



REVOLUTION INTERRUPTED

The revolution will not be televised

Will not be televised

Will not be televised

Will not be televised

The revolution will be no re-run, brothers

The revolution will be live

Gil Scott-Heron, "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised"

Fruitvale, like any landscape, reflects a particular sedimentation of power relations. The entire neighborhood is significantly marked by one organization—the Unity Council. From the community's most prominent architectural symbol, Fruitvale Transit Village, to the Fruitvale Public Market, the annual Día de los Muertos Festival that attracts more than 100,000 people, and the street signage that signals community institutions, these representations of the neighborhood emanate from the same institution. Some of this tentacular reach also takes shape in the form of policy briefs, newspaper reporting, and lobbying on the neighborhood's behalf. There is no doubt that the Unity Council powerfully represents itself as the neighborhood's principal steward.

The neighborhood overflows with Unity Council spatial productions largely as a result of social movement institutionalization. The Unity Council began as a grassroots attempt to create a united voice for Mexican Americans

in Oakland. In the late 1960s, it joined a sea of other minority groups that utilized newly formed community-based organizations to advance their cause. In this process, many formerly grassroots minority organizations quickly became professionalized and corporatized institutions. Institutionalization is often thought of in broad terms—as a process by which organizations become formalized, consolidate leadership, create a governance structure, enact programming, and so forth. In sum, this is largely understood as an aspatial process. However, Fruitvale reveals that institutionalization impacts the production of space. Furthermore, it also entails geographic connections forged through policy interventions, funding streams, and regulatory mechanisms often imposed from afar.

Institutionalization is also a contested process rife with contradictions and conflicts. At the start, minority organizations were armed with a revolutionary spirit of grassroots organizing. These institutions promoted a self-help mandate that prioritized neighborhood autonomy. Services and organizations would be designed by and for the community and not directed by outside forces. Even the social service approach contained a more transformative potential that was fervently political.¹ However, as projects developed and community demand for programming also grew, activists encountered a new dilemma—how would they attain economic resources to grow and maintain the services? And subsequently, how could organizations preserve the grassroots call for autonomy?

Activists wrestled with the inherent paradoxes of procuring funding from private foundations and confronted a new set of uneven power relationships. In these early stages of Chicano institution-building, philanthropic funding seemed like a panacea that could ensure the longevity and growth of institutions (see Gallegos 1989; Kohl-Arenas 2015). The most important player quickly became the Ford Foundation, which funded desegregation battles in schools, supported numerous Black service organizations, and financed the development of Black arts institutions (see K. Ferguson 2013). Through its funding, it strove to convince racial minorities that electoral politics could be an effective nonviolent terrain of struggle. The foundation believed that with the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act an unprecedented expansion of the minority electorate could be achieved.² It therefore made minority voter registration one of its top priorities.

Despite initial optimism, activists' relationships with private foundations were tempered with uncertainty. Chicano activists were not blind to the potential limitations of philanthropic funding. Well versed in Marxism, many activists were openly suspicious of money derived from capitalist

exploitation, or what Erica Kohl-Arenas (2016) calls “twice stolen money” (see also Gilmore 2017).³ They proceeded with caution and actively negotiated with philanthropic agencies, trying ever so carefully to hustle foundation money without losing sight of the social justice mission they envisioned.⁴

The federal government was also an important player in contouring the terrain of 1960s contentious politics. Most scholarship on this era has focused on the policing of radicalism, calling attention to how the federal government feared the rise of militancy among race-based social movements. The FBI’s Counterintelligence Program, popularly known in activist circles as COINTELPRO, for example, surveilled and infiltrated many social movement organizations deemed radical or subversive. However, even the most moderate African American and Mexican American organizations were targeted. This happened both through FBI surveillance and indirectly via congressional scrutiny of the agency that funded these projects—the Ford Foundation. More specifically, federal agencies raised caution regarding the Ford Foundation’s funding of minority voter registration projects.⁵

To demonstrate the impacts of federal and philanthropic regulation, I chronicle the formation of the Southwest Council of La Raza (SCLR), one of the first 501(c)(3) Mexican American nonprofit organizations in the nation.⁶ Created to provide fiscal and administrative support for organizations throughout the Southwest, SCLR channeled Ford Foundation funds to Mexican American grassroots groups, including Oakland’s Unity Council, with the goal of improving Mexican American neighborhoods through nonviolent advocacy and leadership development projects. Despite its relatively “safe” and power-evasive operations, within a year of its inception, SCLR came under close watch from the Ford Foundation.

Federal scrutiny came in the form of tax congressional reform in 1969 that increased federal oversight of private philanthropy and forcefully prohibited nonprofit organizations from engaging in political processes. Congress was concerned with the role of private philanthropy in both funding and organizing minority projects. Once imposed, the tax reform stymied the political fervor of 1960s social movements. This was a historical turning point in the incorporation of racialized movements into what were deemed more appropriate and moderate modes of mobilizing. Federal policing of Ford Foundation projects resulted in new philanthropic programmatic limitations on the foundation’s nonprofit grantees. Although the federal government strictly linked “politics” with electoral processes, in practice the antipolitical mandate de-radicalized nonprofit projects because leaders feared that their actions would be prohibited.

Community development corporations (CDCs) were born at the intersection of these intense political debates, offering a new place-based, public-private model for economic and social development of the nonwhite poor (K. Ferguson 2013, 211). Coordinating social movement leadership, private philanthropy, and private industry, the CDC aimed to uplift minority neighborhoods by privileging capitalist economic development and other entrepreneurial projects. This new nonprofit entity sought to redirect activist energy from challenging institutional inequalities (including upsetting electoral politics) to productions of space. Because the Unity Council was intimately linked to Ford Foundation funding through SCLR, it quickly transformed itself into one of the nation's first Chicano CDCs.

The Ford Foundation model of economic development erased the plurality and local specificity of community approaches to care. Put differently, it privileged a singular approach to community improvement (economic development) in a context in which activists favored multiple methods of securing the well-being of the racialized poor. Most radicalized projects in Fruitvale, for example, focused on unhinging power relations and challenging US imperialism, capitalist inequality, and racism. The CDC model—although fortified with a mandate of transforming impoverished areas into respectable, upwardly mobile Chicano spaces—paled in comparison to the revolutionary visions of change that emblemized the 1960s. This model of community-based development, which also privileged the depoliticized delivery of services, however, quickly became the most respected and financially supported nationally. State officials, private corporations, and philanthropic agencies continue to support these kinds of projects with measurable “deliverables.”

These social-political processes did not happen abstractly—the power relations became sedimented in specific places and subsequently contoured dynamics in neighborhoods like Fruitvale. Federal regulation, like philanthropic funding, limited the political fervor of 1960s social movements by constricting dynamic and manifold approaches to neighborhood improvement. The congressional move to regulate Mexican American Ford Foundation grantees exposes the limitations of philanthropic funding and its ability to effect social change.

Philanthropy and 1960s Social Movements

In her pathbreaking book *The Self-Help Myth*, Erica Kohl-Arenas examines how private foundations transformed US social movements and grassroots institutions in the decades following the 1960s. Her work demonstrates that

“from the establishment of the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations to the multiple general-purpose foundations making grants to nonprofit organizations today, philanthropic giving has clearly defined boundaries” (Kohl-Arenas 2016, 35). Benjamin Marquez (2003, 330) has also argued that foundation money began to transform Mexican American political mobilizations beginning in the 1950s, revealing that by funding social movements, Anglo-administered institutions had a profound influence on the contours of Mexican American political activity. Historian Karen Ferguson (2013, 11) reaches a similar conclusion regarding the Ford Foundation’s relationship with Black organizations, suggesting that the “asymmetry of power relationships between the Ford Foundation and its Black grantees meant that the Foundation’s social vision prevailed.” As a result, projects designed to ameliorate inequality in fact privileged the prerogatives of powerful white interests and their deep investments in the status quo.

Partnerships between private philanthropy and social movements began with lofty goals that were ultimately hampered by ambivalence regarding the transformational potential of philanthropic funding. In the 1960s, both state and philanthropic agencies agreed that community action among the poor should be encouraged (Kohl-Arenas 2016). Yet it was unclear whether community action would maintain the status quo or instead encourage consciousness-raising and revolutionary action. However, a common thread in philanthropic funding was its consistent programmatic effort to draw attention away from critiques of structural inequality and antagonism (Kohl-Arenas 2015, 799). To this day, philanthropic funding frameworks exclude questions that challenge relationships of power and systems of inequality that contribute to enduring poverty and disempowerment. Instead, as described in chapter 2, foundation-funded projects consistently focused on the behaviors of the poor and shifted attention away from relationships of power that produce and maintain poverty and inequality.

As Kohl-Arenas explains, this is not a straightforward story of private philanthropy imposing its own agenda on Chicano social movement actors. The process was much more nuanced, involving compromises among differently positioned stakeholders. In fact, activists were the first to court foundations in order to make Mexican Americans legible to philanthropic agencies. Furthermore, nonprofit institutionalization and professionalization were pivotal to many leaders’ goals and organizational methods. They understood that building institutions required access to state funding and heavy investments from private foundations. However, as late as the 1950s, Mexican American organizations were completely off the radar of

private foundations and the bulk of federal poverty alleviation programs. As members of SCLR soon realized, the central racial issue of the time involved the alleviation of African American disadvantage: “Every time we would have a legitimate set of complaints to present to city hall, Watts was burning or Rochester was burning and the federal money was going to the black programs. This was also a source of frustration to la Raza.”⁷

Foundations viewed Mexican Americans as “the other minority” and modeled their programmatic funding agendas on a longer history of working with African American institutions.⁸ Like their funding strategies for African Americans, philanthropic foundations funded Mexican American organizations to “help” this minority group appropriately incorporate into American society. As Marquez (2003, 333) writes, foundations encouraged Mexican American leaders to create large bureaucratic organizations modeled after already existing African American institutions such as the Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), for example, was incorporated in 1968 with a five-year, \$2.2 million start-up grant from the Ford Foundation (Acuña 2004, 316; Marquez 2003, 333; Tijerina 1968).

The Ford Foundation and the Midcentury “Urban Problem”

The Ford Foundation saw itself as a pioneer in the quest to find peaceful solutions to 1960s inner-city unrest. From 1965 to 1969, the foundation, under the presidency of McGeorge Bundy, granted more than \$100 million in the area of “rights for minorities” (K. Ferguson 2013, 1). By 1970, spending for this purpose reached 40 percent of the foundation’s budget for domestic programs. This funding was intended to “cool inner cities” in a context of massive urban unrest throughout the United States. At the height of civil rights struggles, minority communities protested overpolicing and government disinvestment in the inner city. Popularly understood as “riots,” these forms of urban unrest brought national attention to racial segregation and economic inequality—a set of conditions that became euphemistically referred to as the midcentury urban problem. In this context of violence tied with the rising militancy of Black Power, the Ford Foundation hoped to educate minority groups about the importance of voting as an alternative to violence. It therefore worked with minority-run social movements to promote its program of democratic integration.

In order to bring a more diverse set of social movement organizations into the foundation’s fold, its funding went from a strict integrationist

approach (which funded primarily civil rights groups) to one that tolerated and at times even advocated the development of separatist movements (K. Ferguson 2007). The foundation therefore included militant groups within its grantees to educate them on more reformist methods of mobilizing. Furthermore, the Ford Foundation encouraged minority groups to develop their own separatist agendas during a period of transition, but without losing sight of the ultimate step of full integration. The foundation focused on programs that stressed “economic and educational advancement of disadvantaged minority groups” even within segregated settings, with the understanding that these programs would “in time normalize social integration” (quoted in K. Ferguson 2007, 85). By 1968, the Ford Foundation’s new Division of National Affairs was explicit in its promotion of this model. In defending grant proposals directed at increasing the group identity and power of minorities, the Ford Foundation insisted that “in black identity (at least those manifestations free of reverse racism and destructive apartheidism) may lie the social strength that played so critical a part in the rise of other urban ethnic groups to political and economic status” (K. Ferguson 2007, 85). The foundation strategically selected radical and even Black nationalist organizations in order to promote their incorporation into a more integrationist agenda.

The Ford Foundation’s attempts to steward African American projects is best exemplified by its surprising relationship with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). By the mid-1960s, CORE had shed its integrationist civil rights agenda and had become more Black nationalist and militant. As historian Karen Ferguson (2013) reveals, Ford Foundation funding of CORE was intended to steer the organization into what were deemed safer and more moderate projects. The foundation was strategic in establishing its relationship to CORE and took great care to direct its programmatic projects. On July 14, 1967, it awarded CORE a \$175,000 grant to establish a Target City voter registration and leadership training project for inner-city African Americans in Cleveland (K. Ferguson 2007, 67). The Target City project in Cleveland, according to the Ford Foundation, strove to attain “the development of full, effective and responsible citizenship (as the alternative to civil disorder).”⁹ The foundation continued to fund CORE activities after the Target City project through what it called Special Purpose Funds, which CORE utilized to develop programs in voter registration, youth leadership development, community relations, and economic development. Its most successful projects were voter registration and youth leadership development as it enlisted a broad base of support among community members. In

July 1969, for example, Mitchell “Mike” Sviridoff sent a letter to McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, applauding CORE for its work at preventing further violent unrest in Cleveland.¹⁰ As Sviridoff wrote: “[CORE’s] voter registration efforts have been important. . . . [CORE] also helped Mayor Stokes cool the ghetto after the assassination of Martin Luther King; and it has contributed to the feeling that positive things are on the way in Cleveland—a sharp contrast from last year’s sentiment. It has served as a link between militant black groups, more moderate Negro groups, City Hall and business groups. . . . And—it has kept out of trouble.”¹¹ Ford Foundation funds to CORE operated on multiple fronts to advance the foundation’s approach to race-based organizations. First, the Ford Foundation created new and more expansive monitoring processes to assess neighborhood-level dynamics. The foundation was cautious in its affiliation with CORE and maintained oversight of activities through reports and site visits from program officers, ensuring that the organization was keeping out of trouble. As a Ford Foundation report of CORE activities stressed, “The Voter Education and Registration Program seeks to demonstrate that the political process is a realistic alternative to violence.”¹² In a similar fashion, youth projects were aimed at channeling leadership into more moderate approaches. The 1967–68 program, for example, was expanded in order to concentrate on “youth who are presently occupying positions of leadership in anti-social gangs and who would provide different leadership in activities that were less destructive if they understood how to affect the establishment within the system.”¹³ Ultimately, the Ford grant strengthened those within CORE who had been moving that organization toward translating the slogan “Black Power” into a program of economic development. Therefore, the evaluation of the success of CORE’s activities was based on its ability to broker interactions between different constituents and its efforts to pacify both urban unrest and Black militancy.

The Southwest Council of La Raza

Unlike African Americans, Mexican Americans were not on the radar of the foundation world. In 1963, Herman Gallegos, one of the most prominent Bay Area Mexican American leaders, met the vice president of the Ford Foundation while working in Hunters Point, a predominantly Black neighborhood in San Francisco. Gallegos recounts people’s confusion when they saw him, a Mexican American, serving as an executive director of a Black youth project. He was asked: “What is a Mexican American doing working in a black neighborhood?” I said, ‘Well, it doesn’t appear that [the

Ford Foundation] funds Mexican American projects, and so I have no other place to go to do what I like to do” (Gallegos 1989, 36).

Through its affiliations with Bay Area leaders such as Herman Gallegos and Dr. Ernesto Galarza, the Ford Foundation began to align itself with Mexican American activists and organizations throughout the Southwest.¹⁴ On June 10, 1968, the Ford Foundation awarded the SCLR a grant of \$630,000 to become a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization. Funds were issued to Dr. Julian Samora, Dr. Ernesto Galarza, and Herman Gallegos, who then enlisted a diverse group of organizers and leaders of the Mexican American community to serve as SCLR’s governing board. These participants represented a broad spectrum of organizations with both moderate and radical tendencies. The invited participants included self-described Chicano activists such as Maclovio Barrazo, an organizer with the AFL-CIO; Bert Corona, president of the Community Service Organization; and Alex Mercure, then a teacher in New Mexico alongside more reformist members like Albert Peña, an elected official from Texas.¹⁵

The SCLR organizers had ambitious plans to establish a set of community-driven barrio projects inspired by the farmworkers movement (Gallegos 1989, 68; Garcia 1994, 228; Mora 2009, 68). From the outset they did not want to create a centralized institutionalized organization like the NAACP or MALDEF. The initial organizers believed that the issues confronting Mexican Americans were far too diverse and spread out geographically for a centralized organization to adequately address all their needs. Instead, the organizers endeavored to channel funds directly to the grass roots, with a fundamental goal of social change—a vision that included immediate economic and leadership development projects, in addition to advocacy for the transformation of various institutions. This social change ideology was based on the ideas of liberation theology and Paulo Freire. As activist Bert Corona detailed in his memoir, leaders believed they needed participation of the people to achieve real political power: “[We were] impressed with what the farmworkers and César Chávez were doing, and we looked to the farmworkers’ union as a model. . . . In the barrios, it would involve a strong barrio organization. It would have to be an organization that would go into every nook and cranny of the barrios. The idea was to establish *concilios*, or councils, everywhere. . . . These *concilios* would meet regularly to discuss common problems and to plan strategy for combatting the establishment” (Garcia 1994, 228). This mandate to support grassroots community efforts fit nicely within the Ford Foundation’s goal of fostering minority-based organizations and leadership. It differed, however, from the foundation’s

emphasis on funding institutions and not grassroots struggles. It also differed in terms of the organization's goals. Whereas SCLR hoped to develop grassroots projects that would collectively combat the establishment, the Ford Foundation represented the very establishment that activists sought to dismantle, meaning its money stemmed from capitalists and the foundation was run overwhelmingly by elite white men.

In order to channel funding to community-based projects, SCLR pushed the Ford Foundation to allow it to become a subgrantee organization. SCLR opted to give local groups full responsibility and substantial freedom to operate. However, it closely aligned with the different community groups and quickly established methods by which it could monitor its subgrantees. The SCLR board members were concerned with assuring that the funds were used properly and that proposals were translated into actual programming and successful projects. One board member, Mario Vasquez, expressed fears about "falling flat on our faces" and questioned the level of responsibility SCLR would have over the actions of its subgrantees.¹⁶

SCLR worked closely with local groups in San Antonio, Los Angeles, and the San Francisco Bay Area to help them articulate clear goals and objectives. Each local organization was presented with a supplementary terms document outlining guidelines governing SCLR's relationship to local councils and neighborhood groups. Like CORE's projects in Cleveland, SCLR's board of directors wanted local groups to actively target youths. For example, SCLR recommended that Oakland's Unity Council develop greater student representation. Furthermore, it requested that students be part of the Unity Council's board of directors and also urged the local groups to have greater barrio community representation. Toward these ends, SCLR granted \$2,500 to Oakland's La Causa Inc. to organize a student conference that brought together fifty to eighty student leaders from throughout the Southwest. Furthermore, SCLR scheduled meetings between student groups and its board of directors in order to "iron out ideological differences." The SCLR board understood its role as helping to stimulate, revitalize, and maintain intergroup and intragroup communication of Mexican American student and youth groups, and link them with resources.¹⁷

The arrival of Ford Foundation money fortified Mexican American trans-local organizing and networking. Money for travel and meetings facilitated communication among different factions of Mexican American activists. According to Gallegos (1989, 64): "At that time, many Hispanics knew about each other but had never really met."¹⁸ There were people like Reies Lopez Tijerina whom I had read about and heard about. I had never met him

until the Ford grant. People—like Corkie Gonzales, Grace Olivarez—we were known to each other but had never met because we had no resources. So when [the Ford Foundation] asked us to go out, we began to sit down, and I talked to Reies Tijerina about the whole land grant issue and spent time with him.” These interactions convened both radical and reformist Mexican American leaders and were instrumental in improving their organizational and collaborative potential. They united Mexican Americans as a group whose members shared conditions of inequality across the entire Southwest. Such encounters funded by the Ford Foundation, however, also sought to bring more radical groups into the foundation’s goal of democratic integration.

SCLR funding transformed its subgrantees into 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations. Prior to receiving Ford Foundation money, barrio organizations had been supported through membership dues as well as volunteer and other support services. They were true grassroots political organizations that met in members’ homes; they were not directly in the business of service provision but instead coordinated services by referring clients to existing city and county services. Getting access to SCLR funding was their first formalized form of monetary aid and their first contact with the bureaucratic machinery of both private foundations and federal agencies that recognized them as tax-exempt organizations. Some of these leaders did not even know what a 501(c)(3) organization was or truly understand how to run a privately funded organization (Gallegos 1989, 69). One SCLR member recalled a community activist who “thought the Ford Foundation was a garment that women wear.”¹⁹ Furthermore, SCLR staff worried about community distrust: “The Chicano community was so fed up with brokers and so suspicious of people who came in carrying briefcases.”²⁰

Oakland’s Unity Council utilized Ford Foundation money to fund small projects that engaged in community advocacy and leadership training. It issued mini-grants of approximately \$1,000 each to a collection of small organizations in Oakland (Orozco, Austin, and Beale 2008, 21). The Unity Council hoped to develop and train smaller organizations with the aim of fulfilling the SCLR mission of promoting leadership development in communities. The mini-grant recipients included a Mexican American newspaper; the paper of the Oakland Brown Berets, a Chicano youth organization that mobilized in a militant fashion akin to the Black Panthers; the Filipino American Political Association; and Frente, a UC Berkeley Mexican American student organization. This group of organizations was varied not only in their purpose but also in their organizational tendencies. Some groups,

like the Brown Berets, were much more radical than the others and could easily raise concern among conservative and moderate constituents. The Unity Council decided to fund these organizations because it deemed them to be most in need of leadership development. It also believed that these organizations were at the forefront of community needs and desires. It helped to train these membership-based organizations to apply for Unity Council mini-grants and gave them their first experience with a formal application process. Through these funding processes, the Unity Council established relationships of mutual support among existing community-based organizations.

The 1969 Tax Reform Act

Mexican Americans' initial engagement with private foundations proved to be productive of political and economic openings. Additionally, Ford Foundation funding legitimized them as institutions that could be trusted. Federal authorities were not blind to the triangulations of nonprofit organizations, social movement actors, and philanthropic foundations. Responding to media and lobbying from conservatives, Congress became vigilant of race-based organizations' escalating authority within communities of color. Lawmakers were especially concerned with the success of voter registration projects headed by both CORE and SCLR. By proxy, they also kept a close watch on the philanthropic organizations that funded them. In what follows I analyze key Mexican American and African American mobilizations that accelerated congressional moves to establish new limitations on private philanthropy, which culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. This congressional regulation policed foundations' funding practices, which subsequently delimited their grantees' programmatic efforts. The tax reform was therefore part of a constellation of responses to race-based organizations that limited the expansion of their political movements.

The Ford Foundation envisioned itself as a philanthropic institution empowered to guide minority groups into appropriate forms of mobilizing. It worked hard to bring more militant Mexican American organizations into its purview. SCLR leaders understood that philanthropic funding was aimed at preventing further militancy among Mexican American organizations, and many of these leaders themselves firmly advocated nonviolence. According to Gallego's (1989) oral history, the Ford Foundation funded SCLR to broker relationships with groups that it deemed militant and potentially violent. Gallegos (1989, 65) specifically recounts fear of the rising militancy

spearheaded by Reies López Tijerina and the land-grant issues occurring in New Mexico, which he reported to Ford officials could “erupt in violence unless something is done to resolve the claims that Reies is presenting.”

Ford Foundation oversight of SCLR-funded activities and its subgrantee organizations, however, was never panoptic. In fact, because of the diversity of programmatic efforts that Mexican American communities needed, the foundation granted much more autonomy to SCLR than it normally did to its grantees. This relative autonomy allowed SCLR to fund some of what it deemed as more “protest”-based activities, which included voter registration programs designed to raise consciousness about electoral processes and several demonstrations and marches (Mora 2009, 72). SCLR also equipped community affiliates with resources to organize conferences and rallies. One of these community affiliates in San Antonio, for example, funded the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) student conferences that protested racial discrimination in public schooling. MAYO, which was made up of second-, third-, and fourth-generation students, organized against what it deemed rampant discrimination and enforced social constraints in the Texas educational system (Acuña 2004, 316). Its membership was key to the establishment of the Raza Unida Party, an alternative third party that began in Texas and eventually spread throughout the Southwest. Chicana/o leaders formed the Raza Unida Party because they believed that a third party was necessary, since neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party truly represented their issues. These supporters of the Raza Unida Party were frustrated that although they routinely supported Democratic Party candidates, the party failed to honor some of their basic demands as Chicana/o constituents (see J. A. Gutierrez 1999; Pulido 2006, 114).

Mexican American Youth Organization Conflict

Chicano movement activism entailed multiple fronts. As Chicano activists advanced their own electoral campaigns and voter registration drives, they infused them with a sense of urgency and militancy. Young leaders envisioned electoral gains as far more than merely entering US mainstream politics. They viewed electoral advances as a major means of challenging white dominance in political and economic processes. The Ford Foundation, under pressure from Congress, became concerned that SCLR subgrantees, like the Mexican American Youth Organization, were endorsing violence. On April 8, 1969, a public speech by Jose Angel Gutierrez, a prominent MAYO leader, gained national attention because he was accused of endorsing antiwhite hatred.²¹ Gutierrez’s statement negatively impacted

public and congressional perception of SCLR-funded projects. As Gallegos (1989) recounts:

Jose was appearing to advocate violence. He made some comments about “getting rid of the Anglos.” [People wondered,] “You mean, kill them?” He said, “Well, you can take it any way you want.” Well, that’s all that Congress wanted to hear because the next thing you know, the accusation was that Ford was funding programs to foment violent behavior. What Jose Angel Gutierrez was saying was, “Look, we are 90 percent of the population in city after city, but we don’t control any of the bread or the beer delivery franchises, we have no economic control of those towns.” His idea was to get rid of the Anglos and let Mexicans own a piece of the pie. (70)

As evidenced by Gallegos’s recounting of the incident, Gutierrez’s statement was not militant per se. Instead, congressional and public response to his statement raised another key issue: white political and economic elites’ fear regarding increased Mexican American electoral gains and growing economic clout. Chicano historians differ on the intent of Gutierrez’s words. Lorena Oropeza (2005, 77–78) argues that as an organization was unapologetically anti-gringo and viewed Anglos as the “enemy”: “Although members sometimes drew finer distinctions between sympathetic and racist Anglo Americans, the organization’s aim was to present a clear choice to Mexican Americans in South Texas: Did they stand with MAYO or with the enemy?” Rodolfo Acuña (2004, 323) downplays MAYO’s militant stance and argues that Gutierrez was simply advocating ending white control over Mexicans. Regardless of the intentionality of violence, the congressional “fear” of Mexican American political activity included both violence and growing Mexican American electoral and economic clout and its impact on existing white social structures.

Critiques of this new cadre of Chicano leadership were also fueled by disputes among Mexican American leadership. MAYO’s most vocal critic was actually a Mexican American congressman from Texas, Henry B. Gonzalez, who questioned the new kinds of leadership funded by the Ford Foundation. Gonzalez raised concerns over some of the barrio-driven projects that he believed were advocating hatred against whites and militancy among his constituency. Speaking before Congress, he accused the Ford Foundation of creating disunity in the Mexican American community: “As deeply as I must respect the intentions of the foundation, I must at the same time say that where it aimed to produce unity it has so far created disunity; and

where it aimed to coordinate it has only further unloosed the conflicting aims and desires of various groups and individuals; and where it aimed to help it has hurt.”²² Gonzalez, who described MAYO as a militant group that distributed hate speech, alleged that the Ford Foundation sidestepped his authority in his congressional district. Gonzalez also critiqued the Ford Foundation’s attempts to create new forms of leadership where there was already an existing leadership, as well as the foundation’s lack of responsibility over the actions of its grantees.²³ Gonzalez communicated his concerns with representatives of the Ford Foundation in multiple letters, such as this one from November 1969: “My concern has been that grantees in San Antonio are not all that had been expected, or as they represented themselves. The best designed of grants may well be meaningless if the grantees have no judgment, dedication, skill or energy. SCLR operations in San Antonio have been haphazard, and the council does not operate as it would have you believe, or affectively as it believes.”²⁴ Gonzalez’s criticism was also linked with spatial distance between SCLR and the projects that it funded throughout the Southwest. He questioned the ability of a youthful (and allegedly militant) group of leaders to appropriately administer new programming and services.

In addition to critiques from elected officials such as Gonzalez, newspaper coverage of the MAYO conflict blamed the Ford Foundation, with headlines such as “Do Ford Grants Breed Hate?,” “Foundation Cited in Hate Crime,” and “MAYO Warns It Might Start Killing Gringos.” This national newspaper coverage produced a flood of letters deploring the foundation’s funding of violent behavior.²⁵ Numerous owners of Ford vehicles condemned the foundation’s actions and wrote the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Foundation, and even CEO Henry Ford II. One loyal Ford car owner, for example, wrote the following: “For years Fords served my family well. . . . When I bought my first automobile, I chose a new 1960 Ford. . . . However, because of the recent activities of your Ford Foundation in South Texas, I have decided I will never again buy a Ford automobile or any other Ford product. You are using the vast sum of money at your disposal to divide one American against another and to foment distrust and class hatred among Americans of different ethnic origin.”²⁶ Although the Ford Foundation is entirely separate from the Ford Motor Company, consumers did not differentiate between the two. In May 1969, the Ford Community Affairs Committee of San Antonio, Texas, wrote McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, asking for it to disassociate itself from Mexican American “hate groups.” The letter alleged: “The widespread adverse publicity which is being directed at the

Foundation is also being directed to the Ford Motor Company, its products and dealers. Our business is definitely suffering because of this situation.”²⁷

Ford Foundation officials did not stand idle. The foundation defended its position in funding SCLR and MAYO’s work in San Antonio, especially regarding public education. Siobhan Oppenheimer, program officer for the Ford Foundation in charge of the SCLR fund, for example, wrote the following: “Mr. Gutierrez of MAYO tried to make it clear that the MAYO aim was not the elimination of the white man but the elimination of the racist attitudes held by some white men so that the Mexican American could be free to fulfill his potential as a citizen with dignity and security. In this connection, our Program Officer was informed that there was no intention on the part of Mr. Gutierrez to be critical of all whites, but only those with racist attitudes.”²⁸ In a defense of MAYO’s activities, Oppenheimer further asserted that the organization had received a subgrant from the Mexican American Unity Council to work on educational programs to ameliorate the educational situation for Chicano students in San Antonio. She applauded MAYO’s efforts in education and its work with youths. In this way, Oppenheimer presented a fuller picture of MAYO’s activities by detailing its many accomplishments in San Antonio.

This more generous response, however, was not expressed by all at the Ford Foundation. Recall that for the foundation, electoral processes were supposed to be the alternative to violence, not a conduit for greater conflict. In a letter dated April 30, 1969, a Ford Foundation director critiqued SCLR’s funding of MAYO activities. Mitchell Sviridoff, vice president of the Ford Foundation, wrote to Herman Gallegos, then executive director of SCLR: “As I stated in our various telephone conversations, the Ford Foundation is concerned about press reports relating to public statements made by leaders of the Mexican-American Youth Organization. . . . The Ford Foundation cannot condone the advocacy of violence or racial hatred by its grantees. Forceful advocacy of legitimate objectives is understandable, but the apparent advocacy of violence is not.”²⁹ In his oral history, Herman Gallegos recalls receiving an angry call from a Ford Foundation officer saying, “What the hell are you funding? I want you to get rid of those guys and not give them any more money” (Gallegos 1989, 71). The following day, the Ford Foundation released a press release announcing that the grant to MAYO was being cut off.

Congressional moves to delimit philanthropic power were also a response to increasing private foundation support of Mexican American voter registration. The 1960s were a period of great electoral gains for Mexican

Americans. In 1963, a slate of Mexican American candidates won control of the city council in the small South Texas town of Crystal City (Oropeza 2005, 47). By 1965, three Mexican Americans—Henry Gonzalez, Edward Roybal, and Eligio de La Garza—were elected to the US House of Representatives (Mora 2009, 66). At the same time, the United Farm Workers, under the leadership of Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Larry Itliong, led successful marches and boycotts, all of which garnered national attention and linked thousands of Mexican Americans throughout the Southwest. Politicization among the newer generations promised further electoral gains by the late 1960s.

SCLR quickly became a major motor in voter registration projects for Mexican Americans. From its inception, SCLR formed the Political Research Education Project (PREP) and voter registration project, which had gained tremendous traction in urban barrios.³⁰ According to Herman Gallegos (1989, 70): “To make matters worse, a young man by the name of Mario Compean, just a street kid, ran for mayor against Mayor McAllister and scared the hell out of him because the population of San Antonio is very heavily Mexican. A Hispanic surname running could attract a sizable vote. All of a sudden it looked like here was a mammoth revolution coming with violent behavior in the wings.” White elites at the time viewed Mexican American political gains as a threat, especially given shifting demographics in major Southwest cities like San Antonio. They also questioned Mexican American candidates’ affiliation with Ford Foundation–supported organizations and charged that philanthropic organizations were interfering in areas like electoral politics that were strictly the domain of the federal government. This concern spurred subsequent congressional moves to limit the political projects of race-based nonprofit organizations.

Although cloaked as anxiety over militancy, the desire to curb nonprofit organizations’ political culture reflected a fear of the growing efficacy of Ford Foundation–funded voter registration campaigns. As described earlier, the Ford Foundation channeled funds to CORE’s voter registration projects in Cleveland, Ohio, a city undergoing massive racial transformations contoured by white out-migration and Black in-migration, which resulted in a rising significance of the African American electorate. CORE understood this demographic transition and acted to increase the number African American voters, which analysts speculated had led to the election of Carl Stokes as Cleveland’s first African American mayor (K. Ferguson 2007). Elected on November 7, 1967, Stokes was the first African American mayor of a major US city. This successful Black mobilization, coupled with the fear of Mexican

American political organizations emulating these gains, further propelled Congress into action to curb philanthropic funding of voter registration campaigns and other “political” projects.

In this tense context of national racial movements demanding greater equality through both the ballot box and the streets, the 1969 Tax Reform Act can be read as linked to these contentious processes. One of the most direct limitations concerned the funding of voter registration projects. As SCLR soon realized, because of provisions of expenditure responsibility specified by the new tax reform, voter registration became extremely difficult to fund. SCLR history papers make this clear: “In order to receive money from foundations for voter registration, you had to be incorporated in five of our states. You had to get help concurrently from five or more foundations, and no more than 25 percent from any one foundation. It was hard enough to get support from 1 foundation, let alone 5.”³¹ SCLR continued to push for the PREP voter registration project but encountered obstacles within the conservative Nixon administration.

The 1969 Tax Reform Act not only led to more regulatory scrutiny through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) but also increased fear of policing from other federal agencies. The federal government reserved the right to step in should tax-exempt organizations engage in any type of prohibited activity. This, in turn, influenced the behavior of major philanthropic organizations like Ford. Program officer Siobhan Oppenheimer, for example, explained the foundation’s changing relationship to MAYO in the following fashion:

The Ford Foundation did not withdraw funds from MAYO. They rejected a proposal for refunding when careful investigation showed that the organization had openly supported specific candidates in a city election. . . . The Foundation believes that Mexican Americans should be politically involved and exercise the right and responsibility to vote. However, the Internal Revenue Service does not permit 501 (c) 3 Tax Exempt organizations such as Foundations and their grantees to be involved in partisan politics. Therefore, we cannot continue supporting any organization undertaking partisan political activity without jeopardizing our tax-exempt status.³²

Whereas Ford initially raised caution regarding the alleged militancy of MAYO’s leadership, by the end of 1969 it utilized a new language to explain its changing relationship to MAYO. Under the stipulations of the tax reform, it could no longer support organizations that were actively engaged in partisan political activity, which threatened its own tax-exempt status.

New tax reform regulations increasingly made the Ford Foundation more cautious toward all its grantees, including Oakland's Spanish Speaking Unity Council. On September 21, 1970, for example, the foundation received an anonymous call alleging that the Unity Council had funded a Mr. Richard Amador, who was also running for a local government position. The caller claimed that Mr. Amador had used a portion of the Unity Council funds for his political campaign. Oppenheimer cautioned Arabella Martinez of the Unity Council: "Under this new tax legislation, you must exercise expenditure responsibility."³³ Martinez explained to Ford Foundation officials that the Unity Council paid Richard Amador of the Los Angeles-based Community and Human Resources Agency a total of \$14,000 for leadership development workshops. In an interoffice memorandum, Oppenheimer wrote to another Ford Foundation officer asking for guidance regarding the documentation that would be needed to prove that no Ford Foundation money was used to fund Amador's political campaign. Oppenheimer wrote that the foundation should focus on "protecting them [the Spanish Speaking Unity Council] from themselves."³⁴ Although the Unity Council quickly provided documentation that proved that it paid Amador's organization for leadership development workshops, it questioned the Ford Foundation's response to an anonymous call. Arabella Martinez and James Delgadillo wrote:

Needless to say our Council is extremely disturbed by the allegation and more so by the anonymity of the telephone call. From our experience in the past we have found that anonymous allegations usually have no basis in facts but are used to divert attention away from program tasks. As a result, the Council adopted a policy of not dignifying anonymous letters or telephone calls. Therefore, we would appreciate your notifying us in writing of the recent and any future charges as well as actions required to clear such charges.³⁵

This exchange shows that this was not a straightforward story of the Ford Foundation imposing its authority on its grantees. These were complex relationships whereby Martinez, Delgadillo, and Oppenheimer actively communicated and negotiated the frameworks by which they would respond to potential IRS scrutiny of nonprofit activities. As a subgrantee agency, SCLR also had to initiate its own monitoring services whereby it would send affiliates to oversee the actions of local regional offices.³⁶ Federal regulation therefore operated at a distance, pushing philanthropic foundations to redesign their programmatic efforts for nonprofit agencies. As funders

and nonprofit stewards, private foundations were expected to have greater oversight over the actions of their grantees.

The Ford Foundation also progressively influenced the composition of the board of directors of its minority grantees. It recommended, for example, that SCLR welcome a number of new members onto its board of directors. The SCLR leadership emphatically but respectfully opposed the Ford Foundation's request, responding: "It is our position that the question may be examined, when and if, in the judgement of the Board, expansion of the Board is germane to the strengthening of the program of the Southwest Council of La Raza."³⁷ As Herman Gallegos recalled: "This is where we definitely drew the line and said 'no way.' . . . They were looking at the board and they were probably recognizing that we were too militant and they were nervous about it."³⁸ The Ford Foundation also requested that other grantees shift the composition of their boards of directors. The Center for Community Change, for example, was told that it had too many leftist "Bobby Kennedy" types on the board and it had to get more moderate "Hubert Humphrey" types.³⁹

The Ford Foundation's Shift to Community Development Corporations

The Ford Foundation also responded programmatically by prioritizing funding for what became known as minority "hard programs." It accelerated plans to establish the CDC as a new nonprofit entity intent on producing the measurable development of impoverished minority communities (see Ford Foundation 1973). These local nonprofit organizations would "undertake broad social and economic problems—to improve the quality of life and strengthen the economic base of their communities."⁴⁰ The central idea behind "hard programing" was for minority CDCs to serve as catalysts for economic development in their own communities. The bulk of the energy was dedicated to the consolidation of CDCs in African American neighborhoods, the largest being Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation.

The Ford Foundation envisioned that the CDC model would channel nonprofits away from direct public actions or protest activities. The transition into solely funding minority CDCs crystallized the Ford Foundation's new programmatic focus on "product rather than on process" (Magat 1979, 123). As the foundation deemed it, "a couple of hundred housing units is worth more than 'telling whitey off'" (123). It understood that a transition into "measurable results" would direct less energy into minority protest movements. Instead of fomenting protest, nonprofits were encouraged

to focus their efforts on the redevelopment of space. As the foundation explained in 1974, “Although support will continue for organizations that protect the legal rights and interests of Blacks, Mexican Americans, American Indians, and Puerto Ricans, they will be urged to seek a broader base of financial support.”⁴¹

Historian Karen Ferguson reveals that community development was instrumental in 1960s social movement calls for self-determination. However, her study demonstrates that the CDC model materialized from top-down initiatives mandated from outside the community. The CDCs therefore consolidated the visions of white elites in US government and private philanthropy and supported their goal of managing minority leadership. She shows how Democrats and Republicans flocked to these projects, as did philanthropic and government funders, all based on community development’s promise to solve racial problems without any fundamental social, economic, or political disruption (K. Ferguson 2013, 213).

Like previous Ford Foundation projects for minority grantees, the concept of community-led development began with grand dreams that did not fully materialize. The ambitious goal that a community agency could successfully muster the support of government grants, private industry, and philanthropic agencies to single-handedly redevelop impoverished inner cities was a mammoth and untenable expectation for these newly developed organizations. In addition, it was a tremendous shift in the responsibility for alleviating impoverishment. Instead of the state initiating projects of urban development and eradicating social inequalities, individual communities were expected to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, a model of urban redevelopment that was consistent with the “self-help” myth exposed by Erica Kohl-Arenas.

Ford Foundation monitoring reports of SCLR’s grantees reveal the challenges groups encountered in setting up economic development projects. First of all, few staff members had specific expertise in housing development. The Unity Council, for example, sent its staff members to Washington, DC, to receive training to become housing specialists. It also forged new relationships with private industry, including Kaiser Industries, Crocker Citizens National Bank, the *Oakland Tribune*, Safeway, and the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company. Additionally, Arabella Martinez joined the board of directors of the Oakland Economic Development Council Inc. to advocate for more projects for the Chicano community. Monitoring reports routinely applauded the Unity Council’s gains in its educational programing and its manpower projects geared at skills training for

community members. However, these reports also questioned the council's ability to expedite community development projects:

As I mentioned in my previous reports, Marty [Arabella Martinez] and all of the other Council directors always seem to be on much surer ground when they are talking about education and community action projects; but they become semantically fuzzy when they wander into the field of economic development. I wish someday that I could hear one of them talk about something as practical as a day-care center—but none of them have. Once again, I was left with the feeling that these gentlemen are struggling to accomplish something in the field that is totally alien to them, but they have simply acquired a new set of business phrases.⁴²

The Unity Council was not the only SCLR subgrantee encountering difficulty in transitioning to a CDC. These new minority CDCs were confronted by tense development politics that requires proximity to power, social and hard capital/wealth, a deft political hand, and privilege. The Ford Foundation expected these newly formed organizations to acquire these skills and assets from one day to the next. It is therefore not surprising that numerous reports detailed how Henry Santiestevan, SCLR's president, acknowledged the difficulty many organizations were confronting with economic development projects. Like the Unity Council, Santiestevan reported that other CDCs experienced challenges in recruiting staff and setting up a viable technical assistance capability in housing and economic development areas.⁴³

Additionally, the tax reform and the Ford Foundation's restructuring of its grantee program exacerbated already tense divisions within SCLR's diverse membership. According to Gallegos (1989), the 1969 Tax Reform Act brought about a curtailment of the advocacy agenda so integral to the activist fervor of these organizations. Other board members alleged that the foundation's new focus on "hard" programs aimed to produce "safe" programs that did not challenge power structures. In the end, SCLR leadership agreed to the new agenda of hard programs and prioritized education and economic and housing development. Firm in its commitment to continue to serve as a subgranting agency, SCLR steadfastly affirmed, however, that there would "be no change in the relationship between the Southwest Council of La Raza and the local councils and the Southwest Council of La Raza should continue to serve as a funnel."⁴⁴

SCLR underwent major transitions that were influenced by its shifting relationship with the Ford Foundation as a result of the tax reform. By 1973, SCLR changed its name to the National Council of La Raza (NCLR)

and relocated its headquarters from the Southwest to Washington, DC. G. Cristina Mora (2014) argues that this transition brought the organization into closer relationships with the federal government. Its funding went from primarily Ford Foundation grants to mainly federal grants and a more diverse set of private foundation funding. At this point, NCLR became a more pan-ethnic Latino organization that included Puerto Rican and Cuban groups (Mora 2014). It also became more focused on research and advocacy through the federal government. In short, NCLR became detached from the grassroots community struggles in the Southwest that had propelled Mexican American leaders to form SCLR.

Conclusion: The People Are Our Business

By 1980, the Unity Council had become an organization that prided itself for its business approach to community improvement. This was a completely different organization from its initial focus on community enhancement through leadership development and organizing constituents to demand changes in state institutions. The Unity Council now measured its organizational goals as well as its outcomes in business terms: “While historical conditions have modified the applications, the original goal has never been lost—to improve the social and economic health of the community. The *People are Our Business*. The Unity Council knows that the business of the community and the people of the community are one and the same.”⁴⁵ As the preceding quote demonstrates, the organization now understood its work as an investment in the community, and it quantified its outcomes as profits. The Unity Council also framed its target population as a type of business, and improvements in the community’s social and economic health as a business transaction. This degree of institutionalization and professionalization meant increasing ties with major corporations. I view this change as part of the Unity Council’s navigation of a shifting terrain of funding. It also shows how the organization engineered strategies to legitimize itself in a new landscape of constricted public funding for social services. There is no doubt that the organization continued to be invested in providing services for the community and in expanding opportunities for Mexican Americans and other Latinos in Oakland. These were the organization’s initial goals at its foundation in 1964.

The Unity Council responded to state and private foundation regulatory mandates that channeled it into this particular route. Yet the organization also found strategic political and economic openings in these new routes

of service provision and urban development. The organization's aggressive business approach was contoured by the Ford Foundation's requirement to produce "measurable" results. The Ford Foundation has been a key player in contentious negotiations over the proper comportment of racialized minorities, especially African Americans and Mexican Americans. It viewed these groups relationally and funded organizations that channeled minority leadership into what it deemed safer modes of organizing. The Ford Foundation, along with state officials of the time, therefore attempted to craft specific kinds of Mexican American and African American subjects. In these negotiations, nonprofit leaders enacted their own politicized maneuvers to work around philanthropic and federal regulations. This triangulation of state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private foundations plays a powerful role in contemporary projects of racial formation and development in many Black and Chicano neighborhoods.

A central concern of geographers is to better understand how spaces are produced within an ever-evolving geometry of power (Massey 2007). Furthermore, geographic analysis emphasizes a socio-spatial ontology that conceptualizes "space itself as constituted through relations that extend beyond a singular place" (Elwood, Lawson, and Sheppard 2016, 746). Keeping with this spatial register, this chapter has focused on events in San Antonio, Texas, and Washington, DC, in order to explain how congressional tax reforms impacted Oakland-based Chicano nonprofits. These flows and connections between places allow us to see the complexities in the mutual constitution of race and space. Thinking about history and memory in a cartographic fashion allows us to see how the organizations and political-economic processes that shaped social relations in Fruitvale were not bounded to the geographic confines of the neighborhood. They were connected to faraway centers of power, influenced by policy pathways and innovations shaped elsewhere, and linked to how other racial groups were treated. For example, programmatic innovations developed to ameliorate poverty in Black communities were applied to Chicano barrios. Similarly, if the actions of social movement actors in one neighborhood were seen as suspect, the activities in other geographies would be subsequently affected. This also entailed a global understanding of inequality, whereby both social movement actors and private philanthropy linked the ghetto to conditions of underdevelopment found in the third world.⁴⁶ Viewing the past in a cartographic way, or as a methodology for understanding the history of place-making, also allowed me to further understand how some organizations became institutionalized and more prominently anchored in spe-

cific places. These processes converged in a place called Fruitvale to shape the conditions of possibility of social movement organizations; they offer us a glimpse of how power relations become sedimented through place, privileging some modalities of neighborhood improvement over others. Oakland's Spanish Speaking Unity Council has used its role as a CDC to develop Fruitvale, therefore showing how negotiations between private philanthropy, state officials, and nonprofit leaders continue to impact the production of space (see chapter 4).

Through the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the federal government created a strict register of what constituted appropriate nonprofit political projects and prohibited tax-exempt organizations from engaging in any kind of voter registration campaigns or advocacy that would impact electoral processes. As Susan A. Ostrander (2005, 38) argues, this antipolitical prohibition "to this day discourages funding for social justice work for fear of overstepping these bounds."⁴⁷ Congressional debates that led to the 1969 Tax Reform Act saw both Mexican American militant protest and moderate electoral campaigns as threats to the white-controlled institutions of the time. Radical and moderate activists occupied a singular register of threat to existing social-spatial conditions at the time.

The intense debates between the federal government, nonprofit organizations, and private foundations were competing claims to authority in urban racialized neighborhoods. They also spatialized the self-help ideal—the idea that impoverished communities could pull themselves up by their bootstraps by adequately managing their own economic development and forging their own forms of capitalist growth. At the heart of these debates were questions surrounding the political possibilities of Mexican Americans. This preoccupation with politics linked with economic growth and control over resources was also relationally linked with African American struggles in Oakland and beyond. Therefore, Mexican American nonprofit forms of race-making were relational to the racialization of African Americans. These nonprofit-mediated forms of racializing Mexican Americans and other Latinos were also fundamentally spatial.