

## 6 Quotations as Pictures II: Exemplificational Content

### I. What Does the Quoting Phrase Exemplify?

The compositionally determined truth-value of the quotation-sentence ‘*S* said: “*P*”’ is not a function of the representational content of the (sentential or subsentential) quoting phrase *P*. Rather, the exemplificational content of *P* is what yields the quoted inscription or utterance attributed to the quoted subject that determines the truth or falsity of the quotation-sentence, its semantic value.<sup>1</sup> In other words, the quotation-sentence is true if and only if there is a (quoted) utterance or inscription by *S* of a phrase “quotationally related” to the quoting phrase *P*. This “quotational” relation between the quoting and quoted tokens involves two steps: (i) the quoting phrase exemplifies or samples a property or abstract object like a type or representation, which is (ii) instantiated by a token the quoted subject spoke or inscribed. The relation is asymmetrical: the quoting token must both possess the exemplified property (type, representation, etc.) *and* refer to it, while the quoted token need only instantiate the type, property, or representation (in its context). It is not enough for the quoting phrase simply to possess the property or to token a type in order to exemplify it. The quoting phrase token “has” an innumerable number of properties such as being tokened on a particular date, inscribed in ink or pencil, consisting of *n* number of letters, and so on, few of which it exemplifies or samples. Having the property or type is not enough; the quoting phrase must also refer to it.<sup>2</sup> For this reason, too, the exemplified property or representation is not the use interpretation or representational content of the quoting phrase, that is, it is not *what it says*. On the other hand, the quoting phrase *qua* exemplifying or sampling token is also not an uninterpreted sequence of letters or a brute shape. It is the phrase *with* its representational (bare-bones) content, interpreted in the

same way that the quoted phrase was used and interpreted in its quoted context. Hence, even though the representational content of the quoting phrase is not a direct factor in determining the truth-value of the quotation-sentence, it is nonetheless ‘active’ in the process.

What does a quoting phrase, or its words, exemplify, sample, and thereby refer to? The semantic value of (an utterance or inscription of) the quoting phrase, its contribution to the compositional truth conditions of the quotation-sentence, is another utterance or inscription—of the quoted phrase. However, our only “access” to that quoted token, which is generally in the past, is indirect: via the present quoting token. The quoting phrase-token exemplifies—both instantiates *and* refers to—an abstract entity, a property or type or something else, which in turn is instantiated by the quoted subject’s phrase-token. We first ‘ascend’ from our concrete quoting token  $t_1$  to an intermediate *exemplified* abstract entity  $T$  from which we in turn ‘descend’ to the concrete quoted token  $t_2$  that instantiates  $T$ . As my choice of letters hints, the standard candidate for this ‘intermediate exemplified entity’ is an expression *type*. For those who don’t like the detour through Plato’s heaven, it ought to be possible to reroute using only concrete tokens (or interpret the type or property extensionally). However, it is important to incorporate the referential element into the story—without it, there is no exemplification—and it is not obvious how one token can directly *refer* to another token, circumventing types, even if it replicates it and no matter how much it resembles it.

Word types have been recently criticized on a number of fronts (see, e.g., Kaplan 1990, 2011; Wetzell 1993, 2002, 2008; Szabó 1999; Lepore and Hawthorne 2011). Our standard ways to individuate them by recognitional features of their tokens, either orthographic or phonological, are problematic. Some object to their Platonistic metaphysics; others propose that we think of (word) types as human artifacts or natural objects that undergo change and development over time. But even apart from these ontological problems, there are reasons specific to the phenomenon of quotation not to tie ourselves to types as exemplificanda—certainly not exclusively, and perhaps not at all.

First, the thought that the quoting and quoted expressions must be tokens of one type seems to be motivated by the verbatim requirement (VR) and conflation with mentioning. However, as we saw in chapters 1 and 2, even if VR generally requires that quoting and quoted tokens be word-for-word and order-identical replicas of each other—hence, of one type—that

constraint is based not on linguistic or semantic factors, but on matters of law: a particular conception of copyright and authorial ownership of one's words as private property.<sup>3</sup> From a semantic point of view, it is helpful to distinguish two issues here: (i) the metalinguistic dimension of quotation—the fact that the quoting word token refers to another linguistic entity—and (ii) the specific requirement that quotation obeys VR. The two are separable. Furthermore, unlike the mention-expression that exclusively denotes what is contained between the inverted commas, or m-marks, exactly as it occurs, quotation does not involve containment and what is exemplified depends not only on what is interior to or inside the q-marks but also on a variety of external contextual parameters. As I said in chapter 2, what counts as 'verbatim' itself varies with context and the purpose of the quotation. Sometimes we "clean up" quotations; other times it may be crucial not to 'correct' but to preserve the broken, defective quoted token with all its noise. To deal with these diverse cases, we need a sufficiently malleable thing that can play the intermediate role of exemplificandum in our story.<sup>4</sup>

A second reason not to limit ourselves to word types is that not only tokens of a type are quoted. Although all quotations must involve a vehicle for representational content, some also quote—attribute to the quoted subject—a phonological or inscriptional feature of the quoted utterance or inscription, for example, a speaker's pronunciation or intonation, the kind of sign (the font, color, size) with which he inscribed his expression, his language, or his manner of speech.<sup>5</sup> Recall Potts's examples of the different pronunciations of 'apricot' in (repeated here)

- (1a) When in Santa Cruz, Peter orders "[e]pricots" at the local market.  
 (1b) When in Amherst, Peter orders "[æ]pricots" at the local market. (Potts 2004a)

Or if George Washington inscribed words in script

- (2a) *I slept here,*

in contexts in which we also want to quote his style of handwriting, one might truly report

- (2b) George Washington inscribed above his bed: "*I slept here*"

but deny

- (2c) George Washington inscribed above his bed: "**I slept here.**"<sup>6</sup>

And sometimes, in order to quote figures known by their accent and flair, one must replicate those features in the quoting performance:

(3) And then Greta Garbo said: “I vant to be alone!” (Recanati 2001, 2011)

At the very least, to allow for this variety of quoted things (which now include more than words and their types), we will add to the properties and abstract entities that can be exemplified by the quoting phrase abstract “linguistic objects” that represent word morphology, syntactic category, semantic interpretation, phonological interpretation, and perhaps more—such as the nonlinguistic representation of the sign in which the expression is articulated or of its manner of delivery.<sup>7</sup>

These examples support two additional hypotheses. First, we said that the semantic value of the quoting phrase is determined by what it exemplifies, although what does the exemplifying is in part individuated by its bare-bones representational content. Potts (2004) observes that the representational contents of

(4a) Chris exclaimed: ‘I love “[eɪ]pricots,” not “[æ]pricots”’

namely, the complement clause in

(4b) Chris exclaimed that he (himself) loves apricots, not apricots

and, similarly, the content of (5a) expressed by the complement clause of (5b)

(5a) Chris said: “ “[eɪ]pricots” are the best but “[æ]pricots” suck’

(5b) Chris said that apricots are the best but apricots suck

are each self-contradictory. Likewise, compare (6a) with its representational content in (6b):

(6a) Chris did not know that “[eɪ]pricots” and “[æ]pricots” are the same fruit.

(6b) Chris did not know that apricots and apricots are the same fruit.

In these examples, the semantic values of the subsentential quoting phrases are a function of the phonological representations they exemplify, not their representational contents. Although these quotation sentences have these (trivial or absurd) representational contents or truth conditions, they are not the factor that determines whether or not we are truly quoting Chris. What is exemplified does.<sup>8</sup> So, if Chris said

(4c) Chris: ‘I love “[eɪ]pricots,” not “[æ]pricots”’

and I report him with

(4d) Chris said that he loves “[æ]pricots,” not “[eɪ]pricots”

I have misquoted him and (4d) is false, even though the complement clause has the same representational content as (4c). It is the different exemplified *phonological* representations that make the difference in truth-value.

By similar reasoning, I want to propose that it is their semantic representations, or characters, not the individuals or properties that constitute their bare-bones representational contents (or singular propositions), that are exemplified by quoting phrases and thereby determine whether tokens are “quotationally related.” Here I take a semantic representation to be a representation of the linguistic meaning of a word—what a speaker knows in virtue of his knowledge of language proper (including his lexical knowledge)—and the linguistic meaning of an expression, following Kaplan (1989), to be its character as opposed to its (propositional) content. This is obvious in the case of indexicals, and I will return to non-indexicals in a moment. For indexicals, we might even say that their character individuates their word type. So, by exemplifying its character, a phrase in effect exemplifies its type. To quote an utterance that contains an indexical, we must therefore preserve not only the representational content of the *quoted* utterance, but also its character. If I (JS) want to quote Clark Kent’s utterance in  $c^*$

(7) Clark: “I am Superman”

it is not enough that my quoting phrase preserve the perspective-neutral bare-bones representational content of Clark’s utterance in his context  $c^*$ , namely, what is said in the complement clause of

(8) Clark said that he is Superman,

namely,  $\langle C, S, Identity \rangle$ , where  $C$  and  $S$  are the (same) individual referent of the names. This content could be equally expressed by (9) or (10):

(9) Clark said: “Superman is Superman.”

(10) Clark said: “Clark Kent is Superman.”

I also need to build into our representation of that content the *character* of Clark’s quoted utterance (7):

(11)  $\langle \{I\}, \{\text{‘Superman’}\}, \{=\} \rangle$

whose content in  $c^*$  is equally expressed by  $\langle \{I\}(c^*), \{\text{‘Superman’}\}(c^*)\}, \{=\}(c^*) \rangle$ .

Maier (2014) has observed that subsentential quotation is more flexible in its quotation of indexicals than sentential quotation. Thus both (12a)

and (12b) are equally acceptable as quotations of someone's command to me:

(12) They: "Shove it up your ass."

(12a) They told me to shove it "up my ass."

(12b) They told me to shove it "up your ass."<sup>9</sup>

—Unlike (13a), which is acceptable as opposed to (13b):

(13a) They told me: "Shove it up your ass."

(13b) They told me: "Shove it up my ass."

Maier conjectures that it is VR that legislates for the acceptability of (13a), but one wonders why coordination with its sentential matrix should not equally legislate for the acceptability of (13b). It is not clear how to account for this difference, but in any case it should be noted that neither (14a) nor (14b)

(14a) They told me (JS) to shove it "up JS's ass"

(14b) They told me (JS): "Shove it up JS's ass"

are true or acceptable as quotations of (12), because they do not preserve the indexical character—the context-sensitivity or nonstability—of the quoted utterance even though they have the same representational content. Again, it is the character (or semantic representation) that is exemplified by the quoting token and that must be instantiated by the quoted token.

There is, however, one serious drawback to using character in particular as the kind of semantic representation that must be exemplified for quotation. The problem, as Kaplan (1989) already observed, is that the formal notion is not sufficiently fine-grained to capture differences of linguistic meaning between co-directly referring simple terms (e.g., proper names or common nouns) with stable, that is, context-independent, characters. Any two such terms have the same content (namely, the same direct referent) in all contexts. Since their characters are stable, they ipso facto have the same character. Here is not the place to pursue the project of how to generalize character to cover the linguistic meanings of all expressions; we need something more tightly individuated by the word itself, but we have no better available semantics. I will therefore take it as a working hypothesis that any two simple and even directly co-referring but not identical words  $\emptyset$  and  $\partial$  have different linguistic meanings and (in a loose sense, ignoring the problem just mentioned) different semantic representations. We can still allow many synonyms in an ordinary sense, like 'bachelor' and 'unmarried male,'

because these two have different characters in virtue of the one being simple and the other compound. However, on our proposal, ‘sweat’ and ‘perspire’ will also be required to have different linguistic meanings (hence, characters and semantic representations), as will ‘steed’ and ‘mare’ (notwithstanding Frege’s view that these differ only in their coloring or associations). In either case, although this proposal individuates semantic representations by their word types (rather than words by their meanings), whenever it appears to be its type that is exemplified or sampled by a quoting phrase, what is really exemplified is its semantic representation and, for that reason, the quoted phrase (token) must possess the same semantic representation exemplified (and thereby referred to) by the quoting phrase (token).

## II. Quoting across Languages and Mediums

Taking its character or, more generally, semantic representation to be what is exemplified by the quoting phrase has another advantage. In chapter 2, we cited the possibility of cross-linguistic and cross-medium quotation as one way in which quotation differs from mention. Others have raised these phenomena as an objection to VR and some to the very idea that quoting and quoted tokens must be of the same type. It is clear, in any case, that the practices of interlinguistic and intermedium quotation require norms that cross the standard criteria by which we individuate types by recognitional features specific to a language or medium, either orthographic or phonological. We need norms to govern quotation in one language of an utterance made in another, and the quotation of oral utterances by written inscriptions, and of inscriptions by utterances. Now, types presumably are relative to specific languages and media. But if we take what is exemplified to be a character or semantic representation—which are not language specific—we can explain under what conditions cross-linguistic and cross-medium quotation is possible: the quoting and quoted phrases in different languages or different mediums must have the same character or semantic representation. In many cases, especially in intralinguistic and intramedium quotation, this is sufficient, and we ignore the language or sign system in which the semantic representation is manifest. Sometimes, however, what is quoted is not just a word with the same linguistic meaning as the quoting word, but also—like intonation or pronunciation—the *language* in which the quoted subject spoke or wrote. In those cases, it is not enough

that we preserve linguistic meaning; we must also preserve the language of the quoted subject and their utterance, or at least not misquote by implying that the subject spoke a language different from the one they in fact did. Here are two norms that seem to govern cross-linguistic quotation.

(A) Suppose someone utters a sentence *S* in language *L*. One can verbatim quote *S* in language *L\** using a reporting frame drawn from *L\** provided the quoter understands *S* (since he is quoting it with its representational content). So, suppose Yehoshuah meets Aisha on the way to Al-Aqsa and tells her in Hebrew:

(15) Yeshoshua: Ani gar be-Yerushalayim.

I can report him with

(16) Joshua said: "Ani gar be-Yerushalayim"

provided I understand Hebrew, in which case the quoting phrase in (16) has both representational and exemplificational content—although the sentence is a language-salad. If I don't understand Hebrew, it is less clear whether I am quoting Yehoshuah or simply mentioning his utterance. However, I can also quote Yehoshuah's utterance (15), using a translation of *S*, *S\** in *L\**, while also expressing the reporting frame "X said: \_\_\_" in *L\**:

(17) Joshua said: "I live in Jerusalem."

The exception is when the quoter also wants to quote the original language of the quoted utterance. For example, Aisha reports her exchange with Yehoshuah, telling Maya:

(18) We met on the street to Al-Aqsa, and Joshua said: "I live in Jerusalem."

Maya might deny (18) (metalinguistically) using (19):

(19) That's not what he said. You met in front of Al-Aqsa, and Joshua said: "Ani gar be-Yerushalayim."<sup>10</sup>

Although there is nothing linguistically wrong with (17) or (18) as quotations of (15), in (19) Maya also quotes the language of Joshua's quoted utterance. In (19), what is exemplified by the quoting phrase is not only its semantic representation but also the property of being spoken in Hebrew.

Note that the bare-bones representational content of the quotation-sentence in (19) is

(20) that Joshua lives in Jerusalem (= <Joshua, Jerusalem, *Lives in*>



but we cannot quote Yehoshua's/Joshua's original utterance (16) by either (21) or (22):

(21) Joshua said: "Joshua lives in Jerusalem"

(22) Yehoshuah amar: "Yehoshuah gar be-Yerushalayim"

even though their representational contents are the same as that of (20), because what must be exemplified and then instantiated by the quoted token in order for the quotation-sentence to be true is the first person indexical character or semantic representation of the Hebrew quoting phrase "*Ani gar be-Yerushalayim*" or English "*I live in Jerusalem*" where  $\{\text{'Ani'}\} = \{\text{'I'}\}$ .

(B) If Yehoshua originally uttered (15), I can quote him in English with (17), and I can quote him in Hebrew with

(23) Yehoshua amar: "*Ani gar be-Yerushalayim.*"

But I cannot quote him with

(24) Yehoshua said: "*Je vis à Jérusalem*"

because the contrast between the languages of the reporting frame and of the quoting phrase makes the language of the latter salient and thereby exemplified in context. Hence, apart from its representational content, (24) attributes to Yehoshua a language in which he did not express himself when he uttered his original quoted expression.

In sum, there is no problem quoting someone across different languages or across different modalities so long as we preserve the characters or semantic representations of the quoted phrases by the quoting phrases—unless the speaker also intends to attribute to the quoted subject the language in which they expressed themselves. These examples suggest a rough principle governing what is exemplified in a quotation context analogous to the constraints that govern sampling that we mentioned in chapter 4. In the case of the tailor's booklet of cloth swatches two contextual parameters are at work: what any single swatch samples depends both on the other elements in its schema (the other swatches in the booklet, each of which samples a contrary of each of the others) and on the range of features sorted by the entire schema (color, weave, weight of fabric, etc.). In our examples of quotation across different languages, the context can make salient not only the linguistic meaning, character, or semantic representation of the quoting phrase, but also its *language*, in part by contrast or comparison with

the language of the reporting frame and in part by contrast with the languages of other utterances in the context. So, when we are trying to quote not only the words of the quoted subject (interpreted with their representational content) via exemplification of their linguistic meaning or semantic representation but also the subject's language, then there must be salient contraries within the language range in the context. To be sure, this is typically much less articulated than the tailor's book of swatches, but there is one moral we can draw from this story, and it also distinguishes quotation from mentioning. Regardless of how the contextual parameters affect it, what is exemplified by the quoting phrase—and, hence, what is quoted—*does not depend solely on features of the quoting phrase itself*, that is, the phrase contained within the inverted commas. This contrasts with the practice of mentioning, or at least with a number of prominent theories of mentioning, according to which what is referred to is always the thing (word type, token, shape) “contained” between or “interior” to the inverted commas.<sup>11</sup> For many authors, this kind of containment or interiority is also what captures the special “intimate” relation that a quotation (or, more precisely, mention-expression) bears to what is quoted (mentioned), which they in turn identify with its pictoriality. On our view, the pictorial dimension of quotation depends instead on the role of exemplification (as distinct from and in addition to representation) in quotational attribution. And what is exemplified depends on the context that determines salience, which is ‘outside’ the inverted commas. Hence, what is referred to in quotation is not simply a function of what is insulated *within* the inverted commas. On the other hand, since what is exemplified and therefore referred to must also be possessed or instantiated by the quoting expression, what is interior to the inverted commas constrains what is exemplified.

### III. Analog versus Digital in Quotation

The distinction between the representational and exemplificational contents of quoting phrases parallels a second theme from the theory of pictures: the analog/digital distinction. The word types of natural languages are paradigms of digital representations that allow perfect copyability or replication, as we saw back in chapter 4. Syntactically, there are perfect, always effective procedures for replicating tokens of one word-type, and there are determinative modes of composition of complex phrases given

simple ones. However, recall that the reason why digital representations can be replicated perfectly is *not* because their tokens maximally resemble one another but because the number and kinds of features and respects that determine whether a token belongs to a type are severely restricted. Digital identity disregards most features; they count neither for nor against perfect digital copyability. For the analog, on the other hand, there is no limit to differences in features and no end to discriminations that matter for replication; hence, we can never do more than approximate perfect success. Since every possible feature counts in the individuation of an analog representation, only in a context do we make an overall judgment that settles the question of replication in—but only in—that context. Hence, for the analog as for the digital, resemblance is never the measure of replication.<sup>12</sup>

However, their digital status characterizes quoting phrases only insofar as we focus on them as vehicles for their bare-bones representational content. When we focus on the quoting phrase in its role as an *exemplifier* or *sample* of a property or semantic representation, character, phonological representation, or manner-feature, it becomes much more difficult to predict, independently of its context, which of its features matter and which can be ignored, hence, which features need to be preserved and which do not for copyability or replication. For its exemplifying function, we attend to features of the quoting phrase token as a concrete linguistic object, for example, its medium (whether oral or aural or inscribed and seen or heard), the mode by which it refers, the nuances of its linguistic meaning, its associations or coloring, or to the sound or visual features that it makes salient. This in turn has the effect of heightened sensitivity to variation along a potentially unbounded number of relevant dimensions. The same utterances that differ discretely qua representations differ along more continuous and smooth dimensions qua samples or exemplifying objects. So, if what makes a representational system digital, and its symbols replicable, is that we can specify exactly which features are determinative of each type—and which can be ignored—then if every feature may be determinative for *exemplifying* quoting phrases, their exemplificational symbol system is analog or analog-like. Just as there is no way, a priori or in advance, to delineate the necessary features for membership in a type in a pictorial system, the least or most minute difference in features of the quoting phrase (or more precisely, any feature associated with a phrase that belongs to a quotational system) might make a difference to its identity. Thus, the quoting phrase

that is digital when we attend merely to its representational function (and as it would occur in nonquotational contexts) suddenly takes on new life as an analog symbol when we focus on its exemplificational role. This is a second way in which quotations are pictorial.

#### IV. Summing Up

At the end of chapter 3 we took up Davidson's challenge to give an account of the double-faced semantic behavior of quotations: the fact that quoting phrases show signs of both ordinary extraquotational use and metalinguistic reference. We then examined and rejected two-dimensional accounts in the literature for failing to explain how the very same quoting phrase can have *both* its ordinary meaning as if it were being used in autonomous assertions *and* a semantic value consisting in the quoted token. Since quotations are not ambiguous or polysemous, we therefore proposed to step outside our standard semantics repertoire to adopt the two-directional model of reference of pictures that simultaneously represent and exemplify. Qua representations, quotations express the bare-bones content of complement clauses of indirect discourse reports of the quoted token with all their internal semantic structure. Qua exemplifier or sample, the quoting phrase refers to a meaning, representation, or property, which, in turn, is instantiated by the quoted token attributed to the quoted subject.

The particular property or linguistic (semantic, phonological, syntactic, lexical) representation exemplified by the quoting phrase on an occasion depends on various features of its context. However, this role of the context is neither semantic (like the role of a contextual parameter, e.g., the speaker, for an indexical character) nor 'presemantic' like the part played by presuppositions in assigning a linguistic type (with a meaning or character) to a sound or shape, for example, the name of a state, person, or river to the sound 'jordan.' Context does function presemantically in determining *whether* the inverted commas are q-marks or m-marks and whether we are facing an instance of quotation or mentioning, but its role in rendering salient what the quoting phrase samples or exemplifies is part of the input to general symbolic skills we employ for pictures as much as for verbal speech.

In chapter 8 we will compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of current proposals in the literature to give compositional semantic analyses of quotation-sentences. Here I will only repeat that the full content of

a quotation-sentence involves both the representational and exemplificational contents of the quoting phrase. Unlike the two-dimensional accounts of chapter 3, these are not two independent contents. The property or semantic representation exemplified by the quoting phrase that in turn is instantiated by the quoted subject's token is exemplified by the phrase understood according to its representational content, and different representational contents yield different exemplificanda. (Example: "Trump said: "Build walls around the banks of Mexico!")") So, while the representational content of the quoting phrase does not directly contribute to its exemplified semantic value, it depends on it. To that extent, the representational content of the quoting phrase is *active* in exemplification even if it is not *part* of what is exemplified.<sup>13</sup>

To make this a bit more explicit (but not as explicit as we will get in chapter 8), let  $S/S'$  be the indirect discourse complement sentence uttered in the speaker's context of utterance  $c$  that reports (and therefore expresses) the content of  $S$  as it was uttered in the quoted subject  $T$ 's own context  $c^*$ . Hence, if  $S$  contains an indexical  $i$ , ' $S/S'$ ' is the sentence that results from substituting for  $i$  in  $S$  either a perspectival-free pronoun (or variable) or a quasi-indexical  $j$  that refers in the speaker's context  $c$  to what the  $i$  in  $S$  referred in the quoted subject's context  $c^*$ . As a first stab, the truth conditions for quotation-sentence 'T said: " $S$ "' are:

(SQ) "T said: ' $S$ ,' uttered in  $c$ , is true in  $c$  iff, when the content that was, and would be, expressed by  $S$  in  $c^*$  is the content of *that*  $S/S'$  in  $c$  and  $T$  expressed that content by uttering a token in  $c^*$  that instantiates the representation or property exemplified by the token of ' $S$ ' in  $c$ .<sup>14</sup>

For example, the quotation sentence "Trump said: "I'm the greatest"" uttered in  $c$  is true in  $c$  if and only if Trump uttered in  $c^*$  a token whose representational content is expressed by the complement clause of "Trump said that he's the greatest" (uttered in  $c$ ) and that instantiates the representation (e.g., character) and/or property exemplified by the speaker's token of 'I'm the greatest' in  $c$ .

Similarly for subsentential quotation: Let ' $P$ ' be a subsentential phrase and, where ' $P$ ' contains an indexical  $i$ , let ' $P/P$ ' be the result of substituting for  $i$  in  $P$  either a perspectival-free pronoun (or variable) or a quasi-indexical  $j$  that refers in the speaker's context  $c$  to what  $i$  in  $S$  referred in the quoted subject's context  $c^*$ .

(SSQ) "T said that . . . 'P' . . .," uttered in  $c$ , is true in  $c$  iff, when the content of ' $\dots P/P' \dots$ ' in  $c$  is the content of ' $\dots P \dots$ ' in  $c^*$  and T expressed that content by uttering, together with other words he used in  $c^*$ , a token phrase that instantiates the property or representation exemplified by the token of ' $P$ ' in  $c$ .

I conclude this chapter with one question many readers may be asking themselves. If exemplification, which is a more general kind of symbolization, is the reference relation by which we fix the semantic value of a quotation, why not say that it is also what determines the semantic value of a mentioning phrase, namely, the mentioned phrase, rather than a semantic relation like denotation, naming, or demonstrative reference? Indeed, some examples of mention, such as,

(25) 'BOSTON' is a louder token than 'boston' (where the capital letters signal degree of loudness) (de Brabanter, personal communication),

prima facie suggest that its mode of reference is exemplification or sampling rather than a semantic notion (although one could take the mentioning tokens to be denoting linguistic objects, e.g., phonological representations, as proposed by Potts 2004a). If exemplification and representation are both species of a generic notion of reference, how do we know that it is one rather than the other at work in a given case? And if mention rests on exemplification no different from quotation, the upshot is that there really is no great divide between quotation and mentioning!

I have no knockdown arguments to show either that mentioning is necessarily semantic reference, that is, denotation, rather than a more general symbolic relation like sampling and exemplification, or that it is the former rather than the latter at work in mention.

We saw in chapter 2 that the use of inverted commas for mentioning originated in Frege to disambiguate mention-uses from use-uses of words, and that he seemed to be working with a notion of semantic reference no different from the notion of *Bedeutung* that he employed for the word-object semantic relation. Of course, this is no proof that the present practice is what Frege intended, or Tarski or Quine. However, as Davidson and others have emphasized against the proper name theory, mention-expressions have a rule-governed structure that speakers master as part of learning the language; mentioning is not the kind of arbitrary relation characteristic of proper names. It is a good question whether exemplification captures

this idea of a general rule speakers master that exploits the structure of mention-expressions, especially if the rule is meant to be linguistic. But even if mentioning, like quotation, employs exemplification, there would still remain one important difference between them: quotation, unlike mention, involves *both* representation *and* exemplification. There may not be conclusive reasons to take mentioning to be either representation or exemplification, but it is never *both* simultaneously—unlike quotation.<sup>15</sup>

