

3 “What You Really Mean Is . . .”

Listening to “That Which Is Not Said”

To say who I am (who thinks, who wishes, who fantasizes in me)
is no longer in my power.

Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, *The Freudian Subject* (1988)

After all, there are no words that belong to no one.

M. M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (1986)

In the early fall of 2018, Buenos Aires was consumed by disruption as enraged labor organizers led protests across the city against government austerity measures. These protests were part of a wave of popular anger that erupted after President Mauricio Macri decreased public spending and pensions earlier that year. These actions by Macri depressed both wages and the employment rate amid very high inflation, to the benefit of concentrated local and global financial interests. As the protests spread, the government tried to suppress the unrest, even briefly incarcerating Juan Grabois, a charismatic social organizer and founder of the *Movimiento de Trabajadores Excluidos* (Movement of Excluded Workers).

On September 24, 2018, the *Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina* (Argentine Workers’ Central Union), one of the three union conglomerates in the country, led a march that ended at the iconic Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires’s main square and the symbolic center of the country. During the protest, Sergio

Palazzo, the general secretary of the Asociación Bancaria—the union of bank employees—directed a message to the crowds: “This is where the austerity of Mauricio Macri ends.” He spoke of the threats that Macri’s government had made about imprisoning even more social organizers and union leaders. Then he added: “They are not seeking to imprison leaders. *That might be perhaps a Lacanian object of desire, as we say here. In reality, what they are seeking is to imprison the politics of inclusion and participation, the politics of inclusion developed by the popular governments*” (Portal de Noticias 2018; emphasis added).¹ That a union leader quoted Lacan did not go unnoticed. Four days after this incident, writer and literary critic Martín Kohan (2018) published a note in the newspaper *Perfil* that opened with a question: “Where is Slavoj Žižek when he is most needed? We need to call him right away, we need to find him wherever he is.” He went on: “Who else but [Žižek] can find out what is the implication that a union leader, specifically Sergio Palazzo, a bank employee, had quoted—as he did—Jacques Lacan right in the act at Plaza de Mayo? He quoted Lacan, really. He invoked his conceptualization of the object of desire; he talked to a working mass that listened to him at the foot of the podium.”² Speculating on Palazzo’s reasons for bringing up Lacan in a speech before a workers’ march, Kohan first suggests that Palazzo sought to distinguish the order of *symbolic* capital from that of *sheer* capital, submitting that even Palazzo—a worker—might be knowledgeable about an abstruse philosopher. Palazzo’s use of the deictic *here* (“That might be perhaps a Lacanian object of desire, as we say here”) could be interpreted as meaning here in Argentina or here among the workers. Kohan proposes that bringing up such a sophisticated framework was Palazzo’s way of demonstrating the relative ignorance of Macri and his government compared to the workers. Later Kohan wonders whether Palazzo was calling attention to the authorities of the University of Buenos Aires School of Psychology and their recent attacks on students and professors who were demanding better salaries and a healthier operational budget.³ Invoking Lacan at a workers’ strike could be interpreted as “a clear gesture from the workers’ realm to the realm of knowledge so that those from the realm of knowledge could recognize themselves as workers.”⁴ Kohan closes by dismissing these purely speculative interpretations and returning to his original plea for Slavoj Žižek.

A psychoanalyst and political cartoonist named Marcelo Rudaeff, better known as Rudy, also commented on Palazzo’s reference to Lacan. In a humorous note published on September 29 in *Página 12*, a leftist newspaper known for its severe criticism of Macri’s government, Rudy harshly criticized

what he described as a failed “love affair” between Mauricio Macri and Christine Lagarde, the former president of the International Monetary Fund (Rudaeff 2018). He then interpreted the incident at Plaza de Mayo: “Perhaps (and this is a serious [interpretation] and with all due respect) he [Palazzo] perceived, or intuitively saw that in the face of the delirious certainty (another Lacanian expression with which the *mauritocrático* narcissism wants to mark us), in the face of the neglect of reality and common sense by which they affirm that inflation decreases when life becomes more expensive, or that it is good to lose your job . . . psychoanalysis is—why not?—a tool of resistance, one more path that allows us to get out of this strange storm called neoliberalism.”⁵ Admittedly, a union leader bringing up Lacan at a workers’ march is an interesting phenomenon in its own right. It is hard to think of any other country where something like this could happen. But my interest in Palazzo’s discourse and the later interpretations of his words by renowned writers goes beyond the seemingly ludicrous nature of this episode. I present this episode because of what Palazzo is actually doing by quoting Lacan: he is interpreting through a psychoanalytic framework what he considers to be the government’s “real” intentions. Palazzo is translating to the crowds the real motives behind the words—namely, that the rhetoric of incarcerating workers’ leaders is a metaphor for eliminating social inclusion. He is performing a sort of expertise that can be compared to the one analysts and analysands execute inside the MFSPT or the one-on-one clinic.

By performing *When you say X, I hear Y*, Palazzo is enacting a psychoanalytic listening genre. He is telling the crowd: I hear that the government is threatening to send us to prison, but the true meaning of their words, what they really mean, is that they want to destroy social services.

It does not stop there. In writing about the speech, Kohan and Rudy continue to replicate psychoanalytic listening by trying to uncover the *real* meaning of Palazzo’s words. The subtext is that there must be an intention, a hidden message waiting to be discovered. Though at first it may appear that this is a discussion between people initiated in psychoanalytic theory, the very heterogeneity of Palazzo’s audience suggests that psychoanalytic listening in Buenos Aires has permeated a range of social spheres and has become a social way of listening among many different sectors of the population, surpassing class and gender classifications.

This chapter describes how psychoanalytic listening as a genre has extended beyond the borders of the clinical setting and become a way of listening in day-to-day interaction. To see how this has occurred, it is necessary to understand how the key addressivity form (“I think that you mean

something else . . .” [*When you say x, I hear y*]), used during casual interactions and in many social settings, functions. An addressivity form is a term coined by Bakhtin (1986) when trying to explain the dialogic nature of language. Language, he tells us, is always oriented toward a listener, who will not only respond to an utterance after it is made but also shape the utterance while it is being made (see Morson 2006, 55). For example, a listener who responds “What you really mean is . . .” points to how the speaker is actually *listening* to the other person, a formulation that implies a reordering of who is the producer of the utterance.

Psychoanalytic listening is heteroglossic because it is constituted by multiple voices, but these voices are structured differently from voices in ordinary speech. For instance, when Palazzo claims to hear “something else” or “that which is not said” in President Macri’s words, he is attributing aspects of the president’s utterance to different sources: the self, the *doppelgänger*, repressed desires, and so on. This is similar to the way that the analysts and participants at the MFSPT heard Lucía’s mother’s voice (see chapter 2).

The voices in ordinary speech are organized this way:

I = current self

Others = can be quoted but normally are signaled as such

Doppelgänger = held in abeyance

In psychoanalytic listening, they are reorganized like this:

I = *doppelgänger*

Others = are voiced unconsciously

Self = all of the above

In nonpsychoanalytic listening—ordinary speech—the hearer takes the *I* as the sole producer of the utterance. But in the formula *When you say x, I hear y*, the *I* who produced the utterance is relegated, and the listener directs their full focus to the *doppelgänger*. If a listener uses this new hierarchization between *I/doppelgänger*, other/self, to understand a person’s words, the listener is employing the genre of psychoanalytic listening. The addressivity form *What you really mean* is thus plays the role of a *shifter*—a term whose meaning cannot be determined without referring to the message that is being communicated between a sender and a receiver. For example, the words *I, you, here, and now* can be understood only in the context in which they have been uttered—making explicit how the listener is *listening*.

Today, throughout Buenos Aires, personal identities, conceptions of citizenship, and construction of the political are consistently rooted not only in the performativity associated with speaking but also—and crucially—in this particular form of listening based on psychoanalysis. Such listening is social—produced by a collectivity of individuals and performed in all sorts of interactions surpassing class, age, and gender categorizations. In this way, the genre of psychoanalytic listening has become what Marcel Mauss (1966) calls a social fact, which he defined as an activity that has consequences throughout society, in the economic, legal, political, and religious spheres (for example, the Argentine Pope Francis said in an interview that during the country’s 1976–83 dictatorship he resorted to psychoanalysis [Piangiani 2017]). These listening practices provide crucial insight in creating and sustaining social relations in the country, affecting how media and cultural production, identities, and the political are formulated.

PSYCHOANALYSIS OUTSIDE THE CLINIC

In Buenos Aires, discussions of psychoanalysis, of one’s own therapy, and of *¿Cómo va el diván?* (How’s the couch going?) are common. Many people in Buenos Aires use psychoanalytic terms to talk about common situations. For example, they often use the word *hysteric* to refer to women or men who do not commit to anything (especially to emotional relationships); the word *phobia* expresses dislike for any situation; the term *psychosomatic* is ascribed to specific bodily ailments; and *Me psicopatió* (They “psychopathized” me) describes a situation when another does something bad and blames you.

Not only do people use psychoanalytic jargon; they tell stories about it. During my fieldwork in Buenos Aires I casually overheard many examples of this—from the taxi driver who tells you that he is going to analysis because he “likes women too much” but doesn’t want to put at risk his long-term relationship with his wife; to the sad woman at a convenience store who, when asked by the owner of the store why she looks so sad, responds, “I just came out from therapy” (to which the store owner replies, with absolute familiarity, “Who said knowing yourself was easy?”); to random conversations at the subway and bus stations. Everywhere, it seemed, friends or relatives freely discussed their own or someone else’s analytic situation in public.

However, as Palazzo's use of *When you say x, I hear y* to understand the president's speech demonstrates, psychoanalysis circulates in Argentina in ways that go beyond the use of clinical jargon or stories of one's own or others' analytic experiences. In a wide range of social contexts in Buenos Aires, people of different ages, genders, and professions consistently reproduce psychoanalytic listening outside the clinical setting by making use of lay psychoanalytic interpretation. For instance, in the fall of 2011, I was riding in a taxi cab with another woman who entered into a revealing exchange with the driver. The woman (W) was in her early thirties, and the taxi driver (TD) was in his fifties. Both were born and raised in Buenos Aires. During the ride, the taxi driver drove past a group of children dressed in beige and light blue. After the woman looked at the children, the following exchange ensued:

W: I really dislike that combination of colors, especially light blue. I don't think anybody looks good in that color.

[W: No me gusta nada esa combinación de colores, especialmente el celeste. No creo que le quede bien a nadie.]

TD: What's the matter? *I hear a lot of animosity in your words.* Does your mother wear that color often?

[TD: ¿Qué pasa? Escucho un montón de mala onda en tus palabras. ¿Tu vieja usa ese color seguido?]

W: What are you talking about?

[W: ¿Qué decís?]

TD: *I think that you mean something else, but you don't dare say it.* No one hates a color without a reason.

[TD: Y yo creo que querés decir otra cosa, pero no te animás a decirlo. Nadie odia un color así sin razón.]

W: No, not my mother . . . but now that you mention it . . . I will have to think about it.

[W: No, mi vieja no . . . pero ahora que lo decís . . . voy a tener que pensarlo.]⁶

Asked if he had formal training as an analyst, the taxi driver responded, "I think more than thirteen years of therapy makes you understand how these things work. But to answer your question: no, I have never been trained as an analyst."

This sort of interaction is extraordinarily common in Buenos Aires, and so is the response to queries about an individual's psychoanalytic credentials. Frequently this question is answered through a reference to the number

of years that an individual has undergone therapy. Some explain their psychoanalytic interpretations by claiming, without elaboration, a “commonsensical” relation between an utterance and its “real meaning,” while others reveal that a close friend or family member is a therapist, and consequently they are exposed to the particularities of this listening genre.

When people such as the taxi driver and Palazzo use the formulation *What you really mean is*, they are making explicit how they are listening. But they are not only reproducing a psychoanalytic genre (the rehierarchization of the total utterance)—they are also pointing to different *ideological* dimensions. These include an explicit ideology of knowledge (i.e., indexing the taxi driver and Palazzo as knowledgeable about something others do not perceive), a belief in unconscious practices, a disregard for semantic content in favor of a hermeneutic approach, and faith in a “true” (perhaps unmediated) self (see Ricoeur 1975 for his discussion of hermeneutics of suspicion).

The implication is that interpretation of verbal utterances can “uncover” aspects of the most intimate self, and that this interpretation can be performed by anyone who listens closely. The tacit subtext suggests that *you are unable to understand the real motives of your actions and feelings, so a translation is needed*. When someone says, “What you really mean is,” a social situation is immediately transformed (Goffman 1964) into a setting that grounds the exchange psychoanalytically, where many ideologies emerge. Consequently, in Buenos Aires a form of sociability is enacted through listening practices, moving from the performativity of speaking to a performativity of listening.

The prevalence of psychoanalytic listening as a genre of listening in Argentina has important implications for how key areas of social organization are enacted and maintained. This includes the way people formulate knowledge and assign authority, index themselves as political subjects, and engage in conversations across class, gender, and racial divisions. Psychoanalytic listening draws heavily on philosophical and theoretical constructs of the modern self, which inform the way people engage broader social, personal, and political arenas. Recognizing the way these ideologies are deployed through listening is essential for grasping how listening contributes to their reproduction and dissemination. To help the reader understand these arguments, I will now provide a basic overview of what listening ideologies are, along with some examples of how they have been discussed by scholars in other contexts.

In linguistic anthropology, the concept of *linguistic ideology* points to a person's ability, through their knowledge of communication practices in a local context, to evaluate any given speech utterance within that specific context. This knowledge is both pragmatic and self-reflexive. As pointed out by Susan Gal (1998, 322), "linguistic ideology is a guide to speakers for how they should understand the metapragmatic cues that relate linguistic signals to their context of use and that provide information about the 'what is going on here' of interaction." From its inception, the "ethnography of communication" has been concerned with language ideology as the cultural system of ideas, beliefs, and social values about language use. Current writings on linguistic ideology, focusing on the linkages among linguistic forms, semiotic codes, and power and social relations, reject the notion that linguistic ideology is a singular and politically neutral cultural construction. Instead, a number of scholars argue that multiple differing ideologies construct alternate, even opposing, realities within a culture (Briggs 1988). Language ideologies are the mediating link between social forms and forms of talk (Hanks 1996). As a result, the choice of a speech form (i.e., polite language, informal speech, scientific language, slang, etc.) has political implications on the basis of speakers' commonsensical convictions about what a language is and what the use of language is assumed to imply. As Asif Agha (2007, 145) puts it: "They [speakers] hint at the existence of cultural models of speech—a metapragmatic classification of discourse types—linking speech repertoires to typification of actor, relationship and conduct." Therefore, if linguistic ideologies encompass both social interaction and linguistic forms, it is because they can be understood as verbalized, thematized discussions and as the implicit understandings and unspoken assumptions embedded and reproduced in the structure of institutions and their everyday practices (Gal 1998, 319).

In the same way that linguistic ideologies point to a particular framework of action, interpretation, and subjectivity, "aural ideologies" or "listening ideologies" also provide a clarifying lens for how action, interpretation, and subjectivity operate within social interactions. Historically, the ideological dimension of listening has been generally conceptualized in terms of the content and the social prestige of what is being listened to (see Emmison 2003; Peterson 1992a, 1992b; Savage and Gayo 2011). The most extensive studies have focused on music, since the classificatory ideologies of music (e.g., highbrow vs. lowbrow) opens a debate about

how consumers of music use cultural taste to reinforce symbolic boundaries between themselves and categories of people they dislike (Bourdieu 1977, 1986, 1993; Bryson 1997). These studies emphasize shared networks of signification that are constituted in the appreciation of music. Hence, the ideological construct is somehow “external” to the actual listening. The ideological sphere of listening is located *in the associations*, not in the act of listening per se. These associations are shaped by dominant aesthetic and social expectations that are themselves historically structured and are constantly changing, creating particular kinds of audiences (see Savage and Gayo 2011; Warde, Wright, and Gayo 2008). Accordingly, the cultural history of listening to particular kinds of music, as well as its ideological dimension, encompasses changing aesthetic responses in relationship to public behavior. Studies of music consumption thus conceptualize the constitution of a social subject in relation to the choices a person makes about listening to particular symbolic sounds.⁷

However, if we focus only on the relationship between sounds linked to particular groups of people, we miss elements that are key to understanding listening ideologies *in the act* of listening. To uncover aural ideologies, we need to focus on the *metalevel* of listening. How do subjects listen? What are the evaluations that listeners construct? Do sounds have the same meanings for everyone? An array of ideological conceptualizations comes into play when we perceive sound, especially when the sound source is not visible (Kane 2016). Listening—like any other mode of perception—is historically structured (Foucault 1972, 1988), and by focusing on the way social actors apprehend sound, we can begin to understand how listening ideologies are shaped.

Listening and sounds are historically dependent and reflect different paradigms depending on context. For example, in *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History*, James Johnson (1995, 2) explains that in travelers’ descriptions and concertgoers’ accounts of the Paris Opera in the eighteenth century, the audience was “at times loud and at other merely sociable, but seldom deeply attentive.” Concertgoers talked throughout the performances, paying little attention to the music. It was not until a hundred years later, through a long process of subtle transformation, that the relationship between concertgoers and music changed; people stopped talking, and the audience began to *listen* to the music. The notorious shift in listening practices (or auditory ideologies) between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Paris was a result of changing popular comprehension of new aesthetic styles that, according to Johnson, are “at the same time structural and personal” (4).

Johnson points to the fact that any public response to sounds—including silence—is social: “public expression, although freely chosen, is drawn from a finite number of behaviors and styles of discourse shaped by the culture” (3). At the same time, the expression of these modes of reception does not exist objectively. Their significance resides in *the particular moment of reception*.

The dialectical relationship between the structural and the personal aspects of reception resonates with the concept of “meaning” in language, which makes sense only in light of the social and psychological conditions under which a particular linguistic code is used (Basso and Selby 1976; Ochs 1979). Meaning is shaped by various factors, including the age, sex, and social class of speakers and hearers. It is shaped by the style of speaking, the events or activities in which language is being used, the institutional roles of participants in the interaction, and the organization or flow of information in the prior discourse. This relationship is known to be bidirectional: “language shapes contexts as much as context shapes language” (Duranti and Goodwin 1992, 77). In the case of the Paris Opera in the eighteenth century, we can say that *reception shaped contexts as much as context shaped reception*. In other words, the reality of the sign, whether linguistic or auditory, is wholly a matter determined by communication (see Voloshinov 1973). It is in the intricacies of this dialectic that linguistic and aural ideologies come into being, since both concern how the structure of language or sounds, the use of language and listening practices, and the beliefs about language and sounds are necessarily interconnected and constitutive of each other. Johnson’s analysis of the transformations of the Paris Opera exemplifies how a social space’s ideology and practice of listening can develop into a new regime of silence, attention, and focus. As this example suggests, listening is an extraordinary force for constituting social space and directing behavior.

Looking at these kinds of ideological constructs in the context of psychoanalytic listening brings to light a number of important ways that such ideologies circulate through listening in Buenos Aires and Argentina. But although listening ideologies have not been specifically termed as such previously, auditory ideologies are everywhere, and other scholars have directly taken up many important examples of how listening ideologies operate through a number of important frameworks. As R. Murray Schafer (2003, 25) writes, since “we have no ear lids,” “we are condemned to listen.” Every time we listen, we are consciously or unconsciously making assumptions and judgments and sometimes having fastidious ideas about

the ranges of sounds we consider “good” or interruptive. The sounds we are constantly assessing are themselves impregnated with semiotic meaning. Scholars have identified numerous important examples of these kinds of listening ideologies, along with their impact within specific social contexts.

In his historical analysis of the constitution of meanings and sounds in antebellum America, Mark Smith (2003, 2001) describes how some regional soundscapes helped to define social relations. He (2001, 139) explains how the elites of both northern and southern states associated certain sounds with the notion of progress: “defined by nascent capitalists and boosters, sound heralded progress and, as such, it was sound, not noise.” These were mainly industrial sounds that, far from being signified as noise, were considered signs of growth and development (e.g., the sound of the first railroads). In contrast, the quietness of the countryside was synonymous with recession and backwardness. In this context, when Native Americans were expelled from their land, the elites’ policy was to “settle them in a *quiet* home” (G. C. Munro, cited in Smith 2003, 141; emphasis added). In antebellum America these different sounds acquired meanings that reflected the desires, the fears, and the discomfort of the period. As in the example from the Paris Opera, these are instances of reflexivity of listening, which entails a strong ideological component.

However, aural ideologies associated with these kinds of sounds were hardly static, and the same sounds that were considered harbingers of progress and economic growth in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries acquired a totally different value in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Kerin Bijsterveld (2001) explains in “The Diabolical Symphony of the Mechanical Age,” the sounds of the city and the mechanical revolution that in antebellum America were considered “good” sounds were resignified in Europe as noise by the turn of the century. As social classifications transformed, those who showed no sensitivity to noise were considered “insensible to arguments, ideas, poetry and art—in sum, to mental impressions of all kinds, due to the tough and rude texture of the brains,” as philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer suggested in an article published in 1851 (cited in Bijsterveld 2001, 45). Schopenhauer was not alone in his dislike for external noise—the intellectual elite at the turn of the century in Europe agreed that a “noise etiquette” should be implemented. They worried that they could not concentrate and contemplate beauty due to the “many torments to which our delicate organs [the ear] are exposed” (Bijsterveld 2001, 45). New typologies of people emerged, separating the “brute”

and uneducated, who were unable to distinguish noise from other types of sounds, from the refined and delicate, who could not appreciate beauty under the “torments” produced by excessive sounds.

What is remarkable about these debates is the emergence of subjects who heard things differently and thus belonged to different social strata. In each example, we can grasp a specific listening ideology that indexes particular social actors to certain practices that are ideologically constructed. Among these practices, gender also emerges as a notable feature. Bijsterveld notices that the people who pushed for noise reduction at the turn of the nineteenth century in Europe were at times classified as feminine and weak. This fed a gendered narrative, where the ability to tolerate sounds was masculine and powerful, in contrast to the womanly inability to abide harsh noise (Bijsterveld 2001, 56). (For a discussion of how specific notions of gender are implicated in the circulation of psychoanalytic discourses and are reproduced by the genre of psychoanalytic listening, specifically constructions of the mother, see chapter 5.)

Beyond the issues discussed in this book, however, gendered subjectivities are productive sites for understanding the importance of sound and listening within all social contexts. In the brilliant research by Miyako Inoue (2006) into the constitution of a modern Japanese female subjectivity, the practice of listening and other corporeal sites of subject formation (e.g., other senses, such as seeing and smelling) emerge as socially constructed and historically emergent. Inoue pays particular attention to the gendered constitution of the female character in Japan, focusing on how Japanese schoolgirl speech became a signifier related to modernization. In her account, the female voice, previously largely unheard, began to have semiotic meaning from approximately 1887 to the end of World War II. The female voice slowly transformed from background noise into the form of a linguistic genre: “schoolgirl talk,” which was dubbed “vulgar,” “sugary and shallow,” and problematic in the view of male Japanese intellectuals at the turn of the century (156–59). Inoue takes on Michael Silverstein’s (1979) examination of linguistic ideology and explains that these auditory practices are embedded inside an already customary language ideology that established what constituted a language and what did not. In her analysis, Inoue focuses her attention on the metapragmatic ideology that emerges in male intellectual descriptions of schoolgirl talk so as to demonstrate that these intellectuals are listening ideologically. Inoue presents examples where schoolgirl talk emerges as an imagined *auditory ideology* that existed more in the minds of elite Japanese intellectuals than in the mouths of girls. But

the auditory ideology is sufficiently real that it enables people to hear this imaginary talk. Particular sounds created a noteworthy discomfort in the listener and were later classified as schoolgirl talk. This process was possible, according to Inoue, because the female voice was already embedded in a specific linguistic ideology with clear boundaries and expectations about what it should be or sound like.

Although in Argentina the concept of race is less central than in other social contexts, such as the United States, race is a powerful lens for understanding how specific ideologies and social biases circulate within listening practices. For example, recent scholarship has focused on the concept of *raciolinguistics*, exploring the role that language plays in shaping ideas about race, and vice versa (see Alim, Rickford, and Ball 2016; Flores and Rosa 2015). In these investigations, the listener becomes the arbiter of defining who is a racialized-sounding subject (Flores and Rosa 2015). The politics of listening practices create particular subjects as “sounding like a race,” while others sound “neutral,” thus creating unequal subjects (Rosa 2019). In *The Sonic Color Line* (2016), Jennifer Lynn Stoeber analyzes what she considers to be white-constructed ideas of “sounding Other.” These ideas encompass accents, slang, and dialects, which she claims have “flattened the complex range of sounds actually produced by people of color, marking the sonic color line’s main contour” (11). Thus, the racialized body occupies not only a physical form but a sonic space—an imagined space where, for example, sounding “eloquent” or “articulate” becomes a synonym of sounding white (Alim and Smitherman 2012).

The examples provided by Inoue and by raciolinguistics scholarship help us understand that listening ideologies are, to a large degree, imagined. There is nothing “real” about the discourses that link certain types of people to certain listening practices—these are but beliefs and projections that indicate a way in which subjects understand the world.

In Argentina, when people tune the ear into a “psychoanalytic genre of listening” (such as Ramiro and the taxi driver discussed in chapter 1 or the woman speaking to the taxi driver discussed earlier in this chapter), they bring to life a set of beliefs that index the listener as inhabiting a particular epistemology. They take up a specific ideology of knowledge, marking the listener as knowledgeable about something the speaker is unable to recognize. The ideologies of believing in unconscious practices favor a hermeneutic approach to signification, signaling the possibility of having a “real” intimate self, unknown to the speaker but seemingly up for interpretation. In psychoanalytic listening there is an additional ideological bias

that is rooted in radical modern subjectivities, which undergird this genre of listening and have a profound impact on people's understanding of specific social, personal, and political constructions.

Unlike the examples above, where the ideological component of listening underscores connections between the production of certain sounds and a social classification (e.g., if you don't mind listening to rough noises, you must be an unsophisticated brute), the listening ideology of psychoanalytic listening (*What you really mean is*) does not necessarily rely on specific social class biases. In cases where racial, gendered, and class hierarchies are established by extralinguistic features, the listener creates relationships linking sounds or phonetic variations to kinds of people based on their social position. In such situations, it matters whether the listener is a man or a woman, wealthy, white or occupies another social position. But in the ideology produced by listening psychoanalytically, the relationship between the listener and the listened is not determined by such extradiscursive factors. Instead, what matters is the capacity for listening and interpreting. Rather than bestowing a social position (other than that of being interpreted), psychoanalytic listening creates a particular scenario, a setting, a possibility.

Certainly, there are hierarchical structures that favor some analytic interpretations over others. Someone with a degree in psychology has an institutional voice with more credibility when interpreting the actions or discourses of a specific subject. But as the two stories about taxi drivers show, anyone with an appropriate "ear" has the potential to listen to unconscious practices. Thus, there seems to be a horizontal circulation of interpretations wherein the subject decides whether or not to accept the interpellation.

When it comes to using the formula *What you really mean is*, social position is not part of the equation in Buenos Aires. I witnessed male and female, younger and older, middle-class and wealthy people performing this listening practice. In doing so, they performed an indexical transposition—that is, taking an indexical sign from one field and embedding it in a new field (for example, when I say *I*, but I am quoting someone else's speech, I have transposed the first-person pronoun from the deictic field to the narrative field). *Porteños* perform an indexical transposition of the present dyad into the psychoanalytic dyad, which rehierarchizes the *I-you, here-now* relationship. This is so prevalent in Buenos Aires that people rarely react negatively to the interpretation. It is part of their communicative practices, even though in other contexts it can be interpreted as a violent act: as one

of my United States mentors told me, “it sounds dystopic, like a mocking inversion of empathy into intrusion.”

Listening to the voice of the Other implies advocating for the Other. Listening thus implies a form of care. If we understand the subject as an atomized unit, the *What you really mean* is addressivity form would most likely be perceived as an intrusion. But if we take at face value Freud’s idea that the psyche is extended and cannot truly know of its own existence, we can understand subjectivity not as one individual but as a continuum of “resonances.” The listener who translates the words of others into seemingly unconnected interpretations is helping the subject find the “nodes” that anchor the chain of signifiers. Thus, the listener’s interpretations could be read as an act of generosity, as repair.⁸ As Bakhtin (1986, 121–22) writes, “The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but *the listener* has his rights, and those whose voices are *heard* in the word before the author comes upon *it also have their rights*” (emphasis added). “[A]fter all, there are no words that belong to no one” (124).

PSYCHOANALYTIC LISTENING AND MODERNITY

Contemporary Argentine listening practices tie into larger sociopolitical forces, both regionally and globally, and intersect with important historical lineages of power and identity. Psychoanalytic listening is a profoundly modern form of listening—in the sense that it comprises a modern subjectivity that is constituted in relation to an alterity—where the Other is not an accidental by-product but a necessary condition for the modern self (B. R. Anderson [1983] 2006; Certeau 1984, 1988; Chakrabarty 2000; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Gupta 2005; Horrocks 2001; Inoue 2006). In this view, the modern individual, whose political life is lived in citizenship, is also supposed to have an interiorized “private” self that pours out through different outlets, such as diaries, autobiographies, memoirs, and other literary or artistic forms. Inside this episteme, the analyst’s office becomes the epitome of the expression of the private self. For example, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000, 35) pointed directly to psychoanalysis as a “genre that helps express the modern self.” The main idea is that there is an *internal life that is unique* and is not to be found in the expression of a social position. The modern subject represents the self as irreplaceable, personal, intimate, and not transferable.⁹

In this literature, then, psychoanalysis is depicted as a modern enterprise because it helps to uncover the intimate self. The relations that are formed are “intersubjective” (Gupta 2005). If we transpose the particular way in which modernity has been defined to the circulation of psychoanalysis outside the clinical setting in Buenos Aires, we can say that through listening psychoanalytically, the listener not only refers to the ideologies already discussed but also performs a modern subjectivity based primarily on the idea of unconscious practices. This means that in Buenos Aires there is a public culture constructed on the basis of a radically modern ideology—psychoanalysis—and this culture is created through listening practices that circulate on an everyday basis.

To the extent that this holds true—that psychoanalysis is a modern practice—listening psychoanalytically may seem to contradict some of the Enlightenment epistemologies that conceptualize listening as non-modern and the visual as modern (Gouk 2004; Jay 1993). In the wake of the “communication revolution” that took place through the emergence of the printing press, it has become commonplace to assert that the early modern West shifted from a predominantly aural to a primarily visual culture (B. R. Anderson [1983] 2006; McLuhan 1962).¹⁰ The emergence of positivistic frames of interpretation based on observable facts to determine the veracity of particular phenomena also emphasized the visual, relegating other sensorial expressions to secondary importance (Gouk 1999, 2004; Schmidt 2000; B. Smith 1999).

The ear, on the contrary, has been historically connected with the past, with religious practices, stories of possessions, and other storytelling, and with a connection with the so-called natural and sensible world, among other representations (see Certeau 2000). Psychoanalytic focus, which for many years was placed as “the talking cure,” presents a model of listening that defies linear conceptualizations of time and implies a codification of signs that are referential but whose reference is concealed. Most importantly, through this framework one listens to the inner and perhaps “true” self (Lacan [1966] 2006). Psychoanalysis created a new form of subjective experience that gave birth to the idea of a divided subject, unique and exceptional, pointing to how the modern self is conceptualized. Thus, by being mostly a listening practice, psychoanalysis is a modern enterprise.

In Buenos Aires, listening is based on a radically modern form—psychoanalysis—which is, by definition, intrinsically modern (modern in

the sense of alterity, on the idea of separation of the private and public self and the uniqueness of one's self). When listeners tune their ears into the psychoanalytic listening genre outside the clinical setting, they are performing a modern subjectivity wherein ideologies about a private and unique self become evident.

Reported Speech as the Creation of Alterity

To see how the genre of psychoanalytic listening reproduces specific modern subjectivities in Argentina, it's useful to look at the way this genre of listening helps create alterity. By turning the ear into a psychoanalytic genre, and thus performing a modern subjectivity, we conceptualize a very particular form of *reported speech*, or how speakers represent the speech of others, as well as their own (Bakhtin 1981; Voloshinov 1973). This form does not report directly or indirectly a speech but creates a whole new narrative centered on translating unconscious practices. The following example illustrates this point.

Inside a coffee shop are four friends, three men and one woman: Carlos (C), age forty; Darío (D), age thirty-five; and Andrés (A) and Lorena (L), both thirty-nine. They are discussing a positive review that appeared in the national newspaper *Clarín* of a book recently published by Darío. (I was also present but did not participate in the conversation.)

- 1 **C:** Hey, it says here that you are thirty-nine years old, but you are not thirty-nine.
[C: *Ey, acá dice que tenés 39 años, pero vos no tenés 39.*]
- 2 **D:** No.
[D: *No.*]
- 3 **L:** How old are you?
[L: *¿Cuántos años tenés?*]
- 4 **D:** Well, my analyst says that I am fifteen years old; this guy says that I am thirty-nine, and my document says that I am thirty-five. So I don't know. [*laughs*]
[D: *Y, mi analista dice que tengo 15 años; este tipo dice que tengo 39, y en mi documento dice que tengo 35. Así que ¿qué se yo?*]
- 5 **A:** At least your analyst says that you are fifteen. Mine says that I am eleven! [*laughs*]
[A: *Por lo menos tu analista dice que tenés 15, el mio dice que tengo ¡11!*]

- 6 **D:** The next time that Andrea [the analyst] tells me, “Darío, it seems as if I am listening to my son Manu when I am listening to you.”—C’mon, the kid is around fifteen years old!—I am going to send her this note. [*laughs*]
 [D: *La próxima vez que Andrea me diga: “Darío, me parece que estoy oyendo a mi hijo Manu cuando te escucho a vos.”—¡No me jodas, el pibe tiene como 15 años!—Le voy a mandar esta nota.*]
- 7 **A:** No, what your analyst is telling you is that she thinks of you as her child, so she is not available to fuck. [*laughs*]
 [A: *No, lo que tu analista te está diciendo es que te ve como a su hijo, así que no te la podés garchar.*]
- 8 **D:** What a big moron you are! Andrea is my mother’s age!
 [D: *¡Pero qué pedazo de pelotudo! ¡Andrea es de la edad de mi vieja!*]
- 9 **C:** Oops, here comes the [Oedipus] complex. [*laughs*]
 [C: *Uy, ahí se sale el complejo.*]
- 10 **A:** Congratulations, dude! You are great!
 [A: *¡Felicidades chabón! ¡Sos re-grosso!*]
- 11 **C:** She [the analyst] was generous. I would have guessed three years, max. [*laughs*]
 [C: *Y fue generosa, yo te daría 3 años como mucho.*]

A significant way in which “self” and “other” are differentiated is through the exploration of reported speech. Valentine Voloshinov (1973, 116–19) conceptualized reported speech in three ways: *direct*, when the speaker repeats the same statement with no apparent change; *indirect*, when the speaker paraphrases the statement; and *quasi-direct*, when the speaker presents the statement through a third-person narrative formulation—that is, from the point of view of the narrator in a novel.¹¹ The formulation *What you really mean is . . .* suggests yet another form of reported speech.

Reported speech, in any of its forms, is very useful for the analysis of how alterity is brought to light as well as of listening genres. It points to *how* listeners listen to each other’s words. When we use indirect discourse, we do not just apply a grammatical rule. Instead, we need to analyze and respond to the reported utterance and identify the dialogic relationship within which it operates. As Bakhtin suggests in the opening quote of this chapter, the word cannot be assigned to a single speaker.

When people in Buenos Aires use the addressivity form *What you really mean is*, they are reporting the speech of the other person’s utterance. This appropriation of one speaker’s discourse by another, who may then employ

it to oppose the original intention (either directly or obliquely), is fundamental in psychoanalytic listening. It also points to the way that psychoanalytical listening helps reproduce key aspects of the conceptualization of the modern self in very quotidian social contexts.

In the opening line of the exchange in the coffee shop, Carlos indirectly reports what he read in the newspaper: “it says here that you are thirty-nine years old.” The deictic word *here* behaves much like a demonstrative that, in conjunction with the physical gesture that Carlos is performing by pointing to the newspaper article, is used not only to identify the source of the narrative but to indicate the referent’s spatial and temporal location. It also generates a collective orientation in the conversation to the newspaper text. In this case, the quotation is happening in the present. Likewise, in line 4, Darío is reporting three different sources (three quotations): “my analyst says that I am fifteen years old; this guy says that I am thirty-nine; and my document says that I am thirty-five.”

Unlike in Carlos’s quotation, Darío’s first quotation (of his analysis) lacks the deictic *here* and thus does not provide a specific time frame. Since the analyst is not present at the moment this exchange happened, the implication is that Darío is indirectly quoting what the therapist told him sometime in the past. Darío’s second quotation (in reference to the literary critic) introduces another deictic: *this*. In this case, the deictic not only helps to contextualize the source of the utterance but reduces the scope of interpretation to a particular individual and in a particular time frame, since he, like Carlos, is pointing directly to the newspaper. This is a classic example of transposition; there is a metonymy: pointing at the newspaper and referring to an author (a deferred ostention between counterparts). In both cases, Darío is bringing two absent social actors into the present context.

In line 6 of the conversation, there is a direct form of quotation when Darío straightforwardly quotes his analyst (“The next time that Andrea tells me: ‘Darío, it seems as if I am listening to my son Manu when I am listening to you’”). In this instance, Darío does not claim authorship for a part of his utterance, which he ascribes to another speaker (the analyst). This part of his utterance does not serve a regular referential function. Rather, it refers to words—not to any arbitrary words but to those words that the analyst purportedly uttered at some other time. Through this reference, Darío also collapses different time frames. By drawing on the analyst’s words, Darío is bringing in a reference about listening, making explicit that the analyst is positioning her ear in reference to symbolic sounds. We can see the difference between Darío’s first instance of indirect quotation (line 4)—where

he transforms the analyst's speech through subtle changes in deictic, tense, or pronoun change—and the second instance (line 6), in which he quotes the speech of the analyst directly. In the first quotation we have:

(a) “My analyst says that I am fifteen years old.”

We could infer that the original statement (made by Andrea, the analyst) was:

(b) “Darío, you act/look/sound as if you are fifteen years old.”

Yet, Darío did not exactly listen to option b. Instead, he quotes his analyst as saying there is a *sonic* relationship between his speech and that of the analyst's son, who is “around fifteen years old.” He is making an inference derived from the proposition made by the analyst. We do not have enough context to understand what the analyst meant when she said, “It seems as if I am listening to my son Manu when I am listening to you.” What we do know is that Darío heard “You are fifteen years old,” presumably as an assessment of his level of emotional maturity. We can assume that this exchange happened inside the clinical setting, since one of the most important stipulations of psychoanalytic theory is that the analysand and the analyst should not have any social relation outside the clinic. Their relationship is purely therapeutic. This discrepancy—between what the analyst actually said and the interpretation that Darío is making of it—shows us that in psychoanalysis, what is quoted is far from being a direct or indirect attribution but a new reconfiguration of the words, a new grammatical form.

In line 7 we see a formulation of the *What you really mean is* form of quotation when Andrés says, “No, *what your analyst is telling you is* that she thinks of you as her child.” This belongs to the same group of expressions as the one uttered by the taxi driver (“I think that you mean something else”) and Palazzo's “in reality, what they are seeking is . . .” From one perspective, reported speech—which incorporates a past utterance into a new dialogical context—may be viewed as a reconstruction of that past utterance, one that revitalizes it with a present significance.

The *What you really mean is* form of reported speech—which can be described as intersubjective reported speech—affords a new “hearing/listening” in a necessarily different context. It is essentially deprived of the words' original significance by the author's current interpretation. For example, in the exchange above, Andrés is telling Darío what the analyst really meant with her words. He is simultaneously presenting the third-person

perspective of the reported speaker and the first-person perspective of the reporting speaker. He suggests that the analyst is bringing the figure of her son into the therapy to indicate to Darío that she sees him as a son, thus stating clearly that she is not available for any sexual encounter. While this statement is meant as a joke, Andrés is clearly reproducing, if artificially, how to listen psychoanalytically, disregarding the words of the direct quotation brought up by Darío and offering a different analysis. The one voice has been replaced by a series of new statements.

Bakhtin had envisioned some of these problems when he presented his concept of double-voiced discourse. In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin (1981, 261) describes the novel as a complex set of “several heterogeneous stylistic unities.” From this perspective, the novel is not a single unified form but a genre that subsumes several subgenres. Unlike monological lyric poetry, the novel is dialogical or heteroglot, expressive of a multiplicity of points of views that Bakhtin called *voices*. Such speech constitutes a special type of double-voiced discourse, serving two speakers at the same time and expressing two different intentions simultaneously: the direct intention of the character who is speaking and the refracted intention of the author. These voices are “dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialog) and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other; it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other” (324). Double-voiced discourse, Bakhtin tells us, is internally dialogized. So, one way in which the *What you really mean* is quotation can be interpreted is as representing a double-voiced discourse, which has a particular intentionality (a therapeutic one) and is open to different interpretations.

Alterity inside One’s Own Self

In psychoanalysis there is a radical form of alterity: the unconscious. Derrida (2005) called it an “intruder,” or the other in you that is internal but gets expressed externally through actions, among other behaviors. The recognition that there is something we cannot control that is nevertheless represented by our drives, our fears, and our repressions is a modern idea performed in many casual encounters in Buenos Aires. But unlike other forms of alterity, the idea of the unconscious does not necessarily need another person to recognize that it is there (although most of the time it happens inside an interchange). It can happen inside one’s own dialogue.

Psychoanalytic listening is cumulative: it functions through aural residues that, little by little, give sense to an incoherent group of sounds or perhaps superimpose one set of ideologies and practices of listening over others. This is the main reason that temporality is a crucial element in psychoanalytic listening and one of the “justifications” for some therapies to last many years. Listening can happen at any time, as the following example demonstrates.

Adriana is a forty-three-year-old theater teacher who lives in Caballito, a middle-class neighborhood in the geographical center of Buenos Aires. She has been in and out of therapy for approximately thirty years. She classifies her therapies as “important” and “unimportant.” The important ones lasted approximately seven to ten years, and Adriana has had three of these. There were some smaller therapies between the important ones that lasted just a few months. Adriana told me that her first therapy—which started when she was just ten years old—was not her decision but her mother’s. Adriana did not have a good relationship with her mother, which influenced her decision to continue therapy once her first important one ended. Adriana suggested her problems were related to a house that her grandfather bought her when she was ten years old to provide her with financial stability in the future. But when Adriana became an adult, her mother, who had separated from her husband and needed money, did not want to leave the house. Adriana told me that this situation created a lot of friction between mother and daughter; at the age of twenty-one, Adriana felt forced to leave the house—*her* house—and to find odd jobs to support herself.

She was telling me about her last important analysis, which ended in 2007, when the following monologue ensued:

- 1 It was great because I was able to notice that everything that I had
- 2 come to look for, I was beginning to resolve. So, in one session I told
- 3 [the analyst] “I believe so and so . . .” and it was just, contemporary to
- 4 when
- 5 I bought my apartment. I bought my home, not the one that my
- 6 grandfather,
- 7 where my mom lives. And that was a subject that, if in reality I have
- 8 to tell you
- 9 about it . . .

[Long pause of forty-eight seconds]

7 Oh my God, this is crazy! This is crazy!

[Another long pause of thirty-four seconds]

8 Cristina [the analyst] told me “that house is yours,” and I fought for a
long
9 time with my mom for that house, at one point I wanted to sell it and
that
10 we share the money, but at the end we didn’t sell it, my mother didn’t
have
11 a job. It was a big conflict, *and now I realize, talking with you,*
12 that in 2007 when I bought MY own house, something got resolved.
13 *What I am telling you is that just now, I am realizing something very*
important.

[Pause of thirteen seconds]

14 Well, my mother also felt guilty and responsible, because she
witnessed
15 that I worked a lot in order to pay the rent, and she felt that she was
16 living in my house. But she didn’t have any money, and no job, and
17 the house is very small and in the suburbs, so even if we had sold
18 it you can’t afford to buy two smaller ones. No way. So, a very
19 tense situation generated between me and my mom. I think that right
now
20 our relationship is better, because that issue was resolved. And my
mom, when I
21 bought the house, my mom could not believe it! She told me, “I could
22 imagine that you would win an Oscar, but never that you would buy
23 a house.”

[Pause of twenty-four seconds]

24 And I realized now talking with you . . . this is crazy . . . talking
25 about that. It is as if I am listening to something, as if I am
26 closing an incomplete circle now just by telling you this.

[Long pause of thirty-eight seconds]

- 27 The truth is that I am just now realizing the meaning of what I told
you:
28 that I started therapy at ten years old, right after they bought me
29 ours/the/my house, mine and my mom's. Mine. And then it ended
30 when I bought my house . . . I have never made that connection.
31 Nevertheless, that affected me deeply and was circulating in my
32 unconscious. And it made my relation with my mother hard,
33 that I felt the instability, the lack of parameters, until
34 something finds a closure. And that affected me, it really, really af-
fected me and it
35 affected our relationship. Like when . . . do you understand?
36 And I say, I never brought it up to a conscious level,
37 until now *after I told you about it and hear myself telling you.*
38 But nevertheless, it determined the way I acted.

Adriana has been to therapy for almost thirty years. She has talked for many years to different therapists, and she has talked to her friends about her feelings; consequently, she has listened to herself for a long time. Through all of this exposure, she is capable of uncovering many aspects of her own utterances, ones that are not self-evident to the neophyte listener. If we compare Adriana's listening with the taxi driver's example, the first thing to notice is that he does not possess an aural accumulation about the woman he is trying to interpret. He might have that accumulation with other people he is closer to and with his own self, but the interpretations that he is bringing up may or may not resonate in the psyche of the woman he is addressing. In Adriana's case, on the other hand, it was her own aural accumulation that facilitates not an interpretation but a discovery. In her own words, she was able to listen to something that was circulating inside her psyche but was never articulated before. An aural accumulation of thirty years finally found a form by her listening to her own words.

Adriana, through a variety of metalinguistic remarks (lines 11, 13, 24, 26, 27, 36), points to how she is listening. It is by listening to herself, she tells us, that she has discovered something important: *I never brought it up to a conscious level, until now after I told you about it and hear myself telling you* (lines 36–37). Adriana is bringing to light an unconscious self.

This interesting discursive formation of the emergence of a new self resonates with Émile Benveniste's (1966) view that subjectivity depends on the ability of speakers to posit themselves as a subject in language. In his view, subjectivity emerges through dialogue and the performative and indexical properties of language: "consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. *I* use *I* only when I am speaking to someone who will be a *you* in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of *person*, for it implies that reciprocally *I* becomes *you* in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as *I'*" (224–25; emphasis in the original). Although focused only on pronominal usage, this dialogic perspective may be extended to narrative practices generally and to the manifold ways in which communicative acts create subject positions linking speakers (or authors), texts, and audiences (real or imagined). For psychoanalytic listening as a genre, the contrast that Benveniste is describing has the potential to emerge within a dialogue with one's self. The position between the pronominal *I* and *you* in Adriana's case remains inside her internal discourse. When in line 27 she says, "The truth is that *I* am just now realizing the meaning of what *I* told you," the *I* is coming from her unconscious self, as is the word *myself* in line 37. My presence serves the function of an external depositary—probably the same function that an analyst holds—but the dialogue is not between me and Adriana (you can see the long pauses); the dialogue is happening inside her own self(selves). The creation of an alterity in this example is not the equivalent of imagined voices of the school-girl talk that Japanese intellectuals are constructing, as in the case Inoue describes; it is a particular form of alterity that inhabits one's own self, and it comes to life only through words and through *listening* to those words.

As Adriana's example presents, not all dialogues are between physically embodied voices. Even when the "other" I address appears to be a physical person standing in front of me, I may well be addressing and listening to a particular cultural voice. For example, if I am talking about my own research, and my interlocutor brings up concepts that I associate with a particular aspect of my research, I might find myself engaging with that particular concept rather than with my interlocutor as a concrete person. In this way, I am listening to a particular discourse, independently of who is uttering it. This is why listening in genres is of so much importance. The way we turn the ear into a particular genre reduces and creates particular cultural context.

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When Theodor Reik (1948, 144) explained that psychoanalysis consists of “not so much a heart-to-heart talk as a drive-to-drive talk, an *inaudible* but highly expressive dialog” (emphasis added), he was pointing to the importance that listening holds in the psychoanalytic setting. Once defined as the talking cure, psychoanalysis emphasized the verbal utterances produced by the analysand. But focusing on the attention to listening practices prompts us to ask: How is the listener interpreting sounds symbolically? How do speakers who are undergoing therapy speak in ways that anticipate psychoanalytic forms of listening?

These questions help us to appreciate the enormous display of different contexts that emerge by positioning the ear inside a particular genre. By understanding how listeners listen, we are also able to witness the emergence of different ideological constructs that, just as utterances do, help to anchor a particular interaction inside a specific interpretive framework. In this chapter I have demonstrated how listening psychoanalytically has become a social practice in Buenos Aires by pointing to specific ideologies about how *porteños* are listening. By focusing on how social actors talk about themselves and psychoanalysis outside the clinical setting, we are able to see the performative aspect of this listening genre and how it points to the emergence of modern subjectivities by reproducing a radical form of alterity.