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A “Hive of Subtlety”: Aesthetics and the
End(s) of Cultural Studies

A talking head on the evening news in spring 2004, describing the Democratic primaries underway at the time, claimed that there was so little disagreement between candidates running for president that, at best, their differences were “aesthetic.” What the commentator meant by *aesthetic* is unclear; probably, he simply meant superficial. In the current cultural moment in the United States, aesthetics have come to seem superficial and even suspect; even television, in its distaste for anything that smacks of the scripted (much less crafted), has taken to passing off the implausible and highly artificial as “reality” to avoid the taint of the aesthetic. And in the public and professional cultures of academia, this aversion to aesthetics has been claimed as particularly salutary, allowing criticism and interpretation to concentrate on the real political matters that demand our attention.

But let’s assume that the commentator was going a little deeper. Could he have meant, literally, that difference per se is (related to the generation of the) aesthetic? Ian Hunter describes aesthetics as the dreamwork of a fractured subject, a sanctuary of illusion where coherence and symbolic unity can be imagined.¹ In an era in which subjects conceive of themselves increasingly as self-divided (between, just to take Jane Austen’s list, sense and sensibility or pride and prejudice), when American citizens in particular are encouraged to fracture their self-conceptions on the hard edges of panic and plentitude, suspicion and sympathy, particularity and universalism (the novels Austen never wrote), the desire for integration, however contingent and fleeting, drives the subject into a space withdrawn from the unsatisfying and incomplete work of intimacy and democracy. There the citizen can

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construct, through aesthetic contemplation or activity, the psychic scrim onto which are projected fantasies of integrated and enriched personhood. Elsewhere Hunter suggests that literary hermeneutics represents a negative aesthetic activity that allows a different sort of dreamwork, namely, the spiritual exercise of self-examination, which takes the place of politics.² As Hunter cautions, “when it comes to their roles as citizens . . . it is important for literary theorists not to take their work home with them” lest they mistake the delicate operations of introspection, what Michel Foucault in a different context calls “an aesthetics of existence,” for truer forms of civil engagement.³ But in an American climate where political difference is reduced to spectacle, can aesthetics be uncoupled from the citizen’s withdrawal into a space of contemplation masquerading as agency, a space not of debate but of deliberation? Might not interests in spectacle, fantasy, and form be the only things left in a house that has been repeatedly ransacked by rather strict notions of *realpolitik*?

The talking head probably didn’t mean to invest aesthetics with such power. But if he knew the history of cultural studies and its treatment of aesthetics, he might have. It’s become conventional to treat aesthetics as synonymous with formalism, with “high art,” and with effete (read: academic) hair-splitting detached from the hair-raising of the real world. But let’s allow a moment of speculation here. Hunter suggests that aesthetics may occasion a “becoming” in which, contemplating the divided world, the subject reinvents the self in previously unconfigured ways. Such aesthetic becomings are often unexpectedly politicized, however. Cultural studies, with its attention to the social conditions and settings that make aesthetic contemplation a privilege available to relatively few, keeps us alert to the dangers of making aesthetics inherently progressive. In a corollary and countervailing gesture, however, cultural studies, with its attention to the unpredictable nature of these social conditions and settings, keeps us alert to the parallel fallacy of discarding aesthetic process as inherently conservative. The title of this special issue captures this schismatic sensibility: at one moment, aesthetics prove resistant to the sociological nature of becoming and thus figure as the transcendent end or limit to cultural contexts; at the next, aesthetics reactivate and defamiliarize the social forces and political possibilities that are ends or horizons of cultural analysis.

Take, for instance, Herman Melville’s novella, *Benito Cereno*.

Readers easily recognize this narrative, with its emphasis on historical source material, slavery, and racial misrecognition, as a cultural text. But *Benito Cereno* is also a tale of perspective, sensation, and projection, which combine either to confer or withhold subjectivity. It is, in other words, a text that politicizes aesthetics. The blindness of the American captain, Amasa Delano, who stumbles into a slave rebellion aboard a Spanish trading ship, both precludes a social vision and is itself a social vision whose effects can neither be controlled nor calculated. Delano continually faces a world riven by conflict and contradiction, most obviously related to racial difference and the imperial traffic in human bodies. Delano himself is perilously divided by the contradictory demands of his New England liberalism, which requires both a sympathetic heart and a head given over to order, particularly the order of racial hierarchy. Delano energetically attempts to suture the resulting rent in his consciousness but ultimately withdraws (the majority of the story takes place as Delano's interior monologue) in order to contemplate the self and to engage in an aestheticizing act of synthesis that culminates in a moment of new becoming. Indeed, confronted with the racial, national, and class divisions that are continuously at play on the Spanish ship, Delano repeatedly aestheticizes the slave-revolt-in-progress into a drama that allows him to imagine himself as an increasingly patient, indulgent, and benevolent man. This illusion is the cause of great satisfaction until, of course, the scales fall from his eyes and the reality of the revolt, of a social and economic world so divided that violence and mutiny are the status quo, is revealed. Delano's retreat into aesthetics is an effort to assert his liberal freedom when faced with the violent systems of subjugation—of unfreedom—that make liberalism possible in the first place. (After all, forced labor purchases the liberal subject the time for aesthetic contemplation.) Faced with the violent revolt that would make such leisure impossible, Delano's aesthetic contemplation may be said to be a freedom of last resort. The American captain, in short, engages in aesthetic contemplation in order to end the cultural study of his own liberal investments that the specter of blackness would force upon his consciousness.

Aesthetics, however, need not be a turning away from differences. As our fanciful rendering of the television talking head implies, aesthetics can be the point of incalculable rupture. So while Delano exemplifies the aesthetic contemplation of self that functions as a mode of

retreat, Babo, the leader of the slave revolt, commandeers aesthetic representation as a mode of confrontational engagement. In the violently erotic scene when Babo shaves his master, the American captain likens the slave's unctuousness to "a Nubian sculptor finishing off a white statue-head."⁴ His worldview threatened once more by what he sees right in front of him, Delano sails off blithely toward the safe harbor of his own interior musings. But what he must contemplate even in this moment of inwardness and hermetic safety is the prospect of aesthetics as a tense, dialectical exchange. Babo lubricates, crafts, and ultimately manipulates the white head that he controls. In contrast to the idea that aesthetics comprise the compensatory dream-work within our own heads, Babo forces us to grapple with another possibility: aesthetics can be the site at which we shape the heads—perspectives, ideologies, sympathies—of others. This is illusion with a vengeance. In *Revenge of the Aesthetic*, Michael Clark argues that far from being associated with a logic of domination—such, of course, is Delano's worldview, which is able to assimilate all observation within a presumably pleasurable schema of enlightened racialism—aesthetics provide a "source of autonomy and resistance to the status quo."⁵ The slave revolt, too, requires the generation of difference between black disobedience and white command that takes on an aesthetic dimension. More than anything, then, Babo uses Delano's fantasies for the ends of revolution.

A significant part of Babo's revolutionary aesthetic is its challenge to ideas of individual autonomy. Aesthetic experience entails far more than the bounded dimensions of an American captain's consciousness. Melville's novella sketches aesthetics as an aleatory relation in which Babo acts on the Spaniard by treating him as an aesthetic object. That is, aesthetics are always transitive: they take an object, oftentimes, by force. For Hunter, aesthetic transformation is an individual phenomenon (the transformation of self) but Babo whets this ontology, giving it a much sharper edge by presenting aesthetics as an unsettling of self. Aesthetics, in this guise, are never (only) about self-transformation; rather, they invite the possibility of constituting and producing subjects at the site of dialogue and power. Whether it is the TV talking head or the white statue-head that is up on the block, aesthetics contain the possibility of articulating differences, not in a namby-pamby mode of liberal retreat but in a manner that radically reconfigures reconciliation so that it can no longer secure stability or an identity that

rests on oneness. Where aesthetics produce difference, the materiality of the encounter is too bumpy and uneven to allow one to rest one's head on the pillow of an introspective dreamwork.

To say that reconciliation—in the form of the stability or fixity of oneness—is unsettled in the aesthetic moment is not to deny, however, the capacity for aesthetics to ground a post-identity collectivity. For all its antagonism, the primal scene of Babo shaving his master, in which one individual subject is confronted by another individual denied subjectivity, does not go far enough in suggesting the possibly collective nature of aesthetic transformation. Notions of performance, illusion, and beauty suggest much more than the domain of the singularized liberal subject, implying a fuller and richer field of community feeling and action. And yet aesthetics cannot shake off the criticism that the sociality it generates is only an empty reflection of true social content. Aesthetics fall prey to an inescapable formalism hostile to the gritty materiality, history, and contingencies of the real that jar and disrupt abstract criteria of judgment. Reflecting on “the current aesthetic revival,” Fredric Jameson expresses this worry, suggesting that the collective nature of aesthetic transformation is only its false image. What looks like social engagement, he argues, is actually an “epistemological repression” that prevents sociality from coming into focus.⁶ In place of some truer manifestation, an apparition of sociality takes the world-historical stage, passing off its shadowy outlines as the dimension of social content. Aesthetic form supposedly only counts as social content “when you are no longer able to acknowledge the content of social life itself.”⁷ Melville is not so sure. The slave revolt requires the generation of difference that takes on an aesthetic dimension. Babo stages a play for Delano's consumption in order to manipulate the aesthetic practices that he predicts, rightly, Delano will bring to the spectacle of racial suffering. By placing the tense difference *between* aesthetic practices at the heart of revolution, Melville's entire cast of willing, unwilling, and unaware actors shows that illusion, masquerade, deception, artifice, and any other terms that connote the ultimate ideological bankruptcy of aesthetic practice can, in fact, facilitate collective becoming, and, with it, collective social interests. In suggesting this reading of Melville's aesthetics, we not only want to hold open the possibility of collective transformation within the aesthetic moment but also the possibility that such transformations might become instances of what Lauren Berlant and Michael

Warner have called “world-making” or of imagining what Judith Butler has described as the not-yet-real.⁸ What kind of politics could we have if politicians were better able to aestheticize: to see the unseen (civilly and socially dead citizens), to attempt new expressions (unarticulated social possibilities), to imagine social possibilities previously untried (or badly tried), to understand those constructions as negotiable and changeable over time, and to feel an emotional connection to very public possibilities of creating, of *becoming*? That, indeed, would be an aesthetic difference.

Cultural critics have, of course, been skeptical of the collectivizing potential of aesthetic experience, from Karl Marx’s claims that performativity and poetics are counterrevolutionary through Roland Barthes’s claim that “Revolution excludes myth” to Terry Eagleton’s sustained analysis of how the major chords of aesthetic theory give voice to bourgeois ideology.⁹ While Barthes brilliantly showed how critics could demystify the socioeconomic matrix and penetrate the deeply political character of seemingly innocent objects, such analysis was purchased at the cost of pleasure and fellowship, precisely because cultural analysis unveils the falseness of affect, image, illusion, beauty, and ugliness, rendering them powerless. While it is by no means a straight path from Barthes’s study of culture to cultural studies, the abandonment of aesthetics remains nearly unmitigated. While frequently denying the collectivizing pleasures made possible by aesthetics, cultural studies, especially after its migration to U.S. institutional contexts, has debunked the essentialized identities and sanctioned intimacies at the base of most contemporary community formations, without supplying in their stead grounds for collective life that are affectively satisfying as well as theoretically plausible. It is this bind that arguably has revitalized the study of aesthetics, which traffics in affective sensations that promise—without necessarily providing—post-identity or non-normative forms of collectivism. The essays in this volume recommend aesthetics as a means for generating, through the sensations of the body and play of the imagination, broader collective—and collaborative—identifications, without necessarily tying them to hegemonic social formations. Taking up the challenge of post-identity interiority, the essays in this volume show two things that all critics working in the field of aesthetics should bear in mind. First, aesthetics may be most interesting as a site for locating and naming moments of affective fullness, which,

especially as the traditional modes of interiority disintegrate, will make aesthetics, and its politics, increasingly important. The second, and related, point is that there is nothing fundamentally predictable about the interiorities or collectivities produced by aesthetics. Rather, aesthetics, like all affective formations, operate within institutional and disciplinary frameworks that seek to orient sense and sensation toward desired outcomes: those framings, the object of cultural studies, make aesthetics either conservative or progressive.

The essays in this volume grant aesthetics an agency far beyond what traditionally has been credited by cultural studies. For James Dawes, the power of aesthetic emotion lies in its capacity for disrupting the rational belief-systems that structure reality's common sense. Using both philosophy and cognitive science to address the question of why readers enjoy being scared by gothic fiction, Dawes argues for the pleasures of experiencing "emotions [that] sweep over us in sudden violation of all our most reasoned background assumptions (but safely, since we have willed the circumstances that predictably produce this violation)," thus allowing us to "experience the wondrous and absurd revelation that we are, in conscious thought, only dancing on the surface of what we truly are." This fissure in ontology characterizes Delano's experience in (and ours of reading) *Benito Cereno*. In the end, Delano is able to leap to safety, as we are able to close Melville's book. But in the process we have come to realize, if only affectively, the misconceived rationales of white social order.

Most of the essays in this volume are less interested in disrupting the subject than in formulating new—and usually collective—subjects. Paul Gilmore begins, like Dawes, with the assumption that aesthetic sensation has the power to surpass the limits of conventional cognition. Claiming that "aesthetic experience is the sensual and conscious experience of the suspension and ecstatic transcendence of the interested self," Gilmore doesn't leave us with the abstractly transcended or fragmented self. Like the American and British romantic writers he addresses, who believed that aesthetic experience supplied an electric charge not confined to the singularity of private consciousness, Gilmore asserts that "the aesthetic moment's potential political power derives from its ability to engender an imagined community that, unlike the one described by Benedict Anderson, transcends racial, social, and national boundaries." From Samuel Taylor Coleridge to Ralph Waldo Emerson and from Lord Byron to Walt Whitman,

aesthetic sensation was electric, a material charge that could pass from body to body, becoming the basis for a collective experience that would transcend the limitations of identity. Gilmore's articulation of "a kind of egalitarianism" within aesthetics "that can be translated to the political sphere" suggests why the political projects of both Babo and Delano—both oriented toward nationalist understandings (both men want to return to a homeland they imagine as sites of freedom)—are forestalled by their dialectic aesthetics. Concluding that aesthetics need not signify a withdrawal from the world into consciousness and form "but a particular kind of engagement with the world," Gilmore helps us understand why Melville's drama of revolution takes place not within geographical boundaries but in the transnational space of the high seas.

Other critics, however, while conceding the collectivizing possibilities of aesthetics, are less sanguine about aesthetics' utopian outcomes. Tracing the rise of aesthetic theory in the aftermath of eighteenth-century revolution, Elizabeth Dillon argues that aesthetics ensured the continuation of liberal freedoms in a moment that called for law and social order. For Dillon, aesthetics opened up the individual capacity for evaluation and judgment central to juridical notions of consent, while simultaneously attaching those individual judgments to shared conventions of taste that allowed for collective order (or what Kant famously calls law without law). For Dillon, the liberal aesthete was not, finally, an individual subject but a member of a community of taste. In this regard, Dillon places sentimentalism—which constituted, first, liberal community generally and female community later—at the center of aesthetic production. At the same time, the attachment of aesthetic judgment to external "laws" rendered the liberal subject's freedom provisional at best, a point taken up powerfully by Wai Chee Dimock. Claiming Kant "as a patron saint of cultural studies," Dimock argues that the core of aesthetic experience is (the hope for) a species-wide awareness that could, potentially, become the basis of a "global civil society," allowing "for multilateral ties, more complex and far-flung than those dictated by territorial jurisdictions." The forces leveled against such a global collective are powerful, however, as Dimock demonstrates in her analysis of the fracas that followed the 1949 awarding of the Bollingen Prize to a poet who had been denounced as a national traitor—Ezra Pound. Close reading, which Dimock describes as a method of interpretation that privi-

leges language over national taxonomy, removes critical judgment from the circumscribed horizon of Americanness. And in doing so, such aesthetic interpretation posits a community of taste that necessarily stands in oppositional excess of the nation, suggesting to Dimock a “not altogether unhopeful condition” of debate and divisiveness that, much like the gap-ridden deposition produced by the Spanish provincial authorities in Melville’s novella, never congeals into a single univocal perspective that goes by the name of patriotism.

If aesthetics exist as nationalism’s other, what value do notions of style, manner, and affect have in the globalism of what Christopher Nealon calls “late-late capitalism”? In the willfully obsolescent, often utopian, and always innovative work of post-Language poets, political possibilities become fluid and multiple when the critic cruises sites of damage, waste, and irrelevance—all effects of capitalism’s unprecedented expansions—with the detachment and ironic sensibility of the flaneur. By charting the engagement of contemporary poets such as Kevin Davies, Rod Smith, and Lisa Robertson with the temporal unruliness of Frankfurt school meditations about where and when human history is headed, Nealon suggests that we can rethink our attachments to the materials of the future. The question is not what aesthetic objects signify now. Rather, as Nealon puts it, political significance is always “pending”; it is something we must wait for, resisting the critical temptation to finalize meaning. Theoretical power consists in “our being unable to pin down when the performance is finished.” When will these poems stop meaning? The question is in many ways unanswerable because post-Language writing always awaits its objects, always refuses the possibility of a whole story, putting up “resistance to the idea” that there is “any one thing we know.” In short, Nealon’s essay echoes its own objects, featuring its own unfinished sentences, casual asides, and prophecies that extend interpretation. In place of aesthetic theory, then, Nealon gives us aesthetics *as* theory.

The sublime example of Martin Luther King Jr., as Thomas Kane illustrates, suggests aesthetics as practice. King’s dreamwork has, after all, set the horizon for political action for the last half of the twentieth century. But King’s dream was also deeply melancholic, tinged with the sadness of knowing that his utopian project would remain unfinished. The struggle for civil rights in this sense is an open-ended aesthetic project whose incompleteness stages a scene of

witnessing: the audience watches and listens with a poignant sense of impending loss, yet simultaneously experiences loss as an opening of history, through which they may step—or march—as agents. With King’s death, which he himself prophesized through an aesthetics Kane calls “automortography,” this anxiety and promise become historically real. Now, four decades after King’s assassination, the National Civil Rights Museum relies on an interactive aesthetic that continues the work of melancholy. Located in the motel where King was shot, the museum seeks to preserve the history of segregation and civil demand. If automortography depicts subjects becoming objects (in death), the engagement with melancholic objects in this museum allows spectators, through aesthetic contemplation, to remember in ways that bring political consciousness back to life. At the same time, the institutional logic of the museum, inviting “inward reflection and a detached rumination,” may counter the collective action King sought to engender through his speeches, while the artificiality of museum display creates a misleading aura of immediacy and presence, shuttling visitors “between the plastic falsity of the objects on display and the temporal plasticity of our own fantasy.” Showing how the National Civil Rights Museum, enshrining death, institutionalizes King’s legacy as a matter of exhibits, facsimiles, reproductions, and representations, Kane’s essay speaks provocatively to Nealon’s: are the open futures recovered from the wreckage of capitalism threatened by the institutional aesthetics of supposedly historical consciousness?

Melville well understood both the danger and the potential of aesthetic encounters across histories, cultures, and institutions. It is not the American recapture of the *San Dominick* but the discursive post-mortem of the mutiny that finally ends the rebellion. The American captain of Melville’s novella, of course, employs aesthetics against expanded notions of historicity, exhorting his Spanish colleague, Benito Cereno, to forget the past and live in an eternal present, a natural-seeming stasis that is at once social and temporal, providing consolation in “yon bright sun . . . and the blue sea” (754). And Babo’s manipulation of heads and minds, his subjective power in sculpting white interiority and psychology, is brutally punished when his own head, “that hive of subtlety,” is “fixed on a pole,” staring down the whites who would dare look at it (755). How thoroughly negated is the subjective power that Babo found in aesthetics as he himself becomes

an object of the grotesque! Still we might also take this as a question: indeed, how thoroughly is Babo disempowered, as sculptor becomes sculpture? Not at all, is the answer that the final paragraph of *Benito Cereno* provides. Even though the spectacle of retribution replaces the fanciful Nubian objet d'art with a decapitated head, a defiant and scheming subjectivity nonetheless lingers in "the hive of subtlety." Babo continues to meet the "gaze of the whites," his head a *memento mori* to mutinous collective agency (755). Whiteness remains shot through with the image of blackness; rebellion persists within the scene of punishment; unpredictable meanings still circulate within the workings of an authority so severe and final that, at first glance, nothing would seem to be left to chance. But Babo's gaze demands a closer look at the spectacle, artifice, display, political staging, psychological attachments, liberal identifications, and insurgent possibilities that are all part of the aesthetic and its effects.

Taken together, the essays in this special issue suggest what the dialectical gazings of Babo and Delano also suggest: that aesthetics invite a process of (at least) second looks. If the first look sees aesthetics as a celebration of timeless transcendence, a second look shows us the historical development of theories, objects, sensations, and actions made possible through aesthetics; if a first look suggests that aesthetics provide a foundation for liberal subjectivity, a second look reveals that aesthetics disrupt the individual subject and provide the groundwork for an alternative, post-identity collectivism; if a first look discerns aesthetics' apolitical concern with ephemera, a second look reveals those objects as the historical manifestations of loss and possibility, of waste and wishfulness, as deeply political movements of sensation and sensibility; if a first look tells us that the overly formal subject of aesthetics does not merit close cultural investigation, a second look reveals the ways nationalism and globalism, consent and coercion, materiality and universalism, fear and pleasure, even life and death are mediated through aesthetics. Aesthetics require and enable not just first and second looks but also different tastes. Over the course of this special issue, our contributors shift back and forth, testing out cultural approaches to aesthetic objects (such as texts, poems, and speeches) and utilizing aesthetics as a methodology for discerning communities of taste, as in Dillon's sense. At times, such taste is distinctly pleasurable, allowing for the formation of sympathy, common sense, and other potentially reciprocal relations; at others, the hegemonic for-

mation of taste under the sign of the nation and its sanitized history is so bitter that it burns. Faced with these multiple treatments and deployments of aesthetics, this special issue puts aesthetics on the pike of investigation and becomes the site of object lessons about representation and critique, community and citizenship, and prophesy and possibility. Always loaded, aesthetics are indeed a “hive of subtlety,” one moment fixed in place, the next moment staring back at us, providing insight into the unpredictable and contingent cultural forces that create, identify, and unite subjects. The place of aesthetics in cultural studies is, for the moment at least, a problem, but a productive one, giving critics room to maneuver, to speculate, and, once again, in pursuing our ends, with eyes wide open, to attempt more promising beginnings.

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Notes

- 1 Ian Hunter, “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies,” in *Cultural Studies*, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 347–72.
- 2 Ian Hunter, “Literary Theory in Civil Life,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 95 (fall 1996): 1059–1134.
- 3 Hunter, “Literary Theory in Civil Life,” 1130; Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others, volume 1 of *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984* (New York: New Press, 1997), 274.
- 4 Herman Melville, *Benito Cereno*, in *Herman Melville: Pierre or, The Ambiguities; Israel Potter: His Fifty Years of Exile; The Piazza Tales; The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade; Uncollected Prose; Billy Budd, Sailor* (New York: Library of America, 1984), 720. Further references are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text.
- 5 Michael P. Clark, introduction to *Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2000), 17.
- 6 Fredric Jameson, “Marx’s Purloined Letter,” in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s “Specters of Marx,”* ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999), 52–53.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 52.
- 8 See Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “Sex in Public,” in *Intimacy*,

- ed. Lauren Berlant (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000), 311–30; and Judith Butler, “The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive Excess,” *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 2 (summer 1990): 105–25.
- 9 See Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in *Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire: (Post)modern Interpretations*, ed. Mark Cowling and James Martin (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 146; and Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford, Eng.: Basil Blackwell, 1990).