charismatic public figure in Gandhi's anticolonial struggle, his leadership in the early years of the Hindu nationalist movement, his controversial stance on violence in the Cold War climate of nuclear armament in the region, and his ironic participation in the peaceful front led by the Third World Religion Congress. Schultz's account highlights the many ways in which fluency in local devotional musical styles empowered an Indian spiritual leader to influence the circulation of ideas across various Cold War fault lines. Finally, Qian Zhang examines the role of music criticism in framing and policing popular music as an expression of internal fronts in the People's Republic of China. She shows how critics deployed metaphor and aesthetic discourse to draw clear distinctions between yellow and red musicians as part of the Communist Party of China's media strategy to discredit artists associated with bourgeois values. Just like the substitution of a red flag for a gold one in the lyrics of "Balikudeerangale" and its subsequent

revival as a hip-hop anthem in commercial film, Zhang shows how visual imagery, words, media, and the music itself intensify ideologically charged fronts in ways that influence not only how people respond to the political force of popular music but also how and at what cost they align themselves with one side or the other.

Collectively, the chapters in this volume encourage us to listen beyond national fronts, or as Josh Kun argues, to recognize that while music can have roots in a nation and influence national formations, “it always overflows, spills out, sneaks through, reaches an ear on the other side of the border line, on the other side of the sea.”<sup>88</sup> Likewise, the authors gathered here invite us to consider how the creative work, circulation, and open or clandestine enjoyment of popular songs call into question the conventional routes, boundaries, and periodizations that throw more shade than light on the cultural complexity of everyday life in Asia’s Cold War(s). For example, they invite us to hear covers not as derivative expression of modern yearning but as imaginative acts of mimesis that could amplify homage, subversion, or aspiration, depending on who is performing and listening, where, and when. Regardless of which one of the imbricated themes of routes, covers, or fronts is given more prominence, all the chapters present nuanced accounts of how popular music and Cold War forces mutually shape one another. In that sense, each one unfolds like a cassette playing first the A and then the B side or vice versa. Whereas A sides foreground how sonorous popular music worlds bring uneven, dynamic, and discrepant Cold War alignments into sharper relief, the complementary B sides consider the ways in which human conflict, friction, and territoriality have inspired and provoked some of the most compelling and forceful music of postwar Asia.

#### NOTES

- 1 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 2 Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 8.
- 3 On the phenomenon of “red restaurants” in contemporary China, see Jennifer Hubbert, “Revolution Is a Dinner Party: Cultural Revolution Restaurants in Contemporary China,” *China Review* 5, no. 2 (2005): 123–48; and Claire Conceison, “Eating Red: Performing Maoist Nostalgia in Beijing’s Revolution-Themed Restaurants,” in *Food and Theatre on the World Stage*, ed. Dorothy Chansky and Ann Folino White (New York: Routledge, 2016), 100–115.
- 4 Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American–East Asian Relations at the End of the Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 51, 59.
- 5 See, for example, Daniel Belgrade, *The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Greg

- Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); and Eduardo Herrera, *Elite Art Worlds: Philanthropy, Latin Americanism, and Avant-garde Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
- 6 Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, 6.
  - 7 Lisa Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 15.
  - 8 Yoneyama, *Cold War Ruins*, 61.
  - 9 Dredge Byung'chu Käng, "Idols of Development: Transnational Transgender Performance in Thai K-Pop Cover Dance," *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (November 2014): 559–71.
  - 10 Bruno Nettl, "We're on the Map: Reflections on SEM in 1955 and 2005," *Ethnomusicology* 50, no. 2 (2006): 186.
  - 11 Kathleen D. McCarthy, "From Cold War to Cultural Development: The International Cultural Activities of the Ford Foundation, 1950–1980," *Daedalus* 116, no. 1 (1987): 94. As a newly independent republic under democratic socialist leadership, India was a leading voice in 1955 at the Bandung Conference, where Asian and African nation-states established the groundwork for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
  - 12 Motti Regev, *Pop-Rock Music: Aesthetic Cosmopolitanism in Late Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 17.
  - 13 Theodor W. Adorno, "On Popular Music" (with the assistance of George Simpson), *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* 9 (1941): 17–18.
  - 14 Lawrence Grossberg, *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 29.
  - 15 Peter Manual, *Popular Musics of the Non-Western World: An Introductory Survey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 15.
  - 16 Jonathan Sterne, "Sonic Imaginations," in *The Sound Studies Reader*, ed. Jonathan Sterne (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2.
  - 17 David W. Samuels, Louis Meintjes, Ana Maria Ochoa, and Thomas Porcello, "Soundscapes: Toward a Sounded Anthropology," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 39 (October 2010): 330.
  - 18 Peter J. Schmelz, "Introduction: Music in the Cold War," *Journal of Musicology* 26, no. 1 (2009): 8.
  - 19 Studies on Asian sound include David Novak, *Japanoise: Music at the Edge of Circulation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Nicholas Harkness, *Songs of Seoul: An Ethnography of Voice and Voicing in Christian South Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Noriko Manabe, *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Protest Music after Fukushima* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Andrew N. Weintraub and Bart Barendregt, eds., *Vamping the Stage: Female Voices of Asian Modernities* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017); and Andrew F. Jones, *Circuit Listening: Chinese Popular Music in the Global 1960s* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2020).
  - 20 See Jedrek Mularski, *Music, Politics, and Nationalism in Latin America: Chile during the Cold War Era* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2015); Penny Von Eschen, "Di Ea-



- gle and Di Bear: Who Gets to Tell the Story of the Cold War,” in *Audible Empire: Music, Global Politics, Critique*, ed. Ronald Rodano and Tejumola Olaniyan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), 187–208; and Ewa Mazierska, ed., *Popular Music in Eastern Europe: Breaking the Cold War Paradigm* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
- 21 George Lipsitz, *Footsteps in the Dark: The Hidden Histories of Popular Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xv.
  - 22 Peter Wade, “Hybridity Theory and Kinship Thinking,” *Cultural Studies* 19, no. 5 (2006): 611.
  - 23 Quoted in Michael Berry, *Speaking in Images: Interviews with Contemporary Chinese Filmmakers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 190. See also Jia Zhangke, Cheng Qingsong, and Huang Ou, “Jia Zhangke: Zai ‘Zhantai’ shang dengdai” [Jia Zhangke: Waiting on the Platform], in *Wode sheyingji bu sahuang: Xianfeng dianyingren dang’an—shengyu 1961–1970* [My camera doesn’t lie: Files on avant-garde directors born in 1961–1970], ed. Cheng Qingsong and Huang Ou (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chubanshe, 2002), 343; and Jason McGrath, *Postsocialist Modernity: Chinese Cinema, Literature, and Criticism in the Market Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 149–50. On Teng’s arrival in mainland China, see Andrew Jones, *Like a Knife: Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 16; Jones, *Circuit Listening*, 169–95; Nimrod Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender and Politics, 1978–1997* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 10–13; Marc L. Moskowitz, *Cries of Joy, Songs of Sorrow: Chinese Pop Music and Its Cultural Connotations* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2010), 19–21; and Andrew N. Weintraub and Bart Barendregt, “Re-vamping Asia: Women, Music, and Modernity in Comparative Perspective,” in Weintraub and Barendregt, *Vamping the Stage*, 1–2. On the importance of radio and tape recorders for the diffusion of Teng’s music in China and on the trend of “copying Deng Lijun,” see ChenChing Cheng and George Athanasopoulos, “Teresa Teng (Deng Lijun), the Enlightenment for Democracy in the 1980s and a Case of Collective Nostalgia for an Era That Never Existed,” *Lied and populäre Kultur / Song and Popular Culture* 60–61 (2015/16): 41–59.
  - 24 Andrew Jones, *Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the Chinese Jazz Age* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 6. On Zhou, see Jean Ma, *Sounding the Modern Woman: The Songstress in Chinese Cinema* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015); and Yifen Beus, “On Becoming Nora: Transforming the Voice and Place of the Sing-Song Girl through Zhou Xuan,” in Weintraub and Barendregt, *Vamping the Stage*, 65–82.
  - 25 Jones, *Yellow Music*, 6.
  - 26 Lydia Liu, “A Folksong Immortal and Official Popular Culture in Twentieth-Century China,” in *Writing and Materiality in China: Essays in Honor of Patrick Hanan*, ed. Judith Zeitlin and Lydia Liu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 553–609. Such circular operation of collection, transformation, and dissemination was aimed at retrieving the revolutionary fervor of the people, as reflected in their folk songs, and hence at legitimizing the revolution. See Max

- Bohnenkamp, "Turning Ghosts into People: *The White-Haired Girl*, Revolutionary Folklorism, and the Politics of Aesthetics in Modern China" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014), 17–19.
- 27 Barbara Mittler, "Cultural Revolution Model Works and the Politics of Modernization in China: An Analysis of Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy," *World of Music* 45, no. 2 (2003): 53–81; Mittler, *A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Paul Clark, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); John Winzenburg, "Musical-Dramatic Experimentation in the *Yangbanxi*: A Case for Precedence in *The Great Wall*," in *Listening to China's Cultural Revolution: Music, Politics, and Cultural Continuities*, ed. Paul Clark, Laikwan Pang, and Tsan Huang-Tsai (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 189–212.
- 28 Cheng and Athanasopoulos, "Teresa Teng," 46.
- 29 The term *liuxing* is often used interchangeably with *tongsu*. Both characterize a heterogeneous field of musical styles, even though "*tongsu* clearly implies political legitimacy and ideological orthodoxy, while *liuxing* continues to connote 'yellow music,' westernization, and heterodox activity." Jones, *Like a Knife*, 20.
- 30 The World Federation of Democratic Youth was founded in London in 1945 with the goal of bringing together international youth with a broad antifascist and pro-peace agenda. With the onset of the Cold War, however, it was accused by the US State Department of being under Soviet control. The first of the World Festivals of Youth and Students took place in Prague in 1947 in commemoration of young Czechs' protests against the Nazi occupation in 1939. Later editions took place in Eastern Europe and in other socialist countries such as Cuba and North Korea, but also in Austria (1959) and Finland (1962).
- 31 James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 3. On the global networks of contemporary music, see Jason Toynbee and Byron Dueck, eds., *Migrating Music* (London: Routledge, 2011).
- 32 For the concept of feedback, see Novak, *Japanoise*, esp. 17–20.
- 33 For detailed analyses of the film, see Jason McGrath, "The Independent Cinema of Jia Zhangke: From Postsocialist Realism to a Transnational Aesthetic," in *The Urban Generation: Chinese Cinema and Society at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Zhang Zhen (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 81–114; Michael Berry, *Xiao Wu, Platform, Unknown Pleasures: Jia Zhangke's "Hometown Trilogy"* (London: Palgrave Macmillan/BFI, 2009), 50–92; Liu Jin, *Signifying the Local: Media Productions Rendered in Local Languages in Mainland China in the New Millennium* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 196–201; and Ying Xiao, *China in the Mix: Cinema, Sound, and Popular Culture in the Age of Globalization* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2017), 118–33. See also the useful appendix "Music and Sound in Jia Zhangke's *Platform*," in Xiao, *China in the Mix*, 239–48.
- 34 Berry, *Xiao Wu*, 71–74.
- 35 "Bianjiang quanshui you qing you qun" (Clear spring water at the frontier) was from the soundtrack of the spy movie *Hei san jiao* (Black triangle, 1977). It was the first

- hit by the famous singer Li Guyi, “the first mainland singer to use breathing singing after decades in which only . . . Western heroic bel canto singing . . . and artistic folk/national singing . . . were permissible.” Baranovitch, *China’s New Voices*, 16.
- 36 Berry, *Speaking in Images*, 191.
- 37 McGrath notes that the film foregrounds multiple chronologies and sudden, nonlinear changes in fashion (jeans, perms, etc.) that subtly affect the lives of the protagonists. McGrath, “The Independent Cinema of Jia Zhangke,” 100.
- 38 Berry, *Xiao Wu*, 84.
- 39 Cesare Bermanni, *Guerra guerra ai palazzi e alle chiese: Saggi sul canto sociale* [War war to palaces and churches: Essays on the social song] (Rome: Odradek, 2003), 230. All translations are by Iovene unless otherwise noted.
- 40 One of the earliest attempts at a history of “Bella ciao” is Roberto Leydi e Bruno Pianta, “La possibile storia di una canzone” [The possible story of a song], in *Storia d’Italia*, vol. 5, *I documenti 2* (Turin: Einaudi, 1973). Among other possible affiliations, similarities have been noted with the melody of the Yiddish traditional songs “Koilen” and “Di silberne khasene.” Carlo Pestelli, *Bella ciao: La canzone della libertà* [Bella ciao: The song of freedom] (Turin: Add editore, 2016), 84–89.
- 41 Bermanni, *Guerra guerra ai palazzi e alle chiese*, 230–32, 246.
- 42 Pestelli, *Bella ciao*, 93.
- 43 Presented by the group Nuovo Canzoniere Italiano, the concert was a milestone in the history of Italian folk revival. See Bermanni, *Guerra guerra ai palazzi e alle chiese*, 225; and Pestelli, *Bella ciao*, 60–67.
- 44 In Montand’s version, the last line, “this is the flower of the partisan who died for freedom,” is omitted. In the Chinese version, the last verse is omitted as well.
- 45 Jonathan Sanjeev Withers, “Kurdish Music-Making in Istanbul: Music, Sentiment, and Ideology in a Changing Urban Context” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2016), 97.
- 46 Unlike the majority of Yugoslavian partisan films, these two movies focused on an individual character rather than on a group or collective, though they shared with other films in the genre a “strict Manichean narrative structure, pathos-heavy dramaturgy, and film language that is indebted more to classical Hollywood than to European cinematographies.” Peter Stankovic, “1970s Partisan Epics as Western Films: The Question of Genre and Myth in Yugoslav Partisan Film,” in *Partisans in Yugoslavia: Literature, Film and Visual Culture*, ed. Miranda Jakiša and Nikica Gilić (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2015), 249. On the genre of partisan films, see also Pavle Levi, *Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Cinema* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
- 47 Yuan Qingfeng, “Nansilafu yingpian yu Zhongguo dalu dianying wenhua yujing de duijie—Yi Beijing dianying zhipianchang 1973 nian yizhi de *Qiao* (1969) wei lie” [The cultural contexts of Yugoslavian movies and mainland Chinese cinema—The case of *The Bridge* (1969), dubbed by Beijing Film Studio in 1973], *Shantou daxue xuebao* 30, no. 2 (2014): 13.
- 48 Yuan, “Nansilafu yingpian yu Zhongguo dalu dianying wenhua yujing de duijie,” 13. China had imported eight Yugoslavian films in the 1950s but none in the 1960s,

- for at that time Yugoslavia was considered a revisionist country. Cultural contacts were resumed in the early 1970s, and nineteen Yugoslavian films were imported and dubbed over the decade. The fact that both countries were alienated from the Soviet Union contributed to their rapprochement.
- 49 Anonymous, *Waiguo gequji* [Collection of foreign melodies] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1979). The volume includes Russian, European, and Indonesian leftist and revolutionary songs. “Ah, Friend” is presented as an Italian folk song and as the soundtrack of *The Bridge*, and its translation is credited to the Beijing Movies Dubbing Group. This version also appears in the collection *Liuxing gequ jianshang*, in which musicologist Xu Shujian offers some background information on the song and a detailed analysis of the melody, emphasizing its power as a war song. Xu Shujian, “Shengming—Meili de hua: ‘Ah, Pengyou’ xinshang” (Life—A beautiful flower: appreciating “Ah, friend”), in *Liuxing gequ jianshang* [Appreciating popular music], ed. Jiang Chaowen and Zheng Chengwei (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987).
- 50 *Yingyu gequxuan* [Selected songs in English], ed. Guiyang shifan xueyuan waiyuxi et al. (Guiyang: Zhuankeban yingyuke, 1980), 262–63. This collection must have aimed at teaching English through the greatest hits of world folk songs, as it was issued by the Foreign Language Department of Guiyang Normal University.
- 51 The record included (1) “Ningen no Shōmei no Tēma,” the theme song from *Ningen no Shōmei* (*Proof of the Man*, 1977); (2) “Auld Lang Syne” (theme song from *Waterloo Bridge*, 1940); (3) “Daiya yeh main kahan phasi” (from Bollywood classic *Caravan*, 1971); (4) the theme song from *Future World* (1976); (5) “Bella ciao”; (6) “Merry Unbirthday to You” (from *Alice in Wonderland*, 1951); (7) the theme song from *The Sound of Music* (1965); (8) “Sensei no tsūshinbo” (The teacher’s notebook), the theme song from a 1977 Japanese children’s movie of the same title; and (9) the theme song from *Walter Defends Sarajevo* (1972).
- 52 See, for example, Shunya Yoshimi, “‘America’ as Desire and Violence: Americanization in Postwar Japan and Asia during the Cold War,” *Inter-Asia Culture Studies* 4, no. 3 (2003): 433–50; and Andrew Jones, *Circuit Listening*, 109–131.
- 53 See Maeda Yoshitaka and Hirahara Kōji, eds., *Nihon no fōku & rokku hisutorii 1: 60-nendai fōku no jidai* (Tokyo: Shinkō Music, 1993), 111–15.
- 54 Kuan-Hsing Chen, *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).
- 55 Michael Bourdaghs, *Sayonara Amerika, Sayonara Nippon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). See also Deborah Shamoan, “Recreating Traditional Music in Postwar Japan: A Prehistory of Enka,” *Japan Forum* 26, no. 1 (2014): 113–38; and Christine Yano, “Covering Disclosures: Practices of Intimacy, Hierarchy, and Authenticity in a Japanese Popular Music Genre,” *Popular Music and Society* 28, no. 2 (2005): 193–205.
- 56 Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 138.
- 57 Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity*, 129.

- 58 Yoshikuni Igarashi, "Mothra's Gigantic Egg: Consuming the South Pacific in 1960s Japan," in *In Godzilla's Footsteps: Japanese Pop Culture Icons on the Global Stage*, ed. William M. Tsutsui and Michiko Ito (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006), 83–102.
- 59 Michael Furmanovsky, "A Complex Fit: The Remaking of Japanese Femininity and Fashion, 1945–65," *Kokusai bunka kenkyū* 16 (2012): 43–65. This Japanese fascination with "Frenchness" coincided with the golden age of French chanson (i.e., Brel, Brassens, Barbara, as opposed to the American-derived yé-yé music). Some have argued that the ennoblement of a sophisticated poetic song genre was part of a broader French emphasis on cultural and intellectual excellence/leadership in the face of declining international political influence. See Adeline Cordier, *Post-War French Popular Music: Cultural Identity and the Brel-Brassens-Ferré Myth* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2014), 92.
- 60 John Paul Meyers, "Still Like That Old Time Rock and Roll: Tribute Bands and Historical Consciousness in Popular Music," *Ethnomusicology* 59, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 61–81.
- 61 Gabriel Solis, "I Did It My Way: Rock and the Logic of Covers," *Popular Music and Society* 33, no. 3 (2010): 300.
- 62 Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (London: Routledge, 2007), 213–25. See also Kewku Ampiah, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the U.S., U.K. and Japan* (Folkestone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2007).
- 63 Solis, "I Did It My Way."
- 64 Carol A. Muller, "American Musical Surrogacy: A View from Post-World War II South Africa," *Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies* 7, no. 3 (2006): 4.
- 65 For a recent look at how the circulation of popular music recordings contributed to decolonization movements throughout the Global South, see Michael Denning, *Noise Uprising: The Audiopolitics of a World Musical Revolution* (London: Verso, 2015); and Ronald Radano and Tejumola Olaniyan, eds., *Audible Empire: Music, Global Politics, Critique* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).
- 66 To cite a recent example, Rahile Dawut, the internationally renowned scholar of Uighur expressive culture, disappeared in December 2017. She is widely believed to have been detained by Chinese authorities at a "re-education" facility or prison along with other prominent academics and artists, including popular singer and musician Abdurehim Heyit. Their disappearance appears to be part of a systematic clamp-down on prominent figures whose work or voice could be viewed as supportive of Uighur independence or religious extremism. See Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, "Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western China," *New York Times*, August 10, 2018.
- 67 Jayson Beaster-Jones, *Bollywood Sounds: The Cosmopolitan Mediations of Hindi Film Song* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 33.
- 68 See Andrew Jones's pathbreaking work on rock, subliminality, subversion, and ideology in the People's Republic of China. Jones, *Like a Knife*.

- 69 Sumangala Damodaran, *The Radical Impulse: Music in the Tradition of the Indian People's Theatre Association* (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2017).
- 70 The original recording of "Balikudeerangale" is available as "Bali Kudeerangale—KPAC Drama Songs," YouTube, accessed October 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAQ0OwabjX8>.
- 71 The Indian People's Theatre Association was founded in Mumbai (Bombay) in 1943. The Kerala People's Arts Club was formed in 1951.
- 72 The Martyr's Column at Palayam Junction in Thiruvananthapuram is also known as the Raktha Sakshi Mandapam.
- 73 Ravi Menon, personal communication with Kaley Mason, January 5, 2019.
- 74 "Niñña! ninna samarāṅkaṇa bhūvil ninnāñiñña kavacañña!umāyi. Vannu ñañña! malanāṭṭile maññil ninnitā putiya cenkoṭi nēṭi."
- 75 Thomas Turino, "Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experience: A Peircian Semiotic Theory for Music," *Ethnomusicology* 43, no. 2 (1999): 242.
- 76 Barry Shank, *The Political Force of Musical Beauty* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 39.
- 77 See also Anna Schultz, *Singing a Hindu Nation: Marathi Devotional Performance and Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 78 See Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, *Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 79 Shank, *The Political Force of Musical Beauty*, 48; Lauren Berlant, *The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
- 80 Shank, *The Political Force of Musical Beauty*, 40, 69.
- 81 Conspicuously absent is Mao Zedong. This may simply reflect the director's sense of the spatial and temporal limitations of the scene, or it could also be a commentary on the ambivalent place of China in a new international socialist front. A Chinese character does enter the narrative later on when Aji encounters other irregular migrants in Latin America, but the tech-savvy Akai appears to represent contemporary capitalist China rather than a socialist ally. Special thanks to the EthNoise! workshop participants at the University of Chicago who raised this question in the conversation following Kaley Mason's talk about the film on April 2, 2019.
- 82 For a more detailed discussion of these song genres in South Indian film, see Amanda Weidman, "Iconic Voices in Post-Millennium Tamil Cinema," in *Music in Contemporary Indian Film: Memory, Voice, Identity*, ed. Jayson Beaster-Jones and Natalie Sarrazin (New York: Routledge, 2017), 120–32.
- 83 Gopi Sundar, personal communication with Kaley Mason, January 15, 2019.
- 84 For a trailer for *CIA: Comrade in America* featuring "Kerala Maninnayi," see "Comrade in America (CIA)," YouTube, accessed September 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFrJMiMCgeg>. For the entire film with English subtitles, see "CIA Comrade in America with English Subtitle," YouTube, accessed September 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x263Eh52cQA>. The opening scene begins at 10:34, with the hero introduction song, "Kerala Maninnayi," starting at 12:07.

- 85 The recurring electric guitar riff in “Kerala Maninnayi” resembles the opening ostinato guitar riff in Jay-Z’s and Kanye West’s song “No Church in the Wild,” the first track on their collaborative album *Watch the Throne* (2011). This riff is in fact a sample from guitarist Phil Manzanera’s instrumental piece, “K-Scope” (1978), from the album of the same name. Moreover, Romain Gavras’s video for “No Church in the Wild” appears to have inspired the picturization of “Kerala Maninnayi.” Both the video and Amal Neerad’s hero-introduction scene open with a close-up of a protester lighting a Molotov cocktail before leading a clash with riot police. These intertextual references strengthen *CIA: Comrade in America*’s imagined connection with hip-hop’s Africanist aesthetic, global youth cultural appeal, and oppositional vitality.
- 86 See Hemma Balakrishnan, “Towards an Understanding of the Use of English and Malay in Malaysian-Tamil Hip-Hop Songs,” *South Asian Diaspora* 12, no. 1 (2018): 1–15. For a more general discussion of hip-hop culture’s transnational youth appeal and the globalization of Black expressivity, see Halifu Osumare, *The Africanist Aesthetic in Global Hip-Hop: Power Moves* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- 87 See Jude Woodward, *The US vs China: Asia’s New Cold War?* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2017).
- 88 Josh Kun, *Audiotopia: Music, Race, and America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 20.