Confirming the drugs administered during anaesthesia: a feasibility study in the pilot National Health Service sites, UK

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Key points

- The use of double-checking for all drugs used during anaesthesia has been proposed.
- Two-person checking and electronic checking were evaluated for feasibility.
- Both systems were perceived to improve safety.
- The electronic system appeared to be more feasible.
- Technical aspects and a cultural change need more attention.

Background. To help prevent drug errors, it is recommended that drugs should be confirmed/checked with a second person before administration. We aimed to assess the feasibility of introducing second-person or electronic bar-code confirmation of drugs, administered during anaesthesia, in the National Health Service (NHS) settings in the UK.

Methods. Seven NHS sites took part in a pilot study over a 3 month period. Five used a second-person and two used bar-code electronic confirmation of drugs given during anaesthesia. A total of 36 consultant anaesthetists and three trainees, 15 operating department practitioners (ODPs), and seven anaesthetic nurses participated. A group of anaesthetists, ODPs, and nurse practitioners (n=11) from different NHS sites independently observed both methodologies. In addition, each site was visited and observed by one of the study investigators. At the end of the study period, four focus groups (two with participants from pilot sites and two with observers) were held. The discussions were taped, transcribed, and qualitatively analysed. Data were triangulated using observer’s notes and investigator’s reflective diaries, and processed using line-by-line coding. The codes were then synthesized into themes.

Results. Both methods were perceived to contribute to the prevention of drug errors. For the two-person confirmation to be carried out correctly, there should be no distraction or time pressure. The main limitation to the feasibility was that the continuous presence of the second person was not always possible. The process also met with resistance from the staff at some pilot sites. Electronic confirmation was always feasible, as it did not require the presence of a second person. It was found to be intuitive to the anaesthetist’s current working practice. However, there were some practical issues related to introduction of new technology and an initial learning curve.

Conclusions. The introduction of two-person confirmation to the NHS would have a significant impact on the existing working practices. Issues related to resources and a cultural change will need to be addressed. Electronic confirmation was more feasible, but the technological aspects of its integration into the operating theatre environment, and learning, will require further attention.

Keywords: double-checking; drug administration; drug errors; patient safety

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Drug errors during anaesthesia remain a serious cause of iatrogenic harm.1 2 The reported incidence of errors range from 1:131 to 1:5475 anaesthetics.3 –7 Despite the wide range of reported incidence, and perceived lack of consensus regarding the magnitude of the problem, it is unacceptable that any patients suffer harm, no matter how minor, while undergoing anaesthesia.8 The white paper ‘Building a safer NHS for patients’9 recommends that ideally, all i.v. drug administration should be checked by two qualified practitioners. Several publications10 –14 suggest that errors can be reduced through double-checking. A review of strategies for preventing drug errors during anaesthesia concluded that double-checking could have prevented 58% of the errors, which made it the
most effective single measure.\textsuperscript{10} The need to double-check to prevent drug errors during anaesthesia has been strongly emphasized.\textsuperscript{15} However, the use of double-checking as a process to reduce drug errors continues to be disputed because of the variability in, and paucity of, rigorous conclusive research evidence of its effectiveness.\textsuperscript{16} A recent study concluded that double-checking medicines should be a selective and systematic procedure informed by key principles and encompassing certain behaviours learned from psychological research and aviation industry.\textsuperscript{16}

In an independent review of serious adverse incidents in oncology practice,\textsuperscript{17} the author has strongly recommended the use of an explicit appropriately configured verbal double-checking safety protocol, which, if done correctly, would reduce drug preparation and administration errors. An integrated drug administration and automated anaesthesia record system which utilizes bar-code technology to provide a computerized confirmation of the label that is ‘rapid, accurate and not subject to human suggestibility’ has been developed.\textsuperscript{11}

In September 2007, in the UK, the Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA), Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI), and the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) set up a multidisciplinary Expert Reference Group to provide strategic direction to a project called ‘improvement through partnership’. On the basis of incidents reported to the NPSA which showed the majority of drug errors occurred during administration, and the suggestion that these could have been prevented had a double-checking measure been in place,\textsuperscript{18} the group decided that feasibility of introducing a double-check of drugs given during anaesthesia should be explored. It was noted that confirmation of the drugs administered during anaesthesia, either using a second-person check or a technology-based system, is not routinely practiced in the UK or elsewhere in the world.

The present qualitative study aimed to explore the feasibility of introducing a practice of confirmation of drugs given during anaesthesia in seven NHS pilot sites within England and Wales over a 3 month period during 2008.

**Methods**

We used qualitative research methods. In patient safety meetings, held at the Royal College of Anaesthetists, delegates were invited to participate. A pragmatic approach of purposive sampling was used to select anaesthetists from those who volunteered. They represented a range of NHS secondary and tertiary referral centre Hospitals, geographically spread across England and Wales. Anaesthetists from seven NHS Trusts were selected. Two of these Trusts were identified as having a technology-based system (integrated drug administration and automated anaesthesia record system which utilizes bar-code technology) installed and five Trusts were identified to use the two-person confirmation protocol.

Approval was granted by a multi-domain Ethics Committee and local NHS research governance was gained at all sites. It was left up to the lead participant at each site to identify other anaesthetists who were willing to participate. A total of 36 consultant anaesthetists and three trainee anaesthetists, 15 Operating Department Practitioners (ODPs), and seven anaesthetic nurses participated. Each participant was sent a letter of invitation and information sheet and signed a consent form before taking part.

The two methods of confirmation of drugs were integrated into clinical practice for a period of 3 months. At all the participating sites, the process of confirming the drug to be drawn up into the syringe was standardized through the use of a flowchart (Supplementary Appendix, Fig. 1). At the five sites, which participated in two-person confirmation, a second flowchart was used (Supplementary Appendix, Fig. 2) for drug administration. The flow charts were designed by the human factors team within the NPSA, and piloted at an independent NHS Trust before the study.

At the two sites assigned to use the technology-based system, a specific label that contained a bar code identifying the drug was used. The label was placed onto the syringe after drawing up the drug, and the computer-assisted bar-code reader was used to ‘confirm’ drugs before administration. Hence, the first flow chart was used to draw up the drug, and the electronic system was used during administration. The electronic system has been designed specifically for use within anaesthesia with the aim of reducing the error in drug administration and record keeping.\textsuperscript{11} Scanning the bar-coded syringe produces audible and visual drug confirmation, while at the same time the name of the drug and the dose administered are entered into an electronic anaesthetic record. The system also utilizes barcodes to enter anaesthetic events on the record, such as the start of surgery or the size and placement of the i.v. cannula. The electronic system gathers physiological data directly from the patient monitor via the serial connector. A real-time anaesthetic record is produced from these data, and any further information that is entered via the bar code reader.

All the participants at the pilot sites were asked to keep reflective diaries. The reflective diaries were provided by the study team and were standard across all sites. Each diary entry was divided into five areas for the participant to reflect on: Setting, Drug Preparation, Time, Feasibility, and Other [Supplementary Appendix, Box 1]. The prompts provided within these five areas were only a guide and were by no means prescriptive. Participants were asked to complete these diaries after every surgical session for the first 2–3 weeks of the study.

Independent observation was provided by a number of anaesthetists (n=4), theatre nurses (n=4), and ODPs (n=3), working in NHS Hospital Trusts not participating in the pilot. The independent observers were recruited through RCoA, the College of ODPs, and the Association for Perioperative Practice. They were randomly allocated to observe the two-person confirmation and the electronic bar code confirmation during the 3 month study period. Each person visited two pilot sites and observed both methodologies. In addition, two members of the study team made independent observations of the conduct of the study at all
the sites, and this allowed for comparisons and internal validity checks on the data collected. All observers were provided with instructions and a schedule to record observations in order to promote consistency. The observers were asked to transcribe the detailed notes taken during the observation period immediately afterwards.

At the end of the 3 month study period, a total of four focus groups were held (Table 1). Two focus groups, consisting of anaesthetists (n=5), ODPs (n=3), and anaesthetic nurses (n=3) from the participating pilot sites were conducted within 2 weeks of the end of the study. The other two focus groups, each with four to five independent observers, were conducted within 2 weeks of the completion of all observations. One of the authors moderated the groups and another took notes. Before the start of the focus groups, a brief outline was given of the format of questions. We used the SWOT format to focus on Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of both methods of confirming drug administration in relation to patient safety. All participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. A digital recorder was used to tape all discussions. Pre-defined questions and prompts were used to ensure continuity across administration of questions. We used the SWOT format to focus on Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of both methods of confirming drug administration in relation to patient safety. All participants were assured of confidentiality and anonymity. A digital recorder was used to tape all discussions. Pre-defined questions and prompts were used to ensure continuity across all focus groups. The discussions were continuously taped and transcribed by one of the researchers within 7–10 days of completing each focus group. The finished transcripts were read through and checked against the original recordings by an independent researcher for accuracy and integrity; any further comments were added at this stage.

The data from the reflective diaries were used to check outliers emerging from the observation data to enhance validity and provide triangulation.20 Outlying themes were also explored further within the Focus Groups, allowing for a more comprehensive picture of the issues surrounding the introduction of the drug confirmation into clinical practice. A research diary was also maintained by one of the investigators (R.E.) during the study period, which acted as a ‘memo’ during analysis.21 22

The emphasis of analysis was on determining meaning and understanding rather than counting events or proving hypotheses.23 Qualitative methodology was adopted to generate detailed descriptions and categories, as guided by data24 to explain the phenomenon under investigation.19 The analyses were iterative rather than sequential.23

Initially, one of the researchers (R.E.) read, re-read, and line-by-line coded the transcripts (Focus Groups and Observations) as described by Charmaz.25 This allowed the development of concepts which may have escaped attention through the initial read through and to identify themes and categories within and across the transcripts.25 A second researcher (R.M.) independently read through the transcripts and coded them as described above. R.E. and R.M. then met to discuss the coding and to concur or revise the thematic categories.

The line-by-line coding generated more than 150 codes; these were then synthesized using focused coding into theoretical categories of which two categories were further broken down into three subcategories. Throughout the analysis, the transcripts were repeatedly revisited to compare categories, to look for ‘negative’ or contradictory themes, and triangulation of data from reflective diaries and observations. These themes could then be explored further during the study period through collecting additional purposive data in order to reach the point where no new themes were emerging known as data saturation. After finalizing the categories, the memos about each thematic category were written to define them and ensure consistency between researchers. Memo-writing allowed the researcher to elaborate on a category, specify its properties, define any relationships found between categories, or identify gaps in the data collected.26

### Results

The two main thematic categories that emerged from the data were two-person confirmation and electronic bar-coding system, with their subcategories being benefits, disadvantages, and practicalities. Other categories that emerged were perception of drug errors and wider cultural issues related to patient safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant number</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Which method of confirmation observed or used?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group 1: observers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group 2: observers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group 3: participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group 4: participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Two person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Consultant anaesthetist</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Electronic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second-person confirmation

Benefits
Participants felt that the second-person confirmation had the potential to enhance patient safety, but it had to be carried out properly, with allocated time and without distraction (Table 2). An additional benefit that emerged was that its introduction into clinical practice appeared to have increased awareness of drug errors and other safety issues.

Disadvantages
One of the major barriers to the use of second-person confirmation was that in an emergency, when the drugs were needed in a hurry, and when the potential for drawing up the wrong drug or misadministration could be increased, the confirmation was often abandoned. Having to stop and wait for somebody to be available to confirm the drug was not an intuitive action, and it had an impact on the way the anaesthetist worked. The impact was seen in the form of anaesthetists checking more than one drug at a time, or sometimes giving inhalation agents when no one was available to confirm the i.v. drug. Several participants described how they had started to modify the confirmation flowcharts in order to prevent any perceived delays to the theatre list.

Electronic bar-coding system

Benefits
One of the main benefits was the ability to check the drug without a second person being present (Table 3). The

This had led to the drug confirmation becoming no more than lip service.

Practicalities
The main practical issues related to two-person confirmation were continued availability of a second person, and some people refusing to take on the role. In addition, the observers noted that while the anaesthetists drew up the drugs in most instances, in some sites, ODPs often drew up the drugs for induction of anaesthesia to speed up the lists. In these instances, availability of a second person for confirmation was a major issue. Overall, the introduction of the confirmation protocol, generally, was not seen as too much of an infringement on their clinical practice by nurses and ODPs. However, there were occasions when the confirmation was perceived as a nuisance, and was not carried out. Some participants were reluctant to perform confirmation in front of the patient. The perception of some clinicians was that double-checking a drug would cause delays to the administration of that drug or to the running of the theatre list. However, others felt that it could be performed without causing too much of a delay.

Table 2 Subcategories, key emerging themes, and quotes for two-person confirmation (see Supplementary material for expanded version of the table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Quote(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>No additional equipment</td>
<td>All we need are two people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patient safety</td>
<td>There was no doubt that it is a robust... fail-safe method...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I think it has heightened awareness among users...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Not always feasible</td>
<td>In an emergency situation it goes straight out of the window...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>... in the middle of an operation... and the ODP was not around...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on</td>
<td></td>
<td>I was giving my drugs when my ODA was there rather than when I wanted to give drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicalities</td>
<td>Attitude</td>
<td>Some members of staff were refusing to be involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of resources</td>
<td>Its resources and time... if that allotment arrives... then it could be made to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process-driven</td>
<td>My experience... not just that it was time consuming, but it also became menial and frustrating...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Subcategories, key emerging themes, and quotes for electronic confirmation (see Supplementary material for the expanded version of the table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Quote(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Feasibility/patient safety</td>
<td>Unblinking, untiring ‘eye’ on the drug, you never need to find someone else to do it (double check)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accurate record</td>
<td>It’s an accurate record of what’s going on and it’s my record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Distraction during learning curve</td>
<td>There is potential for the system to be a distraction from other matters of patient/anaesthetic care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can be by-passed</td>
<td>There are ways round the system, because you can scan all the drugs for induction and have them sitting on the side, so there is still a potential for picking up the wrong syringe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicalities</td>
<td>Logistics and space orientation</td>
<td>One of the issues... was the remoteness of the scanner from the cannula, if it was right by the cannula then you are likely to scan it, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IT-issues</td>
<td>Occasionally we’ll lose data from the monitoring that’s going into the servers and it will just stop collecting data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
system itself was found to be easy to use and effective. Another perceived benefit noted by many of the participants was the automated electronic record that the technology-based system produced. The ability to view the anaesthetic record in advance in areas such as the recovery unit was perceived to be immensely important.

Some elements of patient safety were perceived to be essentially a by-product of the electronic anaesthetic record. The quality of the anaesthetic record produced by the system was seen, by both participants and observers, as a great incentive to use the system. The electronic system was also seen to allow the participants more time to concentrate on the patient.

**Disadvantages**

It was noted by observers and participants that there is the potential for the electronic bar-coding system to become a distraction while working through the learning curve. Another disadvantage that emerged consistently from the data was the permissive design of the system. The drugs could be given without having to swipe them through the bar code reader, or multiple drugs could be scanned before administration, defeating the object of confirmation at the time of administration. Locating the scanner close to the i.v. drug administration port could have overcome this problem.

**Practicalities**

The induction of anaesthesia in an anaesthetic room has been a traditional feature of anaesthetic practice in the UK since 1860.21 Before transferring the patient from the anaesthetic room to the operating theatre, the ‘system’ was ‘parked’, once in the operating theatre the second system was initiated and the patient data were retrieved. The unexpected consequence of utilizing the system in this way, however, was the ability to retrieve multiple patient records.

The other practical issues related to initial teething problems that were encountered at both sites related to the physical placement of the system, some drugs not being in the database of the system, and getting hospital monitoring devices and IT facilities to integrate with the system. This was all part of the learning curve, these issues became fewer as the participants became more familiar with the system.

**Perception of drug errors and cultural issues**

There was the overall impression of both participants and observers that although drug errors ‘happened’, they were not a big problem (Table 4). This was due to rarity of the events, lack of significance attached to the error, ability to ‘get out of trouble’, and perception that anaesthesia is safe. This was the view of all groups, not just confined to the anaesthetists.

However, the attitudes to double-checking varied among professionals. In general, nurses thought that it was a good idea to confirm drug administration, but there were mixed feelings among ODPs over confirmation. The majority of ODPs thought that it was a good idea. One ODP commented that they found the different reactions, to the drug confirmation protocol, from anaesthetists and ODPs quite interesting; some anaesthetists were reluctant, whereas the ODPs were of the opinion they already checked drugs, this was no different to their current practice.

Some anaesthetists thought there was no enough evidence that drug errors are a problem to warrant this intervention, while others felt measures to prevent errors should be supported. It was apparent from the data that there was a need for clear guidelines on the responsibility and accountability of the second person confirming the drug. Overall, anaesthetists showed a preference for the electronic system, which did not rely on the presence of a second person, as it did not break the ‘rhythm of the work’.

**Discussion**

This study was designed to explore the feasibility of introducing a method of confirming the anaesthetic drug administration, within the existing environment of NHS hospitals, along with the attitudes, experiences, and behaviours of the participants. Hence, a qualitative methodology was chosen for the study. We found that both methods, that is, two-person and the electronic confirmation, were perceived
to have the potential to minimize drug errors and enhance patient safety. However, second-person confirmation was not always feasible as it depended on the availability of a second person at the time of drug administration. In addition, it was perceived to be time-consuming, prone to human manipulations, and met with some resistance from the staff. On the other hand, the electronic confirmation was independent of the presence of the second person, and was reliable and easy to use. However, it required a period of training for the staff, and overcoming the problems of introducing and installing new technology to the anaesthetic room and operating theatre environment.

The use of an explicit, appropriately configured, verbal double-checking safety protocol has been strongly recommended, with the expectation that if one person misses an error, the other will detect it. In our study, we developed two distinct protocols and flow charts for two-person confirmation. The protocol design, developed by experts in human factors, ensured active engagement of the second person in the process. However, our participants found it difficult to adhere to these protocols, in particular, in emergency situations, and when there was a perceived shortage of time. We also found some reluctance among anaesthetists, which could have been the result of cultural change, as two-person confirmation was more acceptable to nurses and ODPs, who already double-check any injectable drug they prepare or give.

Verbal double-checking does not always prevent drug errors. This may be due to diffused responsibility, where two people are supposed to be responsible for the same task, but in reality neither person is truly responsible, both relying on the other to be rigorous resulting in neither giving the task their full attention. However, some believe the on the other to be rigorous resulting in neither giving the task their full attention. We also found some reluctance among anaesthetists, who already double-check any injectable drug they prepare or give.

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One of the perceived disadvantages of the electronic system, in our study, was that the anaesthetist could bypass many of its safety features by scanning a number of drugs at the same time. The risk of this could be reduced by locating the scanner close to the i.v. port. Other technical issues were also raised in our study which included integration with the existing technologies and IT within the operating theatre, the possibility of technical failure, space utilization, and the location of the scanner. These are more issues regarding the logistics of integrating new technology into an existing environment rather than a limitation of the system. Of the two methods, all observers preferred electronic over two-person confirmation and the participants using the electronic system were positive about its potential to reduce error. However, we suggest that any system used to confirm drug administration, during anaesthesia, should be capable of overcoming the logistical and technical issues as raised in our study for its appropriate utilization in enhancing patient safety.

The introduction of any new technology may have its own hazards which may not have become immediately obvious in this study. We suggest that a further detailed expert technical hazard assessment exercise should be conducted with a view to develop recommendations for introducing such a system in the NHS environment.

Our data suggested that clinical staff differed in their perception of significance of drug errors and their attitude towards measures to prevent them. It is therefore important that the introduction of any method of preventing drug errors should be accompanied by a drive towards awareness
of drug errors, which may be achieved by active engagement of professionals in reporting, analysis, and dissemination of learning from critical incident reporting at the local and national level. We believe that, for any measure of patient safety to be successful, acceptance by the professionals involved is essential. This study has uncovered a number of factors, barriers, and facilitators, which can determine successful uptake of safety interventions in clinical practice within or even outside anaesthesia. We believe that further studies exploring the cultural issues, some of which are uncovered by the present study, are required for successful implementation and long-lasting uptake of safety initiatives in health-care systems.

One of the potential limitations of this study is that all the participants had attended safety meetings, and had shown willingness to participate in the study. Hence, the results may be limited to the anaesthetists who are motivated in the area of patient safety. However, the findings of the participants were triangulated by using independent multi-professional observers and the reflective diaries. In addition, we included the nursing staff and ODPs from the participating sites in the study to build a more complete picture. The participating sites were selected to provide a wide geographical distribution and hospitals of different sizes ranging from a general district hospital to tertiary referral centre.

The relationship between the researcher and the participants has been recognized as a source of potential bias. In this study, this relationship was recognized. To a large extent, these influences are unavoidable; however, the researchers tried to minimize these by having a heightened level of awareness, adhering to basic rules of interviewer’s behaviour, and having more than one method of collecting data.

Our study has produced a considerable amount of data from multiple sources. The issue of the observers causing a Hawthorne effect has been discussed previously. We believe that the introduction of observers did not change the behaviour of any of the anaesthetists or assistants during the process, as the phenomenon of observation is not new in the NHS environment. The risk of different observers placing importance onto different aspects of the process was limited through the use of the observation schedule [Supplementary Appendix, Box 2], the observers were also encouraged to reflect on what they had observed at the end of the session in order to capture any prejudices or preconceptions they may have that could impact on the data collected. We also aimed to limit the bias through using two independent study team members, one unfamiliar with the anaesthetic environment, to cross-check the observations of those more familiar with the setting under observation and these produced correlative accounts. We believe that the data collected were an accurate account of the experiences of the participants, and this was confirmed at the focus groups for those who had participated, and through the reflective diaries. The findings were also similar across all seven sites which support their generalization.

These findings may be transferable on international scale, but this study does have idiosyncrasies that are only typical in the NHS.

In summary, the introduction of two-person drug confirmation was found to be difficult to achieve, at times, due to staff availability and its reliance on time being allocated for the process to take place unhindered. If this check was to be introduced in the NHS, it would have a significant impact on the existing working practices of the anaesthetist, and issues related to resource and cultural change will need to be addressed for it to be successful. Electronic confirmation, on the other hand, is more feasible as it is not reliant on a second person to be available and is more intuitive to the anaesthetist’s current working practice. It allows the anaesthetist to remain as an independent practitioner being able to give the drug when they want to give it and not when a colleague is available to check. For it to be effective, technological aspects of making its integration into the operating theatre environment will require further attention.

Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at British Journal of Anaesthesia online.

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Conflict of interest
Professor R.P.M. is Patient Safety lead of the RCoA, and Dr L.G. was Chairman of the Safety Committee of AAGBI.

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