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# **Winds of Doctrine**

## **Studies in Contemporary Opinion**

**By: George Santayana**

**Edited by: David E Spiech, Martin A. Coleman,  
Faedra Lazar Weiss**

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# Notes to the Text

## 1926 PREFACE

lxxix.25 *Crise de l'Esprit*] “La crise de l’esprit” is the French title of “The Crisis of the Mind,” a two-part essay by French writer Paul Valéry (1871–1945), which consists of two open letters articulating an intellectual crisis in Europe after World War I (published in *The Collected Works of Paul Valéry*, Vol. 10, *History and Politics*, trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews [New York: Pantheon Books, 1962], 23–36). Valéry diagnosed disorder in the European mind due to the variety of opinions that marks modernism. He considered whether Europe could maintain its predominance in the world as technology spread, and he suggested that freedom might be more effectively sought by studying “the thinking individual in his struggle for a personal life against his life in society” rather than looking at social groups. The work was commissioned by John Middleton Murry for the English-language publication *The Athenaeum* and appeared in the 11 April 1919 and 2 May 1919 issues, with a French version appearing in August in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* 13 (1919): 321–37. For more information on the publication history see Valéry, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, 575–76. Santayana was in Paris when Valéry’s French version appeared (*LGS*, 2:529). Santayana also published articles in 1919 in *The Athenaeum*, which he later included in his *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922); and in a 1920 letter to John Middleton Murry he acknowledged seeing *The Athenaeum* regularly (*LGS*, 2:403). Santayana mentioned Paul Valéry as a significant and characteristic figure “among the moderns” (*The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1931, 16), and he wrote of Valéry in a 1931 letter, “How he understands our times!” (*LGS*, 4:275). Santayana’s personal library included seven books by Valéry published between 1926 and 1952, most including marginalia in Santayana’s hand. For a study of the relation of the thought of Santayana and Valéry, see Daniel Pinkas, “Santayana and Valéry,” *BSS* 17 (1999): 26–34.

lxxix.25–26 *Untergang des Abendlandes*;] *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte* (Munich: C. H. Beck) is the most influential of more than a dozen books by German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler (1880–1936). The two volumes of this work appeared in 1918 and 1922, with the English version *The Decline of the West* (New York: A. A. Knopf) published in 1926 and 1928. Spengler believed that human civilizations are born, mature, and die according to a repeating natural pattern such as is

observed in biological phenomena and he thought that European civilization was at the end of its natural lifecycle. Spengler's notion of historical development stands in contrast to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) understanding of history as a rational process of absolute spirit actualizing itself. Santayana's personal library included *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, both volumes of which contain extensive and often critical marginalia in Santayana's hand. Santayana remarked on reading Spengler in a letter dated 23 February 1923 (*LGS*, 3:128), and in a 1 February 1929 letter he mentions finishing an article on Spengler (*LGS*, 4:105). The next month his article "Spengler" appeared in *The New Adelphi*, March 1929: 210–14 (reprinted in George Santayana, *The Idler and His Works*, ed. Daniel Cory [New York: George Braziller, 1957], 87–96). See Note 11.15 Hegel.

lxxix.32 *morituri te salutamus*; ] A variant of "Ave imperator, morituri te salutant!" [Latin for "Hail, emperor; they who are about to die salute thee!"] Santayana's rendering uses the first-person plural conjugation: "we salute thee." It is attributed to the prisoners of war and condemned criminals compelled by Claudius to fight in a mock sea battle on the Fucine Lake in 52 AD (Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, Vol. 2, trans. J. C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library 38 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914], 42–43).

## THE INTELLECTUAL TEMPER OF THE AGE

l.30 Goethe ] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), German poet, dramatist, novelist, critic, statesman, and scientist, became famous with the success of his novel *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* (1774) (*The Sorrows of Werter*, 1779). He and Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) transformed German literature as leaders of the *Sturm und Drang* movement. As a scientist, Goethe published works in comparative anatomy and optics. He disputed Isaac Newton's (1643–1727) theory of color, improved on Carolus Linnaeus's (1707–1778) taxonomy, and aligned himself with pre-Darwinians in finding continuity in the development of humans and other animals. His best-known work is his *Faust*, a two-part dramatic poem in the *Sturm und Drang* style, begun in 1773 and completed in 1831. Santayana regarded Goethe as philosophically significant in his expression of an influential worldview, namely a romantic one that "presents experience in its immediacy, variety, and apparent groundlessness," but there is, claimed Santayana, no totality in this presentation because there is no ground (*TPP*, 121). In his *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910), Santayana characterizes Goethe as "the poet of romantic experience, [who] will tell us that we must renounce, renounce perpetually" (*TPP*, 41). In his later *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana described Goethe as "many-sided, not encyclopædic; he went out to greet the

variety of things, he did not pack it together. . . . Nevertheless the sympathies of Goethe were only romantic or æsthetic; they were based on finding in others an interesting variation from himself, an exotic possibility, rather than an identity with himself in thought or in fate" (*EGP*, 45–46). In a letter Santayana reflected on his different treatments of Goethe in his earlier and later books regarding Goethe's "sworn allegiance to Life [and] romantic philosophy" (*LGS*, 8:399). Anthony Woodward, in his article "Santayana and Goethe," examined Santayana's ambivalence toward Goethe and suggested that Santayana was "a kind of spiritual cousin of Goethe" (*BSS* 9 [1991]: 7). See also David Dilworth, "Santayana's Repression of Goethe," *BSS* 38 (2020): 55–67. Santayana's personal library included *Goethes Gedichte* (*Goethe's Poetry*) (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1905).

2.1–2 it is sweet to see the moon . . . mildly shining. ] Paraphrase of text in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749–1832) autobiography. Goethe wrote of meeting, after a recently failed love affair, a friend's daughters, "von denen die älteste mich gar bald besonders anzog. Es ist eine sehr angenehme Empfindung, wenn sich eine neue Leidenschaft in uns zu regen anfängt, ehe die alte noch ganz verklungen ist. So sieht man bei untergehender Sonne gern auf der entgegengesetzten Seite den Mond aufgehn und erfreut sich an dem Doppelglanze der beiden Himmelslichter" ["of whom the eldest soon particularly attracted me. It is a very pleasant sensation when a new passion begins to stir in us, before the old one is quite extinct. Thus, when the sun is setting, one often likes to see the moon rise on the opposite side, and takes delight in the double lustre of the two heavenly luminaries"] (*Goethes Sämtliche Werke, Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Vol. 3, ed. Eduard von der Hellen [Stuttgart: Cotta, 1902], 138; the English version is from *The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe*, Vol. 2, trans. John Oxenford [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974], 188). See Note 1.30 Goethe.

2.12 Babel ] Genesis 11:1–9 relates that Noah's descendants attempted to construct a tower in the city of Babel that would reach to heaven. God observed this and said, "The people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do" (Genesis 11:6). So God confused the language of the workers, disrupting construction of the tower and introducing the variety of human languages. The term "babel" has come to refer to confusion.

3.2 Reformation, ] Also known as the Protestant Reformation, it began during the sixteenth century in Western Europe as an effort to reform the Roman Catholic Church. It was the catalyst for massive political upheaval and resulted in the establishment of Protestant churches that rejected the authority of the Roman Catholic Church. The term "Protestant" was first applied to a group of German

political leaders who protested the decision of Charles V (1500–1558), Holy Roman Emperor, to revoke each leader's right to decide independently whether to observe the Roman Catholic condemnation of German theologian Martin Luther (1483–1546). For Santayana, the Reformation was the second of the three Rs of modernity, the first and third being the Renaissance and the (French) Revolution; of these three Rs, he wrote that they “have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline” (*GTB*, 8). Of the Reformation in particular, Santayana wrote,

[It] had a mental façade which completely hid the forces that really moved it, and the direction in which its permanent achievements would lie. It gave out that it was a religious reform and revival, and it easily enlisted in its cause all the shocked consciences, restless intellects, and fanatical hearts of the day; but in its very sincerity it substituted religious experience for religious tradition, and that, if the goal had been really religious, would have been suicide: for in religious experience, taken as its own criterion, there is nothing to distinguish religion from moral sentiment or from sheer madness. . . . The fact is, I think, that the Reformation from the beginning lived on impatience of religion and appealed to lay interests: to the love of independence, national and personal; to free thought; to local pride; to the lure of plunder and enterprise; to the sanctity of thrift. . . . [After the Reformation] religion is to be regarded as an instrument for producing a liberal well-being. But when this is secured, and we have creature comforts, a respectable exterior, and complete intellectual liberty, what in turn are the spiritual fruits? None: for the spirit, in this system, is only an instrument, and its function is fulfilled if those earthly advantages are realised. (*GTB*, 8–9)

See also Note 25.37 Luther.

3.7 Voltaire ] Pseudonym of François Marie Arouet (1694–1778), French playwright, poet, and philosopher. He was born in Paris to a wealthy family and educated at Louis-Le-Grand, a Jesuit school. Voltaire lived in exile in London from 1726 to 1728 and returned a great admirer of the empiricism of Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and John Locke (1632–1704). He criticized Christianity, especially as represented in the philosophy of Blaise Pascal (1623–1662, French mathematician and philosopher), and he opposed the institutions of the Catholic Church, which he believed promoted superstition and fanaticism. He also attacked atheism, being a Deist who believed in God and personal immortality as sources of meaning in human life. His skeptical humanism acknowledged the fallible character of human knowledge, and he believed no one was knowledgeable enough to have just cause to persecute those with opposing philosophical or theological beliefs. Voltaire's own theological preoccupations

included the problem of evil, which he initially thought resolved in the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). However, he later rejected Leibniz’s philosophy in his satire *Candide, ou l’optimisme* (1759) (*Candide, or All for the Best* [1759]). Other works by Voltaire include *Lettres philosophiques* (1734) (*Philosophical Letters on the English Nation* [1788]), *Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations* (1756) (*Essays on the Manners and Spirit of Nations* [1758]), and *Dictionnaire philosophique* (1764) (*Philosophical Dictionary* [1764]). In a 1922 letter, Santayana reported owning Voltaire’s “complete works in 69 volumes . . . , having got them second hand in a very nice edition (1793, I think) for 400 francs” (*LGS*, 3:113). See Note 41.27 Locke; Note 42.6 Pascal; and Note 59.14 Leibniz.

3.8 Rousseau ] Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Swiss-born French philosopher, author, political theorist, and composer. Rousseau went to France as a teenager and read extensively in Savoy as he educated himself with the guidance of Françoise-Louise de Warens, who convinced him to convert from Calvinism to Catholicism. Her religious influence on Rousseau included Deistic beliefs and a rejection of original sin and hell. He went to Paris in 1742 to pursue a musical career and met Denis Diderot (1713–1784), who invited him to write for the *Encyclopédie* (1751–72), the 28-volume Enlightenment project. In 1754 Rousseau returned to Geneva and became a Calvinist again. Of his many works, his best known and most influential are *Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754) (*A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind* [1762]), *Émile, ou de l’Éducation* (1762) (*Emile, or On Education* [1764]), *Du contrat social* (1762) (*The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right* [1764]), and *Les Confessions* (1782, 1789) (*Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* [1783–90]). In *Émile*, Rousseau laid out an educational program that rejected corrupting social influences with the aim of preserving the natural goodness of all humans. The religious views expressed in this work were Deistic, affirming the existence of God, the soul, and the afterlife on the basis of individual conscience and a personal relationship with God. In *The Social Contract* he argued that the body of citizens should rule itself through the general will, which arises from each citizen and so each is justly subject to it. In this work Rousseau distinguished civil religion from natural religion, with the former being determined by the state and prohibiting dogmatic intolerance. Rousseau’s philosophy and works, and in particular *Émile*, offended both Catholic and Protestant authorities, spurring him to go into exile, although he returned to France in 1768. Leaders of the French Revolution took up Rousseau’s ideas and regarded him as an intellectual inspiration. Santayana’s library included a single-volume edition of *Du contrat social; Les Rêveries d’un promeneur solitaire* (*The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912).

3.8 Bossuet ] Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627–1704), French writer, orator, theologian, educator, political thinker, Catholic priest, and Bishop of Meaux. His sermons, and especially his funeral orations for figures at the court of Louis XIV, earned him the reputation of France’s greatest orator. From 1670 to 1681 Bossuet was a tutor to the king’s son, after which he became Bishop of Meaux. He corresponded with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) in pursuit of a peaceful reunification of the Christian church. He worked diligently to protect the Catholic Church from Protestants, freethinkers, and heretics (a heretic, according to Bossuet, is “he who has an opinion”), as well as fellow Catholics who advocated new doctrines. He opposed the philosophies of René Descartes (1596–1650, French philosopher, scientist, and mathematician; often cited as the originator of modern philosophy) and Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715, French Cartesian philosopher) which he studied closely, and stood in opposition to the cultural and intellectual currents that would become known as the Enlightenment. Unsurprisingly, he was a main target of Voltaire’s (1694–1778) criticism. Bossuet’s significant works include *Exposition de la doctrine catholique* (1671) (*An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church*), which sought to purge Catholicism of falsehoods, legends, and superfluous doctrines; *Discours sur l’histoire universelle* (1681) (*Discourse on Universal History*), which demonstrates the Christian view of the authority of the divine in history; and *Histoire des variations des églises protestantes* (2 vols., 1688) (*History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*), which was one of many publications attacking Protestantism that he authored. Santayana’s personal library included a copy of Herbert Spencer’s *The Study of Sociology*, 19th ed. (London: 1897) in which Santayana wrote a list of social and political philosophy titles on the endpaper, including “Bossuet *Discours de l’histoire universelle*.” In *Reason in Religion* Santayana quotes *Discours sur l’histoire universelle* on the flood narrative in Genesis 6–9 (LR3, 57), and in a 1932 letter, Santayana characterizes Bossuet along with playwright and poet Jean Racine (1639–1699) as “austere Catholics of the seventeenth century” (LGS, 4:310). See also Note 3.7 Voltaire; for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, see Note 59.14 Leibniz.

3.8 Fénelon. ] François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715), French writer, theologian, educator, political thinker, Catholic priest, and Bishop of Cambrai. Born into a noble family in the southwest of France, he studied at the Collège du Plessis in Paris in 1674, took a doctorate in theology at Cahors, and was ordained in 1677. He concentrated on preaching and writing and had special interest in the conversion of Protestants. In 1689, he began an eight-year engagement as tutor to the grandsons of Louis XIV (1638–1715), King of France. From this came his best-known work, *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699) (*The Adventures of Telemachus*), a novel that uses the voyage of Telemachus in the *Odyssey* to exem-



plify virtues and skills appropriate to a young monarch; it is regarded as the first novel written for children. He came into conflict with his friend and patron Bossuet over the controversy regarding the teachings of Madame Guyon. Bossuet attacked Guyon's teachings as a Quietist heresy, which held that perfection entails abandoning oneself to God such that one becomes completely passive and eliminates all willing. Fénelon defended Madame Guyon against the accusation of heresy. Although Fénelon made a convincing defense and had many friends in Rome and France, his adversaries were stronger; Fénelon had angered Louis XIV with his defense of Madame Guyon and with the publication of *The Adventures of Telemachus*, which the king took as personal criticism. In March 1699, after a request by Louis XIV, Pope Innocent XII condemned Fénelon, who dutifully submitted to the Pope's authority. Fénelon, in spite of his loyalty to the Catholic Church, has come to be seen as a forerunner of the Enlightenment. One reason was his interest in the individual soul and its motivations, which would now be understood as psychology. His attention to the self and subjective experience served as a model to later writers such as Rousseau.

3.11 modernist, ] An advocate of Modernism, which was, in the context of Catholicism, a twentieth-century movement that attempted to reconceive doctrine in light of recent scientific and philosophical developments. Modernism included diverse views but tended to take a critical rather than literal view of the Bible, emphasize practice over doctrine in understanding the Christian life, and find meaning in history by looking to the results of processes rather than their origins. Leading Catholic Modernist theologians included Alfred Firmin Loisy (1857–1940), Lucien Laberthonnière (1860–1932), George Tyrrell (1861–1909), Maurice Blondel (1861–1949), Romolo Murri (1870–1944), and Édouard Le Roy (1870–1954). Modernists often regarded favorably the philosophies of Henri Bergson (1859–1941) and William James (1842–1910), the latter being Santayana's teacher and, later, colleague at Harvard. Pope Leo XIII (reigned 1878–1903) was tolerant of Modernist theology, though he grew more critical of it over time. Pope Pius X (reigned 1903–1914) regarded the movement as heretical and condemned it in 1907; the following year, Loisy was excommunicated from the Catholic Church. In a 18 March 1909 letter, Santayana writes of reading "Loisy, Tyrrell, and Paul Sabatier (who is a Protestant, but a great friend of the 'Modernists') as well as the Pope's Encyclical 'Pascendi' and other documents" (*LGS*, 1:402). Santayana's personal library included works by Le Roy and Loisy and by Bergson and James. Santayana considers Modernism in Chapter 2 of *Winds of Doctrine* and the philosophy of Henri Bergson in Chapter 3. See Note 8.18 William James; for Henri Bergson, see Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson; for Pius X and his condemnation of Modernism and his encyclical



letter *Pascendi*, see Note 28.19–20 Pius X . . . modernism; and for Édouard Le Roy, see Note 30n.1–2 M. Le Roy.

3.25 Liberalism ] An ideology or set of political doctrines that traditionally opposes absolute rule, whether feudal, monarchical, military, clerical, or communitarian, and typically supports individual rights, democratic institutions, and capitalist economies. Liberalism emerged in response to seventeenth-century European religious wars and promoted religious tolerance rather than government-enforced uniform belief as the basis for peace. In practice it has protected private property and promoted freedom of religion, expression, and association. Liberalism has drawn intellectual support from the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679, English philosopher), John Locke (1632–1704), David Hume (1711–1776), Adam Smith (1723–1790, English philosopher and political economist), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). There are diverging interpretations of liberalism, with some emphasizing economic freedom while supporting state intervention in moral life and others emphasizing minimal state intervention in all areas. Santayana was often critical of liberalism and wrote about it in “Liberalism and Culture” and “The Irony of Liberalism” in *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies* (1922), “Alternatives to Liberalism” in the journal *Saturday Review of Literature* (1934), and “Liberalism in a Thankless World” in *Dominations and Powers* (1951). See also Note 5.16 Kant; for Hume, see Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.27 Locke; and Note 46.20 Mill.

3.39 “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” ] An expression of the fundamental principle of the ethical doctrine that came to be known as Utilitarianism, as articulated by English philosophers and social reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Bentham wrote, “*It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong*” (*A Fragment on Government* [London: 1776], ii; italics in the original) and later referred to this as “the greatest happiness principle.” This expression has long been associated with Bentham, though he is not the original author. Bentham claimed to have read it in the work of English polymath Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), and Bentham’s friend and editor John Bowring (1792–1872) cited Priestley’s *Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768) as the source; but in fact the phrase does not appear there. Elsewhere, Bentham raised the possibility that he took the expression from Italian criminologist and economist Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794). According to English philologist and librarian Robert Shackleton (1919–1986), “There can be no reasonable doubt that it was the English version of [Beccaria’s] *Dei delitti e delle pene* [*On Crimes and Punishments*] which put the phrase ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ before the

eyes of Bentham” (Robert Shackleton, “The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The History of Bentham’s Phrase,” *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 90 [1972]: 1474). For John Stuart Mill, see Note 46.20 Mill.

5.16 Kant, ] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), German philosopher, born in Königsberg, East Prussia (today Kaliningrad, Russia), established the philosophical position known as critical idealism. His teachers were Pietists influenced by the German philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Kant himself found inspiration in Rousseau and Newton. Except for a time when he worked as a tutor in the countryside, Kant spent his life as a student and a teacher in Königsberg. Kant maintained that all knowledge is conditioned by the structure of the mind, though he did not deny that there is a reality independent of this structure. Knowledge of experienced objects or “phenomena” is contrasted with the independent reality of things-in-themselves or “noumena.” Our ability to *perceive* phenomena includes the necessary “pure forms of intuition,” space and time, which structure the representations delivered by the senses. Our ability to *understand* phenomena includes the necessary “pure concepts of the understanding” or “categories,” such as causality and substance. In Kant’s moral philosophy, the categorical imperative is the fundamental rule of behavior governing rational agents; it declares what ought to be done from the perspective of pure reason, independent of individual motives or desires. The general formulation commands one to act only on a maxim that can at the same time be consistently willed to be a universal law (a maxim being a particular determination of the will). For example, if acting on the maxim “I will lie by promising to repay money that I desperately need but can never repay,” it cannot be willed to be a universal law without contradiction. The attempt would yield the universal law “Whenever one is in need, one may obtain what is needed by making a false promise,” but if this were a universal law every promise would become suspect and the practice of making promises would become meaningless. Hence as a universal law it is contradictory and in violation of the categorical imperative. Of greater significance is that in choosing the categorical imperative as an essential law of reason, rational agents achieve moral freedom. The rational agent, in choosing the rational categorical imperative, gives the law to him or herself and thus achieves autonomy. To choose an irrational course is to destroy the capacity to choose and to surrender one’s freedom (the moral agent then falls into heteronomy). Santayana read Kant as a sower of the seeds of egotism that grew into Romanticism. According to Santayana, egotism is “subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals—which is the soul of German philosophy” (*EGP*, 6). He wrote that Kant did not embrace that “principle of dogmatic egotism that nothing is able to exist unless I am able to know it” (*EGP*, 55), but he

claimed that Kant was “misled by the psychological fallacy that nothing can be an object of knowledge except some idea in the mind, [which] led him in the end to subjectivism” (*EGP*, 55–56). This “void outside” and the internal absoluteness of the categorical imperative “are germs of egotism” (*EGP*, 56). Santayana saw Kant’s philosophy developed in the direction of egotism and Romanticism in Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), ultimately leading to Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) (*EGP*, 65). Kant’s major works include *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781, 1787) (*Critique of Pure Reason*), *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (1783) (*Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a Science*) and in moral philosophy *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785) (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*) and *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788) (*Critique of Practical Reason*). Santayana’s personal library included *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, in German and two English translations; and *Critique of Practical Reason*, each with extensive annotations in Santayana’s hand. See Note 3.8 Rousseau; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 59.14 Leibnitz; and for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean.

5.17 Darwin, ] Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882), English naturalist, born in Shrewsbury to a family of physicians. He studied medicine at Edinburgh, but grew to dislike it. Darwin took up theology at Cambridge, but natural history remained his passion. After graduating from Cambridge he participated in a five-year voyage exploring southern South America. He is known for his theory of evolution of species, explained in his work *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859). Darwin argued that species evolve through natural selection of random variations. His theory did not assume progress through evolution or that one biological type is absolutely better than another. Other important works by Darwin include *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871) and *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872). Santayana praised Darwin’s naturalism and regarded his contribution to philosophical cosmology as comparable to those of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza (*LGS*, 7:221; *PGS*, 12–13). In particular, Darwin “did more than any one since Newton to prove that mechanism is universal” (*LR1*, 58). Santayana wrote that “as earlier naturalists had shown us how mechanical causes might produce the miracle of the sunrise and the poetry of the seasons, so Darwin showed us how similar causes might secure the adaptation of animals to their habitat. Evolution, so conceived, is nothing but a detailed account of mechanical origins” (*LR5*, 62). Santayana explained that “a naturalism like that of Darwin . . . is a denial of Aristotelianism” because new species may arise; generations differ not by degree of perfection but in the very perfection at which they aim: “the very ground plan of organisation may gradually change and a new form and a new

ideal may appear" (*LR5*, 63). He continued, "All that is scientific or Darwinian in the theory of evolution is accordingly an application of mechanism, a proof that mechanism lies at the basis of life and morals" (*LR5*, 64). Darwin's work greatly influenced Santayana's account of human reason in *The Life of Reason*. Santayana wrote that "a better example of [reason's] essential working could hardly be found than one which Darwin gives to illustrate the natural origin of moral sense" (*LR1*, 159). (Santayana's reference is to "Comparison of the Mental Power of Man and the Lower Animals," Chapter 3 of *The Descent of Man* [New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1871], 1:87.)

5.17 Bismarck, ] Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), German political leader, born in Pomerania into a family of the Protestant, land-owning Prussian aristocracy. After serving as a member of the Prussian parliament and an ambassador to St. Petersburg and Paris, he became Chief Minister of Prussia in 1862 under Wilhelm I. Bismarck was known as a reactionary with an imposing personal presence and remembered as a skilled practitioner of *realpolitik* (political realism, which values national interest over ideals). He unified Germany through wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–71), which resulted in the establishment of the Second German Empire and his appointment as Chancellor of Germany. Known as the "Iron Chancellor," Bismarck worked to maintain peace through a strong military; alliances with Austria, Britain, and eventually Russia; and a diplomatic strategy of isolating France. Domestically, his political realism rather than principle led him between 1883 and 1887 to institute liberal reforms such as welfare programs and labor protections, as a way to weaken increasingly popular socialist leaders. He served as Chancellor from 1871 until 1890, when, two years after assuming the throne, young Kaiser Wilhelm II forced Bismarck to resign.

5.17 Nietzsche: ] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), German philosopher and critic, born in Röcken, Saxony, the son of a Lutheran pastor. Educated in classical philology at Bonn and Leipzig, he became a professor at the University of Basel when he was 24 years old and before receiving his doctorate. Nietzsche came to philosophy through Arthur Schopenhauer's (1788–1860) *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818) (*The World as Will and Representation*), which influenced him greatly. Nietzsche was concerned primarily with finding an alternative to the nihilistic cultural reaction he foresaw as a result of the declining influence of traditional religious and philosophical beliefs. He was openly hostile to traditional religion and morality, and he sought an affirmative philosophy that could replace the absolutist and rationalistic metaphysics and Judeo-Christian traditions that could no longer provide meaning and value. His philosophical approach was naturalistic and perspectival, acknowledging

that different individuals, institutions, and cultures flourished under different moral conceptions. Moralities have a history rooted in cultural circumstances that can be understood genealogically. Nietzsche thought a new morality could be conceived suitable to a higher humanity that recognized and affirmed what he called the “will to power,” which led him to take creativity as a guiding idea in formulating naturalistic human values. His philosophical writings most often are aphoristic, which suits his perspectival philosophical method. In *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana wrote three chapters criticizing Nietzsche as an “imperturbable egotist” whom he thought “hardly fair . . . to judge . . . as a philosopher” (*EGP*, 114). Santayana acknowledged the temptation to dismiss Nietzsche’s work as “the swagger of an immature, half-playful mind,” but he took Nietzsche’s “explosions [to be] symptomatic; there stirs behind them unmistakably an elemental force. . . . Nietzsche, in his general imbecility, betrays the shifting of great subterranean forces. What he said may be nothing, but the fact that he said it is all-important” (*EGP*, 135). In a marginal note to *De Nietzsche à Hitler* (1936) (*From Nietzsche down to Hitler*) by Marius Paul Nicolas, Santayana wrote that Nietzsche “was a genius: but in politics he was an aesthete” (*MARG*, 2:90). Important works by Nietzsche include *Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik* (1872) (*The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music*); *Also Sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen* (1883–85) (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*); *Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft* (1886) (*Beyond Good and Evil: Overture to a Philosophy of the Future*), and *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift* (1887) (*Toward the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*). See also Note 46.33 the “Will” of Schopenhauer.

5.20–21 cry with Faust: “Two souls, alas, dwell in my bosom!” ] The quotation is from Part I (1808) of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749–1832) epic drama *Faust: Eine Tragödie*, in which the title character wearies of academic pursuits with their abstractions and limitations and longs for vivid experience and unlimited knowledge. Mephistopheles wagers that he can gratify Faust’s longing, and so he and Faust agree that if ever Faust be satisfied and cease striving, then Mephistopheles may claim his soul. The text that Santayana quoted may be found in *Faustus, A Tragedy: Translated from the German of Goethe* (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1834), 39. “Two souls” refers to Faust’s competing impulses: a “stubborn fondness for the world” and a life in material nature versus aspiration “to regions where our great forefathers dwell” and intellectual pursuits (*Faustus*, 40). See Santayana’s discussion in *Three Philosophical Poets*, 91–92, and see Note 1.30 Goethe.

5.38 Ruskin, ] John Ruskin (1819–1900), English writer, artist, critic, and social reformer, born in London and educated at Oxford University. He was the most

influential art critic of his day and was the first Slade Professor of Fine Art (1870–78; 1883–85) at Oxford, where he gave lectures and lessons, designed curricula, and established a drawing program. Much of his art criticism dates from his early career, with his attention turning to social issues in the late 1850s; yet he always exhibited concern with the relation of art, morality, and social justice. His most influential art criticism extolled sincerity and truth to nature, and he held good art to be moral and bad art to be insincere and immoral. He was regarded by a broad public as a source of moral wisdom and commentary on contemporary issues. Ruskin was a prolific writer (the standard edition of his complete works comprises 39 volumes). His most well-known works include *Modern Painters: Their Superiority in the Art of Landscape Painting to the Ancient Masters*, 5 vols. (1843–60), which begins with a defense of his artistic hero, the painter J. M. W. Turner (1775–1851) and concludes with attention to art's social context; *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849), which takes up architecture as a political and moral art expressive of social values; *The Stones of Venice*, 3 vols. (1851–53), an extensively researched and deeply personal work about Venice, which judges the Renaissance as the ruin of the city; and *Unto This Last* (1860), which Ruskin regarded as “the one that will stand . . . surest and longest of all work of mine.” *Unto This Last* argues that the truest principles of social organization are found in the Christian Gospels, in opposition to the so-called science of political economy. Ruskin was for wage equality and for labor that serves life, arguing that to be “valuable” is to “avail towards life.” Other reforms he supported, such as old age pensions, later became common policy. His own inheritance, exhausted by the end of his life, he used for philanthropic work. Ruskin founded the Guild of St. George as a utopian venture to promote medieval values and social improvement; the organization still exists today as an educational charity. Santayana wrote in *Persons and Places* that he “profited by, and built [his] love of architecture upon,” Ruskin’s *The Stones of Venice* (PP, 86). However, Santayana thought the Italian Gothic style popularized by Ruskin “absurdly out of place, bastard, and theatrical” (PP, 138), and it left Santayana “quite cold, in spite of *The Stones of Venice*” (PP, 138). Santayana found an excellent corrective to Ruskin in the article on architecture in his family’s *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: “The illustrations were all plans, elevations, and sections; and the only styles treated were the classic and the ‘Italian’. There were no perspective views. I was thus introduced to the art professionally; and the structural interest became as great for me as the picturesque” (PP, 143).

5.39 Pater ] Walter Horatio Pater (1839–1894), English essayist and critic, born in London and educated at Queen’s College, Oxford. He spent his life at Oxford as a tutor and fellow at Brasenose College. His writings ranged widely over literature, aesthetics, art and art history, ancient Greece, and medieval and

Renaissance culture; they include essay collections: *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1873, later reissued as *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry*) and *Appreciations, with an Essay on Style* (1889); collections of lectures: *Plato and Platonism* (1893) and *Greek Studies* (1895, published posthumously); and fiction: *Imaginary Portraits* (1887) and *Marius the Epicurean* (1885), which Santayana, in a 1928 letter, indicated having read (*LGS*, 4:42). Pater practiced “aesthetic criticism,” in which “the first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as it really is. . . . What effect does [the object] really produce on me?” (*The Renaissance* [London: Macmillan, 1877], viii). Pater emphasized moments of intense experience that fell outside conventional expectations, and his conclusion to *The Renaissance* was controversial for arguing that to live fully required dedication to experiences of intense beauty. He held that experience and not what it might produce was the aim of life. This approach stood in contrast to John Ruskin’s emphasis on moral value in judging art, and Pater’s critics interpreted his position as advocating hedonism. Pater further disturbed Oxford authorities with his religious skepticism and his relating of spirituality and bodily pleasure. Homoerotic suggestion in much of his work did not help his case with university leaders. Pater’s aestheticism was influenced by the French writer and critic Théophile Gautier (1811–1872) who espoused the doctrine of “art for art’s sake.” Richard Lyon writes that Santayana “sometimes thought of himself as the last of the Victorians, speaking as had Arnold and Ruskin and Pater for the recovery of the past not for its own sake but as it may serve present sensibility and the full range of the spirit’s needs—as also it may serve to remind us of better times when religions and philosophies and works of art were the vital expressions of an ongoing general life” (*PP*, xvii). Indeed, in a 1928 letter Santayana wrote of his generation: “You must remember that we were not very much later than Ruskin, Pater, Swinburne, and Matthew Arnold: our atmosphere was that of poets and persons touched with religious enthusiasm or religious sadness. Beauty (which mustn’t be mentioned now) was then a living presence, or an aching absence, day and night: history was always singing in our ears: and not even psychology or the analysis of works of art could take away from art its human implications. It was the great memorial to us, the great revelation, of what the soul had lived on, and had lived with, in her better days. But now analysis and psychology seem to stand alone: there is no spiritual interest, no spiritual need. The mind, in this direction, has been desiccated: art has become an abstract object in itself, to be studied scientifically as a caput mortuum [empty husk, lifeless specimen; literally, “dead head”]: and the living side of the subject—the tabulation of people’s feelings and comments—is no less dead” (*LGS*, 4:85). See Note 5.38 Ruskin; Note 15.1 Renaissance; Note 40.1 Plato; and Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.



5.39 Oscar Wilde. ] Oscar Fingal O’Flahertie Wills Wilde (1854–1900), Irish writer, poet, critic, lecturer, and playwright; born to an aristocratic family in Dublin, Ireland; and educated at Trinity College and Magdalen College, Oxford, where he was a student of Walter Pater and John Ruskin. Wilde is well known as a wit, international celebrity, and writer, especially of the novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891) and the plays *Lady Windermere’s Fan* (1892), *A Woman of No Importance* (1893), *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895), and *An Ideal Husband* (1895). He often is remembered as a victim of Victorian sexual conventions, which led to his criminal conviction and imprisonment. Wilde also was a serious and significant critic and theorist whose important works of criticism included “The Portrait of Mr. W. H.” (1889), “The Soul of Man under Socialism” (1891), and the four essays published as *Intentions* (1891): “The Decay of Lying,” “Pen, Pencil and Poison,” “The Critic as Artist,” and “The Truth of Masks.” Influenced by French writers Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867), Théophile Gautier (1811–1872), and Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–1898), and his teachers Ruskin and Pater, Wilde rejected realism in favor of technique and atmosphere. As a member of this aesthetic movement Wilde’s commitment to beauty led him to deeply value individualism, and he conceived of personal autonomy as the freedom to, like the artist, enrich sensation and experiment with new forms of expression. Such artistic experiment should not, thought Wilde, be constrained by morality; rather aesthetic experience should be the standard of success or failure. This was not a rejection of morals, but rather recognition that genuine community and growth cannot come from moral principles alone, and to limit artistic expression to representation of morals and social conventions greatly reduced art’s capacity for cultivating and expressing individual experience. In this Wilde departed from his teachers: Ruskin’s criticism relied on social rationales, and Pater ignored social context altogether. See Note 5.38 Ruskin and Note 5.39 Pater.

6.21 Gilbert Murray, ] George Gilbert Aimé Murray (1866–1957), British classical scholar, public intellectual, and humanist; born in Sydney, Australia; educated at St. John’s College, Oxford. At 24, he became professor of Greek at University of Glasgow (1889–99) but later resigned due to illness. After recovering, he became Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford (1908–36). Murray produced popular translations of many Greek plays, including works of Euripides, Sophocles, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Menander. Productions of his translations won popular acclaim in London theaters in the first decade of the twentieth century. Of his many publications, his best known books are his interpretations of Hellenic culture such as *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907) and *Four (later Five) Stages of Greek Religion* (1912; 1925). Murray, along with classical scholars Jane Harrison (1850–1928) and Francis Cornford (1874–1943), was a

member of the “Cambridge Ritualists,” who used findings of anthropological inquiry in a collaborative search for the origins of religion in primitive ritual. After World War I, Murray moved away from the Cambridge Ritualists and scholarly work when he took a leadership role in the League of Nations. This reflected his strong commitment to political liberalism, which was consistent with his understanding of Hellenism as a process of continual striving toward ideals. His social activism included involvement with the founding in 1942 of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, a nongovernmental organization that continues today as Oxfam. Santayana wrote his impressions of the man in a 1907 letter: “We had a truly ‘liberal’ mind with us in Cambridge for a while this winter. Gilbert Murray of Oxford—who lectured with great *éclat* about early Greek poetry and culture—Homer and what preceded. It was both in substance and in manner very much to my mind, although he takes, on the technical Homeric question, a radical view which I had not before been inclined to, and on which I am yet much in doubt. But the feeling for moral progress, for the cleansing and rationalizing of human society, was very fine and clear in him, so much clearer than in our canting professional moralists. But being English, or rather Scotch, he has to have some private isms, and is a Vegetarian, a Teetotaler, a Pro-Boer, a Woman Suffragist, etc, etc.” (*LGS*, 1:368).

6.38 French Revolution ] A period of political upheaval in France beginning in 1789 and lasting until 1799. During this time the monarchy was deposed and France was reestablished as a republic. The Revolution tore down the ancient structure of Europe, opened the path for nineteenth-century liberalism, and hastened the advent of nationalism and the era of modern total warfare. For Santayana, the Revolution was the third of the three Rs of modernity, the first and second being the Renaissance and the Reformation; of these three Rs, he wrote that they “have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline” (*GTB*, 8). He thought “that in each of the three R’s we may distinguish an efficacious hidden current of change in the unconscious world from the veneer of words and sentiments that may have served to justify that change, or to mask it in the popular mind, and often in the mind of the leaders” (*GTB*, 8); but he thought the distinction less obvious in the Revolution because “liberty, fraternity, and equality have been actually achieved in some measure, even if they lack that Arcadian purity and nobleness which the revolutionary prophets expected. Their cry had been for limpid virtue, antique heroism, and the radical destruction of unreason: the event has brought industrialism, populousness, comfort, and the dominance of the average man, if not of the average woman” (*GTB*, 10–11).

7.3 socialism ] A theory of social organization that emerged in the early nineteenth century, emphasizing community, cooperation, and harmony over the individualism, competition, and instability of capitalism; hence, socialism promotes rational ordering of society and economy in contrast to what it regards as the chaotic free market of capitalism. Socialism typically supports some form of collective control of the means of production, exchange of goods, and distribution of wealth, but, like capitalism, it can take diverse and conflicting forms. Early advocates of socialism such as Welsh textile manufacturer Robert Owen (1771–1858), French philosopher Charles Fourier (1772–1837), French philosopher and politician Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), and French philosopher Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) inspired small, experimental, collectivist communities that differed in regard to centralized control, private property, and family life. In the mid-nineteenth century, the German philosophers, political theorists, and economists Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) presented a more systematic political and economic theory of international scope that they characterized as “scientific” compared to their more “utopian” forerunners. Marxism criticized capitalism for its class divisions and exploitation, advocating worker control of the means of production with the aim of eventually realizing a classless society. Socialists have long disagreed on strategies for abolishing exploitation and achieving equality, with some pursuing change from within liberal democratic systems and others pursuing violent revolution and overthrow of existing non-socialist institutions, whether aristocratic or liberal.

7.9 germ of rational order ] The possibility of rational order—a harmony of natural impulses—penetrating philosophy, society, religion, science, and art was the subject of Santayana’s five-book *The Life of Reason* (1905–6). To realize the ideal of reason in art, Santayana wrote, “we should have to knit it more closely with other rational functions, so that to beautify things might render them more useful and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them in their truth. . . . What might help to bring about this consummation would be, on the one side, more knowledge; on the other, better taste. When a mind is filled with important and true ideas and sees the actual relationship of things, it cannot relish pictures of the world which wantonly misrepresent it” (*LRA*, 129–30). Art remains irrational so long as we demand it to be a dream or escape from reality. Increasing rational order in art would mean that “the poet himself will soon prefer to describe nature in natural terms and to represent human emotions in their pathetic humility, not extended beyond their actual sphere nor fantastically uprooted from their necessary soil and occasions” (*LR1*, 91). In *Three Philosophical Poets*, Santayana remarked that “to think straight, to see things as they are, or as they might naturally be, [rather] than to fancy things impossi-

ble. . . . shows, not want of imagination, but true imaginative power and imaginative maturity. It is those of us who are too feeble to conceive and master the real world, or too cowardly to face it, that run away from it to those cheap fictions that alone seem to us fine enough for poetry or for religion” (*TPP*, 113).

- 7.15 Romanticism, ] Early nineteenth-century painters related to the Romantic tradition include three students of the French painter Jacques-Louis David (1748–1825): François Pascal Simon, Baron Gérard (1770–1837), French, born in Rome; prolific portraitist Antoine-Jean Gros (1771–1825), French, child prodigy, known for his large-scale works marked by drama, color, and vigor; and Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy (or de Roucy), also known as Anne-Louis Girodet-Trioson (1767–1824), French, orphaned at an early age, some of whose paintings had a dreamlike, eerie, or hallucinatory quality; and also Jean-Louis André Théodore Géricault (1791–1824), French, student of French painters Carle Vernet (1758–1836) and Pierre-Narcisse Guérin (1774–1833), regarded as a founder of the French Romantic School. Géricault was known for his sympathetic portraits of mentally ill patients and still lifes of severed heads and limbs of criminals.
- 7.17 This realism ] Examples of nineteenth-century Realist painters include Gustave Courbet (1819–1877), French, regarded as a founder of the Realist movement. Claiming (falsely) to be self-taught, he was self-assured and hostile to authority, academic practice, and conventional standards. He rejected idealization and said he painted what he saw, a practice reflected in his scenes from everyday rural life and erotic paintings without classical allusions; Honoré Daumier (1808–1879), French lithographer and painter. He contributed satirical cartoons on political and social subjects to popular publications and later produced often-satirical paintings of subdued color. His work portrayed city life, often revealing its bleaker aspects; and Jules Bastien-Lepage (1848–1884), French, known for large *en plein air* (French for “outdoors”) works. He enjoyed acclaim throughout Europe and especially in Great Britain. His work, marked by muted colors, often portrayed peasant subjects including children, workers, and beggars.
- 7.19–20 a display of archæological lore or for exotic *motifs*; ] Ferdinand-Victor-Eugène Delacroix (1798–1863), French, born in Paris, student of Pierre-Narcisse Guérin (1774–1833) and admirer of André Théodore Géricault (1791–1824). Often associated with the Romantic tradition, he rejected the label in spite of temperamental sympathies and personal friendships. He painted subjects from myth, history, and contemporary European literature, and an 1832 trip to Morocco made a lifelong impression on him: his sketchbooks from his travels gave him material for a lifetime. He enjoyed great artistic and social success;

Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824–1904), French, student of Paul Delaroche (1797–1856) and Charles Gleyre (1806–1874). He was known for his archaeologically precise scenes of ancient Greece and Rome, including sensationalistic details of carnage and sex. Beginning in 1855 he was a regular traveler to Egypt and Asia Minor. He was committed to tradition and opposed progressive artistic trends such as Impressionism; Théodore Chassériau (1819–1856), French, student of Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780–1867). He visited North Africa in 1840 and 1846 and was inspired by Delacroix, especially the latter's use of color. He painted subjects from North Africa, the Bible, and the works of William Shakespeare (1564–1616); Alexandre-Gabriel Decamps (1803–1860), French, born in Paris. His travels in 1828–29 through Greece, Asia Minor, and North Africa provided material for his work. He often painted colorful, small-scale works with thickly applied paints. See Note 7.15 Romanticism and Note 15.2 Shakespeare.

7.20–21 others . . . abstract problems of execution, ] In the second half of the nineteenth century several French painters, who came to be known as Impressionists, rejected the highly refined and formal techniques of the academy and conventional subject matter (history, myth, the Bible) in favor of spontaneity in capturing the visual impression of a moment in city settings or rural landscapes. The label “Impressionist” – though often understood to indicate paintings done *en plein air* (French for “outdoors”) and characterized by informal brushwork and bright color – suggests greater unity of principle than existed among these artists. Their only actual common aim was mounting public exhibitions independent of the conservative, state-sponsored salon system. Artists associated with Impressionism and, later, Post-Impressionism or Neo-Impressionism include Paul Cézanne (1839–1906), Edgar Degas (1834–1917), Édouard Manet (1832–1883) (who never exhibited at the group shows), Claude Monet (1840–1926), Camille Pissarro (1830–1903), Pierre-Auguste Renoir (1841–1919), Alfred Sisley (1839–1899), Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), Vincent van Gogh (1853–1890), and Georges Seurat (1859–1891). Problems of execution that interested particular artists included pictorial structure (Cézanne), the symbolic values of color and line when freed from representational functions (Gauguin and, later, Cézanne), and scientific analysis of color (Seurat).

7.26 One gave himself to religious archaism, ] In the late nineteenth century several French painters known as Symbolists, reacting to the naturalism of Impressionism, took up religious, mythological, or mystical subject matter in attempts to express intense emotions visually. Often motivated by antimaterialist and antirational sentiments, they rejected literal representations and instead aimed to evoke or suggest sensuous feeling through color and line. They

believed in a correspondence between external forms and subjective states, and that their work could transmit and perpetuate emotions. Some sought to express a mystical unity of spirit and matter in signs and hidden meanings, comprehensible only to initiates. Significant Symbolists included Gustave Moreau (1826–1898), Pierre Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898), and Eugène Carrière (1849–1906). Stylistically similar to Symbolists were the Nabis, who were heavily influenced by Paul Gauguin’s (1848–1903) use of color and rhythmic pattern for expressive purposes and whose work often was esoteric and bound up with religious symbolism. The name “Nabis” comes from “nabi,” the Hebrew and Arabic word for “prophet,” and indicated their missionary zeal for Gauguin’s style, which they regarded as a sort of religious illumination, and their interest in mystical and occult subject matter. Significant members of the group included Paul Sérusier (1864–1927), Maurice Denis (1870–1943), and Émile Bernard (1868–1941).

7.26–27 Japanese composition, ] Japanese ukiyo-e prints began to arrive in European ports in the 1850s, influencing French artists in their use of color and pattern. “Ukiyo-e” or “pictures of the floating world” refers to the principal art movement in Japan of the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, in which subject matter reflected the trends and fashions of everyday life. Popular subjects included actors performing well-known roles, prostitutes, and bathhouse scenes. The French Impressionist painter Claude Monet bought an ukiyo-e print in 1856 at Le Havre, and Edgar Degas, also a French Impressionist, imitated the use of unfamiliar perspectives he found in Japanese color prints. The Dutch painter Vincent van Gogh moved to Paris in 1886, where his style was influenced by Impressionism and Japanese woodcuts. The Nabis, a group formed in 1892 by French painters who rejected Impressionism and academic training, looked to Japanese prints (among other sources) for new inspiration. For the Nabis, see Note 7.26 One gave himself to religious archaism.

7.27 barbaric symphonies of colour; ] The French painter Henri Matisse (1869–1954) was a central figure in the movement of French artists known as Fauvism, which was characterized by the nonnaturalistic use of intense color, sometimes applied directly from the tube without mixing. The group came to be known as the Fauves (“les fauves” in French, meaning “wild beasts”) after a critic’s hostile characterization upon viewing a 1905 Salon d’Automne exhibition of work by several artists including Matisse, Georges Rouault (1871–1958), André Derain (1880–1954), Maurice Vlaminck (1876–1958), Kees van Dongen (1877–1968), Raoul Dufy (1877–1953), and Georges Braque (1882–1963). The Fauves, reacting to Impressionism and academic conventions and influenced by Gauguin’s symbolic use of color and van Gogh’s forceful expression, were

active as a group from 1905 to 1907. Fauvism strongly influenced Abstract Expressionism.

7.27–28 sculptors . . . dramatic climaxes, . . . lyrical passion, ] Auguste Rodin (1840–1917), French sculptor and draftsman, one of the most well-known and influential artists of the nineteenth century. He failed three times to gain admittance to the *École des Beaux-Arts*, Paris, and began his career as an artisan working as an ornamental mason. By 1900 he was regarded as the greatest living sculptor. His sculptures often are of figures or groups with historical, literary, or symbolic import, including several commemorative sculptures of significant figures in the arts. Rodin exerted a lasting influence through his ability to convey a sense of movement and energy, use of partial figure, and demonstration that sculpture could be appreciated for its immediate characteristics as well as its representational qualities. He resisted narrative as found in classical sculpture and challenged expectations of visual coherence, juxtaposing images that did not readily seem to belong together.

7.29–32 latest whims . . . abandon painful observation . . . crudity of caricature. ] When Santayana published this essay in 1913, the artistic movement known as Expressionism was dominant in Europe. Expressionism, as a rejection of naturalism and Impressionism, privileged an artist's inner feelings over the reproduction of an observed scene; antecedents can be found in Gauguin's and van Gogh's use of color and line to convey intensity of feeling. The term was used broadly enough to refer also to the Fauves and the Cubists. Cubism was a style that flourished from 1907 to 1914. It originated in the work of Spanish painter Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) and of Georges Braque (1882–1963), who were followed in the style by Spanish painter Juan Gris (1887–1927). Cubism is characterized by its rejection of a naturalistic three-dimensional perspective and an emphasis on the material quality of the medium. Spatial dimensions were depicted by the use of multiple perspectives, and painted spatial forms were broken up into patterns of flat planes. Artists who employed Cubist methods include French painters Robert Delaunay (1885–1941), Albert Gleizes (1881–1953), Roger de La Fresnaye (1885–1925), Jean Metzinger (1883–1956), and Francis Picabia (1879–1953). In Santayana's 1922 essay "Penitent Art" (in *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews*, ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936], 149–61), he characterized contemporary art: "Little children is what artists and poets are now striving hard to be; little children who instead of blowing a tin trumpet blow by chance through a whole orchestra, but with the same emotion as the child; or who, instead of daubing a geometrical skeleton with a piece of chalk, can daub a cross-eyed cross-section of the entire spectrum or a compound fracture of a nightmare. Such



is Cubism: by no means an inexpert or meaningless thing. Before you can compose a chaos or paint the unnameable, you must train yourself to a severe abstention from all practical habits of perception; you must heroically suppress the understanding" (*OS*, 155). For the Fauves, see Note 7.27 barbaric symphonies of colour.

8.8–9 modern philosophy ] Modern European philosophy is typically regarded as beginning in the seventeenth century and continuing through the twentieth century. In the most general terms, modern philosophy is marked by concern with problems of knowledge (the nature, possibility, and limits of knowledge), often in connection with scientific methods of knowing. Significant figures in modern philosophy, whose interests actually were broader than the characterization just given, include Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), John Locke (1632–1704), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), George Berkeley (1685–1753), David Hume (1711–1776), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (German mathematician and philosopher, 1848–1925), and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Santayana regularly taught courses at Harvard on Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but he wrote in a 1949 letter that “modern philosophy was always alien to me” (*LGS*, 8:154). In a 1933 letter he wrote, “I disagree utterly with that modern philosophy which regards experience as fundamental” (*LGS*, 5:25). Santayana published criticism of several modern philosophers and modern philosophy. See, for example, *Reason in Common Sense*, *Egotism in German Philosophy*, and *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. In *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, Santayana wrote that modern philosophy’s “advances in analysis and self-knowledge . . . have been neutralized . . . by a total intellectual cramp or by a colossal folly” (*SELS*, 216). In Santayana’s view, this cramp or folly is detrimental to a vital philosophical life. He explained that

to survey the world of existences in its truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives, or with practical urgency. . . . is the path trodden by ancient philosophers and modern saints or poets; not, of course, by modern writers on philosophy (except Spinoza), because these have not been philosophers in the vital sense; they have practised no spiritual discipline, suffered no change of heart, but lived on exactly like other professors, and exerted themselves to prove the existence of a God favourable to their own desires, instead of searching for the God that happens to exist. (*SELS*, 120–21)

See also Note 3.8 Bossuet; Note 3.25 Liberalism; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 7.3 socialism; Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 11.15 Hegel; Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell; Note 40.22 Spinoza; Note 41.26 English malicious psychology; Note 41.27 Locke; Note 46.20 Mill; Note 53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates; Note 59.14 Leibnitz; and Note 74.11 *The Problems of Philosophy*.

8.10 Berkeley and Hume, ] George Berkeley (1685–1753), Anglo-Irish philosopher, graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, lived in Rhode Island from 1728 to 1732, and became Anglican bishop of Cloyne, Ireland in 1734. He wrote on the psychology of vision, mathematics, and medicine, as well as philosophy and theology. His important works include *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709), *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). His subjective idealism denied the existence of matter and maintained that all existing entities are either perceiving spirits or perceptions, which entails that perception by a mind is the being of unthinking things: “Their *esse* is *percipi*; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them” (*A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, in *Philosophical Works*, 1705–21, Vol. 1 of *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. C. Fraser [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901], 259). Santayana’s personal library included *Selections from Berkeley* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884). David Hume (1711–1776), Scottish philosopher and historian, born and educated in Edinburgh. Hume, an empiricist, claimed that philosophy could not go beyond experience to any ultimate origins. His important philosophical works include *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–40), *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751). Hume is known for his claim that, despite the persistent human belief in necessary causal connections, neither sense nor reason can discover such a connection. Sense experience reveals only temporal or spatial contiguity. Reason offers no direct access to the truth of causal connection because there is no contradiction in imagining an observed correlation happening otherwise than it has so far been observed. Although he explains this belief as a habit conditioned by the experience of constant conjunction of things said to be causally related, Hume did not reject inductive reasoning based on causal relations; rather, he offered a new description of reason as a habit of mind. Between 1889 and 1898, Santayana taught six courses at Harvard on English philosophy including works by Berkeley and Hume (these included Philosophy 5 [1889–90], Philosophy 11 [1890–91, 1891–92, 1892–93, 1894–95], and Philosophy 11<sup>2</sup> [1897–98]). In a 1952 letter Santayana wrote of Berkeley and Hume that

they never seemed to me to belong, as the English think, to the main line of philosophy, but to a loop-line called subjectivism, and limited, in appeal, to the Protestant and romantic movements. . . . I have a great esteem for both Berkeley and Hume in their personal dispositions and temper, each in a different way. I think you have read my paper on Berkeley: but in regard to Hume I think I have written nothing. But as a man of the world and a historian he felt as I do, and was not subjective or negative at all. I say “negative” rather than “sceptical” because he was a sceptic in official philosophy but a naturalist in his real convictions. (LGS, 8:426)

Santayana wrote an essay called “Bishop Berkeley” that appeared in *From Anne to Victoria: Essays by Various Hands*, ed. Bonamy Dobrée (London: Cassell, 1937), 75–88; reprinted in John Lachs, ed., *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 102–14. Comments on Hume by Santayana can be found in *Reason in Common Sense*, *Reason in Science*, and *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. For a study of Santayana on Hume see Jessica Wahman, “Corpulent or a Train of Ideas? Santayana’s Critique of Hume,” *BSS* 25 (Fall 2007), 1–9.

8.18 Avenarius, ] Richard Avenarius (1843–1896), German philosopher, born in Paris, educated at the University of Leipzig, professor at Leipzig and then at University of Zürich. His major work was *Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung* (1888–90) (*Critique of Pure Experience*). His “empirio-criticism” sought to eliminate metaphysical ideas in order to clarify the intuitions of pure experience, and he attempted to describe the character of pure experience in order to justify a scientific empiricism. Like David Hume (1711–1776), he held the ideas of substance and causality to be ontologically invalid. His ideas about pure experience influenced William James (1842–1910), and his epistemology influenced Ernst Mach (1838–1916). Santayana mentioned him in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920) as one whose ideas inclined him to deny the existence of consciousness (151).

8.18 William James, ] William James (1842–1910), American philosopher and psychologist, born in New York City, educated as a physician at Harvard, brother of novelist Henry James, professor of philosophy at Harvard. James is well known for his version of pragmatism. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s (1839–1914) idea that a concept’s meaning lies in the practical relevance of the concept’s effects, James held that the truth of an idea depended on its utility in predicting experience or in leading to beneficial behavior. James also advocated what he called radical empiricism, which regarded reality ultimately to

be pure experience. The qualities of pure experience make up mind in one arrangement, and physical things in another arrangement. Knowledge is understood as the way in which mind, made up of one arrangement of experience, results in a beneficial coordination with experience in a different arrangement apart from mind. James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) is a classic in the field and was reviewed admiringly by Santayana ("James's Psychology," *The Atlantic Monthly* 67 [April 1891]: 552–56). James's other important works include *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (1897), *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907), and *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912). James was a teacher and later a colleague of Santayana at Harvard. Santayana published criticism of James's philosophy and personal recollections of James in several places, including "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" (1912), *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920), and *Persons and Places* (1943, 1947, 1953); *The Letters of George Santayana* also includes letters to and about James. Of his published remarks on James, Santayana wrote:

I have made sundry scattered observations for the public, without attempting a fair total portrayal of the man or of his philosophy: neither he nor his philosophy lent themselves to being summed up. But here, where I am portraying only my own impressions, I may add a word more about the feelings that he excited in me. I trusted his heart but I didn't respect his judgment. I admired his masculine directness, his impressionistic perceptions, and his picturesque words. I treasured his utterances on the medical side of things, such as that the best way to understanding the normal is to study the abnormal. All this belonged to his independent, radical, naturalistic temper, to his American sense of being just born into a world to be rediscovered. But he was really far from free, held back by old instincts, subject to old delusions, restless, spasmodic, self-interrupted: as if some impetuous bird kept flying aloft, but always stopped in mid-air, pulled back with a jerk by an invisible wire tethering him to a peg in the ground. The general agreement in America to praise him as a marvellous person, and to pass on, is justified by delight at the way he started, without caring where he went. In fact, he got nowhere; and for that reason his influence could be great and beneficent over those who knew him, but soon seemed to become untraceable in the confused currents of the world. I, for instance, was sure of his goodwill and kindness, of which I had many proofs; but I was also sure that he never understood me, and that when he talked to me, there was a mannikin in his head, called G. S. and entirely fantastic, which he was really addressing. No doubt I profited materially by this illusion, because he would have liked me less if he had understood me better; but the sense of that illusion made spontaneous friendship

impossible. I was uncomfortable in his presence. He was so extremely natural that there was no knowing what his nature was, or what to expect next; so that one was driven to behave and talk conventionally, as in the most artificial society. I found no foothold, I was soon fatigued, and it was a relief to be out again in the open, and alone. (*PP*, 401–2)

8.18–19 M. Bergson ] Henri-Louis Bergson (1859–1941), French philosopher, born in Paris, educated at the École Normale Supérieure, and taught at Clermont-Ferrand and later the Collège de France. Bergson is best known for his ideas of *la durée*, duration or time as experienced by consciousness, and of *élan vital*, a life force that counters the mechanistic movement of matter. According to Bergson, to understand time as analogous to space, as science does, is a mistake that misses the essence of time. Duration is not composed of discrete, homogeneous moments that can be quantified, but rather it is continuous, ever-changing, and qualitative. Duration, being qualitative and spontaneous, is unpredictable and gives rise to free acts. His notion of *élan vital* appears in his best-known work *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907) (in English translation, *Creative Evolution* [New York: Henry Holt, 1911]). Evolution, thought Bergson, is driven by *élan vital*, a creative force that overcomes the entropic tendency of matter without aiming at some predestined end. Bergson's work influenced Catholic modernists, and he and William James mutually influenced each other, as indicated in their published work and their correspondence. Bergson and James met three times: 1905 in Paris, 1908 in London, and 1910 at Bergson's home in Auteuil, Paris (Larry McGrath, "Bergson Comes to America," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 74, no. 4 [2013]: 599–620). Santayana wrote of Bergson that "his own mind is fanatically closed to almost all ideas. His smooth language and wide information (not always correct or impartial) are gathered as protective colouring for his bitter hatred of the intellect" (*MARG*, 1:64). In a 1947 letter Santayana wrote, "The intolerable thing about Bergson is his blindness to definite concepts, to the *tout fait* [ready-made] and the 'static'. There is flux enough in the world; but the mind arrests essences (which can have all degrees of articulation) and in those terms is able to distinguish events and objects. Just to flow is never to be anywhere or to be anything. Toynbee has the same superstition as Bergson, and it would spoil his work if he were a mere historian; but the interest for him is to see the hang of certain political movements, and that is to find 'static' forms or types of motion in the flux" (*LGS*, 7:370). An extensive critical review of Bergson by Santayana appears in this volume as "The Philosophy of M. Henri Bergson" (39–71). Santayana wrote after its publication that he "feared it might seem too severe" (*LGS*, 2:128). However, after reading Julian Benda's critical attack in *Le Bergsonisme, ou, Une philosophie de la mobilité* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1912),

Santayana wrote that “Benda’s capital book on Bergson . . . relieved me of all qualms about my essay. . . . When I read now some newspaper accounts of [Bergson’s] visit to America (I have heard nothing of the substance of his lectures there) I begin to fear on the contrary that I have taken him too seriously. But the best way of discrediting a charlatan is perhaps not to call him one” (*LGS*, 2:128). Santayana’s personal library included *L’intuition philosophique* (1927); *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (1932) (*Two Sources of Morality and Religion*), with extensive marginal notes; and *La pensée et le mouvant* (1934) (*The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*), with marginal notes. For Catholic Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist; see also Note 8.18 William James; Note 44.36 M. Bergson’s *Evolution Créatrice*; and Note 45.18 *élan vital*.

9.6 Babylon ] Capital of Babylonia, a region in the south of modern Iraq that was the site of several ancient civilizations, including those of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Persians. In 586 BC, the Chaldean Empire conquered Egypt and removed prominent and capable Jews to Babylon to serve the empire. The captives tended to view this city as a place of decadence and immorality, and Babylon became a symbol for exile and corruption. For biblical reference to Babylon, see Note 22.3–4 Israel was led . . . restored the Temple.

9.7–8 the porcupine. . . its fretful quills ] Santayana borrowed phraseology from *Hamlet*, Act 1, Scene 5: “Like quills upon the fretful porpentine.”

9.20 Solipsism ] The doctrine that one can know only the contents of one’s own mind, thereby isolating one from other persons or anything else that may exist outside of one’s mind. One form of solipsism would be the idea that a sentient being is isolated from any other by a mutual inability to access the experience of another. Another form of solipsism would be the idea that the only thing that can be said to exist is oneself and one’s experience.

9.21 idealism; ] Idealism holds that human self-consciousness is the main philosophical datum; that the world is thoroughly spiritual, having something akin to a cosmic self; and that for both the individual and the cosmic self the will is more significant than the intellect. Santayana was critical of idealism because he saw it as a sort of romantic egotism which grew out of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) “radical subjectification of knowledge” (*EGP*, 34). According to Henry Samuel Levinson, Santayana thought the idealists “tried to revive the corpse of supernaturalism” (*Santayana, Pragmatism, and the Spiritual Life* [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992], 125). See Santayana’s *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915) for his sustained critique of the tradition, and see Note 32.27 German idealism.

11.15 Hegel, ] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), German philosopher, born in Stuttgart. He was educated at the University at Tübingen, where he met as students the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854) and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). Hegel worked as a private tutor, a newspaper editor, and a high school headmaster, and in 1801 he gained a university appointment. In 1818 he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, which was the center of German intellectual culture under the Prussian monarchy. Hegel’s philosophy maintains the priority of a collective spirit over the individual, and human history is understood as the coming to consciousness of this collective or Absolute Spirit, which becomes actual or self-conscious through the development of human consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved through the dialectical interaction of spirit and matter in history and results in the realization of universal rational order. Hegel regarded Prussia as the fulfillment of the dialectical ideal, and he wrote that Prussia’s Frederick the Great (Friedrich II, 1713–1786) “hatte das Bewußtsein von der Allgemeinheit, die die letzte Tiefe des Geistes und die ihrer selbstbewußte Kraft des Denkens ist” (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* [Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1837], 435) (in English translation: “had the consciousness of Universality, which is the profoundest depth to which Spirit can attain, and is Thought conscious of its own inherent power” (*Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree [London: The Colonial Press, 1900], 438). Commentators have read Hegel’s work as endorsing the Prussian state, and philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) accused Hegel of selling himself to the Prussian ruling power that employed him. Santayana commented on Hegel’s philosophy throughout his career, acknowledging it as an inspiration for *Life of Reason* (“Preface to Second Edition,” *LR1*, 185), while also regularly criticizing it, especially in *Egotism and German Philosophy*. In this work, Santayana wrote that Hegel regarded the state as “morally absolute” and recognized “no moral authority or tribunal higher than the state” (*EGP*, 96). He explained that “for Hegel . . . the life of the state was the moral substance, and the souls of men but the accidents; and as to the judgment of God he asserted that it was none other than the course of history. This is a characteristic saying, in which he seems to proclaim the moral government of the world, when in truth he is sanctifying a brutal law of success and succession. . . . He despised every ideal not destined to be realised on earth, he respected legality more than justice, and extant institutions more than moral ideals; and he wished to flatter a government in whose policy war and even crime were recognised weapons” (97). In his marginalia to Arnold J. Toynbee’s *A Study of History*, Vol. 5: *The Disintegrations of Civilizations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939),



Santayana characterized Hegel as a fascist: “Liberalism = Protestantism = a bastard X’ity; so that to be a Fascist is to desert the Church. Yes, Hegel was a ‘Fascist’. He liquidated X’ity into Pantheism” (*MARG*, 2:348). Santayana’s personal library included three of Hegel’s most important works: *Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1914[?]) (*Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*), *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) (*Phenomenology of Spirit*), and *The Logic of Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874). See also Note 46.33 the “Will” of Schopenhauer.

12.4–6 if life is better . . . best form of life. ] The text is similar to Santayana’s observation in *Three Philosophical Poets* that “Philosophy is a more intense sort of experience than common life is, just as pure and subtle music, heard in retirement, is something keener and more intense than the howling of storms or the rumble of cities” (*TPP*, 73).

12.10 *la nostalgie de la boue*. ] French for “nostalgia for mud” or “homesickness for mud.” The phrase is used to indicate a wish to regress to a previous or more primitive condition; a desire for what is crude, base, or degrading. The first known appearances of the phrase are in Act 1, Scene 1 and Act 2, Scene 14 of French playwright Émile Augier’s 1855 play *Le Mariage d’Olympe* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1881), 5, 68. In both contexts, the same character makes this remark referring to lower-class young women who married for title and wealth but persisted in their crude manners and promiscuous lifestyles; the first is in response to the comparison that a duck moved to a clear lake among swans will prefer, and eventually return to, its life in the swamps (5).

14.22 Shelley ] Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), English romantic poet, essayist, playwright, and translator. Born to a wealthy family in Sussex, educated at Eton and University College, Oxford. Shelley was expelled from Oxford for coauthoring *The Necessity of Atheism* (1811). That same year, he further alienated his father and lost his financial support when he married 16-year-old Harriet Westbrook. In 1813 he published *Queen Mab: A Philosophical Poem*, which advocated for republicanism, vegetarianism, atheism, and free love. His marriage ended in 1814, when Shelley left his pregnant wife and daughter to travel Europe with Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin and her stepsister Clara Mary Jane “Claire” Clairmont. Harriet Westbrook killed herself in 1816, and her family won a suit denying Shelley custody of his children. That summer was spent with Lord Byron (George Gordon Byron, 1788–1824) at Lake Geneva. In 1818, Shelley, Godwin, and Clairmont moved to Italy permanently to escape creditors and social disapproval. It was the beginning of a productive period in which Shelley translated Homer, Euripides (c. 480–c. 406 BC), Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600–1681), Johann Wolfgang von

Goethe (1749–1832), and Plato (c. 427–347 BC); and wrote his poems *The Revolt of Islam* (1818), *The Cenci* (1819), *Prometheus Unbound* (1820), and *Epipsychidion* (1821); and the essay *A Defence of Poetry* (1821, published in 1840). He drowned in August 1822 after visiting Byron in Livorno when a sudden storm sunk his boat. Shelley was a hard-working and assiduous writer, and he was extremely well read in classics, philosophy, and science. He was a sophisticated political thinker, critical heir of Enlightenment ideals, and energetic advocate of revolutionary views. Santayana greatly admired Shelley's poetry, as he did that of Byron and Keats, and his own poetry was influenced by their work. In an 1887 letter, Santayana wrote,

I had not read Shelley to any extent since my early days of poetic sentiment, when I saw nothing in him but music and nonsense. But I find that he is the prophet of the rising generation in England, and the only true substitute for Jesus Christ. Well, I have reread him, and find a great deal in him that I knew nothing of. He represents, in an exaggerated and therefore vulnerable form, the contradiction of my theory of natural authority. His theory is briefly this: Nature is ready and willing to maintain the human race, (multiplied by the full energies of free love) in happiness and luxury, but the Evil Power, embodied in kings, priests, judges, and capitalists, somehow wickedly prevents it. Let but a spring be touched, and the scene will transform itself. The hollow power of tyrants will disappear, and everything will be in a normal and satisfactory condition. That is, a wrong has somewhere been perpetrated, and authority and subordination are the result. Now I conceive on the contrary that authority is naturally and normally acquired, because the business of society can be better done by some people and in certain ways, than by other people in other ways. (Santayana to Charles A. Loeser, 4 June 1887; available at <https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/loeser/index.html>, 47–49).

In 1910–11, Santayana hosted weekly poetry readings modeled on the “poetry bees” he had hosted in his room as a young professor eighteen years earlier. This new incarnation was more like a seminar, he wrote, and was dedicated to reading “Shelley, from beginning to end, except *The Cenci*” (PP, 345). From these sessions came a paper Santayana read that spring at Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr College, and Williams College. It later became the essay “Shelley, or the Poetic Value of Revolutionary Principles” (1913), which appears in this volume (103–123). See Note 1.30 Goethe and Note 40.1 Plato.

14.22 Leopardi. ] Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837), Italian poet and scholar. Born in Recanati to an aristocratic family of reduced financial means. Taught by private tutors until he was 14 years old, he then directed his own education in

the family's extensive private library. He studied classical languages and wrote poetry in Latin and Greek. His intense study took a toll on his eyesight and general health, and he was chronically ill during his short life. Leopardi felt oppressed and unhappy at home, where his talents were unappreciated, and after a series of departures and returns beginning with a trip to Rome in 1822, he finally moved out of the family home for good in 1830. In 1824 he turned to writing philosophical prose, though he continued to write poetry. His early poetry, inspired by his study of classics and of the poet and philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), sought a poetic language in nature. However, Leopardi later articulated a cosmic pessimism and regarded nature as lacking any purpose and indifferent to humanity. Important works include the lyric poems in *Canti* (1831, 1845), written between 1816 and 1837; and the philosophical essays, dialogues, and aphorisms in *Operette morali* (1827, 1845). Robert Lowell and Ezra Pound, both correspondents of Santayana's, published translations of Leopardi. Santayana wrote a foreword to Iris Origo's *Leopardi: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935; reissued as *Leopardi: A Study in Solitude* [London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953]). Origo was the daughter of a Harvard friend of Santayana's, Bayard Cutting (*PP*, 397). In his foreword, Santayana praised the divine quality of Leopardi's poetry and wrote that reading it "we are transported out of ourselves ascetically, by the vision of truth" (*Leopardi: A Biography* [1935], vi). He acknowledged Leopardi's suffering but thought that "the white heat of his anguish burned all anguish away," and Leopardi's intuition of beauty in a world of change and loss "liberated him from the illusions of the past and those of the future" (*Leopardi* [1935], vi).

15.1 Renaissance ] French for "rebirth," the term "Renaissance" was first used in the nineteenth century to refer to the intellectual movement that revived Classical Greek and Roman learning and emphasized a hopeful image of human life (known as "humanism") that embraced the possibilities in the development of human capacities. The movement began in Northern Italy in the thirteenth century and spread throughout Italy over the next two centuries. By the sixteenth century the movement culminated in what is often called the High Renaissance and spread throughout Europe. The humanism of the movement contrasted with medieval Christianity's emphasis on the inherent corruption and depravity of human nature. Humanism was marked by a turning away from Christian dogma in favor of experience and increasing adoption of vernacular in written works. Important early figures include Brunetto Latini, Dante, Boccaccio, Petrarch, Machiavelli, and Erasmus. High Renaissance figures include Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo. For Santayana, the Renaissance was the first of the three Rs of modernity, the second and third being the Reformation and the (French) Revolution; of these three Rs, he wrote

that they “have left the public mind without any vestige of discipline” (*GTB*, 8). Of the Renaissance, Santayana wrote that it “really tended to emancipate the passions and to exploit nature for fanciful and for practical human uses: it simply continued all that was vivacious and ornate in the Middle Ages”; but “for all its poetry, scholarship, and splendour, [the Renaissance] was a great surrender of the spirit to the flesh, of the essence for the miscellany of human power” (*GTB*, 8–9). See Note 24.18 Dante.

15.2 Raphael ] Raffaello Sanzio (1483–1520), Italian High Renaissance artist, born in Urbino. He was greatly influenced by his older contemporaries Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) and Michelangelo (1475–1564) but established an original style of extensive influence. Raphael spent most of his life in Rome and was chief architect of Saint Peter’s Basilica. The Sistine Madonna (c. 1512–14) is perhaps his best-known work.

15.2 Shakespeare; ] William Shakespeare (1564–1616), English actor, poet, and dramatist, baptized in Stratford-on-Avon. He was a leading literary figure of the English Renaissance and now is regarded as the foremost writer in English literature and most influential dramatist in the world. His best-known works include the tragedies *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Othello*, and *Romeo and Juliet*. He also wrote over 150 sonnets. Santayana, in his 1896 essay “The Absence of Religion in Shakespeare,” observed in Shakespeare “no fixed conception of any forces, natural or moral, dominating and transcending our mortal energies” (*IPR*, 100); and he contrasted Shakespeare with Homer and Dante, whose “faith had enveloped the world of experience in a world of imagination, in which the ideals of the reason, of the fancy, and of the heart had a natural expression. They had caught in the reality the hint of a lovelier fable, – a fable in which that reality was completed and idealised. . . . They had, as it were, dramatised the universe, and endowed it with the tragic unities” (*IPR*, 96). Santayana also wrote “Hamlet’s Question” in 1919, which appeared later in *Soliloquies in England* (27–29); and an essay entitled “Introduction to Hamlet” (*Hamlet, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare*, Vol. 15, ed. Sidney Lee [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1906], ix–xxxiii); reprinted as “Hamlet” in *Obiter Scripta*, 1936, 41–67), as well as citing or alluding to this play in almost all of his other published work as well as in many letters. In a notable 1933 letter, Santayana gave an extended summary of his view of the writer:

Shakespeare happened to have a great fluid imagination and an enormous eloquence or gift of storing and mating and pouring out words. These natural powers – which many a man has here and there – happened in his case to be set free, fed, and loosened by the circumstances of the age and by his special craft as an actor and playwright. Most other poets have been

held down by tradition or religion or lack of opportunity to a single mode of expression, to one literary key. They were not allowed to mix poetry with prose, tragedy with comedy, love-making with politics, or edification with atheism. The top wave of the renaissance allowed Shakespeare to combine all these elements: and the wealth of Christendom and of paganism were at his disposal, without the restraints or limitations of either. . . . Exuberance seems to me to cover everything, the wealth of genius as well as the contempt for art; and in particular it covers the irrelevant elaboration of language and of characters which, to us, is one of Shakespeare's chief charms: those glimpses that he stops to give us of the back-waters and eddies and weeds of the stream of passion. He challenged and perhaps annoyed his public by doing so; but he just could manage it without being dismissed as a closet-tragedian; and these escapades of his imagination into the by-conscious now seem to us a proof of miraculous depth in him. I don't think they are that: but they are proofs of his knowingness and quick intuition. And this brings me back to your conclusion about his philosophy—that life is a dream. Yes, that is his philosophy; and, when T. S. Eliot says that this philosophy (borrowed he thinks from Seneca) is an inferior one, compared with Dante's, I agree if you mean inferior morally and imaginatively: but it happens to be the true philosophy for the human passions, and for a man enduring, without supernaturally interpreting, the spectacle of the universe. It is a commonplace philosophy, the old old heathen philosophy of mankind. Shakespeare didn't create it. He felt it was true, and never thought of transcending it" (*LGS*, 5:19–20). See Note 24.18 Dante.

15.15 *Wanderjahre* ] German for “years of traveling,” which refer, in medieval tradition, to the time of working as a journeyman, that is, one who has completed an apprenticeship but not yet established himself as a master. Traditionally, a journeyman traveled for two or three years, working with different masters in different locations.

15.37 Bertrand Russell, ] Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–1970), 3rd Earl Russell, English philosopher and social activist; grandson of Lord John Russell (1792–1878), a former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; secular godson of English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873); educated at Trinity College, Cambridge University. His early philosophical work was on logic, mathematics, and language. He investigated the logical foundations of mathematics, a project known as “logicism,” and attempted to clarify the logical structure of language. He also wrote on epistemology and metaphysics, arguing that the world we know is made up of immediately perceived “sense-data” and the facts they comprise, a doctrine known as “logical atomism.” His work influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1889–1951, Austrian philosopher) *Tractatus*

*Logico-Philosophicus* (1922). He also wrote on morals, politics, and education. Russell founded an experimental school, Beacon Hill School, with his second wife, Dora Black, in 1927. He supported female suffrage, opposed World War I (for which he was imprisoned in 1918), and helped lead the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. He was a prolific and clear writer and won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. His important works include *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903); *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13), written with A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947); *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (1940); *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945); *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits* (1948); and *Autobiography* (1967–69). In 1885, Santayana met Bertrand's brother, John Francis Stanley Russell, 2nd Earl Russell (1865–1931), known as Frank, when they were undergraduates at Harvard. In 1895, Frank introduced Santayana to Bertrand during a day trip to Cambridge, England. The next year, when Santayana was on sabbatical at Cambridge, he came to know Bertrand better. Santayana wrote of him in *Persons and Places*:

Of all my friends, of all persons belonging at all to my world, Bertrand Russell was the most distinguished. He had birth, genius, learning, indefatigable zeal and energy, brilliant intelligence, and absolute honesty and courage. His love of justice was as keen as his sense of humour. He was at home in mathematics, in natural science, and in history. He knew well all the more important languages and was well informed about everything going on in the world of politics and literature. He ought to have been a leader, a man of universal reputation and influence. He was indeed recognised to be a distinguished man, having made his mark in mathematics and logic, and largely inspired the new philosophical sect of 'logical realists'. Yet on the whole, relatively to his capacities, he was a failure. He petered out. He squandered his time and energy, and even his money, on unworthy objects. He left no monument – unless it be the early *Principia Mathematica* written in collaboration with Whitehead – that does justice to his powers and gives him a place in history. (*PP*, 440)

*Winds of Doctrine* includes a review essay entitled "The Philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell" (73–101) which Santayana characterized in a 1911 letter to Russell as "an elaborate review – in three articles – for the . . . Columbia [Journal of Philosophy, etc]. You will not expect me to agree with you in everything, but, whatever you may think of my ideas, I always feel that yours, and [G. E.] Moore's too, make for the sort of reconstruction in philosophy which I should welcome. It is a great bond to dislike the same things, and dislike is perhaps a deeper indication of our real nature than explicit affections, since the latter may be effects of circumstances, while dislike is a reaction against them" (*LGS*, 2:28). Santayana's personal library included several books by Russell, including

copies presented by the author to Santayana. See also Note 73.6 Mr. G. E. Moore. For John Stuart Mill, see Note 46.20 Mill.

## MODERNISM AND CHRISTIANITY

- 17.19 *Zeitgeist*. ] German for “spirit of the age.” It is used to refer to social or cultural trends and is sometimes taken to suggest a suprahuman influence on the actions and choices of masses of people.
- 17.22 Copernicus, ] Nikolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), Polish mathematician and astronomer. He proposed the theory that the Earth and other planets revolve around the sun in individual orbits while spinning on their axes. His theory replaced Ptolemy’s (second century AD) assertion that planets and stars revolve around the Earth.
- 17.27 liberal Catholicism, ] See Note 3.11 modernist.
- 18.23 days of the Prophets ] The period in which the prophetic books in the Hebrew scriptures are set ranges approximately from the ninth century BC to the sixth century BC. The major prophets, so called because of the length of their writings in the Old Testament of the Bible, are Isaiah (eighth century BC), Jeremiah (seventh and sixth centuries BC), and Ezekiel (seventh and sixth centuries BC). Sometimes Daniel (sixth century BC) is included among the major prophets. The twelve minor prophets, represented by shorter books, include Hosea (eighth century BC), Joel (eighth century BC), Amos (eighth century BC), Obadiah (sixth century BC?), Jonah (eighth century BC?), Micah (eighth century BC), Nahum (seventh century BC), Habakkuk (seventh or sixth century BC), Zephaniah (seventh century BC), Haggai (sixth century BC), Zechariah (sixth century BC), and Malachi (sixth century BC). Also recognized as prophets are Elijah and his successor Elisha (both ninth century BC), whose stories appear in the Old Testament books of 1 and 2 Kings. The prophets communicated the will of God to the people of Israel and often warned of God’s wrath if the Israelites did not follow God’s laws.
- 18.25–26 St. John the Baptist ] A Jewish preacher, ascetic, and prophetic figure, mentioned in the New Testament and by the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus (AD 37–100). According to the Gospel of Matthew in the New Testament, John was born to Elisabeth, a cousin of Mary, mother of Jesus, and Zechariah, a Jewish priest (Luke 1:5). John lived alone in the desert, wearing camel’s hair and a leather belt and eating locusts and honey (Matthew 3:4). He was a popular preacher in Judea, warning of God’s wrath and the people’s need to repent of their sins (Matthew 3:5–12; Luke 3:3–17). He introduced the rite of baptism: a one-time ritual cleansing that promised salvation (Matthew 3:11; Mark 1:4). His birth and ministry were believed to foretell the coming of Jesus (Matthew 3:3;



Mark 1:2–3; Luke 1:41–44, 1:76, 3:4), and he later baptized Jesus (Matthew 3:14; Mark 1:9; Luke 3:21). He was executed by King Herod after John denounced Herod's unlawful marriage to his brother's wife (Matthew 14:1–12).

18.30–37 Those who hoped . . . that very generation. ] Allusion to several Bible verses. “The remnant” refers to the group of righteous and faithful believers who will be spared divine punishment. The Old Testament prophets Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah all told of a group of Jews who would survive because they repented and trusted in God. Isaiah was especially concerned with the idea of the remnant and the coming of the Messiah (Isaiah 11:1–26), and in the New Testament, Paul cited Isaiah and wrote of the remnant of Jews whom God's grace would preserve (Romans 9:27, 11:1–5). The idea of a “New Jerusalem” comes from Isaiah's prophecy of future glory for Jerusalem (Isaiah 52:1), and in the New Testament the name refers to the perfected Church after the Final Judgment and in the reign of Christ in the new heaven and new earth (Revelation 3:12, 21). Sackcloth is a coarse cloth made of black goat hair (Revelation 6:12) traditionally worn by mourners or penitents, who might also sit in ashes or put ashes upon their heads (2 Samuel 13:19 and Jonah 3:5–6, for example). In the New Testament, sackcloth and ashes are mentioned as signs of repentance (Matthew 11:21; Luke 10:13). Jesus advised followers: “Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning” (Luke 12:35) in preparation for the coming of the kingdom of God; and he warned them that the exact time of the coming was unknown (Matthew 24:42; Mark 13:32–33; Luke 12:35–40). Since one's main concern should be the kingdom of God, Jesus said, “Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof” (Matthew 6:33–34).

19.14–15 sifting of the wheat from the tares, or to any burning of whole bundles of nations, ] In the Gospel of Matthew 13:24–30 and 36–43, Jesus compared the coming of the kingdom of heaven, when the wicked shall be cast “into a furnace of fire” (13:42) and then the righteous “will shine forth as the sun” (13:43), to the harvest of a field, when the wheat and tares (weeds resembling wheat, maliciously sown by an “enemy” [13:25]) must be similarly separated. Pulling the weeds too early risks uprooting the wheat as well, so the owner of the field charges his servants to wait until the wheat is ripe and then to begin by bundling and burning the tares before gathering and storing the wheat (13:29–30).

19.32 Professor Harnack, ] Carl Gustav Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), German theologian and historian of Christianity, born in a Russian province (now Estonia), educated at University of Leipzig, professor at University of Berlin

(1888–1921). His three-volume *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (1886–89) (*History of Dogma*, 7 vols., 1894–99) examined Christian doctrine from its beginnings through the Reformation and questioned miracles, the Resurrection, baptism, and the authorship of several New Testament books. He regarded the adoption of Greek metaphysics by Christian theology as a distortion of Christian doctrine, a view which put him in opposition to conservatives who opposed his appointment to the University of Berlin. His *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900) (*What is Christianity?* [1901]) emphasized the moral message of Christianity to the exclusion of doctrine. The influential twentieth-century theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968) was a student of Harnack and later a strong critic of Harnack’s work. In his copy of *Dogmengeschichte*, Santayana wrote, “Harnack’s original Christianity is an idiocy pure and simple” (*MARG*, 1:319).

21.1 The prophecy about . . . world ] According to the New Testament, Jesus told listeners that some of them would not die before seeing Jesus in his kingdom, suggesting that his return would occur within their lifetimes (Matthew 16:28; Mark 9:1; Luke 9:27). Christians believe that Jesus’s return will initiate the Final Judgment and his eternal kingdom will replace the imperfect human world. In the New Testament, 2 Thessalonians 2:1–9 prophesies the coming of Jesus Christ and his destruction of lawlessness, which is the work of Satan. The Nicene Creed, a concise statement of Christian beliefs that originated at the First Ecumenical Council of the Catholic church at Nicaea in 325, states: “[Jesus Christ] will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead and his kingdom will have no end” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed., Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2019, 50).

21.7–8 It would profit . . . his own soul. ] Allusion to parallel verses in the three synoptic Gospels:

For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? (Matthew 16:26)

For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? (Mark 8:36)

For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, or be cast away? (Luke 9:25)

21.23 “this wicked world” ] Santayana quoted a similar but longer text in *LR3* (122): “renounce the pomps and vanities of this wicked world,” which is found in *The Westminster Assembly’s Shorter Catechism, with which is Incorporated a*

*Scripture Catechism in the Method of the Assembly's* (1703) by Matthew Henry (1662–1714), an English Presbyterian minister and biblical commentator. The text occurs in the context of the question “What is Baptism?” and more specifically the question of whether baptism binds one to renounce the devil (Henry, *A Scripture Catechism*, American edition [Princeton, NJ: Franklin Merrill, 1846], 193). The phrase “this wicked world” appears twice in Marcus Dods’s English translation of Augustine’s *City of God* ([Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1871], 99, 281). Augustine of Hippo (354–430) was a Christian theologian, philosopher, bishop, and Catholic saint, whose writings have directly influenced orthodox doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. His influential work *City of God* (413–26), in twenty-two books, defends Christianity against the charge that its rejection of pagan gods made it responsible for the sack of Rome in 410. Augustine built his defense by describing human history as the interaction between two cities: a divine city of God, exemplified by the true Church, whose members—through grace—have renounced self in favor of God, and a corrupt city of Man (or of Satan), exemplified by Rome or Babylon and whose citizens have turned away from God in favor of self. The progress of history moves toward the separation of the two cities until ultimately all persons are united with their resurrected bodies and citizens of the city of God enjoy the vision of God and citizens of the city of Satan suffer eternal punishment. The second reference to “this wicked world” refers to the condition in which many nonbelievers are mingled with faithful believers in God, but in the future, wrote Augustine, “the wicked must be separated from the good, that in the good, as in his Temple, God may be all in all” (Augustine, *City of God*, 1871, 282). See Note 19.14–15 sifting of the wheat . . . bundles of nations.

21.23–24 “this transitory life” ] The phrase occurs in the Church of England’s *The Book of Common Prayer* in the section “The Order for the Administration of The Lord’s Supper or Holy Communion”: “And we most humbly beseech thee of thy goodness, O Lord, to comfort and succour all them, who in this transitory life are in trouble, sorrow, need, sickness, or any other adversity” (*The Book of Common Prayer*, [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892], 242). *The Book of Common Prayer* originated with King Edward VI and his First Prayer Book (1549) and Second Prayer Book (1552), which drew on liturgies from Latin, German, Spanish, and Orthodox traditions and was assembled largely by Thomas Cranmer. The book was altered or suppressed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as religious and political conditions in England changed. Though modernized versions appeared in the late twentieth century, the official version remains the 1662 edition. *The Book of Common Prayer* has greatly influenced the English language and is an early published source for many now common idioms and expressions.

21.24 “the coming of the Kingdom” ] The phrase refers to the prophecy discussed in Note 31.3–4 the prophecy about . . . world. It also occurs in the New Testament in Luke 17:20–21:

Once, on being asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God would come, Jesus replied, “The coming of the kingdom of God is not something that can be observed, nor will people say, ‘Here it is,’ or ‘There it is,’ because the kingdom of God is in your midst.”

21.24–25 “life everlasting.” ] The phrase occurs at the end of the Apostles’ Creed, a statement of belief used in western Christian churches. The title comes from a reference to the creed in a fourth-century letter from St. Ambrose. Contrary to legend, the creed was not composed by Jesus’s twelve apostles. It is derived from a second-century Roman baptismal creed based on Jesus’s instruction to spread salvation through baptism found in Matthew 28:19: “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” The enumeration in this New Testament text of the Trinity (the Christian doctrine of the one God being three persons) gives the creed its three-part structure. The English version current in the nineteenth century comes from the seventeenth-century *The Book of Common Prayer*: “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth: And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, Born of the virgin Mary, Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead and buried. He descended into Hell, The third day he rose again from the dead. He ascended into Heaven, And sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty. From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost, The holy Catholic Church, The Communion of Saints, the forgiveness of sins, The resurrection of the body, And the life everlasting. Amen” (*The Book of Common Prayer* [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892], 55).

22.1 Sodom and Gomorrah ] According to the Old Testament, God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah because of the wickedness of the inhabitants: “Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven” (Genesis 19:24). Lot, the nephew of Abraham, was spared destruction because he showed kindness to two strangers and protected them from his neighbors who planned to assault them; the strangers actually were angels sent by God. The angels warned Lot to flee and told him, “We will destroy this place, because the cry of them is waxen great before the face of the LORD; and the LORD hath sent us to destroy it” (Genesis 19:13).

22.3–4 Israel was led . . . restored the Temple. ] The Old Testament (2 Kings 24–25) recounts the conquest of Jerusalem by King Nebuchadnezzar of

Babylon in 586 BC. He destroyed the Temple (or Temple Mount) originally built by Solomon (1 Kings 6) and took the Jews captive: “And he carried away all Jerusalem, and all the princes, and all the mighty men of valour, even ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save the poorest sort of the people of the land. . . . And all the men of might, even seven thousand, and craftsmen and smiths a thousand, all that were strong and apt for war, even them the king of Babylon brought captive to Babylon” (2 Kings 24:14, 16). The destruction of the Temple and the Jewish exile in Babylon figure in much of the narrative and imagery of the Old and New Testaments. After this exile ended, reconstruction of the Temple began in 515 BC (Haggai 2). The second Temple was completed by Herod in 20 BC and again destroyed in AD 70 by the Romans.

22.19 St. Paul, ] Paul, also known as Saul (died c. AD 67), Christian missionary, born in Tarsus to a Hellenistic Jewish family. He became a Pharisee, represented in the New Testament as demanding strict adherence to the group’s interpretation of religious law, especially to laws concerned with ritual purity, and as shunning people regarded as sinners. Initially he opposed Christianity and actively persecuted Christians, but a conversion experience in which the Lord spoke to him convinced him that Jesus lived and was the Son of God (Acts 9:1–31). After his conversion, he became a dedicated preacher of the gospel. Paul’s missionary work included extensive travels throughout Greece and Asia Minor, where he established and supported churches in major cities and encouraged church members to evangelize in surrounding towns. The New Testament book of Acts includes information about his mission work and the challenges he faced. The New Testament contains 14 books (Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon, Hebrews) traditionally attributed to Paul and known as the Pauline Epistles. These letters addressed to early church communities and individuals became foundational to Christian theology, influencing Augustine of Hippo (354–430), Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), Martin Luther (1483–1546), John Calvin (1509–1564), and other thinkers essential to the Christian tradition.

22.19 St. James, ] James, son of Zebedee (d. AD 44), born in Galilee, worked as a fisherman, one of the Twelve Apostles chosen by Jesus, older brother of Saint John the Apostle. Along with John and Simon Peter, he was a member of Jesus’s innermost circle and witnessed the Transfiguration of Christ (when Jesus appeared with Moses and Elijah [Matthew 17:1–13, Mark 9:2–13, Luke 9:28–36]) and Jesus’s agony at Gethsemane (where he prayed prior to his arrest

resulting from Judas's betrayal [Mark 14:32–42]). Jesus called James and John “Boanerges” or “Sons of Thunder” (Mark 3:17), presumably for their zeal in preaching the gospel. James became the first martyred apostle when he was beheaded by Herod Agrippa I; he is the only apostle whose martyrdom is recorded in the Bible (Acts 12:2). He is distinct from another of the twelve apostles, James, son of Alphaeus (Acts 1:13), and from James, brother of Jesus (Matthew 13:55, Mark 6:3) who became a follower of Jesus after the crucifixion and a leader of the early church (Acts 15:13).

22.20 St. John, ] John, son of Zebedee, brother of James, also known as Saint John the Apostle and Saint John the Evangelist. He is traditionally regarded as the author of five books of the New Testament: the Gospel of John; three letters, 1 John, 2 John, and 3 John; and Revelation. The Gospel of John often is distinguished from the three synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) for its emphasis on theology and for providing a foundation for an understanding of what is distinctive about Jesus. Taken together, the stylistically varying letters of John give an account of Jesus's relation to God and humankind, present an idea of righteous conduct, and promote unity among the Christian churches. The book of Revelation is written as a letter to the seven churches of Roman Asia relating a vision John had of the events leading up to God's final judgment and the establishment of a new heaven and earth after the defeat of evil. John is mentioned in the New Testament book of Acts, including his imprisonment along with Peter (Acts 4:1–21) and his evangelizing with Peter in Samaria (Acts 8:14). For James, son of Zebedee, see Note 22.19 St. James.

24.4 whoever does the will . . . brother and sister and mother ] Allusion to Matthew 12:50: “For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother.”

24.6–7 pledged, at baptism, to renounce the world, the flesh, and the devil; ] The language is common in Christian tradition. It appears, for example, in the Litany, or general prayer of supplication, recited regularly in Anglican churches after morning prayer on Sundays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and at other ritual services: “*Good Lord deliver us. . . .* from the “the deceits of the world, the Flesh, and the devill” (*The Book of Common Prayer*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1892, 74). Santayana appropriated the triad to describe, “after the picturesque manner of Christian wisdom,” what distracts spirit or consciousness from “the spontaneous exercise of its liberty and holds it down to the rack of care, doubt, pain, hatred, and vice” (*RB*, 673). In 1938, he described his later work as a “goodbye to the world, the flesh, and the devil, particularly the last, recognized by me under the disguise of modern philosophy” (*LGS*, 6:156).

24.18 Dante? ] Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), Italian poet, born in Florence. He was the first poet to write a major work in Italian vernacular. His best-known work is *Divina Commedia* (1321) (*The Divine Comedy*), which describes a spiritual journey through hell, purgatory, and heaven in three *cantiche* (canticles): *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso*. Each of these parts is divided into 33 *canti* (songs) of 115 to 160 lines of verse. For this work, Dante invented the verse form known as *terza rima*, with a rhyme scheme of ABA BCB CDC. In addition to a vision of the afterlife, the poem presents social critique and moral education, drawing symbols and allusions from contemporary political and social events as well as from natural science, astronomy, history, and philosophy. Dante is one of the figures treated in Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910), in which Santayana wrote that Dante's idea of nature "is . . . intercepted by myths and worked out by dialectic." He continued, "Dante is always thinking of the divine order of history and of the spheres; . . . so that he seems to be a cosmic poet, and to have escaped the anthropocentric conceit of romanticism. But he has not escaped it." (*TPP*, 185). Santayana's personal library included four copies of *The Divine Comedy*, two in English and two in Italian. Other important works by Dante include two collections of poems in vernacular with the author's commentary: *Vita Nova* (1293/4) (*The New Life*) and *Convivio* (1304–7) (*The Banquet*); and a prose treatise in Latin on political philosophy: *De Monarchia* (c. 1318).

24.26 Philip II. ] (1527–1598), King of Spain; born in Valladolid, son of Emperor Charles V and Isabella of Portugal. In 1556, Charles V abdicated, and Philip became king of Spain, Naples, Sicily, Milan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the Spanish empire in America. Philip aimed to limit French power, beat back the Turks, and defend Catholicism in the lands he ruled. His conflict with France ended in 1559, but he still worked to undermine French stability by supporting civil strife there. His navy defeated the Turks at Lepanto in 1571. Philip was less successful in establishing papal leadership that favored Spanish interests, and in 1588 his attempt to subdue England on behalf of Spanish trade and Catholic interests failed when the Spanish Armada was defeated. He secured his own lands, but the effort—including suppression of the 1567 Revolt of the Netherlands that continued 11 years after his death—strained the Spanish economy and cost much wealth imported from America. In Spain, Philip dealt with two regional rebellions, including one by Moriscos (Christianized Muslims, often suspected of secretly practicing Islam) in Granada (1568–70). In the sixteenth century, Moriscos had become a target of the Spanish Inquisition, an ecclesiastical tribunal that judged and punished heretics and enforced orthodox teaching and that Philip used to eliminate political enemies and extend his power. The Spanish Inquisition was modeled on but separate from the Roman Catholic Inquisition. Philip's cultural legacy includes the Escorial (1563–83), a



monastery, palace, and mausoleum, where Philip lived his final years. See also Note 24.29 Inquisition.

24.28 Protestants. ] See Note 3.2 Reformation and Note 25.37 Luther; see also Note 24.26 Philip II.

24.29 Inquisition, ] A special tribunal of the Catholic Church concerned with the detection and prosecution of heresy. The early Christian Church typically punished heresy with excommunication. After the Roman Empire adopted Christianity, secular rulers came to regard heresy as an affront to their authority punishable by forfeiture of property or death, though the Church's policy on punishment remained largely unchanged. However, in 1184 Pope Lucius III commanded bishops to turn over unrepentant heretics in their dioceses to secular authorities. This was not effective, and in 1233 Pope Gregory IX established a permanent papal inquisition into heresy. Inquisitors, answering to the pope, were assigned to areas where heresy was thought to be a problem and where secular authorities were supportive. By the fifteenth century, the Inquisition was in steep decline. It was revived by Pope Paul III in 1542, though its power extended only to Papal States (most of peninsular Italy and Avignon in France).

The Spanish Inquisition was distinct from that in Rome. Established in 1478 by Ferdinand V (1452–1516) and Isabella I of Castile (1451–1504) and authorized by Pope Sixtus IV, it was a centralized organization led by an Inquisitor General named by the pope. In practice the Inquisitor General served the Spanish king, and Philip II (1527–1598) made use of the Spanish Inquisition to eliminate political enemies and extend his power. The Spanish Inquisition, which punished heretics by torture, seizure of property, and *autos de fe* (public ceremonial punishment, which could include execution by burning), targeted converted Jews and Muslims suspected of being Christians in name only. It also attacked Protestants and Alumbrados (contemplatives, some of whom claimed spiritual visions and original revelations).

In a 1951 letter, Santayana gave this account of the Inquisition:

This was, and still is, a tribunal to judge any reported heresy or moral perversion arising within the Catholic fold; the accused being assumed to be pledged to support Christian faith and morals. The people are supposed to be unanimous, as in the present Communist countries; and torture was applied, as now in those countries, to extract confessions of guilt from the accused. Nobody was condemned who had not confessed sin, and fire, following on self-accusation, was calculated to burn the corruption away. I once read the verbatim reports of the trial of the Cenci family on the charge of having murdered their husband and father. The judge would say: the Court knows, and would retail [recount] the crime as discovered or imagined by the agents of the Holy Office:

the prisoners all began by denying and all ended by confessing; and they were condemned to various punishments: the son to be branded with hot irons and then quartered; the wife and daughter to be beheaded, and the boy to be sent to the galleys for life. Horrible glimpses of hell, by which actual endless hell was avoided. There was a sort of rationality in this religious madness; and it is impossible not to be impressed by the overwhelming force of the moral tyranny asserted to rule the world (*LGS*, 8:364).

The Cenci family's torture and killing by the Church are the subject of Shelley's *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts* (1819), about which see Note 109.19 *Cenci*.

25.12 the Revolution ] See Note 6.38 French Revolution.

25.33–36 “I see a vision . . . been done for.” ] The quotation is from section 61 of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche's (1844–1900) *The Antichrist* (1895). The original text reads, “Ich sehe ein Schauspiel, so sinnreich, so wunderbar paradox zugleich, dass alle Gottheiten des Olymeps einen Anlass zu einem unsterblichen Gelächter gehabt hätten—Cesare Borgia als Papst . . . Versteht man mich? . . . Wohlan, das wäre der Sieg gewesen, nach dem ich heute allein verlange—: damit war des Christenthum abgeschafft!” (*Nietzsches Werke*, Vol. 8 [Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1899], 311). The first English translation reads, “I see a spectacle so rich in meaning and so wonderfully paradoxical to boot, that it would be enough to make all the gods of Olympus rock with immortal laughter,—*Caesar Borgia as Pope*. . . Do you understand me? . . . Very well then, this would have been the triumph which *I* alone am longing for to-day:—this would have swept Christianity away!” (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Vol. 16, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, First Complete and Authorised English Translation in Eighteen Volumes*, ed. Oscar Levy, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici [Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911], 228–29). This contemporary authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 5.17 Nietzsche.

25.34 Cæsar Borgia ] Cesare Borgia (1475–1507), Italian political and military leader, Duke of Valentinois, Duke of Romagna, born in Rome as the illegitimate son of the Aragon aristocrat Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia (later Pope Alexander VI). In 1492 Cesare's father was elected the second Borgia pope (after Callistus III [reigned 1455–58]), and Cesare was then made archbishop of Valencia and admitted to the College of Cardinals a year later. In 1497, Cesare's brother Giovanni (Juan), Duke of Gandía, was murdered by an unknown assailant. Cesare resigned his ecclesiastical offices and succeeded his brother as Captain-General of the Church in charge of the papal army. A successful military commander, Cesare conquered most of central Italy in two

campaigns beginning in 1500. Cesare and his father became seriously ill in 1503 (possibly from poisoning); his father died and Cesare remained incapacitated and politically ineffective. Cesare had an ally in the newly elected Pope Pius III (reigned 1503), but Pius III died three weeks after assuming office. His successor, Julius II (reigned 1503–1513), was a longtime opponent of the Borgias, and Cesare lost his Italian conquests and fled to Naples. In 1504, Cesare was arrested and delivered to the Spanish King Ferdinand, who imprisoned him for two years before he escaped. Cesare then served in the military of his brother-in-law King John III of Navarre and died in 1507 while besieging a rebel castle. Cesare had a reputation for cruelty but also was known as a firm and fair ruler. Niccolò Machiavelli wrote approvingly of Cesare Borgia in his work *The Prince*: “There were in the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties” (Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott [London: J. M. Dent, 1903], 61). In Machiavelli’s judgment, the only political mistake Cesare ever made was not preventing the election of Julius II by supporting a rival candidate.

25.37 Luther ] Martin Luther (1483–1546), German theologian and leader of the Protestant Reformation, born in Eisleben, Saxony, educated in Magdeburg and Erfurt. He entered the monastery of the Augustinian Friars in 1505 and two years later was ordained a priest. In 1508 he was named professor of moral philosophy at the University of Wittenberg, where in 1511 he became doctor of theology and professor of biblical exegesis, a position he held for the rest of his life. In 1517, Luther posted on the church door at Wittenberg ninety-five theses criticizing the use of indulgences by the Catholic Church. This academic dispute became a movement for church reform typically known as the Protestant Reformation or simply the Reformation. In 1520, Luther explicitly advocated reform in three treatises addressed to the German people and the following year was condemned as a heretic and excommunicated by the Catholic Church. Unlike earlier critics of the Roman Catholic Church, he attacked doctrine rather than simply the day to day activities of the church and its relationship with adherents. In particular, he rejected papal authority in favor of unmediated interpretation of the Bible; abandoned several Catholic sacraments, including confession; and believed that salvation is the gift of divine grace rather than the result of human effort, thereby denying the power of an institution to mediate one’s relationship to God or determine one’s spiritual state. See also Note 3.2 Reformation.

- 26.27 Empedocles ] Empedocles of Acragas (492–432 BC), philosopher, poet, and physician. He was born in the Greek city of Acragas (present-day Agrigento in Sicily) to an aristocratic family, was active in political life, and participated in the Olympic Games. He was influenced by Parmenides, and his thought is preserved in two fragmentary poems, *On Nature* and *Purifications*, and in the work of Diogenes Laërtius (third century AD). He is known for his theory of matter (which remained influential until the advent of modern chemistry in the eighteenth century), which posits four “roots” or unchanging elements: earth, water, fire, and air. He also held that the cosmos results from the cyclical influence on the elements of Love and Strife. When Love dominates, the universe is a harmonious whole; when Strife dominates, all elements are completely separated.
- 27.27 Ritschl ] Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889), German Protestant theologian, born in Berlin, educated at Bonn, Halle, Heidelberg, and Tübingen. He was professor of theology at Bonn (1851–64) and Göttingen (1864–89). As a student of F. C. Baur, Ritschl initially followed the Tübingen School, which used Hegelian ideas to explain the development of early Christianity, but he broke with his early academic influences in the 1850s. He came to regard religion and faith as superior to philosophy and reason, and he believed that the exculpation of sins and reconciliation with God are possible only through the community. He rejected metaphysical inquiry, natural theology, mysticism, and individualism for this communal faith as a means to revelation and relation with God. His central ideas are expressed in the influential three-volume *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (1870–74) (*The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*). The Ritschlian School, emphasizing ethics and community, included theologians J. W. M. Kaftan (1848–1926), Wilhelm Hermann (1846–1922), Adolf Harnack (1851–1930), and Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923). By the 1920s Ritschl’s influence had waned considerably. See Note 29.7 Professor Harnack and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.
- 28.11 *a priori*, ] Latin for “before,” used in philosophy to denote knowledge that is prior to or independent of experience.
- 28.19–20 Pius X. . . modernism, ] Giuseppe Melchiorre Sarto (1835–1914), Roman Catholic priest and Pope (reigned 1903–1914), born to a poor family in Riese, Upper Venetia, Italy. Ordained in 1858, he became Pope Pius X in 1903 and took as his motto “Instaurare omnia in Christo” (“To restore all things in Christ”) (Ephesians 1:10), consistent with his intention to be a religious rather than political leader. This meant not that he disregarded political matters but rather that he resolved not to compromise with secular authorities: he protested the separation of church and state legislated in France and Portugal; he supported Catholics in Poland and Ireland, to the vexation of Russian and British leaders; and he was an

active opponent of socialism both before and during his time as pope. He also opposed the liberalizing movement in the Roman Catholic Church known as Modernism. In his decree *Lamentabili* (3 July 1907) Pius X rejected Modernist propositions that departed from orthodox views of the Church, revelation, Christ, and the sacraments, and in his encyclical (a letter addressed to all Roman Catholic parishes) *Pascendi* (8 September 1907) he condemned Modernism, calling it a “synthesis of all heresies.” He also instituted an anti-Modernist oath for all clergy. Though he was religiously conservative, he reorganized church administration, education, and liturgy with the aims of securing the independence of the Church, increasing pastoral effectiveness, and improving the spiritual life of Catholics generally. While still living, he was regarded as a saint with a reputation for miracles, and he was canonized forty years after his death, in 1954. For Catholic Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist.

28.22 Prometheus, ] In Greek mythology, Prometheus, son of the Titan Iapetus, seeks to alleviate human suffering by introducing fire in defiance of the gods, who have reserved fire for themselves. Zeus, king of the gods, punishes Prometheus by chaining him to the top of a mountain and dispatching an eagle to eat his liver. By night Prometheus’s liver grows back and the eagle returns the next day to repeat the evisceration. Even after prolonged suffering, Prometheus refuses to submit to Zeus and eventually is rescued by Hercules. See also Note 109.22 *Prometheus* about Shelley’s 1820 drama *Prometheus Unbound* based on the Greek myth.

28.31 Ovid ] Publius Ovidius Naso (43 BC–AD 17), Roman poet, born to an aristocratic family at Sulmo in Abruzzi, educated in Rome. After a brief career in law, he dedicated himself, contrary to his father’s wishes, to writing poetry. At the height of his fame, he was exiled in AD 8 by the Emperor Augustus to a remote town on the Black Sea, where he died. The cause of his exile is unclear but may have been due to knowledge of a scandal involving Augustus or his family. Ovid is perhaps best known for his unorthodox epic *Metamorphoses* (*Transformations*). Purporting to be a history of the world from creation to his own times in fifteen books, it compiles mythological tales of shape changing in the natural and divine worlds. Among his contemporaries, Ovid gained prominence as a writer of love elegies. *Amores* (*Loves*) is composed as an autobiographical account of a love affair. Unlike earlier love elegies, Ovid’s work unites the perspective of the poet and the lover. *Heroides* (*Heroines*) is a collection of epistolary poems written from the perspective of mythological women to lovers or husbands. Ovid also composed a series of three didactic works on love, writing in the second person. The first, *Ars Amatoria* (*Art of Love*) gives relationship advice to both men and women. *Medicamina Faciei Femineae*

(*Women's Facial Cosmetics*) gives instruction about female makeup. *Remedia Amoris* (*Cures for Love*) provides an antidote to the results of the first book, explaining how to fall out of love. In a 1948 letter (some thirty-five years after the reference in the present work), Santayana wrote, "I have recently got . . . two lovely eighteenth century editions, one of Lucretius and the other of Ovid. In the latter I have discovered that the end of Romeo & Juliet comes from that of Pyramus and Thisbe!" (*LGS*, 8:114).

28.32 Mohammed, ] also known as Mahomet or Muhammad (c. 570–632), prophet and founder of Islam, born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, orphaned and raised in the tribe of his uncle Abu Talib. According to his traditional biography, Mohammed was visited in 610 by the angel Gabriel, who delivered words from God about correct worship, his earlier prophets (including Adam, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, David, and Jesus), Judgment Day, and right conduct. These revelations would be compiled in a standardized written form in the 650s as the *Quran*. Initially, Mohammed repeated God's message privately to family, and then publicly in 613. Wealthy merchants opposed Mohammed's teachings that elevated the importance of piety over one's class, wealth, or race; and in 622, Mohammed and his followers were forced to flee to Yathrib, which then became known as Medina (from *Madinat al-Nabi*, "city of the Prophet"). This flight to Medina is known as the *Hegira* ("Emigration"). Mohammed established Islam in Medina and surrounding areas; and in 628, after years of conflict with Mecca, he negotiated a treaty to allow his followers to make a pilgrimage (or *hajj*) to Mecca. When the treaty was broken a year later, Mohammed peacefully took control of Mecca. Mohammed made the *hajj* in 631 and died the next year in Medina, where he was buried in the mosque.

30n.1–2 M. Le Roy's interesting theory of dogma ] Édouard Le Roy (1870–1954). French philosopher, born in Paris, studied at the *École Normale Supérieure*, earning a doctorate in 1898. He was deeply influenced by Henri Bergson, whom he succeeded as professor of philosophy at the *Collège de France* in 1921. Le Roy claimed that scientific facts are constructed as means to action in meeting human needs. Science, in this way, modifies reality and enables discourse about what would otherwise be an inarticulate flux. Le Roy applied these pragmatic ideas to religious truth in *Dogme et critique* (1907) (translation published as *What is a Dogma?*), which influenced Modernist theologians who were condemned in Pope Pius X's 1907 encyclical *Pascendi*. (Le Roy's 1929 work *Le problème de Dieu [The Problem of God]* would be placed on the Catholic Church's "List of Prohibited Books.") Le Roy maintained that dogma was unprovable, imposed by authority, assumed a medieval worldview, and was incompatible with modern inquiry, and so could not be regarded as truth, but

that dogma has a pragmatic moral value as a guide to action. Le Roy considered Christianity not as a collection of speculative truths but as a set of precepts indicating a way of life. Raised a Catholic and trained as a scientist, his philosophy reflected his commitment to both institutions. Santayana's personal library included Le Roy's *Dogme et critique* (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907), which includes the following comment among Santayana's marginal notes: "Le Roy is more interested in proving that Catholics must be pragmatists than that men should be Catholics" (*MARG*, 1:446). For Modernism, see Note 3.11 modernist; for Pius X and his encyclical letter *Pascendi*, see Note 28.19–20 Pius X . . . modernism.

30.16–17 Because, as one of the most distinguished modernists has said, the age of partial heresy is past. ] Édouard Le Roy wrote, "Nous ne sommes plus au temps des hérésies partielles" ("We no longer live in the day of partial heresies") in *Dogme et critique* (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907), 5. See Note 30n.1–2 M. Le Roy's . . . .

31.22 mysticism, ] The religious attitude or opinion that knowledge of the real world cannot be obtained by means of the senses or by conceptual thought. Such knowledge is obtained instead through mystical experience, often connected with ascetic or meditative practice. Typically, mystical experience leads to the realization that distinctions between oneself and reality, or subject and object, are erroneous. Santayana wrote of mysticism that it is

a certain genial loosening of convention, whether rational or mythical. . . . Mysticism can exist, in varied degrees, at any stage of rational development. Its presence is therefore no indication of the worth or worthlessness of its possessor. . . . Mysticism is the most primitive of feelings and only visits formed minds in moments of intellectual arrest and dissolution. It can exist in a child, very likely in an animal. . . . When articulation fails in the face of experience; when instinct guides without kindling any prophetic idea to which action may be inwardly referred; when life and hope and joy flow through the soul from an unknown region to an unknown end, then consciousness is mystical. . . . Every religion, all science, all art, is accordingly subject to incidental mysticism; but in no case can mysticism stand alone and be the body or basis of anything. (*LR5*, 164–65)

31.38 "Scholasticism" ] The term typically refers to an academic European philosophy that flourished in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries. Scholasticism grew out of the traditions of Plato (c. 427–347 BC), Aristotle (384–322 BC), and Christian apologetics. Influential figures on the development of Scholasticism include Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and Anicius Manlius Severinus Boëthius of Rome (480–524). Consistent with Anselm of Canterbury's (1033–1109) phrase *fides quaerens intellectum* ("faith seeking understanding"), Scholastic philosophers often were concerned with making Christian theology a field of rational inquiry, resulting in contributions to logic and the nature of scientific inquiry. Scholasticism declined in the Renaissance as inductive methods of scientific inquiry and humanism challenged the theological agenda in philosophy. In addition to Anselm, important scholastic philosophers included Peter Abelard (1079–1142),



Peter Lombard (1100–1160), Albertus Magnus (c. 1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), Bonaventure (1221–1274), Duns Scotus (1266–1308), and William of Ockham (1285–1349). Neo-scholastic revivals (often characterized as neo-Thomist for their emphasis on Aquinas’s philosophy) have occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In a marginal note to neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain’s 1934 work *Sept leçons sur l’être et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative* (*A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being*), Santayana characterized Scholasticism as “myth denuded of poetry and reduced to grammar” (*MARG*, 2:23). For Augustine, see Note 21.23 “this wicked world.” See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 45.12 Aristotle.

31.39 “Mediaevalism” ] The study or reconstruction of the arts and culture of the European Middle Ages (eighth century to fifteenth century). Medievalism includes the treatment in art of medieval themes such as chivalry, religious faith, and social hierarchy. It may be exemplified in literature in the use of medieval idioms, as in Edmund Spenser’s (c. 1552–1599) use of expressions from Geoffrey Chaucer’s (c. 1340–1400) poetry or in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s (1772–1834) imitation of medieval ballads. Social critics such as Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) and John Ruskin (1819–1900) drew on medieval values to present an alternative to modern industrial society. Also reacting to industrial society, Pre-Raphaelite artists such as Dante Gabriel Rossetti (1828–1882), John Millais (1829–1896), and William Holman Hunt (1827–1910) took up a medieval aesthetic, which they conceived as favoring clean lines, in an attempt to achieve a pictorial realism in service of social utility as well as beauty. The first use of the term “mediaevalism” is attributed to Ruskin in an 1853 lecture in which he distinguished architectural styles of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the postmedieval period. In the decades following Ruskin’s use, the term often was used to distinguish popular interest in the Middle Ages from scholarly inquiries in medieval history and philology. See also Note 5.38 Ruskin and Note 127.10 Carlyle.

32.27 German idealism; ] A nineteenth-century philosophical movement that reintroduced speculative metaphysics after its eclipse by science during the Enlightenment. Idealism holds that human self-consciousness is the main philosophical datum; that the world is thoroughly spiritual, having something akin to a cosmic self; and that for both the individual and the cosmic self the will is more significant than the intellect. Important figures in German idealism include Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854). Santayana was critical of German idealism because he saw it as a sort of romantic egotism which grew out of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) “radical subjectification of knowledge” (*EGP*, 34). Santayana characterized German idealism as “a false physics adored” (*LR1*, 107) and “a translation of physical evolution into a mythical language, which now presents the facts in the guise of a dialectical progression, now in that of a romantic drama” (*LR5*, 5). Santayana’s personal library included Fichte’s *Science of Knowledge* (*Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794]), trans. A. E. Kroeger (Philadelphia,

J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1868); Anna Boynton Thompson's *The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895); Benedetto Croce's (1866–1952) *Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel* (*What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel*), trans. Henri Buriot (Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1910); Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Johannes Schulze (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*); and *The Logic of Hegel*, translated from Hegel's *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817–1843) (*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*) by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 9.21 idealism; Note 11.15 Hegel; for Fichte, Note 66.10 Fichtean; Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

34.2 vanity and vexation of spirit, ] Allusion to Ecclesiastes 1:14: “I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.”

34.10–11 waiting lamp in hand for the celestial bridegroom. ] Allusion to the parable of the wise and foolish virgins in Matthew 25:1–12: “Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom” (25:1). The bridegroom arrived at midnight; the wise virgins, who had brought extra lamp oil with them, were ready to meet the bridegroom for their metaphorical marriage, while the foolish virgins, who had run out of oil and had to go out and buy more, were shut out of the kingdom of God: “Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us. But he answered and said: Verily I say unto you, I know you not” (25:11–12).

34.27 as a leaven ] Appears in several parables in the New Testament, in the metaphorical sense of something initially almost imperceptible bringing about an overwhelming change in the whole of what it touches. The metaphor is used to refer to both negative and positive changes. Here it is used positively, as in Matthew 13:33: “Another parable spake he unto them; The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened” and its doublet Luke 13:20–21.

34.31 monachism, ] Another term for monasticism, both coming from the ancient Greek μοναχός, meaning “single, solitary.” Monachism or monasticism has come to refer to the practices of monks and nuns, who take religious vows renouncing or limiting conventional social institutions (such as family and private property) and physical pleasures (such as sex, food, or sleep) in order to better cultivate spiritual discipline through, for example, systematic meditation, prayer, study, or fasting. Monastic life may be solitary (hermitic) or communal (cenobitic). Both forms are found in the Christian tradition of monasticism, which originated in ascetic practices of the early Church that attempted to detach members from worldly concerns. Supporters of Christian monasticism

find scriptural support in Jesus's call to leave behind family and follow him (Luke 14:26; Matthew 10:34–39) and in Paul's endorsement of celibacy (1 Corinthians 7:1, 7–8). In the sixth century, St. Benedict of Nursia (c. 480–c. 550) composed administrative and spiritual rules that influenced Christian monasticism in Europe for centuries. Christian monasteries supported local economies both as producers and consumers of goods and services, became centers of learning where manuscripts were kept and copied, and developed political significance as providers of priests and bishops who served in the hierarchy of an increasingly powerful Church. Sixteenth-century humanists attacked monasticism for deceiving lay people with the shallow trappings of holiness while indulging in corruption and material excess. Reformation theology, such as that of Martin Luther, maintained that salvation came through divine grace, not human effort (such as monastic practices), and so rejected the idea of monastics as spiritual elite, instead articulating a form of holiness outside of the monastery in work and marriage. See Note 3.2 Reformation; for sixteenth-century humanists, see Note 15.1 Renaissance; and for Martin Luther, see Note 25.37 Luther.

34.31 scholasticism, ] See Note 31.38 Scholasticism.

34.31 Jesuitism, ] Jesuits are members of the Society of Jesus, a Catholic religious order founded by Ignatius of Loyola in 1534 and approved by Pope Paul III in 1540. Loyola's book *Spiritual Exercises*, a thirty-day program of meditations required of every initiate and typically repeated annually by Jesuits, continues to guide Jesuit spirituality. The organization has been distinguished since its beginning by its commitment to ministry and mission work, and Jesuits vow to minister anywhere in the world at the direction of the Pope. The Jesuit commitment to ministry was extended in 1548 when they began large-scale efforts in education, which has earned them a reputation for learning and scholarship. While other religious orders included scholars, Jesuits' systematic approach to learning and education distinguished them. The Society of Jesus added "defense of the faith" to their stated aims in 1550, and they were active (especially in German-speaking countries) in opposing the Reformation, which included prosecuting heresy but also pastoral efforts to support and encourage Catholics experiencing doubt or facing criticism. The power of the Jesuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made them targets of both political and religious opponents, and eventually Pope Clement XIV, compelled by France, Spain, and Portugal, suppressed the Society of Jesus in 1773. However, with protection from Frederick the Great of Prussia (Friedrich II, 1713–1786) and Empress Catherine of Russia (Catherine II, 1729–1796), the Jesuits continued to teach in Austria and Germany and initiated new members in Russia.

Governmental indifference in England allowed them to retain property and establish a college at Stonyhurst in 1794. In 1814, Pope Pius VII restored the Jesuit order. In 2013, Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina became the first Jesuit pope, taking the papal name Francis. Santayana, in *Reason in Society* (1905), cited the Jesuits, along with Sparta, as societies in which “public spirit has held best [though] it has been paid for by a notable lack of spontaneity and wisdom; such inhuman devotion to an arbitrary end has made these societies odious. We may say, therefore, that a zeal sufficient to destroy selfishness is, as men are now constituted, worse than selfishness itself. In pursuing prizes for themselves people benefit their fellows more than in pursuing such narrow and irrational ideals as alone seem to be powerful in the world. . . . For an indoctrinated and collective virtue turns easily to fanaticism; it imposes irrational sacrifices prompted by some abstract principle or habit once, perhaps, useful; but that convention soon becomes superstitious and ceases to represent general human excellence” (*LR2*, 84–85). See also Note 3.2 Reformation.

34.31 ultramontaniam, ] From Latin, “ultra” meaning “beyond,” and “montes” meaning “mountains.” For most of Europe, an ultramontane was an Italian, who lived beyond the Alps. The term took on an ecclesiastical rather than geographical sense in the eighteenth century and referred to Catholics who supported papal over state authority in matters of doctrine and Church governance. Ultramontaniam was opposed to movements such as Gallicanism in France and Josephinism in Austria that promoted Enlightenment principles and national authority over the Church. Ultramontaniam appealed to those in the Church seeking to strengthen Catholic identity as state support for religion declined, and the Ultramontane party gained influence with the 1814 restoration by Pius VII of the Jesuit order, the 1864 issuing by Pius IX of the *Syllabus Errorum* declaring liberalism incompatible with Catholicism, and the 1870 declaration by the First Vatican Council of papal infallibility. See also Note 34.31 Jesuitism.

34.31 Vaticanism ] The doctrine, sometimes equated with Ultramontaniam, of papal supremacy and infallibility. These dogmas have deep historical roots, but were first formally defined in 1870, in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Pastor Aeternus*. This doctrine was reaffirmed in *Lumen Gentium*, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church promulgated by the Second Vatican Council in 1964: “The Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, is the perpetual and visible principle and foundation of unity of both the bishops and of the faithful” (Vatican Council II, *Lumen Gentium*, “The Mystery of the Church,” §23, [https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist\\_councils/ii\\_vatican\\_council/documents/vat-ii\\_const\\_19641121\\_lumen-gentium\\_en.html](https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html); accessed 28 February

2020). “The pope’s power of primacy over all, both pastors and faithful, remains whole and intact. In virtue of his office, that is as Vicar of Christ and pastor of the whole Church, the Roman Pontiff has full, supreme and universal power over the Church. And he is always free to exercise this power” (*Lumen Gentium*, §22).

35.8 *mise-en-scène* ] From the French for “putting” or “placing on stage”; it is used in English to mean the stage setting; the arrangement of scenery, props, and actors; or the physical environment of a scene. It can be used apart from the context of theatre production or filmmaking to refer more generally to situation or surroundings.

35.26 Buddhists, ] Students of the teachings of the Buddha, who was born Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–c. 480 BC) in present-day Nepal. The Buddha’s teachings emerged in a context of Vedic and Brahmanic religious traditions of northern India, but they differed from these traditions in rejecting the caste system and Brahmanic ritualism and in finding transience in all things, including self. Buddha taught that relief from suffering is the result of pursuing the Middle Way between austerity and sensual indulgence, and he expressed his insights in the form of The Four Noble Truths: suffering or dissatisfaction exists; its cause lies in desire or clinging to what is transient; it can be ended by eliminating desire or clinging; the way to end desire or clinging is the Eightfold Path. The Eightfold Path consists in perfected view, perfected resolution, perfected speech, perfected conduct, perfected livelihood, perfected effort, perfected mindfulness, and perfected concentration (in some translations “perfected” is replaced with “right” or “skillful”). Following the Eightfold Path results in escape from samsara, or the cycle of birth and death, and achievement of nirvana, or the extinction of desire. Though the number of followers of Buddha’s teachings had declined in India by the first century, these teachings had already spread throughout Asia and given rise to a new form known as Mahayana which emphasized the pursuit of enlightenment or nirvana for the well-being of all sentient creatures, in contrast to the older form of Theravada that emphasizes personal enlightenment. Further developments occurred in the seventh century with the arrival of the Buddha’s teachings in Tibet and the emergence, under the influence of Taoism, of Zen Buddhism in China, with this latter becoming established in Japan in the twelfth century. There are an estimated three million students of the Buddha’s teachings today. Santayana wrote in response to a query about his thoughts on Buddhism that he made “no distinction between [Buddhism] and Brahmanism, between Vendanta and Samkya philosophies. This is not wholly an effect of ignorance, but because the

differences touch mythology or metaphysics only, and not the wisdom which is all I care for in these (or any other) philosophers" (*LGS*, 3:68).

35.26 Mohammedans ] Followers of the teachings of Mohammed, also known as Muslims or adherents of Islam. See Note 28.32 Mohammed.

36.10 Noah ] According to the Bible, Noah, a tenth-generation descendant of the first man Adam, and his family were spared when God caused a great flood to wipe out all other humans because of their corruption and immorality. God warned Noah of the impending deluge and instructed him to build an ark and take on board a breeding pair of each kind of animal. The inhabitants of the ark then repopulated the earth after the flood subsided. According to the account, all later peoples are descended from Noah's sons, Shem, Ham, and Japheth (Genesis 5:28–10:1).

37.15 a voice crying in the wilderness, ] Allusion to Mark 1:2–3: "As it is written in the prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight." This passage, which paraphrases Isaiah 40:3, in context announces the imminent metaphorical or literal presence of God. Often the phrase, "a voice crying in the wilderness," indicates a significant announcement not heeded, as early Christians perceived the announcement of the appearance of Christ and Christ's subsequent message not to have been heeded by their persecutors.

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. HENRI BERGSON

40.1 Plato ] Greek philosopher (c. 427–347 BC), born to a wealthy family in Athens. He was a follower of Socrates (469–399 BC), and in 387 BC he founded the Academy in Athens, where Aristotle (384–322 BC) was his student. Plato wrote approximately twenty-four dialogues, which typically feature an inquirer and a respondent exploring a topic. Plato maintained that the observable world is made up of imperfect copies of unchanging ideal "Forms" that constitute true reality. His ethical doctrine advocated a life dedicated to study and contemplation of these Forms. Because the truth of the Forms was difficult (or impossible) to communicate, some commentators have thought that Plato resorted to myths in his dialogues to convey a sense of the truth. Santayana wrote that in the 1890s "what then most enticed me in philosophy was Plato" (*PP*, 393). In 1896–97, he took a leave of absence from teaching at Harvard and enrolled as an advanced student at King's College, Cambridge University, where he studied Plato with English classics scholar Henry Jackson (1839–1921) (*PP*, 394, 439). After returning to Harvard, Santayana began

teaching “a new course, Philosophy 12, on Plato and Aristotle in English, which remained my chief subject, until almost the end. I lectured on the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*” (PP, 394). In *Reason in Religion* (1905), Santayana wrote of the “disastrous consequences” of Plato’s parables or mythmaking and described how Greek culture appropriated Hebrew metaphors and created “a chimerical metaphysics containing much which, in reference to existing facts, is absurd” (LR3, 54). Santayana further remarked that “to give moral importance to myths, as Plato tended to do, is to take them far too seriously and to belittle what they stand for” (LR4, 108). Santayana’s personal library contained editions of Plato’s dialogues in German, English, and ancient Greek. See also Note 45.12 Aristotle and Note 49.5 Socrates.

40.1 Kant ] See Note 5.16 Kant.

40.21 Prussia, ] The Kingdom of Prussia, established in 1701, occupied present-day northeast Germany and Poland with Berlin as its capital. In the eighteenth century under Friedrich II (Frederick the Great, 1713–1786), Prussia became a military and cultural leader. In the nineteenth century, after the Prussian victory over France in 1871, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) united twenty-five German states to create the German Second Empire, led by the Prussian king, who became Emperor Wilhelm I. The Prussian monarchy was dissolved after Germany’s defeat in World War I, and Prussia as a political entity ceased to exist after Germany’s defeat in World War II. Prussia’s significance for the history of philosophy owes much to Frederick, who as a young man cultivated a deep interest in philosophy. He was an admirer of German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754), and shortly after becoming king Frederick recalled Wolff to Halle from Marburg, where he had been exiled for impiety. Frederick actively supported the French Enlightenment, welcoming Voltaire (1694–1778), Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert (1717–1783), Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Count of Mirabeau (1749–1791), and others to Berlin. Prussian-born philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) wrote that “this age is the age of enlightenment, the century of Frederick” (“An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, trans. Ted Humphrey [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983], 45). In the Prussian capital city in 1809, philosophers Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), and Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768–1834) founded the University of Berlin, where Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) later became a professor. In his copy of British Idealist Thomas Hill Green’s (1836–1882) *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Santayana notes in the margin by Green’s characterization of ideal society:



“Here is base Hegelianism. Prussia the type of heaven” (*MARG*, 1:292). See also Note 3.7 Voltaire; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Bismarck; Note 11.15 Hegel; for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean; and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

40.22 Spinoza ] Baruch (or Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677), Dutch philosopher, born and educated in the Spanish–Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam. He studied René Descartes’s (1596–1650) philosophy with a German former Jesuit, Franciscus van den Enden, in 1652–56, and in 1656 the Jewish community excommunicated Spinoza for his unorthodox views. In 1673 he refused the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg because he was unwilling to give up his independence and tranquility. Spinoza’s philosophy finds its fullest expression in his most famous work, *Ethics* (1677). Spinoza maintained that one cannot understand the world without understanding it as a whole, a single system that has two names, God and Nature. This pantheism constituted the heresy that led to his excommunication. Santayana published “The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza” in *The Harvard Monthly* (June 1886: 144–52) and wrote an introduction to Spinoza’s *Ethics and De intellectus emendatione* (London: Dent, 1910, vii–xxii). In 1932 Santayana was invited to give a public lecture, published as “Ultimate Religion” in *Obiter Scripta: Lectures, Essays and Reviews* (ed. Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936], 280–97), in honor of the tricentennial of Spinoza’s birth. In his autobiography, Santayana characterized Spinoza as his “master and model” in understanding the naturalistic basis of morality. While Santayana regarded Spinoza as a complete naturalist, he believed “Spinoza was not a complete humanist. He had no idea of human greatness and no sympathy with human sorrow. His notion of the soul was too plebeian and too quietistic. . . . Now such limitations, deep as they run, do not at all annul the nobility of Spinoza’s simple and brave life, devoted to sublime speculation; yet they destroy the authority of his judgment in moral matters” (*PP*, 235). Nevertheless, Santayana maintained Spinoza to “have been right on the chief issue, the relation of man and of his spirit to the universe” (*SAF*, viii). Santayana thought Spinoza distinct among “modern writers on philosophy” because he, like “ancient philosophers and modern saints or poets,” surveyed “the world of existences in its truth and beauty rather than in its personal perspectives” (*SELS*, 120–21). Unlike modern philosophers, Spinoza along with Lucretius “were not especially epistemologists but had theories of the nature of things, putting human ‘knowledge’ in its place” (*LGS*, 8:233). In contrast to Bergson with his “blindness to definite concepts, to the *tout fait* [ready-made] and the ‘static’” (*LGS*, 7:370), Spinoza was “the clearest philosopher on the ‘eternal’ . . . . Plato too often shows that his heart is in the right place but his political preoccupations make him lean more and more, as he grows old, to popularise his myths into dogmas” (*LGS*, 8:311). Santayana’s

personal library included a collection of Spinoza's works entitled *Benedicti de Spinoza Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt* (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1882–83) and several of Spinoza's works in German and Spanish. For Lucretius, see Note 67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing.

40.23 St. Francis ] Saint Francis of Assisi, originally Giovanni Francesco di Pietro di Bernardone (c. 1181–1226), Italian monk, preacher, and founder of the Franciscan order. Born into a wealthy merchant family, he fought as a soldier and was held as a prisoner of war for a year. In 1204, he had a vision that led him to give up soldiering. Later, after a pilgrimage to Rome, he broke with his old life in Assisi and was disowned by his father. In 1208, while attending Mass, he heard the preaching of the gospel as a personal call and undertook a life of poverty and evangelism. Attracting similarly committed men, he composed a simple rule of life, and in 1209 Pope Innocent III approved the new religious order. In 1212, Saint Clare, originally Chiara Offreduccio (1194–1253), a noblewoman of Assisi, was inspired by Francis's ideals to establish a religious order for women. Francis's order continued to grow, and the simple rule he composed was revised and approved in 1223 by Pope Honorius III. In 1224, Francis displayed the stigmata wounds of the crucified Christ. In 1226, he died in Assisi, and in 1228, he was canonized. He is known for his humility, charity, love of nature, strong faith, and devotion to God. Twentieth-century interest in Francis revived with the scholarly work of Paul Sabatier, whom Santayana, in a 1909 letter, reported reading and described as “a Protestant, but a great friend of the ‘Modernists’” (*LGS*, 1:406). Francis's writings include rules for his followers, liturgical works, and letters (*Francis and Clare: The Complete Works*, ed. Regis J. Armstrong and Ignatius C. Brady [New York: Paulist Press, 1982]). For Catholic Modernists, see Note 3.11 modernist.

41.15 “retardent sur Kant”; ] In *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), Bergson wrote, “Ces doctrines se trouvent ainsi retarder sur la critique kantienne” (235), translated as “These doctrines are thus found to fall short of the Kantian criticism” (*Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1911], 356). “Retarder sur” can also imply being behind the times, echoed in Santayana's comment in the same paragraph that “M. Bergson himself ‘lags behind’ Kant.” The quotation refers to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). See also Note 5.16 Kant.

41.17 more sinned against than sinning, ] In William Shakespeare's (1564–1616) tragedy *King Lear*, Act 3, Scene 2, Lear says, “I am a man more sinned against than sinning.” See also Note 15.2 Shakespeare.

41.25 Scylla or Charybdis. ] In Book 12 of Homer's *Odyssey*, Odysseus is warned by Circe of the threat posed by Scylla and Charybdis. Scylla is a six-headed monster living in a cave above the Straits of Messina whose heads, each with three rows of teeth, dart out to snatch fish or passing sailors from the water below. Across from Scylla, the monster Charybdis lies beneath the water and three times daily sucks in the sea and spews it out, resulting in the whirlpool that bears her name. When Odysseus comes to the Straits of Messina, he sees the water churned up by Charybdis and must drive the ship away from it to avoid going down, but Scylla then snatches up and devours six of his sailors. From this story comes the expression "to be caught between Scylla and Charybdis," which means to be faced with two equally unappealing or dangerous courses of action.

41.26 English malicious psychology ] In "On Some Critics of this Discovery," Chapter 4 of *Reason in Common Sense*, Santayana wrote of the "malicious purpose" of "the English psychologists who first disintegrated the idea of substance" (*LR1*, 53). He was referring to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), and George Berkeley (1685–1753), and their heir Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who, according to Santayana, reasoned according to the principle "that ideas whose materials could all be accounted for in consciousness and referred to sense or to the operations of the mind were thereby exhausted and deprived of further validity" (*LR1*, 53). The malicious result was that "the advance of psychology meant, in this school, the retreat of reason" (*LR1*, 53). In "Hesitations in Method," Chapter 4 of *Reason in Science*, Santayana wrote of the psychologists treating "the whole mechanical world as a mere idea. In that case, it is true, the only existences that remained remained entirely without calculable connexions: every thing was a divine trance or a shower of ideas falling by chance through the void. But this result might not be unwellcome. It fell in well enough with that love of emotional issues, that want of soberness and want of cogency, which is so characteristic of modern philosophers" (*LR5*, 58). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 8.8–9 modern philosophy; for Berkeley, see Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.27 Locke; and Note 46.20 Mill.

41.27 Locke ] John Locke (1632–1704), English philosopher and physician, born in Somerset to a middle-class Puritan family, studied at Oxford. His important works include *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1689) and the *Second Treatise of Government* (1689). Locke is regarded as one of the British Empiricists, since he rejected innate ideas as an explanation for knowledge. He instead regarded the mind as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) at birth that acquires ideas through experience, specifically through sensation and reflection. The mind

then combines, divides, generalizes, and abstracts these ideas to create new ideas. Locke accounts for physical objects, about which one has ideas, in terms of matter in motion and impacts among material bodies. But Locke characterized the fundamental substance of things as that “I know not what,” and he was unsure about what immaterial and material substances had in common that made both substances. Locke acknowledged a distinction between natural and revealed theology. He believed the existence of God could be demonstrated and that the existence of God was a condition for human existence. In 1923, Santayana wrote of Locke “that he was regarded as a great philosopher . . . due . . . not to any intrinsic greatness. He announced some revolutionary principles, which alarmed and excited the public, but he did not carry them out, so that the public was reassured” (*SAF*, 298–99). In 1932, Santayana accepted an invitation to lecture on Locke at the Royal Society of Literature in October, which, like the lecture Santayana gave on Spinoza at The Hague the month before, commemorated the 300th anniversary of the philosopher’s birth (*PP*, 521–22). Of his topic, Santayana wrote in a letter that “Locke is a terrible come-down after Spinoza; but it is an easier and pleasanter theme. At the Royal Society of Literature (of which I have the honour to be a member, though I have never been at their place, 2 Bloomsbury Square, nor know even the name of any other member) the audience too will be easier and pleasanter to address. They will understand a little philosophic banter: because Locke . . . is intelligent and ridiculous. This will be the comedy after the high tragedy of Spinoza” (*LGS*, 4:335). Preparing for the lecture he found Locke “a bit prosy, and speculatively poor, but pungent and genuine in his common sense” (*LGS*, 4:344). Two months before the lecture, Santayana wrote in a letter, “My Locke paper is to have a sub-title, ‘and the Frontiers (or Boundaries) of Common Sense.’ I try to show where Locke went too far, for common sense, in the direction of psychologism” (*LGS*, 4:353). The lecture was published the following year as “Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense,” Chapter 1 of *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (1–47). In it, consistent with his 1923 comment, Santayana asserted that “had Locke’s mind been more profound, it might have been less influential. He was in sympathy with the coming age, and was able to guide it: an age that confided in easy, eloquent reasoning, and proposed to be saved, in this world and the next, with as little philosophy and as little religion as possible” (*STTMP*, 3). Santayana’s personal library included a two-volume edition of Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Samuel Marks, 1825). See also Note 40.22 Spinoza; for more on Santayana’s criticism of Locke, see Note 41.26 English malicious psychology.

41.29 Protestantism ] See Note 3.2 Reformation and Note 25.37 Luther.

41.34 The tree of knowledge ] See Note 118.3–4 sin of Adam.

42.6 Pascal. ] Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), French mathematician and philosopher; born in Clermont-Ferrand and raised in Paris. An important figure in the scientific revolution in Europe, he made significant contributions to mathematics and physics. When Pascal was 16 years old he published a scholarly paper on solid geometry, and when he was 18 he invented the first functional mechanical calculator. With his father, also a mathematician, he demonstrated by experiment that a vacuum is possible, countering the ancient dictum that nature abhors a vacuum, and in 1647 he formulated a law regarding the transmission of force in a static fluid. This law bears his name, as do a theorem of projective geometry, a triangular array, the standard unit of pressure, and a modern computer programming language. In philosophy, Pascal is known for his religious writings, which appeared after a conversion experience on 23 November 1654. He denied that human reason could ever prove the existence of God, and he argued instead for the rationality of believing in God. His argument, which is known as Pascal’s Wager, appeared in the posthumously published *Pensées* (1670). It contends that if God exists, a believer stands to gain the infinite reward of an eternal life of happiness; but if God does not exist, a believer loses nothing significant yet still gains the benefit of a virtuous life. Santayana, in a 1916 letter, noted that he was reading “Pascal’s *Pensées*—they are very wrong-headed” (*LGS*, 2:248). In a 1949 letter, Santayana remarked that “although there are not many great French philosophers, they all write good French . . . because they know how to see and to judge the world. They are not so good in the heights and the depths, because these can’t be written about in good French, and they don’t talk inflated nonsense about those super- or infra-human things, because the French language will not permit it. Yet they do manage to say quite clearly what is intelligible about the greatest subjects, for instance, . . . Pascal about ‘existence’ and its irrationality.” In this same letter Santayana described Pascal as “too good a mathematician to be a man of the world” (*LGS*, 8:180).

42.14 *Auseinandersein*. ] German for “being apart” or “being apart from another.” Santayana used this term to characterize the perception of extension and to mean “mutual externality”:

The perception of extension is therefore a perception of form, although of the most rudimentary kind. It is merely *Auseinandersein*, and we might call it the *materia prima* of form, were it not capable of existing without further determination. (*SB*, 64)

A mutual externality, or *Auseinandersein*—an alternation of centres such as moment and moment, thing and thing, place and place, person and person—is characteristic of existence. (*RB*, 203)

43.8 Jesuit ] See Note 34.31 Jesuitism.

43.27–28 Goethe . . . *farbiger Abglanz*, ] The German “farbiger Abglanz” can be translated as “colored reflection” or “colorful reflection.” The reference is to a text in Act 1 of Part II of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749–1832) *Faust*:

Allein wie herrlich diesem Sturm entspriessend,  
Wölbt sich des bunten Bogen Wechseldauer,  
Bald rein gezeichnet, bald in Luft zerfliessend,  
Der spiegelt ab das menschliche Bestreben.  
Ihm sinne nach und du begreifst genauer:  
Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben.

(*Goethes Sämtliche Werke* [Goethe’s Complete Works], Vol. 10, intr. Karl Goedeke [Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1893], 198–99)

Nineteenth-century translations render Goethe’s text variously as follows:

But how lovely budding from out the storm doth the changing continuity of the variegated bow vault itself, now clearly outlined, now flowing away into air, spreading cool showers around. This mirrors human striving. Look on *this*, and thou wilt comprehend the other better. In the coloured reflection we have life. (*Goethe’s Faust, Part II*, trans. Leopold J. Bernays [London: Sampson Low, 1839], 4)

But see, in splendour bursting from the storm,  
Arches itself the many-coloured bow,  
An ever-changeable, yet continuous form,  
Now drawn distinctly, melting now away,  
Diffusing dewy coolness all around!  
Man’s efforts there are glassed, his toil and strife;  
Reflect, more true the emblem will be found:  
This bright reflected glory pictures life!

(*Goethe’s Faust, In Two Parts*, trans. Anna Swanwick [London: George Bell and Sons, 1881], 174.)

But, see! where springs—glad bud of this wild storm—  
A tranquil presence thro’ the storm that gleams,  
The heaven-illuminated Rainbow’s glorious form;  
Distinctly now limned out, and now it seems  
To flow away, in airy atoms lost,

Spreading around a cool and fragrant shower.  
 Man's strivings, are they not the torrent's strife?  
 Think, and yet more you feel the emblem's power:  
 The colour, the reflected light, is LIFE.

(*The Second Part of Goethe's Faust*, trans. John Anster [London: George Routledge and Sons, 1886], 13)

Santayana also refers to this text in *Three Philosophical Poets* (127). See Note 1.30 Goethe.

44.26 *ad libitum*. ] Latin for “at pleasure;” in this context meaning “without constraint,” “spontaneously.”

44.31 *arrière pensée* ] French for “ulterior motive,” “secret intention” (literally, “back thought”). It may also refer to “mental reservation,” the Roman Catholic theological idea of inwardly or mentally qualifying a statement such that what is spoken and understood by the hearer is not what actually is intended by the speaker.

44.36 M. Bergson's *Évolution Créatrice* ] Refers to Henri Bergson's book *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), in which he proposed an *élan vital* (“vital impetus,” “vital impulse,” or “life-force”) to account for the evolution of novel and complex forms of life that he thought could not be explained by materialist theories of evolution. He denied teleological characterization of *élan vital*; and he wrote, “It is abundantly evident that the rest of nature is not for the sake of man. . . . It would be wrong to regard humanity . . . as pre-figured in the evolutionary movement” (265–66), but critics still charged him with anthropocentrism. Bergson also introduced the notion of *durée* (duration) to counter intellectualist conceptions of time, such as the absolute time of physics, which he thought distorted a reality fully known only through intuition. A fundamental concern of Bergson's was creative freedom, which he thought was threatened by materialist philosophies, and which, in Bergson's view, allows humans to escape an automatism of routine habits characteristic of nonhuman animals. See also Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

45.12 Aristotle. ] Greek philosopher (384–322 BC), born in the Ionian city of Stagira. He entered Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) Academy in Athens around 367 BC and remained until Plato's death. For three years Aristotle supervised the education of Alexander the Great (Alexander III of Macedon, 356–323 BC) and eventually founded the Lyceum about 335 BC near Athens. He was a prolific lecturer and writer on art, logic, metaphysics, natural sciences, psychology, politics, and ethics. Santayana had special regard for Aristotle's *Ethics* and



*Politics*, and he wrote that “in Aristotle the conception of human nature is perfectly sound; everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural an ideal development. . . . The Life of Reason finds there its classic explication” (*LR1*, 12–13). Santayana read Aristotle as a philosophic naturalist who rejected Plato’s Theory of Forms but who also maintained that forms (or essences or ideals) could influence matter and who saw no place for mechanism in scientific explanation (*LR1*, 15); this made Aristotle’s physics dialectical or magical rather than scientific (*LR1*, 14; *TPP*, 60). According to Santayana, Aristotle understood motion as striving for fulfillment of an ideal; this compelling ideal or purpose, and not physical causes, was to explain things. The ultimate fulfillment is found in the mind of God, which is “eternally realizing what the world aspires to. . . . Its operation is admittedly not transitive or physical. It itself does not change in working. . . . The world accordingly is moved and vivified in every fibre by magic, by the magic of the goal to which it aspires” (*TPP*, 60). Around 1900, Santayana worked on a translation of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that was never completed (a transcription is available in the Santayana Edition’s digital collections at <https://digitalsantayana.iupui.edu/metaphysics/index.html>). Santayana’s personal library contained German, English, and French editions of Aristotle’s works, as well as editions in the original Greek. See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 49.5 Socrates.

45.18 *élan vital*, ] French for “vital impetus,” “vital impulse,” or “life-force.” See also Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson and Note 44.36 *Evolution Créatrice* (M. Bergson).

46.14 seven-league boots ] Invoked in many fairy tales, seven-league boots allow their possessor to travel rapidly, with strides of seven leagues (21 miles). As Santayana notes, a disadvantage of seven-league boots is that they allow only skimming of the surface of the ground passed over, with no opportunity to examine one’s surroundings in depth.

46.20 Mill, ] John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), English philosopher, civil servant, and social reformer. Beginning at age 3, Mill pursued an ambitious curriculum of classics, mathematics, logic, and political economy, designed and overseen by his father, the historian, political economist, and journalist James Mill (1773–1836). For 35 years, John Stuart Mill worked for the East India Company, and then served as a member of the British Parliament. He established himself in philosophy with the 1843 publication of *A System of Logic*, a study of inductive reasoning that greatly influenced understandings of scientific method. His best-known works are *On Liberty* (1859), in which he argued that society is justified in interfering with the actions of an individual only when the individual poses a threat to others, not merely to him or herself; and *Utilitarianism* (1861, 1863), in which he developed the moral philosophy of his father and his father’s friend

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), stating that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure” (*Utilitarianism*, 2nd ed. [1864], ed. George Sher [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002], 7). In 1869 he published *The Subjection of Women*, advocating for the rights of women, including access to education, reform of marriage laws, and establishment of women’s suffrage. Santayana was critical of Mill’s philosophy and wrote that Mill was “a poor victim of the malicious psychology, and of the intuitive dogmatism behind it” (*MARG*, 2:44). In *Reason in Common Sense*, Santayana ascribed this malicious psychology to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and wrote that “they thought that if they could once show how metaphysical ideas are made they would discredit those ideas and banish them for ever from the world. . . . The principle of their reasoning, where they chose to apply it, was always this, that ideas whose materials could all be accounted for in consciousness and referred to sense or to the operations of mind were thereby exhausted and deprived of further validity. Only the unaccountable, or rather the uncriticised, could be true. Consequently, the advance of psychology meant, in this school, the retreat of reason; for as one notion after another was clarified and reduced to its elements it was *ipso facto* deprived of its function” (*LR1*, 53). Santayana, consistent with his criticism of modern philosophy as being subjective (*WD*, 8), wrote “that such worthies as Mill have little speculative capacity and missed their vocation in becoming philosophers. It is a mere scratching of the surface in a deep soil of prejudices and verbal conventions. There is not the least freedom or sweep of mind” (*MARG*, 2:46).

Santayana’s personal library included four works by Mill, two with extensive marginalia in Santayana’s hand: *Dissertations and Discussions* (New York: Holt, 1882); *Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism*, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1885); *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy*, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1889); and *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1904); as well as *Bibliography of the Published Writings of John Stuart Mill*, edited from Mill’s manuscript by N. MacMinn, J. R. Hains, and J. M. McCrimmon (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1945). See also Note 3.39 “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”; Note 5.16 Kant; Note 8.8–9 modern philosophy; for Berkeley, Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume; Note 41.26 English malicious psychology; and Note 41.27 Locke.

46.20 Huxley ] Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), English biologist. He trained in medicine and was appointed to the Navy Medical Service in 1846. As assis-

tant surgeon on the HMS *Rattlesnake* he traveled to Australia and New Guinea and carried out important research on coelenterates, for which he was awarded the Royal Medal of the Royal Society in 1852. He took up a teaching post in London at the School of Mines in 1854. He objected to evolutionary theories that relied on divine directives, but Charles Darwin, whom he first met in 1856, presented a theory of evolution in *Origin of Species* (1859) agreeable to Huxley's naturalism (though Huxley departed from Darwin's theory of natural selection). Huxley's defense of Darwin's theory earned him the epithet "Darwin's Bulldog." He, more readily than Darwin, argued for the evolutionary origins of human beings, and in 1863 he published *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, in which he argued for human descent from an ancestor common to apes and humans. He was a vigorous advocate for science education as a means to improve society both intellectually and morally, and this informed his work as a member of the London School Board from 1870 to 1872. He was not opposed to Bible reading in schools, but he was opposed to organized religion and its influence on education. He coined the term "agnosticism" for the idea that "it is wrong for a man to say he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty" (*Agnosticism and Christianity and other Essays* [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992], 193). In 1878, Huxley published *Hume*, a study of the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776), and later expanded this work, reissued in 1894 as *Hume, with helps to the study of Berkeley* and including two additional essays on the Anglo-Irish philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753). Huxley was a member of the Metaphysical Society, which was founded by James Knowles and existed from 1869 to 1880, debating issues of science and religion. Huxley's descendants include grandsons evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley (1887–1975), novelist Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) (whom Santayana was acquainted with when Huxley was an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford [PP, 498]), and winner of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine Andrew Huxley (1917–2012). See also Note 5.17 Darwin and Note 8.10 Berkeley and Hume.

46.33 the "Will" of Schopenhauer ] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), German philosopher, born in Danzig, studied medicine at the University of Göttingen and philosophy at the University of Berlin and the University of Jena, where he earned his doctorate in 1813. His main philosophical influence was German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). The systematic statement of his philosophy and his most well-known work is *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818) (*The World as Will and Representation*) in which he claims that the fundamental reality is Will, which he equates with Kant's thing-in-itself. Furthermore, he maintains that the thing-in-itself is knowable through experience of one's inner reality of willing. In Schopenhauer's view, Will extends beyond the individual

to the inner nature of all things, and, in fact, all Will is one. The quieting of the Will is the human ideal and is achieved only rarely and by the saint, who recognizes the futility of struggle and rejects desire. This results in compassion for all beings and the insight that all things are one. Other important works include *Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde* (*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*) (1813, rev. 1847) and *Parerga und Paralipomena* (1851). As a graduate student in 1888, Santayana told his advisor, Josiah Royce, that he wanted to write his doctoral dissertation on Schopenhauer. According to Santayana, “the wise Royce shook his head. That might do, he said, for a Master of Arts, not for a doctor of philosophy. Instead, he proposed [German philosopher and logician Hermann] Lotze [1817–1881]” (*PP*, 389). In a marginal note to the 1952 dissertation by Richard Butler entitled *The Notion of Essence in the Philosophy of George Santayana*, Santayana wrote that Schopenhauer “had a great influence over me” (*MARG*, 1:126), and the ways in which Schopenhauer entered into his thought can be seen in both early and late works. In his *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), Santayana wrote, “It was a capital error in Fichte and Schopenhauer to assign essential fertility to the will in the creation of ideas. They mistook, as human nature will do, even when at times it professes pessimism, an ideal for a reality: and because they saw how much the will clings to its objects, how it selects and magnifies them, they imagined that it could breed them out of itself. A man who thinks clearly will see that such self-determination of a will is inconceivable, since what has no external relation and no diversity of structure cannot of itself acquire diversity of functions” (*IPR*, 165). In *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1915), Santayana wrote that “the transcendentalism of Schopenhauer” had jettisoned the egotistical idea that the universe is but the image of reality created by the mind. In Schopenhauer’s system “the so-called Will which he still placed behind everything was no longer his own will evolving experience out of nothing; it was a fanciful name for whatever force or substance might lie behind experience, animating all its objects, determining their inherent life, and constituting them facts collateral with himself. . . . Life was seen to radiate, as it really does, from an elementary form into all sorts of disparate and incomparable growths, capable of endless diversity. No limit, no forced co-operation, no stereotyped method was imputed to life. . . . Man lost his importance and at the same time the insufferable burden of his false pretensions. In Schopenhauer frankness returned, and with frankness clearness” (*EGP*, 108–9). In his autobiography, *Persons and Places* (1944–53), Santayana made a similar point in terms of his own system, writing that “the ‘Will’ in Schopenhauer was a transparent mythological symbol for the flux of matter. There was absolute equivalence between such a system, in its purport and sense for reality, and the systems of Spinoza and

Lucretius. This was the element of ancient sanity that kept me awake and conscious of the points of the compass in the subsequent wreck of psychologism" (PP, 239). Santayana's personal library included Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1891). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 40.22 Spinoza; and, for Fichte, see Note 66.10 Fichtean.

46.33–34 the “Unknowable Force” of Herbert Spencer. ] (1820–1903), English philosopher and social and political theorist, born in Derby, son of a schoolmaster, self-educated. He applied the study of natural sciences and psychology to philosophy, making the theory of evolution a unifying principle of knowledge and applying it to all phenomena. The phrase “theory of evolution” appeared in an 1857 revision of his essay “The Developmental Hypothesis” (*The Leader*, 20 March 1852) to refer to an explanation of transmuting species, predating publications on the subject by Alfred Russell Wallace in 1858 and Charles Darwin in 1859. In the preface to a later reprint of this essay, Spencer wrote, “It struck the keynote of all that was to follow” (*Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, Vol. 1 [London: Williams and Norgate, 1891], 1). In his *Principles of Biology*, Spencer coined the phrase “survival of the fittest,” which he characterized as synonymous with Charles Darwin’s “natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life” (*Principles of Biology* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1864], 444–45). Spencer’s first books appeared in the 1850s: *Social Statics* (1851) and *Principles of Psychology* (1855). His *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (1861) was an enduringly popular textbook for teachers. Inspired by evolutionary theory, utilitarianism, political liberalism, and individualism, he announced his intention in 1860 to articulate his “synthetic philosophy” in several books which appeared over the next thirty-six years: *First Principles* (1862), *The Principles of Biology* (1864–67), *The Principles of Sociology* (1876–96), and *The Principles of Ethics* (1879–93). Spencer was extremely influential in the fields he wrote about and in intellectual culture more broadly. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) provided financial support for Spencer’s work; Thomas Henry Huxley respected his pre-Darwinian evolutionary theorizing; Wallace and Darwin were admirers of Spencer’s work; William James and John Dewey addressed Spencer as a worthy target of criticism in their important contributions to psychology and educational theory; and George Eliot was a close friend. Nevertheless, Spencer’s popular reputation began to wane by the 1880s. Spencer was a leading proponent of agnosticism and regarded the domain of religion as unknowable. While this unknowable was closed off to human consciousness, it was the foundation for knowledge of reality; and reality was dependent on the Absolute, which could never be known. Spencer treated the idea of the unknowable in Part I of his book *First Principles*. Santayana’s essay “The Unknowable,” presented at Oxford University as the

Herbert Spencer Lecture on 24 October 1923 and reprinted in *Obiter Scripta*, 162–88, criticized the idea of the unknowable for confusing knowledge with intuition, like an idealistic philosophy. Reality is unknowable in the way a drum is inaudible—you hear the sound, not the drum, and you know the intuition, not the reality; but this is an idealistic doctrine and little better, Santayana thought, than a pun. Santayana maintained that one hears the sound or perceives the reality by intuition and knows it by animal faith—a readiness to assume and act in ways required for actually living, and in this way reality is knowable (*OS*, 173). Santayana further criticized Spencer’s use of the unknowable as a problematic attempt to reconcile science and religion—problematic because genuine religion, according to Santayana, claims actual knowledge of reality and would never be satisfied with the comparatively meager knowledge “that no knowledge can penetrate to the heart of things” (*OS*, 176). In his autobiography, Santayana wrote, “Herbert Spencer, I think, taught me nothing. I agreed with his naturalism or materialism, because that is what we all start with: the minimum presupposition of perception and action. But I agreed with James about Spencer’s theory of evolution: It was a tangle of words, of loose generalities that some things might sometimes suggest to us, and that, said properly, it might have been *witty* to say, but that had absolutely no value as ‘laws’ or ‘causes’ of events. Spencer in his ‘principles’ was an ‘objective idealist’, not a naturalist or a scientific man. . . . Spencer, unlike Lucretius and Spinoza, had no speculative power. He meant to be a naturalist, but language and the hypostasised idea of progress turned him into an idealistic metaphysician” (*PP*, 232–33). Santayana’s personal library included Spencer’s *The Study of Sociology* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1897). See Note 5.17 Darwin; Note 8.18 William James; Note 46.20 Mill; and Note 46.20 Huxley.

46.36 vitalism ] In the history of science, vitalism is contrasted with materialism. Materialism holds that biological phenomena can be explained in terms of matter moving in ways described by chemistry and physics. Vitalism holds that biological phenomena depend on a vital principle distinct from anything described by chemistry or physics. Materialism explains life as resulting from matter in motion; vitalism accounts for life as the result of a soul or special force. The term “vitalism” appeared for the first time in the seventeenth century, but Aristotle (384–322 BC) often is regarded as a vitalist in opposition to materialists such as the Greek philosophers Democritus (c. 460–c. 370 BC), and Epicurus (341–270 BC), who conceived the world as material atoms moving in space. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, vitalists and materialists working in the life sciences engaged in debates that gained attention with increasing religious concerns about the implications of materialism for moral and political order. Romanticism sometimes made common cause with vitalism

against materialism. Like Romanticism, vitalism is notoriously difficult to define, with a range of sometimes incompatible positions classed together as “vitalist” (see, for example, Edward Benton, “Vitalism in Nineteenth-Century Scientific Thought: A Typology and Reassessment,” *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 5, no. 1 [May 1974]: 17-48). Philosophical vitalists included Bergson, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911). In his copy of Henri Bergson’s *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1932), Santayana wrote, “Vitalism a confession of ignorance” (*MARG*, 1:59)

48.36–39 mankind is what nature . . . her darling is all mankind and not merely Israel. ] Santayana distinguished between the Judaic conception of Israel as God’s chosen people (for example, Exodus 19:5, Deuteronomy 14:2) and Bergson (who was Jewish by ancestry) regarding all human beings as nature’s chosen creation.

49.5 Socrates, ] (469–399 BC) Greek philosopher, lived entire life in Athens, concerned primarily with moral questions and specifically the nature of the good. He famously maintained that the unexamined life is not worth living, and his dedication to the examined life led him to question famous and powerful Athenians about the virtues they lauded. His persistent questioning provoked the ire of fellow Athenians, who put him on trial and condemned him to death for impiety and for corrupting the youth of the city. Socrates left no written works, but Plato (c. 427–347 BC) wrote many dialogues portraying him in conversation with fellow Athenians and visitors to the city. Plato’s accounts are the chief source of Socrates’s reputation, though it is often difficult to distinguish Platonic and Socratic strains of thought. Xenophon (c. 430–350 BC), an Athenian soldier and writer, also left written accounts of Socrates. According to Santayana, Socrates “thought the moral interpretation of existence the whole of philosophy. . . . The virtues or moral uses of things, according to Socrates, were the reason why the things had been created and were what they were” (*STTMP*, 14). This inspired later Greek thinkers to establish what Santayana called “orthodoxy in morals,” and he wrote in 1940 that he had “endeavoured to retrace this theme in *The Life of Reason* and in my entire criticism of literature and religion” (*PGS*, 12). In *Reason in Science*, Santayana wrote that Socrates’s method “consists in accepting any estimation which any man may sincerely make, and in applying dialectic to it, so as to let the man see what he really esteems. What he really esteems is what ought to guide his conduct; for to suggest that a rational being ought to do what he feels to be wrong, or ought to pursue what he genuinely thinks is worthless, would be to impugn that man’s rationality and to discredit one’s own (*LR5*, 143). And in this way, Socrates “rescued logic and ethics for ever from authority. With his friends the Sophists,



he made man the measure of all things, after bidding him measure himself, as they neglected to do, by his own ideal" (*LR1*, 11). But on Santayana's interpretation, a "plebeian strain in [Socrates's] humanity . . . hardly did justice to what gives utility to life" so that "what purposes a civilised soul might harbour, and in what highest shapes the good might appear, was a problem that seems not to have attracted his genius. . . It was reserved to Plato to bring the Socratic ethics to its sublimest expression and to elicit from the depths of the Greek conscience those ancestral ideals which had inspired its legislators and been embodied in its sacred civic traditions" (*LR1*, 11–12). However, Plato and Aristotle (384–322 BC) in following Socrates's example of moral interpretation of existence "could not bear to abstain from physics altogether; they therefore made a mock physics in moral terms, out of which theology was afterward developed. Plato, standing nearer to Socrates and being no naturalist by disposition, never carried the fatal experiment beyond the mythical stage. He accordingly remained the purer moralist, much as Aristotle's judgment may be preferred in many particulars. Their relative position may be roughly indicated by saying that Plato had no physics and that Aristotle's physics was false; so that ideal science in the one suffered from want of environment and control, while in the other it suffered from misuse in a sphere where it had no application" (*LR1*, 14). Santayana maintained the criticism throughout his career, writing fifteen years after *The Life of Reason* that "we must remember that ever since the days of Socrates, and especially after the establishment of Christianity, the dice of thought have been loaded. Certain pledges have preceded inquiry and divided the possible conclusions beforehand into the acceptable and the unacceptable, the edifying and the shocking, the noble and the base. Wonder has no longer been the root of philosophy, but sometimes impatience at having been cheated and sometimes fear of being undeceived. The marvel of existence, in which the luminous and the opaque are so romantically mingled, no longer lay like a sea open to intellectual adventure, tempting the mind to conceive some bold and curious system of the universe on the analogy of what had been so far discovered. Instead, people were confronted with an orthodoxy though not always the same orthodoxy whispering mysteries and brandishing anathemas. Their wits were absorbed in solving traditional problems, many of them artificial and such as the ruling orthodoxy had created by its gratuitous assumptions" (*COUS*, 10–11; see also *TPP*, 61, and *STTMP*, 114–15). In his autobiography Santayana wrote that "since the age of the Greek Sophists and of Socrates . . . subjectivism, egotism, conceit of mind" have contributed to undermining "political sanity . . . by way of a moral fable, an anthropomorphic picture of the universe given out for scientific truth and imposed on mankind by propaganda, by

threats, and by persecution” (*PP*, 546). See also Note 40.1 Plato and Note 45.12 Aristotle.

49.8 literary psychology. ] This is the first documented use by Santayana of a term that became much more frequent in his writing after 1920. In *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923), “Literary Psychology” is the title of Chapter 24 (*SAF*, 252–61), where it is defined as “the art of imagining how [animals] feel and think” (*SAF*, 252). The term figures significantly in *The Realm of Matter* (1930), *The Realm of Truth* (1938), and *The Realm of Spirit* (1940). Other appearances of the term are found in *Character and Opinion in the United States* (1920; 72–73), the 1922 Preface to *Reason in Common Sense*, the review article “Living without Thinking” (1922, reprinted in *AFSL*), and in letters written in 1922 (*LGS*, 3:101), 1931 (*LGS*, 4:257), 1932 (*LGS*, 4:340), and 1951 (*LGS*, 8:395). The term also appears in published and unpublished pieces collected in *Obiter Scripta* (1936), *Physical Order and Moral Liberty* (1969), *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life* (1967), and both books of *George Santayana’s Marginalia*. Though some of the unpublished occurrences are undated, evidence suggests these were not written before the publication of *Winds of Doctrine*. For discussions of Santayana’s notion, see Charles T. Harrison, “Santayana’s ‘Literary Psychology,’” *The Sewanee Review* 61 (1953): 206–20; Jessica Wahman, “The Meaning of Self-Knowledge in Santayana’s Philosophy,” *BSS* 19 (2001): 1–7; Glenn Tiller, “Self-Knowledge and Psychology: Literary, Dialectical, and Scientific,” *BSS* 19 (2001): 8–10; and Wahman, “Literary Psychology and Philosophical Method,” *BSS* 31 (2013): 29–38.

49.23 Homer ] Epic poet. According to Herodotus, Homer lived c. 850 BC; others date him as early as the twelfth or as late as the eighth century BC. Homer is credited with authorship of the *Iliad* (c. 750 BC), the *Odyssey* (c. 725 BC), and *The Homeric Hymns*. Santayana devotes the second essay in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* to *The Homeric Hymns*. According to Santayana, these narrative fragments “are not hymns and are not Homer’s” (*IPR*, 21) but provide insight into Greek religious mythos and practice. Allusions to Homer and the works attributed to him are frequent in Santayana’s letters and published works. Santayana’s personal library included copies of *Aphrodite: The Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite and the Pervigilium Veneris* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948) and *The Original Iliad*, trans. Robinson Smith (London: Grafton & Co., 1937).

50.14 Æsop ] Legendary Ancient Greek storyteller, known for satirical and moralistic animal stories, including “The Tortoise and the Hare,” “The Fox and the Grapes,” and “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” According to one tradition, Aesop was born in Thrace in the early sixth century BC and was enslaved on Samos.

He is mentioned in Herodotus's *Histories*, Aristophanes's *Wasps*, and Plato's (c. 427–347 BC) *Phaedo*. Drawing on these earlier accounts and popular legends about the storyteller, a Greek work titled *Life of Aesop* appeared in the second century AD. According to this work, Aesop was extremely ugly and regarded as foolish, but he outwitted his slave masters to gain his freedom. After winning a reputation for storytelling and wisdom, he later was accused of theft and executed after insulting the people of Delphi. The first known collection of his tales, since lost, was compiled by Demetrius of Phaleron (c. 350–c. 280 BC); a later collection is attributed to the Roman poet Gaius Julius Phaedrus in the first century AD. In addition to other ancient and medieval compilers, European editors produced influential collections of Aesop's fables in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries. Santayana occasionally referred to the fabulist in his work when indicating shortcomings of some example of speculation: In *Reason in Common Sense*, he wrote of the limits of insight into other minds and remarked that characterizations of animal minds "are a grotesque compound of *Æsop* and physiology" (*LR1*, 94). In *Reason in Religion*, he wrote of the tendencies of pantheism to mythologize without acknowledging the limitations of its poetic expression, producing idealizations of some aspects of nature in which "their total and real mechanism is no better represented than that of animals in *Æsop's* fables" (*LR3*, 105).

50.25–26 Paolo . . . Francesca ] Paolo Malatesta (c. 1246–c. 1285) was one of four brothers in the ruling family of Rimini, a Northern Italian city on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. Francesca da Rimini or Francesca da Polenta (1255–c. 1285) was the wife of Paolo's brother Giovanni Sciancato, a soldier serving Francesca's father. The marriage was loveless, and Francesca fell in love with Paolo. Giovanni caught Paolo and Francesca together and murdered them. Their story appears in Dante's *Inferno* (Canto 5), and Santayana discusses Dante's account in some detail as an example of Dante's understanding of moral reward and punishment. According to Santayana, Dante at his best regarded a sinner's punishment as "nothing added; [the punishment] is what the passion itself pursues; it is a fulfilment, horrifying the soul that desired it. . . . [Rewards and punishments are] simply symbols for the intrinsic quality of good and evil ways" (*TPP*, 68). But in Dante's account Paolo and Francesca spend an eternity floating in each other's arms, which seems a complete satisfaction of their passion; how could it be a punishment for the lovers? Santayana explained that

love itself dreams of more than mere possession; to conceive happiness, it must conceive a life to be shared in a varied world, full of events and activities, which shall be new and ideal bonds between the lovers. But unlawful love cannot pass out into this public fulfilment. It is condemned to be mere possession—possession in the dark, without an

environment, without a future. It is love among the ruins. And it is precisely this that is the torment of Paolo and Francesca—love among the ruins of themselves and of all else they might have had to give to one another. Abandon yourself, Dante would say to us,—abandon yourself altogether to a love that is nothing but love, and you are in hell already. Only an inspired poet could be so subtle a moralist. Only a sound moralist could be so tragic a poet. (*TPP*, 70–71)

See Note 24.18 Dante.

51.19–21 The idea Paul . . . that of Paul; ] Refers to Spinoza’s *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 17, Scolium: “Moreover . . . we clearly understand what is the difference between, e.g., the idea of Peter which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea of Peter as it exists in the mind of another, say, Paul. The first directly explains the essence of the body of Peter, nor does it involve existence save as long as Peter exists; but the second idea indicates rather the disposition of Paul than the nature of Peter, and so as long as this disposition of Paul’s lasts his mind will regard Peter though he no longer exists as if he were nevertheless present to him” (Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. A. Boyle [New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910], 54–55; the original is found in *Benedicti de Spinoza, Opera Quotquot Reperta Sunt I–II*, eds. J. Van Vloten and J. P. N. Land [The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1913], 91–92). This text from Spinoza was a favorite of Santayana’s for remarking on the variance between an observer’s idea and the object of inspection, with allusions occurring throughout Santayana’s writings (*LR5*, 76, 82; *SAF*, 247; *RE*, 141; *LGS*, 6:58, 6:187).

52.26 *mobile* ] Latin for “thing capable of movement.”

52.31 Achilles and the tortoise ] One of four paradoxes of motion attributed to Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BC), Greek philosopher, born in Italy and followed his teacher Parmenides (c. 515–after 450 BC) to Athens. Parmenides and Zeno are primary figures among thinkers known as the Eleatics, who argued that reality is changeless. Zeno’s thought is known primarily through others’ commentaries; for example, the paradoxes are discussed in Aristotle’s (384–322 BC) Book VI, Chapter 9 of *Physics*. In the second paradox, that of Achilles and the tortoise, the slow-moving tortoise is given a head start in a race against the fleet-footed Achilles. When Achilles begins the race, the tortoise is some definite distance ahead. In the time it takes Achilles to cover that definite distance, the tortoise has moved ahead some further definite distance. In the time it takes Achilles to cover that second definite distance, the tortoise has again moved ahead some further definite distance. This is repeated, with the result that Achilles never can overtake the tortoise because no matter how quickly Achilles covers the distance between himself and the tortoise, in that same

amount of time the tortoise has covered some further definite distance. Zeno's own interpretation of the paradox is not documented, but he may have taken the paradox to demonstrate the impossibility of making sense of motion and so supporting skepticism about it. In other words, the paradox uses the assumption that motion is real to arrive at an absurd conclusion (an argument strategy traditionally known as *reductio ad absurdum*) thereby refuting the assumption. Santayana, in *Reason in Common Sense*, wrote that "when the Eleatics proved the impossibility – i.e., the inexpressibility – of motion, . . . their task was made easy by the native diversity between the concretions in existence which were the object of their thought and the concretions in discourse which were its measure. The two do not fit; and intrenched as these philosophers were in the forms of logic they compelled themselves to reject as unthinkable everything not fully expressible in those particular forms" (*LR1*, 110).

Apart from the paradox, Achilles is the central figure and greatest of Greek heroes in Homer's eighth-century BC epic poem the *Iliad*, which tells of the Trojan War. The war is believed to have historical roots in a thirteenth-century BC conflict between Greece and Troas, but evidence of a historical Achilles yields little reliable information. For discussion of Achilles see Santayana's *The Sense of Beauty*, 113–20.

53.11–12 "blooming buzzing confusion" ] Quotation from William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1890), 488. It appears in Chapter 13, "Discrimination and Comparison," in a section in which James claimed "that *any number of impressions, from any number of sensory sources, falling simultaneously on a mind WHICH HAS NOT YET EXPERIENCED THEM SEPARATELY, will fuse into a single undivided object for that mind.* The law is that all things fuse that can fuse, and nothing separates except what must" (emphasis in original). As an example he gives the following: "The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things in one space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations which came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space" (James, *Principles*, 488). See Note 8.18 William James.

53.37–38 the wise men . . . language of birds; ] Facility with the language of birds, symbolizing wisdom or community with a higher state of being, is a trope found in many religious traditions and mythologies, including the Quran, the legend of Siegfried, and Greek literature. For the Greeks, the ability to decipher the noises made by birds was bestowed by the god Apollo and was a form of prophecy practiced by oracles and recorded in myth. Ancient Greeks reputed to understand the language of birds include the Neo-Pythagorean holy man

and teacher Apollonius of Tyana (first century AD) and the mythical seer Melampus. Santayana refers to understanding the language of birds in *LR4*, 52 and in *SELS*, 263. In the latter work, the ability was attributed to “the healing wand of [the Greek god] Hermes the Interpreter.” See René Guénon, “The Language of Birds,” *Studies in Comparative Religion* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 80–82; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica*, The Loeb Classical Library, trans. R. C. Seaton (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1912), 22; Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, Books I–IV, The Loeb Classical Library, trans. Christopher P. Jones (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 81.

53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates, ] The idea that the properties of light can be explained if light acts like waves was proposed by René Descartes (1596–1650) and further developed by English polymath Robert Hooke (1635–1703), who compared light waves to waves washing against a shore. Dutch mathematician and physicist Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) devised the mathematical theory describing this phenomenon. Isaac Newton (1643–1727) was the most prominent proponent of the alternative theory that light behaves as if composed of particles. At the turn of the twentieth century, the work of physicists Max Planck (1858–1947) and Albert Einstein (1879–1955) reconciled the two views with the development of quantum theory. In *Realms of Being*, Santayana expands on the concept of light: “Light, which should be the source of clearness, is itself the most obscure of things, and its name the most ambiguous of names. For in physics light is understood to be a mysterious agency coursing through space, . . . and is a form of vibration or radiation emitted by bodies when ignited, and intercepted and reflected upon them even when opaque” (*RB*, 237).

54.1 each throb forgotten as the next follows upon it; ] Refers to the phenomenon called “persistence of vision.” The eye or brain can interpret only about 10–12 images per second. As a result, images viewed at a faster rate appear continuous. This phenomenon is used in animation, movies, and television to create the illusion of movement. On a more basic level, it explains why light is experienced as continuous despite acting on a microscopic level as waves or particles.

54.3–4 “Like as the waves . . . to their end.” ] The original text is from the opening lines of William Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) Sonnet 60:

Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,  
 So do our minutes hasten to their end;  
 Each changing place with that which goes before,  
 In sequent toil all forwards do contend.  
 Nativity, once in the main of light,  
 Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crown'd,  
 Crooked eclipses 'gainst his glory fight,  
 And Time that gave doth now his gift confound.

Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth  
 And delves the parallels in beauty's brow,  
 Feeds on the rarities of nature's truth,  
 And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow:  
 And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,  
 Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand.  
 (William Shakespeare, *The Sonnets of William Shakespeare*,  
 London: John Lane, 1902, 93–94)

Shakespeare's poem continues to invoke the comparison of waves of light and waves approaching shore, as well as connecting light to birth and noting the conflict between light and eclipse. See Note 15.2 Shakespeare and Note 53.39–54.1 waves of light, vibrating at inconceivable rates.

55.22–56.2 “Any one, . . . is simplicity itself.” ] The original text by Bergson reads as follows:

Quiconque s'est essayé à la composition littéraire, par exemple, sait bien que lorsque le sujet a été longuement étudié, tous les documents recueillis, toutes les notes prises, il faut, pour aborder le travail de composition lui-même, quelque chose de plus, un effort, souvent très pénible, pour se placer tout d'un coup au cœur même du sujet et pour aller chercher aussi profondément que possible une impulsion à laquelle il n'y aura plus ensuite qu'à se laisser aller. Cette impulsion, une fois reçue, lance l'esprit sur un chemin où il retrouve et les renseignements qu'il avait recueillis et mille autres détails encore; elle se développe, elle s'analyse elle-même en termes dont l'énumération se poursuivrait sans fin; plus on va, plus on en découvre; jamais on n'arrivera à tout dire : et pourtant, si l'on se retourne brusquement vers l'impulsion qu'on sent derrière soi pour la saisir, elle se dérobe ; car ce n'était pas une chose, mais une direction de mouvement, et, bien qu'indéfiniment extensible, elle est la simplicité même. (“Introduction à la métaphysique,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 11, no. 1 [January 1903]: 35)



The English text quoted by Santayana, which he presumably translated himself, differs from the first published English translations of the essay, which appeared in 1912:

For example, whoever has attempted literary production knows indeed that, if the object has been studied for a long time, if all the documents have been collected, and if all the notes have been taken, one must exert an effort, often quite difficult, in order to project oneself into the heart of the object, and in order to seek a stimulus as deeply as possible; on the other hand, all one has to do is to let oneself go. This impulse, once received, guides the mind into a road where it rediscovered the information, which it has collected, and a thousand other details; it develops itself, and it analyses itself in terms, the enumeration of which goes on infinitely; the further one goes, the more one discovers; one never reaches the point where one can say everything: and yet, if one suddenly returns toward the impulse, which one feels behind him, in order to seize it, it conceals itself; for it was not a thing but a direction of movement, and though infinitely extensible, it is simplicity itself. (Henri Bergson, *The Introduction to a New Philosophy: Introduction à la métaphysique*, trans. Sidney Littman [Boston: J. W. Luce, 1912], 104–6)

Any one of us, for instance, who has attempted literary composition, knows that when the subject has been studied at length, the materials all collected, and the notes all made, something more is needed in order to set about the work of composition itself, and that is an often very painful effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, after which we need only let ourselves go. This impulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers all the information it had collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyzes itself into terms which could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover; we shall never say all that could be said, and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we feel behind us, and try to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely simple. (Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. T. E. Hulme [New York: Putnam's, 1912], 89–90).

See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

55.33 *ad infinitum*. ] Latin for “to infinity”; in other words, endlessly.

57.18 *Antony and Cleopatra*. ] A tragedy written by William Shakespeare (1564–1616), probably in 1606 (it first appeared in print in 1623). Shakespeare followed closely the account of his subject as presented in Sir Thomas North’s

(1535–1603) translation of Plutarch's (AD c. 46–120) *Life of Antony*. John Dryden (1631–1700) acknowledged his debt to Shakespeare's work for inspiring his play on the same subject, *All for Love; or, The World Well Lost* (1676). Marc Antony (c. 82–30 BC), Roman general and statesman who backed Julius Caesar against the Roman Senate and the republicans. After Caesar's assassination, civil war broke out between Caesarists and republicans. Antony eventually prevailed against Julius Caesar's assassin, the republican Brutus, and went on to form the Second Triumvirate with his rival Octavian and Lepidus, dividing rule of the Roman Empire. Cleopatra (69–30 BC), Egyptian queen and last of the Ptolemies, the Greek-speaking Macedonian ruling family who came to Egypt with Alexander the Great. Shakespeare's play treated Antony and Cleopatra's love affair, Antony's defeat by Octavian, and the resultant suicide of Antony and Cleopatra. The play is among Shakespeare's longest dramatic works and includes a large number of scenes set all around the Mediterranean. Santayana occasionally alluded to Antony or Cleopatra in his writing, sometimes citing Shakespeare's work (*LGS*, 6:85; *LGS*, 8:446; *SELS* 70), sometimes Dryden's (*LGS*, 3:65), and sometimes to a conventional depiction of the historical figures (*LGS*, 3:17; *PP*, 207, 319). See Note 15.2 Shakespeare and Note 57.21 Plutarch.

57.21 Plutarch ] Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (AD c. 46–120), Greek writer and philosopher, born in Chaeronea in Boeotia. He studied in Athens, visited Egypt and Italy, and lectured in Rome. The last thirty years of his life he served as a priest at Delphi. He was a prolific writer, producing rhetorical performances earlier in his career, treatises on moral philosophy, dialogues (on love and prophecy, for example), and other works on religious and literary themes. Plutarch is best known for his biographies, which include individual biographies and two series: *Lives of the Caesars* and *The Parallel Lives*. Unlike most of his writings, the majority of *The Parallel Lives*, forty-six biographies, has survived to the present. The work includes chronologically ordered biographies arranged in pairs, each pair comparing the lives of historically significant Greek and Roman figures, for example, Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Alexander and Caesar, and Demosthenes and Cicero. In addition to being a history, the work examines the sources and effects of virtues and vices in the lives of extraordinary individuals. Plutarch's *Lives* has influenced readers' understanding of Greek and Roman culture for over a millennium. It was translated into French by Jacques Amyot (1572), whose version was translated into English by Sir Thomas North (1579). Plutarch's work inspired notable writers Michel Montaigne (1533–1592), William Shakespeare (1564–1616), John Dryden (1631–1700), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882). Philosophically, he was a Middle Platonist, believing in an immaterial god and

a transcendental hierarchy of reality. However, unlike other Platonists, he regarded evil as a positive force in the universe. Santayana, in his autobiography, wrote that “the sectarian politics and moralising of most historians made history an impossible study for me for many years: not ancient history, of course, nor Plutarch’s *Lives*, which we had at school to read out of at sight” (*PP*, 142). Santayana praised “the excellent Plutarch” for refuting sophistical arguments that since there can be no good without evil, to diminish one is to undermine the other (*EGP*, 132–33); but he also wrote that “in reading Plutarch . . . I am put out by his doctrinaire morality, as if all men and ages ought to follow the same model” (*PP*, 464). See Note 3.8 Rousseau, Note 15.2 Shakespeare, and Note 129.7 Emerson.

59.10–12 Herbert Spencer says . . . law of evolution. ] Allusions to Herbert Spencer’s (1820–1903) parody of English mathematician and critic of evolutionary theory Thomas Penyngton Kirkman (1806–1895), which Spencer presented as an “imaginary addition to that address before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, in which [Kirkman] first set forth the leading ideas of his volume”:

“Observe, gentlemen,” we may suppose him saying, “I have here the yolk of an egg. The evolutionists, using their jargon, say that one of its characters is ‘homogeneity’; and if you do not examine your thoughts, perhaps you may think that the word conveys some idea. But now if I translate it into plain English, and say that one of the characters of this yolk is ‘all-alikeness,’ you at once perceive how nonsensical is their statement. You see that the substance of the yolk is not all-alike, and that therefore all-alikeness cannot be one of its attributes. Similarly with the other pretentious term ‘heterogeneity,’ which, according to them, describes the state things are brought to by what they call evolution. It is mere empty sound, as is manifest if I do but transform it, as I did the other, and say instead ‘not-all-alikeness.’ For on showing you this chick into which the yolk of the egg turns, you will see that ‘not-all-alikeness’ is a character which cannot be claimed for it. How can any one say that the parts of the chick are not-all-alike?” (Herbert Spencer, “Prof. Tait on the Formula of Evolution,” *Various Fragments* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1897], 83.)

See Note 70.6–7 the “Unknowable Force” of Herbert Spencer.

59.14 Leibnitz ] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), German philosopher, mathematician, scientist, historian, and diplomat, born in Leipzig, educated in law, died in Hanover. He developed the basic theory of calculus independently of Isaac Newton (1643–1727) and was first to publish his results. Leibniz maintained that the fundamental entities of the universe are monads, which are

simple, immaterial, perceiving, and desiring discrete elements. Each monad perceives every other with varying clarity, except for God who perceives all monads with complete clarity. Contrary to appearance, monads do not interact causally with one another; rather, any given state of a monad is causally linked only to its own prior or subsequent states. To explain the appearance of interaction among discrete elements Leibniz posited a “pre-established harmony.” On this view each monad is similar to a clock in that it behaves independently of others of its kind; yet all are synchronized or harmonious in their individual activity; God establishes this harmony among monads. Leibniz further considered the nature and role of God when he considered the question of freedom and how some states of affairs are true when they could have been false. The reason for any state of affairs that actually obtains is God, and God’s choice is due to God’s power and moral character. Hence, it is necessary that God choose to create the best of all possible worlds, so what is actual is necessary.

Leibniz published only one philosophical work during his lifetime, *Théodicée* (1710) (*Theodicy*), which Santayana characterized as “an intelligent abstract of Christian doctrine, exhibiting what it would be if it were essentially scientific, whereas it is essentially moralistic, so that its inspiration is missed, while its dogmas are harmonized as much as possible” (*LGS*, 8:395). Other important works by Leibniz include *Discours de métaphysique* (1686; not published until 1846) (*The Discourse on Metaphysics*) and the work now known as *Monadology* (1714; published 1720 in German translation as *Lehrsätze über die Monadologie*).

As a first-year teacher at Harvard in 1889–90, Santayana was unexpectedly asked to teach a course on René Descartes (1596–1650), Spinoza (1632–1677), and Leibniz (*PP*, 390). Later in his career Santayana acknowledged several times in published and unpublished writings the influence of Leibniz on his mature philosophy. In 1922, he wrote that the realm of essence was not his own discovery, having been described “by Leibniz in two different ways; once as the collection of all possible worlds, and again as the abyss of non-existence, *le néant*” (*SELS*, 256). He again acknowledged the equivalence of the realm of essence and Leibniz’s possible worlds in 1927 (*RB*, 162) and in a letter of 1948 (*LGS*, 8:36). In 1940, he wrote of the “respects in which the monadology [of Leibniz] does justice to spirit” (*RB*, 581–85). The similarity was not lost on at least one critic: Santayana reported in his autobiography that “a faithful diehard of British psychologism, asked why I was overlooked among contemporary philosophers, replied: ‘Because he has no originality. Everything in him is drawn from Plato and Leibniz’” (*PP*, 541). In a 1947 letter, he revealed this British critic to be Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), who had excluded Santayana from his *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). In response to

Russell's charge of unoriginality Santayana wrote, "This is a very interesting assertion; it shows that R. was considering me as a logician only, which of course I am not, and disregarding the real influences that have affected me. Besides, I never wished to be original, so as to contribute to the growth of science. All I care for is to sift the truth from traditional imagination, without impoverishing the latter" (*LGS*, 7:328–29). Unsurprisingly, Santayana had a high regard for Leibniz, who, he wrote, "had a wonderfully clear head" (*RB*, 162), but he was not without criticism; he thought Leibniz's "philosophy is technically first rate, but absurd, because . . . he was too good a mathematician to be a man of the world" (*LGS*, 8:180). And though worldly concerns seemed sometimes to hinder Leibniz, Santayana's ultimate criticism targeted what he thought to be Leibniz's artificiality: "Leibniz could be a very great philosopher when he chose, when the press of business allowed, or when some Serene Highness commanded it; but he was a diplomatist even in philosophy, and his chief preoccupation was to reconcile powerful opinions and to recommend himself to the orthodox as well as to the competent. He could play as readily with the notion of essence as with any other notion, but his sincerity was not of that profound sort which gives to human conceptions their radical values, and his system was a masterpiece of artificiality in which nobody—not even himself—could very heartily believe" (*RB*, 164). Santayana's personal library included a copy of *The Philosophical Works of Leibniz* (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1890). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

61.18 Neptune ] Ancient Italian god of water and protector of waterways. The origin of his name and early form is unknown. Greek cultural influences led to Neptune's identification with Poseidon, god of the sea and natural forces such as weather and earthquakes and who is often portrayed with a trident with which he brings storms or pacifies the sea. He was the patron of sailors and fishermen, who prayed to him for calm waters and bountiful catches.

61.18 Æolus ] In Book 10 of Homer's *Odyssey*, Aeolus is king of the floating island of Aeolia and, though a mortal, is entrusted by Zeus to be keeper of the winds. When Odysseus's ship lands on Aeolia, the hospitable Aeolus gives Odysseus a bag containing the winds to aid his journey home. After departing Aeolia, Odysseus falls asleep, and his sailors open the bag thinking it contains treasure. The winds escape and blow the ship back to Aeolia, and an angry Aeolus offers no further help to Odysseus. In Virgil's *Aeneid*, Aeolus is said to control the winds by keeping them in a large cave.

62.8–10 Bradley murmuring . . . unmeaning to him; ] Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924), British philosopher, educated at Oxford University, where he became a fellow of Merton College. Noted Santayana scholar T. L. S. Sprigge

wrote that “Bradley is indisputably the greatest British philosopher between J. S. Mill and Bertrand Russell” (Sprigge, “Bradley, Francis Herbert” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], 100). Bradley’s work, influenced by Hegel, responded critically to the utilitarian ethics and empirical logic and metaphysics dominant in British universities, substantially aiding the rise of British Idealism in academic philosophy. In response to hedonistic and Kantian ethics (after Immanuel Kant [1724–1804]), Bradley argued that ideal morality regards the individual as a concrete, unified person rather than a series of experiences (hedonism) or an abstract ego (Kantianism); and this individual has a capacity to develop beyond what social conditions might dictate. Bradley’s metaphysics considered unity and wholeness as characteristic of reality, while division and distinction were the marks of illusion. Concepts and language are always partial and cannot capture reality, but even as they give rise to contradictions they are part of the harmony of the Absolute, or the reality that exceeds all concepts. In *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley wrote:

Find any piece of existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience. Try to discover any sense in which you can still continue to speak of it, when all perception and feeling have been removed; or point out any fragment of its matter, any aspect of its being, which is not derived from and is not still relative to this source. When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of nothing else than the experienced. Anything, in no sense felt or perceived, becomes to me quite unmeaning. And as I cannot try to think of it without realizing either that I am not thinking at all, or that I am thinking of it against my will as being experienced, I am driven to the conclusion that for me experience is the same as reality. (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* [London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893], 145)

Other important works by Bradley include *Ethical Studies* (1876), *The Principles of Logic* (1883), and *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914). Santayana reported in a 1928 letter that he was reading Bradley’s *Ethical Studies* for the first time in preparation for reviewing the second edition (*LGS*, 4:7). Santayana’s review, “Fifty Years of British Idealism,” appeared in *The New Adelphi* 2 (1928): 112–20, and was reprinted as the second chapter of *STTMP* (48–70). Reflecting on the fifty years since the first edition of *Ethical Studies*, Santayana wrote that Bradley, “with his scornful and delicate intellect, his wit, his candour, his persistence, and the baffling futility of his conclusions” has been “a chief agent in the change” of English opinion “from insular dogmatism to universal bewilderment” (*STTMP*, 48). He noted that Bradley held “that the only possible reality

was consciousness” (*STTMP*, 52) but he did not think such idealism ultimately required any refutation. Idealism “is an honest examination of conscience in a reflective mind. Refutations and proofs depend on pregnant meanings assigned to terms, meanings first rendered explicit and unambiguous by those very proofs or refutations. On any different acceptance of those terms, these proofs and refutations fall to the ground; and it remains a question for good sense, not for logic at all, how far the terms in either case describe anything existent” (*STTMP*, 65–66). The significance of the distinction between logical refutation and good sense is echoed in Santayana’s observation that Bradley’s part in dislodging utilitarianism and empiricism from academic philosophy did little to influence “certain political and intellectual circles outside” universities, which still “need[ed] chastening at least as much as those of fifty years ago” (*STTMP*, 49). Santayana’s personal library included *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* and *Ethical Studies*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927). For J. S. Mill see Note 46.20 Mill; see also Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

63.6–7 “To perceive all . . . a material object.” ] The original text reads, “Percevoir toutes les influences de tous les points de tous les corps serait descendre à l’état d’objet matériel” (Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire: essai sur la relation du corps à l’esprit* [Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896], 38). The authorized English translation reads, “To perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object” (Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer [London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1911], 46). The authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

64.35 Plotinus ] Plotinus (c. AD 205–270), philosopher, birthplace unknown (ancient sources suggest Egypt). At the age of 28, Plotinus began studying philosophy at Alexandria. After ten years, interest in Persian and Indian philosophy led him to join a military expedition to Persia. After the expedition foundered, Plotinus, now 40 years old, moved to Rome to teach philosophy and established a school there. At the age of 50 he produced his first writings: short pieces in Greek intended for his pupils. His student Porphyry (AD 234–c. 305) later arranged Plotinus’s writings into six groups of nine articles and published them about AD 300 as the *Enneads*. They covered ethics, aesthetics, physics, psychology, metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Plotinus is known as the leading figure in Neoplatonism, a revival of Platonic philosophy that flourished through the sixth century. Plotinus thought the unity of all being is the Absolute One, a transcendental and unknowable principle or cause of all existence. Most removed from the unified Absolute One is Matter, which has



the least value and reality. Three grades of reality, each exhibiting increasingly diminished unity, lie between the One and Matter: first, *Nous* or World–Mind or Intelligence consists of an eternal apprehension of the Platonic ideas as inter-related forces; second, *Psyche* or World–Soul, with its diminished unity, must apprehend objects successively and severally, thereby creating time and space; third, *Phusis* or Nature has a dreamlike consciousness that projects the physical world.

Santayana described the universe of Plotinus in this way: “a process of emanation from the One through the Ideas to the Soul of the World, whence, like rays from different stars, human and animal souls descend on occasion to animate material bodies. This system was designed to encourage the spirit to rise from its animal prison—prison was the word—reversing that emanation until it recovered the primal bliss of contemplative union with pure Being” (*PSL*, 70). The Absolute One of Plotinus typically has been identified with the Good, but Santayana wrote, “It is the good of religion, because religion is a conversion from one object of pursuit to another, under the form of the good: but in the One itself, or in attainment, the pursuit is absent, and the category of the good no longer has any application” (*PSL*, 46). In *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), Santayana claimed that the failure of Neoplatonism as a religion was due to its foundation in dialectic and in the hypostasis of abstractions, such as taking Plato’s (c. 427–347 BC) allegories as metaphysical discoveries and revelations (*IPR*, 52). According to Santayana, a successful religion takes its form from tradition and its substance from national imagination and conscience. Neoplatonism, however, took its form and substance from abstract thought (*IPR*, 53). This left Plotinus’s philosophy at an explanatory disadvantage. Santayana followed up this criticism thirteen years later, the same year *Winds of Doctrine* appeared, with a review of B. A. G. Fuller’s *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* (“Dr. Fuller, Plotinus, and the Nature of Evil,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 10, no. 23 [23 October 1913]: 589–99; reprinted as “Plotinus and the Nature of Evil,” *Obiter Scripta*, 68–87). In the review, Santayana wrote that Plotinus “could not explain the origin of evil; in fact he could not explain the origin of anything, his whole natural philosophy being unnatural, and merely a moral allegory” (*OS*, 83). Further, the disconnection with nature caused serious moral problems because “Plotinus, in supposing that the good was single and *a priori*, in fancying it to be the creative power, encouraged himself to ignore the greater part of its possible forms. He shut himself up, with his sect, in imaginative intolerance” (*OS*, 75).

None of this was reason for Santayana to dismiss Plotinus, in whom Santayana found a “dominant sense . . . of the spiritual life” absent in Socrates (469–399

BC) and Plato; and this aspect of Plotinus was a significant inspiration for Santayana in thinking about Platonic philosophy. In several letters from 1926, Santayana wrote of working on an essay about Platonism and “Spiritual religion,” which originally was to be a review of *The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought* (1926) by William Ralph Inge, who also wrote *The Religious Philosophy of Plotinus and Some Modern Philosophies of Religion* (1914) and *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (1918) (*LGS*, 3:284, 287, 289, 299). After the review became an independent essay, it soon outgrew “the limits of an article, for which it was first intended, and [became] a little book” (*LGS*, 3:287, 289, 291), namely, Santayana’s *Platonism and the Spiritual Life* (1927) (*LGS*, 3:289, 291, 299). In Santayana’s *Realms of Being*, the second book, *The Realm of Matter*, carries an epigraph—which observes the effects of matter on the heavenly soul—from Plotinus (Plotinus, Vol. 1: *Porphyry on Plotinus, Ennead 1* [Loeb Classical Library 440], trans. A. H. Armstrong [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 314–15). For studies of Plotinus and Santayana see Jay Bregman, “Santayana and Neoplatonism,” *BSS* 34 (2016): 4–15; Paul G. Kuntz, “Santayana’s Christian Neoplatonism,” *Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought*, Part 1, ed. R. Baine Harris (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 271–302; and John Lachs, “Neoplatonic Elements in the Spiritual Life,” *Neoplatonism and Western Aesthetics*, ed. A. Alexandrakis and N. J. Moutafakis (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 143–52. See also Note 40.1 Plato.

65.37 Hebraic morality. ] According to Santayana, the Jewish moral tradition includes a prophetic legacy that identified virtue and happiness and understood social well-being as dependent on character and conduct rather than omens and sacrifices (*LR3*, 46). But these insights were not interpreted naturalistically: Virtue was not understood as natural human excellence but rather regarded as a supernatural means for securing Jehovah’s favor (*LR3*, 45). To this moral understanding was added the institution of a formal law taken as revealed by Jehovah and recorded by Moses (*LR3*, 46). While these innovations led to an articulation of “the moral government of the world,” it was not accompanied by the notion “that nature shows a generic benevolence toward life and reason wherever they arise” (*LR3*, 47). In Santayana’s words, “What this moral government of things meant when it was first asserted was that Jehovah expressly directed the destinies of heathen nations and the course of nature itself for the final glorification of the Jews” (*LR3*, 47–48). And this “fanaticism,” wrote Santayana, was then bequeathed to the Christian and Muslim traditions (*LR3*, 48). The broader contribution to human moral development has been an instrumentality for adhering to ideals: “Hebraism has put earnestness and urgency into morality, making it a matter of duty, at once private and universal, rather than what paganism had left it, a mass of local allegiances and legal

practices” (*LR5*, 135–36). Santayana regarded this a potentially powerful factor in a rational ethics: “Could this abstract moral habit, this transferable earnestness, be enlisted in rational causes, the Life of Reason would have gained a valuable instrument. . . . The abstract power of self-direction . . . might give the Life of Reason a public embodiment such as it has not had since the best days of classic antiquity” (*LR5*, 136).

65.39–66.3 Philosophy, said Plato, is a meditation on death . . . ; and Schopenhauer said that the spectacle of death was the first provocation to philosophy. ] In Plato’s (c. 427–347 BC) *Phaedo*, Socrates remarks that “those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death” (*Phaedo*, 63e–64a). Socrates’s observation is based on the possibility that “death is nothing more or less than . . . the separate condition of the body by itself when it is released from the soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when released from the body” (*Phaedo*, 64c) and that “the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body, so far as is possible” (*Phaedo*, 65a). He goes on to state, “If at its release the soul is pure and carries with it no contamination of the body, because it has never willingly associated with it in life, but has shunned it and kept itself separate as its regular practice—in other words, if it has pursued philosophy in the right way and really practiced how to face death easily—this is what ‘practicing death’ [μελέτη θανάτου] means” (*Phaedo* 80e–81a). Schopenhauer wrote, “Death is the true inspiring genius, or the muse of philosophy, wherefore Socrates has defined the latter as θανάτου μελέτη. Indeed without death men would scarcely philosophise” (*The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 3, trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp [London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1909], 249). See Note 40.1 Plato, Note 46.33 the “Will” of Schopenhauer, and Note 49.5 Socrates.

66.10 Fichtean ] Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), German philosopher and political thinker, born in Saxony and educated at Jena and Leipzig. His chief philosophical influence was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Fichte called his account of transcendental idealism *Wissenschaftslehre*, the first systematic account of which he gave in his seminal work *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (*Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy*) [Leipzig: Christian Ernst Gabler, 1794]. His main philosophical concern was reconciling human freedom with natural necessity. Fichte took the free human will to be primary and then sought to understand how human beings with free will could be part of the natural world of causally determined material objects. He was an influential figure for German idealism and romanticism. The three basic principles of Fichte’s philosophical system are: first, the basic existent is the self-affirming

Ego, which is absolute and whose infinite activity makes possible any ideal act of Ego. Second, the Ego posits a nonego, thereby differentiating absolute ideal activity and its field of activity. Third, the absolute Ego posits a limited ego in contrast to a limited nonego. These provide the subject matter for empirical knowledge (as opposed to the ideal activity of Ego). Santayana wrote in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900) that

It was a capital error in Fichte and Schopenhauer to assign essential fertility to the will in the creation of ideas. They mistook, as human nature will do, even when at times it professes pessimism, an ideal for a reality: and because they saw how much the will clings to its objects, how it selects and magnifies them, they imagined that it could breed them out of itself. A man who thinks clearly will see that such self-determination of a will is inconceivable, since what has no external relation and no diversity of structure cannot of itself acquire diversity of functions. (*IPR*, 165)

In 1901, Santayana wrote that reading Fichte felt “as if I were listening to the confessions of a refracted sun-beam rather than of a two-legged man” (*LGS*, 1:247). In a 1914 letter, Santayana wrote “I am rereading Fichte: it is very fine and grand, and at the same time curiously childish. It seems as if Life, to him, meant Inexperience” (*LGS*, 2:201). In Santayana’s *Egotism and German Philosophy* (1916), a sustained criticism of German idealism and transcendental philosophy, he wrote that “Fichte purified the system of Kant of all its inconsistent and humane elements; he set forth the subjective system of knowledge and action in its frankest and most radical form” (*EGP*, 65). Santayana explained, in a chapter entitled “Fichte on the Mission of Germany,” that the mission of German idealism “to consecrate the world and show that every part of it is an organ of the spirit” gave rise to Fichte’s “prophetic glimpses of an idealistic Germany conquering the world” (*EGP*, 78). In 1933, Santayana maintained his earlier views when he wrote that with Fichte “transcendental method showed its true colours” (*STTMP*, 30). Santayana’s personal library included Fichte’s *Science of Knowledge*, trans. A. E. Kroeger (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1868), which contains marginalia in Santayana’s hand. See Note 5.16 Kant and Note 32.27 German idealism.

67.14–18 the lower organisms store energy. . .perished. Their *élan vital*. . . to live is to kill. ] The description of *élan vital* parallels Einstein’s formulation of  $e = mc^2$ , as the energy and mass in the grass and mutton are transmuted into energy and mass in the sheep who eats the grass and the human who eats the sheep.

67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing. ] Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–c. 55 BC), Roman poet and follower of Epicurean philosophy. Little is known with confidence of Lucretius' life apart from the fact that he is the author of the epic poem *De Rerum Natura* (*On the Nature of Things* or *On the Nature of the Universe*), which presents Epicurean philosophy in hexameter verse. It presents even the most abstruse points of physics and philosophy as contributing to tranquility and freedom from the fears of popular religion, especially the fear of death. The work has survived mostly intact, though it is not known whether Lucretius completed it to his satisfaction. Santayana's allusion is to Book I of *De Rerum Natura*: "None of the things therefore which seem to be lost is utterly lost, since nature replenishes one thing out of another and does not suffer any thing to be begotten, before she has been recruited by the death of some other" (T. Lucreti Cari, *De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex, with Notes and a Translation*, 4th ed., trans. H. A. J. Munro [London: George Bell and Sons, 1886], 7). Santayana greatly admired and referred throughout his writings to Lucretius' philosophy. In his autobiography, Santayana wrote of his initial acquaintance with Lucretius's work and its influence on his thought:

I read Lucretius, in a pocket edition without notes given me by a friend, somewhat pathetically, because he was leaving college. I couldn't properly understand the text, many a word was new to me, and I had to pass on, reading as I did at odd moments, or in the horse-car. But the general drift was obvious, and I learned the great passages by heart. Even the physical and biological theories seemed instructive, not as scientific finalities, as if science could be final, but as serving to dispel the notion that anything could be non-natural or miraculous. If the theory suggested were false, another no less naturalistic would be true; and this presumption recommended itself to me and has become one of my first principles: not that a particular philosophy called naturalism must be true *a priori*, but that nature is the standard of naturalness. (*PP*, 230)

In letters spanning decades, Santayana often wrote of his appreciation and admiration for Lucretius. In 1887, he wrote to a friend, "By the way, do you ever read Lucretius? If you don't, I should advise you to try him. He fills me with the greatest enthusiasm and delight. The arguments are often childish, but the energy, the flow, the magnificence and solidity are above everything." (*LGS*, 1:46). And in 1951, he wrote, "Naturalism . . . is something to which I am so thoroughly wedded that I like to call it materialism, so as to prevent all confusion with romantic naturalism like Goethe's, for instance, or that of Bergson. Mine is the hard, non-humanistic naturalism of the Ionian philosophers, of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza" (*LGS*, 8:328). Lucretius is one of the poets treated in Santayana's *Three Philosophical Poets* (1922), in which Santayana

described him as “the poet of substance” (*TPP*, 121) and “of nature” (*TPP*, 122). Santayana thought that “Lucretius’ notion . . . of what is positively worth while or attainable is very meagre: freedom from superstition, with so much natural science as may secure that freedom, friendship, and a few cheap and healthful animal pleasures” (*TPP*, 122). But Santayana also believed that, “If any poet ever felt the life of nature in its truth, irrepressible, many-sided, here flaming up savagely, there helplessly dying down, that poet was Lucretius, whose materialism was unqualified” (*RB*, 188). Santayana’s personal library included a copy of *De Rerum Natura, Libri Sex*.

67.39 the angel the pool of Bethesda. ] Refers to a scene in Chapter 5 of the book of John in the New Testament. Sick and disabled people would gather at the pool of Bethesda, where an angel would periodically visit and stir the waters, and the first person to step into the water thereafter was cured of whatever ailment was present. The text reads: “Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep market a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches. In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water: whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in was made whole of whatsoever disease he had” (John 5:2–4). In John’s account, Jesus visits the pool and performs a miracle, curing a man who never could manage to be first into the water after the angel’s appearance.

Santayana used the image of the angel and the pool of Bethesda to different purposes in different works. It appears in Santayana’s *The Sense of Beauty* in a section about the importance of form for beauty:

A formless object cannot *inform* the mind, cannot mould it to a new habit. That happens only when the data, by their clear determination, compel the eye and imagination to follow new paths and see new relations. Then we are introduced to a new beauty, and enriched to that extent. But the indeterminate, like music to the sentimental, is a vague stimulus. It calls forth at random such ideas and memories as may lie to hand, stirring the mind, but leaving it undisciplined and unacquainted with any new object. This stirring, like that of the pool of Bethesda, may indeed have its virtue. A creative mind, already rich in experience and observation, may, under the influence of such a stimulus, dart into a new thought, and give birth to that with which it is already pregnant; but the fertilising seed came from elsewhere, from study and admiration of those definite forms which nature contains, or which art, in imitation of nature, has conceived and brought to perfection. (*SB*, 92)

More similar to Santayana's usage in *Winds of Doctrine* is the appearance of this image in *The Realm of Matter*. Santayana wrote that one tempted to dualism when contemplating life may suppose "two opposite agents: one an inert matter only capable of sinking into a dead sea of indistinction: the other a supernatural spirit, intrinsically disembodied, but swooping down occasionally upon that torpid matter, like the angel into the pool of Bethesda, and stirring it for a while into life and shape" (*RB*, 328).

68.6–9 The original tendency of life . . . like a wireless message sent at the creation . . . by the humanity of to-day. ] The phrase "we are told. . ." suggests that Santayana is referring to something specific and well known to him and presumably to the reader. The idea of one "message" producing diverse individuals goes back at least as far as the Mishnah (redacted early third century), which uses the metaphor that coins stamped by a die are all alike but that humans, all of whom God creates in the image of Adam/the original human, are all different (Sanhedrin 4:5). A more contemporary parallel, referring to a semaphore telegraph, comes from the German writer Heinrich Heine (1797–1856): "Siehst du ihn schon, den Willen Gottes? Er zieht durch die Luft, wie das stumme Geheimniß eines Telegraphen" (Heine, "Französische Zustände" ["Conditions in France"] [1831/1832]; repr. in *So weit das Auge reicht: Die Geschichte der optischen Telegraphie*, ed. Klaus Beyrer [Karlsruhe: Braun, 1995], 157; cited and translated in Erik Christopher Born, "Sparks to Signals: Literature, Science, and Wireless Technology, 1800–1930" [doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2016], 76): "Do you see it already, the will of God? It moves through the air like a telegrapher's silent secret." A closer parallel appears in the newsletter of the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church of Zion, a Biblical literalist and utopian community based in Zion, Illinois: "I wish to say to the Glory of God, that WIRELESS TELEPHONY IS NO NEW THING IN THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN among the children of God. It has been practiced from the beginning of creation," followed with numerous examples of "WIRELESS TELEPHONY IN OPERATION FROM THE BEGINNING OF CREATION" (O. L. Tindall, "Wireless Telephony," *Leaves of Healing* 37 [January 15, 1916]: 375; all emphasis in original).

Santayana is much more likely to have been familiar with Henri Bergson's somewhat similar assertion that "le cerveau ne doit donc pas être autre chose, à notre avis, qu'une espèce de bureau téléphonique central" ("in our opinion, then, the brain is no more than a kind of central telephonic exchange") (Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* [Paris: Alcan, 1896], 16; authorized trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer as *Matter and Memory* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1911], 19).



68.39–69.1 Translate me into a thousand tongues! ] A well-known Hebrew parable states that when God gave the Torah on Mount Sinai, it was given in seventy languages, comprising the languages of all peoples and nations, so that everyone would understand (Shabbat 88a; Exodus Rabbah 5). In the New Testament, Acts 2:1–18 recounts that at Pentecost, the apostles “were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak in tongues” (2:4). The multitude who came to listen, representing “every nation under heaven” (2:5), were astonished “because that every man heard them speak in his own language” (2:6).

69.37–70.5 “led to suppose” . . . “capable of . . . their future,” . . . “we shall . . . earthly life.” ] The quotations are from Henri Bergson, “Life and Consciousness,” *The Hibbert Journal* 10, no. 1 (October 1911): 24–44 (reprinted as “Life and Consciousness,” *Huxley Memorial Lectures to the University of Birmingham* [Birmingham, UK: Cornish Brothers, 1914], 99–128):

when we see that consciousness, whilst being at once creation and choice, is also memory, that one of its essential functions is to accumulate and preserve the past, that very probably (I lack time to attempt the demonstration of this point) the brain is an instrument of forgetfulness as much as one of remembrance, and that in pure consciousness nothing of the past is lost, the whole life of a conscious personality being an indivisible continuity, are we not led to suppose that the effort continues beyond, and that in this passage of consciousness through matter (the passage which at the tunnel’s exit gives distinct personalities) consciousness is tempered like steel, and tests itself by clearly constituting personalities and preparing them, by the very effort which each of them is called upon to make, for a higher form of existence? If we admit that with man consciousness has finally left the tunnel, that everywhere else consciousness has remained imprisoned, that every other species corresponds to the arrest of something which in man succeeded in overcoming resistance and in expanding almost freely, thus displaying itself in true personalities capable of remembering all and willing all and controlling their past and their future, we shall have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life. (*Hibbert Journal* 10, no. 1 [October 1911]: 43)

The published essay is a modified version of Bergson’s Huxley lecture presented on 29 May 1911 at the University of Birmingham, the seventh in the lecture series established in honor of T. H. Huxley (see Note 46.20 Huxley). In 1919 another modified version of the Huxley lecture appeared in French as “La conscience et la vie” in Henri Bergson, *L’énergie spirituelle. Essais et conférences* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1919), 1–14. When the English translation of this book appeared the next year, it included a translation of “La conscience et la vie”:

“Life and Consciousness,” in *Mind-Energy, Lectures and Essays*, trans. H. Wilden Carr (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 3–36. This English translation of the French-language essay is distinct from the identically titled 1911 publication, the latter being the source of the quotations Santayana used. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

70.6–8 “spurn every kind of resistance and break through many an obstacle, perhaps even death.” ] The quotation is from Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), 294: “L'animal prend son point d'appui sur la plante, l'homme chevauche sur l'animalité, et l'humanité entière, dans l'espace et dans le temps, est une immense armée qui galope à côté de chacun de nous, en avant et en arrière de nous, dans une charge entraînant capable de culbuter toutes les résistances et de franchir bien des obstacles, même peut-être la mort.” The authorized English translation renders the text in this way: “The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death” (Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt, 1911], 271, 285–86). The authorized translation differs from the quoted text, which Santayana presumably translated himself. See Note 8.18–19 M. Bergson.

71.17 *non peccavi*, ] Latin for “I have not sinned.” “Peccavi” is the first person singular perfect indicative active for “to miss, to mistake, to offend, to sin.” The text of “Confiteor” (“I confess”), recited by the celebrant in the Tridentine Roman Catholic Mass that was used during Santayana’s lifetime, includes the confession “peccavi”—“I have sinned” (*Missale Romanum ex Decreto Sacro Sancti Concilii Tridentini restitutum: Pii V Pont. Max. iussu Editum* [Roman Missal as established by the Council of Trent: ed. Pope Pius V] [Paris: Societatem Typographicam Librorum Officii Ecclesiastici, 1603], 136; retrieved December 22, 2021 from <https://archive.org/details/MissaleRomanum1603/>).

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL

73.6 Mr. G. E. Moore ] George Edward Moore (1873–1958), British philosopher, born in London and educated at Cambridge University, where he was a lecturer (1911–25) and professor (1925–39) of philosophy. Moore, with Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), responded to the Hegelian idealism prevalent in British universities with demands for clarity and criteria of meaning faithful to common sense, and contributed to what came to be known as analytic philosophy. In ethics, Moore’s legacy includes his articulation of the naturalistic fallacy, which consists in giving an account of the good that denies its goodness as something distinct from whatever natural concepts or elements it is reduced to. In other words, the fallacy

consists in reducing the good to something else such as pleasure or power or honor and neglecting whatever makes any one of those good. This fallacy is treated in Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903), a work which, along with Moore himself, influenced the Bloomsbury Group and, in particular, its members Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), Leonard Woolf (1880–1969), Clive Bell (1881–1964), and Lytton Strachey (1880–1932). Moore's other works include *Ethics* (1912), *Philosophical Studies* (1922), and the posthumous collection *Philosophical Papers* (1959). As an advanced student at King's College, Cambridge University, Santayana first met Moore in 1896–97: "Although I was a member of King's, all my work was at Trinity, under Henry Jackson as Tutor, and with Bertie Russell, G. E. Moore and MacTaggart as philosophical friends" (*PP*, 439). Santayana wrote that Russell and "Moore . . . helped me, in 1897, to grind fine and filter Platonic Ideas into my realm of essence" (*PGS*, 587). In 1904, Santayana wrote to a friend about Moore's *Principia Ethica*: "I should more heartily agree with his logic if it were backed by some sense of the conditions in which it operates, some knowledge of human nature. His points become cogent only when the speaker forgets himself and makes his assertions irresponsibly forthright and categorical. So taken—as ready-made accidental judgments—they may well be what Moore says they are in respect to their form. Their substance, however, needs to be transformed by experience and culture. How little wisdom these metaphysicians have, and how punctiform and scholastic their vision of things is apt to become when they live in colleges or dwell in an atmosphere of technical controversy. In its rather insignificant sphere, however, I agree with Moore's doctrine. Good is a unique predicate, quite distinct in meaning from pleasant, etc; but its application is intelligible, and what things are good can be decided only by asking what things make a difference to somebody. The inanimate 'beautiful' universe Moore speaks of can be good only because it meets a given sense for harmony" (*LGS*, 1:275). In another letter Santayana wrote that Moore's "book seems to contain a grain of accuracy in a bushel of inexperience" (*LGS*, 1:282). More than ten years after their initial meeting Santayana characterized Moore as "arrogant and brutal" and "disagreeable and unfair" but also liked "the clearness with which [Moore] holds to the intent of thought and avoids those psychological sophisms [to which we all, brought up under the blight of idealism, remain so prone. For that lesson I am willing to forgive him all his narrowness and general incapacity" (*LGS*, 1:378–9). Santayana's personal assessment of Moore changed after meeting him in person in the summer of 1908, and he wrote to Bertrand Russell, "It was a real pleasure to see Moore who is so different from what I expected, so young, shy, and nice-looking, instead of ugly, old, and aggressive, as for some reason I had imagined him" (*LGS*, 1:386). Santayana consistently attributed the development of his ideas to, among other sources, his early interactions with Russell and Moore

(*LGS*, 6:81, 8:36), but he remarked in his autobiography that Moore did not maintain a friendly attitude toward him in later years (*PP*, 444). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell, Note 40.1 Plato, and Note 107.35 Hegelian idealism.

73.20–21 *ex cathedra*, ] Latin for “from the chair” or “from the seat.” It is used to mean “authoritative,” “authoritatively,” often with the implication of a view held dogmatically. It sometimes suggests the authority of the professor’s chair, and sometimes the authority of the Pope, who according to Roman Catholic doctrine is infallible when speaking *ex cathedra* on matters of faith or morals.

74.10 *Philosophical Essays*] Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910). The book collects seven essays, all previously published except the final one. Three are concerned with ethics (“The Elements of Ethics,” “The Free Man’s Worship,” and “The Study of Mathematics”) and four with the nature of truth (“Pragmatism,” “William James’s Conception of Truth,” “The Monistic Theory of Truth,” and “On the Nature of Truth and Falseness”). The first essay makes plain the influence of G. E. Moore’s *Principia Ethica* (1903) on Russell’s thinking. The second and third essays present ideals that Russell himself finds good, ideals that broaden one’s perspective beyond the individual and human and that realize freedom in renunciation of willful resistance to Fate. The essays concerning truth include Russell’s critique of pragmatism and James’s pragmatic notion of truth. Reviewers praised the book for its style and accessibility, comparing it favorably on those points to the works of James that Russell criticized. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

74.11 *The Problems of Philosophy*] Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912). The book is the fortieth in the “Home University Library of Modern Knowledge: A Comprehensive Series of New and Specially Written Books” and was intended as an introduction to philosophy for students and the general public. The book states (and Santayana notes) that its fifteen chapters deal mainly with the theory of knowledge. The final chapter presents philosophy as valuable:

not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, . . . but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good. (Russell, *Problems*, 249–50)

The historical and intellectual context of the book is reflected in the recommended reading list: Plato (c. 427–347 BC), René Descartes (1596–1650),

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), George Berkeley (1685–1753), David Hume (1711–1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

76.20–21 This backward look, when the hand is on the plough, ] Allusions to Luke 9:57–62. In this passage, one man pledges to follow Jesus wherever he may go, but two others, whom Jesus asks to follow him, say that they need to attend to family issues first. “And Jesus said unto him, No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God” (Luke 9:62). This verse contrasts with 1 Kings 19:15–21, in which God commands Elijah to anoint Elisha as his successor in his prophetic mission. Elijah permits Elisha to say goodbye to his family and to share with them a feast, roasting the oxen he had been plowing with over a fire made of wood from the broken plow, before leaving to follow Elijah (1 Kings 19:20–21).

76.39–77.1 The quality of wisdom, like that of mercy, is not strained. ] Based on the opening line of Portia’s speech in Act IV, Scene 1 of *The Merchant of Venice*: “The quality of mercy is not strained.”

77.19–77.28 “The solution of . . . in this matter.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Study of Mathematics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 77–78. Including the elided text, the paragraph begins: “The solution of the difficulties which formerly surrounded the mathematical infinite is probably the greatest achievement of which our own age has to boast. Since the beginnings of Greek thought these difficulties have been known; in every age the finest intellects have vainly endeavoured to answer the apparently unanswerable questions that had been asked by Zeno the Eleatic. At last Georg Cantor has found the answer, and has conquered for the intellect a new and vast province which had been given over to Chaos and old Night.” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 52.31 Achilles and the tortoise.

77.22 Cantor ] Georg Ferdinand Ludwig Philipp Cantor (1845–1918), German mathematician, born in St. Petersburg, Russia, earned his doctorate from the University of Berlin in 1868, and joined the faculty at the University of Halle in 1870. He became a professor of mathematics at Halle in 1879 and remained there for his entire career. He is known for his work on infinite sets and as the originator of modern set theory. In 1874, Cantor, building on Richard Dedekind’s (1831–1916) work on infinite sets, demonstrated that infinite sets may have differing numbers of elements and established the theory of transfinite numbers, which include transfinite cardinals, numbers used to quantify elements of infinite sets; and transfinite ordinals, numbers ordering the infinite sets. See Note 77.26 Dedekind.

77.22 Dedekind ] Julius Wilhelm Richard Dedekind (1831–1916), German mathematician, born in Braunschweig, earned his doctorate at Göttingen in 1852. After teaching in Göttingen and Zürich, he returned to Braunschweig in 1862, teaching at the Technical High School until his retirement in 1912. Dedekind is known for his work demonstrating how the real numbers can be formally constructed from the rational numbers, which contributed to the formalizing of the foundations of mathematics. His definition of infinite sets (a set is infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself), published in 1872, was used by Georg Cantor (1845–1918), with whom Dedekind was friends, in his groundbreaking work on infinite sets. See Note 77.26 Cantor.

77.28–78.2 “To reconcile us . . . of its beauty.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Study of Mathematics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 82. The elided text reads: “–which is merely the literary personification of these forces–”. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

78.6–15 “Real life is . . . the actual world.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Study of Mathematics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 82. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 text, with two changes in punctuation and one in wording. The original reads: “Real life is, to most men, a long second-best, a perpetual compromise. . .” and “the pitiful facts [Santayana substituted “laws”] of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell. . .” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

78.15–16 “those elements in . . . place in heaven.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Study of Mathematics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 73. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 text. The original reads “and Plato realised, more perhaps than any other single man, what those elements are in human life which merit a place in heaven,” with Santayana omitting “are”. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 40.1 Plato.

78.16–19 “The true spirit . . . as in poetry.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Study of Mathematics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 73. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

81.29–30 laying up his treasures in the mathematical heaven. ] Allusion to Matthew 6:19–21: “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.”

82.11 “Thirteen Pragmatisms”; ] Arthur Oncken Lovejoy (1873–1962), philosopher and historian of ideas, in his two-part article “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. I,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 5, no. 1 (2 January 1908): 5–12; “The Thirteen Pragmatisms. II,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 5, no. 2 (16 January 1908): 29–39, distinguished thirteen logically independent meanings of the term “pragmatism.” He ordered them “according to the leading of those associations of ideas through which the ambiguities of the several doctrines, and the transitions from one to another, become relatively intelligible” (Lovejoy, “Thirteen Pragmatisms. II”: 37):

1. The meaning of a judgment consists in future experienced consequences regardless of belief in the proposition.
2. The meaning of a judgment consists in the future consequences of believing it.
3. The truth of a judgment is identical with the occurrence of the series of experiences which it predicts.
4. A judgment is true insofar as its predictions have been realized in past experience.
5. General propositions are true which have in past experience been biologically serviceable to those living by them.
6. Temporal becoming is fundamental to reality, and processes of consciousness contribute an essential and creative part to this becoming. The future is non-real, partly indeterminate, and dependent on movement of consciousness.
7. Apprehension of truth is a kind of satisfaction, and the true judgment fulfills some need. Moving from doubt to belief is moving from dissatisfaction to satisfaction.
8. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is satisfactoriness, and all the dimensions of satisfaction have commensurable epistemological values.
9. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is the degree in which it satisfies the distinctive theoretic demands of human nature.
10. The criterion of the truth of a judgment is its practical usefulness as a postulate; general truths are postulated truths, and there are no necessary truths.
11. There are some necessary truths, but they are few and not practically suitable to our needs; beyond these truths it is legitimate and needed to use postulates.
12. Of postulates regarded as truths, those that enrich moral, esthetic, and religious life have a coordinate place with those commended by common sense and physical science as the basis of active physical life.
13. The meaning of a judgment consists in part in the apprehension of the relation of an object to a conscious purpose.



After enumerating the different pragmatisms, Lovejoy grouped them “in a more logical manner” according to the forms of theory they took:

Pragmatist Theories of Meaning: 1, 2, 13

Pragmatism as an Epistemologically Functionless Theory concerning the “Nature” of Truth: 3

Pragmatist Theories of Knowledge, i.e., of the Criterion of the Validity of Judgment: 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Pragmatism as an Ontological Theory: 6

82.18–83.3 “The influence of democracy. . . rather than a George III.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “Pragmatism,” in *Philosophical Essays*, 121–22. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 original in text: “to decide philosophical questions by putting them to the [Santayana substituted “a”] vote,” and punctuation: “the religion of the pragmatists: they have the religion they have chosen.” The elided text reads: “Dr. [Ferdinand Canning Scott] Schiller at one time set to work to elucidate the question of a future life by taking a poll. William James claims for the pragmatist temper ‘the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth’” (Russell, “Pragmatism,” 121). F(erdinand) C(anning) S(cott) Schiller (1864–1937) was an English philosopher educated at Oxford University, where he became a fellow of Corpus Christi College; he also taught at Cornell University and the University of Southern California. Russell’s citations of William James are drawn from James, “What Pragmatism Means,” Lecture 2 in *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 20, 28–29. In turn, James took the phrase “The prince of darkness is a gentleman” from *King Lear*, Act 3, Scene 4. See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.2 George Washington ] (1732–1799), American military and political leader, tobacco farmer, first president of the United States of America, born into a slave-owning and landowning family in the British colony of Virginia. At the age of 15, he became a land surveyor and plantation supervisor. At 20, he inherited his older half-brother’s estate and eighteen slaves. From 1752 to 1758 Washington served as an officer in the Virginia militia and had success in the French and Indian War. In 1759, he resigned his commission, having achieved the rank of brigadier general, and retired to his estate to farm tobacco, later converting his crops to wheat. That same year he became a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses (the lower house of the colonial Virginia legislature). After 1763, he opposed British colonial policies discouraging western settlement and taxing imported goods. Washington was a delegate to the First Continental Congress in 1774, and he was named commander in chief of the

Continental Army at the Second Continental Congress in 1775. Washington retained the post, in spite of setbacks and conspiracies to remove him, until the conflict ended, retiring in 1783. Washington attended the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 and was chosen presiding officer. Though he had quelled a 1783 mutiny that sought to make him an American king, he reluctantly ran for president and won the election. He served two terms as president and chose not to run for a third, though he likely would have won. He sought to ensure the financial soundness of the new nation and maintain international neutrality, and upon leaving office he warned of the risks to the nation posed by party politics. Washington retired to his estate, Mount Vernon, and died in 1799.

83.3 George III.” ] (1738–1820), King of Great Britain, first monarch of the ethnic German House of Hanover born in England. He succeeded to the throne when his grandfather George II died in 1760. George III respected the constitution and did not interfere with ministers’ responsibility for colonial policy. However, the king became for American colonists the symbol of British oppression, and his supposed tyranny was taken as justification for revolution. George III had supported repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, but after the Boston Tea Party in 1774 he no longer sought any compromise with colonists. He supported prime minister Lord North’s prosecution of the war and was reluctant to end that support when Parliament refused to continue the war. George III became ill in 1788 and was thought to be insane, but he recovered. However, in 1810 he became ill again. Already losing his sight and hearing, George III also suffered increasing mental deficits and was again declared insane. His son George IV then became regent, succeeding to the throne after his father’s death.

83.6–14 “The facts that . . . are both psychological.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “Pragmatism,” *Philosophical Essays*, 104. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 text. The original has “The facts which fill” instead of the “The facts that fill” and colons rather than semicolons after “psychical facts” and “theories are based.” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.18–19 “they never think . . . theories are based,” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “Pragmatism,” 104. This repetition of text previously quoted by Santayana (see Note 83.6-14) omits the phrase “, like scientific specialists,”. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

83.19–20 Facts are the cash which the credit of theories hangs upon. ] This metaphor is drawn from the thought of William James and of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), American polymath and a founder of pragmatism. The idea of the cash value of truth runs throughout James’s 1906–7 lecture series

published as *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907). In Lecture 6, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” James asserts, “Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But all this points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other’s truth” (80). Peirce was a founder of economic theory. According to Peirce, “The doctrine of economy, in general, treats of the relations between utility and cost. That branch of it which relates to research considers the relations between the utility and the cost of diminishing the probable error of our knowledge. Its main problem is, how, with a given expenditure of money, time, and energy, to obtain the most valuable addition to our knowledge” (“Note on the Economy of Research,” *Coast Survey Report* [1879], 197–201, reprinted as “Economy of Research” in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 7, ed. Arthur W. Burks [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958], 140). Peirce continues with a series of equations for maximizing utility while minimizing cost, concluding by cautioning, “It is to be remarked that the theory here given rests on the supposition that the object of the investigation is the ascertainment of truth. When an investigation is made for the purpose of attaining personal distinction, the economics of the problem are entirely different” (157). This pioneering article deals with actual costs and benefits related to Peirce’s work as a surveyor, but he also saw that these concepts could be used figuratively: “Let us now come to the question of the maxim of Pragmatism. This maxim runs as follows: ‘Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object’” (Charles Sanders Peirce, *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, ed. Patricia Ann Turrissi [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997], 231). In his commentary on the Turrissi edition of Peirce’s lectures, Philip L. Campbell summarizes: “That is, the cash value of a concept is its possible effects” (Campbell, *Peirce, Pragmatism, and The Right Way of Thinking* [SAND2011-5583] [Albuquerque: Sandia National Laboratories, 2011], 51).

83.33 *pragmata* ] Greek; singular *pragma*, literally “things”, “actions”, “facts”; the basis of the term “pragmatism.”

83.38 “For illustration . . . earth is flat,” ] The quotation is from Helen Bradford Thompson, “Bosanquet’s Theory of Judgment,” in John Dewey, *Studies in*

*Logical Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903), 86–127. The original text occurs in this context:

The contrast between the naïve view of the criterion of reality and the one we have just been discussing may be brought out by considering how we should have to interpret from each standpoint the constant succession of facts in the history of science which have ceased to be facts. For illustration take the former fact that the earth is flat. It ceased to be a fact, says the theory we have been reviewing, because further thought-constructions of the real world convinced us that there is no reality which the idea “flat-world” represents. The idea “round-world” alone reproduces reality. It ceased to be a fact, says the naïve view, because it ceased to be a safe guide for action. Men found they could sail around the world. Correspondence in one case is pictorial, and its existence or non-existence can, as we have seen, never be ascertained. In the other, correspondence is response, adjustment, the co-meeting of specific conditions in further constituting of experience.

In actual life, therefore, the criterion of reality which we use is a practical one. The test of reality does not consist in ascertaining the relationship between an idea and an  $x$  which is not an idea, but in ascertaining what experience can be taken for granted as a safe basis for securing other experiences. (Thompson, 106–7)

83.39–84.2 “two centuries . . . independence of cities.” ] The quotation is from Wendell T. Bush, “Sub Specie Æternitatis,” *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 4, no. 24 (November 21, 1907): 659–63. The original text occurs in this context:

The dispute over universals in the twelfth century, and again in the fourteenth century, shows us a doctrine first suppressed because it was hostile to the dominant conception of society and its needs, and then victorious because the political and social situation characterized by the breaking up of the medieval world could use such a point of view as nominalism. If nominalism were true, then it would follow that the church was but the aggregate of its members, a conception intolerable to a period in which social and metaphysical thinking started with the idea of “the whole,” and with very little application to a world where nationality had hardly begun to emerge. Again, two centuries later, nominalism was evidently true because it alone could legitimize the local independence of cities, and the rights of individual citizens, and recognize the working of the principle of nationality. (Bush, “Sub Specie Æternitatis”: 660–61)

Santayana substituted “would legitimise” for “could legitimize” in the sentence quoted.

84.16 “truths in the plural.” ] The quotation is from William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 218; quoted in Bertrand Russell, “Pragmatism,” 102. The quotation of James in Russell reads, “Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of processes of leading, realised *in rebus* [in fact], and having only this quality in common, that they *pay*.” In James’s original text “realized” appears instead of “realised.” See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

85.21–22 “as far as . . . God their cause.” ] The quotation is from William James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 101. The original text, including the text elided in Santayana’s quotation, reads: “As far as the past facts go, indeed, there is no difference. Those facts are in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that’s in them is gained, be the atoms or be the God their cause” (James, *Pragmatism*, 101). See Note 8.18 William James.

85.25–27 “Of course, . . . of our idea.” ] This exchange also is reported in Santayana’s 1922 *Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies*, in the essay “On My Friendly Critics,” in which he wrote:

The whole contention of my book [*Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*] was that the glow of human emotion lent a value to good poetry which it denied to bad, and to one idea of God which it denied to another. My position in this matter was that of empirical philosophy, and of William James himself. In his book on Pragmatism he says that the being of atoms is just as good as the being of God, if both produce the same effects in human experience; and I remember once mildly protesting to him on that point, and asking him if, apart from these effects on us, the existence of God, assuming God to be conscious, would not have a considerable value in itself; and he replied, “Of course; but I was thinking of our idea.” This was exactly the attitude of my book; I was thinking of our religious and poetic ideas, and reducing their value to what they stood for in the elements of our experience, or in our destiny. (*SELS*, 247–48)

The James text referred to is found in *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, 101. See Note 8.18 William James and Note 85.21–22 “as far as . . . God their cause.”

85.37 if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell’s, ] The allusion is to Russell’s “William James’s Conception of Truth,” in which he wrote:

This brings me to the difference between *criterion* and *meaning*—a point on which neither James nor Dr. Schiller is very clear. I may best explain the difference, to begin with, by an instance. If you wish to know whether a certain book is in a library, you consult the catalogue: books

mentioned in the catalogue are presumably in the library, books not mentioned in it are presumably not in the library. Thus the catalogue affords a *criterion* of whether a book is in the library or not. But even supposing the catalogue perfect, it is obvious that when you say the book is in the library you do not mean that it is mentioned in the catalogue. You mean that the actual book is to be found somewhere in the shelves. It therefore remains an intelligible hypothesis that there are books in the library which are not yet catalogued, or that there are books catalogued which have been lost and are no longer in the library. And it remains an inference from the discovery that a book is mentioned in the catalogue to the conclusion that the book is in the library. Speaking abstractly, we may say that a property A is a criterion of a property B when the same objects possess both; and A is a useful criterion of B if it is easier to discover whether an object possesses the property A than whether it possesses the property B. Thus being mentioned in the catalogue is a useful criterion of being in the library, because it is easier to consult the catalogue than to hunt through the shelves. (*Philosophical Essays*, 137).

See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

86.1–2 a catalogue of the library at Alexandria, all the books being lost for ever; ] The Library of Alexandria was established, likely in the third century BC, as part of the Mouseion, a campus dedicated to scholarship and knowledge and the source of the word “museum.” According to tradition, the goal of the Library was to acquire or copy as many texts as possible; estimates of the numbers of scrolls it contained range from forty thousand to four hundred thousand. Popular culture represents the Library as having been entirely destroyed by fire during Julius Caesar’s occupation of Alexandria in 48 BC. Although this story is legendary in part or in whole, the destruction of the Library of Alexandria has become the paradigm of lost knowledge. Thus, a catalogue of the texts held by the Library of Alexandria, if such a document were extant, would be an excellent example of representations of objects—the lost scrolls listed in the catalogue—which are “useless and unattainable” (*WD*, 85). See Note 85.37 if I may adapt a comparison of Mr. Russell’s.

86.12–13 Emersonian circles in which pragmatism sprang up. ] For Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), see Note 129.7 Emerson.

86.14 transcendentalism ] See Note 130.4 Transcendentalism.

88.15–16 “working hypotheses” . . . “prudent people . . . degree of belief.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “William James’s Conception of Truth,” *Philosophical Essays*, 147. According to Russell, working hypotheses are assumed propositions from which data are deduced, and they include

all the general laws of science and all the metaphysics both of common sense and of professed philosophy. It is, apparently, by generalising the conception of “working hypothesis” that pragmatism has arisen. But three points seem to me to have been overlooked in this generalisation. First, working hypotheses are only a small part of our beliefs, not the whole, as pragmatism seems to think. Secondly, prudent people give only a low degree of belief to working hypotheses; it is therefore a curious procedure to select them as the very types of beliefs in general. Thirdly, pragmatism seems to confound two very different conceptions of “working.” When science says that a hypothesis works, it means that from this hypothesis we can deduce a number of propositions which are verifiable, i.e. obvious under suitable circumstances, and that we cannot deduce any propositions of which the contradictories are verifiable. But when pragmatism says that a hypothesis works, it means that the effects of believing it are good, including among the effects not only the beliefs which we deduce from it, but also the emotions entailed by it or its perceived consequences, and the actions to which we are prompted by it or its perceived consequences. (Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, 147–48)

See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

88.16–31 “we hold different . . . only temperatures.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “William James’s Conception of Truth,” *Philosophical Essays*, 133–34. The original text reads:

When we survey our beliefs, we find that we hold different beliefs with very different degrees of conviction. Some—such as the belief that I am sitting in a chair, or that  $2 + 2 = 4$ —can be doubted by few except those who have had a long training in philosophy. Such beliefs are held so firmly that non-philosophers who deny them are put into lunatic asylums. Other beliefs, such as the facts of history, are held rather less firmly, but still in the main without much doubt where they are well authenticated. Beliefs about the future, as that the sun will rise to-morrow and that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw, may be held with almost as great conviction as beliefs about the past. Scientific laws are generally believed less firmly, and there is a gradation among them from such as seem nearly certain to such as have only a slight probability in their favour. Philosophical beliefs, finally, will, with most people, take a still lower place, since the opposite beliefs of others can hardly fail to induce doubt. Belief, therefore, is a matter of degree. To speak of belief, disbelief, doubt, and suspense of judgment as the only possibilities is as if, from the writing on the thermometer, we were to suppose that blood heat, summer heat, temperate, and freezing were the only temperatures.



See Note 8.18 William James and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

88.22–23 that the trains will run approximately as in Bradshaw, ] George Bradshaw (1800–1853), English cartographer, printer, and publisher, originated a series of travel guides to Europe, the Middle East, and India, notably including railroad timetables for the British Isles and Ireland. These were published from 1839 until 1961, and became so well known that the term “Bradshaw” was understood to refer to any railroad timetable.

88.29–31 from the writing on the thermometer. . . were the only temperatures.” ] These markings, sometimes together with additional empirical markings such as boiling point and “cold of snow and salt,” were used in the past as either the only markings or alongside degree markings on thermometers. The article “United States Thermometer” (S. B. D., *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal* 49, no. 16 [November 16, 1853]: 318–21) describes the development of a thermometer including these reference points to be specifically calibrated for a minimum of four major cities, the primary one being Boston.

89.25 Democritus ] Greek philosopher (c. 460–c. 370 BC), born at Abdera in Thrace. Following fellow Greek philosopher Leucippus (fifth century BC), Democritus was a materialist who held that all existence could be explained in terms of collisions and conglomerations of atoms (from the Greek ἄτομος, meaning “uncut” or “unmown,” “indivisible”) moving in a void. Atoms are, according to Democritus, tiny indivisible and indestructible particles, imperceptible to the senses. The mechanical motion of atoms, and not human perception, is true reality; human knowledge results from contact with atoms; and mind operates according to the same principles as other material existence. Democritus’s works, which included writings on physics, astronomy, mathematics, literature, and ethics, are known only through quotations by other authors and through Aristotle’s (384–322 BC) discussion of atomism. Democritus was a significant influence on Santayana’s thought, and Santayana wrote that his own naturalism, which he preferred to call materialism to distinguish it from Romantic naturalism, was “the hard, non-humanistic naturalism of the Ionian philosophers, of Democritus, Lucretius, and Spinoza” (*LGS*, 8:328). He regarded Democritus as the culmination in Greek philosophy of “orthodox physics” (*PP*, 234), by which he meant an understanding of physics consistent with “a certain shrewd orthodoxy which the sentiment and practice of laymen maintain everywhere” (*SAF*, v). According to Santayana, Democritus held as an ideal the intelligibility of natural phenomena: “To reduce phenomena to constant elements, as similar and simple as possible, and to conceive their union and separation to obey constant laws, is what a natural philosopher will inevitably do so soon as his interest is not merely to utter experience but

to understand it. Democritus brought this scientific ideal to its ultimate expression" (*LR1*, 10). Santayana acknowledged the "grossness and false simplicity" of Democritus's atomic theory and wrote "that while atomism at a given level may not be a final or metaphysical truth, it will describe, on every level, the practical and efficacious structure of the world. We owe to Democritus this ideal of practical intelligibility; and he is accordingly an eternal spokesman of reason" (*LR1*, 10). Democritus also figured as a character in Santayana's *Dialogues in Limbo* (1925/1948). See Note 40.22 Spinoza; for Lucretius, see Note 67.18–19 Nothing arises in nature, Lucretius says, . . . some other thing.

91.7–8 M. Henri Poincaré, ] (1854–1912) French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher, born at Nancy, studied mathematics and engineering before attending the University of Paris, where he earned a doctorate in mathematics in 1879. He is reputed to have been the last mathematician with expertise in all fields of the subject. According to Bertrand Russell, "Henri Poincaré was, by general agreement, the most eminent scientific man of his generation—more eminent, one is tempted to think, than any man of science now living. From the mere variety of the subjects which he illuminated, there is certainly no one who can appreciate critically the whole of his work" (Bertrand Russell, "Preface," Henri Poincaré, *Science and Method*, trans. Francis Maitland [London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1914], 5). Poincaré created the field of algebraic topology; he also contributed to cosmology and, independently of Albert Einstein (1879–1955), to the special theory of relativity. In philosophy of science, Poincaré is remembered as a conventionalist because he held that the truth of the laws of geometry and Newton's laws of motion could be established neither prior to experience nor empirically; in other words, their truth depends on prior theories or definitions. However, he did not regard all of science to be conventional, since he held the truth of scientific theories to be subject to empirical results. Poincaré wrote about science and mathematics for a general audience in works such as *La valeur de la science* (Paris: Flammarion, 1905), translated as *The Value of Science*, trans. George Bruce Halsted (New York: The Science Press, 1907); and *Science et méthode* (Paris: Flammarion, 1908) (*Science and Method*). Other important works include *La science et l'hypothèse* (Paris: Flammarion, 1902), translated as *Science and Hypothesis*, trans. George Bruce Halsted (New York: Science Press, 1905); and *Dernières pensées* (Paris: Flammarion, 1913), translated as *Mathematics and Science: Last Essays*, trans. John W. Bolduc (New York: Dover, 1963).

91.9 "bankruptcy of science," ] The original text, of which the quotation is a translation, is found in Chapter 10, "Les théories de la physique moderne" ("The

Theories of Modern Physics”), in Henri Poincaré, *La science et l’hypothèse* (*Science and Hypothesis* [Paris: Flammarion, 1902]):

Les gens du monde sont frappés de voir combien les théories scientifiques sont éphémères. Après quelques années de prospérité, ils les voient successivement abandonnées; ils voient les ruines s’accumuler sur les ruines; ils prévoient que les théories aujourd’hui à la mode devront succomber à leur tour à bref délai et ils en concluent qu’elles sont absolument vaines. C’est ce qu’ils appellent la *faillite de la science*. (Poincaré, *La science et l’hypothèse*, 189; emphasis in original)

The chapter is derived from a public presentation Poincaré gave in 1900 at the International Congress of Physics in Paris. The authorized English translation (with an introduction written by Santayana’s teacher and colleague Josiah Royce), beginning with the paragraph quoted above and continuing, reads:

The laity are struck to see how ephemeral scientific theories are. After some years of prosperity, they see them successively abandoned; they see ruins accumulate upon ruins; they foresee that the theories fashionable to-day will shortly succumb in their turn and hence they conclude that these are absolutely idle. This is what they call the *bankruptcy of science*.

Their scepticism is superficial; they give no account to themselves of the aim and the role of scientific theories; otherwise they would comprehend that the ruins may still be good for something.

No theory seemed more solid than that of Fresnel which attributed light to motions of the ether. Yet now Maxwell’s is preferred. Does this mean the work of Fresnel was in vain? No, because the aim of Fresnel was not to find out whether there is really an ether, whether it is or is not formed of atoms, whether these atoms really move in this or that sense; his object was to foresee optical phenomena.

Now, Fresnel’s theory always permits of this, to-day as well as before Maxwell. The differential equations are always true; they can always be integrated by the same procedures and the results of this integration always retain their value.

And let no one say that thus we reduce physical theories to the role of mere practical recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain true it is because these relations preserve their reality. They teach us, now as then, that there is such and such a relation between some thing and some other thing; only this something formerly we called motion; we now call it electric current. But these appellations were only images substituted for the real objects which nature will

eternally hide from us. The true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain to, and the only condition is that the same relations exist between these objects as between the images by which we are forced to replace them. If these relations are known to us, what matter if we deem it convenient to replace one image by another. (*Science and Hypothesis*, trans. George Bruce Halsted [New York: Science Press, 1905], 114–15; emphasis in original)

An alternative translation renders the relevant paragraph in this way:

The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the *bankruptcy of science*. (Henri Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*, trans. W. J. G. [London: Walter Scott, 1905], 160; emphasis in original)

See Note 91.7–8 M. Henri Poincaré.

91.22 “The Elements of Ethics,” ] The first essay in Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, 1–58. Regarding the ethical doctrine expressed in his essay, Russell acknowledged the influence of Santayana’s criticism more than once. In 1929, Russell wrote:

I no longer regard good and evil as objective entities wholly independent of human desires, nor can I find an emotional refuge in the realm of essence with the same intellectual confidence which I once felt. It was Santayana who first led me to disbelieve in the objectivity of good and evil by his criticism of my then views in his “Winds of Doctrine”, but I have been gradually driven to a position beyond that which he holds, since for him but not for me, the realm of essence is eternal and independent of existence. (“Preface,” *Mysticism and Logic* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1929], v)

Twenty-seven years later, Russell wrote:

I owe [Santayana] certain philosophical debts. When I was young, I agreed with G. E. Moore in believing the objectivity of good and evil. Santayana’s criticism, in a book called *Winds of Doctrine*, caused me to abandon this view, though I have never been able to be as bland and comfortable without it as he was. (*Portraits from Memory and Other Essays* [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956], 96)

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

91.25–28 “what is called . . . included in ethics.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 3–4. The original, including the elided text, reads:

What is called good conduct is conduct which is a means to other things which are good on their own account; and hence the study of what is good on its own account is necessary before we can decide upon rules of conduct. And the study of what is good or bad on its own account must be included in ethics, which thus ceases to be concerned only with human conduct.

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

91.34–92.10 “The philosopher, bent . . . moralist could enjoin.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 50–51. The original, including elided text, reads:

The philosopher, bent on the construction of a system, is inclined to simplify the facts unduly, to give them a symmetry which is fictitious, and to twist them into a form in which they can all be deduced from one or two general principles. The moralist, on the other hand, being primarily concerned with conduct, tends to become absorbed in means, to value the actions men ought to perform more than the ends which such actions serve. This latter error—for in theorising it is an error—is so forced upon us by the exigencies of practice that we may easily come to feel the ultimate ends of life far less important than the proximate and intermediate purposes which we consciously endeavour to realise. And hence most of what they value in this world would have to be omitted by many moralists from any imagined heaven, because there such things as self-denial and effort and courage and pity could find no place. The philosopher’s error is less common than the moralist’s, because the love of system and of the intellectual satisfaction of a deductive edifice is rarer than the love of virtue. But among writers on ethics the philosopher’s error occurs oftener than the other, because such writers are almost always among the few men who have the love of system. Kant has the bad eminence of combining both errors in the highest possible degree, since he holds that there is nothing good except the virtuous will—a view which simplifies the good as much as any philosopher could wish, and mistakes means for ends as completely as any moralist could enjoin.

See also Note 5.16 Kant and Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

92.37–93.2 “Good and bad . . . which is right.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 11. Santayana’s quotation departs slightly from Russell’s 1910 text by omitting italics for the words “good,” “bad,” “round,” and “square.” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

- 93.2–5 “We cannot maintain . . . or ought not.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 7. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.
- 94.2–3 Plato, who complained . . . trite and exploded. ] In Plato’s *Philebus* 14c–d, Socrates objects to those paradoxes such as his interlocutor raises “that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single ‘me’ into many ‘me’s,’ and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways” (*The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], 579). Socrates characterizes them as “common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought” (*Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 579). Santayana’s personal library included this book. See Note 40.1 Plato.
- 94.17–18 “only one of . . . which is right.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 11. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 92.37–93.2 “Good and bad . . . which is right.”.
- 94.21–22 “if this were . . . what is right.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 18. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.
- 94.22–95.1 “We do in . . . them is mistaken.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 18. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.
- 94n.1 *Philebus*, ] Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 11a–67b (575–645). A dialogue, typically counted among Plato’s later writings, in which Socrates engages with two young men, Protarchus and Philebus, about whether pleasure or knowledge constitutes the good for all beings capable of both. The dialogue proceeds by considering a method of inquiry, the nature of pleasure, and the constitution of happiness. The dialogue declares neither pleasure nor knowledge the winner of the contest: the good, Socrates states, is found in a life with pleasure and knowledge mixed (61b). A happy mixture requires beauty, proportion, and truth, which together constitute the good. By considering whether pleasure or knowledge is more akin to each of these ingredients, knowledge comes to be regarded as closer to the good than does pleasure. Santayana recounted in his autobiography his study of *Philebus* with Henry Jackson (1839–1921), a classics

tutor at Trinity College, Cambridge University, when Santayana spent a year (1896–97) as an advanced student at Cambridge:

[Jackson] was tolerant and considerate about my bad Greek, which I had confessed at the beginning; and he recommended, as I needed a translation to help me in my reading, to get the dialogues we were to read—the Parmenides, Philebus, Sophist, and Politicus—in a cheap edition in separate little volumes with the text and a German translation on opposite pages. These little books proved invaluable. They went easily into the pocket, and I could read them anywhere during my walks, or look up again at any time a passage that had arrested my attention. (*PP*, 439)

Santayana’s personal library contained several works by and about Plato, including Plato, *Platons Philebos: Griechisch und Deutsch* (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann, 1857); Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vols. 1–5, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett; and several articles by Henry Jackson about Plato’s later theory of ideas from late nineteenth-century issues of *The Journal of Philology*. See Note 40.1 Plato.

94n.6–7 “some state and . . . all men happy.” ] The text is from Plato, *Philebus* 11d. The quotation is found in Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett, 576. See Note 40.1 Plato.

94n.8 “as an element in human life.” ] The text is from Plato, *Philebus* 66e (Santayana cited the text as *Philebus* 66d). The quotation is found in Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892), 644. Santayana’s personal library included this book. See Note 40.1 Plato.

95.3–4 Truly the debating . . . and the theatre. ] The idols of the cave and of the theatre are two of the four types of idols that Francis Bacon (English philosopher, 1561–1626) describes in his *Novum Organum* (London, 1620), Book 1, Axioms 39–45. As rendered in a modern translation:

XXXIX.

There are four classes of Idols which beset men’s minds. To these for distinction’s sake I have assigned names,—calling the first class *Idols of the Tribe*; the second, *Idols of the Cave*; the third, *Idols of the Market-place*; the fourth, *Idols of the Theatre*.

. . .

XLII.

The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or



den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like. So that the spirit of man (according as it is meted out to different individuals) is in fact a thing variable and full of perturbation, and governed as it were by chance. Whence it was well observed by Heraclitus that men look for sciences in their own lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.

. . .

#### XLIV.

Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. Nor is it only of the systems now in vogue, or only of the ancient sects and philosophies, that I speak; for many more plays of the same kind may yet be composed and in like artificial manner set forth; seeing that errors the most widely different have nevertheless causes for the most part alike.

(“Aphorisms Concerning the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man: Book I,” in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. 8: *Translation of the Philosophical Works*, Vol. 1 [Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900], 76–78; retrieved December 22, 2021 from <https://archive.org/details/worksfrancisbaco08bacoiala/>)

95.18–20 since the majority . . . or frogs' legs, ] Pork is taboo for observant Jews and Muslims, and might also be found hateful by people who do not eat meat at all for religious or ethical reasons; Pythagoras (c. 570–495) insisted that his disciples follow a vegetarian diet but specifically forbade them to eat the local staple fava beans, legendarily for a perceived resemblance to human fetuses or flesh and perhaps more practically because G6PD deficiency, a genetic disorder prevalent in the Mediterranean area and far more common among men than among women, can cause severe and sometimes fatal anemia in persons with the disorder who eat fava beans; and over and above anyone whose religion or ethics prohibits eating frogs, the English elite in Santayana's time patriotically hated frogs' legs because their peers in their traditional enemy France considered these a delicacy, going so far as to refer to the French themselves as “frogs.”

95.34 *Brod.* ] This is an older spelling for the German word “Brot.”

97.3–7 Plato’s argument . . . the oyster. . . answer instinctively, No! ] The reference is to *Philebus* 21a–d:

*Soc.* Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* Certainly I should.

*Soc.* Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

*Pro.* Certainly not.

*Soc.* Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?

*Pro.* Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

*Soc.* Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?

*Pro.* I should.

*Soc.* But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.

*Pro.* Certainly.

*Soc.* And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or “pulmo marinus” [a type of jellyfish]. Could this be otherwise?

*Pro.* No.

(Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. 4, 3rd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892], 586–87)

See Note 40.1 Plato and Note 97.18 Protarchus.

97.7–8 *argumentum ad hominem* ] Latin for “argument from attacking the person,” which is a rhetorical strategy, usually resulting in a fallacious argument, in which some (typically unappealing or unpopular) characteristic of a person is used to suggest that an argument put forth by that person is faulty and should be rejected. The fallacy results when the criticized personal characteristic is irrelevant to the content of the argument. The strategy may not result in a

fallacy when the criticized personal characteristic is relevant to the content of the argument.

97.18 Protarchus ] Character in Plato's *Philebus*, who along with the title character maintains that the good is pleasure against the character of Socrates, who maintains that the good is knowledge. The character Protarchus is distinct from and unrelated to the Epicurean philosopher Protarchus of Bargylia, who lived three centuries after Plato. See Note 40.1 Plato and Note 97.3–7 Plato's argument . . . the oyster. . . answer instinctively, No!

97.28 "Free Man's Religion" ] The reference appears to be to "The Free Man's Worship," the second essay of Russell's *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 59–70, which was first published in *The Independent Review* 1 (December 1903): 415–24. An article titled "Free Man's Religion" does not appear to have been published by Russell, though two authors in addition to Santayana attribute a publication with this title to Russell: J. C. Hardwick, "The Tension which Creates Religion," *The Quest: A Quarterly Review* 13, no. 1 (October 1921): 73; and Raymond Bernard Cattell, *Psychology and Social Progress: Mankind and Destiny from the Standpoint of a Scientist* (London: C. W. Daniel, 1933), 220. In "The Free Man's Worship," Russell wrote, "To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship" (Russell, *Philosophical Essays* [1910], 69). The essay also appeared as "A Free Man's Worship" in *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917), a collection of Russell's essays that included other titles from *Philosophical Essays*. Over 20 years after its original publication, an admiring reader of Russell's essay privately published a bound reprint of "A Free Man's Worship," with a new preface by Russell. In this preface, Russell acknowledged that if he were again to write on the same theme, he would "use somewhat different words . . . , but I see no reason to think that they would be better words. Fundamentally, my view of man's place in the cosmos remains unchanged" ("Preface," *A Free Man's Worship: With a Special Preface* [Portland, ME: T. B. Mosher, 1923], ix). Russell further commented that

the fundamental attitude recommended in A Free Man's Worship, which was the one that I strove to maintain, appears to me in retrospect the one which I should still wish to preserve. . . . There are, however, two points in regard to which, if I were writing now I should wish to introduce some modification. The first of these concerns materialism; the second concerns the scope of the notions of good and evil. (Russell, "Preface," *A Free Man's Worship* [1923], x–xi).

Six years later, Russell wrote another preface for a new printing of *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*. In this preface he wrote:

“A Free Man’s Worship” . . . depend[s] upon a metaphysic which is more platonic than that which I now believe in. I no longer regard good and evil as objective entities wholly independent of human desires, nor can I find an emotional refuge in the realm of essence with the same intellectual confidence which I once felt. (Bertrand Russell, “Preface,” *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1929], v)

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.29–31 “if I am . . . the only good.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 46. See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.31–34 “Most people. . . is simply good.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 47. The original, including the elided text, reads:

Everybody judges that some sorts of communities are better than others; and most people who affirm that when they say a thing is good they mean merely that they desire it, would admit that it is better two people’s desires should be satisfied than only one person’s. In some such way people fail to carry out the doctrine that there is no such concept as *good*; and if there is such a concept, then what is good is not good *for me* or *for you*, but is simply good.

See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell.

97.34–39 “It is, indeed . . . B may be.” ] The quotation is from Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays*, 47–48. Santayana’s quotation substitutes the word “question” for “maxim”; the original clause reads: “since it is irrelevant to the general maxim who A and B may be.” See Note 15.37 Bertrand Russell and Note 114.21–24 “It is so . . . affect the question.”

98.16–17 *sub specie boni*. ] Latin for “under the aspect of the good.” Typically, this phrase is used to express the notion that intended actions are performed with a conscious aim understood to be good (regardless of how confused or mistaken that understanding actually may be). More generally, it may indicate the perspective with which something can be understood as good.

**SHELLEY: OR THE POETIC VALUE OF REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES**

103.22 Matthew Arnold, ] (1822–1888) English poet, essayist, and critic of culture and society. As a school inspector, he traveled widely in both rural and urban areas of England, and in Europe at the request of Parliament. He also lectured in poetry at Oxford, being the first professor to do so in English rather than Latin. Arnold decried the contemporaneous exaltation of material culture and mediocrity and supported a return to classical education, culture, and morality, albeit in the light of his own liberal understandings. Arnold's best-known works include the poem "Dover Beach," in *New Poems* (London: Macmillan, 1867); his series "Essays in Criticism" (1865/1888); and *Culture and Anarchy* (1869). Arnold critiqued Shelley and his poetry in *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), specifically citing a recently published biography by Edward Dowden (*The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, 1886) and the posthumous edition of Shelley's poems edited by Mary Shelley (*The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, 1839). See Note 103.25–26 "a beautiful and . . . ineffectual angel, . . .

103.25–26 "a beautiful and . . . ineffectual angel, beating his wings in a luminous void in vain." ] At the end of an essay on Shelley published in January 1888, Matthew Arnold wrote that "in poetry, no less than in life, he is 'a beautiful *and ineffectual* angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain'" (emphasis in original). Arnold is quoting from the end of his own 1881 essay on Byron, in which he compared Shelley unfavorably to Wordsworth and Byron ("Shelley," *Nineteenth Century* 23 [January 1888]: 23–39; "Byron," *Macmillan's Magazine* 43 [March 1881]: 367–77, taken from the preface to *Poetry of Byron: Chosen and Arranged by Matthew Arnold* [Macmillan, 1881]; both essays were reprinted in *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* [1888]). See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold, and see Santayana's response to this critique of Shelley at 113.15–23; see also 116.17–117.2 and Note 116.17 Matthew Arnold said . . .

103.26–27 Shelley was not a classic, ] Matthew Arnold wrote, in reference to the editions of Shelley's poems published after the 1839 edition edited by Mary Shelley: "The text of the poems has in some places been mended since; but Shelley is not a classic, whose various readings are to be noted with earnest attention" (*Essays in Criticism: Second Series* [1888], 206). Arnold expands on the term "classic" in "The Study of Poetry," the first essay in this anthology. See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.

103.28 *sale*, ] dirty, nasty, filthy, foul; indecent, obscene; squalid (French); a *sale bête* is a "dirty dog," in the sense of an untrustworthy person. In *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), Arnold connects the two terms: "I used the French word *bête* for a letter of Shelley's; for the world in which we find him I

can only use another French word, *sale*” (237). Arnold goes on to exemplify that world by describing “[William] Godwin’s house of sordid horror” as well as Shelley’s friends and family.

104.1 *bête*. ] An animal or beast, and, by extension, a fool; as an adjective, stupid or nonsensical (French). In *Essays in Criticism* (1881), Arnold defines *bête* as “a word expressing blank defect of intelligence” (70). In *Essays in Criticism: Second Series* (1888), Arnold uses *bête* to describe Shelley’s letter to his wife Harriet, inviting her to stay with him and Mary Godwin: “It is *bête* from what is the signal, the disastrous want and weakness of Shelley, with all his fine intellectual gifts—his utter deficiency in humour” (231).

104.30–31 that other revolution . . . which began at Bethlehem; ] Bethlehem is a town in Israel, about five miles south of Jerusalem, invoked as the birthplace of Jesus (Matthew 2:1, John 7:42) and thus literally the cradle of Christianity (“that other revolution”). Luke 2:8–14 recounts that an angel announced the birth of Jesus as savior: “And the angel said unto them, Fear not: for behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord. And this shall be a sign unto you; Ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger” (Luke 2:10–12). Luke 2:4 explains that “city of David” is another name for Bethlehem; 1 Samuel 17:12 identifies David’s father as an “Ephratite of Bethlehemjudah [Bethlehem in Judea].”

106.35 liberty, equality, and fraternity; ] Translation of “liberté, égalité, et fraternité.” These words, first associated by François Fénelon (1651–1715), became a common slogan in France beginning with the French Revolution (see <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/symbols-of-the-republic/article/liberty-equality-fraternity>). See Note 4.8 Fénelon and Note 6.38 French Revolution.

106.37 Plato’s *Republic*. ] An ideal state imagined by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue *The Republic*. In the dialogue, Socrates and his companions try to determine the nature of justice. Though they are seeking justice in the human soul, they decide first to observe it in the state, because justice is presumed easier to find on a larger scale. They trace the development of society from an idyllic, rustic setting through a corrupt, luxurious state to the ideal republic that embodies justice (*Republic* 368e–369a). In the ideal republic, justice consists in a harmonious organization of the classes of wise guardians, soldiers, and producers. In the individual, justice consists of the harmony of the parts of the soul: reason, spirit, and appetite, which correspond to the three social classes (*Republic* 427c–445e).

Socrates goes on to argue that justice is better than injustice for both the state and the individual.

107.10 *Hellas*] A lyrical drama written by Shelley in the fall of 1821 and published in the spring of 1822, inspired by the Greek insurrection against the Ottoman Empire (1821–30). The insurrection was widely supported by democratic sympathizers throughout Europe, as well as “Philhellenes” such as Lord Byron. Shelley’s play is loosely based on Aeschylus’s *The Persians*, which dramatized the defeat in antiquity of Xerxes and his army by the Greeks.

107.11 Ahasuerus:] A character in *Hellas* who is consulted by the Ottoman sultan. Ahasuerus is identified by the character Hassan as a Jew who has existed since ancient times:

Some say that this is he whom the great prophet  
Jesus, the son of Joseph, for his mockery,  
Mocked with the curse of immortality.  
Some feign that he is Enoch: others dream  
He was pre-adamite and has survived  
Cycles of generation and of ruin. (*Hellas*, 149–154)

The first description is that of the “Wandering Jew.” As Shelley explains in the words of the character Hassan, the Wandering Jew is a legendary character who, for his disdain of Jesus’s suffering on the way to the crucifixion, is condemned to roam the earth for eternity. The Wandering Jew appears in several of Shelley’s other works, notably *Queen Mab*, though the descriptions and ascribed talents of this personage vary widely.

Enoch is listed in Genesis 5 as the seventh of ten antediluvian patriarchs. The formulaic recitation of the lives of the other nine patriarchs ends with “and he died.” Exceptionally, that of Enoch ends “and he was not, for God took him” (Genesis 5:21). This cryptic text was taken to signify that Enoch ascended alive to heaven: “By faith Enoch was translated that he should not see death” (Hebrews 11:5a). The extrabiblical but well-known Book of Enoch and some later Jewish literature continue the theme of Enoch as a prophet of apocalypse, arguably alive or existing in heaven.

The third possibility mentioned by Hassan is that Ahasuerus is “pre-adamite,” that is, from before the creation of “adam” (“[a hu]man”; Genesis 1:27, 2:7). Philo seems to have been the first to write about the concept of an “original man” (*De Allegoris Legum* I:xii). This in turn is related to the Hebrew legend of *adam qadmon* (“primordial man/Adam”), who in some traditions is said to have existed before all creation (Genesis Rabbah 8).



In the previous speech, Mahmud notes of Ahasuerus that “his tribe/Dream and are wise interpreters of dreams” [lines 135–136]. In the Old Testament, Joseph has prophetic dreams about himself and his family (Genesis 37:5–10) and interprets dreams (Genesis 40:8–13, 16–19; 41:17–32). Daniel interprets a vision that is arguably a dream (5:24–28), and recounts his own “dream and visions” (chapters 7, 8, 10–12; the quotation is from 7:1), during each of which one of the creatures in the vision interprets the dream to Daniel.

In this context, the name Ahasuerus for the Wandering Jew is particularly ironic: the non-Jewish and likely legendary King Ahasuerus in the book of Esther has been identified with the historical King Xerxes, while in *Hellas* it is Ahasuerus who convinces the Sultan Mahmud—the parallel to Xerxes in *The Persians*—to abandon his fight against the Greeks.

107.12–21 “this whole . . . itself to be.” ] Shelley, *Hellas*. From a speech of Ahasuerus to Mahmud. Mahmud has requested the counsel of Ahasuerus, whom he calls “an adept in the difficult lore of Greek and Frank philosophy” (741–42):

this Whole  
Of suns, and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers,  
With all the silent or tempestuous workings  
By which they have been, are, or cease to be,  
Is but a vision;—all that it inherits  
Are motes of a sick eye, bubbles and dreams;  
Thought is its cradle and its grave, nor less  
The Future and the Past are idle shadows  
Of Thought’s eternal flight—they have no being:  
Nought is but that which feels itself to be.  
(*Hellas*, 776–84)

107.29 “the gathered rays which are reality,” ] The quotation is from Shelley, *Prometheus Unbound*, Act III, Scene 3, line 53, published in *Prometheus Unbound, A Lyrical Drama in Four Acts, With Other Poems* (London: C and J Ollier, 1820), 105. See Note 107.32–33 “lovely apparitions . . . rapt poesy.”

107.32–33 “lovely apparitions . . . rapt poesy.” ] The quotation is from Shelley, *Prometheus Unbound*, Act III, Scene 3, lines 49–55. The entire quotation, with the elided text (which includes the quotation immediately previous) reads as follows:

Lovely apparitions, dim at first,  
 Then radiant, as the mind, arising bright  
 From the embrace of beauty, whence the forms  
 Of which these are the phantoms, casts on them  
 The gathered rays which are reality,  
 Shall visit us, the progeny immortal  
 Of Painting, Sculpture, and rapt Poesy, (49–55)

and continues:

And arts, tho' unimagined, yet to be. (56)

Santayana reproduces the text faithfully other than regularizing capitalization. See also Note 107.29 “the gathered rays which are reality.”

107.35 Hegelian idealism ] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), German philosopher, born in Stuttgart. Traditionally, Hegelian philosophy is interpreted as an absolute idealism in which human history is understood as the coming to consciousness of Absolute Spirit or God. In other words, the mind of God becomes actual or self-conscious through the development of human consciousness. This self-consciousness is achieved through the dialectical interaction of spirit and matter in history and results in the realization of universal rational order. Hegel’s cosmography according to this traditional interpretation is rational and pantheistic. As a result of the varying interpretations Hegel’s philosophy invites, its influence has been both extensive and complicated. Hegel’s most famous works are *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807), *Wissenschaft der Logik* (*The Science of Logic*, 1812–16), and *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (*Philosophy of Right*, 1821). Santayana’s personal library included editions of all three of these works, with the first and third titles in the original German. See also Note 11.15 Hegel.

108.16 *Cloud* ] “The Cloud,” a poem written by Shelley in late 1819 or early 1820 and published together with *Prometheus Unbound* in the latter year. The poem describes the never-ending cycles of nature.

108.16 *West Wind* ] “Ode to the West Wind,” written by Shelley in 1819 and also included in the collection with *Prometheus Unbound*. This poem describes nature in the changing seasons, ending with the often-quoted line “If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?”

108.16 *Witch of the Atlas* ] “The Witch of Atlas,” written by Shelley in 1820 and published in *Posthumous Poems* (London: John and Henry L. Hunt, 1824). In this long poem (78 stanzas) Shelley tells the convoluted story of an immortal “lady-witch,” daughter of one of the Atlantides and living on Atlas’s mountain, and

her interactions with characters from Greek and Egyptian mythology and with humans. Midways in the poem, this “wizard lady” creates a winged hermaphroditic creature, which rests insensible until she summons it by the word “Hermaphroditus” to be her companion. The idea of a created humanoid summoned by a word is similar to that of the Jewish legend of the golem, briefly mentioned in an 1808 article on folklore by Jacob Grimm (1785–1863), and also to the creature in Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel *Frankenstein*.

108.17 *bataille des fleurs* ] Literally “battle of flowers,” *Bataille des Fleurs* has been part of the celebration of Carnival in Nice since 1876. Originated to showcase and support local horticulture, *Bataille des Fleurs* is a parade featuring flower-covered floats portraying the theme of that year’s Carnival; costumed riders on the floats toss flowers to massed spectators who fight to retrieve them. Santayana compares the image of being bombarded by flowers during *Bataille des Fleurs* to the barrage of loosely related images evoked by Shelley’s poems.

108.21 Francis Thompson’s ] Francis Thompson (1859–1907), English poet, essayist, and Catholic mystic, born in Lancashire. Thompson excelled as a student in subjects that interested him and did poorly in those that did not. Pressured to study medicine, he failed the degree exam multiple times. Making a bare living through odd jobs and self-medicating for his chronic poor health, Thompson became addicted to opium and was for a time homeless, but continued to write poetry and essays that were published and admired. While recovering from his addiction, he wrote numerous poems and *Shelley, An Essay*, in 1889. Thompson’s essay on Shelley was not published until after his death (*The Dublin Review*, July 1908); Santayana’s library included an edition of the essay published by Scribner’s in 1909. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

108.23–26 “He gets between . . . in his song.” ] Quotes part of Francis Thompson’s description of Shelley’s poem “The Cloud” in *Shelley, an Essay* (1909). The entire description is as follows:

Coming to Shelley’s poetry, we peep over the wild mask of revolutionary metaphysics, and we see the winsome face of the child. Perhaps none of his poems is more purely and typically Shelleian than *The Cloud*, and it is interesting to note how essentially it springs from the faculty of make-believe. The same thing is conspicuous, though less purely conspicuous, throughout his singing; it is the child’s faculty of make-believe raised to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  power. He is still at play, save only that his play is such as manhood stops to watch, and his playthings are those which the gods give their children. The universe is his box of toys. He dabbles his fingers in the day-fall. He is gold-dusty with tumbling amidst the stars. He makes bright mischief with the moon. The meteors nuzzle their

noses in his hand. He teases into growling the kennelled thunder, and laughs at the shaking of its fiery chain. He dances in and out of the gates of heaven: its floor is littered with his broken fancies. He runs wild over the fields of ether. He chases the rolling world. He gets between the feet of the horses of the sun. He stands in the lap of patient Nature, and twines her loosened tresses after a hundred wilful fashions, to see how she will look nicest in his song. (Thompson, *Shelley, An Essay*, 45–46)

See Note 14.22 Shelley and Note 108.21 Francis Thompson's.

108.29 Elysian ] Refers to Elysium or the Elysian Fields, an afterworld first described in Homer's *Odyssey* 4.563ff, trans. Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), 79 as a paradise in which the inhabitants enjoyed a life of leisure similar to that of the gods. Originally, Elysium was regarded as reserved for the distinguished few, but later literature suggested that anyone who had lived a good life was admitted to Elysium (see, for example, Virgil's *Aeneid* 6.637, trans. Robert Fitzgerald [New York: Vintage Books, 1984], 186).

108.33–35 *Sensitive Plant* . . . “It loves even . . . not, the beautiful.” ] “The Sensitive Plant” is another of Shelley's 1820 poems collected with *Prometheus Unbound*. Written when Shelley and his wife Mary were mourning the death of a child, it describes a garden and the woman who tends it, comparing the seasonal cycle of growth and withering to human birth, death, and decay. Prominent in the garden is mimosa, grown primarily as a curiosity and called “sensitive plant” because it droops when touched. Unlike the other plants in the garden, it has neither beauty nor scent:

For the Sensitive Plant has no bright flower;  
Radiance and odour are not its dower;  
It loves, even like Love, its deep heart is full,  
It desires what it has not, the Beautiful! (74–77)

108.37 mincing rhymesters, ] This seems to be a reference to Shelley's 1819 poem “Peter Bell the Third,” written under the alias of “Miching Mallecho” (a phrase in *Hamlet*, Act 3, Scene 2, alluding to mischief). The poem is one of many parodies of English Romantic poet William Wordsworth's (1770–1850) much-debated poem *Peter Bell, A Tale in Verse* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1819). In “Part Third: Hell” Shelley begins,

“Hell is a city much like London” (147)

and continues:

There are mincing women, mewing,  
 (Like cats, who *amant miserè*)  
 Of their own virtue, and pursuing  
 Their gentler sisters to that ruin

Without which--what were chastity?  
 Lawyers--judges--old hobnobbers  
 Are there--bailiffs--chancellors--  
 Bishops--great and little robbers--  
 Rhymesters--pamphleteers--stock-jobbers--  
 Men of glory in the wars,-- (182–91)

109.5–10 “The joy, the . . . its own wind!” ] Spoken by The Earth in *Prometheus Unbound*, Act 4. Santayana reproduces the text exactly other than small differences in punctuation and capitalization; these also vary by edition of Shelley’s work.

109.17 *Cenci*, ] Shelley’s *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts* (London: C and J Ollier, 1819) deals with the story of a noble family of sixteenth-century Rome led by a criminally vicious and abusive man who was murdered by his victimized family after they found no relief from authorities. The family was subsequently punished by the Church: the man’s daughter, older son, and their stepmother (the man’s second wife, referred to by Shelley in the Preface by the archaism of “mother-in-law”) were executed, and a younger son was sentenced to galley slavery, though he was released a year later. Shelley gave the following account in the preface to the play:

A manuscript was communicated to me during my travels in Italy, which was copied from the archives of the Cenci Palace at Rome and contains a detailed account of the horrors which ended in the extinction of one of the noblest and richest families of that city, during the Pontificate of Clement VIII, in the year 1599. The story is that an old man, having spent his life in debauchery and wickedness, conceived at length an implacable hatred towards his children; which showed itself towards one daughter under the form of an incestuous passion, aggravated by every circumstance of cruelty and violence. This daughter, after long and vain attempts to escape from what she considered a perpetual contamination both of body and mind, at length plotted with her mother-in-law and brother to murder their common tyrant. The young maiden who was urged to this tremendous deed by an impulse which overpowered its horror was evidently a most gentle and amiable being, a creature formed to adorn and be admired, and thus violently thwarted from her nature by the necessity of circumstance and opinion. The deed was quickly discovered, and, in spite of the most earnest prayers made

to the Pope by the highest persons in Rome, the criminals were put to death. The old man had during his life repeatedly bought his pardon from the Pope for capital crimes of the most enormous and unspeakable kind at the price of a hundred thousand crowns; the death therefore of his victims can scarcely be accounted for by the love of justice. The Pope, among other motives for severity, probably felt that whoever killed the Count Cenci deprived his treasury of a certain and copious source of revenue. (The Papal Government formerly took the most extraordinary precautions against the publicity of facts which offer so tragical a demonstration of its own wickedness and weakness; so that the communication of the manuscript had become, until very lately, a matter of some difficulty.) Such a story, if told so as to present to the reader all the feelings of those who once acted it, their hopes and fears, their confidences and misgivings, their various interests, passions, and opinions, acting upon and with each other yet all conspiring to one tremendous end, would be as a light to make apparent some of the most dark and secret caverns of the human heart. (Percy Bysshe Shelley, *The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts*, London: Reeves & Turner, 1886, 2)

Shelley described his artistic approach to the story of the Cenci:

The person who would treat such a subject must increase the ideal and diminish the actual horror of the events, so that the pleasure which arises from the poetry which exists in these tempestuous sufferings and crimes may mitigate the pain of the contemplation of the moral deformity from which they spring. There must also be nothing attempted to make the exhibition subservient to what is vulgarly termed a moral purpose. The highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of the drama is the teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in proportion to the possession of which knowledge every human being is wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind. (Shelley, *The Cenci*, 4).

See also Note 24.29 Inquisition.

109.20 *Skylark*, ] Shelley, “To a Skylark,” another of the poems collected with *Prometheus Unbound*. According to Mary Shelley, this poem was inspired by hearing a skylark as she and Shelley were walking. Shelley compares the song of the skylark to a wide variety of beauties in nature and mythology, saying that the poet’s art is minor by comparison. “To a Skylark” is often compared thematically to John Keats’s (1795–1821) “Ode to a Nightingale,” which had a similar inspiration and was written and published at nearly the same time, but there seems to be no direct connection between the two.

109.20 *Epipsychidion*, ] This major work by Shelley, subtitled *Verses Addressed to the Noble and Unfortunate Lady Emilia V— Now Imprisoned in the Convent at —* (London: C and J Ollier, 1821) was inspired by his infatuation with Countess Teresa Emilia Viviani, a 19-year-old with whom the Shelleys were friendly. (“Epipsychidion” means “concerning a little soul”.) At the time the young woman was in a convent boarding school and regarded herself as being imprisoned there at the instigation of a jealous stepmother until her family could marry her off (Stopford A. Brooke, “Introduction,” *Epipsychidion* (Reeves and Turner, 1887). The poem ranges through varieties of love, from platonic and courtly through romantic and sexual, with Shelley espousing free love.

109.21 *Prometheus*. ] *Prometheus Unbound*, a four-act drama based on the legend of Prometheus, a Greek Titan (pre-Olympian god) of fire, who gave fire as a gift to humanity and as a result was punished by Zeus by being chained to a rock and having his liver torn out daily by birds of prey. Shelley’s work was inspired by *Prometheia*, a series of plays attributed to Aeschylus, but with the major plot difference that instead of Prometheus and Zeus reconciling, in Shelley’s version Prometheus is freed when Zeus falls from power. See Note 28.22 Prometheus.

110.3–5 standing aghast, like a Philistine . . . traditional order. ] Likely an allusion to Judges 14–16, stories in which the legendarily strong Samson kills increasing numbers of Israel’s Philistine enemies, ending with his final act of pulling down an entire building upon himself and thousands of Philistines celebrating his capture (Judges 16:23–30).

111.18 the Israelites in exile, ] Notably, the prophet Ezekiel, even as he chastises his compatriots as deserving exile because of their sins, promises a better future: comparing Israel to sheep who were neglected by shepherds but whom God will bring to good pasture and care for (Ezekiel 34), promising literal and figurative fruitfulness (36:8–12, 21–38), promising hope and restoration with the image of resurrection from dry bones (37:1–14) and reunion of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah (37:15–28).

111.18 St. John the Baptist in the desert, ] Matthew introduces this hope together with John the Baptist: “In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judaea, and saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matthew 3:1–2). Luke 3:6 promises that “all flesh shall see the salvation of God.” For John the Baptist, see Note 27.11 St. John the Baptist.

111.20 “This day thou . . . me in paradise.” ] Luke 23:43b; this is Jesus’s response to the repentant thief crucified alongside him who pleads, “Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom” (Luke 23:42).



111.22 *Adonais*] *Adonais: An Elegy on the Death of John Keats, Author of Endymion, Hyperion etc.* (Pisa: Didot, 1821). In this pastoral elegy, Shelley describes Adonais, who represents Keats, as being mourned by “mighty mother” Urania and other characters from Greek mythology, by poetic terms (for just a few, “Splendours, and Glooms, and glimmering incarnations of Hopes and Fears, and twilight Phantasies” [*Adonais*, 13]), and by nature, but also by poets of times past (Thomas Chatterton, Philip Sidney, and the Roman poet Lucan). Shelley attributed Keats’s death in large part to a scathing review of *Endymion*, which he alludes to in *Adonais* as a dart and as poison. The name Adonais is an adaptation of Adonis, a Greek god of beauty about whom elegies were written.

111.32–33 “life, like a . . . radiance of eternity.”] *Adonais*, 462–63. Without Santayana’s insertion, the text reads “Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, / Stains the white radiance of eternity.”

111.36–37 he hoped, like the old Hebrews, for a paradise on earth.] Santayana may be referring to the prophecy in Isaiah 2:1–4 of a time when everyone will follow “the God of Jacob” and there will be no more war, and the image of the “peaceable kingdom” in Isaiah 11–12.

112.1–4 “that mankind had . . . of his system.”] This is taken from Mary Shelley’s note to *Prometheus Unbound* in *The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Mary Shelley, Vol. 2 (London: Edward Moxon, 1839), 133. In the Oxford edition as well as in the original posthumous collection by Mary Shelley, the quotation reads, “That man could be so perfectionized as to be able to expel evil from his own nature, and from the greater part of the creation, . . .” Santayana omitted the following text between the two quotations: “It is not my part in these notes to notice the arguments that have been urged against this opinion, but to mention the fact that he [Shelley] entertained it, and was indeed attached to it with fervent enthusiasm.”

112.6 cosmic extension of the Fall conceived by St. Augustine;] The Roman Catholic doctrine that the sin of Adam and Eve corrupted all of creation, and thus their salvation would restore all of creation. For Augustine, see Note 21.23 “this wicked world.”

112.39 “Beautiful idealisms of moral excellence.”] In the Preface to *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley writes,

My purpose has hitherto been simply to familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware that, until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles of moral

conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of his happiness. Should I live to accomplish what I purpose, that is, produce a systematical history of what appear to me to be the genuine elements of human society, let not the advocates of injustice and superstition flatter themselves that I should take Æschylus rather than Plato as my model.

113.10–12 “had no care . . . and abstruse truth.” ] This quotation is from Mary Shelley, “Note on Poems Written in 1818,” *The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Mary Shelley, Vol. 3 (London: Edward Moxon, 1839), 159. It appears in the context of her request that Shelley complete his previously discarded poem “Rosalind and Helen.”

114.15–16 The world we have always with us, but such spirits we have not always. ] Allusion to a sentiment found several places in the Gospels: in the words of Jesus, “For ye have the poor always with you, but me ye have not always” (Matthew 26:11), with almost identical wording in John 12:8 and a close parallel in Mark 14:7.

114.21–24 “It is so . . . affect the question.” ] The “contemporary of ours” is Bertrand Russell, and the quotation is from “The Elements of Ethics,” *Philosophical Essays* (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1910), 47–48. See Note 97.34–39 “It is, indeed . . . *B* may be.”

114.25 love your neighbour as yourself, ] Leviticus 19:18 states, “Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.” Matthew 22:39b and Mark 12:31a cite “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” as the second-greatest commandment.

115.13–20 “All killing insects . . . ill, was innocent.” ] The quotation is from “The Sensitive Plant,” 155–62. The poem goes on to illustrate “this inevitable tragedy”:

This fairest creature from earliest Spring  
Thus moved through the garden ministering  
All the sweet season of Summertime,  
And ere the first leaf looked brown—she died! (171–74)

See Note 108.33–35 *Sensitive Plant*.

- 116.3 all is not vanity ] Allusion to Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 1:14b: “Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity”; “Behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.”
- 116.3–4 nor night in his blindness. ] Not as exact a scriptural reference as the preceding, but consonant with the biblical use of the term “blindness” in a spiritual as well as in a physical sense. The most salient verse is Isaiah 42:16a–c: “And I will bring the blind by a way that they knew not; I will lead them in paths that they have not known: I will make darkness light before them, and crooked things straight.”
- 116.17 Matthew Arnold said that Shelley was not quite sane; ] The reference is to “Shelley,” *Essays in Criticism*, Second Series, 408: “The man Shelley, in very truth, is not entirely sane, and Shelley’s poetry is not entirely sane either.” See Note 103.25–26 “a beautiful and . . . void in vain.”
- 116.21–22 a Platonic soul just fallen from the Empyrean; ] Allusion to Dante, *Paradiso*, Canto 4, 28–39: “You are given further cause for perplexity, by the souls returning to the stars, in Plato’s doctrine. . . . He of the Seraphim nearest to God, Moses, Samuel, John, either one [St. John the Apostle or St. John the Divine], you may choose, and Mary, none of them take their places in any different Heaven than the spirits who appeared to you just now, nor do they have more years or less of existence. But all beautify the first sphere, the Empyrean, and share sweet life, but differently, by feeling the eternal spirit more, or less” (Dante, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso* Cantos 1–7, trans. A. S. Kline; retrieved August 19, 2021 from [https://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Italian/DantPar1to7.php#anchor\\_Toc64099821](https://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/Italian/DantPar1to7.php#anchor_Toc64099821)). “The appearance of a certain Saint in a certain moving Sphere is a *sign* of his or her position in the graded hierarchy of the Empyrean, or Unmoved Heaven, in which all the Saints have their real abode. A Saint who appears to Dante in the Lunar Sphere, for example, has a lower position in the Empyrean than one who appears in the Sphere of Jupiter” (J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato* [London: Macmillan and Co., 1905], 166n).
- 116.25–26 If children did not see visions, ] Paraphrases Joel 2:28: “And it shall come to pass afterward that I will pour out My Spirit on all flesh; Your sons and daughters shall prophesy. Your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions.” Acts 2:17 is a parallel verse: “And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of my spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams.”

116.38–39 to develop things æsthetic after their own kind; ] A deliberate parallel of language in the creation narrative in Genesis, for example: “And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good” (Genesis 1:12).

117.26 his friend Hogg, ] Thomas Jefferson Hogg (1792–1862), British barrister and writer. Hogg and Shelley met at Oxford in 1810, where they found common ground in atheism and free thinking and in support of free love. Both were expelled after refusing to confirm or deny authorship of an anonymous pamphlet, *Necessity of Atheism*, but continued their friendship throughout Shelley’s life. Besides his legal work, Hogg wrote fiction, poetry, and articles on Greek literature, but is best known for his biographical works “Shelley at Oxford” (*New Monthly Magazine*, 1833) and the unfinished *The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley* (London: Edward Moxon, 1858).

117.26–29 “I never could discern . . . an intense abhorrence of persecution.” ] Hogg, *The Life of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, Vol. 2 (London: Edward Moxon, 1858), 458. The quotation without elisions reads:

I never could discern in him any more than two fixed principles. The first was a strong, irrepressible love of liberty; of liberty in the abstract, and somewhat after the pattern of the ancient republics, without reference to the English constitution, respecting which he knew little and cared nothing, heeding it not at all. The second was an equally ardent love of toleration of all opinions, but more especially of religious opinions; of toleration, complete, entire, universal, unlimited; and, as a deduction and corollary from which latter principle, he felt an intense abhorrence of persecution of every kind, public or private.

In excerpting this passage, Santayana omitted the word “fixed.”

118.3–4 sin of Adam, ] Also known as “original sin,” this is the Christian doctrine that human beings are, when conceived, already sinners. This inherent sin means, for Catholic theologians, that humans have lost the sanctifying grace of God as a result of the Fall of Man, which occurred when Adam disobeyed God’s prohibition against eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2–3). The notion of original sin has no textual basis in the Old Testament, but only in pseudepigraphal books (such as *Apocalypse of Baruch* 23:4, 54:15 and *4 Ezra* 3:21–26). Scriptural support is primarily found in the Epistles of Paul: “Wherefore, as by one man [namely, Adam] sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned” (Romans 5:12). The doctrine gained significance as the Christian

Church struggled to counter Gnostic doctrines of a dualism of good and evil. Christian doctrine maintained that creation was good and that evil was introduced by Adam. The doctrine was significant also for the Christian belief in the freedom of the will. Augustine believed that Adam's sin was passed on by strong sexual desire, which weakens but does not destroy freedom of the will. See Note 21.23 "this wicked world."

118.4 Artaxerxes; ] Likely refers to the Artaxerxes king of Persia mentioned in Ezra 4 as promulgating decrees. This may be the same person as Artaxerxes I (reigned 465–424 BC) or Artaxerxes II (reigned 404–358 BC), kings of the Achaemenid Empire in Persia.

118.7–25 "I never was . . . for its eternity." ] *Epipsychidion*, lines 149–63, 169–73 (415). Forman, Vol. 2 (374–75), explains how the word "in" ("it is in the code") is justified for inclusion by most editors. Apparently this version without "in" appears only in a fragment, and most editions follow Mary Shelley's 1821 edition. However, Woodberry (*The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, 1894, vol. 3, 472) gives this as a variant in an 1839 printing. Santayana cannot be quoting the fragment, since his quotation includes "crowd" rather than "world" and "With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe," rather than "with one sad friend and many a jealous foe":

I never was attached to that great sect,  
Whose doctrine is, that each one should select  
Out of the crowd a mistress or a friend,  
And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend  
To cold oblivion, though it is in the code  
Of modern morals, and the beaten road  
Which those poor slaves with weary footsteps tread,  
Who travel to their home among the dead  
By the broad highway of the world, and so  
With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe,  
The dreariest and the longest journey go.

True Love in this differs from gold and clay,  
That to divide is not to take away.  
Love is like understanding, that grows bright,  
Gazing on many truths; 'tis like thy light,  
Imagination! which from earth and sky,  
And from the depths of human fantasy,  
As from a thousand prisms and mirrors, fills  
The Universe with glorious beams, and kills  
Error, the worm, with many a sun-like arrow

Of its reverberated lightning. Narrow  
 The heart that loves, the brain that contemplates,  
 The life that wears, the spirit that creates  
 One object, and one form, and builds thereby  
 A sepulchre for its eternity.

118.27–28 his first wife ] Harriet Westbrook (1795–1815), a school friend of Shelley’s sisters. They married when Shelley was 19 and she was 16. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

118.31 his best friend ] Thomas Jefferson Hogg. In contrast to Santayana’s assertion, some sources suggest that Shelley encouraged Hogg to pursue a sexual relationship with Harriet Westbrook Shelley, who was horrified by the idea. See Note 117.26 his friend Hogg.

118.34 his second wife ] Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin (1797–1851), an author in her own right, best known for *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus* (1818). She encouraged Shelley in his writing and edited and annotated several posthumous editions of his works. See Note 14.22 Shelley.

118.35–36 the waves of Platonic enthusiasm for other ladies ] To name just one, Countess Teresa Emilia Viviani. See Note 109.21 *Epipsychidion*.

119.11–12 and even of Goethe, when Goethe really loved: ] The title character of Goethe’s *Faust* seduces and abandons Gretchen, who inadvertently poisons her mother in order to be alone with Faust and then drowns their illegitimate child. At the end of *Faust, Part 1*, Faust finally realizes his love for Gretchen, who has been sentenced to death for her crimes. He attempts to help her escape, but she insists on meeting her deserved fate.

119.14–17 “I have been . . . did not die.” ] Quotes letters of January 6 and January 3, 1811 published in Shelley, *Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley to Thomas Jefferson Hogg*, vol. 1 (London: privately printed, 1897), 39; 30–31.

119.18 “And did not marry!” ] Shelley’s expression of suicidal thoughts in the letters quoted above followed the rejection of his marriage proposal by his cousin Harriet Grove (1791–1867), with whom he had a romantic relationship. Both of Shelley’s subsequent marriages were volatile, involving financial hardship and legal troubles as well as physical and emotional infidelity. See Note 14.22 Shelley and Note 119.14–17 “I have been . . . did not die.”

119.20 Shelley called himself an atheist in his youth; ] Over and above his likely authorship of *The Necessity of Atheism*, Shelley left several entries in guest registers at prominent sites in which he declared himself (in Greek) to be an

“Atheist. Lover of humanity. Democrat.” See Graham Henderson, “Hotel Register in which Shelley Declared Himself to be an Atheist: Found” (July 28, 2016; retrieved August 21, 2021 from <http://www.grahamhenderson.ca/blog/Day/7/Year/hotel-register-in-which-shelley-declared-himself-to-be-an-atheist-found>) and related posts, and see Note 14.22 Shelley.

119.26 *Paradiso* ] “Paradise” or “Heaven,” the third section of Dante’s *Divina Commedia* (*The Divine Comedy*). See Note 24.18 Dante.

119.27 *Inferno* ] “Hell,” the first section of Dante’s *Divina Commedia* (*The Divine Comedy*). See Note 24.18 Dante.

120.3–10 “To suffer . . . and free.” ] Quotes *Prometheus Unbound*, Act 4, lines 570–77 (268):

To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;  
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;  
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;  
To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates  
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;  
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;  
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be  
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free.

120.15–34 “The pure spirit . . . dead live there.” ] Shelley, *Adonais*, stanzas 38, lines 338–41; 39, 343–46; 42, 370–72; 43, 379–80; 44, 388–93, 395 (440–41). See Note 111.22 *Adonais*.

121.20–21 Literature, according to Matthew Arnold, should be criticism of life, ] Quotes Arnold, “Joubert,” in *Essays in Criticism* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1865), 249.

121.33–34 persons who can grow as old as Matthew Arnold, ] Santayana may have intended this in a metaphorical sense; Arnold lived to the respectable but hardly unusual age of 65. See Note 103.22 Matthew Arnold.

122.1 “arts, though unimagined, yet to be.” ] Quotes *Prometheus Unbound*, Act 3, Scene 3, line 56 (247).

123.7–12 “Must be . . . of time.” ] Quotes *Hellas*, lines 1002–7 (475). See Note 161.13 *Hellas*.

123.21 this world of blood and mire. ] The second century pseudepigraphal book *Apocalypse* (or *Revelation*) of Peter, line 30, describes usurers as being punished “in a lake of pitch and blood and mire,” but in hell, not in “this world.”



123.34–35 the epitaph which a clear-sighted friend wrote upon his tomb: *cor cordium*, the heart of hearts. ] British novelist and adventurer Edward John Trelawny (1792–1881), who arranged for the funeral and the burial of Shelley’s ashes, ordered a grave marker inscribed with Shelley’s name, followed by COR CORDIUM, Shelley’s birth and death dates, and a quotation from Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* (“Two Epitaphs,” Harrison S. Morris, *Bulletin and Review of the Keats-Shelley Memorial, Rome* 2 [1913], 55–56).

### THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY

125.19 Indians ] The original inhabitants of the Americas, i.e., Native Americans.

125.20 wrestling with the Lord. ] Genesis 32:24–30 tells the story of Jacob wrestling with an opponent who represents God, as indicated by the bestowal of a new name: “Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed” (Genesis 32:28).

125.20–21 the race was tried . . . memories. ] Allusion to Hebrews 12:6–11, beginning “For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth.”

125.21–22 old wine in new bottles: ] “And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish. But new wine must be put into new bottles; and both are preserved. No man also having drunk old wine straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better” (Luke 5:37–39). The parable indicates that new wine, still in the process of fermenting, may break old bottles (or, in some translations, wineskins) that have been weakened by use and age; similarly, new ways of thinking may initially be rejected, sometimes even violently, before they are fully understood and assimilated. By contrast, old wine, representing the wisdom that comes with history and experience, can be safely stored and enjoyed in new bottles—the young America.

126.20 Bernard Shaw ] George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950), Irish playwright and critic; also well known as an advocate of social reform and later as a member of the Fabian Society. Only one of Shaw’s books was found in Santayana’s library, *The Adventures of the Black Girl in Her Search for God* (London: Constable, 1932); Santayana wrote in a 9 January 1933 letter to Daniel Cory that it had “amusing turns, but as a whole it is trash” (*LGS*, 5:4).

126.21 America is a hundred years behind the times. ] Santayana’s source for this remark is uncertain. An indirect reference appears in Archibald Henderson, *George Bernard Shaw: His Life and Works* (Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company, 1911), attributing to Shaw the opinion that America is “fifty years behind England, and a hundred years behind Europe, in art, literature, science,

religion, and government—in a word, in civilization.” (Henderson, “Preface to the American Edition” [September 4, 1911], xv–xvi).

127.2 the Calvinism of Calvin, ] John Calvin (1509–1564), French theologian and pastor, whose writings and preaching started a Protestant movement called Calvinism by its opponents. (Its adherents refer to it as the Reformed tradition or church.) Major points of Calvinist doctrine include the authority of the Bible, rejection of all sacraments except baptism and communion, and predestination, the view that all are irredeemably sinful and that God mercifully has elected some believers to be saved. Many early immigrants to the New England and mid-Atlantic colonies, such as Puritans, French Huguenots, and Scotch–Irish Presbyterians, held Calvinist beliefs.

127.2 Jonathan Edwards; ] (1703–1758), American clergyman and theologian; known as the founder of the Calvinistic “New England Theology,” or American Puritanism. Only one book of Edwards’s writings was found in Santayana’s library, an anthology (*Representative Selections* [New York: American Book Co., 1935]) with 271 marginalia (*MARG*, 1:229–35).

127.9 Cardinal Newman; ] John Henry Newman (1801–1890), an English theologian who converted from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism. He wrote a popular autobiography, *Apologia pro vita sua* (1864), which explained his views.

127.10 Carlyle ] Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), a Scottish historian and essayist. He studied at the University of Edinburgh to enter the clergy, but his doubts prevented ordination. As a young man he translated Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship* (1824) and wrote *Life of Schiller* (1825). In 1833–34 he published his popular humorous essay *Sartor Resartus*, which mixed German philosophy and autobiography as it examined spiritual crises and social concerns of the times. After difficult financial times, Carlyle won acclaim and success with the 1837 publication of his three-volume *The French Revolution*. As a well-known writer and social critic, he influenced John Stuart Mill, John Ruskin, Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Carlyle could not reconcile himself with Calvinistic Presbyterian doctrines, but in *Sartor Resartus* (1836) he nevertheless affirms confidence in a beneficent universe.

127.10–11 Professor Royce, ] Josiah Royce (1855–1916), professor of philosophy at Harvard University. Royce was the most prominent American proponent of absolute idealism, in which God was conceived as an impersonal, all-encompassing consciousness or Absolute Knower. Royce advised Santayana in his PhD thesis (*PP*, 389) and recommended that Santayana teach at Harvard. Santayana corresponded with Royce from 1892 to 1896 and profiled him in *Persons and Places* (*PP*, 234) and *Character and Opinion in the United States* (*COUS*, 97–138). Santayana’s library included Royce’s *The World and the Individual* (2 vols., New York: Macmillan, 1899), with extensive marginalia. See also Note 46.33 the “Will” of Schopenhauer.

128.5 Franklin ] Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), statesman, printer, and inventor, known for the folksy, democratic virtue ethic expressed in publications such as *Poor Richard's Almanack* (1733–58). In a 5 November 1930 letter to Herbert Wallace Schneider, after reading his book *The Puritan Mind* (New York: Waterloo, 1930), Santayana wrote this regarding Franklin's relation to Puritanism: "Franklin's maxims cover the interest in success natural to any able and vigorous person beginning at the bottom and feeling his capacity to reach the top. The austerity of it seems rather that of a mediaeval burgher than of a puritan" (*LGS*, 4:210–11). See also Santayana's marginal remarks on Schneider's book in *MARG*, 2:226–28.

128.19–22 Nature, in the words of Emerson, . . . æsthetically. ] In *Nature* (1844), Ralph Waldo Emerson describes several aspects of nature that benefit humanity, including commodity, beauty, language, and discipline. See also Note 129.7 Emerson.

128.27–28 that saying of Jonathan Edwards, that men are naturally God's enemies! ] "Men naturally GOD's Enemies" is the title of an August 1736 sermon by Edwards (Sermon 7 in Samuel Hopkins, *The life and character of the late Reverend Mr. Jonathan Edwards, president of the College at New-Jersey. Together with a number of his sermons on various important subjects* [Boston: S. Kneeland, 1765], 104–17).

129.6 Poe, ] Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849), American short story writer, poet, and critic. In a 7 June 1932 letter to Henry Ward Abbot, Santayana wrote, "I felt there was something of the consecrated spirit about him, although very meagrely fed by tradition or learning or experience of the larger world: it was puerile love, puerile sorrow, and puerile love of beauty. . . . and as a prophet of romanticism what could he say to a person who fed, by day and by night, on Shelley and Leopardi and Alfred de Musset?" (*LGS*, 4:342).

129.6 Hawthorne, ] Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864), American novelist and short story writer. His works include *Twice-told Tales*, *The Scarlet Letter*, *The House of the Seven Gables*, and *The Marble Faun*. His novels deal with the gloomy, brooding spirit of Puritanism. Hawthorne is known for his creation of dark atmosphere, his symbolism, and his blend of realistic detail and romantic theme.

129.7 Emerson ] Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) American philosopher and poet. He was one of the founders of the Transcendental Club, which gave rise to transcendentalism in the United States. Santayana wrote of Emerson in

Chapter 8 of *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, “If we ask ourselves what was Emerson’s relation to the scientific and religious movements of his time, and what place he may claim in the history of opinion, we must answer that he belonged very little to the past, very little to the present, and almost wholly to that abstract sphere into which mystical or philosophic aspiration has carried a few men in all ages. The religious tradition in which he was reared was that of Puritanism, but of a Puritanism which, retaining its moral intensity and metaphysical abstraction, had minimised its doctrinal expression and become Unitarian” (*IPR*, 138). See Note 130.4 Transcendentalism.

130.4 Transcendentalism ] Transcendentalism was a movement among liberal New England Unitarians who emphasized the importance of human effort and piety towards Nature. Ralph Waldo Emerson, among others, traced its origins to German idealism:

It is well known to most of my audience, that the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental, from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant, of Konigsberg, who replied to the skeptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them *Transcendental* forms. The extraordinary profoundness and precision of that man’s thinking have given vogue to his nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that extent, that whatever belongs to the class of intuitive thought, is popularly called at the present day *Transcendental*.

Although, as we have said, there is no pure Transcendentalist, yet the tendency to respect the intuitions, and to give them, at least in our creed, all authority over our experience, has deeply colored the conversation and poetry of the present day; and the history of genius and of religion in these times, though impure, and as yet not incarnated in any powerful individual, will be the history of this tendency.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist” (1842); first published in *Nature, an essay and lectures on the times* (1844) (available at <https://emersoncentral.com/texts/nature-addresses-lectures/lectures/the-transcendentalist/>). See Note 32.27 German idealism.

130.6 romanticism. ] Philosophical romanticism rebelled against Enlightenment ideals of order, uniformity, and rational control, espousing instead spontaneity, variety, subjectivity, freedom of imagination and emotional expression, and the superiority of nature over culture. Accordingly, romanticism is not an easily definable, coherent school of philosophy with clear dogmas; and it may be

better characterized as a perspective, sentiment, or conviction than an explicit doctrine. Historically, it has roots in Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) philosophy. Kant's belief in free will and commitment to faith appealed to later romantic philosophers. However, his more significant though inadvertent contribution was his distinction between reason and understanding, the elaboration of which Kant intended to curb metaphysical excesses of misapplied reason and acknowledge the understanding, along with the senses, as the source of empirical knowledge. Romantic philosophers reversed the significance of the terms, denigrating the understanding for distorting knowledge through abstraction and approving reason as the proper approach to essential knowledge of reality. Representative romantic philosophers include Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) brought romantic philosophy to England and was read approvingly by Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) in the United States. Santayana also included Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) as the “last prophet” of the “heroic romantic school” (*EGP*, 65). Santayana distinguished Schelling and Emerson from other romantic philosophers because, according to his interpretation, they tended toward naturalism and recognized something existing apart from the subjective ego (*EGP*, 65), though elsewhere he explicitly characterized Emerson as a romantic (*TPP*, 5). Santayana regarded romanticism and the form it took in German idealism as philosophical egotism, marked by “subjectivity in thought and wilfulness in morals” (*EGP*, 6). He characterized romantic philosophy as accepting “passionately the aims suggested to it by sentiment or impulse. It despises prudence and flouts the understanding” (*EGP*, 13). Santayana acknowledged that Hegel might seem to prize objectivity, exempting him from Santayana's charge of egotism, but he maintained that the “philosophy of Hegel is . . . subjective and all its realism is but a pose and a tone wilfully assumed” (*EGP*, 86). Santayana's criticisms of philosophical romanticism appear throughout his works, but *Three Philosophical Poets* (1910) and *Egotism in German Philosophy* (1915) both include sustained criticisms of romanticism. Santayana's personal library included Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* (*Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* [1794]), trans. A. E. Kroeger, (Philadelphia, 1868); Anna Boynton Thompson, *The Unity of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1895); Benedetto Croce, *Ce qui est vivant et ce qui est mort de la philosophie de Hegel* (*What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel*) (Paris: V. Giard and E. Brière, 1910); Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*The Phenomenology of Spirit*), ed. Johannes Schulze (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1841) and *The Logic of Hegel* (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 1817–1843), trans. William Wallace (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1874); Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Friend* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1899) and *The Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890); Van Wyck Brooks, *Emerson and Others* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1927); and Newton Dillaway, *Prophet of America: Emerson and the Problems of Today* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936). See also Note 5.16 Kant; Note 5.17 Nietzsche; Note 11.15 Hegel; Note 49.19 German idealism; for Fichte, Note 66.10 Fichtean; and Note 129.7 Emerson.

131.18–19 Kant came . . . make room for faith, ] This statement comes from the 1787 “Preface to the Second Edition” of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is quoted as “I had, therefore, to remove knowledge in order to make room for faith” in George Trumbull Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Nature, Limits, and Validity of Human Cognitive Faculty* (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1897), 84. Ladd does not indicate which translation he cites.

Santayana owned three translations of the Kant work into English as well as two editions in the original German. One translation owned by Santayana reads: “I had therefore to remove *knowledge*, in order to make room for *belief*” (Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition” [1787], *Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. F. Max Müller, second ed., revised [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922], 700; italics in original). Santayana’s copy of the revised second edition of the Müller translation was published in 1900, but the first edition (London, Macmillan and Co., 1881) has the identical wording (452). Another translation owned by Santayana renders the passage slightly differently: “I must, therefore, abolish *knowledge*, to make room for *belief*” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1901], 33–34; italics in original). The third translation in Santayana’s library, *Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, third ed. (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1883), does not include Kant’s prefaces to the first and second editions.

132.4 self-trust. ] Emerson describes self-trust in his essay “Self-Reliance” (R. W. Emerson, *Essays* [First Series] [Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1841]).

132.19–20 the habits and training . . . those of a preacher. ] Emerson earned a degree from Harvard Divinity School and was an ordained Unitarian minister, serving as pastor of Boston’s Second Church for three years while increasingly finding that ministry incompatible with his personal beliefs.

132.34–35 Bertrand Russell has observed . . . desire to reach it. ] “If little truth has been attained in philosophy, the reason is chiefly that few philosophers have wished to attain truth” (“Pragmatism,” *Philosophical Essays* [Longman’s: New York, 1910], 99).

134.35 humorists, ] At the time that Santayana was writing, well-known humorists who had spent considerable time in California included Josh Billings (pen name of Henry Wheeler Shaw, 1818–1885), Artemus Ward (pen name of Charles Farrar Browne, 1834–1867) and Mark Twain (pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens, 1835–1910). See Note 135.16 Mark Twain.

135.16 Mark Twain ] Pen name of Samuel Langhorne Clemens (1835–1910), self-educated printer, riverboat pilot, journalist, writer, and humorist. His best-known works include novels *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer* (1876) and *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884). In a 8 December 1950 letter to Clemens’s grandson Cyril Coniston Clemens, Santayana wrote, “I have never read a word of Mark Twain’s books, but remember The Jumping Frog that my half-brother, Robert Sturgis, had learned by heart at the English High School in Boston, about the year 1870” (*LGS*, 8:308). Eventually, Cyril Clemens persuaded Santayana to read *Tom Sawyer Abroad and Other Stories*, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, *The Prince and the Pauper*, and *Mark Twain’s Autobiography*, all of which were found in Santayana’s library.

135.16 “I was born of poor but dishonest parents,” ] Although frequently ascribed to Mark Twain, this exact quotation has not been located in his writings. In a speech at a dinner held by the journal *The Aldine* in 1872, Twain quipped, “When I was fourteen, . . . I was living with my parents, who were very poor and correspondingly honest” (“Dinner Speech,” *Mark Twain Speaking*, ed. Paul Fatout [Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1976], 67; Clemens was 11 when his father died). Claiming “poor but dishonest parents” was a common trope of the time. The London comedian and actor John Lawrence Toole (1830–1906) “was born, as he sometimes jokingly says, ‘of poor but dishonest parents, you know,’ in the year 1831” (“J. L. Toole” in Anonymous, *Cartoon Portraits and Biographical Sketches of Men of the Day* [London: Tinsley Brothers, 1873], 22. Amy Strachey begins her article “The Training of Housewives” with the exact phrase used by Santayana, which she calls “a paraphrase of the remark made by one of Offenbach’s Blind Beggars” (*The Cornhill Magazine* 4, no. 22 [April 1898], 530). In Jules Moinaux’s original libretto for *Les Deux Aveugles* (*The Two Blind Men*), the character Giraffier describes himself as “Né des parents auvergnats, mais honnêtes” (“Born of parents from the Auvergne, but honest”) (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 2. People from the Auvergne have the reputation of being penny-pinching (as a response to poverty) and unwelcoming. There is no mention of poor or dishonest parents in H. B. Farine’s English-language libretto *The Blind Beggars* (London: Metzler & Co., 1872).



135.22 Walt Whitman. ] Full name Walter Whitman (1819–1892), American journalist and poet, noted for writing on controversial topics including politics and sexuality and considered one of America’s most influential poets. His best-known works include “When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom’d” (1865), an elegy on the death of President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), and his anthology of poems *Leaves of Grass*, which he revised and expanded multiple times, from twelve poems in a self-published edition in 1855 to nearly four hundred poems in his final edition in 1892. Santayana called Whitman a barbarian in his essay “The Poetry of Barbarism” (*IPR*, 109–14); yet he also composed two poems subtitled “After Walt Whitman”, “Had I the Choice” and “You tides with ceaseless swell” (*Complete Poems*, 404–5, 410–11).

136.3 Stoics ] Greek and Roman philosophers who propagated a doctrine that elevated virtue and counseled indifference to worldly concerns. Stoicism was a movement in ancient philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium (334–262 BC), who came to Athens in 313 BC. The name of the movement comes from the Greek word *στοά*, a kind of colonnade or porch with a roof and a rear wall. Zeno was said to frequent the Stoa Poecile so much that his followers became known as Stoics. The movement is divided into three periods: Early, Middle, and Late or Roman Stoicism. Figures in Early Stoicism include Zeno, Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 BC), and Chrysippus of Soli (c. 280–c. 206 BC). Figures of Middle Stoicism include Panaetius of Rhodes (185–c. 110 BC) and Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135–c. 51 BC). Figures of Late Stoicism include Seneca (c. 4 BC–AD 65), Epictetus (c. AD 50–c. 138), and Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180). Stoics were monists whose theology reflected their physics: God is the power that forms all things and harmonizes the relationship of all creation. For Stoicism, there is no distinction between God and the universe.

136.5 Bohemia ] Bohemia is a region of the present-day Czech Republic. However, Santayana is here using the term figuratively to refer collectively to socially unconventional, artistic people. This usage comes from a nineteenth-century French practice of associating nonconformist artists living in low-rent districts with the Romani people, who were called *bohémien*s on the supposition that they had immigrated from Bohemia. This terminology has been immortalized in Giacomo Puccini’s (1858–1924) 1895 opera *La bohème* (*The bohemian woman*), which tells the story of the relationships and survival strategies of a poor seamstress and her equally impoverished artist friends.

136.24 Swedenborgian household ] Emanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772) was a Swedish scientist and mystic who wrote many theological works. He claimed to converse with angels in his dreams and in daily life. These visitations

convinced him that God wanted him to reform Christian doctrine and he spent the later part of his life attempting to do so. According to his philosophy, for example, Jesus was a great human being, but Swedenborg rejected the doctrine of atonement. His major works include *Arcana Coelestia* (1756) and *Divine Love and Wisdom* (1763), which may be the most comprehensive explanation of his philosophy. After his death, a number of religious groups began promoting his teachings in Great Britain and North America. Notable followers of Swedenborg's teachings included the English poet William Blake (1757–1827), the Irish poet William Butler Yeats (1865–1939), and William James's father, Henry James Sr. (1811–1882). See Note 8.18 William James.

137.21–22 The lame, the halt, the blind, ] In Luke 14:13 and 14:21, Jesus encourages inviting “the poor, [and] the maimed, [and] the lame [halt], [and] the blind” to feasts, even though these people are not in a position to reciprocate or otherwise benefit their host, in order to be blessed and to participate in the kingdom of God (Luke 14:14–15, 24).

137.22 those speaking with tongues ] Interpreted here as people who are not otherwise understood. In some, but not all, New Testament passages that mention speaking in tongues, people who hear others speaking in tongues are able to understand them. See also Note 68.39–69.1 translate me into a thousand tongues!

139.20 *a posteriori* ] Latin for “from the latter”; reasoning from effects to presumed causes; alternatively, things only knowable from experience.

139.24–27 “There shall be news . . . there shall be news in heaven!” ] James's “obscure friend” is the American sometime farmer, inventor, philosopher, and prolific writer Benjamin Paul Blood (1832–1919). William James wrote an article on Blood (“A Pluralistic Mystic,” *Hibbert Journal* 8, no. 4 [July 1910], 739–59) in which he quotes “a poetic apostrophe of Mr. Blood's to freedom,” beginning:

Let it ne'er be known.  
If in some book of the Inevitable,  
Dog-eared and stale, the future stands engrossed  
E'en as the past. There shall be news in heaven,  
And questions in the courts thereof; and chance  
Shall have its fling, e'en at the [ermined] bench. (754n)

William James, *Memories and Studies* (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1911) 402.

139.34 Eternal vigilance is the price of knowledge; ] This well-known statement by Santayana draws on the well-known phrase “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” often inaccurately attributed to Thomas Jefferson.

140.1–2 the visions . . . influential things about him. ] This comes from *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), the publication of a series of lectures that James delivered at Oxford University. In the table of contents, the point is summarized as “The type of vision is the important thing in a philosopher.” In the text, it reads as follows:

Let me repeat once more that a man’s vision is the great fact about him. Who cares for Carlyle’s reasons, or Schopenhauer’s, or Spencer’s? A philosophy is the expression of a man’s intimate character, and all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon it. (20)

140.7 “*écraser l’infâme.*”] French; literally, to crush the infamous. Voltaire frequently used the phrase in his works and letters, encouraging his readers to fight against abuses of power by kings and the Roman Catholic church. See Note 4.7 Voltaire.

140.9–12 Book of Ecclesiastes . . . there is nothing new ] Ecclesiastes 1:9 states, “There is no new thing under the sun.”

140.14–16 to the blinking little child . . . new all day. ] Santayana describes this childlike perspective similarly in *Reason in Common Sense*:

In the first stage of life the mind is frivolous and easily distracted; it misses progress by failing in consecutiveness and persistence. This is the condition of children and barbarians, in whom instinct has learned nothing from experience. (*LR1*, 172)

Also, in the Bible, Lamentations 3:23a refers to God’s mercies, saying, “They are new every morning.”

140.35 the moon is sister to the sun, ] In *Reason in Religion*, Santayana describes some of the mythology surrounding Apollo, as a god and personification of the sun: “At first he is the sky’s child, and has the moon for twin sister” (*LR3*, 41).

141.25 Sir William Hamilton ] (1788–1856), 9th Baronet of Preston, Scottish lawyer and philosopher. Hamilton studied medicine, law, and philosophy at the University of Glasgow and Oxford, and served as Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh from 1836 until his death. His knowledge of both the Common Sense philosophy tradition of Thomas Reid (1710–1796) and of German philosophy was critical in developing the Scottish philosophical tradition and brought him international renown: “In the United States Hamilton was highly regarded until late in the 19th century” (Gordon Graham, “Sir William Hamilton [1788–1856],” Institute for the Study of

Scottish Philosophy [Sioux Falls, SD: University of Sioux Falls, 2021], retrieved August 31, 2021 from <http://www.scottishphilosophy.org/philosophers/sir-william-hamilton/>), comports with Santayana's view that Hamilton belonged to the previous generation.

143.3–5 A Californian whom . . . what they are. ] The individual has not been identified, but in a letter of 15 August 1911, Santayana writes, "I am struck in California by the deep and almost religious affection which people have for nature, and by the sensitiveness they show to its influences. . . . It is a relief from business and the genteel tradition" (*LGS*, 2:45–46).

142.23 when she destroys . . . momentary spasm. ] At 5:12 a.m. on 18 April 1906, about three hundred miles of the San Andreas fault ruptured in an earthquake with an estimated magnitude of 7.9 on the Richter scale and extreme intensity centered in the San Francisco Bay area. The earthquake and ensuing fire destroyed about 80 percent of the buildings in San Francisco, with an estimated three thousand lives lost and hundreds of thousands left homeless. About half of the evacuees found refuge in Berkeley and other cities across the Bay, which suffered lesser though still significant damage.



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