III.—FREEDOM AND MODERN POLITICAL CONCEPTIONS.

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I.

Before endeavouring to ascertain how far modern political tendencies in Western Europe promote or impede the personal freedom of their citizens it is necessary first to indicate the meaning which is here given to the term 'freedom.'

Freedom is founded on the structural unity which human beings possess in common with all living organisms. It is characteristic of organisms that, in reaction to their environments, they maintain and develop their own peculiar unities. There is a sense in which, in these reactions, organisms express their own natures. But we do not regard living organisms as free so long as their reactions are conceived as taking place necessarily in accordance with laws which transcend their individual unities. A being is not free unless the manner of its reactions to the environment is in some sense indeterminate, and such indeterminacy can be regarded as rendered determinate by action proceeding from its own nature. In man this process of rendering an indeterminate future determinate connects with his power of apprehending and appreciating values. Apprehension informs him regarding the natures of objects experienced and of their likely effects upon himself, while appreciation arouses subjective feelings or emotions which promote the realisation of such effects as are valued. For this reason man is not entirely determined by influences proceeding from an environment already existing. He is also moved to action by the appreciation of ideal entities or conditions which are possible but not yet actual. Further, in so far as man's responses are of this kind, he is acting...
spontaneously and in accordance with his nature; for the appreciation which moves him to action is his own appreciation, springing from the unity which constitutes his personality. Further, persons are ever seeking self-fulfilment, and the motive underlying action directed by appreciation can be regarded as self-fulfilment. Neither is man an absolute individual, capable of achieving self-fulfilment in solitude. On the other hand he is dependent for his development on his relations with both his physical and his social environment.

The important conditions of human freedom may then be summarised as follows: (1) The existence of personalunities seeking self-fulfilment, (2) the presence of a certain indeterminacy in regard to the future conditions of such unities, (3) the possession of a power to direct the transition from an indeterminate future to a determinate present from within under guidance by apprehension of the nature and appreciation of the value of experience. Further (4) these necessitate harmonious co-operation both with the physical and with the social environment.

But these are not only conditions of freedom; they are also conditions of the opposite of freedom. A man can rightly be described as not free, or enslaved; but such descriptions are not usually applied to plants, or even to animals—despite the fact that further knowledge in regard to their ultimate structure may show them to be applicable. It happens that frequently there are very serious limitations to man's actual freedom, although the essential conditions are present. Such limitations are of two kinds. They may be (1) internal—springing from a condition within the person himself, or (2) external—arising from conditions in his environment over which he has no control. Among the former would be included such limitations as come from ignorance or lack of insight into and appreciation of the kind of experience which would promote satisfaction, weakness of will leading to inability to direct personal activity by such insight as is given, and prejudice and strong personal or group interests which destroy the capacity of apprehending and appreciating truly. External
conditions include such physical conditions as are caused by poverty or disease which leave men helpless in the face of hostile natural forces, or conditions in the social structure which give privileged groups of individuals power over others and enable them to use influence or force to assert their will.

We have conceived freedom as founded in the urge of the complex unity we describe as a person towards self-fulfilment. It implies the possession by persons of the power so to direct their responses to the environment that their resultant experiences lead to self-fulfilment. Under such conditions persons would habitually act as they would wish if activity were directed from within by understanding and appreciation. We have also assumed that, if man is to be free, he must discover the way of establishing harmonious relations with his environment. He cannot set aside natural laws or completely control other human wills; but he may, by harmonising his desire with natural tendencies and by co-operation and communion with other men, so direct his responses as to achieve satisfaction and self-fulfilment within these conditions. But in so far as he fails in this endeavour, nature and man must operate as external forces to limit his freedom.

When we look for an example of this conception of freedom Plato's philosopher appears to be the most striking. By education of his powers of rational and spiritual apprehension, the philosopher of the Republic attains insight into the values pervading the universe and human experience, and his life both of contemplation and of action is inspired by this vision. He controls and harmonises impulses springing from his lower nature, but spontaneously and without any sense of compulsion save that which comes from what is deepest within himself. He is drawn to what is highest by the affinity of his nature. Thus in all his activity and moods the philosopher is supremely himself—life for him being such as must lead to a maximum of self-fulfilment. At the same time while finding self-fulfilment he has also arrived at a deeply unifying experience. For the good to which he aspires is
universal goodness and is the goal towards which all others must proceed if they are to find satisfaction. The pursuit of the Good therefore leads to co-operation and communion with other rational beings.

Despite, however, the greatness of Plato's example, in a certain regard it appears to me inadequate. The philosopher in Plato is the ideal for a spiritual aristocracy and not merely for man as man. Apparently Plato accepted as natural, and without misgiving or protest, the division of Athenian citizens into legally free men and slaves, and he was convinced that only gifted members of the former class can possess the natural endowment which enables them to become philosophers and truly free. Thus just as Plato considered it natural for philosophers to order their lives from within, acting spontaneously in accordance with their apprehension of the good; in like manner he believed it to be as natural for slaves to accept guidance and control from philosophers, since they inevitably lacked that vision of the Good from which alone true guidance can come. This inadequacy in the conception of freedom was made good in the history of philosophy by Kant, when he enunciated the ethical principle that 'Each should treat humanity in his own person and in the person of others always as an end and never only as a means.' In Kant's conception every rational being belongs to the Kingdom of Ends as a sovereign, for he is conscious of himself as creating the laws to which he is subject; and Kant regards this as possible in so far as persons are able to abstract from their individual differences and from the content of their private ends. In proportion as they are able to accomplish this they will, without any sacrifice of freedom, find themselves united in submission to universal law. This change in emphasis became inevitable with the rise of Christianity and the insistence of its Founder on the worth of the individual irrespective of the class to which he belongs; and it embodies the principle from which democratic institutions have sprung.
II.

Having indicated the meaning given to 'freedom,' we will consider some of the principles fundamental to modern Corporate States—chief of which are Italian Fascism and Nazi Socialism—in their relation to personal freedom. These states manifest marked differences, dependent upon differences in national temperament and the characters of their respective dictators, but it is certain features which they possess in common that are relevant for this discussion.

The representatives of Corporate States affirm that the one purpose of government is the expression of their people's will and the promotion of their welfare. They insist, however, that the individual is a member of a people or community and cannot exist apart from the work of his fellow men. For this reason they hold that a natural society is an organic unity embodying ends transcending those of its individual members, and bearing within itself an implicit authority. Further they hold that the highest of all social organisms is the state. It embodies a unity of aspiration and purpose which has emerged from racial kinship, the possession of a common language, and of common traditions and history. Thus the authority of the state is absolute. The alleged nature of this authority is important. Authority resides in the state only in virtue of the fact that it expresses the general will. The conception implies the reality of a general will which transcends in value the will of any individual member. It seeks general and universal ends as against the individual ends of the members. The state is not a sum but a synthesis of individual interests and hence has its own higher and permanent ends to pursue. It follows therefore that the authority of the state is a moral authority. It enforces (according to the conception) only those ends which the individual citizen as a member of the organism must recognize as his own, and as right and good.

The view of unity and authority in Corporate States finds further expression in their conception of the Dictator
or Leader. It is claimed for both Mussolini and Hitler that they are men of the people who possess an extraordinary gift of intuiting and interpreting the sub-conscious ideals of their peoples—such ideals in the former case being enshrined in historical tradition, and in the latter in racial instinct. Each is regarded as the executor of his people's will; for he is said to bring to complete self-expression the purpose which indwells the race. For this reason the conception of authority which is inherent in the state is transferred to the Leader, and it is claimed that in serving him citizens make the common purpose their goal.

The position of the individual in Corporate States is also significant. It is recognised that he possesses rights, but at the same time it is assumed that these cannot conflict with his duty to the community. The natural rights of the individual, it is admitted, lie at the root of society; and if the state were to infringe them it would be defeating its own purpose. It is, however, the business of the state to promote the general welfare, and the state demands that the individual's welfare be made one with the general welfare. The individual is subordinate to the state but not because he is himself unimportant. His subordination follows from his vital dependence on the community, which it is the duty of the state to protect.

As corollaries to the assumed absolute character of their authority, Corporate States appear to claim: (a) the right to achieve their purposes by force whenever there is failure in achievement by persuasion, and (b) the further right to utilize all institutions within the state for the promotion of the way of life their governments approve. The claim to absolute authority is aided by the fact that the Leader's power to express his people's will be assumed to rest upon intuition rather than upon reason. Intuition can reject criticism on the ground that critics do not possess the insight which alone justifies conviction. Unfortunately, however, conclusions arrived at by intuition do not carry conviction with those who possess conflicting views of the means of promoting human welfare; and, so long as conflicting views remain, there is no other
alternative than to impose the supposedly absolute ends by force.

But how do the conditions created by Corporate States affect personal freedom? Democratic convictions and the inheritance of liberal traditions may predispose many to the view that the conception of the Corporate State is merely a convenient illusion accepted by rulers who wish to achieve national unity by depriving individual citizens of their liberties, and the entire absence in these states of many of the liberties which we cherish seems to support this view. But similar theories of the state have been held by Hegel and other thinkers, and it seems to me that these states do provide conditions which, in one respect, make a positive contribution to the personal freedom of many of their citizens.

If freedom, as we have maintained, implies self-fulfilment, the individual cannot obtain freedom in isolation from or in opposition to the society to which he belongs. On the other hand he can only find self-fulfilment by entering into mutually helpful relations with other individuals. In such relations the individual discovers himself in a manner that would not otherwise be possible, and at the same time does so by subordinating purely personal desire and purpose to the demands made upon him by membership of a society. This is obvious from a consideration of the simplest of societies into which an individual can enter, that of friendship. We all experience how we find ourselves in this relationship; and we know also the loyalty which it demands, a loyalty which is incompatible with pursuit of merely personal ends. Thus there is the emergence of a common purpose which would not be present apart from the relation, and the common purpose takes precedence of individual purpose. The individual becomes subject to law but a law which is willingly self-imposed. A like principle is operating in all societies into which individuals willingly enter; and in so far as the state is a real society it is present in the state. So far, therefore, as citizens are actually made to realise their membership of the state, it is true that they acquire aspiration and purpose which
transcends that of the individual, and that such aspiration and purpose are general to them all. Nor is it necessary to suppose that this more general purpose is suffered as externally imposed. Corporate States aim at creating among their peoples an experience of comradeship, and in so far as individual citizens possess this experience they accept the ends of the state as their own. Like friends they willingly concede the priority of the claims made by these ends. But the admission of the existence of purposes which members of communities possess in common does not necessitate the conception of the state as a transcendent reality possessing a general will. Human societies differ from other organic unities in that the members are in themselves ends, and the purposes with which these societies are concerned are those which belong to or are accepted by the members. Nevertheless, since the state is a society, citizens do possess common ends which could not have existed outside the state. The pursuit of these ends may assist them to realize themselves, and they may recognize instinctively the loyalty demanded of them. Thus citizens may, while enjoying comradeship with their fellow citizens, find enhanced freedom by accepting ends which the state pursues. Many in the Corporate States are possibly experiencing such a sense of enhanced freedom. They have been convinced that the basic purpose of the state is the restoration of the people’s honour and the promotion of their welfare. This is an end in the pursuit of which they willingly co-operate and in doing so find enlargement of their outlook and activity. By a change in Weltanschauung they have come to appreciate and to pursue more general ends, and in this respect have entered into greater freedom.

But this positive contribution to the conditions of freedom is unfortunately accompanied by disastrous limitations. These arise from the fact that Corporate States insist upon the acceptance of their ends as absolute. It is true that appreciation of ultimate values implies the conviction that such values are objective and universal, and that genuine appreciation is a unifying influence bringing common
loyalties, interests and purpose. But such appreciation is only possible for an individual in so far as he is able to free himself from dominance by merely personal ends. Although universal values can only be experienced by individuals in the particular situations in which they find themselves, they cannot be identified with individual ends. Now the state is an extensive and complex political organization, but any particular state is an individual among other individual states. Hence in so far as the ends of a state arise from its interests, these are of the nature of individual ends. It does not follow that they must necessarily conflict with universal ends, but it does imply that they must be regarded as subject to rational revision in the light of apprehension and appreciation of more general ends.

The Corporate States reject any such explanation of their ends and their rejection affects vitally the question of freedom, both as regards their relations with other states and their relations with their citizens. As regards the former, since corporate states are committed to the assertion of the final truth of their own forms of government and of the ends which they pursue, it is difficult for them to concede to other nations similar—or indeed any—claims when these conflict with their own, and the foundation of international co-operation is undermined. The effect of their assumption on the personal freedom of the subject is still more dangerous. It leads to the repression by force not only of those who for personal motives disregard the authority of the state, but also of those who find themselves out of harmony with its purpose because of the deeper apprehension which they possess. In pursuance of its ideal the state is necessarily obliged to repress some of the best as well as the worst among its citizens, and conditions are created which militate against the experience of the deepest freedom.

The control of all institutions for the promotion of the ends of the state is even more subversive of true freedom. This right is claimed by the rulers of Corporate States on the ground that it is necessary to ensure that the interests and ends of all citizens be harmonized with those of the state. Thus they control freedom of speech and of the
press, the manner in which citizens are permitted to unite in public organizations and societies, the entire system of education, and as far as possible all forms of social, cultural and spiritual activity. If the ends for which such control is exercised were truly universal the need for its exercise would disappear, and the imposing of control to ensure the acceptance of a view of life and ends sponsored by the state must endanger not only the existence but also the growth of freedom. The control of the educational system illustrates this point of view. Conditions which promote independent thought and development have been replaced by such as will lead coming generations to accept certain fixed notions of the state and of their functions as members of the community. While the view of life imparted carries with it the fervour of a new belief, the individuals concerned may be unaware of restriction of their freedom. Eventually, however, fervid belief must give place to conventional acceptance, and the system become an instrument for turning out men and women of a uniform pattern. The policy eliminates from the life of the nation conditions which are vital to full and free human development.

III.

Turning to the consideration of Communism we find that whereas Corporate States emphasize the unity and authority of the nation, Communism emphasizes the value and rights of individual citizens. Communism originated in rebellion against a social and economic order which supposedly permits a majority of human beings to be utilized, in a certain regard, as means and not as ends. Communists hold that a capitalist economic system in which mass production is a necessity must lead to warring interests between workers and those who control raw material and the instruments of production. The latter—they say—are immediately interested in production from the point of view of profit-making, whereas workers are obliged to sell their labour to them and thus become one of the many, although the most important,
means of production. Under the system it is not necessary for workers to be immediately interested in production. They have other interests such as family and social relationships, relaxation and entertainment, and perhaps intellectual and cultural pursuits, which impel them to sell their labour; but the immediate results of productive labour are not necessarily an end for them. In so far as this assumption is true it has an important bearing on the question of freedom, for it is clear that no person can be regarded as wholly free so long as he is compelled to spend the greater part of his working day pursuing ends which he does not appreciate; and it is a vital purpose of any communist government to effect such reorganization in the economic order as will ensure that workers possess responsibility for and interest in production. This basic purpose is embodied by the new constitution for the Soviet Union in the provisions which it makes for socialist ownership of the implements and means of production (which takes the form of either state ownership or co-operative and collective ownership), and for the prohibition of any form of private ownership which involves exploitation of the labour of others. In this manner it is sought to eliminate what is regarded as the necessary conflict of ends present in any capitalist system and to create in the worker a sense of his responsibility and importance. The provisions are such that the worker should be conscious of himself as an end, since he becomes immediately interested in the results of his labour. It is maintained that the transformation of the character and functions of trades unions under the system illustrates the manner in which the elimination of this radical conflict of ends is effected. Trades unions in the Soviet Republics include as members, in addition to the workers, those who are responsible for the supervision and direction of labour; and their most important purpose is not the securing of the interests of workers as against employers but increase in production.

The constitution referred to above indicates throughout how the problems of government have been thought out from the point of view of the individual. Not only its
provisions for ownership of the means of production, but the system of local, provincial and central administration; the provisions for franchise and for secret voting, and the definite rights conferred upon individuals, are all designed to give citizen workers effective responsibility and control. These rights include, in addition to those generally conferred by democratic constitutions, the right of every citizen (male and female) to guaranteed employment, with remuneration in accordance with its quantity and quality; the right to rest and holidays, to security in old age and sickness, and the right to whatever education is available in the state. Further it is definitely laid down that women are accorded equal rights with men in all fields of state, cultural, social and political life; and that the rights of all citizens are equal, irrespective of their nationality or race.

But it may be argued: what is the use of the conferment of rights unless the Government is in a position to render these effective? Communists are alive to this difficulty, but they are convinced that it can be overcome if central authorities are empowered to control all national resources and to utilize them to the best advantage for the well-being of all citizens. To this end they have extended the jurisdiction of these authorities over every department of public activity, in the belief that, with scientific planning of production and distribution, the rights to employment and remuneration guaranteed to citizens can be secured. Ideally then Communism may be regarded as an endeavour to create a society which confers real equality and freedom on all its members by obliging and enabling them to participate in socially necessary labour the fruits of which they enjoy. But how far have communist leaders succeeded in bringing about conditions which accord with this ideal?

As is the case with Corporate States the ideals of Communism appear to be by no means fully realized in the actual conditions which communist rulers have established. The manner in which this new form of human society has been brought into being has made this inevitable. The
policy of Lenin and his associates was directed towards the
termination of class conflicts by the elimination of all
privileged classes, and for them the dictatorship of the
proletariat was a necessary step in progress towards
socialism. Consequently the new order had to be main­
tained against determined opposition and could only be
secured by force—such force being at the disposal of the
majority and not of a powerful minority as heretofore.
Nor could Soviet rulers afford to be much less relentless
in their attitude towards those whom they wished to bring
within the new order. Following Marx they were con­
vinced that human happiness could only be achieved by
compulsorily introduced improvement in the material
conditions of life; and in the stress of revolutionary endea­
vour Lenin wrote: 'The world cannot be made happy
unless it is deprived of its freedom which is nothing but a
torment and a burden to it, and unless men are by force
maintained in a condition of earthly bliss thought out by
the authorities in accordance with reason.' This con­
viction may appear to be entirely opposed to the conception
of personal worth and rights embodied in the Soviet Con­
nstitution, nevertheless it expresses a very important feature
of the actual situation. The circumstances under which
Communism was brought into being compelled its leaders
to insist—if necessary by force—that the conception of the
type of society they were promoting should be accepted
without question by their followers. Among the rules for
admission to the Party are (1) acceptance of the creed, and
(2) implicit obedience; and, despite the liberty of speech
and freedom of the press which the new constitution
provides, it is doubtful whether these rights extend to dis­
agreement in regard to the fundamental structure of the
social order which has been devised. Citizens are expected
to assume that the principles which guide the action of
their rulers have been arrived at in accordance with
reason. This view also is regarded as sufficient justification
for utilizing important state institutions, such as the educa­
tional system, for the imparting of a definite conception of
life rather than for the development of free personality.
Thus Communism is another instance of insistence upon a limited ideal of life as final. In this case limitation in the conception has resulted from the rejection of values which were appreciated by the excluded privileged classes. Nevertheless, claiming complete rationality for their ideal, communists have sought to justify its propagation by force. It follows therefore that Communism also must rouse opposition not only from those who, for interested motives, wish to undermine the form of government which has been set up, but in addition from those who through deeper apprehension and appreciation are unable to accept the doctrine its rulers would enforce. For this reason Communism, like the Corporate States, must fail to provide the conditions for freedom.

IV.

In describing these two systems of government we have seen how Corporate States insist on national unity and authority, whereas Communism emphasizes the rights of the individual. Despite this difference of emphasis, however, the two conceptions are not so radically opposed as their representatives would have us believe. The unity and authority of Corporate States arise out of the necessary association of their citizens, and the need for central authority is supported on the ground that it is the only means of promoting their development and welfare. On the other hand the constitution for the Soviet Union evinces the conviction that the only way in which the rights of citizens can be guaranteed is by the extension of central power over every department of their corporate activity. The representatives of both these forms of government therefore admit that individual rights cannot be secured without adequate central authority, and that such central authority should exist not for itself but for the individuals whom it protects. Thus 'central power' and 'individual rights' are complementary rather than contradictory conceptions. Historically they have been present in
European history for many centuries. Insistence on authority appears in the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, and the development of Imperialism; and insistence on individual rights in the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution, and in Liberalism of the 19th century. The truth which gives rise to these complementary conceptions is embodied in the view of personal freedom which is explained in the opening section of this paper. Personal freedom involves true apprehension and true appreciation; and, in so far as the objects apprehended are universal, apprehension and appreciation carry with them their own authority and unite men in common endeavour. At the same time appreciation is always spontaneous, and the subordination of purely personal inclination and interests to more general ends is willingly accepted. In this subordination therefore there can be no infringement of human dignity and worth. It is the imperfect embodiments of these conceptions which war against each other, for both are powerfully influenced by the conditions in which they have emerged. Class warfare was regarded as the indispensable prelude to Communism, and the disintegrating influence of communist propaganda contributed largely to the growth of Corporate States. These circumstances have prejudiced their outlook and mutual relations, and made it appear necessary to assert their ends by force. But so long as force is necessary to ensure the acceptance of these ends the conditions which promote freedom cannot exist. For force operates as external compulsion compelling fear, and whatever the value of the ends imposed their acceptance is not spontaneous.

V.

It remains to consider how far the conditions which promote true freedom are provided by existing democratic governments. The democratic form of government has arisen out of recognition of the worth of human personality,
and rests upon the assumption of the essential equality of all men and of their right to govern themselves. In other words it is an acknowledgment of the principle that man is in himself an end. Citizens of democratic countries do of course differ in respect of their ability and experience and such differences lead to diversity in their functions, but they do not affect their legal equality as persons and citizens.

Now it is important to understand how vitally this conception of man as an end influences the conception of human society which a democratic form of government implies. It is expressed not only in the claim that a people shall govern themselves in all matters, where control by the state should make for general welfare, but also in the implicit demand that they shall remain uncontrolled in much that pertains to their mental and spiritual activity and development and yet does not rightly come under the authority of the state. Democratic forms of government appear to imply that persons are complex individuals, and that membership of any society does not embrace their entire personalities. The union of persons in societies may be real though not all embracing. The reality follows from the fact that certain purposes and ends may be possible of achievement within but not without the society. Any member of a society may discover that it provides the conditions which promote a certain aspect of his self-fulfilment, and he may therefore, in regard to certain of his activities, willingly agree to accept its authority. At the same time he may rightly hold that the society's authority does not extend over all his activities. Since a person is himself an end there must be a sense in which his deepest aspiration and purpose, which makes for unity in all his activities, must remain outside control by any society. In reply to this it may be argued that such limitation in authority does not apply to the state since the state is the highest form of human society, and its natural function is the promotion of every department of a people's welfare; whether material, intellectual, or spiritual. It is just this claim which undermines so dangerously the conditions for
freedom, and which democratic peoples are unwilling to admit. However embracing and important the unity and purpose of the state may be, its authority cannot extend over what concerns that growth and deep purpose which is man's in virtue of his common humanity. In the development of his mind and his power of appreciation, for example, man must recognize his indebtedness to all who have contributed to human advancement without respect of country or race, and the objects of his apprehension and appreciation are a universal possession. Neither can it be conceded that there may be no contradiction between absolute control by the state and the acceptance of direction by such apprehension and appreciation, since the state is the most perfect embodiment of the aspiration and will of its people. For apprehension and appreciation which arises in man through the exercise of reason in his wider human relationships claims his first allegiance; and, wherever any state seeks to impose final conceptions of the principles of government and the meaning of life, the higher authority of inner appreciation must either suffer repression or protest. Further, this rational authority, springing as it does from the deepest and most pervasive of human powers, inevitably spreads its influence over the varied interests and activities that make up a person's life. From this consideration then it follows that although the state possesses legitimate authority, since it organizes its citizens in a social and political order which is necessary for the promotion of their material progress and cultural development, any extension of the state's authority beyond its legitimate spheres of influence must militate against the deep sense of human worth upon which democratic states are founded, and must frustrate the individual's capacity to act and develop in accordance with apprehended and appreciated ends.

But since democracy assumes the essential equality of all men, it may be asked how far such equality has been achieved in practice. In discussing Communism we traced its origin to rebellion against a social and economic order which permits a majority of human beings to be treated as means. Communist leaders claim that democracy
means merely \emph{formal} equality, and that it has in fact led to the subjugation of the many to the few. Further advocates of Corporate States, although differing radically in their view of the remedy, agree in their conviction regarding the truth of this fact. They hold for instance that the Liberalism of the 19th century, while it aimed at liberty and self-realization for all, resulted in providing the conditions of self-realization only for the few. The conception of the equality and rights of individuals, they say, gave birth to claims for security from external interference of private enterprise and private property, which eventually resulted in the subjection of the majority to a powerful minority. It conferred upon the minority privileges which they use their influence to conserve; and democratic governments have, they hold, provided no radical solution of the problem involved. Representatives of both these new forms of government would urge that democracies have conceived their responsibilities in a negative rather than in a positive manner; regarding it as a duty rather to avoid interference with the existing liberties of their subjects, than to create conditions which give reality to the equality assumed. In so far as this conviction rests on true appreciation of the facts it must be admitted that there exists in democratic countries a situation which is incompatible with the fundamental principle upon which their form of government is based.

It is generally assumed that while, in this situation, the many are deprived of the possibility of freedom, freedom is granted to the few. In my view it is much more in accordance with fact to describe it as a situation which prevents both classes from becoming truly free. For, since freedom implies the capacity spontaneously to direct activity in accordance with true apprehension and appreciation, it is possible only for those who are able to free themselves from dominance by interests and purposes which are primarily individual and possess preparedness to accept and examine facts that are given. But the acquisition of exclusive powers by any class tends to prejudice them against changes which would diminish their exclusive
privileges*. It thus promotes in them a kind of lie in the soul, distorting the power of apprehension and appreciation in such manner as to weaken appreciation of those influences which make for change, even when change would be in the direction of ends which are more just and of greater worth. The consequence of this condition then is twofold; first, it tends to prevent a privileged class from achieving perfect freedom, though they have the appearance of freedom since they possess power to attain ends which they seek; and secondly, it implies for the many external conditions which limit their freedom in the manner already indicated.

To sum up; the Corporate States and Communism are, in different ways, reactions against a conflict of ends assumed to be inherent in existing democratic states. It is now possibly generally admitted that such radical conflict within the social and economic system does exist despite all that has been done by legislation and benevolent social effort to level opportunity and to mitigate the circumstances of the more unfortunate. Until the cause of conflict is removed the conditions which make for perfect freedom cannot be said to exist, and there remains therefore the problem of effecting by persuasion such transformation of the political and economic structure as will lead to its removal. For if the conditions of freedom are the end desired such transformation cannot be effected by force.

Finally, I recognize the complexity of the problem which has been raised and the inadequacy both of my treatment of freedom and of the conceptions of the forms of government to which reference has been made. At the same time the endeavour to understand the relevance of a general conception of freedom to movements with which we must be concerned appears to me important. Further, I am fully aware that freedom is a spiritual condition which no government can provide, but which each citizen must win

* Similarly the possession of overwhelming power by a nation tends to result in the direction of its policy by national interests, rather than by any clear apprehension of justice in reference to the issues with which it is confronted.
for himself if he wishes to be free. Nevertheless govern­ments can create conditions which facilitate the achievement of freedom, and I have attempted to elucidate the nature of these conditions. Behind the argument is the assumption that personal freedom is a value which must be acknowledged by man.