

Carpeteo Redux

Surveillance and Subversion against the Puerto Rican Student Movement

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As I approached the social sciences building at the University of Puerto Rico's flagship campus in Río Piedras on the morning of March 8, 2012, I heard voices amplified by bullhorns and people chanting slogans of resistance as they protested a series of security reforms being implemented by the university administration. The proposed measures included a strict monitoring of campus access, ranging from identification checks across campus to the installation of mechanical arms at entrances limiting access to registered vehicles. Many of the students protesting that day worried that such strategies of enclosure would harm the University of Puerto Rico's mission as a public institution that should serve the community. Particularly concerning for students, however, was the plan to install security cameras throughout many of the public spaces around campus. Students marched on campus with papier-mâché security cameras on sticks (fig. 1) and painted antisurveillance messages on the sidewalks in front of academic buildings (fig. 2) to signal their rejection of the administration's security reforms.

For many students, the timing of the new security plan was extremely suspicious. The university had only recently come out of a series of student strikes and protests that effectively immobilized the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) system, and especially the Río Piedras campus, for much of the 2010 and 2011 academic years. During the two strikes over tuition hikes and proposed privatization efforts, which

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Figure 1. Student march with papier-mâché security cameras on March 8, 2012, to protest proposed security reforms at the University of Puerto Rico's Río Piedras campus. Photo by author

took place from April 21, 2010 to June 21, 2010, and from December 7, 2010 to March 7, 2011, students and their supporters experienced tremendous violence from the police and security forces charged with restoring “order” to the campus.¹ Students also complained that police regularly engaged in illegal surveillance techniques in order to target students for arrest and suspension. Students even accused police and administrators of utilizing agents provocateurs and *chotas*, or informants, to destabilize the student movement. Students thus worried that

the security reforms were little more than a punitive effort to surveil and eliminate clandestine organizing efforts on campus in response to the political mobilizations of the previous two years. As a statement from the *Comités de Acción*, or student action committees, noted, “This plan poses a potential violation of our constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy and provides conditions that allow authorities to pursue and *carpetear*.”²

In signs, chants, and speeches, the proposed security reforms were often referred to as an effort to *carpetear*, which literally means to create files but in Puerto Rican vernacular refers to politicized forms of police surveillance and harassment. The creation of *carpetas*, or files, on political dissidents has a long history in Puerto Rico. Police created and maintained files on proindependence and left-leaning citizens dating as far back as the earliest days of US colonization. Until the late 1980s, the practice of creating *carpetas* intensified in tandem with bursts of prolabor and proindependence organizing on the island. *Carpeteo*, or politicized police surveillance and targeted harassment, was particularly widespread during the 1960s as the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRPD) collaborated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence program known as COINTELPRO. Approximately 75,000 Puerto Ricans had been targeted by local and fed-



Figure 2. Students from the School of Communication at the University of Puerto Rico–Río Piedras demanded “cameras to inform not to *carpetear*” in response to proposed security reforms. Photo by author

eral law enforcement surveillance, often with no justification beyond presumed political affiliation or beliefs. The creation of law enforcement files based on political ideology was eventually deemed unconstitutional and illegal, and, in 1999, governor Pedro Rosselló issued a formal apology and pledged an end to the practice once and for all. The experiences of student activists during and after the 2010 and 2011 student strikes at UPR, however, demonstrate that *carpeteo*, while officially verboten, has a robust afterlife in the policing of radical social movements in contemporary Puerto Rico.

The goal of this article is twofold. In what follows, I draw from interviews I conducted with individuals active during the UPR strikes as well as relevant documentation by legal observers and journalists to detail how police and security forces engaged in surveillance tactics that deeply resonated, for many students, with historical forms of repression experienced by political dissidents in Puerto Rico. First, I provide a nuanced understanding of *how* policing took place during the strikes beyond the police brutality that is often foregrounded in many analyses of the strikes. While the spectacle of physical brutality understandably grabbed public attention, the underlying tactics of surveillance, harassment, and intimidation directed at the student movement received less scrutiny and the historical antecedents of these tactics often went unmentioned. Second, I demonstrate how police drew on proscribed tactics and strategies associated with *carpeteo* to subvert the student movement and prevent further mobilization against the agenda of the state. At the same time, students culled from popular knowledge about the violent, politicized policing experienced by Puerto Rican radical movements to position themselves within a genealogy of repression and resistance on the island.³ Rather than understanding their experience of police repression as unique or unprecedented, students instead situated their movement, and the policing of their movement, within historical struggles against inequality and colonial rule in Puerto Rico. Doing so allowed students to make the repression they were experiencing more legible to a Puerto Rican public familiar with the history of the *carpetas* at the same time that it allowed students to draw on the past to develop strategies to circumvent the kind of surveillance and subversion that earlier generations of activists also experienced.

In this article, I trace the history of *carpeteo* and politicized policing in Puerto Rico under US rule. This history reveals how surveillance and counterintelligence measures swelled in response to the most active periods of resistance to US rule on the island. I also situate the UPR strikes within the island's prolonged economic downturn. According to students, their potential to mobilize a broad cross-section of Puerto Rican society affected by the economic crisis is what caused them to be targeted by the repressive force of the state. As the strikes unfolded, students and their supporters decried what they saw as a return of the illegal surveillance and counterintelligence strategies associated with the *carpeteo* era of the mid and late twentieth century. I show how students drew on popular memory and historical

narratives of *carpeteo* to understand their own experience and signal to the Puerto Rican public the continued repression experienced by leftist and radical activists at the hands of the state and its agents. I then focus on how students, anticipating police repression that echoed that experienced by earlier generations of political dissidents on the island and drawing from the tactics of activists who came before them, attempted to subvert police surveillance through the use of *capuchas*, or coverings that fully or partially obscured their faces.⁴ Through a discussion about the strategic use of *capuchas*, I show how students continually drew on and understood themselves as a part of this history of political repression on the island, which led them to see themselves as always potentially surveilled and/or infiltrated. I conclude by reflecting on how the experience of surveillance and subversion during the strikes has been imprinted on the student movement and what that might mean for present-day struggles against US-centered responses to the Puerto Rican debt crisis. Ultimately, this article illuminates the central role that strategies of surveillance and subversion continue to play in the policing of radical social movements. Further, given the recent climate of surveillance, harassment, and infiltration of social movements in the mainland United States, for example Black Lives Matter, Occupy, or environmental justice movements, it's clear that Puerto Rico, despite its colonial status, is not an exception to established "norms" of contemporary policing. Indeed, Puerto Rico has formed a key terrain for the development of repressive technologies used throughout the US to subdue radical social movements. The Puerto Rican student movement is, thus, part of a larger network of global struggles against predatory capitalism and state violence at the same time that it challenges local conditions of colonial exploitation on the island.

Histories of Police Surveillance and Counterintelligence in Puerto Rico

The full extent that the PRPD, and in particular its Intelligence Division, played in surveilling and subverting the island's leftist and proindependence social movements remained relatively unknown until the broadcast of a radio interview with William Colón Berríos, a former agent of the Intelligence Division, in 1987. Colón Berríos had pled guilty to charges of conspiracy and perjury for his role in trying to cover up the murder of two young proindependence activists at Cerro Maravilla in 1978.⁵ On July 25, 1978, Carlos Enrique Soto Arriví and Arnaldo Darío Rosado Torres, participated in a plan to blow up a communication tower located at the top of Cerro Maravilla, a mountain outside of the southern city of Ponce.⁶ Alejandro González Malave, an undercover police officer who had been recruited by the PRPD to infiltrate the independence movement years earlier, largely conceptualized the plan to entrap Soto Arriví and Darío Rosado. When Soto Arriví and Darío Rosado arrived at Cerro Maravilla, they were ambushed and executed by a group of police officers. During his interview on WKAQ almost a decade after Cerro Maravilla, Colón Berríos confirmed that the PRPD's Intelligence Division was actively subverting radical

activist groups and that they maintained a list of supposed “subversives” to assist with this purpose.⁷ With this, Colón Berríos set into motion a series of investigations that would culminate in the discovery of 16,793 dossiers and 151,541 reference cards on individuals and groups associated with the island’s proindependence, student, and labor movements, as well as cultural, religious, feminist, and environmental activists.⁸ When the carpetas were brought to light, approximately 75,000 Puerto Ricans had active files on them, ranging from a few details on an index card to dossiers containing dozens upon dozens of pages of information.⁹

While the PRPD’s Intelligence Division was quite prolific in the creation of carpetas over the course of the 1970s, the phenomenon was far from recent and had its roots in a much earlier era of US colonial rule on the island.¹⁰ As historical sociologist Kelvin Santiago-Valles argues, the consolidation of US rule in Puerto Rico during the early twentieth century brought with it a discourse of criminalization, which aimed to discipline “wayward” subjects who threatened capitalist interests and development.¹¹ As a result, policing and surveillance during the first two decades of US rule on the island served to ensure the smooth functioning of US capital and was in many ways primarily concerned with labor and antipoverty organizing. During the 1930s, however, with the increased professionalization of the FBI under the directorship of J. Edgar Hoover, the collaboration between insular police and federal intelligence-gathering agencies worked to create a vast network of agents, infiltrators, and informants to identify and disrupt groups or organizations “advocating the overthrow or replacement of the Government of the United States.”¹² The professionalization of the FBI coincided with the growth of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party and other radical proindependence and prolabor groups on the island. Over the course of the 1930s, the FBI began to compile information on Puerto Ricans suspected of being affiliated with proindependence and communist groups on the island and in the diaspora. A memorandum from Hoover to the heads of FBI field offices in 1939 indicated that the purpose of the data being compiled was to create a list of citizens who would be placed in “preventative detention” in the case of a “national emergency.”¹³ On October 30, 1950, when the Nationalist Party staged an unsuccessful armed rebellion on the island, Governor Luis Muñoz Marín ordered all members of the Nationalist Party to be arrested. Using the “security index” created by the FBI and local law enforcement during the 1930s, police arrested approximately one thousand citizens over the course of two days, a number of whom were not even remotely affiliated with Nationalists.¹⁴ As the commonwealth arrangement between the United States and Puerto Rico was initiated in 1952 and consolidated throughout the 1950s and 1960s, local and federal law enforcement agencies compiled lists of suspected dissidents and actively sought to disrupt radical movements on the island. These existing efforts were only intensified by the implementation of COINTELPRO on the island.

From 1956 to 1971 the FBI directed incredible resources toward COIN-

TELPRO. The explicit goal of COINTELPRO was to “disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize” the activities of political dissidents and subversive elements.¹⁵ As sociologist David Cunningham points out, intelligence work is a largely passive form of policing, with agents gathering information about a target through surveillance and the cultivation of informants.¹⁶ The goal of counterintelligence, on the other hand, “is to actively restrict a target’s ability to carry out planned actions (prevention), or to encourage acts of wrongdoing (facilitation).”¹⁷ Using the information provided by intelligence operatives, counterintelligence seeks to “raise the costs of action” for radical groups, ultimately frustrating and discouraging their efforts.¹⁸ According to Carmen Gautier Mayoral and Teresa Blanco Stahl in their study of COINTELPRO in Puerto Rico, counterintelligence work on the island had three central goals: first, to foment division within the broader pro-independence movement and within each specific group or organization; second, to prevent the formation of alliances between the various pro-independence groups or political parties; and, third, to prevent solidarity between Puerto Rican independentistas and radical groups in the United States, especially communist and Black Power groups.¹⁹ It is important to note that COINTELPRO was not simply carried out by FBI field officers in Puerto Rico. Instead, the FBI relied on and regularly collaborated with local law enforcement in order to gather intelligence and enact counterintelligence activities. The PRPD, however, were not simply FBI lackeys; they were waging their own war against dissidents and were as invested in maintaining local power relations as they were in preserving colonial order.

As a central aspect of counterintelligence efforts, local and federal authorities would often spread rumors and disseminate political propaganda to the local media to create conflict within and among radical groups and turn the public against radical causes. Perhaps the most valuable tools in the counterintelligence arsenal were the everyday citizens who served as informants and infiltrators. Historian José “Che” Paraltici notes, “There were many civilians who volunteered or were paid to become informants, what in Puerto Rican slang are called ‘chotas.’ Much of the information was false and submitted to collect money or because of their anti-independence sentiments.”²⁰ These informants and infiltrators supplied the Intelligence Division with the mix of facts and conjecture that would make up the *carpetas*, files that would be used to justify long-term surveillance and deny suspected subversives government employment and benefits. According to historian Ramón Bosque-Pérez, this expansive network of informants and undercover police operatives created a widespread sense of fear and mistrust among many Puerto Ricans. He notes, “Through the extensive use of paid informers to infiltrate organizations, visits by intelligence agents to neighborhoods, schools, or work centers, and even occasional acts of harassment or physical aggression, *carpeteo* contributed to the generation of a culture of fear among large sectors of the population.”²¹ In many ways, the reliance on informants in the creation of *carpetas* functioned to discipline

and discourage radical social movements on the island by providing the sense that they were constantly being watched.²²

The history of the carpetas is part of many Puerto Ricans' collective memory, particularly among the left. The reach of local and federal law enforcement affected tens of thousands of citizens who were either targeted by counterintelligence measures or collaborated with police. The generations of Puerto Ricans who bore the brunt of the carpetas during the mid and late twentieth century passed down stories of the repression, harassment, and violence that they experienced at the hands of police. Young Puerto Ricans have been exposed to these narratives through family, friends, and acquaintances, not to mention by hearing first- and second-hand accounts in political settings, on television, in documentaries, and in popular and scholarly texts. Additionally, for young Puerto Ricans, the carpetas and their history resurfaced, first in 1999 when Governor Rosselló issued an apology for the government's role in the creation of the carpetas and again a year later when Representative José E. Serrano of New York questioned FBI director Louis J. Freeh during a House Appropriations subcommittee hearing about COINTELPRO and the existence of FBI files on Puerto Rican dissidents.²³ Freeh provided the first official acknowledgement of the federal government's surveillance of Puerto Rican citizens, which thrust local and federal law enforcement's role in the creation of carpetas into the spotlight once again. Further, following this revelation, the FBI handed over millions of pages of its files on Puerto Rican dissidents to repositories like the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College in New York City and the legal library and archive of the Puerto Rican Senate in San Juan, which generated a renewed interest among Puerto Ricans on the island and in the diaspora in accessing the information gathered by local and federal law enforcement agencies.

These moments of increased attention devoted to the history and impact of the carpetas formed a key part of the cultural, political, and social terrain for a number of young Puerto Ricans who came of age during the 1990s and 2000s. When some of these young people began to experience police violence and harassment as they struggled against efforts to privatize and shrink the island's public university system, they drew on the well-known historical narratives about the carpetas to make sense of what they were witnessing/experiencing and also to make these parallels legible to a Puerto Rican public familiar with the history of police surveillance and repression directed at radical movements. For the young activists at the University of Puerto Rico, the so-called subversive archive created by local and federal law enforcement agencies generations earlier became an *archive of subversion*—evidence that what they were experiencing at the hands of police and private security forces was far from unprecedented and had to do with the long entanglement of colonial and capitalist exploitation on the island. In this sense, the UPR strikers drew on and inserted themselves within a genealogy of radical resistance and repression as they tried to make sense of not only being physically abused but also constantly

photographed, filmed, informed on, and infiltrated. As the philosopher Michel Foucault notes, genealogy “operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”²⁴ Police and security forces, immersed in their own intersecting genealogy “scratched over and recopied” mechanisms of repression that had historically targeted earlier radical movements in order to manage and contain the potential of the UPR student strikes to galvanize broad cross-sections of Puerto Rican society against the agenda of the state. Students thus pointed out how police were revitalizing what had seemingly been dormant strategies of repression at the same time that they drew on their own genealogy of resistance to counter the efforts of the state.

Spearheading the Radical Opposition

The University of Puerto Rico, and in particular its Río Piedras campus, has long been a site of radical organizing on the island. UPR students have historically been very active and dynamic participants in leftist, proindependence, prolabor, and anti-military struggles, and, over the past two decades, in feminist, queer, and environmental justice struggles as well.²⁵ Indeed, many students who were active in the 2010 and 2011 strikes have a deep sense of their actions as part of a long tradition of radical organizing efforts in Puerto Rico. All of the student activists with whom I spoke mentioned UPR students’ role in a variety of important social movements in Puerto Rico, from the Nationalist uprisings of the 1930s and 1950s, to protests against the wars in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, to the struggle against the privatization of public resources during the 1990s, to the effort to eject the US Navy from Vieques in the early 2000s. As student activist Roberto José Thomas Ramírez noted, “As I understand it, in Puerto Rico the university has historically been the site, the spearhead, of resistance and struggle.”²⁶ The student movement has been similarly understood as a galvanizing force for protest and social change by the state, which has made it a target of repression and violence. Student activists have been perhaps one of the most documented sectors of Puerto Rican society, taking up hundreds upon hundreds of pages in the files created by the FBI and PRPD.²⁷ This layered history between the state and the student movement created a sense of *déjà vu* during the strikes and a circulating sentiment that the *carpeteo* era was unfolding anew—or had never actually been abandoned.

The 2010 and 2011 strikes and protests at the University of Puerto Rico have their roots in the island’s precipitous economic decline during the 2000s. As the island’s economic recession deepened in 2008 and 2009, Wall Street creditors threatened to demote Puerto Rico’s credit rating to junk status. In an effort to protect Puerto Rico’s credit and investment status, Governor Luis Fortuño, introduced Ley 7, or Public Law 7, a “special law declaring a state of emergency and establishing a plan for fiscal stabilization to save the credit of Puerto Rico.”²⁸ Ley 7 empowered the government to restructure public sector employment with devastating conse-

quences by allowing for the suspension of union contracts, resulting in the unilateral dismissal of public sector employees and the elimination of labor protections.²⁹ Following the implementation of Ley 7, in early September 2009 the Fortuño administration announced that it would be laying off more than 17,000 public sector workers in an attempt to stabilize the economy. Ley 7 also dramatically slashed university funding, with university administrators announcing that they would be increasing tuition, decreasing scholastic and athletic scholarships, and doing away with fee exemptions for university employees and their families to make up for the budgetary shortfall.³⁰ Students argued that these efforts by university administrators were part of a concerted effort to shrink and privatize the UPR system by making it significantly harder for many low-income and working-class families to be able to afford an education at the University of Puerto Rico.

On October 15, 2009, an estimated 200,000 demonstrators gathered in the streets of San Juan as part of a one-day general strike protesting the economic and political agenda of the Fortuño administration. The one-day *Paro Nacional del Pueblo* (People's National Stoppage) was a manifestation of the widespread discontent with the so-called economic recovery plan being instituted on the island. Despite massive student solidarity with workers during the *Paro Nacional*, after the event was over, many students, especially those who would later become active participants in the UPR strikes, lamented the lack of sustained action and coordination on the part of the labor groups that had played a central role in organizing the massive one-day stoppage. According to student activist Abner Y. Dennis Zayas, "After the *Paro Nacional* the labor movement threw in the towel . . . they did absolutely nothing. That, of course, has a series of explanations, but, in that sense, the radical opposition from the streets against the policies of the government fell to the student movement."³¹ Roberto José Thomas Ramírez puts it in similar terms. After the *Paro Nacional*, he explains:

We were already conscious that we had become the only real opposition to the government. The only sector of society that was standing up to the government saying, "what you are doing is unjust, and we are not going to permit you to do this." And in that sense, a debate emerged about what we were planning, because this was a historic moment where the student movement could assume a greater responsibility, and we couldn't get locked into discussing issues that only affected the university.³²

A number of student activists understood the university as a potential catalyst for a renewed social movement against the neoliberal agenda of the state. Ricardo Olivero Lora, a student at the UPR School of Law, summed up this perspective during the first transmission of "Radio Huelga," or "Strike Radio," a student run radio broadcast, when he said, "These times are crucial for society because the current government, in an abusive manner, has launched an offensive against the working

class, to the point that many are in a state of hopelessness. We want to make this a place where we can return that hope.”³³ The students worked to create a movement that would ensure a more affordable and accessible public university system and also spark larger mobilizations against the agenda of the Fortuño administration across Puerto Rican society. Similarly, some veterans of the radical proindependence movement saw the student movement as leading a struggle against neoliberal and colonial exploitation on behalf of the Puerto Rican people. For instance, Rafael Cancel Miranda, a lifelong proindependence activist who spent twenty-five years in US prisons for his role in the 1954 attack on the US Capitol Building, noted that the students at UPR were “waging a battle on behalf of us all,” before adding, “As a Puerto Rican, I thank them for the example and lesson they are giving us.”³⁴ The support that the student movement garnered from long-time political activists as well as members of the public frustrated by the Fortuño administration’s approach to the island’s economic crisis seemed to cause the state to zero their attention in on the protests unfolding at UPR. Many of the student activists I interviewed felt that the state violence directed at student protestors, along with the reemergence of *carpeteo*, indicated that the state was well aware of, and threatened by, the student movement’s potential to galvanize widespread protest and discontent across civil society. Once the student movement set their plans into motion, state and university officials turned to policing in the form of *carpeteo* and physical brutality to discipline the student movement and discourage the emergence of other oppositional protest movements.

“Clubbing, Carpeteo, and Oppression”

On April 21, 2010, students at the University of Puerto Rico’s Río Piedras campus (UPR-RP) called a forty-eight-hour strike asking the administration to stop tuition hikes, reinstate fee waivers, and guarantee that none of the UPR campuses would be privatized. Students warned administrators that if their demands were not met they would go on indefinite strike and completely shut down the campus. The administration failed to take the students seriously and, as a result, students at UPR-RP went on indefinite strike on April 23 to force the administration into negotiations. The mobilization at UPR-RP quickly spread as students were able to rally other campuses, as well as teaching and nonteaching staff, behind their demands. One week after the indefinite strike was announced, the Association of Puerto Rican University Professors staged a one-day walkout in support of the strike and agreed to respect the picket line. Likewise, the Brotherhood of Non-Teaching Employees of the University of Puerto Rico urged their members to respect the picket line and expressed support for the striking students. Finally, by May 4, ten out of eleven UPR campuses had joined the indefinite strike.³⁵

On May 13, 2010, at an assembly with hundreds present, students voted to continue the strike. The strike’s ratification coincided with growing public sup-



Figure 3 (left). Police officer with camera observing student protesters at the University of Puerto Rico; figure 4 (right), police officer films students with cell phone while other officers look on at the University of Puerto Rico – Río Piedras. Photos by Desde adentro. Source: rojogallito.blogspot.com/2010/05/la-represion-como-respuesta.html

port as more and more members of the public started to show up at the *portones*, or entrance gates, of the UPR-RP campus to show their support for the striking students. As the strike intensified and garnered more support, students started to notice police personnel whose sole purpose seemed to be taking videos and photos. Student activists and journalists documented the presence of police with cameras around campus who were photographing and filming not only protests, but also moments of calm, when students and supporters were simply milling about and chatting (figs. 3, 4, and 5). Requests to know why the police were filming and what they were doing with the recordings were met with vague responses. Students and their supporters started to connect the police with cameras to the long history of *carpeteo* targeting radical movements.

For student activist Waldemiro Vélez Soto, the reemergence of *carpeteo* during the strikes illuminated longstanding efforts to curtail political organizing efforts at UPR:

Here then, we see that not only in 2010 and 2011, but in the 1980s and 1970s, there is a huge process of *carpeteo* directed at the student movement. It doesn't occur because of security concerns; to the contrary, it's about a violation of the collective process, an effort to restrict the freedom of expression and the right of association that we have as students, workers, and teachers who struggle and labor in the university. It's a repressive measure.³⁶

Other students similarly saw the strikes as a resurgence of colonial tactics of political repression. In a post on the blog, *Desde adentro* (*From the Inside*), which was dedicated to documenting the strike from the perspective of the students, Andrés González Berdecía explicitly tied what he was seeing around campus to a history of



Figure 5. Two police officers, one with a cell phone and the other with a camcorder, film students at the University of Puerto Rico—Río Piedras. Photo by *Desde adentro*. Source: rojogallito.blogspot.com/2010/05/repudian-abuso-policiacono_21.html

repression he had previously only read about. He outlined the various forms of abuse and repression that students had encountered: police recording and taking photos of protesters; attempts to prevent food and water from entering the student encampments; physical brutality; attempts to disrupt and prevent peaceful protests; and the dissemination of misinformation to local news outlets in an effort to discredit the movement. González Berdecía continued, noting, “Many of us have heard and read about the repression to which the Puerto Rican student and labor movements have been subjected, but I admit to never having felt in the flesh the magnitude of that repression until this moment.”³⁷ According to González Berdecía, the events of the student strike revealed the Puerto Rican state’s continued dependence on “clubbings, carpeteo, and oppression” for power and authority over its citizens. “Before, you heard names like Romero Barceló, Desiderio Cartagena, and Pérez Casillas; now you hear Fortuño, Figueroa Sancha, and Rodríguez Emma,” González Berdecía suggested, linking the current governor, police superintendent, and governor’s chief of staff to those government and police officials implicated in the murders at Cerro Maravilla and the counterintelligence activities that drove them.³⁸

Many watching the strikes unfold suggested that the state and its police force were up to old tricks—only with better technology. The new technologies of surveillance deployed against the student movement seemingly made it more difficult to stop illegal surveillance practices even though they were, for the first time, “in plain sight.” Osvaldo Burgos Pérez, a civil rights attorney who participated in the strike as a legal observer for the Colegio de Abogados (the Puerto Rican Bar Association), described the strikes at UPR-RP as the first time he witnessed police openly documenting peaceful protests and gatherings. According to Burgos Pérez, “Here there were specialized units recording with cameras and camcorders. That was new. Before we always knew, and always denounced, that police infiltration [of social movements]. Now they were in plain sight. They [the police] said it was to protect citizens from abuse because they would record the abuse. What they did was *carpeteando*. We now have an electronic carpeteo.”³⁹ Burgos Pérez allegations

of “electronic carpeteo” suggested that police capitalized on public mistrust in order to justify their illegal surveillance tactics. Knowing that the PRPD have a reputation for rampant brutality and civil rights violations, police officials suggested that protesters and members of the public should be comforted by constant surveillance because this would discourage police from engaging in violence and illegality. When police were asked to show the public what was on the footage they were collecting during the strikes, however, police denied access to the footage and even, at times, denied the very existence of the recordings.

After months of official silence regarding accusations of carpeteo, Police Superintendent José Figueroa Sancha admitted that the police were “documenting everything” related to the strikes at the university.⁴⁰ While coming clean that police were engaging in widespread surveillance against students and their supporters, the superintendent failed to provide any meaningful information regarding protocols for the recordings being compiled by police. For instance, how and with whom was the footage shared and how is it stored? And why couldn’t members of the public request to see the footage? In addition to the nonexistent protocols governing the recordings, there was concern about the very legality of the practice in a post-Cerro Maravilla Puerto Rico. In response to Superintendent Figueroa Sancha’s admission, Alvin R. Couto de Jesús, spokesperson for the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement toward Socialism) said, “We remind the superintendent of police that he is engaging in criminal conduct by actively encouraging his agents to engage in carpeteo. According to Article 178 of the Penal Code it is a crime to illegally collect personal information. In addition to recording, officers are dressing like students in order to obtain information from student leaders.”⁴¹ While the issue of police and security personnel posing as students eventually became a more serious one, which I discuss later in this article, here Couto de Jesús’s comments point to a more general concern over police illegality and impunity. Couto de Jesús’s warning to Superintendent Figueroa Sancha served to remind the public and the police that is illegal for law enforcement officials to surveil citizens on the basis of political affiliation and beliefs. Despite efforts to highlight the apparent illegality of the police actions during the UPR strikes, police continued to utilize dubious surveillance and counterintelligence tactics. As Waldemiro Vélez Soto noted, “There were a bunch of legal observers there who saw the police recording, and what did it accomplish?”⁴² The seeming lack of clear-cut rules regarding surveillance in the digital era allowed this latest iteration of carpeteo to flourish with seemingly little legal consequence at UPR.

“Definitivamente Carpeteado”

During the second strike, the number of police seen videotaping students around campus increased dramatically. Not only were police filming the perimeter of the university campus—protests and shows of solidarity taking place at the entrance gates—they were also now stationed inside the campus, going into academic buildings and public gathering spaces filming and trying to break up protests.⁴³ The

filming of students associated with the strike was so ubiquitous that it was mentioned regularly, if nonchalantly, in press accounts of the strike. For instance, *Primera Hora*, one of the island's daily newspapers, produced “*minuto a minuto*” rundowns of the events occurring each day at the university for its online portal, which regularly referenced the police filming and photographing students. *Diálogo*, *Desde adentro*, and other student run publications similarly made frequent references to police with cameras and high-end recording equipment as regular fixtures around campus and provided ample video and photographic evidence.

According to students, this rampant surveillance had serious consequences; they believed that students who were frequently recorded were more likely to be targeted for brutality and arrest by the police. In an interview I conducted with Pedro Lugo Vázquez and Lourdes Santiago Negrón, both of whom worked as student reporters for *Radio Huelga*, they noted that police would not only film events, but would focus specifically on the people they had identified as leaders. These recordings allowed their faces to become known, which, they argued, caused police to target them for violence and arrest. According to Lugo Vázquez, “You would see them videotaping people. They knew who the leaders were.”⁴⁴ Santiago Negrón added, “They would follow you. There were cameras that would only follow certain people throughout the multitude of the protest.”⁴⁵ Lugo Vázquez also stressed that police recorded students whether they were engaged in protest or just hanging out: “And it was like standing around, there wasn't like an official demonstration, we were just hanging out and they would come and videotape, and that was like to profile, to find out who people are.”⁴⁶ Lugo Vázquez said that police officials with cameras would sometimes go against the current of student marches in order to capture protestors' faces on film, before suddenly arresting certain student activists. When I asked if he felt like the police knew who in the crowd to target for arrest because of the filming, Lugo Vázquez responded, “Yeah, because they always look for some people, like Giovanni [Roberto].”⁴⁷ “They would like point their baton at you, ‘You're next,’ basically, so it's like all very open,” Santiago Negrón asserted.⁴⁸

Xiomara Caro, who was a student spokesperson during the strikes, also thought that the police surveillance led certain students to be specifically targeted for arrest, harassment, and brutality. According to Caro, “I think [we were] *definitivamente carpeteado*. And when they have the opportunity, for instance, with Ian Camilo [Cintrón], I saw his arrest and it was brutal. They took advantage. . . . It [being active in the strike] was a risk because a lot of people were always being looked for.”⁴⁹ Camilo Cintrón was the first of more than forty demonstrators arrested during an act of civil disobedience in front of the *portón* leading to the natural sciences building on January 19, 2011.⁵⁰ Officers from the PRPD's Tactical Operations Unit, known as the *Fuerza de Choque*, utilized pressure point submission tactics on Camilo Cintrón, inflicting pain on him as he was immobilized in clear view of the crowd gathered there. According to Camilo Cintrón, “An officer from the *Fuerza*

de Choque stuck his fingers into my neck, generating an extreme pressure with the intention of removing me from the human chain we had formed.”⁵¹ The officer continued to apply pressure to Camilo Cintrón’s neck for more than a minute making him feel as though he were being suffocated. For Caro, the brutality of Camilo Cintrón’s arrest had to do with his visibility to police and their ability to easily identify him for arrest and physical punishment. She also noted that, once individuals were marked by these surveillance technologies and arrested, it became a cycle as the police continued to seek them out. And, indeed, Camilo Cintrón was repeatedly targeted for harassment and arrest following this initial incident.

Coverage by the University of Puerto Rico’s student newspaper, *Diálogo*, also pointed to a pattern of targeted arrests of student leaders in the context of the police’s constant video surveillance. On January 25, 2010, *Diálogo* reported that agents were stationed around campus recording protesters with high-tech, professional-grade equipment.⁵² Reporters overheard police discussing plans to arrest three students who were protesting on Avenida Gándara. Among those to be arrested was Waldemiro Vélez Soto, a highly visible member of the student movement. The targeting of Vélez Soto is telling given the oppositional stance he had taken regarding the constant surveillance that he and his fellow students were under. Vélez Soto was known to approach police with cameras while they were recording strike-related activities and record personal messages to Police Superintendent Figueroa Sancha in order to call out the *carpeteo* that he and others faced.⁵³ These acts of defiance, coupled with his very active role in the movement, made Vélez Soto a constant target of police attention. Vélez Soto, along with Giovanni Roberto Caez, Ian Camilo Cintrón, and Adriana Mulero Claudio, not only experienced constant harassment because of their prominent roles in the student movement, but they would eventually be summarily suspended by the university administration because of their roles in the strikes, which seemed to point to collaboration between police and university officials in identifying and punishing student activists.

Perhaps the most alarming allegations I heard when interviewing students were accounts of police harassment that they encountered when they were off campus and engaged in activities that were not in any way related to the strikes. One student, who was very visible and active in the movement, explained, “I’m sure I have a *carpeta*. I can hear the phone, my line, being tapped. I remember going to the supermarket one time and cops saying hi to us. They weren’t there when we got there and suddenly we were leaving the supermarket and they’re outside in the entrance saying hi to us by our names. So, I’m sure we were being watched.”⁵⁴ This student’s account recalls the practices of police harassment and intimidation regularly experienced by proindependence and other radical activists on the island during the mid and late twentieth century. Such tactics are meant to not only instill fear in the person(s) being followed and documented, but also to mark them as under surveillance in a public way that functions to intimidate others who might be

sympathetic to their struggle. The public witnessed the ways that the student movement was surveilled and the ways that police officials closely followed the moves of students thought to be in leadership positions. The police violence and harassment experienced by some of the most visible members of the student movement showed the incredibly high costs of visibility. It is within this context that students responded to *carpeteo* by donning *capuchas* that fully or partially obscured their identity. While students turned to *capuchas* in an attempt to subvert the power of the police stationed around campus filming and photographing them, debates over who was really behind those *capuchas* soon emerged as *encapuchadas/os* were increasingly captured on film participating in acts of violence and property destruction around campus. Students and their supporters, once again turned to the history of the *carpetas* in an attempt to anticipate state strategies in the present and wondered if police were employing counterintelligence agents, or agents provocateurs, to undermine public support of the striking students.

Why Must One Hide Their Face to Exercise Their Freedom of Speech?

Many students entered the second strike with the expectation that the police would use extreme violence in their attempts to break the strike. As Abner Y. Dennis Zayas noted, “Many of us were clear that a second strike would not be possible without police intervention . . . precisely because you don’t put on two strikes back-to-back in one year without the government doing something.”⁵⁵ During the second strike, students engaged in more direct confrontation with law enforcement officials and actively resisted police attempts to physically harm and surveil them. Although police initiated the vast majority of the violence that occurred on campus during the second strike, with police regularly seen deploying excessive force to subdue student protestors, political conservatives pointed to the more militant style adopted by the student movement as responsible for the clashes between police and protestors. The increased visibility of the *encapuchadas/os* at protests, sometimes acting aggressively toward law enforcement agents, bolstered claims by UPR administrators and conservative politicians that the second strike was driven by a violent and senseless agenda. Thomas Rivera Schatz, president of the Puerto Rican Senate, for example, pointed to the *encapuchadas/os* as evidence that the striking students’ only goal was to cause mayhem and destruction. Rivera Schatz asked the public to consider whether it was “necessary” for students to “have their faces covered” or whether “hitting people and vandalizing the university” was necessary in order to demand reduced tuition and fees.⁵⁶ Moments of friction between protesters and police were exaggerated to make the student movement appear dangerous, unruly, and unfocused. Despite the fact that there was little substance behind the image of violent student strikers, the implicit question posed by Rivera Schatz and others nonetheless started to gain traction: why did students have to hide their faces if they were not doing anything wrong?

On January 12, 2011, facing mounting criticism over the use of capuchas, the striking students issued a statement affirming the right of students to hide their faces during protests and meetings. The statement, in part, read: “We defend the use of capuchas as a way to protect our colleagues from being arrested or penalized for participating in demonstrations and public activities. We reject its irresponsible use, where capuchas have been used to commit acts that have not been approved by strikers and go against the spirit of struggle of this student movement.”⁵⁷

While acknowledging that capuchas had been or could be used to allow individuals to get away with unsanctioned acts of violence and vandalism, the student strikers noted that capuchas were ultimately necessary in a context of illegal police surveillance and harassment. Similarly, in an opinion piece published in *Diálogo*, a student, writing anonymously to avoid retribution, explained that the treatment of the most visible members of the student movement by law enforcement and university officials demonstrates why some might want to protect their identity. Responding to critiques of the encapuchadas/os, the anonymous student wrote, “Why is it necessary to wear a capucha to exercise one’s freedom of expression? Simple, because those that have shown their faces have been demonized, suspended, arrested, harassed, and videotaped.”⁵⁸ These student leaders, according to the writer, were punished precisely because they didn’t hide their identities and, as a result, were forced to face the consequences for visibly fighting against the agenda of the state.⁵⁹ The capucha emerged, then, in direct response to the punitive actions of the state and university administration and could not be separated from the *carpeteo* that student activists experienced on and off campus.

Further, many began to question whether the encapuchadas/os that had been seen committing acts of property destruction might have actually been police operatives. One anonymous comment in response to the striking students’ statement on capuchas noted, “The police had the opportunity to arrest those that destroyed property on Tuesday the 11th and those that broke the windows of the security van last year. But they didn’t do it because it’s part of their plan to criminalize the student movement, just like they did for decades with the proindependence movement.” The anonymous commenter was not alone in these suspicions—testimony, eyewitness accounts, and rumors started to circulate among students and their supporters about the role of undercover agents in the spate of vandalism and violence being attributed to encapuchado/as. The police’s past use of such tactics of subversion against the proindependence movement further justified these suspicions for many involved with the strikes. The example that authorities most often pointed to in order to paint the use of capuchas as little more than a cover for criminal activities was an incident when students wearing capuchas destroyed the windows of a campus security van and threatened security employees during the forty-eight-hour *paro* that preceded the second strike on December 7, 2010. From the moment those windows were smashed a debate emerged regarding who was responsible for the

property destruction. Many students suspected that private security or even police were responsible for the damage and were actively trying to discredit the student moment and justify the subsequent police occupation of the campus. Some students reported seeing encapuchadas/os enter the Office of Campus Security, while others said they overheard Capitol Security employees tell the police not to worry because the encapuchadas/os were “their own.”⁶⁰ Students and their supporters turned to the history of the carpetas in order to prove that such actions by the authorities were easily within the realm of possibility. Historian Ivonne Acosta Lesprier, for example, tied what she saw happening at the university to the tactics of political repression aimed at the proindependence movement that she had spent decades researching and writing about: “Since the encapuchadas/os appeared last month destroying a van in clear view of everyone on campus at the University of Puerto Rico, without anyone being arrested to this date, I knew the tactics of the police during the 1970s and 1980s of the twentieth century had returned. . . . Yesterday encapuchadas/os committed even worse acts of vandalism at UPR, also in view of cameras but still haven’t been arrested.”⁶¹

Like Acosta Lesprier, others asked why these encapuchadas/os were not arrested despite the fact that police were not only in the vicinity of these actions when they took place, but were also often filming the incidents. Adding credence to allegations of subversion, journalist Jesús Dávila said that he had uncovered evidence that suggested that two officers from the PRPD’s Intelligence Division helped to instigate a volatile confrontation between students and university officials, which resulted in the university chancellor, Ana Guadalupe, being physically attacked.⁶² Two of the “students” who participated in the “riot,” were identified by witnesses as undercover police officers and an internal memo discovered by Dávila and news outlet NCM Noticias after the incident reportedly included information about their employment history with the police department. Dávila and others suggested that the entire event involving the Chancellor was staged because the student movement, at that very moment, was gaining increased international attention and sympathy after images and videos of extreme police brutality circulated via news reports and social media.

Despite evidence that seemingly exculpated the students who chose to wear capuchas or, at the very least, suggested they were not solely to blame for much of the violence of the second strike, public support dwindled and internal rifts emerged within the student movement around questions of self-defense and how best to respond to police violence and harassment. These debates, and the divisions that ensued, seemed to distract both students and members of the public from the initial demands and goals of the strikes, somewhat weakening the student movement and putting the university administration in a position that allowed it to roll back some of the gains achieved by the first strike. Following the end of the second strike, the student movement would continue to wrestle with the effects of *carpeteo* on

their attempts to transform public education on the island, and by extension Puerto Rican society.

Conclusion: Living the Radical Tradition

My relationship with a group of young people who had participated in the UPR strikes began when I myself was a student conducting research for my dissertation. One year after the strikes, the students who would eventually become my interlocutors were in the midst of trying to make sense of the history they had just lived through. One question they seemed to wrestle with in the aftermath of the strikes, especially as university officials worked to implement their punitive “security reforms,” was the extent to which they had been infiltrated and what this meant for their continued activist efforts moving forward. While the history of the *carpetas* and its parallels in the 2010 and 2011 UPR strikes encouraged many students to see themselves as part of a radical tradition on the island that had long been unjustly targeted by federal and local authorities, it also generated fear and suspicion among activists that the student movement was riddled with infiltrators. When the university administration rolled out their proposed security reforms almost a year after the second strike, I got a glimpse of the anxiety that this posed for student activists trying to confront continued attacks on their organizing efforts.

Following the protest that opened this article, one of my interlocutors, a young woman who had “vouched” for me with some of the other students, told me about the initial suspicion my presence at the protest had generated. Since many of the student activists had never seen me at a protest before and because I arrived alone, planning to meet my interlocutor later on in the day, some of the students wondered whether I was a *chota* there to document the protest and snitch on them to university or police officials. Indeed, as I milled about waiting for my interlocutor, I noticed that some students kept their distance from me and even shielded their faces when I took a picture of the demonstration on my phone. At the time, I convinced myself I was imagining their suspicion, chalking it up to my own self-consciousness as an outsider; however, later in the day, my interlocutor confirmed that questions about who I was and why I was observing the protest were indeed circulating among some students. It was not until I finally caught up with my interlocutor and she and some of the other students I had already met started introducing me around that a number of students started to relax around me. As fast as concern that I was a *chota* at the protest to *carpetear* spread, so too did the relief when word got out that I was just *una estudiante de NYU* looking to talk people about their experiences of police violence during the strikes.

Student suspicion of me as a potential *chota* at their protest is not evidence of unsubstantiated paranoia; it is evidence of the afterlife of real, state-sanctioned surveillance and counterintelligence efforts directed at radical movements on the island, including the contemporary student movement. The history of the *carpetas*

provided a powerful reminder to students that they were not alone in experiencing the repressive force of the state. While this history connected the student movement to other radical movements that have been targeted by similar forms of repression, it also provided students with a playbook of counterintelligence tactics that they were, justifiably, constantly on the lookout for in their own movement. In this case, surveillance and infiltration as police tactics, and even the rumor of infiltration, functioned to remind students that their movement, if not constantly surveilled, is always *subject to surveillance*.

The long history of repression and resistance in which the student movement is enmeshed, which I have detailed in this article, promises to make itself apparent once again as the Puerto Rican debt crisis continues to unfold. On June 30, 2016, one day before Puerto Rico was set to default on \$2 billion in debt payments, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). The PROMESA bill stipulates the creation of a Fiscal Control Board to oversee the island's finances. With virtually no local input, the Control Board would have the power to override the commonwealth government and implement austerity measures in an effort to reduce the debt. Further, the PROMESA bill includes a provision that allows for newly hired minimum wage workers under the age of 25 to be paid less than the federal minimum wage, as little as \$4.25 an hour. The student movement has been front and center in the struggle against the PROMESA bill and the proposed Fiscal Control Board. Students are not only cognizant of how austerity as a solution to the debt crisis will inevitably gut the public sector, including the University of Puerto Rico, but also that young people's futures are being mortgaged in order to service the debt. Further, many in the student movement, joining with other sectors of Puerto Rican civil society, see PROMESA and the Fiscal Control Board as an attempt to restore more overt and direct US colonial rule under the guise of financial restructuring.

As in 2010 and 2011, students again are joining with broad swaths of civil society in direct action against the state to demand a more just and equitable approach to restoring the Puerto Rican economy. For instance, on March 18, 2016, in the midst of a three-day shutdown at UPR-RP, students held a protest in front of the Puerto Rican Treasury demanding to meet with Subsecretary Juan Flores Galarza to discuss the UPR budget. Eventually, Flores Galarza met with representatives from the eleven UPR campuses but maintained that the Treasury must withhold funds from UPR to service the debt.⁶³ The willingness of the government to sacrifice UPR and gamble with the futures of Puerto Rico's young people in order to meet its debt obligations has caused students at a number of UPR campuses, including campuses that have traditionally been less politically active, such as Utuado, Bayamón, and Ponce, to hold additional stoppages and strikes in late March and April. Furthermore, following the passage of the PROMESA bill, students have been active participants in and supporters of the Campamento contra la Junta (Encampment against the

Control Board), an ongoing encampment situated outside the Federal Court House in San Juan that is protesting “the colonial condition of all Puerto Ricans” and the “imposition of a Fiscal Control Board.”⁶⁴ The recent passage of the PROMESA bill and the feelings of frustration and outrage that it has generated among young people on the island have the potential to catalyze one of the most prolific eras of student activism seen on the island.

As students continue to immerse themselves in direct action campaigns against both austerity and the intensification of US rule, parallels between government repression of the proindependence movement and government repression of the student movement continue to abound. Puerto Rican activist and journalist Carmelo Ruiz has reported that in April 2016, just as protests against the proposed Fiscal Control Board were ramping up on the island, the FBI with the support of local law enforcement began a campaign of harassment and intimidation against veterans of Puerto Rico’s proindependence movement.⁶⁵ Law enforcement agencies are already utilizing familiar tactics of subversion to consolidate colonial power and facilitate economic exploitation during this moment of political flux, and time will tell the extent to which they will return to the logics and methods of *carpeteo* seen in the recent UPR strikes and in their historical precedents over the course of the twentieth century. As the student movement continues to fight for a more just and equitable society—one that is not governed by the colonial and capitalist logics of both Washington and Wall Street—the 2010 and 2011 student strikes illuminate the archive of subversion students have inherited and the genealogy of radical resistance they must harness to confront it.

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Notes

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1. The end date of the second strike is debatable. Some suggest that the strike did not end until May 2011; however, for many, the end of the strike was marked by an incident in which UPR-RP Chancellor Ana Guadalupe and the chief of campus security were assaulted by protestors on March 7, 2011. Though many students and their supporters claim that the individuals who assaulted the chancellor and chief of campus security were not actually affiliated with the student movement and were in fact police operatives, this moment soured the public's support and the movement had difficulty mobilizing in its wake.
2. Comités de Acción, "Alerta de Seguridad!," handout received by author at a student protest against security reforms at the University of Puerto Rico's Río Piedras campus on March 8, 2012. Translation from Spanish my own.
3. My use of genealogy throughout this article is influenced by Michel Foucault's engagement with the concept in his essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." Taking up this understanding of genealogy, in this article I do not attempt to posit an unbroken chain of police surveillance and repression against radical movements in Puerto Rico. Rather, I attempt to understand how students both understood their place within a history of repression and the ways in which they drew on this history of repression to generate solidarity and understanding among a broader public familiar with the history of carpeteo against prolabor and proindependence activists on the island.
4. Capuchas represent a practical strategy to protect one's bodily integrity and identity during social mobilizations. Activists use capuchas in order to protect their airways from the chemical irritants police often use to disperse protests and demonstrations, as well as to hide their identities in order to prevent law enforcement agencies from taking retaliatory action against them. In Puerto Rico, capuchas became a regular sight during the 1999 to 2003 protests to eject the US Navy from the island municipality of Vieques. The makeshift capuchas, often fashioned out of T-shirts, worn by Puerto Ricans around the Vieques encampments, are also said to be inspired by the balaklavas worn by the Zapatistas.
5. Associated Press, "5 in Puerto Rico Receive Sentences."
6. My discussion of Cerro Maravilla and the subsequent cover up draws from journalist Manuel Suarez's exhaustive investigation, in *Two Lynchings on Cerro Maravilla*.
7. Blanco-Rivera, "Forbidden Files," 301–02.
8. The number of carpetas is cited in Blanco-Rivera, "Forbidden Files," 297. The targets of carpeteo are cited in Bosque-Pérez, "Political Persecution against Puerto Rican Anti-Colonial Activists," 24.
9. Bosque-Pérez, "Political Persecution," 14.
10. This is not to imply that US colonial authorities were the first to implement structures of political surveillance and subversion in Puerto Rico. Like all colonial powers, Spain used sometimes covert forms of policing to facilitate governance and economic extraction. Kelvin Santiago-Valles provides a useful overview of policing in Puerto Rico under Spanish colonial rule and how it transformed under early US rule in *Subject People and Colonial Discourses*.
11. Santiago-Valles, *Subject People and Colonial Discourses*, 5.
12. Bosque-Pérez, "Political Persecution," 19.
13. *Ibid.*, 20.
14. Blanco-Rivera, "Forbidden Files," 300.
15. Cunningham, *There's Something Happening Here*, 6.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. Gautier Mayoral and Blanco Stahl, "COINTELPRO en Puerto Rico," 279.

20. Paralitici, *La represión contra el independentismo puertorriqueño*, 191. Translation from Spanish my own.
21. Bosque-Pérez, "Political Persecution," 32.
22. In some ways, carpeteo served a panoptic purpose in the Foucauldian sense insofar as the surveillance not only provided valuable, if not always factual, information for law enforcement, but also induced subjects to police themselves by promoting the idea that there could be informants around every corner and in every meeting. For more, see Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
23. Navarro, "New Light on Old F.B.I. Fight."
24. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 76.
25. For a history of student solidarity with radical labor struggles, see Cacimar Cruz Crespo's *Solidaridad obrero-estudiantil*. The University of Puerto Rico's student paper, *Diálogo*, also ran an excellent two-part series on the history of UPR as a site of struggle. See Juan Carlos Castillo, "Las huelgas estudiantiles de la UPR, aquellas que se repiten y continúan," parts 1 and 2.
26. Roberto José Thomas Ramírez interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
27. Gautier Mayoral and Blanco Stahl, "COINTELPRO en Puerto Rico," 285.
28. "Ley Especial Declarando Estado de Emergencia." Translation my own.
29. Bonilla and Boglio Martínez, "Puerto Rico in Crisis," 6–8.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Abner Y. Dennis Zayas interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
32. Roberto José Thomas Ramírez interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
33. Olivero Lora, "Primera Transmisión." Translation from Spanish my own.
34. Cancel Miranda, "Mensaje Rafael Cancel Miranda." Translation from Spanish my own.
35. The only campus that did not join the indefinite strike was the Recinto de Ciencias Médicas, the University of Puerto Rico's medical school, which could not stop operations due to the time-sensitive nature of their scientific investigations and their work with patients. The medical school did, however, hold a brief work stoppage in solidarity with the other ten campuses on strike.
36. Waldemiro Vélez Soto interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
37. González Berdecía, "La represión como respuesta." Translation from Spanish my own.
38. *Ibid.*
39. Osvaldo Burgos Pérez interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
40. Hernández, "La policía."
41. *Ibid.*
42. Waldemiro Vélez Soto interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
43. During first strike, police were not allowed entrance to the campus due to a nonbinding agreement between the PRPD and UPR known as the Non-Confrontation Policy. Because police had often contributed to violence rather than prevented it when they responded to disturbances on campus, administrators asked police not to intervene on campus. The agreement held for three decades until police entered and occupied campus during the second strike. For more information on the Non-Confrontation Policy and the different approaches of the police during the first strike versus the second strike, see LeBrón, "Policing Solidarity."
44. Lourdes C. Santiago Negrón and Pedro Lugo Vázquez interview.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*

48. Ibid.
49. Xiomara Caro interview.
50. *Primera Hora*, “Fuerza de Choque.”
51. Diálogo UPR, “El estudiante Ian Camilo Cintrón.” Translation from Spanish my own.
52. “Agresiones y arrestos,” *Diálogo*.
53. *Primera Hora*, “Estudiantes marchan en silencio.”
54. I am withholding the name of this student in order to prevent any kind of harassment or retaliation.
55. Abner Y. Dennis Zayas interview. Translation from Spanish my own.
56. *Primera Hora*, “Rivera Schatz recomienda protestar.” Translation from Spanish my own.
57. Rojo Gallito, “Estudiantes repudian la violencia.” Translation from Spanish my own.
58. *Diálogo*, “La polémica (en)capucha(da).” Translation from Spanish my own.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Acosta Lespier, “Encapuchados ¿pagos por la Policía?” In this quotation, Acosta Lespier argues that during the second strike she saw a resurgence of “the tactics of the police during the 1970s and 1980s,” which she uses as shorthand to highlight the practices of surveillance, infiltration, and subversion regularly used by the police prior to the discovery of *las carpetas*. Although she seems to be speaking broadly about how these practices were used against radical proindependence groups, she could also be specifically referencing the policing and carpeteo of the student movement during the 1970s and 1980s when antimilitary and anticolonial protests at UPR were met with violence and repression. Translation from Spanish my own.
62. Dávila, “UPR.”
63. *Democracy Now*. “Special Report.”
64. Campamento contra la Junta, Facebook page. Translation from Spanish my own.
65. Carmelo Ruiz, “New Wave of Repression.”

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