

## Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe

*John Watkins*

University of Minnesota  
Minneapolis, Minnesota

The time has come for a multidisciplinary reevaluation of one of the oldest, and traditionally one of the most conservative, subfields in the modern discipline of history: the study of premodern diplomacy. Diplomatic studies are often bracketed aside from other areas of investigation and seem impermeable to theoretical and methodological innovations that have transformed almost every other sector of the profession. Scholars interested in race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, subalternity, and new modes of intellectual history have occasionally used diplomatic sources, but they have rarely investigated the diplomatic practices that created those sources in the first place. The modern cross-disciplinary study of international relations has broadened the discussion of diplomatic issues for later historical periods, but the presentist biases of that conversation—centered on nineteenth-century understandings of the nation—have limited its application to the medieval and early modern periods.

Nor has diplomacy figured significantly in the dialogue with history that has transformed literary studies within the last three decades. In some ways, nothing could be stranger than the literary critic's lack of attention to diplomatic theory and practice. Many of the most familiar figures in European literary canons spent a significant portion of their career in diplomatic service, such as Petrarch, Chaucer, Wyatt, Sidney, Tasso, and Montaigne. Diplomacy also figures in the careers of newly discovered and newly rediscovered women writers such as Veronica Gàmbara and Marguerite de Navarre. But an emphasis on power relationships *within* individual polities characterizes literary study in the wake of new historicism. As a consequence, relationships *between* and *among* polities have remained under-investigated and under-theorized.

For English readers, two books published in the middle of the last century dominate thinking about medieval and early modern diplomacy:

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Donald Queller's *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (1967) and Garrett Mattingly's *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955).<sup>1</sup> Every general history of diplomacy written in the last forty years bases its account of premodern Europe almost exclusively on these works. This lack of a new historiographic synthesis has left unchallenged the periodizations and narrative teleologies that structure Queller's and Mattingly's arguments. As Mattingly's title suggests, for example, his sense that European diplomacy changed in distinct ways between 1420 and 1530 perpetuates the notion of a Burckhardtian Renaissance.<sup>2</sup> Like Burckhardt's Renaissance, Mattingly's Renaissance diplomacy is an Italian invention that spreads beyond the Alps and creates modernity. The emergence of the resident embassy as the primary locus of diplomatic exchanges occupies a position in Mattingly's thought analogous to the emergence of the individual in Burckhardt's. Although Mattingly is less pejorative than Burckhardt in his treatment of the Middle Ages, he characterizes it as a period in which religion so dominated diplomatic theory that it remained aloof from the conflicts that defined the period's military and diplomatic practice:

. . . the West, in 1400, still thought of itself as one society. Christendom was torn by the gravest internal conflicts, by religious schism, doctrinal dispute, and the endemic warfare of class against class, people against people, faction against faction, king against king. But Latin Christendom still knew itself to be one. . . . This is the less surprising since throughout the period when Latin Christendom was a living reality, saints and philosophers, poets and propagandists were constantly seeking to capture in universal terms the essential quality of its unity, without ever winning the unqualified agreement of even a majority of their contemporaries.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this un-Burckhardtian emphasis on the "gravest internal conflicts" that rent Christendom no less in the Middle Ages than during the Renaissance, Mattingly reinscribes within the discourse of diplomatic theory the Burckhardtian vision of a medieval world "dreaming or half awake" beneath a common veil "woven of faith, childlike prejudices, and illusion."<sup>4</sup>

Like other accounts of the unifying medieval experience of faith, Mattingly's ignores the historical contingency of his sources. As Björn Weiler has argued, the discourse of the *res publica Christiana* arose during specific historical circumstances.<sup>5</sup> It originated as a rallying cry urging Christians to stop fighting among themselves and to take up common arms

against the Muslim Infidel. Dating back to the period of the First Crusade, it acquired renewed urgency during periods of Ottoman expansion in the East and heretical preaching in the West. Mattingly bases his account of medieval diplomatic theory primarily on Bernard Du Rosier, who famously declared that “the grand object of all diplomacy is peace.”<sup>6</sup> But Mattingly fails to mention that Cardinal Bernard published his *Ambaxiator, Brevilogus Prosaico Moraliqye Dogmate pro Felici et Prospero Ducatu circa Ambaxiatas Insistencium Excerptus* in 1436, just one year after Pope Eugenius IV rallied all the powers of the church to bring England, France, and Burgundy into negotiations aimed at ending the Hundred Years War.<sup>7</sup> The peace of Christendom may have been the pope’s official aim, but his more immediate goal was enlisting the support of all three belligerents in a campaign against Bohemian heretics. Eugenius was also locked in a major contest over the limits of papal authority with hostile prelates at the Council of Basel. Du Rosier’s idealizing views of diplomacy might best be read as part of this Vatican effort to stabilize a volatile ecclesiastical situation. Du Rosier, rewarded with the archbishopric of Toulouse in 1451, also wrote tracts defending the pope’s temporal powers and the liberties of the church.

The resemblance between Eugenius’s diplomatic practices and those of several sixteenth-century popes in their campaigns against Protestantism, as well as the implication of Du Rosier’s treatise in Eugenius’s efforts, suggest that Mattingly constructed his history of Renaissance diplomacy on unstable dichotomies. Diplomatic theory is inseparable from diplomatic practice, and the distinctions between sacred and secular, medieval and Renaissance experience are less clear than Mattingly, after Burckhardt, maintains. This analytical instability undermines Mattingly’s overarching vision of a preeminently secular Renaissance diplomacy carried out by increasingly professionalized residents that was later compromised by post-Reformation sectarianism. Mattingly’s lament on the disintegration of relations between Elizabeth I and Philip II depends as much on stereotypes about the relationship of the Renaissance to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation as his insufficiently historicized reading of Du Rosier depends on those about the relationship of the Renaissance to the Middle Ages.<sup>8</sup>

A commitment to crude periodizations is only one aspect of the older diplomatic history that needs to be reexamined. Much previous work has centered on a restricted European geography. Since detailed correspondence and record-keeping was a hallmark of Venetian diplomatic practice, for example, a preponderance of earlier research has focused on Venice. Queller, for instance, was a Venetianist. The Victorian translation of all

Venetian materials pertinent to the study of English history as part of the *Calendars of State Papers* has made these sources especially convenient for British and North American scholars. The same is true of the Spanish materials archived in Simancas and translated in the *CSP* Spanish series. Mattingly, for example, was an Anglo-Iberian specialist. His earlier research on Catherine of Aragon and later work on the Spanish Armada framed and in many ways limited his general perspective on Renaissance diplomacy.<sup>9</sup>

Very little previous scholarship has dealt with diplomatic contacts between western and eastern Europe, or between European and non-European powers like the Arabs and the Ottomans.<sup>10</sup> Scholars have even implied that such work was unnecessary, since these early exchanges were allegedly insignificant or even nonexistent. Bernard Lewis's many books, for example, portray the Ottomans and other Muslims as isolationists who only began sending larger numbers of envoys to the West in the eighteenth century.<sup>11</sup> M. S. Anderson builds his influential 1993 account in *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* around the model of "two Europes":

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Europe was still divided between a core of western states, in which permanent diplomatic representation was well rooted and between which diplomatic relations were active and more or less continuous, and a periphery of less developed ones—the Scandinavian countries, Poland, Russia and in the west Scotland and Portugal—where diplomacy was less important and diplomatic organization more primitive. Between these two Europes there were as yet only slender links.<sup>12</sup>

The presentist, teleological biases of such writing are apparent: for Anderson, the history of diplomacy is one of slow, sometimes interrupted, but increasingly detectable progress toward the modern system of permanent representation. Contact between polities that fails to conform to that model is "less important," "primitive," and by implication, less rewarding to study.

This assumption that the only significant geographies in diplomatic history are those that can be mapped onto a progressivist narrative culminating in the exchange of permanent resident ambassadors has contributed directly to the field's conceptual estrangement from other areas of medieval and early modern investigation. The majority of contacts between premodern polities do not conform to this criteria, but they still had an enormous impact on the shifting political, economic, religious, and cultural fortunes

of European peoples and the emergence of national self-consciousness. Ironically, the divergent forms these contacts took sometimes provide striking analogues for the new practices that occupy a widening sector of our post-Cold War diplomatic practice. Traditional histories, for example, see the separation of diplomatic and consular duties as a defining moment in the emergence of modern diplomacy. Yet in the last quarter-century, diplomats around the world have noted that questions of economics and trade now demand much more of their time than purely political matters. The ambassador is becoming once again a *bailo*, the consulate officer who served the Venetians in lieu of an ambassador at the Ottoman court. Asymmetrical warfare, terrorism, and “clashes of civilizations” were not unknown to an era that witnessed the Gunpowder Plot and the assassinations of two successive French kings, Henry III and Henry IV. Contemporary interest sections, protecting powers, and front missions, which allow the actual business of diplomacy to continue when conventional bilateralism fails, had their prototypes in the strategies that rulers on either side of the Great Schism, the Reformation/Counter-Reformation divide, or the boundary between Christians and Muslims devised to negotiate without the appearance of negotiating with heretics and infidels.

In short, diplomatic discourse before the advent of the bourgeois nation-state has acquired a peculiar relevance in an era when globalization so powerfully challenges the state’s economic and even political significance. But in order to analyze prenational relationships most effectively, scholars need critical vocabularies that do not assume the greater value and sophistication of nation-based diplomacy. This development can come about only through the interdisciplinary engagement that has so richly transformed other areas of historical investigation. One place to start would be a more productive encounter with contemporary international relations theory. Much IR theory may first seem irrelevant to a discussion of premodern diplomatic configurations because of its grounding in relationships between modern nation-states. But scholars writing on anything from strategic negotiations and treaty-making to the cultural impact of shifting political configurations in the premodern period could benefit from reading bodies of IR theory that explicitly challenge the state-based assumptions currently dominating the field, such as transnationalism, postinternationalism, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s complex interdependence theory, constitutive theory, and Krasner’s international regime theory.<sup>13</sup>

More ambitious and productive would be intellectual exchanges between diplomatic historians and cultural and social historians, including

those who teach in departments of art history, the history and philosophy of science and technology, English and the modern languages, comparative literature, women's studies and gender studies, rhetoric, and cultural studies. The history of diplomacy is finally inseparable from parallel histories of education and literacy, technological innovation, economics, literature and rhetoric, gender, sexuality, and marriage. One story cannot be told fully without reference to others. The same men who forged the canon of medieval and early modern Italian literature helped to orchestrate relationships between Italian city states and between those states and principalities beyond the Alps. Almost every major late medieval and early modern treaty involved intermarriages between belligerent parties. We cannot assume that women involved were merely pawns caught up in negotiations between men. Some of the most important treaties of the Renaissance were conceived and brokered by women, including the 1529 Treaty of Cambrai, the so-called "Paix des Dames" between Margaret of Austria and Louise de Savoie, and the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the culmination of a peace process directed by Christina of Denmark, Dowager Duchess of Lorraine.<sup>14</sup>

The last several years have witnessed some important steps in these scholarly directions by historians working primarily in Europe. A group of innovative Italianists has begun exploring the relationship between external affairs and internal state formation during the early modern period. Some of their earliest work has centered on the Savoyards, whose diplomatic artistry gave them a pivotal role in European politics and eventually garnered them royal titles as the kings of Sicily and later Sardinia. One of the contributors to this special issue on diplomacy, Daniela Frigo of the University of Trieste, pioneered this field with *Principe, Ambasciatori e "Jus Gentium": L'amministrazione della Politica Estera nel Piemonte del Settecento* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1991). Working on the intersections of military and diplomatic history and the analysis of state formation, Christopher Storrs of the University of Dundee has offered a powerful complement to Frigo's research with *War, Diplomacy, and the Rise of Savoy, 1690–1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). In 2000, Frigo edited a landmark collection translated into English by Adrian Belton as *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Frigo and her co-contributors unite in a powerful challenge to Mattingly's central belief that modern diplomacy emerged from the balance of power achieved among the Italian states after the 1454 Treaty of Lodi. Taken collectively, these essays suggest that Mattingly's biases as a scholar who worked primarily on large monarchies led him to read their

political dynamics back into the relationships between the significantly smaller, less bureaucratized, regional states of Italy.<sup>15</sup>

Other scholars have begun dismantling the assumption that diplomacy was a male prerogative. This historiographic revision has complemented the recent explosion of interest in medieval and early modern queens. Traditional historians often downplayed the diplomatic initiatives even of powerful queens like Elizabeth I and Catherine the Great by stressing instead the accomplishments of male ambassadors and members of governing councils. Recent British historians like Carole Levin and Susan Doran have challenged that model by stressing instead the extent of Elizabeth's own agency and by looking more generally at the ways her gender figured in the dynastic courtships that stood at the center of her foreign policy.<sup>16</sup> Denis Crouzet's magisterial biography of Catherine de Medici brings her diplomatic achievements to center stage in ways that prefigure his interest in a specifically feminine diplomatic practice that he examines in his contribution to this issue.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Abbey Zanger's *Scenes from the Marriage of Louis XIV: Nuptial Fictions and the Making of Absolutist Power* achieves a methodological breakthrough in bringing archival research, literary analysis, history of the book and print, anthropology, theater history, and gender theory to bear on the Hapsburg-Bourbon peace negotiations that culminated in Louis XIV's 1660 marriage to the Infanta María Teresa.<sup>18</sup>

The strong use that Crouzet and Zanger make of literary sources points to one of the most recent and exciting developments in the history of diplomacy, the integration of literary and historical methodologies that have so productively transformed the study of other aspects of early European society. Faculty within modern language departments are beginning to answer this interdisciplinary challenge with their own contributions to our understanding of diplomatic practice and more generally of power relations between medieval and early modern polities. Another of our contributors, Douglas Biow, has devoted two important chapters of a book on the interaction between humanist discourse and the emergence of professionalism in Renaissance Italy to the diplomatic writings of Ermolao Barbaro, Ottaviano Maggi, and Francesco Guicciardini.<sup>19</sup> Foregrounding the clash between humanist optimism and practical disillusionment, Biow finds pathos beneath the more familiar stereotype of the ambassador as a bearer of Renaissance confidence, ambition, and rhetorical bravura.

This special issue of *The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* seeks to encourage more profound reflection on the cultural significance of diplomatic encounters in the medieval and early modern period by bring-

ing into conversation six scholars from the fields of history, art history, and literary studies. In planning this issue, we have aimed for as broad a range as possible by inviting contributions that deal with events from late antiquity to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The geographical sweep is equally ambitious. While four articles deal with aspects of western European diplomacy of immediate interest to the journal's regular readers, two other articles press our understanding of "Europe" to its farthest boundaries by investigating diplomatic practices in Byzantium and Muscovy.

The issue opens with an article by Daniela Frigo on the function of the ambassador in early modern political culture. Rejecting the teleologies that have dominated previous accounts of the "dawn" of early modern diplomacy, Frigo examines how the office of the ambassador existed in a complex and often slippery symbiosis with other aspects of the state. Diplomatic practices differed significantly across the continent and even across the political divisions of the Italian peninsula, the primary focus of Frigo's analysis. In inventing a historiography that might best represent this radical fragmentation and asymmetry, Frigo pays close attention to the linguistic nuances of the texts that mediated, facilitated, and eventually codified and described the works of envoys, secretaries, agents, consuls, "bailos," ambassadors, and others entrusted with diplomatic business. This often confusing array of titles paralleled an even more confusing array of tasks that might be entrusted to a late medieval or early modern diplomat and that tended to get lumped together under the general term *negozi* or "business." A *negozio* might involve the negotiation of a treaty or the change of an alliance. But it might also entail the acquisition of goods, the effort to track down manuscripts or works of art, or the recruitment of a particular artist or author. While Frigo argues that significant changes took place in diplomatic culture over the period, she grounds her account of it primarily in an analysis of the shifting vocabularies that writers used to describe and dignify the ambassador's office. The fortunes of one word in particular, *prudenza*—a recurrent term in lists of the qualities taken to characterize the perfect ambassador throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—maps a gradual, but nevertheless perceptible, movement away from an ethical and personal interpretation of diplomatic culture to a practical and bureaucratic one.

Frigo's fine attention to the language, style, and idiom of diplomatic expression, as well as her reminder that the envoy's *negozio* might encompass artistic commissions or quests for rare manuscripts for humanist libraries, exposes the growing permeability in diplomatic studies between the disciplines of history, the modern languages, and the history of art. Our next



three contributions, from literary scholars and a distinguished art historian, press the disciplinary question even further by showing how intimately diplomatic culture was bound up with artistic creation in premodern Europe. This section opens with Douglas Biow's essay on the conspicuous absence of explicit discussion of ambassadorial duties in Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano*, perhaps the ultimate expression of Renaissance courtly humanism. As Frigo observes in her contribution, diplomats were expected to participate fully in the urbane culture that Castiglione describes, and argues that at least during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ambassadorial discourse might best be seen as a subset of a larger courtly idiom. But Biow detects professionalizing pressures at work that distinguished the ambassador from the more general category of courtier at an earlier period than Frigo. According to Biow's reading of *Il Cortegiano*, Castiglione understates his own accomplishments as an ambassador for several Italian princes, and ultimately as a papal *nunzio*, because of a fundamental tension between the professional roles of the courtier and the ambassador. Whereas the courtier must maintain intellectual independence in order to advise his or her prince as honestly and effectively as possible, the ambassador must submerge his own identity as fully as possible in the image of the prince that he represents. The ambassador is simultaneously more honored and exalted than the ordinary courtier, from whose ranks he is generally selected, and less free to speak his mind. Biow concludes his essay with particularly poignant reflections on the difficulties that Castiglione faced as the representative for Pope Clement VII at the court of Charles V just before the 1527 sack of Rome, an event that not only marked the end of the Roman Renaissance and a lasting embarrassment for the papacy but also one of the period's greatest diplomatic failures.

In Timothy Hampton's reading of Racine's *Andromaque*, the pathos that Biow locates in the ambassador's role as a representative of his prince develops into full-blown tragedy. Situating the play at a critical turning point in the intersecting histories of literary neoclassicism and European diplomatic practice, Hampton finds a generic correlative for the shift from personal to bureaucratic modes of ambassadorial representation in Racinean tragedy's descent from epic. With the play itself, the two modes collide when a vaguely identified coalition of Greek princes commission Agamemnon's son Orestes to persuade Achilles's son Pyrrhus to surrender Hector's son Astyanax to them so that they might kill him and obliterate the last traces of Trojan royalty. In this play about sons of an illustrious prior generation, tragedy continually glances back to its origins in epic: the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid* serve throughout as principal subtexts for Racine's action. But the

consciousness of generational and generic belatedness also glances toward the contemporary moment and Louis XIV's restructuring of French society in the years following the Fronde rebellion against absolutist rule. Orestes's partial reduction in status from a prince in his own right to a mere envoy representing an association of Greek interests parallels the general restriction and even degradation of aristocratic prerogative under Louis XIV. The play thus casts the bureaucratization of diplomatic service in an ambiguous, tragically contradictory, light. Depersonalization suggests a movement away from an aristocratic rivalry and infighting, but also an encroachment on aristocratic independence that is only partially compensated by the reinscription of noble prerogatives as public service to the state.

Literature was not the only form of cultural production associated with diplomacy. As Anthony Cutler argues in his essay "Significant Gifts," the gifts presented, exchanged, and redistributed in the course of ambassadorial encounters constitute an important but understudied chapter in the parallel histories of art and premodern "international" politics. Despite ample records documenting the importance of diplomatic gift-giving, scholars have let the topic slip into the historiographic crack between Machiavelli and Castiglione, between a concern with "effective power" and "polite conduct and social discrimination." Yet as Cutler suggests, such distinctions not only efface the Machiavellian aspects of Castiglione and the Castiglionesque sides of Machiavelli. They also distort the history of diplomacy by introducing a false distinction between court ritual and the imagined "real substance" of negotiations.

Particularly in the interface between the Byzantine Christian and Islamic worlds that is the focus of Cutler's study, such distinctions did not apply. As Cutler notes, gifts exchanged between Islamic rulers were important "constituents of their foreign policy" rather than mere expressions of politeness. Interpreting these exchanges presents unique challenges to modern scholars, and especially to those with western biases and expectations. Cutler argues, for example, that the Maussian model that has dominated so many contemporary readings of gift-giving is particularly inappropriate in a Byzantine or medieval Islamic context. Circularity of exchange, for example, was typically less important in these societies than the redistribution of gifts to those subject to a ruler's favor. Above all, the Byzantine-Islamic examples challenge the universal application of the western "Whig narrative" of modern diplomacy as a progression from the personal to the bureaucratic. As Cutler argues, a slippage between Islamic understandings of sovereignty in highly personal terms and the more abstract Byzantine view of the emperor

as an embodiment of the Roman state was an important factor in medieval diplomacy itself.

The essays in the final section address the role of women in medieval and early modern diplomacy, both as negotiators and as brides exchanged in politically arranged marriages. Denis Crouzet's essay on Catherine de Medici's orchestration of the 1579 Nérac peace conference shows how far scholars have come in revising the notion that interdynastic marriages reduced women to pawns in transactions between men. Catherine de Medici's marriage to the future Henry II began as a classic attempt to seal an alliance between two major European powers, in this case Francis I of France and the Medicean pope Clement VII. At first, the match seemed to exemplify all the pitfalls of such diplomatically arranged marriages. When Clement died the following year, Francis's dream of a Franco-papal alliance came to nothing. Disillusioned Frenchmen condemned the marriage to a Florentine banker's daughter as a bad deal, and Henry himself flaunted his preference for his mistress Diane de Poitiers. But Catherine came into her own as a major force in European diplomacy after Henry's death in a 1559 tournament celebrating the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. As Crouzet shows in this essay, she worked tirelessly in her new capacity as *reine mère* to broker agreements between feuding Protestants and Catholics during the French wars of religion.

As a strong close reader of literary and archival texts alike, Crouzet centers his argument on Catherine's correspondence with her son Henry III about her negotiations with the belligerent Huguenot parties during the critical months between October 1578 and March 1579. True to the spirit of the new diplomatic history, Crouzet focuses more on questions of gender and genre than on the narrative of political events. As Crouzet argues, the letters document far more than a series of complicated and often frustrating conversations between Catherine and the Huguenot rebels. Serving as a de facto handbook on diplomatic practice for her newly crowned and relatively inexperienced son, Catherine's letters complement the explicit treatises on diplomatic theory and practice that Frigo analyzes in the opening essay. In the course of the letters, Catherine speaks quite self-consciously about her strategies for bringing resistant parties to the negotiating table. Striking a balance between patience and menace, she mirrors her contemporary Elizabeth I of England in transforming women's supposed liabilities into advantages of negotiation. By analyzing behaviors such as malice and irascibility that earlier biographers dismissed as calculated diplomatic strategies, Crouzet's essay offers historians and literary critics alike an important new model for thinking not only about diplomacy but about the history of personality.

This special issue closes with Russell Martin's essay on marriage diplomacy in late medieval Muscovy. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, marriages between rival dynasties had become a standard feature of peace treaties between rival western European dynasties. The century's most important treaty, the 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, for example, ended the Hapsburg-Valois feud over Italy by authorizing the double marriages of Henry II and Catherine de Medici's daughter Elisabeth to Philip II of Spain, and of Henry's sister Marguerite de Valois to Philip's client, Duke Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy. Although historians have often analyzed the political implications of individual marriages, no scholar has yet tackled the story of interdynastic marriage itself as a specific diplomatic practice. Martin's essay moves the frontiers of this important investigation to the eastern boundaries of Europe by examining the interactions of war, diplomacy, and dynastic marriage among Muscovy, Lithuania, and the Tatar khanates in the critical years following the disintegration of the Golden Horde.

Like Frigo, Storres, and other recent Italian diplomatic historians, Martin exposes the complex interactions between foreign policy and state formation in the late medieval and early modern periods. Although Muscovite princes contracted relatively few truly foreign marriages during the period that Martin investigates, newly discovered inventories of wedding gifts and other archival evidence allow him to develop a provocative thesis. According to Martin, actual foreign marriages, typified by the one between Ivan III's daughter Elena and a Catholic Lithuanian prince, often posed insurmountable difficulties. As in western Europe, marriage negotiations exposed differences in culture and religion that sometimes exacerbated the hostilities they were intended to resolve. According to Martin, Elena's marriage to Alexander of Lithuania was such a failure that it made the Muscovites wary of undertaking similar negotiations for the next century. At the same time, they also needed to avoid destabilizing their inner circle of aristocrats by seeming to privilege one particular noble family over another in selecting royal brides. The solution seems to have been the *smotr*, or bridal pageant, in which the Tsar—at least in theory—selected his bride from hundreds of women of all ranks throughout his realms. As Martin concludes, the bride show transformed a native bride into a surrogate foreigner, someone sufficiently distant from the court not to upset its oligarchical politics, and yet still sufficiently Russian and Orthodox not to pose the threat of radical religious difference.

As the articles featured in this issue suggest, diplomacy contributed to the development of multiple other discourses that structured European

life throughout the medieval and early modern periods. Its history is inseparable from the histories of the visual arts, dramatic and nondramatic literature, education, race, the state, marriage, and manners. By bringing a consciousness of diplomatic agency to bear on these other areas of cultural and political practice, our authors have pressed their investigations beyond the horizons of the national histories that continue to dominate most treatments of premodernity. Even when they focus ostensibly on Italy, France, Russia, or Byzantium, their works coalesce in a powerful new way of conceiving Europe itself.



## Notes

- 1 Donald Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955).
- 2 Burckhardt's historiography has been the subject of numerous recent critiques. See especially Alison Brown, "Jacob Burckhardt's Renaissance," *History Today* 38 (Oct. 1988): 20–26; David Wallace, *Chaucerian Polity: Absolutist Lineages and Associational Forms in England and Italy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 55–60; Thomas A. Howard, *Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W. M. L. de Wette, Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- 3 Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 16.
- 4 Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (1945; repr. Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1981), 81.
- 5 Björn Weiler, "The *Negotium Terrae Sanctae* and the Political Discourse of Latin Christendom, c. 1215–c. 1311," *International History Review* 25 (2003): 1215–1311.
- 6 Quoted in Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 38.
- 7 For a full discussion of the Congress of Arras and this particular political context, see Joycelyne Gledhill Russell, *The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955).
- 8 Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 170–76.
- 9 Garrett Mattingly, *Catherine of Aragon* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941); Mattingly, *The Armada* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).
- 10 An important exception is the recent work of Nabil Matar. See his *Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and *Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 2005).
- 11 Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 26–28.
- 12 M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1993), 27–28.

- 13 See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (New York : Longman, 2001); Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an introduction to transnationalism, see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1993); and for postinternationalism, see James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
- 14 For a convenient survey of the negotiations at Cateau-Cambrésis, see Joycelyne G. Russell, *Peacemaking in the Renaissance* (London: Duckworth, 1986). See also Julia Mary Cartwright, *Christina of Denmark* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1913).
- 15 I have focused here on works available to English readers. See also Riccardo Fubini, *Italia quattrocentesca: Politica e diplomazia nell'età di Lorenzo il Magnifico* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1994); Paolo Margaroli, *Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali: Le ambascerie sforzesche fino alla conclusione della Lega italiana, 1450–1455* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1992); Franca Leverotti, *Diplomazia e governo dello stato: I "famigli cavalcanti" di Francesco Sforza, 1450–1466* (Pisa: ETS, 1992).
- 16 Susan Doran, *Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I* (London: Routledge, 1996); Carole Levin, *The Heart and Stomach of a King: Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 39–65.
- 17 Denis Crouzet, *Le haut coeur de Catherine de Médicis* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005).
- 18 Abbey Zanger, *Scenes from the Marriage of Louis XIV: Nuptial Fictions and the Making of Absolutist Power* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
- 19 Douglas Biow, *Doctors, Ambassadors, Secretaries: Humanism and Professions in Renaissance Italy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).