

## Virtue, Identity, and Agency

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Despite a vibrant revival of virtue ethics, now spanning several decades, the discourse of virtue in early modernity has been insufficiently integrated into narratives of the history of ethics. It was Alasdair MacIntyre's enormously influential *After Virtue* that set the precedent: *After Virtue* wove a spellbinding tale of a fall from coherent traditions and practices sustaining the virtues into ethical incoherence and interminable debate, but it essentially skipped from the medieval scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas to the Enlightenment.<sup>1</sup> Of course, if modernity names the time "after virtue," lack of attention to the discourse of virtue in early modernity seems only natural. Why waste energy looking for something that isn't there? However, MacIntyre's thesis was not that the language of virtue dropped entirely out of use, but that it was used in a fragmentary, impotent way. Given the loss of a shared telos in the form of a common conception of the good life, and of the virtues as essential to the realization of this telos, morality was reduced either to rules constraining desire or to rules for the maximization of desire and satisfaction.

There have been significant challenges to and complications of MacIntyre's thesis, coming from a variety of angles. Some have argued that the real challenge to the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues was not the Enlightenment but rather Christianity, seen as essentially deontological or law-centered.<sup>2</sup> Others have suggested that Aristotelian virtue ethics flourished well into the eighteenth century, or that the Dominican school of theology has maintained an unbroken Thomistic theology of virtue up through the present day.<sup>3</sup> Still others have worked to give charitable readings of the ways in which Aquinas's synthesis of the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions was challenged by later medieval thinkers who nevertheless in their own way sustained a coherent discourse of virtue ethics.<sup>4</sup> In addition, a wealth of scholarship has explored virtue in relation to the rhetoric of exemplarity, courtesy literature and conduct books, and the Renaissance aspira-

tion to “self-fashioning,” showing how the language of virtue functioned in socialization and in the reproduction of social models and how central it was both in hagiographical and devotional literature.<sup>5</sup>

Despite this flurry of activity, it is fair to say that the discourse of virtue in the fourteenth through the seventeenth century has not yet come into clear focus. In part, this is due to the fact that reflections on virtue during this time take new directions shaped by heightened concerns with identity, character, and agency; in part, too, because the variety of genres in which reflection on virtue is at home cuts across contemporary disciplinary divisions, and because divergent methodological approaches and theoretical commitments shape scholarly inquiry on this as on any other topic. This special issue of *JMEMS* begins to address this challenge by featuring philosophical, theological, historical, and literary studies of virtue and the virtues in various thinkers, texts, and sociocultural contexts from the thirteenth through the seventeenth century. Together, these essays give us insight into the variety of ways in which consideration of the virtues flourished across the divide between medieval and early modern periods, high and low cultures, and a diversity of literary genres.

I will make no attempt to impose a false uniformity on the rich array of contributions that compose this special issue. However, certain common themes do emerge, setting the stage for future inquiry. I want to note very briefly three in particular, before turning to an overview of the individual pieces in this issue: attention to (1) the dependent or independent character of virtuous human agency; (2) the problem of self-love; and (3) the challenge of recognition and moral discernment of vice and virtue, together with the social conditions for the identification and cultivation of virtue.

The first of these themes arises naturally out of the challenges inherent in a Christian appropriation of pagan ethical categories. The Christian narrative of Fall and Redemption set a question mark over independent human moral achievement and emphasized human dependency on Christ’s saving deeds and the sacraments of the church. While one might think that the task of working out the relationship between pagan and Christian ethics would have been a settled matter by the time period with which we are concerned, in fact this was a topic that arose again and again, stimulated by the recovery of Aristotle’s thought in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by Renaissance humanism and by Protestant-Catholic debates over nature and grace.

The problem of self-love was, of course, closely related to the prob-

lem of agency, since Augustine had so influentially connected the two in his critique of heroic pagan virtue as glittering vice, as a prideful self-love that asserts human independence instead of relying humbly on divine grace. In the later medieval and early modern periods, the problem of self-love is both a prominent theoretical concern and a practical concern associated with greed and envy, with what we might name today as hedonism and possessive individualism. Was self-love and its associated vices to be overcome through conviction of sin and conversion? Through sympathetic identification with others? Through the cultivation of virtue? And were these necessarily exclusive alternatives?

The third theme, a preoccupation with the challenges of moral discernment, is connected with worries over one's soteriological status, that is, whether one is upright or in need of mercy, saved or damned, among the elect or among the reprobate, and with how virtues of character correspond or do not correspond to these soteriological categories. It is also evident more generally in reflection on how moral discernment is possible in the face of corruption and commodification, both within the church and in society at large, that is perceived as having perverted the use of moral terms beyond recognition. Closely connected with this is the matter of identifying the role of relationship and social formation in enabling moral discernment, relieving soteriological anxiety, and sustaining both the intelligibility and the practice of the virtues. This concern seems in part to reflect efforts to grapple with social and economic changes, and with the social dislocations introduced by the various reform and renewal movements that in part responded to these changes, in particular from the fourteenth century onward.

Of course, in attempting to discern the shape of discourse on virtue in late medieval and early modern thought and practice, we must be attuned to the ways in which these themes may also reflect our own preoccupations with social formation and individual agency, with cultural authorities and individual identity, with the possibility of differentiating vice from virtue amidst cultural and ethical pluralism, and with sustaining moral identity amidst rapid social change and the commodification of culture. This does not mean that scholarship is simply importing its own contemporary concerns into the past, but it does remind us that contemporary reasons animate an interest in studying the discourse of virtue in the past. Raising this to self-consciousness can lead both to more adequate historical inquiry and to more fruitful contemporary reflection on virtue and the virtues.

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The language of the virtues comes from the classical tradition; Christian thinkers absorbed and transformed Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic accounts of the virtues and their place in the moral life. As they did so, they grappled with tensions among these various classical schools and between classical and Christian understandings of moral psychology, agency, and the good life. The questions were many: Is virtue a matter of knowledge or of habituation? Does virtue secure happiness or does happiness require external goods? Were the pagan heroes virtuous? Can the virtues be acquired through human effort, or only by divine gift? How does virtue relate to salvation? The controversies became particularly intense in the context of the twelfth- to thirteenth-century recovery of Aristotle. Part of what makes the thought of Thomas Aquinas so significant is the way in which he “baptized” Aristotle and in particular the way in which he integrated Aristotle’s virtue ethics into Christian ethical reflection. Exactly how he did so, how stable his synthesis was, and the extent to which Aristotle’s thought was transformed in the process, remain matters of controversy. In “Jesus in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” Joseph Wawrykow offers a corrective to a widespread scholarly tendency to assimilate the moral teaching of Aquinas to the virtue ethics of Aristotle, or to assume that Aquinas’s major departure from Aristotle consists simply in adding grace-infused virtues to the naturally acquired virtues recognized by Aristotle. By attending to the often-overlooked Christological part III of Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae*, we can see the key role that Jesus Christ plays for Aquinas’s account of human virtue: Christ is both savior and model. Strikingly, what Jesus as perfect human models is not independently acquired virtue, but the humble reception of divine grace; other human beings, likewise, become virtuous through their reception now of Christ’s saving grace. Wawrykow shows how this understanding of Jesus as “model [who] also (indeed primarily) empowers” is sustained into the sixteenth century by Cajetan, even as it falls apart in Luther’s thought. For Luther, the preeminence of Christ in the salvific process can only be adequately defended if we recognize that righteousness is imputed and involves no fundamental change in the moral character of the believer. The aspiration to imitate Christ as model is for Luther a prideful grasping after virtue rather than, as for Aquinas, a participation in Christ’s humble reception of divine gifts.

In her essay, Ann Astell explores the way fourteenth-century changes in the canonization process, and specifically the requirement of “heroic virtue,” influenced hagiography as a genre in ways that are visible in otherwise puzzling features of Raymond of Capua’s *Life of Saint Catherine of*

*Siena*. The term “heroic virtue” can be traced to Robert Grosseteste’s early thirteenth-century translation of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. This might suggest an intention to champion the cardinal virtues of pagan heroes and specifically warrior courage. In fact, though, the category of heroic virtue was understood not in a strictly Aristotelian fashion but by way of its scholastic interpretation, according to which patiently enduring evil is shown to be more difficult than attacking evil, and martyrdom, made possible by infused virtue, becomes the principal act of fortitude. The heroic virtue expected of Christian saints was thus the humble endurance of the martyrs, not the pagan virtue that Augustine named glittering vice and diagnosed as prideful and puffed up. Astell shows how Raymond depicts Catherine as a martyr for the unity and peace of the church, contributing through her humility and patience to strengthening the chain of interlinked virtues that sustains the church as a body. Raymond emphasizes that Catherine’s heroic virtue is grounded in divine charity and in her union with Christ the Rock. While his purpose is to elevate *her* virtue and *her* claim to sainthood, this does not compete with acknowledging her dependence on Christ.

The three essays that follow all examine challenges posed by the Wycliffite movement to the cultivation of virtue and the sustaining of the church in late fourteenth-century England. Wyclif’s insistence that the true church was an invisible church of the elect, not the visible institutions of Roman Catholicism, together with his call for the institutional church to return to apostolic poverty, destabilized fourteenth-century English Catholicism and gave rise to the anticlerical Lollard movement. William Langland’s *Piers Plowman*, John Gower’s *Confessio Amantis*, and the play *Mankind* construe the challenges, and thus the proper response to Wyclif and his followers, in divergent ways. Ought we align ourselves with the pure remnant that alone sustains the proper meaning of cardinal virtues and vices? Cultivate a sympathetic identification capable of overcoming envy and social division? Protect the collective rituals that make our utterances explicit and sustain the possibility of moral self-recognition? These debates continued until Martin Luther transformed the terms of the debate yet again.

If Raymond of Capua shows how Christian saints build up the body of the church, Langland wrestles with the threat that collective vice poses to the integrity of that body. As David Aers shows in “Langland on the Church and the End of the Cardinal Virtues,” *Piers Plowman* confronts the possessive individualism, hedonism, and commodification that are eating away at the social institutions of Langland’s day, including the church. While the gifts of grace that are the theological and infused cardinal virtues

make possible in principle a purifying redemption of social practices, in fact vicious social practices can so malform our meanings that the cardinal virtues can come to name vices; tyranny, for instance, can be systematically termed “justice.” Since *no* pure seat of institutional authority can be found, Langland does not align with a Wycliffite revolution against church corruption; instead, Aers suggests, he points us to a remnant that sustains genuine Christian charity, while leaving us at the same time with a disquieting worry: can such a remnant really provide the necessary communal context for the social formation and sustenance of virtuous habits and practices?

Jessica Rosenfeld argues that Gower, author of the late fourteenth-century *Confessio Amantis*, is likewise preoccupied with social conflict and division. According to Gower’s diagnosis, these problems are rooted not in any simple lack of love but in envy, that “unnatural” vice which seeks the frustration of others’ desires rather than the fulfillment of one’s own. This focus on envy, something that previous interpreters of the *Confessio Amantis* have overlooked, is key to making sense of some of the most original aspects of Gower’s approach to the discipline of desire. Given the unusual structure of envy, the typical therapy offered by penitential writing—redirecting earthly desire to higher heavenly objects—falls flat. Gower locates the source of envy in a failure of identification that leads desire to take a competitive and conflictual form; goods that become *yours* are goods of which *I* am deprived. Rosenfeld shows how Gower seeks in *Confessio Amantis* to display the possibility of an identification with others that generates love rather than envy and replaces social conflict with concord. Gower narrates the conversion of Constantine, for instance, as the triumph of charity over envy; the Christian body politic was founded in exemplary acts of sympathetic identification, and this remains a healing possibility for social life. Gower, a conservative royalist, regards Lollardy as an expression of envy; he does not admit that Wyclif and his followers aptly diagnose social injustices that require material redress. But Rosenfeld suggests that it is nevertheless significant that Gower’s remedy for envy lies not in the otherworldly redirection of desire, but in a sympathetic identification made possible by the recognition of the fundamental likeness of rich and poor, powerful and lowly, strong and weak. Here is a task for literature: to narrate this-worldly reality in ways that trigger such experiences of recognition and thus reopen the possibility for love to displace envy.

In Sarah Beckwith’s essay, “Language Goes On Holiday: English Allegorical Drama and the Virtue Tradition,” our attention turns to the fifteenth-century play *Mankind*. Beckwith shows us how deeply we distort

*Mankind* when we cast it as “morality play,” expecting to encounter in it abstract virtues that subsist outside of any context, rather than as a penitential play, centrally concerned with the task of recognition, with concrete, not abstract knowing. *Mankind* seeks not to define the allegorical character Mercy but to lead us all to the recognition that we, ourselves, are sinners in need of mercy. This self-recognition, though existentially involving, is not a private matter but hinges on our relations with others. Socially enacted rituals have the capacity to make the force of an utterance explicit, and when ritual is attacked, as by Wyclif and his followers, language can lose its meaning. *Mankind*, argues Beckwith, construes this as a threat to the performative power of sacramental language, specifically the declaration of absolution. Beckwith also briefly examines three later plays, from the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, in order to demonstrate an ongoing preoccupation with the problem of recognition, now heightened aesthetically through the use of disguise. Here, she argues, we see how moral discernment is challenged in new ways by ethical strains created by market relations. Money, Beckwith notes, has the power “to recalibrate all values in its own image.” This undermines the possibility of recognizing virtue in ways that were already grasped, our earlier essays suggest, by Langland and Gower.

In Martin Luther, the task of distinguishing and cultivating genuine virtue in the midst of corruption and hypocrisy takes on crisis proportions. Sinful self-love can no longer be overcome by identification, as in Gower, but requires a more fundamental unselfing, and ritual no longer offers a stable context for self-recognition but must be cleansed from its sinful tendency to wrestle control over our moral and spiritual identities from God. Instead of redefining and baptizing heroic virtue, or looking to a faithful remnant to sustain true virtue, Luther rejects the category of virtue as essentially pagan. We may speak of growth in faith or growth in Christian righteousness, but the language of virtue implies a self-assertion inherently antithetical to our properly passive stance before God.

In an essay that ranges widely in the history of moral thought from Augustine to Aquinas and Scotus and beyond to Baius and Mandeville, Terence Irwin situates and critiques Luther’s attack on pagan virtue as blameworthy self-love. Irwin argues that Luther arrives at his position by combining eudaemonist claims consistent with the approaches of Aristotle and Aquinas together with anti-eudaimonist claims that Luther derives from Duns Scotus. Luther follows Scotus in claiming that the virtuous must pursue what is right over what is advantageous, transcending the natural desire for happiness. But whereas Scotus thought it was possible for human beings

unaided by grace to subordinate the advantageous to the honest, Luther does not; apparent examples of this are always in fact also manifestations of selfishness. On this score, Luther appears to agree with the eudaemonist claim that each person necessarily pursues her own happiness as ultimate end. But eudaemonists do not mean by this that everyone is necessarily selfish. They affirm, rather, that virtue may at one and the same time genuinely be chosen for its own sake and as constitutive of happiness. Irwin argues that Luther's position is unstable, defending Aquinas's eudaemonist approach as the more adequate development of the Augustinian tradition. Aquinas leaves room for genuine, if incomplete, pagan virtue; pagans are not irremediably selfish, though they do not grasp that communion with God is their ultimate end.

Irwin and Wawrykow agree, then, that Luther's thought was a misfortune for the Christian virtue tradition, and agree further that Aquinas represents a kind of high point for that tradition. They present strikingly different portraits of Aquinas's thought, however. Wawrykow emphasizes the Christocentric character of Aquinas's account. Genuine virtue, even on the part of Christ, the perfect human, is a perfect receiving of grace from God rather than an independent accomplishment. Ordinary human virtue is an imitation of Christ, to be sure, but an imitation of the reception of grace, the grace of Christ's salvific work. Irwin, by contrast, emphasizes the conceptual distinction Aquinas erects between proximate and ultimate ends and the way this distinction allows him to recognize a genuine virtue aimed at the proximate end of the earthly common good even in the absence of any knowledge of Christ or divine grace. It seems possible to harmonize these two interpretations only if we affirm that even pagan virtue is receptive rather than autonomous in character and moreover that pagan virtue involves a reception of divine grace even if that is not conscious.<sup>6</sup> Whether either Irwin or Wawrykow would accept such a harmonization of their respective interpretations is an open question.

For Luther, education could not convey genuine righteousness; it could provide nothing more than, on the one hand, a tool to secure external conformity, or, on the other, an external occasion for God's transformative work. Nevertheless, in the early modern period humanist education won the day in Catholic and Protestant territories alike. More than likely, humanist schools contributed more to the erosion of earlier theological accounts of the dependence of human virtue on divine grace than did arguments either for or against pagan virtue. The humanists were optimistic about human nature and the possibilities of inculcating virtue. They aimed at a holistic formation of character in which an upright life, polished style, and persua-



sive speech were all seen as intrinsically connected. They did so through a curriculum focused on classical literature, classical accounts of the cardinal virtues, and, most prominent, classical training in rhetoric. The result, as Markku Peltonen argues in “Virtues in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Grammar Schools,” was that humanist education fostered an instrumental attitude toward the virtues; the virtues were not cultivated as an end in themselves but as a means to more effective speech. Of course, we could push this line of questioning one step further and ask about the end of rhetoric. Rhetoric was understood as a tool to be used in the active life of civic virtue, an arena in which appearances mattered, in which virtue had to be *seen* and *effective*. But it is easy to see how imperceptibly this can shift to the Machiavellian position that it is *only* the appearance of virtue that matters publicly. Moreover, as Peltonen notes, the curricular focus on classical material encouraged the educated elite to compartmentalize their conceptual worlds. Classical accounts of the cardinal virtues were not related integrally to Christian teachings about sin and grace, and it became natural to think of virtue as independent achievement.

Stephen Fallon’s essay, “Milton and Literary Virtue,” shows us these tensions at work in the greatest English author of the seventeenth century. Even if the Son of God in Milton’s *Paradise Regained* dismisses the wisdom of classical thought, Fallon shows that Milton’s own relationship to pagan moral philosophy was more complicated. The problem of recognition or discernment, specifically the challenge of discerning the true good among counterfeit goods, remains central for Milton as it was in the works discussed by Aers and Beckwith. But instead of Mankind’s exemplary recognition of the need for mercy, a recognition with the power to catalyze, perhaps, the spectator’s own self-recognition, we are confronted with Milton’s presentation of his own exemplary discernment, a kind of hermeneutic heroism that drew from, while literarily transforming, classical republican understandings of virtue. Milton presents himself as the poet of heroic choice, capable of discerning the evil in apparent goods and of choosing the good. Milton’s Son of God, too, is offered as a model for such heroic choice, in a move that was simultaneously a revolt against the passivity of Luther and a departure from Aquinas’s understanding of Christ as model of dependence on grace. Milton’s heroic virtue is clearly not that which Raymond of Capua seeks to demonstrate in Catherine of Siena.

The issue concludes with Constance Furey’s “Relational Virtue: Anne Bradstreet, Edward Taylor, and Puritan Marriage,” which takes us to seventeenth-century New England. Puritan theology is often seen as focused

on obedience to God and thus as comprising an ethic of duty rather than of virtue. But Calvinist theology had a strong doctrine of sanctification, of growth in virtue and holiness; even the nonelect can be coerced into obedience, but the elect glorify God by being renewed after the divine image of perfection. Famously, Calvinists were dogged by soteriological uncertainty; prideful self-assertion could mimic grace-filled transformation, placing a stubborn question mark over ethical striving. The problem of recognition explored in different ways by Langland, *Mankind*, and Milton here returns again. Furey argues that this problem was overcome relationally in Puritan devotional poetry, which allowed understandings and experiences of Puritan covenant theology and of Puritan marriage, and of poetic form and freedom, to mutually inform and interpret one another. The poetic works of Bradstreet and Taylor present a vision of relational virtue that overcomes the isolation of self-examination and offers a safeguard against hypocrisy and self-deception; assurance of salvation is secured not through lonely self-scrutiny but through affective union. If the problem is self-recognition, the solution is social in character. So we connect back here with Raymond of Capua's insistence that patient love serves as the touchstone of authentic Christlike virtue, building up the chain of virtues that strengthens the church, as well as with Gower's emphasis on the power of literature to evoke sympathetic identification, an affective relationship that bridges difference. Even more strikingly, we are reminded of Aquinas's understanding of perfect human virtue as humble reception of grace, as loving acceptance of dependence on God, not as independent achievement. For Aquinas displays Christ's virtue, and so human virtue, as relational virtue.

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We are accustomed to thinking of modernity as a declaration of autonomy from tradition and the past, and of virtue ethics as a countervailing project of retrieval. But this very project of retrieval and the broader scholarly interest in virtue that it has spawned have made abundantly clear that the discourse of virtue continued to flourish well into modernity, even if not necessarily in an Aristotelian form. The contributions to this special issue testify to the varied ways in which the fateful Christian adoption of the pagan language of virtue continued to work itself out in medieval and early modern thought and culture. On MacIntyre's account, incorporating the Aristotelian tradition into a Christian framework left the teleological structure of ethics intact. Of course, he acknowledges some differences: in the Christian context, ethical precepts were regarded not simply as teleological injunctions but

as divine laws. Failure to conform to these laws was not simply error but sin. Certain virtues and vices (i.e., magnanimity and humility) traded places. And the telos was regarded as something to be realized fully only in a life to come.<sup>7</sup> The essays gathered here suggest that the scholastic transformation of Aristotelian virtue was more dramatic than MacIntyre implies. From the very outset it raised questions about the radical dependency on divine grace both of human moral agency and of the ritual processes of social formation (think of Christ as exemplary precisely in his reception of divinely infused virtue, and of Catherine's humbly "heroic" virtue). This profound transformation was bound at times to be both misunderstood, and therefore rejected (as by Luther), or understood, and therefore rejected (as it is in at least incipient ways both by humanist educators and by Milton). Moreover, we are dealing here not merely, as MacIntyre implies, with a schema according to which persons are socially formed in the virtues that sustain those communities in which in turn social formation in virtue is possible. For this process of social formation is grasped as standing in complex relation to the reception of divinely infused virtues, in part through participation in the sacramental and broader ritual life of the church. And the church not only mediates divine grace but serves as a site of social formation which, being itself corrupt and in communication with a corrupt secular society, is also a site of social malformation.

Having grasped the multidimensional and fluid character of the Christian rapprochement with pagan virtue, we are in a position to see that modernity did not simply mean a lost grip on the teleology that made the virtues intelligible. Rather, what comes into focus from medieval to modern is a nagging suspicion that the aspiration to virtue cloaks a longing to declare independence of agency, together with an ongoing struggle to work out how ethical formation is to proceed if church and society are corrupted by pride and self-love. The essays in this special issue serve to take the measure of this reality and the multiple places of "virtue" and the "virtues" within it.



## Notes

- 1 Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
- 2 J. B. Schneewind, "The Misfortunes of Virtue," in *Virtue Ethics*, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 178–200.

- 3 Annette Baier, for instance, argues that Hume be seen as returning the Aristotelian virtue tradition to its properly naturalist identity; *Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 246–62. Other scholars point to figures, such as Jonathan Edwards, whose importance in sustaining the discourse of virtue has been underappreciated. See, e.g., Stephen A. Wilson, *Virtue Reformed: Rereading Jonathan Edwards's Ethics* (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, *Receptive Human Virtues: A New Reading of Jonathan Edwards's Ethics* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011). Thomas O'Meara argues for the sustained Dominican theology of virtue, in "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies* 58, no. 2 (1997): 254–85.
- 4 Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). My own *Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008) attends to the discourse of virtue from Erasmus through Kant.
- 5 See, e.g., Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (1939; Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, eds., *The Ideology of Conduct: Essays on Literature and the History of Sexuality* (New York: Methuen, 1987); John D. Lyons, *Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Timothy Hampton, *Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Anna Bryson, *From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
- 6 See Herdt, *Putting on Virtue*, 97.
- 7 MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 53.