

# Jacques Khalip

## Introduction: *Voir venir*

What seems to me to be the difficult—and privileged—position of Foucault might be the following: do we know who he is[?]  
—Maurice Blanchot, “Who Is Me Today?”  
in *Foucault/Blanchot*

In his 1991 lecture, “To Do Justice to Freud: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,” delivered on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Michel Foucault’s *Histoire de la folie*, Jacques Derrida movingly conjures his long-departed friend by reminding his audience of the debate from the 1970s around the *Histoire* that ultimately drove the two friends apart—a debate, Derrida states, that is “archived and those who might be interested can analyze it as much as they want and decide for themselves.”<sup>1</sup> The grace of the elegist rests on “fidelity and fidelity honed by thought” (80), and it inevitably entails mixed emotions—fidelity to the past and the friend, but also to the unanticipated torquing effects of that friendship, which move beyond present events and catalyze a “stormy discussion” (80) resonating well into the future. Derrida maintains an ethical vigilance to this temporally complex spectrality in order to disabuse memory of any rote capacity for recuperation and monu-

mentalization. But even more, his critique weighs the past as something that inscribes contemporary circumstances—an eruption from the present registered by the shadows of futurity. And it is for these reasons that dredging up the history of his break with Foucault would miss the point of the tribute. Derrida continues:

There is no privileged witness for such a situation—which, moreover, only ever has the chance of forming, and this from the very origin, with the possible disappearance of the witness. This is perhaps one of the meanings of any history of madness, one of the problems for any project or discourse concerning a history of madness, or even a history of sexuality: Is there any witnessing to madness? Who can witness? Does witnessing mean seeing? Is it to provide a reason [*rendre raison*]? Does it have an object? Is there any object? Is there a possible third that might provide a reason without objectifying, or even identifying, that is to say, without examining [*arraisonner*]? (81)

By folding the “histories” of madness and sexuality into the ethics of witnessing (and mourning), Derrida suggests that Foucault’s projects are not only epistemological, but inventive and ethical: they are never merely in line with materialist excavations of secrets or inner meanings but rather tend toward the creation of multiple critical positions through which to ponder the forms of constraint and potentialities that underwrite the blindness or illegibility of their own insights.

Out of witnessing things that never were there to begin with, Foucault’s oeuvre turns upon the (im)materiality of various imperfect testimonies that become topics of analysis (like madness and sexuality) insofar as they are limit cases arising from the critical dissonance of the past, the present, and the future. “Madness” and “sexuality” thus never come before witnessing but rather *become* situations that form afterward because they are excesses to thought, at once effects of power structures and deterritorialized resistances to those powers. They cannot be thought in advance. Thus for Derrida, mourning Foucault gives rise to the possibility that thinking about his friend *today* is an intellectual relation to a future that occurs in spite of elegy itself—an elegy for and toward the future of Michel Foucault, where the philosopher’s self returns as something potentially new, different—reactivated. Derrida’s lecture, then, contains the seeds for re-form because *today* invokes a place or “*site*” (84) from where to pose anew the very question of thinking as a risk, one that opens onto a field of potentiality between the “question of yesterday, of the today of yesterday” and the “today of today” (82).

“Future Foucault” was a one-day symposium held at Brown University in the early spring of 2010, and that event in part charged its participants to imagine their works as part of the theoretically unfinished business of what remains potential and risky in Foucault’s projects of critique. In many ways, the title of the symposium (and this special issue) was a lure and provocation I held out, one that came with few caveats for the scholars themselves but also bore some organizational strategies on my part. For example, each contributor was chosen based on the ways in which his or her own unique relationship to Foucault—productively aslant and athwart his writings—could invigorate or *capacitate* new flights of thought beyond the specificity of the work itself and, in so doing, emancipate the discussions in such a way as to carve out areas of inquiry that would be collaborative, incalculable, possibly playful, *sui generis*, and definitely seminal in spirit, scraping against what William Haver evokes in his essay as the ungrasped “sense of the common . . . expressed as the surface, the interface between *aisthēta* and *noēta*, the sensible and the intelligible.”

Doubtless, the gathering could not escape the conjunction of two temporal and historical markers: the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of one of the last century’s most crucial philosophers, and the publication of the final two volumes of *The History of Sexuality*. And yet, grief was hardly the governing mood at the event: as if taking a cue from Derrida, questions of how to pay homage to Foucault’s memory were rethought by our guests as sites for analyzing the futurity of his influence on critical theories and disciplinary approaches of all stripes. Thus in planning this issue, it was clear that it would say less about what “Foucault studies” might be vis-à-vis current scholarship now and more about how thinking with, through, and against his writings engages in a temporal process of deferral that meditates on how meanings arise as concatenations among past, present, and future genealogies and archaeologies. While the status of “futurity” has a complicated valence throughout Foucault’s writings—in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, for example, he discusses “forms of *meletai* (of meditations, of exercises of thought on itself)” like the *praemeditatio malorum* or exercise of death that forecloses expectations of the future<sup>2</sup>—the essays in this collection all imply, with varying degrees of explicitness, that reading and rereading Foucault always involves pushing on the future rearrangements of sociality, governmentality, politics, ethics, and aesthetics.

Some points of contact did emerge: in particular, readers will find that all the essays here gravitate, centrifugally and centripetally, to Foucault’s later writings, which are often popularly thought to mark a transition

from theories of regulatory power or repressive apparatuses to biopower, governmentality, and technologies of the self—or as Foucault remarked in “What Is Critique?” to issues that stem from the “art of not being governed or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost.”<sup>3</sup> As Carolyn Dean notes in her perceptive afterword, contemporary theoretical interest in this “late” work circles back to questions of political praxis in Foucault, which evoke the future insofar as they lay claim to moving beyond normative discursive formations. But this interest doesn’t so much reveal a new direction or missed angle of vision (indeed, these projects were very much intrinsic to Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* and *The Birth of the Clinic*) as it throws into sharper relief the degree to which volition and self-modification—the “will to be otherwise”—are continuous in Foucault’s writings with emphases on how and why the subject should be re-formed, and how it can organize and access a capacity to endure within a nexus of relations and contexts that are effectively—and politically—transpersonal, transindividual, and nonhumanist.

To this end, these essays assert a certain affinity for the relational remappings that Foucault’s writings variously point to as the surplus of being-in-the-world: Haver’s “sense of the common” evokes the implicit asociality or community without community of political, ethical, and aesthetic work; for Elizabeth Povinelli, the ability to endure within intolerable spaces interrogates how potentiality is antithetically distributed and employed among various social groups; and for Mark Hansen, Foucault’s notion of “refusal” allows for “exploring how the maintenance of subindividual aggregates over time supports a reconceptualization of the category of the individual.” In Nancy Armstrong’s estimation, on the other hand, the resurging debates around biopower signal missed opportunities in feminist theory to revise gendered subjectivity as a specious liberal form of population management and control, and Tim Dean zeroes in on how biopolitical forces are inseparable from the numinous possibilities inherent in the “difficult” category of Foucauldian pleasure.

And yet, despite contrasting methodologies, the essays in this collection all intimate that coming to terms with Foucault *now* means participating within the kind of critical work traced out in what he elusively called “the history of the present,” or a history that embryonically traces what Immanuel Kant, according to Foucault, contributed with his concept of enlightenment: “What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?”<sup>4</sup> For Foucault, the temporal dimension that cuts this question is central insofar as it serves less to provide a before/after narrative to

thought (the difference, he says, doesn't measure the present in relation to a "totality or of a future achievement") than to modify, change, or rearrange a "preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason."<sup>5</sup> Thus the present is not simply coterminous with the sudden, the transitory, or the momentary, but it is a question about prospective alternatives built into the circumstantial limits of the world at hand. Kant's senses of enlightenment and presentness thus attempt to overcome immaturity by introducing complexities around how reason is to be used on the level of potentiality: at the very least, should it involve the "humanity of human beings" on a micro- or macrolevel? And how does it—must it—contribute to a public expression of freedom in spite of its seemingly subjective nature? Similarly in "What Is Critique?" Foucault considers how the cleavings between what was, what is, and what will be are central to critique's force "in relation to something other than itself: [critique] is an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be, it oversees a domain it would want to police and is unable to regulate."<sup>6</sup> As an "instrument, a means for a future," critique suggests a perceptual limitation that at once reflects on a "domain" by way of extraction, while at the same time dissolving any capacity to render it legible and epistemologically ascertainable. "I would like to write the history of this prison," Foucault notes at the end of "The Body of the Condemned" section of *Discipline and Punish*, "with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present."<sup>7</sup> The writing of the past as a history of the present evokes a specific critical attitude: it takes up a relation to the past based on the limits of knowing that circumscribe that very relation, but it derives insight from the indiscernible return of that temporal force *as a question of and for the present moment*. Thus the history of the present is also a history of the future insofar as the latter manifests as the potentiality *within* the present's citation of the past.<sup>8</sup>

An "instrument, a means for a future": as a movement toward a future, rather than *the* future, critique addresses this rhythmic transformation and the indefiniteness of the article (*a* future) points out the contingencies implicit in any art of governance. Foucault thus does not put critique in the service of a falsely utopic perspective of liberation: much like "bodies and pleasures," which he invokes in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*,<sup>9</sup> critique's futural bent is a curb, a condition of constraint on thinking that is specific to the historicity of thoughts themselves; policing a domain

while being unable fully to regulate it allows for a minimal degree of change to occur while also remaining contextualized by (or showing fidelity to) the event itself. Thus critique is a process of working beyond events even as it remains immanent to them. “An event is not a state of things,” Foucault reminds us in “*Theatrum Philosophicum*,” “something that could serve as a referent for a proposition. . . . We should not restrict meaning to the cognitive core that lies at the heart of a knowable object; rather, we should allow it to reestablish its flux at the limit of words and things, as what is said of a thing . . . and as something that happens.”<sup>10</sup> To confuse the proposition for the referent is to pin down the saying of an event too readily after it has transpired; in this way, “Future Foucault” takes inspiration from the alternative perspective, which thinks of the event as fluctuating and constructing, neither before nor after its meaning but rather as something that differentiates itself according to each relational move taken toward and away from it.

If we are to think about the persistence and the pitch of Foucauldian thought in the time to come, we should see it as firmly on the side of debunking the predictions of any kind of critical speculation, analysis, opinion, or discernment that tries to account for what may or may not stand the “test of time”—what may or may not survive in Foucault, what might live on, and what might not. Framed in this way, futurity can be thought of along the lines of Catherine Malabou’s *The Future of Hegel*, where it means

“to see (what is) coming” (*le voir venir*). . . . “Voir Venir” in French means to wait, while, as is prudent, observing how events are developing. But it also suggests that other people’s intentions and plans must be probed and guessed at. It is an expression that can thus refer at one and the same time to the state of “being sure of what is coming” (“être sûr de ce qui vient”), and of “not knowing what is coming” (“ne pas savoir ce qui va venir”).<sup>11</sup>

For Malabou, openness to what may or may not come, to randomness and risk, invokes futurity as a relational critical act developed within and toward the temporality of an environment. Critique, then, as a “means for a future,” occurs as a temporal cleaving of thought between what is and what is not—“what is coming” and “not knowing what is coming.” Malabou’s thoughts circle around a particularly suggestive passage from Foucault’s *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*:

Clear a space around the self and do not let yourself be carried away and distracted by all the sounds, faces, and people around you. Clear a space around the self, to think of the aim, or rather of the relation between yourself and the

aim. Think of the trajectory separating you from that toward which you wish to advance, or which you wish to reach. All your attention should be concentrated on this trajectory from self to self. Presence of self to self, precisely on account of the distance still remaining between self and self; presence of self to self in the distance of self from self: this should be the object, the theme, of this turning back of the gaze which was previously directed on others and must now be brought back, not to the self as an object of knowledge, but precisely to this distance from your self insofar as you are the subject of an action who has the means to reach your self, but above all whose requirement is to reach it. And this something you must reach is the self.<sup>12</sup>

Foucault is commenting on what he calls transsubjectivation, or a “break or change within the self”<sup>13</sup> that is productive and elaborative: it establishes alternate spaces and times within a self ordinarily thought to be a point of epistemological disclosure or concern for scopical regimes that congeal it and render it static in its attachments. Transsubjectivation involves an opposing turn or “reversal of the gaze” that looks not toward any kind of inwardness but toward the distance between selves. While Foucault insists on “clear[ing] a space between the self and its aim,” the aim is a “trajectory between self and self” or the “presence of self to self,” which is to say it highlights the self’s detachment from itself in order to turn on itself. This clearing of space is also etched by a temporal dimension. “Presence of self to self, precisely on account of the distance still remaining between self and self; presence of self to self in the distance of self from self”: these two deceptively similar sentences suggest a delicate difference. If the aim of transsubjectivation is to form a relationship between oneself and the aim, as in Foucault’s example of an archer shooting his arrow at a target,<sup>14</sup> then it is also a disciplined preparation for something that *will* happen, rather than a way of focusing on that very target as an object of knowledge that is present and directly in front of us. In order to highlight these trajectories, Foucault emphasizes how the presence of self *to* the self is mediated by both the distance that *remains between* self and self and the distance of self *from* self, echoing a model of nonrelationality that rids selfhood of its sentimental ties to privacy, intimacy, and interiority. The time that remains in between and the time that defines the distance from *x* to *y* converge in the space of an aperture or a clearing away from one self to another, a temporal space of nothingness and nonfulfillment, of things “to come.”

Knowledge as potentiality instead of a knowledge that extracts objects as they are; knowledge on the move even as it empties itself out at every clearing—the contributors to this issue all evince a future Foucauldian

potential in their essays even as those gestures are laced with skepticisms of a critique that cannot properly rest on its investments. Even more, this critique risks—without expectation—cultivating creative resources and practices of theoretical reading that produce different social, political, and cultural edges within bodies of scholarship that cannot help but remain alive to what Foucault describes as an adjustment between yesterday and today, an attitude or transsubjectivation often receptive to what he calls the “thought from the outside,” or the sense that thinking neither coalesces nor coheres but rather deflects, diverges, and moves outward, as it were, to that which already disrupts thought at its core. In “Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside,” for example, Foucault speculates on the degree to which this outside produces an unknowable emptiness within discourse, best expressed in the merging of the myth of the Sirens with the myth of Eurydice in Blanchot’s writings: if the Sirens sing a song “that is no more than the fatal promise of a future song” (they sing to Ulysses the promise of singing about his life in the future), then Eurydice figures the face from the past that is always irrecoverable to Orpheus. In both cases, Ulysses and Orpheus confront what is coming as a temporal problem that exposes them to a “void” that cuts into their present: Ulysses cannot hear the song, and Orpheus fails to find anything except a nothingness on the threshold of the underworld.<sup>15</sup> Both men thus miss the lucidity of a knowledge that defines them, but in these misses they are exposed to the void of a language that has yet to be thought and whose futurity has always already arrived. Ulysses and Orpheus thus *become*, in the absence of knowing what they are.<sup>16</sup>



*Voir venir*: to wait, to observe how things go; to probe and guess; to consider what others think and do as one thinks and does—the different practices of reading explored in these essays all participate in new colloquies of seeing and waiting, and in turn, they eloquently speak to new critical terrains that saturate every movement of change, hope, and apparent potentiality in Foucault’s writings. William Haver’s “A Sense of the Common” argues for the emergence of the “common” in all of Foucault’s various projects, even if it never explicitly appears as a linchpin. Haver conceptualizes the common as thinkable in conjunction with its sensing, which is to say as an unrepresentable movement of perception marked by an “impossible transcendental object of a passionate—that is, aesthetic—a priori intuition” that allows for the registry of *something* in the absence of any kind of intelligible claim for identity. In this way, Haver rereads Foucault’s provocative emphasis on



“bodies and pleasures” in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* as a call to recognize the aesthetic power of concepts that are noncognitive and thus strain at the borders of our various normative materialities and social formations. It is precisely in this commonness, Haver argues, that they gesture toward a “nothing, the empty black hole that is the very impossibility of a ground for the human and social sciences,” as well as the emptiness that underwrites any kind of politics that is organized around the brute evidence of the social. Calling attention to such an impossibility while delineating its ungraspable contours allows Haver to suggest a different kind of arrangement of social relations, one arrived at through the aesthetic, “that non-neutrality, that partisanship, that is logically prior to any assertion of nontranscendence.”

In “The Will to Be Otherwise/The Effort of Endurance,” Elizabeth Povinelli reads Foucault alongside and against William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Giorgio Agamben in order to consider how will, effort, endurance, and exhaustion evoke a more capacious theoretical field for understanding the conditions of the dead-in-life body of neoliberalism. While a term like Agamben’s “bare life” appears to designate such a deprived body, it fails to account for the different contexts of possibility that underwrite a body’s agency, as well as the multiple resistances to and metabolizations of subjugation that challenge the passive “mereness” that Agamben discovers. Povinelli remarks that Foucault’s interest in the art of governing the ethical self suggests ways of understanding how such a self endures through social phenomena to which it is both attached *and* detached, at once subjected to circumstance and capable of readdressing itself to itself in ways that evoke “the agency that allows a person to emerge as such and then to exit (*sortie*) her minority status *at the threshold of this knowledge*.” By weaving an argument around “energy” and “exhaustion” in James and Peirce, Povinelli ponders how volition and potentiality are redistributed among subjects whose relationships to themselves and the circumstances of their lives evoke a complex web of risks and adaptations that are part and parcel of the projects of self-discovery detailed by thinkers like Foucault.

A similar emphasis on risk and bodies and pleasures emerges in Tim Dean’s “The Biopolitics of Pleasure,” where the apparent ejection of pleasure from analyses of regulation, biopower, and biopolitics becomes the launching pad for his discussion of pleasure’s inescapable imbrication within (and contribution to) models of subordination and resistance. Dean notes that for Foucault, “self-dislocating pleasures” undo the kinds of depth models of identity that are often the bedrock of political theories of ideology that turn

on recognition and acknowledgment. Pleasure testifies to excesses of resistance and experience that cannot be wholly contained within power relations themselves, even as it is in turn constrained by them. It is for these reasons, Dean continues, that Foucault rejects Althusserian interpellation as a mode of subjection since it revolves around recognition and the apparent “unity” of the human body as subject to identificatory penetrations. Pleasure becomes both the node that evokes the “disunity” of the body and, more important, the descriptor for how power takes hold on a “subindividual” level, exposing “the body” to different topologies such as the double helix of DNA, which Dean offers as a different—and differentiating—conceptual model for interpreting pleasure beyond the restrictions of the body of surfaces.

The emphasis on the “micropolitics” of power reverberates in Mark Hansen’s “Foucault and Media: A Missed Encounter?,” which moves from a consideration of how and why Foucault has not figured prominently in “contemporary media’s increasing incursions into the subperceptual, micropolitical dimensions of life” to a larger reading of the question of individuation for Foucault and how his interest in subindividual temporal formations, aggregates, or multiple powers and forces becomes part of a project to understand subjectivation itself or the capacity of the individual to be re-formed over time. Hansen considers closely how Foucault illuminates current media theorizations of the embeddedness of human life: rather than perceive individuals as dominated and depersonalized by “control” networks, Hansen locates in new media a reconfiguration of individuals’ relationships not only to their environments and each other but almost molecularly *to themselves*. Such media highlight the potential for reactivating the self, rather than undertaking its complete oppression.

Nancy Armstrong’s contribution, like Dean’s and Hansen’s, puts a sharp lens on the contours of power and resistance in Foucault, albeit from a more sobering perspective. In “Gender Must Be Defended,” Armstrong revisits debates around gender in feminist theory through a careful rereading of Charlotte Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*, where “the question of exactly how and under what conditions institutions enforcing discipline converged and began to collaborate with biopolitical policies so that class conflict recedes into the background” is magnified to the point of recoding the political, social, and aesthetic operations of gender difference. For Armstrong, feminism’s early focus on the imbalances between masculine and feminine models in the novel is symptomatic of a greater theoretical blindness to the biopolitical forces through which gender is appropriated by the liberal

polity for measuring (and indicting) the potential humanness of certain characters at the expense of others. In this way, Foucauldian emphases on discipline fail to chart the far more supple structures of political life giving and life taking: “producing individuating forms of deviance, gender also renders those imagined as beyond its disciplinary reach and thus ineligible for the rights and protections of liberal society.”

In conclusion, Carolyn Dean’s afterword, “The Agency of Sex: Volition after Foucault,” reads the issue’s contributions as centering around the viability of political agency in late Foucault, and Dean suggests (after Haver, Tim Dean, and Armstrong) that thinking about volition and the “will to be otherwise” must take pleasure into account in order to appreciate the provocative ethical and aesthetic constraints of Foucault’s writing. Taking Leo Bersani’s work on self-shattering as an example, Dean remarks on how self-fashioning is less a process that is structurally antagonistic to political thinking than it is a perceptual recalibration of the kinds of social relationalities that can be imagined, both potentially and impotentially, prior to any form of political position.

All the essays in this issue dwell, in one measure or another, on the conditions of propinquity between bodies, selves, and pleasures that never quite congeal, and prefer movement forward (without telos) to doing nothing even if circumstances render real mobility null and void for some of us. Again, if critique amounts to an “instrument” for making some kind of dent within things and objects for Foucault, it does so without the expectation that the future will be any better but rather that our mindfulness to things as they are is meaningful only insofar as our critiques are subject to rearrangement and potential revolution. Future life, then, is less a matter of looking toward something and more of a nonprospective, nonsolicitous appreciation of breakdown. Glossing this kind of nonrelationality in his book *Homos*, Leo Bersani reads a passage of rooftop sex in Jean Genet’s *Funeral Rites* as just this kind of image of thought: two men fucking back to front, they create an “oval that exclude[s] all light,” as Genet notes in the novel, “but the bodies in the figurehead which they formed looked into the darkness, as one looks into the future.” For Bersani, these queer outlaws “come not with each other but, as it were, *to the world*, and in so doing they have the strange but empowering impression of looking at the night as one looks at the future.”<sup>17</sup> The strange conceptual empowerment felt within emptiness defines a relational placement of the couple away from the privacy of the encounter to a public—indeed, quasi-ecological—dispersal into the momentum of the world, whose future is finite and unknowable.

Much like Lee Edelman's own resistance to the logic of reproductive futurism,<sup>18</sup> Bersani singles out Genet's couple as a species of nonprocreative creativity, a misalignment of normative propulsions away from teleologies and toward clearings and distantiations within the self. If homosexuality, for Bersani and for Foucault, is one example of a structure that imaginatively rearranges how we encounter each other, then the decisive shifts also speak to a similar queerness within theory itself, whose matters of thought will always remain unseen because there is no way to know whether what is done or said is a move forward, a move backward, or a staying in place.

### Notes

- 1 Jacques Derrida, "‘To Do Justice to Freud’: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis," in *The Work of Mourning*, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 81; hereafter cited parenthetically by page number.
- 2 Michel Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 462.
- 3 Michel Foucault, "What Is Critique?" in *The Politics of Truth* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 41–81, 45.
- 4 Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 303–19, 305.
- 5 Foucault, "What Is Critique?" 42.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 42.
- 7 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), 30–31.
- 8 Futurity describes a "temporal predicament" that Janet Halley and Andrew Parker have identified, for example, in the "very relationship between two books crucial for all queer theory—volumes 1 and 2 of Foucault's *History of Sexuality*—[which plant] the temporal question in the center of the courtyard." Halley and Parker cogently note, "Foucault's own struggle with the problematic of a 'Great Paradigm Shift' to modernity from antiquity, the intense exploration he made into that claim by proceeding backward, in volume 2, from the modern to the antique, has imbricated the question, what is sexuality? with the question, *when* is it?" Andrew Parker and Janet Halley, introduction to *After Sex? On Writing since Queer Theory* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 5. The "when" of sexuality means that the latter is never a chronologically identifiable, referential "state" but rather subsists as a temporalized cluster of practices, behaviors, institutions, discourses, and structures (events). Indeed, to understand sexuality means to ask the questions, why does it matter now? Under what conditions does it become a question to be asked today?
- 9 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980), 157.
- 10 Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 173–74.

- 11 Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic*, trans. Lisa-  
beth During (London: Routledge, 2005), 13.
- 12 Foucault, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, 222–23.
- 13 Ibid., 214.
- 14 Ibid., 222.
- 15 Michel Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside,” in *Foucault/Blan-  
chot*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 41, 45.
- 16 As Foucault reminds us in one of his interviews, “We don’t have to discover that we are  
homosexuals. . . . Rather, we have to create gay life. To *become*.” Michel Foucault, “Sex,  
Power, and the Politics of Identity,” in *Ethics*, 163–73, 163.
- 17 Leo Bersani, *Homos* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 165, 166.
- 18 Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham, NC: Duke Univer-  
sity Press, 2004).