

NOTES

PREFACE

1. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1975] 1990), vii.
2. Marion LeRoy Burton, *President's Report, University of Michigan (1920-1921)*, quoted in Julie A. Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 231. For an example of the work it takes to craft a substantive and living core curriculum (in this case, at Boston College), see Mary Thomas Crane, David Quigley and Andy Boynton, eds., *Curriculum by Design: Innovation and the Liberal Arts Core* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2023).
3. As the reader will see from the extensive notes, this remains a scholarly book despite its essayistic approach.
4. I am thinking of figures such as Montaigne, Emerson, Nietzsche, Woolf, and Weil. And the tradition continues with essayists such as John Berger, David Foster Wallace, and Adam Phillips.
5. Ezra Pound, *A B C of Reading* (Reading, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, [1934] 1961), 40.

PROLOGUE

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, [1981] 2007), 219.
2. Michael Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
3. I don't mean to suggest that this miseducation begins in college, only to note with alarm that it continues there. As William Deresiewicz notes, our hurried college students "are winners in the race we have made of childhood." Deresiewicz takes aim not only at elite higher education institutions, but at:

everything that leads up to and away from them—the private and affluent public high schools; the ever-growing industry of tutors and consultants and test-prep

courses; the admissions process itself, squatting like a dragon at the entrance to adulthood; the brand-name graduate schools and employment opportunities that come after the B.A.; and the parents and communities, largely upper-middle class, who push their children into the maw of this machine (William Deresiewicz, “Don’t Send Your Kid to the Ivy League: The Nation’s Top Colleges Are Turning Our Kids into Zombies,” *New Republic*, July 21, 2014, <https://newrepublic.com/article/118747/ivy-league-schools-are-overrated-send-your-kids-elsewhere>).

Deresiewicz elaborates his critique of the college-industrial complex (my term) in William Deresiewicz, *Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life* (New York: Free Press, 2014).

4. William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming” (1920), <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/43290/the-second-coming>.

5. I return to this issue in “Job Prospects,” discussing the bad faith of defending premature major selection in the name of respecting student interests and avoiding paternalism (see pp. 208–210).

6. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 24.

7. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 23. In “New Student Orientation” and “Job Prospects,” I explore further this ordeal of the self-interpreting animal (see pp. 103–104 and 251–253).

8. Interrupting this studenting mindset is the focus (and point) of “New Student Orientation,” where I unpack and defend Oakeshott’s account of liberal learning.

CAMPUS TOUR

1. Bill Readings, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 169.

2. The Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP)’s “Freshman Survey” was launched by the American Council of Education in 1966 and has been administered by UCLA’s Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) since 1973. All US higher educational institutions are invited to participate. HERI then selects and weights the results to reflect the population of all full-time first-year students (since 2000 this has been approximately 1.5 million students at 1,500 institutions). In 2010, for example, the survey was completed by 261,511 students representing 420 institutions. From these, 201,818 surveys from 279 institutions were selected to form the stratified, weighted sample. Its annual report, *The American Freshman: National Norms*, and longitudinal studies are available at <https://heri.ucla.edu/publications-tfs/>. I calculated these decade averages myself, drawing on the 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 installments of *The American Freshman* and on M. K. Eagan et al., *The American Freshman: Fifty-Year Trends, 1966–2015* (Los Angeles, CA:

Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA, 2016). Note that there is no data for the meaning question in 1966, for the financial question in 1973, or for either in 1988. The high point on the meaning question was the first year it was included, 1967 (85.8%); its low point was 2003 (39.3%). The low point for the financial question was 1970 (36.2%); its high point is the most recent year for which we have data, 2019 (84.3%). The two slopes crossed in 1979. By the end of Reagan's first term, the importance of the meaning of life had fallen to less than half of what it was in the late sixties, and the importance of being very well-off financially had increased by 77%.

The discussion that follows in the text is a survey of contemporary conditions in US higher education, though some of what I say surely points to broader trends. For instance, the shift I track here, from a thirst for meaning circa 1968 to an increasing desire for stock options over the subsequent decades, tells a broader story. Consider that the generation of 1968 made itself heard not only in Berkeley but in Berlin and Belgrade, Paris and Prague, Stockholm, Mexico City, and Tokyo.

3. See IPEDS Table 322.10, "Bachelor's degrees conferred by postsecondary institutions, by field of study: Selected years, 1970–71 through 2019–20" (https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d21/tables/dt21_322.10.asp?current=yes) and Table 325.92, "Degrees in economics, history, political science and government, and sociology conferred by postsecondary institutions, by level of degree: Selected years, 1949–50 through 2019–20" (https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d21/tables/dt21_325.92.asp). To derive an overall percentage for the humanities, I combined totals in Table 322.10 in five subcategories: "Area, ethnic, cultural, gender, and group studies," "English language and literature/letters," "Foreign languages, literatures, and linguistics," "Liberal arts and sciences, general studies, and humanities," and "Philosophy and religious studies." Since Table 322.10 combines history and the social sciences, I pulled the number of history majors from Table 325.92.

4. See IPEDS Table 322.10.

5. See Alan Finder, "Cornell's Worried Image Makers Wrap Themselves in Ivy," *New York Times*, April 22, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/22/nyregion/cornells-worried-image-makers-wrap-themselves-in-ivy.html>.

6. Finders, "Cornell's Worried Image Makers."

7. Readings, *University in Ruins*, 10.

8. Readings, *University in Ruins*, 11.

9. Readings, *University in Ruins*, 10. As far as I can tell, the logo Readings describes is this one: https://www.sportslogos.net/logos/view/1gn6f1h3qe7xqmhgkgrj/Syracuse_Orange/1989/Primary_Logo. For the traditional seal, adopted in 1871, see <https://www.syracuse.edu/150years/150-years-timeline/>.

10. Readings, *University in Ruins*, 10.

11. Syracuse University Brand Guidelines (<https://www.syracuse.edu/wp-content/uploads/syracuse-university-brand-guidelines-19.pdf>), 9.

12. Syracuse University Brand Guidelines, 18.

13. Jefferson said that he wished “most to be remembered” for three things, specifying “the following inscription, & not a word more”: “Here was buried/Thomas Jefferson/Author of the Declaration of American Independence/of the Statute of Virginia for religious freedom/& Father of the University of Virginia” (see <https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/207.html>; I have updated Jefferson’s archaic spelling of “independance”).

14. For some nice maps and engravings, see <http://juel.iath.virginia.edu/node/109>. For Jefferson’s thinking, a good place to start is the Monticello site (see <https://www.monticello.org/research-education/thomas-jefferson-encyclopedia/jeffersons-plan-academical-village/>). As I discuss in the text, the idea of separate pavilions connected by covered walkways was inspired by quite practical considerations (curbing the spread of disease, minimizing the effects of fire, staying dry between classes). Woods suggests a possible philosophical inspiration for the phrase, “academical village,” noting that Jefferson—who was an admirer of the *Encyclopédie Methodique* (seeking to become its US distributor)—owned volume 61 (1789), on architecture. This volume included an extract from a Monsieur Paw’s research on the layout of Greek schools of philosophy. Students would build primitive huts around the teacher’s house. “An accumulation of such habitations,” Paw writes, “presented from afar the appearance of a village where one learned ethics like a trade” (quoted in Mary N. Woods, “Thomas Jefferson and the University of Virginia: Planning the Academic Village,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 44, no. 3 (1985): 272; Woods emphasizes this entire sentence).

15. What I call “humane letters” Jefferson lists as “Ideology, General Grammar, Ethics, Rhetoric, Belles Lettres, and the fine arts.” Later, he glosses “ideology” as “the doctrine of thought,” and says that “General Grammar explains the construction of language.” See Thomas Jefferson, “Report of the Board of Commissioners for the University of Virginia to the Virginia General Assembly, [4 August] 1818,” Founders Online, National Archives, <http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0289>.

16. Jefferson, “Report of the Board of Commissioners for the University of Virginia.”

17. Sullivan’s (forced) resignation was announced on June 10, 2012; she was reinstated on June 26.

18. Appointments to the seventeen-member board (then sixteen) are made by the governor of Virginia. The board arrayed against Sullivan “included lawyers, developers, a coal-mining executive and a beer distributor, but no voting member had an education background. Because of rapid turnover in the wake of the election of Gov. Bob

McDonnell, a Republican, it included only four members of the search committee that picked Sullivan two years before” (Andrew Rice, “Anatomy of a Campus Coup,” *New York Times Magazine*, September 11, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/magazine/teresa-sullivan-uva-ouster.html>). According to the *Washington Post*, “the campaign to remove Sullivan began around October [2011]” (Daniel de Vise, Jenna Johnson, and Anita Kumar, “University of Virginia president to step down,” *Washington Post*, Education Section, June 10, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/university-of-virginia-president-to-step-down/2012/06/10/gJQAKQDYSV_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.c9f3cf6b7fd8).

19. There is some uncertainty whether specific departments were targeted and, if so, which ones. Sullivan told the *Times* that the “elimination of the classics and German departments . . . [was not] ever discussed” (Rice, “Anatomy of a Campus Coup”). However, “based on conversations with more than a dozen current and former board members, state and university officials, faculty and others with direct knowledge of the events,” the *Post* reported that “The Dragas group . . . felt Sullivan lacked the mettle to trim or shut down programs that couldn’t sustain themselves financially, such as obscure academic departments in classics and German” (de Vise, Johnson and Kumar, “University of Virginia president to step down”).

20. Rice, “Anatomy of a Campus Coup.”

21. Responsibility Center Management (RCM) devolves budgeting to individual units as a means of promoting entrepreneurship and distributing responsibility for controlling costs. Though Harvard has practiced a form of decentralized budgeting since the early nineteenth century, RCM per se was introduced at The University of Pennsylvania in 1974. Use of the model has risen rapidly over the past fifteen years. In the span of just three years (2008–2011) the share of public research universities using RCM more than tripled (6.4% to 21.3%) (Kenneth C. Green, Scott Jaschik, and Doug Lederman, *The 2011 Inside Higher Ed Survey of College & University Business Officers*, 2011, https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/insidehigheredcfosurveyfinal7-5-11.pdf). From 2011 to 2015, the share of all universities using the model rose from 14.2% to 24% (Laura DeLancey and Susann deVries, “The Impact of Responsibility Center Management on Academic Libraries: An Exploratory Study,” *portal: Libraries and the Academy* 23, no. 1 [2023]: 8). At that time, more than 50% of leading public universities used RCM (Darren Deering and Daniel W. Lang, “Responsibility Center Budgeting and Management ‘Lite’ in University Finance: Why Is Rcb/Rcm Never Fully Deployed?,” *Planning for Higher Education Journal* 45, no. 3 [2017]: 94). Though RCM has likely spread further, *Inside HigherEd* stopped asking its budget-model question of university business officers in 2015.

22. Remarks of Rector Helen Dragas, Meeting with Vice Presidents and Deans, June 10, 2012. The transcript is posted under “Rector Dragas’ Remarks to VPs and

Deans” on *UVA Today*, <https://news.virginia.edu/content/rector-dragas-remarks-vps-and-deans>.

23. Disruptive innovation is the watchword of Clayton Christensen and his followers, first developed in *The Innovator’s Dilemma* and later extended, in a series of coauthored books, to schooling, health care, and higher education. See Clayton M. Christensen, *The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); Clayton M. Christensen, Michael B. Hill, and Curtis W. Johnson, *Disrupting Class: How Disruptive Innovation Will Change the Way the World Learns* (New York: McGrawHill, 2008); Clayton M. Christensen, Jerome H. Grossman, and Jason Hwang, *The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008); and Clayton M. Christensen and Henry J. Eyring, *The Innovative University: Changing the DNA of Higher Education* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2011). Not only did this last title come out the year before the UVA fiasco, but the application of Christensen’s brand to higher education (easy to predict in any case) had also been previewed much earlier in shorter pieces. See, for example, Clayton M. Christensen, Sally Aaron, and William Clark, “Disruption in Education,” *Educause Review* (January 10, 2003), <https://er.educause.edu/~er/media/files/articles/2007/1/erm0313.pdf?la=en>; and Clayton M. Christensen, Scott D. Anthony, and Erik A. Roth, “Disrupting Diplomas: The Future of Education,” in *Seeing What’s Next: Using the Theories of Innovation to Predict Industry Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 99–128.

For a nice critique of Christiansen’s thesis and especially of the bankrupt worldview for which his work has provided academic cover, see Jill Lepore, “The Disruption Machine: What the Gospel of Innovation Gets Wrong,” *New Yorker*, June 23, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/the-disruption-machine>. Lepore exposes Christiansen’s “hand-picked” and “murky” cases, “dubious” sources, and “questionable” logic, showing how the proofiness of the Christiansen school only increases as it seeks to spread its Hobbesian moral, “disrupt or be disrupted,” from the manufacture of “drygoods” to practices such as medicine, education, and journalism devoted to complex social goods. For an inside view of such disruption in progress, see Robinson’s case study of a midwestern state flagship “partnership” with Coursera (Rashid Robinson, “Learning On-Demand: Massive Open Online Courses and the Privatization of the Educational Experience,” PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2021).

24. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848), trans. Samuel Moore in cooperation with Engels (1888), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm>, chap. 1.

25. See “Rector Dragas’ Remarks to VPs and Deans.”

26. See David Brooks, “The Campus Tsunami,” Op-Ed, *New York Times*, May 3, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/opinion/brooks-the-campus-tsunami>

.html; and John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, “Chubb and Moe: Higher Education’s Online Revolution,” Commentary, *Wall Street Journal*, May 30, 2012 (updated), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304019404577416631206583286>. The emails, available at <http://www.readthehook.com/files/article-documents/kington-emails.pdf>, were obtained by a FOIA request from the UVA student newspaper, the *Daily Cavalier*, which broke this aspect of the story with a series of tweets containing snippets of the emails.

27. In the email that would later lead to his resignation, Kiernan speaks of two “important Virginia alums” working with him and Dragas on “this project” (i.e., replacing Sullivan with someone more disruptively innovative). One of these is Paul Tudor Jones; as far as I know, the other was never identified. See “Full Text of Darden Foundation Board Chair’s Email,” *Daily Progress* (June 12, 2012), https://dailyprogress.com/news/full-text-of-darden-foundation-board-chair-s-email/article_8abcfabc-a59c-5013-a190-a75408f22d8a.html.

28. Dragas asked Jones to serve as the board’s unofficial disruption consultant. Too busy, Jones recommended his Greenwich neighbor, Kiernan, the Goldman Sachs partner turned hedge fund manager and self-appointed spokesman for the “radical center.” On the relationships among Sullivan, Dragas, Jones, Kiernan, and others see Rice, “Anatomy of a Campus Coup.” For Kiernan’s foray into political theory, see Peter D. Kiernan, *Becoming China’s Bitch: And Nine More Catastrophes We Must Avoid Right Now. A Manifesto for the Radical Center* (Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing Company, 2012).

29. “Full Text of Darden Foundation Board Chair’s Email.”

30. “Full Text of Darden Foundation Board Chair’s Email.”

31. Paul Tudor Jones II, “OP-ED: Aspiring to Achieve Greatness,” *Daily Progress*, Sunday, June 17, https://dailyprogress.com/news/op-ed-aspiring-to-achieve-greatness/article_be382c81-3059-56a2-81c5-3eb85627c978.html.

32. As quoted in Nick DeSantis, “After Leadership Crisis Fueled by Distance-Ed Debate, UVa Will Put Free Classes Online,” Technology Section, *Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 17, 2012, <http://www.chronicle.com/article/After-Leadership-Crisis-Fueled/132917>.

33. DeSantis, “After Leadership Crisis.”

34. I say more about marketization and exchange-value in “Public Hearing” (see pp. 194–196) and “Job Prospects” (see pp. 206–207).

35. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation),” trans. Ben Brewster, in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 128. Here, Althusser is specifically pointing to the ‘obvious’ fact that production is the key to political-economy. He wants to interrupt that ideological commonsense so that we can come to see capital from

the “point of view of reproduction [of the means of production]” (128, emphasis removed).

36. This is a central theme in the writings of A. Bartlett Giamatti, the Renaissance scholar turned Yale president turned Major League Baseball commissioner. Giamatti sees both the university and the ballpark as instructive examples of the dialectic of freedom and order. See, for example, A. Bartlett Giamatti, *A Free and Ordered Space: The Real World of the University* (New York: Norton, 1988); and Kenneth S. Robson, ed., *A Great and Glorious Game: Baseball Writings of A. Bartlett Giamatti* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1998).

37. See <https://www.coursera.org/uva>. Not all of the ninety-one icons are clip art: ten are photographs (three shots of the US capitol, two unpotted plants, a close-up of the statue of Jefferson in front of the Rotunda, a detail from a painting, an overgrown landscape, a picture of JFK, and a bust of Patrick Henry).

38. “From Thomas Jefferson to Littleton W. Tazewell, 5 January 1805,” Founders Online, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-0958>.

39. The first quote is from a letter from Jefferson dated May 6, 1810, quoted in Woods, “Planning the Academic Village,” 269; the second comes from Jefferson’s previously cited 1805 letter to Tazewell. As Woods demonstrates, developments in hospital design were an important inspiration for Jefferson.

40. Jefferson, Letter to Thornton (May 9, 1817), quoted in Patricia C. Sherwood and Joseph Michael Lasala, “Education and Architecture: The Evolution of the University of Virginia’s Academical Village,” in *Thomas Jefferson’s Academical Village: The Creation of an Architectural Masterpiece*, ed. Richard Guy Wilson (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 17.

41. Woods, “Planning the Academic Village,” 273.

42. There is a nice photograph of the Pavilion III entry in Sherwood and Lasala, “Education and Architecture,” p. 25, fig. 17.

43. Sherwood and Lasala, “Education and Architecture,” 17.

44. Richard Guy Wilson, “A Classroom as Big as the Lawn: Jefferson Wanted Students to Learn All the Angles,” *Virginia Magazine*, https://uvamagazine.org/articles/a_classroom_as_big_as_the_lawn.

45. For a thoughtful critique of ten faulty ideas leading us to assume that the “economies of attention” on traditional campuses are inherently superior to those possible in online spaces, see Richard A. Lanham, “The Audit of Virtuality: Universities in the Attention Economy,” in *The Future of the City of Intellect*, ed. Steven Brint (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

46. Craig Steven Wilder, *Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America’s Universities* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).

47. See Jefferson, “Report of the Board of Commissioners for the University of Virginia,” pars. 3–4. I have left the word “White” uncapitalized as it is in the original.

48. Wilder, *Ebony and Ivy*, 137–138.

49. There are a range of institutions that simulate a college experience for the underclass. For eye-opening tours, see Marc Bousquet, *How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation* (New York: NYU Press, 2008), chap. 4; and Tressie McMillan Cottom, *Lower Ed: The Troubling Rise of For-Profit Colleges in the New Economy* (New York: The New Press, 2017). For two recent treatments of how higher education exacerbates class inequality, see Suzanne Mettler, *Degrees of Inequality: How the Politics of Higher Education Sabotaged the American Dream* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); and Anthony P. Carnevale, Peter Schmidt, and Jeff Strohl, *The Merit Myth: How Our Colleges Favor the Rich and Divide America* (New York: New Press, 2020).

50. Raj Chetty et al., “Income Segregation and Intergenerational Mobility across Colleges in the United States,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2020), 1569. The study includes all college students in the United States from 1999 to 2013. The “Ivy-Plus” category adds Duke, MIT, Stanford, and the University of Chicago to the eight Ivy League colleges.

51. Gregor Aisch et al., “Some Colleges Have More Students from the Top 1 Percent Than the Bottom 60. Find Yours,” *The Upshot*, *New York Times*, January 18, 2017, <https://nyti.ms/2jRcqJs>. To qualify as the 1%, you must have an annual income of more than \$630,000. This article and the *Times*’ interactive tool (<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/college-mobility/>) are based on the Chetty data. I use this tool for the comparison between UVA and Piedmont Community College.

52. One of the fascinating findings in Robinson’s study is that Coursera itself is ambivalent about that architecture, capriciously flip-flopping between a sequential rollout format (feels like college) and an on-demand format (feels like Netflix). See Robinson, “Learning On-Demand.”

53. Oakeshott, “The Idea of a University,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 103.

54. Herbert Spencer, “What Knowledge Is of Most Worth,” in *Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects* (London: Dent, [1861] 1911), <https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/eliot-essays-on-education-and-kindred-subjects-1861-1911>, pars. 7–8. The full passage reads:

In education, then, this is the question of questions, which it is high time we discussed in some methodic way. The first in importance, though the last to be considered, is the problem—how to decide among the conflicting claims

of various subjects on our attention. Before there can be a rational curriculum, we must settle which things it most concerns us to know; or, to use a word of Bacon's, now unfortunately obsolete—we must determine the relative values of knowledges.

55. Donna St. George, "U-Va.: A Donor in the Crisis," *Washington Post*, Education Section, August 4, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/u-va-a-donor-in-the-crisis/2012/08/04/b9e0e146-ce86-11e1-aa14-708bac2c7ee9_story.html.

56. Gerald Grant and David Riesman, *The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 377.

57. It is interesting to compare the staffing of the three units a decade later. Classics has faculty of eleven and a staff of two; Germanic Languages and Literatures has a faculty of fourteen and a staff of three. The new center (<http://www.uvacontemplation.org/>) has twelve directors (including associate directors), two research professors (one who is also a director), three managers, two coordinators, nine instructors, and nine interns.

58. David L. Kirp, *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line: The Marketing of Higher Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 136.

59. "Franchise fee" is what Darden's associate dean called it, as quoted in Kirp, *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line*, 137.

60. Kirp, *Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line*, 136. "Internal tax rate" is Snyder's term.

61. See University of Virginia, Darden School of Business, *Pillars, Issue 28 (Fall 2022)*, 17, https://issuu.com/dardenreport/docs/pillars_28_fall2022_online; and National Association of College and University Business Officers and TIAA (2023), "U.S. and Canadian Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Endowment Market Value and Change in Endowment Market Value from FY21 to FY22," <https://www.nacubo.org/Research/2022/NACUBO-TIAA-Study-of-Endowments>. The Darden endowment is 11.6 times greater than that of Virginia State University as a whole.

62. John T. Bethell, Richard M. Hunt, and Robert Shenton, "Harvard A to Z: From Aab to Zeph Greek—and Everything Crimson in Between," *Harvard Magazine*, May–June, 2004, <https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2004/05/harvard-a-to-z.html>.

63. Zachary M. Seward, "For Sale by Owner: Historic Colonial: FAS Sells Massachusetts Hall to Central Administration for Planned Office Expansion," *Harvard Crimson*, January 22, 2006, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/1/22/for-sale-by-owner-historic-colonial/>.

64. See, for example, Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All Administrative Faculty and Why It Matters* (New York: Oxford University Press,

2011), chaps. 1–3. In “Public Hearing” (193–194), I document another key budget pressure, the historic decline of state support.

65. Michael Delucchi, Richard B. Dadzie, Erik Dean, and Xuan Pham, “What’s that smell? Bullshit jobs in higher education,” *Review of Social Economy* (2021), DOI: 10.1080/00346764.2021.1940255, table 1, p. 3. I have added together two categories, “Executive/Administrative” and “Other Professionals.” Disaggregated, the rates of increase are 164% and 452% respectively. The authors base their calculations on data publicly available via the National Center for Educational Statistics.

66. Data from “Executive Compensation at Public and Private Colleges” (updated June 8, 2015), Facts and Figures, *Chronicle of Higher Education* (Chronicle.com) as analyzed by Andrew Irwin and Marjorie Wood for the Institute for Policy Studies (see http://www.ips-dc.org/one_percent_universities/) and reported in the *New York Times* (see <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/fat-cat-administrators-at-the-top-25.html?ref=topics>).

67. See <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2011/10/the-newest-live-in-the-oldest/>.

68. Mario Savio, December 2, 1964. Available on YouTube. See, for example, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tcx9BJRadfw>.

SOUL ACTION

1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar,” in *Essays and Lectures*, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1983), 57. The title of my essay is also inspired by this line from Dewey: “The supreme mark and criterion of a teacher . . . [is] insight into soul-action” (John Dewey, “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” in *John Dewey on Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1904) 1974], 319).

2. R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938).

3. Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, ed. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [1846] 1941), 166.

4. On the “whole child” as a floating signifier whose value can be presumed as self-evident, see Bronwen M. A. Jones, *Educating the Neo-Liberal Whole Child: A Genealogical Approach* (London: Routledge, 2022), 7–8. Jones offers a Foucauldian reading of the contemporary turn (in the UK) to well-being, emotion, self-regulation, and character as an expression of neoliberal governmentality and bio-power. Interestingly, she notes how these new policy initiatives/discourses simultaneously produce and negate the object on which they focus, creating “a kind of Schrödinger’s whole child” (168; I have corrected the spelling of Schrödinger).

5. Roger Waters, “Another Brick in the Wall, Part II,” from Pink Floyd, *The Wall* (Harvest/Columbia Records, 1979), <https://genius.com/Pink-floyd-another-brick-in-the-wall-pt-2-lyrics>.

6. Dead Kennedys (lyrics by Jello Biafra and John Greenway), “California Über Alles,” *Fresh Fruit for Rotting Vegetables* (Cherry Red Tentacles, 1980). Adapted from <https://genius.com/Dead-kennedys-california-uber-alles-lyrics>.

7. “Repressive desublimation” is a term coined by Marcuse to name the process by which advanced capitalism controls not by thwarting but by infantilizing desire. See Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). *Eros*, the force by which we are drawn to make contact with the real even while inevitably frustrated by its independence from our wishes, is traded for the frustration-free packaging of libido in commodity culture. Conscience disintegrates along with the decline of the reality principle; “naughty” impulses are liberated; dissent diverted.

8. For demonstrations of these theses, see, for example, Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” trans. Denver Lindley, in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin, [1958] 1977); Chris Higgins, “Worlds of Practice: Macintyre’s Challenge to Applied Ethics,” in *The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); and Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 35–39.

9. Richard Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (New York: Penguin, 1999), 272.

10. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), part III.

11. For Oakeshott, it is because we share the condition of learner that we cannot be said to share a nature. For example, “Each man is his own self-enacted ‘history;’ and the expression ‘human nature’ stands only for our common and inescapable engagement: to become by learning” (Michael Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989], 21; cf. 28). The essential historicity and linguisticity of human experience, our embeddedness in tradition, is the central theme of Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, 2nd rev., Continuum Impacts ed. (New York: Continuum, [1960] 2004); *Lebensformen* or “forms of life” is the related concept famously developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Reissued German-English ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, [1953] 1997). Gadamer links his own view to Wittgenstein’s only once in *Truth and Method*, but approvingly (561).

12. Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Education Is Self-Education,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35, no. 4 (2001). “These analogies of clay and wax,” Oakeshott writes,

“of receptacles to be filled and empty rooms to be furnished, have nothing to do with learners and learning” (Oakeshott, “Learning and Teaching,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 44). For Oakeshott’s conception of our inalienable freedom as self-interpreting animals who actively shape our formative worlds, see Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 18–23. I unpack his argument in “New Student Orientation” and “Job Prospects” (see pp. 103–104 and 251–253).

13. The dialectic of influence and individuation has occasioned a discipline-defying, genre-expanding conversation among the independent-minded, including classic essays, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in *Essays and Lectures*, and Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” trans. William Arrowsmith, in *Unmodern Observations: Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, ed. William Arrowsmith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1874] 1990); an actor’s reflections, such as Vasily Toporkov, *Stanislavski in Rehearsal*, trans. Jean Benedetti (New York: Routledge, [1949–1950] 2004); a literary critic’s psychology of poetry—I refer to Bloom’s series of “revisionist” works beginning with Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); intellectual history in an existentialist key, see Robbie McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971); and belletrist ruminations on apprenticeship, such as George Steiner, *Lessons of the Masters*, The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). There is also a renewed interest in questions of imitation, initiation, and emulation within philosophy of education. The conversation staked out by R. S. Peters, in “Education as Initiation,” in *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, ed. R. D. Archambault (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), and by Philip W. Jackson, in “The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching,” in *The Practice of Teaching* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986), and extended by Bryan Warnick, in *Imitation and Education* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), has been joined by some interesting more-recent work—for example, in Timothy McDonough, “Initiation, Not Indoctrination: Confronting the Grotesque in Cultural Education,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 43, no. 7 (2011); Mark E. Jonas and Drew W. Chambers, “The Use and Abuses of Emulation as a Pedagogical Practice,” *Educational Theory* 67, no. 3 (2017); and Douglas W. Yacek, *The Transformative Classroom: Philosophical Foundations and Practical Applications* (New York: Routledge, 2021).

14. McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances*. At once erudite and existentially charged, McClintock not only writes about Ortega (both his experience of and views on self-formation) but writes with Ortega to his generation about their own formative tasks.

15. McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances*, 37.

16. It is no stretch to add Ortega to Rorty’s edifying duo. All three thinkers drew from Dilthey and saw history as reason’s medium and not merely its object or captor. For Gadamer’s appreciation of Ortega’s development of Dilthey’s thought,

see Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Dilthey and Ortega: The Philosophy of Life,” (1985) in *Hermeneutics between History and Philosophy: The Selected Writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, vol. 1, eds. and trans. Pol Vandavelde and Arun Iyer (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

17. McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances*, 36.

18. McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances*, 36.

19. McClintock, *Man and His Circumstances*, 36.

20. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), 8.

21. I return to this idea that, while students must drive the formative process, we must awaken their formative agency in “New Student Orientation,” “Wide Awake” (see the sections An Allegory of Arrival and Who is the Formative Educator?), and “Job Prospects” (see pp. 208–209).

22. In thinking through the implications of this distinction, I benefited from discussions with Jeremy Alexander, Jeff Bloechl, Samantha Ha, Greg Kalscheur, Brian Robinette, and Stanton Wortham in a reading group at the Lynch School of Education and Human Development at Boston College.

23. Friedrich Nietzsche, “From On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1976), 47.

24. Antonio Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003), chap. 3.

25. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1980] 2003).

26. For a genealogy of the idea of the self as interior space, see “Inwardness,” part II in Taylor, *Sources of the Self*.

27. See “well-turned, adj,” OED Online, June 2020, Oxford University Press, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/227669?redirectedFrom=well-turned&> (accessed July 22, 2020). I have expanded an abbreviation and adjusted to American spelling.

28. This is fragment (DK) B101: “ἔδιζήσαμην ἐμewotón” (attributed by Plutarch in *Against Colotes*), translated by Haxton. See Heraclitus, *Fragments*, trans. Brooks Haxton (New York: Penguin, [c. 500 BCE] 2003), §80, p. 51.

29. This is fragment (DK) B45: “ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροιο πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει” (attributed by Diogenes Laertius), translated by Wheelwright. See Philip Wheelwright, *Heraclitus* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1959] 1981), §42, p. 58.

30. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, [1981] 2007), chap. 15.

31. Iris Murdoch, “Metaphysics and Ethics” [1957], in *Existentialists and Mystics*, ed. Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1998), 75. I unpack this idea with the help of Oakeshott in “Job Prospects” (see pp. 251–253).

32. This is fragment (DK) B115: “ψυχῆς ἐστὶ λόγος ἑαυτὸν αὐξῶν” (attributed to Socrates by Stobaeus). Its proximity to other Heraclitean fragments in the Stobaeus anthology and resonance with other Heraclitean observations about the soul have led to its tentative inclusion among the fragments. The editors of the Loeb edition suggest specifically that a “comparison with [B45] makes its attribution to Heraclitus plausible”; see André Laks and Glenn W. Most, eds., *Early Greek Philosophy*, vol. 3: *Early Ionian Thinkers, Part 2*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 189n1.

I have combined elements of multiple translations. As an alternate translation, Laks and Most offer “Soul is an account that increases itself” (Laks and Most, *Early Greek Philosophy*, vol. 3, p. 189n1). McKirahan/Curd have “The soul has a self-increasing logos” (Patricia Curd, ed., *A Presocratics Reader* [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011], 45). The translation “To the soul, belongs the self-multiplying Logos” appears in Hermann Diels, “Heraclitus,” in *The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 6, *Fiction-Hyksos*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914), 593. (The source of Diels’s translation is unclear. He cites only his own Greek/German *Fragments der Versokratiker* and the Bywater volume, which omits B115.) In rendering B115, I have also drawn on Albert Cook, “Heraclitus and the Conditions of Utterance,” *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics* (New Series) 4, no. 2 (1975): 453–454. Cook reads B115 as an echo of B1’s “when they make trial of words and deeds,” offering this interpretive gloss: “human life is properly seen as an increment (*auxon*) of speech-acts” (454).

33. As Lear has argued, the divorce between philosophy and psychology has simultaneously crippled our ability to answer the central philosophical question, How should I live?, and to advance the core psychological project of “working out the logic of the soul” (see Jonathan Lear, “Preface: The King and I,” in *Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998], 7–9). Throughout his work, Lear works to mend this gap, pursuing philosophical and psychological (specifically psychoanalytic) ideas together, “with a sense of liveliness and openness” (15). My colleague, David Goodman, has arranged fruitful marriage counseling for psychology and the humanities with the launch of the Center for Psychological Humanities and Ethics in the Lynch School of Education and Human Development at Boston College (<https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/schools/lynch-school/sites/Psychological-Humanities-Ethics.html>).

34. McClintock has developed the concept of formative justice across a number of works, culminating in Robbie McClintock, *Formative Justice* (New York: Collaboratory for Liberal Learning, 2019). For his earliest published formulation, see Robbie McClintock, *Homeless in the House of Intellect: Formative Justice and Education*

as an Academic Study (New York: Laboratory for Liberal Learning, 2005), 72–101. Here I am quoting from a definition of the concept McClintock posted on his former website (see, <http://robbiemcclintock.com/shelving/C-12-Form-Just.html>, accessed March 26, 2017). This is close to the formulation in the abstract of Robbie McClintock, “Formative Justice: The Regulative Principle of Education,” *Teachers College Record* 118, no. 10 (2016), 1. The phrase I elided is “and groups” as here I am emphasizing the personal side of formative justice. Note though that the distinction between distributive and formative justice is not a distinction between justice at the collective and individual levels. As McClintock makes clear, formative questions are at once existential/ethical and social-political.

35. For an antidote to the fantasy that architects design in only three dimensions, and for a salutary metaphor of formative experience, see *Stewart Brand, How Buildings Learn: What Happens After They're Built* (New York: Penguin, 1994).

36. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 224.

37. See Plato, 246a–253e, for example, Plato, “Phaedrus,” trans. R. Hackforth, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, [c. 380 BCE] 1961), 493–500.

38. Plato, “Phaedrus,” 500 (523e).

39. Giovanni Ferrari, *Love among the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 192, 194.

40. Ferrari, *Love among the Cicadas*, 200.

41. This is Ferrari's translation of Plato, 253d3–d6. See Ferrari, *Love among the Cicadas*, 185.

42. This is not to suggest that Plato would want to put *thumos* in the driver's seat even when it is oriented to the esteem of the temperate. In the *Republic*, Plato clearly denigrates both the psychology and politics of timocracy where life is organized around “the love of victories and honors” (Plato, *Republic*, trans. C. D. C. Reeve [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, (c. 380 BCE) 2004], 243 [548c5]).

43. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or on Education*, Introduction, Translation, and Notes by Allan Bloom, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books [1762] 1979).

44. To get in touch with this is to experience what Rousseau calls “*le sentiment de l'existence*.” I explore this concept further in “Wide Awake” (see p. 127).

45. Cf. Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. I concur with Neuhouser that the traditional contrast between a healthy (*amour de soi*) and corrupt (*amour propre*) form of self-love captures neither the importance of nor internal divisions in the concept of *amour propre* as Rousseau develops it (see p. 15, and p. 15n24).

46. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1807] 1977), 111–118; Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love*:

Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), for example 12, 32–36, and passim.

47. “L’homme en tout et par tout, n’est que rapiècement et bigarrure.” I take Cotton’s “wholly and throughout” for “en tout et par tout” and Frame’s “patchwork and motley” for “rapiècement et bigarrure.” See Michel de Montaigne, “We Taste Nothing Pure,” in *The Complete Works of Michel De Montaigne*, vol. 6 (Charlottesville, VA: Intalex Corp., 2017), 140 (Reprint of Michel de Montaigne, *The Works of Michel de Montaigne: 10 volumes with letters and notes on the life of Montaigne*, trans. Charles Cotton, ed. and rev. W. Carew Hazlitt, with an introductory essay by Ralph Waldo Emerson [New York: Edwin C. Hill, 1910]); and Michel de Montaigne, “We Taste Nothing Pure,” trans. Donald M. Frame, in *The Complete Works: Essays, Travel Journals, Letters* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 621.

48. Michel de Montaigne, “On the Inconsistency of Our Actions,” in *Complete Works (Cotton)*, vol. 3, 240, 246, 246.

49. Montaigne, “On the Inconsistency of Our Actions,” in *Complete Works (Frame)*, 290, 294.

50. Montaigne, “On the Inconsistency of Our Actions,” in *Complete Works (Frame)*, 294.

51. Simone Weil, “The Needs of the Soul,” trans. Arthur Wills, in *The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind* (London: Routledge, [1949] 2002).

52. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, [1930]), 16–18.

53. Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” trans. John Reddick, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, [1930] 2003), chap. 6; and Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 77ff.

54. Montaigne, “On the Inconsistency of Our Actions,” in *Complete Works (Cotton)*, 241.

55. Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 167.

56. Quoted in Helen Molesworth, “Imaginary Landscape,” in *Leap before You Look: Black Mountain College, 1933–1957*, ed. Helen Molesworth (Boston: Institute for Contemporary Art, 2015), 51.

57. Henry David Thoreau, “I Am a Parcel of Vain Strivings Tied,” in *The Portable Thoreau*, ed. Carl Bode (New York: Penguin Books, [1841] 1977).

58. We could also read “once” to mean that, far from securing the narrator’s diverse inclinations securely, the wisp of straw was only coiled around a single time.

59. The phrase “differentiated unity” comes from Jonathan Lear, “Restlessness, Phantasy, and the Concept of Mind,” in *Open Minded*, 89. Compare the opening of Jonathan Lear, “Inside and Outside the Republic,” in *Open Minded*, 219.

60. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 308.
61. Dewey writes, “Any one occupation loses its meaning and becomes a routine keeping busy at something to the degree in which it is isolated from other interests” (Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 307).
62. On the limitations of the moral-dilemma approach, see Edmund L. Pincoffs, “Quandary Ethics,” *Mind* 80 (1971).
63. Maxine Greene, “Wide-Awakeness and the Moral Life,” in *Landscapes of Learning* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978), 43. It was in Greene’s classes where I encountered the concept of “wide-awakeness” which she developed in dialogue with writers such as Thoreau, Woolf, Dewey, Camus, Arendt, and Schutz, always sure to model how we might grapple with our own moral somnolence through encounters with the arts and attention to the everyday “plagues” around us. The term itself comes from Alfred Schutz, whose definition serves as an epigraph in “Wide Awake” (see p. 119), an essay that aims to build upon this tradition.
64. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Modern Library, [1922] 1930), 258.
65. This quote appears as an epigraph to Bernard Cooper, *My Avant-Garde Education: A Memoir* (New York: Norton, 2015). Thanks to Cristiano Casalini for pointing me to this book.
66. Various thinkers including Kant, Weber, and Habermas have spoken to the affordances and limitation of this disjoining. In *Worlds Apart* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1963), Owen Barfield stages a reengagement across these divides. In *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), Stephen Toulmin sketches the road not traveled. By contrast, Bruno Latour asserts via his title that, in fact, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
67. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 70–87.
68. Seamus Heaney, “Song” (1979), in *Opened Ground: Selected Poems, 1966–1996* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1998), 173.
69. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 77.
70. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 74. I have removed a parenthetical note from the translators that “experiencing” translates *erlebende*. Gadamer contrasts experience as psychological uploading (*Erlebnis*) and as intersubjective unfolding (*Erfahrung*).
71. J. R. Oppenheimer, “Atomic Weapons,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 90, no. 1 (1946): 7.
72. Quoted in *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance Hearing*, edited by Richard Polenberg (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 46.
73. See Max Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik Und Der Geist Des Kapitalismus: Vollständige Ausgabe*, ed. Dirk Kaesler (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2004), 201; and Max

Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, Routledge Classics ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 128. Thanks to Anke Pinkert for discussing the connotations of “*Fachmenschen*.” On Weber’s ventriloquization of Nietzsche, see Stephen A. Kent, “Weber, Goethe, and the Nietzschean Allusion: Capturing the Source of the ‘Iron Cage’ Metaphor,” *Sociological Analysis* 44, no. 4 (1983): 301–302.

74. Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, Oxford World Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1931] 1998), 83.

75. Here I am mining the dance scene itself for evidence that Jinny’s shifting responses are authentic and agentic. Woolf also makes this point by bookending the scene with glimpses into Bernard’s and Rhoda’s struggles with authenticity. Attempting to write a letter to “the girl with whom he is passionately in love,” Bernard is strangled by self-consciousness (Woolf, *The Waves*, 62). He narrates the composition process as if he were his future biographer; he wonders how someone intimately careless would cross his t’s. Rhoda draws an explicit contrast between Jinny’s agency at the dance and her own struggle to find such genuine fluency, lamenting that “Jinny rides like a gull on the wave, dealing her looks adroitly here and there, saying this and saying that, with truth. But I lie; I prevaricate” (86).

76. On *metis* see, for example, Nicholas C. Burbules, “2001: A Philosophical Odyssey,” in *Philosophy of Education 2001*, ed. Suzanne Rice (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2002). For a pithy definition of *virtú* see Arendt, “What Is Authority?,” in *Between Past and Future*, 137. In Woolf’s portrait of Jinny, I see a counterpoint to the masculinist tradition in which integrity is viewed as a rigid and fragile thing threatened by relational responsiveness, which it reads as vicious changeability and codes as female. Strange as it may seem—after all, Machiavelli names this excellence of meeting the moment after the word for man—I am suggesting that we can see Homer and Machiavelli (and we could add Aristotle on *phronesis*) as precursors in this countertradition.

77. Woolf, *The Waves*, 84.

78. I take this to be one of the great lessons of psychoanalysis from Freud and Winnicott to Jonathan Lear and Adam Phillips.

79. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, [1918] 1946), 147. I have removed the scare quotes around the phrase “moral achievement” and around the word “inconvenient” in the phrase “inconvenient facts.”

80. *New York Times* and Serial Productions, *Nice White Parents* (reported by Chana Joffe-Walt; produced by Julie Snyder), Episode 5, “We Know It When We See It,” August 20, 2020 (<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/podcasts/nice-white-parents-school.html?action=click&module=audio-series-bar®ion=header&pgtype=Article>), 10:42–11:38.

81. Arlie Hochschild, *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right* (New York: New Press, 2018), chap. 2.

82. Disavowal works not by denying facts but by erasing the connections between them, rendering them inert. Octave Mannoni captured this canny psychic strategy in a phrase (Octave Mannoni, “Je Sais Bien, Mais Quand Même” [1964], in *Jacques Lacan: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory*, ed. Slavoj Žižek, vol. 1: *Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice* [London: Routledge, 2003], 125–144). Combining elements of Morag’s and Myer’s translations best captures this pseudo-accommodating, can’t-be-bothered shrug: “Yes, I know, but anyway . . .” (Talia Morag, *Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason* [London: Routledge, 2016], 236; and, Clive Myer, “An Interview with Noel Burch: Playing with Toys by the Wayside,” in *Critical Cinema: Beyond the Theory of Practice*, ed. Clive Myer [New York: Columbia University Press, 2011], 285).

Wallace-Wells (building on Robinson Jeffers and Samuel Scheffler) makes the point that it is part of the broader pattern of “civilizational disavowal,” our “day-to-day . . . denial of fragility . . . [and] our own mortality,” to locate responsibility in the outright climate change denialists, who are only a force in one country, if a rich and powerful one. Reading this as a case of US “narcissism,” Wells sees the complacent, soft denialism practiced by virtually all of us as the true culprit. See David Wallace-Wells, *The Uninhabitable Earth: Life after Warming* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2019), 209, 293, 149.

I offer an extended case study of disavowal in The Last Butler section of “Job Prospects.”

83. Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 147.

84. From J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The Open Mind” (1948), quoted in Walker Gibson, ed., *The Limits of Language* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962), 50–51.

85. William James to Henry James, March 10, 1887. Whitehead mentions this quote at the beginning of *Science and the Modern World* (Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* [New York: Free Press, 1925]). I found it through Bell, who quotes the Whitehead passage as an epigraph in Daniel Bell, *The Reforming of General Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). For the dating of the letter, see Robert D. Richardson, *William James: In the Maelstrom of Modernism* (Boston: Mariner/Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 297 and 562n18.

86. My description of personal styles as patterns of disturbance is inspired by Lydia Davis, *Varieties of Disturbance: Stories* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).

87. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quoted in Jane Sherron De Hart, *Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Life* (New York: Knopf, 2018), 27.

88. Hope Edelman, *Motherless Daughters: The Legacy of Loss* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994), 272.

89. Lithwick, in Dahlia Lithwick and Jeffrey Rosen, “Jeffrey Rosen on Conversations with RBG,” *Live at the National Constitution Center* (podcast), November 12,

2019 (<https://constitutioncenter.org/news-debate/podcasts/jeffrey-rosen-on-conversations-with-rbg>), 3:06.

90. *Bush v. Gore*, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); *Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.*, 550 U.S. 618 (2007); *Shelby County v. Holder*, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

91. Lithwick, in Lithwick and Rosen, “Jeffrey Rosen on *Conversations with RBG*,” 4:30.

92. Jeffrey Rosen, *Conversations with RBG: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Life, Love, Liberty, and Law* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2019), 150 and 15.

93. Ginsburg, quoted in Rosen, *Conversations with RBG*, 138. In 2007, both Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens went on record about the court’s rapid rightward shift. In her dissent, Ginsburg notes that no new legal principle emerged in the fifteen years since *Casey*, only now the court “is differently composed” (*Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124 [2007]). Stevens concludes his dissent in the consolidated resegregation cases with this testimony: “It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision” (*Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*, 551 U.S. 701 [2007]).

94. This is Lithwick’s characterization of the picture of RBG’s judicial approach that emerges in Rosen’s book, in Lithwick and Rosen, “Jeffrey Rosen on *Conversations with RBG*,” 4:46.

95. This is Rosen relaying a statement of Ginsburg’s from a prior interview in Jeffrey Rosen and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “RBG on Life, Love, Liberty, and Law,” *We the People* (podcast), December 19, 2019 (<https://constitutioncenter.org/news-debate/podcasts/rbg-on-life-love-liberty-and-law>), 6:08.

96. Ginsburg, in Rosen and Ginsburg, *RBG on Life, Love, Liberty, and Law*, 6:26.

97. See Rosen, *Conversations with RBG*, 223–224. I am quoting from Rosen’s recounting of this exchange in Lithwick and Rosen, “Jeffrey Rosen on *Conversations with RBG*,” 6:43.

98. Ginsburg, quoted in Rosen, *Conversations with RBG*, 224.

99. Notwithstanding the recent setback represented by *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization*, 597 U.S. ____ (2022).

100. James McCosh, *The New Departure in College Education: Being a Reply to President Eliot’s Defence of It in New York, Feb. 24, 1885* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1885), 4.

101. Eugene Lyle Seeley, Todd Goddard, and Ronald Mellado Miller, “Ge-Whiz! How Students Choose Their General Education Classes,” *Journal of Applied Research in Higher Education* 10, no. 3 (2018): 326–327. To be fair, scheduling convenience

was essentially tied with “personal interest.” There were two items, one asking students to rank methods of selecting courses and another to “choose all that apply.” On the ranking item, the four most popular responses, summing the frequencies that were top-ranked and second-ranked, were, “What best fits my schedule” (62.4%); “Personal interest” (59.7%); “Recommendations from my academic advisors or professors” (29.5%); and “I check internet sites to find the best professors” (24.7%). However, “Personal interest” was top-ranked more often than “What best fits my schedule” (32.3% vs. 28.5%) and was also more frequently selected on the “choose all that apply” item (68.8% vs. 66.8%). Depressingly, a small but not insignificant number of students (3.15%) could not recall a principle of selection; another portion (2.66%) admitted to choosing randomly.

102. Clarissa A. Thompson, Michele Eodice, and Phuoc Tran, “Student Perceptions of General Education Requirements at a Large Public University: No Surprises?” *Journal of General Education* 64, no. 4 (2015): 285.

103. Elizabeth A. Armstrong and Laura T. Hamilton, *Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

104. I served on the UIUC faculty from 2006 to 2019, where I participated in the faculty senate and Campus Faculty Association, served on the Gen Ed Board and various initiatives to strengthen the humanities, and was one the faculty leaders of the Campus Conversation in Undergraduate Education (CCUE) that led to the creation of an experimental integrative track within Gen Ed. It is an institution I know well, and for which I have a great deal of respect. The problems I go on to point out are shared by most comprehensive research universities. That humane learning continues to flourish in such a massive and, it must be said, technicist university is thanks to the living example and endless efforts of specific individuals. I was fortunate to be in Urbana during a period when the late Nancy Abelmann served as associate vice chancellor for research in the arts, humanities, and related fields; when Lauren Goodlad was heading up the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory and then CCUE; and when Antoinette Burton, now director of the Humanities Research Institute, was tirelessly rallying us to defend the humanities in their own terms even while securing conditions for dynamic, new, interdisciplinary and public-oriented humanistic work.

105. 7 U.S.C. 301, §4. In discussing the Morrill Act, it is important to remember that land grants were predicated on land seizures through forced removal of native nations. The land that was “granted” from the federal government to the State of Illinois was first taken from the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Piankashaw, Wea, Miami, Mascoutin, Odawa, Sauk, Mesquaki, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Ojibwe, and Chickasaw Nations. See the UIUC land acknowledgement statement here: https://chancellor.illinois.edu/land_acknowledgement.html. In the fall of 2021, UIUC enrolled thirteen Native American students among its 33,851 undergraduates (see <https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/FacsimileView.aspx?surveyNumber=15&unitId=145637&year=2021>).

106. *First Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Illinois Industrial University: From Their Organization, March 12, 1867, to the Close of the Academic Year, June 18, 1868* (Springfield: Bakee, Bailhache & Co., 1868), 20–21, <https://digital.library.illinois.edu/items/600975d0-5cd8-0132-3334-0050569601ca-2>. The quotations in the remainder of this paragraph and the following one are all drawn from p. 49 of this report. “Pierian fount” refers to the Macedonian spring said to be the source of inspiration for the Muses, and specifically to the famous couplet from Alexander Pope’s “Essay on Criticism”: “A little learning is a dang’rous thing; / Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.”

107. This language was updated sometime between 2015 and 2017. The older language is preserved at <https://web.archive.org/web/20150218222514/https://courses.illinois.edu/gened/DEFAULT/DEFAULT>.

108. Plato, *Republic*, 208–223 (513e–519d); Tara Westover, *Educated* (New York: Random House, 2018).

109. In later essays, I explore two counterexamples: Oakeshott’s (re)orientation remarks at the London School of Economics in 1961 (“New Student Orientation”) and John Rice’s initial advisement of a Black Mountain College student in 1933 (“Wide Awake,” pp. 124–128).

110. This is the cover image of the paperback edition of David Shrigley, *What the Hell Are You Doing? The Essential David Shrigley* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2012).

111. This is what we have set out to provide in the Transformative Educational Studies program in the Lynch School of Education and Human Development at Boston College. Interrupting instrumentalism is the topic (and point) of “New Student Orientation.”

112. See <https://courses.illinois.edu/gened/DEFAULT/DEFAULT>. The old language is retained in slightly modified form as the tagline for the Gen Ed link on the course explorer page (<https://courses.illinois.edu/>), which reads, “Browse core requirements students must satisfy in order to graduate.”

113. For a nice close-reading of another case of discursive decay from founding ideals to modern mission-speak, see the opening of William Deresiewicz, “The Neoliberal Arts: How College Sold Its Soul to the Market,” *Harper’s* (September 2015).

114. Indeed, in the famous examples of robust programs of general education, we tend to see the founding of a new institution (Black Mountain College; St. Johns College) or of a new autonomous division within a university (The Hutchins College at the University of Chicago).

115. Here I develop further the critique of Responsibility Center Management (RCM) broached in “Campus Tour” (see pp. 9–10 and 269n21).

116. This is from an explanation of RCM budgeting from the CFO of Indiana University. The page no longer exists but a screenshot (from August 8, 2012) is preserved in the IUPUI archives at <https://archives.iupui.edu/handle/2450/6269>.

117. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, [1963] 2001). The term “university” derives from the Latin word “universus” meaning whole or entire. However, the term did not originally refer to a “universality of learning,” but rather to an incorporated guild of scholars (teachers, students, or both), able to bargain collectively with townspeople prone to rent gauging and other profiteering. See Charles Homer Haskins, *The Rise of the Universities* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 9.

118. Abraham Flexner, *Universities: American, English, German* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, [1930] 1994), 178–179; quoted in Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 5.

119. Flexner, *Universities*, 235, 231–232. Here, Flexner is contrasting the University of London with the “unity of spirit and design” still evident at Oxford and Cambridge (Flexner, *Universities*, 234). However, as Kerr notes, what Flexner says of London echoes his critique of “Harvard and American universities” (Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 5). Flexner sees US universities as increasingly disjointed, equating modernization with expansion in every direction at once: “The result is plain: the American universities are open to innovation; that is excellent; but, alas, they have been invaded indiscriminately by things both good and bad” (Flexner, *Universities*, 221).

120. Quoted in Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 15.

121. Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 6.

122. Kerr, *Uses of the University*, 15.

123. David B. Truman, “Foreword,” in Bell, *Reforming of General Education*, vii.

124. See <http://catalog.illinois.edu/undergraduate/>.

125. This book’s closing essay, “Job Prospects,” begins with a closer look at these interdepartmental hunger games.

126. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 30.

127. I did this count in 2019. See <https://courses.illinois.edu/gened/2019/fall/>, which links to each category’s list of courses.

128. This is a rough calculation. Some cross-listed courses appear twice on a list, once under each department. If we reduce each number by 10%, we get $3 \times 51 \times 130 \times 140 \times 192 \times 444 \times 443 \times 83 \times 82 \times 28 \times 69 \times 178 \times 177 = 4.36 \times 10^{25}$ permutations. However, many courses meet multiple requirements (at UIUC these are known as “double dippers” and “triple dippers”). Assuming a student who takes no more Gen Ed courses than necessary, this greatly reduces the number of thirteen course pathways. At the same time, it adds new shorter pathways, ranging from seven to twelve courses, each with a huge number of variants.

129. Because astronomers must make a series of highly debatable assumptions in counting stars, estimates range widely from 1×10^{20} to 1×10^{24} .

130. The dates 1828 and 1885 serve as useful bookends for a period of rapid change in US higher education. From the founding of Harvard in 1636, into the early republic, we find small denominational colleges—Frederick Rudolph’s “temples of piety and intellect”—offering a prescribed curriculum (Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University: A History* [Athens: University of Georgia Press, (1962) 1990], 3.) Already by 1828, the rumblings of an expanded, more egalitarian, and more research-oriented university had reached New Haven, prompting Yale to issue its famous defense of a unified, Greco-Roman-Christian curriculum (The so-called Yale Report is available online. It was first published as *Reports on the Course of Instruction in Yale College; By a Committee of the Corporation, and the Academical Faculty* [New Haven, CT: Hezekiah Howe, 1828]. For the key opening essay with helpful notes, see Jeremiah Day, “Course of Instruction in Yale College,” in *The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary History*, ed. Bruce A. Kimball [Lanham, MD: University Press of America (1828) 2010]). Though it advocated “gradual changes,” opposing only the notion that the traditional college should be “broken up” and “new-modelled,” the Yale Report was long read as a rearguard action (Day, “Course of Instruction,” 265, emphasis original). “Obviously the Yale Report was no invitation to the future,” Rudolph writes, going on to conclude that it had forestalled modernization through the civil war, consigning “thousands of students to thousands of days of boredom” (Rudolph, *American College and University*, 134, 135). Historians disagree over just how homogeneous, rigid, and rote the antebellum colleges were; for a thoughtful appraisal of this debate, see Bruce A. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986), Appendix 1.

More recently, historians have tended to view the Yale Report as doing exactly what Rudolph denies, issuing an invitation to the future. As Jack Lane argues, by defending the traditional curriculum on the grounds that it promotes mental discipline, the Yale Report fatefully casts liberal learning not as an integral part of the search for wisdom or civic virtue, but as an instrument for acquiring what is itself another flexible instrumentality. As Lane plays out the story, it goes like this: The writers wanted to save the classical curriculum, and mental discipline justified that course of study. This was a grave mistake because it played into the hands of the enemy, those clamoring for an instrumental collegiate education. They now had only to sever the umbilical connection that the report had established between the classics and mental discipline, or they could discredit mental training and thus collapse the arch of classical liberal education. Actually, they did both. Although forced to the fringes of American higher education by the Yale Report, new fields and disciplines slowly but surely made their way into the college curriculum during the nineteenth century. Late in the century, when psychologists discredited faculty psychology and the natural and social sciences won academic respectability, most of them entered the curriculum as discrete professional disciplines bereft of larger moral/public ends. (Jack C. Lane “The Yale Report of 1828 and Liberal Education: A Neorepublican Manifesto,” *History of Education Quarterly* 27, no. 3

(1987): 337; cf. Jurgen Herbst, “The Yale Report of 1828,” *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 11, no. 2 [2004]).

Thus, by the time we arrive at the famous Eliot-McCosh debate of 1885, the question has already shifted from how to evolve the prescribed curriculum to how to rein in Eliot’s ascendant and “revolutionary philosophy of virtually total curricular freedom for undergraduates” (George M. Marsden, *The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], 199). Far from harking back to eighteenth-century Oxbridge, McCosh’s objections to Eliot’s position already anticipate the compromise position under which we still operate, with free election hedged by concentration and distribution requirements. While McCosh shows some rhetorical flair, the contrast he draws is relatively modest one. “I hold that in a college with the variety there should be a unity,” he declares (McCosh, *The New Departure*, 16). “In Harvard,” McCosh explains, “everything is scattered like the star dust out which worlds are formed” (16). By contrast, his Princeton organizes its diverse subjects into three “compacted heads,” representing the “Trinity of studies: in Language and Literature, in Science, and in Philosophy” (11n1, 11). While our “compacted heads” differ somewhat, already evident are the basic rationale and architecture of the breadth requirements that would be put in place by Eliot’s successor, A. Lawrence Lowell, in 1909. As Lowell was fond of saying, an educated person should “know a little bit of everything and one thing well.” (For this version of Lowell’s adage, see Arthur Stanwood Pier, *The Story of Harvard* [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1913], 202; cf. Abbot Lawrence Lowell, “Inaugural Address of the President of Harvard University,” *Science, New Series* 30, no. 772 [1909]: 502; and Charles Johnston, “A New Experiment: How President Lowell Is Modifying the ‘Elective System’ at Harvard,” *Harper’s Weekly*, July 2.)

131. I picked these courses more or less at random, quickly scanning for courses that met the right requirements, just as research tells us that students pick. I was looking for neither a cohesive nor an intentionally eclectic set. I did steer away from classes likely to evoke the usual polemics about the decline of standards or politicization of the university. Though I will raise questions about how such an assortment of classes helps us face up to our formative tasks, I consider each of these topics to be interesting and important in its own right. None of these is offered as the butt of a joke.

132. Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” 122.

133. Michael S. Roth, *Safe Enough Spaces* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019), 103.

134. Thanks to Jessica Harless and Eboni Zamani-Gallaher for an interesting discussion of this point.

135. William T. Foster, *Administration of the College Curriculum* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 190, quoted in Bruce A. Kimball, *The Liberal Arts Tradition: A Documentary History*, 377. I do not know how common this exact phrase was but

we have already seen two variants: McCosh's (1885) "scattered like . . . star-dust" (just quoted in note 130) and Burton's (1920) "scattering and smattering" (Preface, p. viii). Here is one more, later instance: Harvard President James Conant remarked that the aim of Gen Ed must be more than "collecting in one's mind a wide scattering of factual information, however helpful such information may be in a quiz program" (James Conant, "Some Aspects of Modern Harvard," *Journal of General Education* 4, no. 3 [1950]: 181).

136. William G. Perry, *Forms of Ethical and Intellectual Development in the College Years: A Scheme* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, [1968] 1999), 33.

137. *Schopenhauer as Educator* (§6). See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations: Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, ed. William Arrowsmith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1873–1876] 1990), 204. I have modified Arrowsmith's translation in one place. He had rendered *Knochenmenschen* as "human skeletons."

138. Scott Carlson, "A Crusade against Terrible Advising," *Chronicle of Higher Education* (August 4, 2020).

139. One recent study of faculty time found that faculty at a state university spend about 2.8% of their sixty-plus-hour workweek mentoring, and 4.7% of their time advising (the distinction is not explained). See Ziker et al., "Time Distribution of Faculty Workload at Boise State University" (2014), https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/sspa_14/22. For a description of the study, see John Ziker, "The Long, Lonely Job of Homo Academicus," *Blue Review*, March 31, 2014, <https://www.boisestate.edu/bluereview/faculty-time-allocation/>.

140. Ellen Bara Stolzenberg et al., *The Freshman Survey: National Norms Fall 2019* (Los Angeles: Higher Education Research Institute, UCLA, 2020), 46. This is the most recent year for which UCLA received enough data to create a weighted, nationally representative sample.

141. William Arrowsmith, "The Shame of the Graduate Schools: A Plea for a New American Scholar," *Harper's Magazine* 232, no. 1390 (1966): 55–56.

142. Arrowsmith, "Shame of the Graduate Schools," 55.

143. I am referring to Franz Kafka, "A Hunger Artist," trans. Willa Muir and Edwin Muir, in *The Metamorphosis and Other Stories* (New York: Schocken, 1948). The second quote is from Arrowsmith, "Shame of the Graduate Schools," 56.

144. Arrowsmith, "Shame of the Graduate Schools," 56.

145. Walker Percy, *The Moviegoer* (New York: Vintage, [1961] 1998), 13; William Arrowsmith, "Teaching and the Liberal Arts: Notes toward an Old Frontier," in *The Liberal Arts and Teacher Education: A Confrontation*, ed. Donald Bigelow (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 12.

146. On the tenure track as shaper of identity, see William G. Tierney and Estela Mara Bensimon, *Promotion and Tenure: Community and Socialization in Academe*

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); and Nathan F. Alleman, Justin J. Nelson, and Cara Cliburn Allen, “The Stigma of Tenure Denied: An Exploration of Individual and Institutional Implications,” *Research in Higher Education* 60, no. 7 (2019). For fuller explorations of scholarly formation, see Bruce Wilshire, *The Moral Collapse of the University: Professionalism, Purity, Alienation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); and David Damrosch, *We Scholars: Changing the Culture of the University* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

147. On this point, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, especially, chap. 1.

148. This is a rough average. I am assuming the standard six years at the rank of assistant professor (ignoring the facts that some go up early or late, others reset some or all of their clock when changing institutions, and others still have to repeat the whole process after a negative decision). I am assuming an average of eight years at the rank of associate professor. I know of no broad national data on average time in rank for associate professors. A 2009 MLA study of language and literature professors found an average 7.4 years for the 145 full professors who responded to their survey. The average was 8.2 years for women, 8.2 years for faculty at Carnegie-designated doctoral institutions, 9.6 years for women in doctoral institutions, and 10.2 years for female professors of foreign languages in doctoral institutions (Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession, “Standing Still: The Associate Professor Survey” [Modern Language Association, 2009], <https://www.mla.org/About-Us/Governance/Committees/Committee-Listings/Professional-Issues/Committee-on-Women-Gender-and-Sexuality-in-the-Profession/Standing-Still-The-Associate-Professor-Survey>, 5-6).

149. Maxine Greene, *The Dialectic of Freedom* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988), 14.

150. Deresiewicz, “The Neoliberal Arts,” 26, summarizing the thesis of William Deresiewicz, *Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life* (New York: Free Press, 2014).

151. Deresiewicz, “The Neoliberal Arts,” 26.

152. Steven Pinker, quoted in Deresiewicz, “The Neoliberal Arts,” 26.

153. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 87n8.

154. This is what Jonathan Lear’s calls “Kierkegaard’s fundamental ironic question” (Jonathan Lear, *A Case for Irony* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011], 12). Lear also offers a second, blunter form: “Among all Christians, is there a Christian?” These are distillations, not direct quotations, drawing not only on Kierkegaard but also on Plato who raises the “among” question repeatedly in relation to various vocations (I return to this in “Job Prospects” [see pp. 246–248 and p. 372n135]). Compare this line in Kierkegaard’s papers: “in the midst of Christendom we seem to have forgotten what Christianity is” (“Selected Entries from Kierkegaard’s Journals

and Papers Pertaining to *Philosophical Fragments*” in Johannes Climacus [Søren Kierkegaard], *Philosophical Fragments* [c. 1842–1843], ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985], 220). Interestingly, a line in Emerson comes even closer: “In Christendom where is the Christian?” (Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” 280).

155. This interpretive rendering of *Analects* §13.3 draws on a number of translations as follows.

The master must be joking, as surely there are more pressing things to take care of. In a gloss of §13.3 in his introduction, Leys has Zilu ask, “Rectify the names? And that would be your first priority? Is this a joke?” (Confucius, *The Analects*, trans. Simon Leys, ed. Michael Nylan, Norton Critical Edition [New York: Norton, 2014], xvii [henceforth: Leys, *Analects*]). Similarly, Muller has “Are you serious? Why is this so important?” (*Analects of Confucius*, trans. A. Charles Muller [1990], §13.3, <http://www.acmuller.net/con-dao/analects.html>).

Zilu as a blundering associate and bumpkin. As Halberstad explains, while the Master “betrays some affection for” this disciple described in the *Analects* as “wild” (§11.18) he also scolds the “worldly, ambitious, and blundering Zilu” as inattentive (§11.25) and rash (§5.14 and §11.22) (Luke Halberstad “The Sage and His Associates: Kongzi and Disciples across Early Texts,” in Leys, *Analects*, 179–180). I take “Bumpkin” from Ezra Pound’s earthy translation: “You Bumpkin! Sprout!” (*Confucian Analects*, trans. Ezra Pound [London: Peter Owen Limited, 1933], 79 [henceforth: Pound, *Analects*]). The most common translation of the epithet is “boorish.” I also like Brown’s contemporary, “How Dense can you get!” (See Richard Brown, “The Analects of Confucius Book 13 New English Translation” [May 20, 2021], <https://brownbeat.medium.com/the-analects-of-confucius-book-13-new-english-transla-585b9db725e8>; [henceforth: Brown, *Analects*]).

A Junzi—an exemplary person—should keep his trap shut when he’s out of his depth. This translation of *Junzi*, often rendered as “gentleman,” comes from *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*, trans. Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemount Jr. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 162 and passim [henceforth: Ames and Rosemount, *Analects*]. My free “should keep his trap shut when he’s out of his depth,” is inspired by Pound’s earthy vernacular and the playful aggressiveness of Brown’s “How dense?”. Some translations bury the sting of rebuke in politesse, for example, Leys’ stuffy and wordy, “Whereupon a gentleman is incompetent, thereupon he should remain silent” (Leys, *Analects*, 37). Eno is much more direct: “A junzi keeps silent about things he doesn’t understand” (Robert Eno, “The Analects of Confucius: An Online Teaching Translation,” Version 2.21 [2015], <https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/handle/2022/23420>, pp. 66 [henceforth: Eno, *Analects*]).

When speech does not accord with reality, actions misfire . . . This is a condensed version of the Master’s closing chain of reasoning, in which each conclusion is restated as the antecedent of the next conditional. I take “speech does not accord

with reality” and “miss their mark” from Slingerland (Confucius, *Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*, trans. Edward Slingerland [Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003], 139 [henceforth, Slingerland, *Analects*]), “laws and punishments” from Ames and Rosemount (Ames and Rosemount, *Analects*, 162), and “wither” and “do not know where they stand” from Leys (Leys, *Analects*, 37). “Actions misfire” is my attempt to capture succinctly and dynamically the calamitous dyspraxia that results from the corruption of our vocabularies of meaning and purpose, praise and blame. Most renderings of this line are too passive, banal, bureaucratic, wordy: “nothing gets accomplished” (Confucius, *Analects*, trans. Annping Chin [New York: Penguin, 2014], 197 [henceforth: Chin, *Analects*]); “matters are not taken care of” (Ames and Rosemount, *Analects*, 162); “no affair can be effected” (Leys, *Analects*, 37); “cannot be followed out, or completed in action according to specifications” (Pound, *Analects*, 79). “If the names . . . do not match reality,” Leys suggests in his gloss, “all human affairs disintegrate and their management becomes pointless and impossible” (Leys, *Analects*, xvii). In the closing line, the idiom Leys translates as “do not know where they stand” can also be rendered more literally as not knowing “where to place hand or foot” evoking a palpable experience of disorientation and disintegrity (for variations on the literal version, see Confucius, *The Analects (Lun Yü)*, trans. D. C. Lau [New York: Penguin, 1979], 118; Chin, *Analects*, 197; Eno, *Analects*, 66; and Brown, *Analects*).

156. On changing how you see rather than worrying about how you look, and for the line about “unflappable pretence,” see Leys, *Analects*, 35–36 (§12.20). §4.9 says that the true “scholar sets his heart on the Way” (Leys, *Analects*, 11). §6.13 makes it clear that the term *shi* can range from the “noble scholar” to the “vulgar pedant” (Leys, *Analects*, 16). The contrast drawn in §6.18 comes through clearly in Eno’s translation: “When patterned refinement prevails over substance, you have a clerk” (Eno, *Analects*, 27). The two terms used to describe the teachable student in §7.8 suggest not only desire but desperation to understand and articulate. Pound speaks of “zeal,” Leys of fervor, Slingerland of struggle, Eno of agitation, Moran of “pent-up excitement,” and Chin of “frenzy.” See Pound, *Analects*, 42; Leys, *Analects*, 18; Slingerland, *Analects*, 66; Eno, *Analects*, 30; Patrick Moran, “Lun Yu, the *Analects* of Confucius A translation, divided by topic, of some of the more noteworthy passages,” http://users.wfu.edu/moran/zhexuejialu/Analects_PEM.html, hyphen added to “pent-up”; and Chin, *Analects*, 100.

157. For further discussion of MacIntyre’s theory of practice and account of bureaucratization, see “Job Prospects” (see pp. 225–228 and 365n58).

158. Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*. Nietzsche explores the thanatotic tendencies of the new scientized historicism in “History in the Service and Disservice of Life” (87–145). The critique of *Homo academicus* is developed especially in the two *Betrachtungen* translated by Arrowsmith. “We Classicists” is Nietzsche’s notes toward a never completed “book on *the scholar’s way of life*” (V, §187, p. 385, emphasis

original). And in one electric section (203–208) of “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche offers a devastating thirteen-point indictment of the scholarly type born of the new research university. Throughout his writings, Nietzsche continues to develop this distinction between deathly academicism and joyful wisdom. For example, he picks up his examination of “We Scholars” in §6 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, and extends his critique of the wissenschaftlicher’s deadly seriousness in his discussion of asceticism in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (§3). In his introduction to “We Classicists” (in Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, 315), Arrowsmith mentions the concentrations of “brilliant aphorisms” on classics and classicists in *Daybreak*, *Twilight of the Idols*, and *Human, All Too Human*.

159. “We Classicists” (V, §31), in Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, 352.

160. Emerson, *Selected Journals: 1820–1842*, 312. Delbanco discusses this passage, which he quotes in two parts, in Andrew Delbanco, “The Decline and Fall of Literature,” *New York Review of Books* 46, no. 17 (1999): 34.

161. Delbanco, “Decline and Fall of Literature,” 34.

162. Delbanco, “Decline and Fall of Literature,” 34.

163. Goethe to Schiller, December 19, 1798: “[Übrigens] ist mir Alles verhasst, was mich bloss belehrt, ohne meine Tätigkeit zu vermehren, oder unmittelbar zu beleben.” Note that in the English translation of the correspondence, *unmittelbar* is mistranslated as “indirectly,” a mistake that persists in many quotations (see Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, *Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, from 1794 to 1805*, trans. L. Dora Schmitz, vol. 2, 1798–1805 [London: G. Bell, 1890], 182).

164. “We Classicists” (V, §25), in Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, 351, emphasis original.

165. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

166. Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, 66 and passim.

167. Quoted in Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, xix.

168. Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, 184.

169. Plato, *Republic*, 208 (514a).

170. Bruce Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness: Tragedy in Dewey’s Life and Work,” in *Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture: Pragmatic Essays after Dewey*, ed. John J. Stuhr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 261, 260. These are distinct passages, a full page apart. I have reversed their order.

171. For an interesting defense of this arrangement, see McClintock, *Homeless*. I have taken this formulation, that the university represents each major domain of

human experience twice, from him (see esp. p. 12). Not only does McClintock not seek to overcome this distinction between academic (“disinterested”) and professional (“interested”) knowledge, but also his argument is directed against one notable exception to this scheme, namely the university’s failure to provide a separate home for the disinterested study of educational experience. In colleges of education, McClintock convincingly demonstrates, the academic and professional study of education have been fused, to the detriment of each. This approach, McClintock writes, “conflates the trappings of academic scholarship with substantial professional learning. As a result, schools of education too often nurture well neither excellence in scholarship nor prepossessing competence among licensed practitioners” (30). The best work in education combines intellectual rigor with the impetus of live social problems and a grounding in the texture of lived experience. But McClintock is right to suggest that there is too much “pseudo scholarship” (34) in education. The academic study of education is hamstrung by being cut off from the arts and sciences and from the constant pressure to produce studies that will solve immediate practical problems. The conflation also warps the preparation of practitioners as they orient their efforts to the acquisition of “a professional peacock-tail” (31n23). Though McClintock’s premise, that the distinction between interested and disinterested inquiry is salutary, seems to clash with the Deweyan position I am developing here, his diagnosis of the Ed School muddle does not. As I will discuss shortly in the text, Dewey was clear that even worse than separating liberal and vocational studies is the sort of worst-of-both-worlds curricular compromises that temper the unimaginative with injections of the useless (see, e.g., Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 257–8). Nor is it entirely clear to what extent McClintock’s premise does ultimately clash with Dewey. McClintock wants to distinguish his pairing dis/interested from the common pure/applied binary and suggests that disinterestedness is not a steady state by which one implausibly floats above the fray but is rather a targeted refusal of the control of “inquiry by external interests, however putatively normative others may claim those to be” (McClintock, *Homeless*, 9n2). McClintock admits that further work is needed to distinguish his conception of disinterestedness from notions of purity and objectivity (2n5). In the end, his distinction may sidestep the dichotomies we are here considering: mind/body, thought/action, culture/utility, liberal/vocational.

172. John Dewey, “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*, ed. Jo Anne Boydston, vol. 5, Electronic Ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corp., [1985] 2003), 156. To be precise, what Dewey says is that “*Democracy and Education* was for many years that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully expounded” (emphasis added). It is likely that it is *Experience and Nature* (the final revised version of which appeared in 1929) that Dewey thinks has since come to represent his fullest statement. For the argument that overcoming the liberal/vocational dichotomy is the central project of *Democracy and Education* see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 140n3.

173. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 258.

174. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 259, 250.

175. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, Perigee Trade Paperback ed. (New York: Penguin [1934] 2005), 54–55; cf. 169, 182–184, and 266–267.

176. This obviously assumes a single frame of reference. The earth is large compared with Boston and small compared to the Milky Way.

177. In a short essay from 1929, Dewey explores the limits of the law of the excluded middle when extended from formal ontology to the realm of actual existence. The claim that the door is either open or not open, Dewey points out, “overlooks two facts.” First, closed (i.e., airtight) is an ideal limit; practically, closed always means “closed enough.” Second, the best description of the door will often be that it is in the process of changing from one state to the other, that is, opening or closing. See John Dewey, “The Sphere of Application of the Excluded Middle,” in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*, vol. 5, 201.

178. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 257, 259, 326, 255, 348, 133. One must be careful here, since Dewey develops four related concepts: the liberal, the vocational, the pseudo-liberal, and the pseudo-vocational. (And this applies to related dichotomies, such as culture/utility.) The first two are the true, compatible meanings. The latter two are the denatured, oppositional meanings. While he occasionally uses scare quotes to distinguish the pseudo concepts, he typically leaves it to the reader to infer from context which is which. And while Dewey devotes a whole chapter (Chap. 23) to teasing apart the vocational and pseudo-vocational, his remarks on liberal learning are scattered and often indirect. From context we can infer when he would count a trait as a genuine liberal value. For example, the quote about “deeper levels of meaning” (326) comes from Dewey’s description of the “philosophical attitude.” It is consonant with other characterizations of liberal aims, such as “deepening of intellectual insight” (258) and “personal appreciation of . . . meaning” (259). The argument for reading this as a description of liberal education is not only that the discipline of philosophy is one of the liberal arts. Dewey is referring to a broad disposition, one closer to a definition of liberal education itself: “thinking what the known demands of us, what responsive attitude it exacts” (326).

The last passage I quote is the only reference to “the cultivation of the self” in *Democracy and Education*. It occurs in a discussion of the rhetorical power of the word “disciplinary,” which Dewey says has “screened and protected” curricular subjects from scrutiny. It would not even disqualify disciplines if one showed “that they were of no use in life or that they did not really contribute to the cultivation of the self” (133). Here we find Dewey applying his twofold test: vocational *and* liberal; utility *and* culture. We can thus add self-cultivation to our list of liberal education descriptors. While it is true that Dewey sometimes uses *self*, *refinement*, and *culture/cultural/cultivation* to signal the pseudo-liberal, he signals this with qualifiers. For example, in pseudo-liberal education “culture” is “associated with a

purely private refinement, a cultivation of certain states and attitudes of consciousness, separate from either social direction or service” (306).

179. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 309–310. For a detailed discussion of this Deweyan idea of vocation as (mis)educative environment, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 113–130. The final two sections of “Job Prospects” explore how vocations widen and narrow experiential worlds.

180. In *Art as Experience*, Dewey uses the terms “anesthetic” five times (mixed in with five uses of “non-esthetic” and four of “unesthetic”). While he never explains his novel use of this term normally reserved for numbing agents (though he does use a visit to a dentist’s chair as one of his examples of anesthetic experience [206]), the intention is clear. The term signals his intent to move art out of the museum, resituating the aesthetic in broader experiential terms. He describes our everyday experience as insensible, as unconscious as a stone bouncing down a hill (41). He introduces the idea of aesthetic experience through images of alertness and sensitivity, comparing us unfavorably to the animal that is “fully present, all there, in all of its actions: in its wary glances, its sharp sniffings, its abrupt cocking of ears. All senses are equally on the *qui vive*” (18).

181. This network of dichotomies is introduced in Chapter 19 of *Democracy and Education*. Dewey then examines specific dichotomies in greater detail in later chapters. Chapter 20, “Intellectual and Practical Studies,” is devoted to the false opposition between knowing and doing (variously known as “theory and practice, intelligence and execution, knowledge and activity” [262]). Chapter 21 explores the curricular tension between humanism and naturalism that stems from the mind/world dichotomy. Chapter 22 focuses on the pitting of the individual against society. The “Opposition of Duty and Interest” is the subject of the second section of Chapter 26 (350–354).

182. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 253.

183. Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” 121.

184. Jonathan Kozol has dedicated his career to chronicling such conditions, from *Death at an Early Age: The Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in the Boston Public Schools* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) and *Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools* (New York: Crown, 1991) to *The Shame of a Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America* (New York: Crown, 2005). For example, on the neo-behaviorist pedagogy, the vacuous (no-collar) vocational curriculum, and the anesthetic architecture of high-poverty, majority minority schools, see Kozol, *Shame of a Nation*, chaps. 3, 4, and 7, respectively.

185. Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield, *A Multiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?* The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University (2003), 28, <https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/a-multiracial-society-with-segregated-schools-are-we-losing-the-dream/frankenber-multiracial-society-losing-the-dream.pdf>. The

situation has only grown worse since the time of this report. In 2021, 39.9% of Black students (2.9 million) and 40.9% of Hispanic students (5.7 million) attended schools enrolling 90% or more non-White students. See NCES Table 216.50, “Number and percentage distribution of public elementary and secondary school students, by percentage of non-White enrollment in the school and student’s racial/ethnic group: Selected years, fall 1995 through fall 2021,” https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_216.50.asp.

186. College Board, “Total Group SAT Suite of Assessments Annual Report (2022),” <https://reports.collegeboard.org/media/pdf/2022-total-group-sat-suite-of-assessments-annual-report.pdf>.

187. David F. Labaree, “The Winning Ways of a Losing Strategy: Educationalizing Social Problems in the United States,” *Educational Theory* 58, no. 4 (2008): 459.

188. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 257.

189. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 258.

190. Plato, *Republic*, 46 (368c–d).

191. The phrase “liberal arts” is a misleadingly literal translation of *artes liberales*, which would be more accurately rendered as “the disciplined practices befitting a free person.” The Latin *ars* (and this also applies to its Greek conceptual cousin, *techne*) encompassed a wide range of practices, including some of what we would call arts, crafts, trades, professions, disciplines, and sciences. Despite the range of *ars*, some thinkers in the liberal arts tradition who wanted to emphasize the formal nature of these subjects instead choose the terms *disciplina* or *studium*. Thus, while Cicero and Varro are both talking about the same sort of practices, the former calls them *artes* and the latter *disciplinae*. Initially, there was also disagreement over which practices (and how many) ought to be counted as *liberales*. However, as the concept works its way from Hellenistic Rome to the Christian middle ages, a final roster of seven is derived. These *septem artes liberales* were famously divided into a group of three *artes sermocinales* pertaining to language and expression (the “trivium” of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) and a group of four *artes reales* dealing with mathematical subjects (the “quadrivium” of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). At some point, the equivocation between *artes* and *disciplinae* settles into a distinction between the *artes* of the trivium and the *disciplinae* of the quadrivium. Thus, the roots of the phrase “liberal arts and sciences” go back at least to Cassiodorus’s *De Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum* (c. 560 CE), though it now refers to a collection of nonapplied disciplines very different from the original seven.

192. Drama, theatrical performance, belongs here. My mention of dramatic literature as relatively disembodied referred to the practice of treating the play as text in literature classes.

193. Many have observed this fact. See for example, Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 48.

194. Dewey, “From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” 153.

195. This echoes a line of Dewey’s describing the character of the compartmentalizer—who seeks to avoid “the strain of thought and effort needed to bring competing tendencies into a unity”—as “marked by stigmata resulting from this division” (Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 38).

196. Plato, *Republic*, 209 (515e).

197. John Dewey, *Psychology* (1887), in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882–1898*, ed. Jo Anne Boydston, vol. 2, Electronic Ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Intelix Corp., [1972] 2003), 43.

198. See, for example, Dewey, “Culture and Industry in Education” (1906); “The Bearings of Pragmatism upon Education” (1908); *Ethics* (1st ed., 1908), chaps. 17–18; *How We Think* (1st ed., 1910), chap. 15; and Dewey’s contributions to the *Cyclopedia of Education* (1912–1913) on “Humanism and Naturalism,” “Liberal Education,” and “Theory and Practice” (these essays may be found in the *Middle Works of John Dewey*, vols. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively).

199. Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness,” 257.

200. John Dewey, “Statements to the Conference on Curriculum for the College of Liberal Arts” (1931), in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953*, ed. Jo Anne Boydston, vol. 6, Electronic Ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Intelix Corp., [1985] 2003), 417.

201. Steven C. Rockefeller, *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 312, 335. The characterization of this episode as a “breakdown” comes from F. M. Alexander’s story of a client of his, an author who “after finishing his latest book . . . passed through a crisis described as a ‘breakdown.’” As I describe in the discussion that follows, Dewey began body-work with Alexander in 1916 just after the publication of *Democracy and Education*. Rockefeller’s conjecture that the client in this story is Dewey seems a safe one.

202. See Rockefeller, *John Dewey*, 303–356; Thomas Dalton, *Becoming John Dewey: Dilemmas of a Philosopher and Naturalist* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), chap. 5; Jay Martin, *The Education of John Dewey: A Biography* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 285–293; Alan Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), chap. 5; Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness”; Jo Ann Boydston, “Introduction,” in *The Poems of John Dewey*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977). Boydston’s research suggests that most of Dewey’s poems were written between 1910 and 1918.

203. Max Eastman, “The Hero as Teacher,” quoted in Dalton, *Becoming John Dewey*, 113. Eastman writes that, after the polemics over the war, Dewey had “got into a state of tension that in most people would have been a state of illness.” Eastman’s hesitation to simply admit that Dewey was unwell physically and emotionally during this time is likely explained by his lionizing approach.

204. Ryan, *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism*, 187.
205. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," trans. Shaun Whiteside, in *The Penguin Freud Reader*, ed. Adam Phillips (London: Penguin Books, [1917] 2006).
206. Again, this is Rockefeller quoting Alexander. See Rockefeller, *John Dewey*, 335.
207. John Dewey, "The Child's Garden" (#27), in *The Poems of John Dewey*, 19. In the discussion that follows in the text, I concentrate on the forty-six personal poems Boydston designates as "lyric." I should also note that I am allowing myself exceptions to two ordinarily wise methodological principles: (1) avoid psychobiography; (2) read lines in the context of their poems. Though Dewey had some talent and dedication to the craft of poetry, his brief burst of poetic activity can be profitably read as, in effect, a series of distilled, artful diary entries, and thus as windows into Dewey's mental state during the period. My aim is merely to adduce evidence of broad themes running through this group of poems as a whole.
208. John Dewey, Untitled (#8) ("Is this the End?") and Untitled (#6) ("I wake from the long, long night"), in *The Poems of John Dewey*, 6–7, 5–6.
209. John Dewey, "The Child's Garden" (#27), *The Poems of John Dewey*, 19. Other images of cold and ice appear in poems #3, #5, #13, #14, and #25.
210. John Dewey, "Two Weeks" (#22), *The Poems of John Dewey*, 14–17. Thorny, desiccated landscapes also appear in poems #2, #3, #6, and #28.
211. John Dewey, "Two Births" (#46), *The Poems of John Dewey*, 30–31. Other images of duty, renunciation, and drudgery appear in poems #6, #13, #22, #40, and #43.
212. John Dewey, "Pulse in an Earthen Jar" (#38), *The Poems of John Dewey*, 25. The imagery of confinement, smothering, and suffocation reappears in poems #4, #6, #22, #23, and #28.
213. John Dewey, "Unfaith" (#89), *The Poems of John Dewey*, 66–67. For an account of the intertwined story of Dewey's poetry and his relationship with Yeziarska, see Boydston, "Introduction."
214. Wilshire, "Body-Mind and Subconsciousness," 257. This is a revised and extended version of Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, chap. 8. He reworked this material again as Bruce Wilshire, *The Primal Roots of American Philosophy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), chap. 7. All three versions are worth consulting for their different emphases. It was Wilshire's daring and underappreciated *The Moral Collapse of the University* that first led me to the topic of Dewey's encounter with Alexander. As I have come to learn, we have others to thank for rescuing this important episode in Dewey's development from the consensus corpophobic narrative of Dewey's life and work that had ignored or trivialized it. Wilshire was building on a body of work beginning with the crucial early efforts of Frank Pierce Jones and Eric McCormack and continuing in the work of others such as Jo Ann Boydston and Alexander Murray. See Frank P. Jones, "The

Work of F. M. Alexander as an Introduction to Dewey's Philosophy of Education," *School and Society* 57 (1943); Eric David McCormack, "The Neglected Influence: Frederick Matthias Alexander and John Dewey" (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1958); Frank P. Jones, "Letters from John Dewey in the Wessel Library, Tufts University," *Educational Theory* 17, no. 1 (1967); Frank P. Jones, "Dewey and Alexander," in *Freedom to Change: The Development and Science of the Alexander Technique* (London: Mouritz Books, [1976] 1997); and Jo Ann Boydston, "John Dewey and the Alexander Technique," *Alexander Review* 1 (1986). This piece by Boydston appeared in the third installment of a four-pamphlet series, *John Dewey and F.M. Alexander*, edited by Murray and published by the American Society for the Alexander Technique (AMSAT). See also Alexander Murray, "John Dewey and F.M. Alexander: 36 Years of Friendship" (The 1982 F.M. Alexander Memorial Lecture), published as an appendix to the book version of the McCormack thesis (Eric David McCormack, *The Neglected Influence: Frederick Matthias Alexander and John Dewey* [London: Mouritz, 2014]).

About the dating of Dewey's first session with Alexander: according to Jones, Dewey's lessons with F. M. Alexander continued "intermittently" throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. From 1935 to 1941, he took lessons from the founder's brother, A. R. Alexander (see Jones, "Dewey and Alexander," 103–104). Dewey wrote to Jones that he had met Alexander as early as 1915, but this seems to be a misrecollection. McCormack has dated their first meeting to a dinner hosted by the Columbia Philosophy Department in 1916 (McCormack, "The Neglected Influence," 47).

215. Jones, "Dewey and Alexander," 97–98.

216. See Martin, *The Education of John Dewey*, 286.

217. Craig Cunningham takes a similar position, quoting from a letter to Joseph Ratner in which Dewey credits Alexander with "one of the most important discoveries that has been made in practical application of the unity of the mind-body principle" (John Dewey to Joseph Ratner [July 24, 1941], Letter #07140, in Harriet F. Simon et al., eds., volume 3: 1940–1953, *The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871–1952*, Electronic ed. [Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 2008], quoted in Craig A. Cunningham et al., "Dewey, Women, and Weirdoes: Or, the Potential Rewards for Scholars Who Dialogue across Difference," *Education and Culture* 23, no. 2 [2007]: 51). Cunningham fixes on the phrase "practical application" in reaching his conclusion that Alexander had only a "marginal influence on Dewey's philosophy, more in the way of confirmation than in causal influence" (51). In the end, the most Cunningham will say about the Alexander technique is that it helped Dewey to "solidify," "ground," or "concret[ize]" ideas of Dewey's "already in place" (51). For Cunningham, the credit redounds not to Alexander (as Dewey himself would have it), but rather to Dewey, demonstrating the openness to new experience that he had "always displayed," showing his willingness to listen to those outside the academy and engage with heterodox ideas (51). Cunningham misses the mark here in two ways.

First, we might retort, “Where were these ideas ‘in place’ before they became grounded in concrete experience?” That is, Cunningham seems to lapse into an idealism precisely as he attempts to assess the role of Alexander in helping Dewey complete his overcoming of mind/body dualism! As Dewey will go on to say in *Art as Experience*, ideas require a medium. Dewey himself supplies a better word than “application,” “confirmation,” or even “grounding” when he says (in the collaborative auto/biography he prepared with his daughters for the 1939 Library of Living Philosophers volume in his honor), “My theories of mind-body, of the coordination of the active elements of the self and of the place of ideas in inhibition and control of overt action required contact with the work of F.M. Alexander and in later years his brother, A.R., to transform them into *realities*” (“Biography of John Dewey,” ed. Jane M. Dewey, in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 1, 50th anniv. ed., ed. Paul A. Schilpp and Lewis E. Hahn [New York: Open Court (1939) 1989], 45, emphasis added). Incidentally, it is striking how Martin edits this to read, “My theories of mind-body, of the coordination of the active elements of the self and of the place of ideas in inhibition and control of overt action required [for confirmation] contact with the work of F.M. Alexander” (Martin, *The Education of John Dewey*, 286).

Second, I think Cunningham misses the key point that it is, in significant part, the work with Alexander that restores Dewey’s openness to new experience during a period in which the flow of his experience had become clogged, in which he had become a “choked up fountain” and experienced a “hunger . . . to be” (John Dewey, “Two Weeks” [#22] and Untitled [#4] [“Generations of stifled worlds reaching out”], in *The Poems of John Dewey*, 14–17, 4–5). The Dewey who meets Alexander in the late teens is the Dewey who describes himself as “penned” in a narrow present between “a past with a closing door” and the “tight shut door of the future,” begging God for “A little hope that things which were / Again may living stir— / A future with an op’ning door” (see John Dewey, Untitled [#8] [“Is this the End?”], in *The Poems of John Dewey*, 6–7).

218. Rockefeller, *John Dewey*, 343.

219. Rockefeller, *John Dewey*, 313, 339.

220. Rockefeller does perpetuate the myth of a kind and gullible Dewey taken in by a huckster when he says that Dewey “latches” onto Alexander’s theories as an answer to the world’s problems. See Rockefeller, *John Dewey*, 341.

221. This was the reaction of Ella Flagg Young, who had not seen Dewey for over a decade. See Martin, *Education of John Dewey*, 286.

222. Jones, “Dewey and Alexander,” 97.

223. John Dewey to Joseph Ratner [July 24, 1941].

224. Regarding Alexander’s breakthrough, Dewey writes, “The act must come before the thought, and a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses the actual state of affairs” (Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 30–31). For the full Alexander-inspired section, see 28–35.

225. McCormack, “The Neglected Influence,” 159–160. Jones begins his account of Dewey and Alexander with passages from *Art as Experience* (1934) and *Experience and Education* (1938) that also show a subtle but clear Alexandrian residue (Jones, “Dewey and Alexander,” 94).

226. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1929). Though Dewey significantly revised and expanded his Carus lectures (December 1922) for publication in 1925, he was not satisfied, especially with the book’s opening chapter, which is completely revised in the 1929 edition.

227. Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 246.

228. John Dewey, “Introduction,” in F. M. Alexander, *Use of the Self* (London: Orion Books, [1932] 2001), 11.

229. Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness,” 259.

230. John Dewey, “The Child and the Curriculum” (1902), in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899–1924*, ed. Jo Anne Boydston, vol. 2, Electronic Ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Intalex Corp., [1978] 1996), 273; Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 257. In this 1902 essay, Dewey had already laid down the pattern for his later treatment of the liberal/vocational dichotomy. Instead of enduring the “effort of thought” needed to rework the terms of the debate between the “child” (freedom, relevance, initiative, progress) and the “subject matter” (discipline, rigor, guidance, conservation), we argue the extremes until finally retreating into a “maze of inconsistent compromise” (Dewey, “The Child and the Curriculum,” 273 and 277). Fourteen years later, Dewey will speak of the curriculum as an “inconsistent mixture,” a worst-of-both-worlds compromise between the pseudo-liberal and the pseudo-vocational (Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 257).

231. Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness,” 260.

232. Plato, *Republic*, 209 (515e).

233. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 37. This is the passage I mentioned in note 225, used by Jones as an epigraph.

234. Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, 178.

235. Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, 182.

236. Jones, “Dewey and Alexander,” 97. Jones is relating what Alexander told him about Dewey’s debut. “Drugged with thinking” is a direct quote; the other bit a paraphrase.

237. Wilshire, “Body-Mind and Subconsciousness,” 260.

238. John Dewey, “Introduction,” 10.

239. John Dewey, “Introduction,” 10.

240. John Dewey, “Introduction,” 10.

241. John Dewey, “Preoccupation with the Disconnected,” *Alexander Journal* 3 (1964): 12. This is described as “reprinted from a talk that Dewey gave to the NY Academy of Medicine.” The typescript for this 1927 talk, “Body and Mind,” is lost. However, it was published in three close variations (see “Textual Commentary,” in *The Later Works of John Dewey*, vol. 3, 444-445). “Preoccupation with the Disconnected” contains both abridgments and material not appearing in any of these three versions, including the shout out to Alexander that I quote in the text. It is not clear what version of Dewey’s talk the *Alexander Journal* worked from.

242. Wilshire, *Moral Collapse of the University*, 183. Cf. Bruce Wilshire, “The Moral Collapse of the University,” *Kettering Review* 30, no. 1 (2012): 20, where he credits C. S. Lewis’ recovery of this ancient Greek idea.

243. John Dewey, “Introduction,” 12. The concept of the “means whereby” is central to the Alexander Technique. For Alexander’s definition, see Alexander, *Use of the Self*, 41n. Richard Shusterman offers this useful gloss:

Alexander concluded that a systematic method of careful somatic awareness, analysis, and control was needed for improving self-knowledge and self-use: a method to discern, localize, and inhibit the unwanted habits, to discover the requisite bodily postures or movements (the indispensable “means whereby”) for best producing the desired action or attitude, and finally to monitor and master their performance through “conscious control” until ultimately a better (i.e. more effective and controllable) habit could be established to achieve the willed end of action. The elaborate method he developed—emphasizing heightened somatic awareness and conscious control through inhibition, indirection, and focus on “the means whereby” as crucial, provisional ends—became the famed Alexander Technique. (Richard Shusterman, “Dewey’s Somatic Philosophy,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 245, no. 3 [2008]: 301; parenthetical citations removed).

244. Charles Sanders Peirce, “Private Thoughts—Principally on the Conduct of Life,” *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce—A Chronological Edition*, Electronic Edition, ed Nathan Houser et al., vol. 1: 1857-1866 (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 2003), 6 (§XLI [September 16, 1856]). Peirce then answers his question with a single word: beauty.

245. The Pugh translation of the Exercises is available online at <http://spex.ignatianspirituality.com/SpiritualExercises/Puhl>. This quotation is from the first of the “Introductory Observations” (or “Annotations” as they are known in other versions). Pugh also supplies the *Monumenta* marginal numbers. This is §001.

246. Ignatius (Pugh trans.), *Spiritual Exercises*, §020. It is worth noting that one is recommended to undertake Ignatian spiritual exercises with a guide.

247. Peirce, “Private Thoughts,” 6 (§XLI).

248. In “Wide Awake,” I explore the brilliant life of Black Mountain College, an educational community built around just such a reunion between general and aesthetic education.

249. Murray Sperber, *Beer and Circus: How Big-Time College Sports Has Crippled Undergraduate Education* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001).

250. I have trustworthy secondhand knowledge of a recent small gathering of philosophers (and historians) of education, in which one philosopher (let’s call him V) had the temerity to suggest that philosophy might still be linked in some way to its etymological meaning, the love of wisdom. At this, several of his colleagues broke into derisive snorts and clubby laughter, leading the kind one in the group to smooth things over by remarking, “You know we love you, V, but you’re crazy.”

NEW STUDENT ORIENTATION

1. Oakeshott, “The Idea of a University,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1950] 1989), 100.

2. Michael Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” in *What Is History? And Other Essays*, ed. Luke O’Sullivan (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2004). Based on press clippings found in the same file, O’Sullivan dates the text, speculatively, to 1961. A reproduction of the typescript, available online (<https://manwithoutqualities.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/scanned20from20a20xerox20multifunction20printer-85.pdf>), shared with Leslie Marsh by Frank Minogue, shows that the title was supplied by Oakeshott. Minogue dated it 1963.

3. I return to the theme of reorientation in An Allegory of Arrival in “Wide Awake.”

4. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 333.

5. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 333.

6. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning” [1975], in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 24.

7. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 334.

8. As Skeffington relates, immediately upon his arrival in 1950, Oakeshott consolidated the loose political science faculty into a functioning Department of Government (only formally instituted in 1962), remaining the formal or de facto head until his retirement in 1968 (see Daniel Skeffington, “The Orator and the Conversationalist: From Laski to Oakeshott, 1921–1965,” in *Political Science at the LSE: A History of the Department of Government, from the Webbs to Covid*, ed. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and Gordon Bannerman [London: Ubiquity Press, 2021], 64, 68).

9. I refer to the concepts of the “learning society” and “lifelong learning” which spitshine with an ounce of eduspeak the turds of late capitalism (globalization, “human capital,” reification, governmentality, the gig economy). For an Arendtian critique of “the learning society,” see Jan Masschelein, “The Discourse of the

Learning Society and the Loss of Childhood,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 35, no. 1 (2001). For a Lukacsian critique of lifelong learning, see René V. Arcilla, *Wim Wenders’s Road Movie Philosophy: Education without Learning* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), chap. 5. For a Foucauldian critique of the entrepreneurial self and the university of human capital, see Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution* (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2015).

10. David Blacker, *The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2013), 53. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983). I unpack Walzer’s value-pluralistic account in “Job Prospects” (see pp. 228–233).

11. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 336.

12. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 333–334.

13. From 1957 to 1967, LSE’s director was Sydney Caine: “Sydney Caine, a civil servant who had decidedly positive views about the market” (Michael Cox, “Red Flag over Houghton Street? The Radical Tradition at LSE—Myth, Reality, Fact,” *LSE History* blog, January 16, 2019, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsehistory/2019/01/16/red-flag-over-houghton-street-the-radical-tradition-at-lse-myth-reality-fact/>).

14. For a critique of the connoisseur, see my discussion of Gadamer in “Soul Action” (pp. 33–35). In “Job Prospects,” I discuss how liberal learning can degenerate into the hoarding of treasure (see pp. 218–220). My dig at the graduate student is certainly not to disparage critical museum studies and Marxian cultural theory. Who could deny the force of Benjamin’s famous, searing indictment:

Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which current rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried in the procession. They are called “cultural treasures,” and a historical materialist views them with cautious detachment. For in every case these treasures have a lineage which he cannot contemplate without horror. They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great geniuses who created them, but also to the anonymous toil of others who lived in the same period. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another (Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in *Selected Writings*, vol. 4, 1938–1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003], §VII, 391–392).

Nonetheless, I stand by my claim that a purely suspicious stance forecloses aesthetic experience. Following Said, I favor a “contrapuntal” approach that braids hermeneutics of retrieval and suspicion (Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* [New York: Vintage Books, 1994], 66 and passim; compare the closing line of the section on *Mansfield Park* [97]).

15. Fishman and Gardner would approve of Oakeshott's intervention. Among their recommendations to address the cynical transactional mindset prevalent among today's students is a process of continuous "onboarding" that explains "this is what college is about" (Wendy Fishman and Howard Gardner, *The Real World of College: What Higher Education Is and What It Can Be* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2022], 246, emphasis removed).

16. Timothy Fuller, "Introduction," in Oakeshott, *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 10; Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 27.

17. Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 26.

18. Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 25, 26, 26.

19. Michael Oakeshott, "Learning and Teaching," in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 62.

20. Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 25.

21. In this respect, Oakeshott's theory of practice anticipates MacIntyre's. On MacIntyre's theory of practice, see "Job Prospects" (pp. 225–228 and 365n58).

22. Oakeshott, "Learning and Teaching," 62.

23. Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 24.

24. Michael Oakeshott, "The Definition of a University," *Journal of Educational Thought* 1, no. 3 (1967): 130.

25. Michael Oakeshott, "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind," in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, ed. Timothy Fuller (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press [1959] 1991), 496.

26. Oakeshott, "Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind," 496.

27. Maxine Greene, "Teaching for Openings," in *Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Art, Education, and Social Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 115.

28. Oakeshott gestures toward this problem of circularity in lines such as, "the learner is animated, not by the inclinations he brings with him, but by intimations of excellence and aspirations he has never yet dreamed of" (Michael Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration" [1972], in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 69). "Intimation" is an important term for Oakeshott, signaling his view that ethical and political understanding is largely tacit (see Michael Oakeshott, "Political Education," in *Rationalism in Politics* where he first staked out this position, and especially his postscript about his use of the term).

However, the question is not merely whether we can verbalize the novel value structure but how it is exactly that we can coherently value a new structure of value, how we can aspire to a life animated by different aspirations. This question is at the center of several recent rich books: Talbot Brewer, *The Retrieval of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); L. A. Paul, *Transformative Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Agnes Callard, *Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2018). There is also a line of interesting recent work on the possibility of epiphanic moral conversion: Mark E Jonas, “Education for Epiphany: The Case of Plato’s *Lysis*,” *Educational Theory* 65, no. 1 (2015); Kristján Kristjánsson, “Epiphanic Moral Conversions: Going beyond Kohlberg and Aristotle,” in *Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A Neo-Aristotelian View* (London: Routledge, 2020); Douglas W. Yacek and Kevin Gary, “Transformative Experience and Epiphany in Education,” *Theory and Research in Education* 18, no. 2 (2020); and Kevin Gary and Drew Chambers, “Cultivating Moral Epiphanies,” *Educational Theory* 71, no. 3 (2021).

As I discuss in *A New Organ* in “Job Prospects,” vocational discernment is a species of this problem. Like Oakeshott (and Brewer), my strategy is the hermeneutic one of embracing the circularity: intimations lead to an initial superficial engagement, which deepens our understanding of the practice’s animating goods, which deepens our engagement, and so on.

29. I explore these difficulties in “Wide Awake” (see pp. 124–145). On the ethics of transformative education, see Douglas W. Yacek, “Should Education Be Transformative?” *Journal of Moral Education* 49, no. 2 (2020).

30. Plato, *Republic*, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [c. 380 BCE] 2004), 209 (515c–516a).

31. Plato, *Republic*, 209 (515e).

32. Jerome S. Bruner and Leo Postman, “On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm,” *Journal of Personality* 18, no. 2 (1949).

33. Bruner and Postman, “On the Perception of Incongruity,” 221. Nearly all of the participants (27 out of 28) demonstrated this strategy of “perceptual denial” at least once (213).

34. Bruner and Postman, “On the Perception of Incongruity,” 216. Fifty percent of the participants displayed a compromise reaction to the trick red cards; 11% to the trick black ones (216, 217). One of the compromise reactions elicited from a trick black card was that the card was alternately black and red (217).

35. Bruner and Postman, “On the Perception of Incongruity,” 214. This experience of “disruption” occurred in 4% of the prerecognition responses of sixteen out of twenty-eight participants (218).

36. Bruner and Postman, “On the Perception of Incongruity,” 218.

37. John Donne, “Eclogue. 1613. December 26,” in *The Complete Poetry and Selected Prose of John Donne*, ed. Charles M. Coffin (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 183–184.

38. In the Transformative Educational Studies Program in the Lynch School of Education and Human Development at Boston College, we devote an entire course, *The Educational Conversation*, to the sort of reorientation Oakeshott attempted in 1961, assigning, among other things Oakeshott’s “On Arriving at a University.”

Given the nature of his themes (1961 going on 1861) and his style (simultaneously conversational, learned, and lyrical) we have been pleasantly surprised by the enthusiasm of our student's response to Oakeshott's anti-orientation speech.

39. Oakeshott, "Work and Play" [c. 1960], in *What Is History?*, 313.

40. Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 69.

41. Oakeshott, "On Arriving at a University," 337.

42. Oakeshott, "On Arriving at a University," 336.

43. Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 308.

44. Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 308.

45. Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 309.

46. Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 308.

47. Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 102. (The same line appears in the longer work, of which this is a distillation and extension (Michael Oakeshott, "The Universities" [1949], in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 128). Oakeshott's terminology shifts over time as he draws this tripartite distinction: (A) the grind, (B) mere release from the grind, and (C) escape from the false binary into a third space. In these early essays (1949–1950), he uses (A) work, (B) play, and (C) *skholê*/leisure/interval. A decade later, in "Work and Play" (c. 1960), he uses (A) work, (B) rest/recreation/holiday/"corruptions of play" and, (C) play/*skholê*/leisure (Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 313). A year or so later, as we saw, Oakeshott decided that "leisure" was a "lame" translation for *skholê*. In "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration" (1972), Oakeshott now not only reinforces the contrast between *skholê* and leisure, but play has been downgraded back to the B-term (Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 69).

Thinkers such as Oakeshott who want to retrieve ideas that fall between the cracks of our current concepts have no perfect rhetorical option. Ancient terms may be overly defamiliarizing—sealing the author's meaning in a display case at the Bodleian—and risk hiding the fact that the term represents not the displaced worldview itself but our present understanding of what we think we have lost. That said, to eschew foreign/technical terms is to risk that the reader too quickly assimilates the untimely idea to current thinking; and it forces authors to juggle multiple meanings of the same term (as we see in Oakeshott's ambiguous uses of "leisure" and "play"). John Dewey, Josef Pieper, and Michael Walzer faced the same rhetorical dilemma. Dewey avoids archaic terms but then offers the reader the confusing task of disambiguating two meaning of "liberal," when defined in opposition to or as complementary with the "vocational" (see John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), chaps. 19 and 23). Pieper does not hesitate to incorporate archaic terms (e.g., *ratio/intellectus*, *artes liberales/serviles*, *banausos*, *acedia*). However, after introducing the ancient distinctions *a/skholia* and *neg/otium*, he uses "leisure"

to name both the concept he seeks to retrieve and its modern debasement, bringing out the untimeliness of the older meaning by repeating Aristotle's dictum that "we are not-at-leisure in order to be at-leisure" (see Josef Pieper, "Leisure, the Basis of Culture," trans. Gerald Malsbary, in *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, (1948) 1998], esp. chap. 1). By contrast, even while Walzer notes their roots in older notions of *skholé* and sabbath, and in ambiguities in the meaning of "rest," Walzer sees the two main, modern structurations of free time, the vacation and the holiday, as spheres in which genuine goods are distributed and pursued (see Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, chap. 7).

48. Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 101, emphasis added. Oakeshott uses a variety of terms to evoke this key concept in his educational writings: interval, interim, *skholé*, leisure, play, detachment. For his variations on this theme, see Oakeshott, "The Universities," 126–129; Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 101–103; Oakeshott, "Work and Play," 309–310; Oakeshott, "On Arriving at a University," 334–337; Oakeshott, "The Definition of a University," 140–141; Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 69, 71–72, and 93; Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 24, 41.

49. Oakeshott, "The Universities," 125.

50. Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 101.

51. Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 102; cf. Oakeshott, "The Universities," 128.

52. Oakeshott, "On Arriving at a University," 335.

53. Oakeshott likes to stress the continuity between the modern primary schools and older institutions such as monastery schools. He says, for example, that the primary school near his rural Dorset home "had a continuous history from the 12th century" (Michael Oakeshott, Letter to Kevin Williams [June 23, 1983], published as "A Letter from Michael Oakeshott," *Newsletter*, Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain [June 2016]: 11; cf. Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 71). Or compare his remark that, despite the apparent "experimentalism" of the school he attended, his headmaster's "intention was to centre himself pretty firmly in the sort of grammar school that had been knocking around England for centuries and from which the Victorian public schools emerged" (quoted in Robert Grant, *Oakeshott*, Thinkers of Our Time [London: Claridge, 1990], 120). However, the discontinuities are more instructive. Schools of various sorts have existed for millennia, but mass, compulsory *schooling* is a novel educational modality, arising in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries, born of and contributing to a period of rapid social change marked by the spread of literacy, changing conceptions of childhood, the rise of the nation-state, and the advent of industrialization. Thus, Kieran Egan observes the irony in naming this modern institution "school" (*Schule*; *école*, *escuela*, *scuola*, etc.), a word derived from the Greek *skholé*, meaning freedom from the grind. The irony is that "the

new school was a place to which all children had to go in order to be equipped for productive work.” “Calling the new institutions ‘schools,’” Egan suggests, “helped to disguise their important differences from the older *skholé*-inspired institutions” (Kieran Egan, *The Future of Education: Reimagining Our Schools from the Ground Up* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008], 6). As E. P. Thompson nicely illustrates, the shift in capitalist production from an artisan-merchant to an industrial mode required inculcating new relationships to time and work, a task explicitly handed to the new schools (see E. P. Thompson, “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,” *Past and Present* 38, no. 1 [1967]: 84–85).

54. Oakeshott, “On Arriving at a University,” 333.

55. Oakeshott, “The Definition of a University,” 140.

56. Oakeshott, “Work and Play,” 309. With the phrase “getting and spending,” Oakeshott is referring to the Wordsworth poem, “The World Is Too Much With Us,” which I discuss in “Job Prospects” (see pp. 253 and 256).

57. Oakeshott, “The Idea of a University,” 101.

58. Oakeshott’s earliest published piece on education was “The Universities” (1949). His last was “A Place of Learning” (1975). There is also a manuscript tentatively dated to 1948 that appeared only posthumously (see Oakeshott, “The Voice of Conversation in the Education of Mankind”). There was also a short article he coauthored in high school: Michael Oakeshott and H. Howe, “An Experiment in the Teaching of History,” *Georgian (the magazine of St. George’s School)* 14 (1919).

59. Oakeshott, “The Definition of a University,” 139.

60. On detaching/detachment, see Oakeshott, “The Universities,” 130; Oakeshott, “The Definition of a University,” 140; Oakeshott, “Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration,” 69; and Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 24, 39. On “seclusion,” see Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 24, 26, 34, 41, 42. On places of learning as “sheltered,” see Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 24, 27.

61. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 24. That the tower is not ivory does not mean that universities are passive puppets of political-economy. As Sheldon Rothblatt shows in his interesting study of the evolution of the University of Cambridge in the Victorian era, a university “may draw upon its own history, heritage and ideals to interpret the demands upon it in a unique and unexpected way” (see Sheldon Rothblatt, *The Revolution of the Dons: Cambridge and Society in Victorian England* [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1968) 1981], 26). Indeed, that universities serve social functions is compatible with the claim that universities differ from other segments of society. On one reading, their function is precisely to serve as exceptions, as hedges against our typical amnesia, myopia, and monomania. Thus, universities might be thought to preserve what would otherwise be forgotten, nurture alternate modes of seeing and describing, reanimate goods lost in the pursuit of business as usual. This points to a central ambivalence in the literature

on the corporatization of the university. Are we living through an era in which we finally recognize that the university is essentially an instrument of power and privilege? In this case, the university's aspiration to these forms of independence is simply dangerous false consciousness. Or are we living through the transformation of the university from one set of social functions (including perhaps the nurturing of what Nietzsche called "untimely considerations") to a new portfolio (socializing the costs and risks, but not the profit, of corporate R&D; laundering the inequities of educational tracking; etc.)? I return to these questions in "Public Hearing." Nietzsche originally planned to write thirteen *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*. For the four he completed and a set of careful notes for a fifth, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations: Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, ed. William Arrowsmith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1874] 1990).

62. I return to the question of scale in "Wide Awake" (see pp. 112–113).

When Oakeshott began college in 1920, there were 33,004 undergraduates enrolled full time in the UK. By 1950, when Oakeshott began writing on education, that number had increased 136%, to 78,064. By the time he published his final statement on education, "A Place of Learning," in 1975, the number had increased another 168%, to 209,078. At the time of his death in 1990, the full-time undergraduate enrollment in the UK was 290,285, representing a 780% increase from the time Oakeshott began college (see Vincent Carpentier, "Historical Statistics on the Funding and Development of the UK University System, 1920–2002" [UK Data Service, 2004], <http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4971-1>). For comparison, the UK population grew only 29% (44 million to 57 million) during these same seventy years. Another point of comparison: in the US, in 1920, 4.7% of eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds were enrolled in institutions of higher education; in 1950, 14.3%; in 1975, 40.3%; in 1990, 51.1% (Thomas D. Snyder, ed., *120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait* [Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, US Department of Education, 1993], 76–77, table 24).

63. Oakeshott, "The Definition of a University," 139.

64. Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 67.

65. Oakeshott, "The Idea of a University," 102; cf. Oakeshott, "The Universities," 128.

66. Oakeshott, "The Universities," 125.

67. Oakeshott's class anxieties bubble up in a series of troubling tropes in which he likens the widening of college admissions to invasion, flooding, and looting. On flooding and looting, see Oakeshott, "The Universities," 129–130. On invasion/invaders, see Oakeshott, "Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration," 71, 76; and Oakeshott, "The Definition of a University," 141.

Oakeshott's elusive, category-defying views make him notoriously difficult to place on the political map. He has been claimed not only by conservatives but also by progressives (Richard Rorty), radicals (Chantal Mouffe), and would-be anarchists

(Richard Flathman). He is “a refusenik of modern life” (Fawcett), defends modernity (Podosik), and anticipates postmodernism (Rorty again). He is said to combine: a celebration of the experience of individuality with a critique of individualism (Franco); both Whig and romantic elements of liberalism (Podosik again); and “a communitarian account of the agent with a liberal account of the republic” (Rabin). The supposed “high priest of modern Conservatism” (Fairlie) was, in 1938, the first Cambridge don to lecture on Marx, with whom he went on to have a critical but far from dismissive relationship. See Richard Rorty, “Review (Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*; Roberto Mangabiera Unger, *Knowledge & Politics*),” *Social Theory and Practice* 4, no. 1 (1976): 114; Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 57–60; Chantal Mouffe, “Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern,” in *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993), 16; Richard E. Flathman, *Reflections of a Would-Be Anarchist: Ideals and Institutions of Liberalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Edmund Fawcett, *Liberalism: The Life of an Idea*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 314; Efraim Podoksik, *In Defence of Modernity: Vision and Philosophy in Michael Oakeshott* (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2003), 159; Paul Franco, *The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 205–206; M. Jeffrey Rabin, “The Idea of Freedom in Michael Oakeshott and the Contemporary Liberal-Communitarian Debate” (PhD diss., University of London, 1999), 19n21; Henry Fairlie (*Spectator* 209 [1962]: 644–645), quoted in Bernard Crick, “The Ambiguity of Michael Oakeshott,” *Cambridge Review* 112 (1991): 66. On Oakeshott’s teaching Marx in 1938, see Paul Franco, *Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 188n16. For a detailed recounting of Oakeshott’s changing, but far from dismissive, relationship to Marx, communism, democratic socialism, and anarchism, see Luke O’Sullivan, “Michael Oakeshott and the Left,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 75, no. 3 (2014).

Nonetheless, many have been content to ignore such subtleties, reducing Oakeshott to a “cheerleader for the British aristocracy” (Steven Wulf, “Oakeshott’s Politics for Gentlemen,” *Review of Politics* 69, no. 2 [2007]: 246). His evident disdain for party politics—culminating in his refusal to accept the Companion of Honor award from Margaret Thatcher—did not stop Bernard Crick from memorializing Oakeshott as “a brilliant Tory pamphleteer” (Crick, “The Ambiguity of Michael Oakeshott,” 68). This picture did begin to shift with the posthumous publication of Oakeshott’s early writings and a new generation of non-polemical Oakeshott scholarship, leading Elizabeth Corey to conclude in a review essay in 2006 that “it is no longer possible . . . to dismiss Oakeshott as merely an ideological defender of the Tory party or an English gentleman out of touch with reality” (Elizabeth Corey, “The World of Michael Oakeshott,” *Modern Age* 48, no. 3 (2006): 266). But then came Corey Robin’s *The Reactionary Mind*, which seats Oakeshott “at the same table” not only with Hobbes and Burke but also with, among others, Ayn Rand, Antonin Scalia, Margaret Thatcher, and Donald Trump (Corey Robin, *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump*, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018], 29).

68. Oakeshott, “The Definition of a University,” 141. Compare this with Oakeshott’s disturbing claim, from two decades earlier, that “anyone who has worked in a contemporary overcrowded university knows it to be an illusion that there was any large untapped reserve of men and women who could make use of this kind of university but who never had the opportunity of doing so” (Oakeshott, “The Universities,” 129).

69. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 28. In “Job Prospects,” I both offer a sympathetic reading of our desire to avoid this ordeal and a further development of Oakeshott’s argument that it is impossible to do so (see pp. 251–253).

70. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 23.

71. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 40.

72. Oakeshott, “Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration,” 93.

73. See Martin Hollis, “Education as a Positional Good,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 16, no. 2 (1982): 236; drawing on Fred Hirsch, *The Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), esp. chap. 3.

74. I develop this idea further in “Public Hearing” (see pp. 189–193).

75. I document this in “Job Prospects” (see p. 203, table 4).

76. For the film, see Bong Joon Ho, dir., *Snowpiercer* (CJ Entertainment, 2013). For the TV adaptation, see Ho, Erickson, et al., executive producers, *Snowpiercer* (CJ Entertainment, 2020–2022). The term “tailies” comes from the series. For the educational equivalent of the tail section, see p. 273n49.

77. For an argument of this sort, see Anthony P. Carnevale and Jeff Strohl, “How Increasing College Access Is Increasing Inequality, and What to Do About It,” in *Rewarding Strivers: Helping Low-Income Students Succeed in College*, ed. Richard D. Kahlenberg (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2010). If Thomas Piketty is right, then increased social mobility in the fifties and sixties was a product of a historical aberration (within modern capitalism), a resetting of wealth inequality to near zero by two world wars and specific redistributive policies from FDR and Beveridge to the GI Bill. Since then, while college access has only widened (in the United States, the percentage of eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds attending college rose from 25.7% in 1970 to 40% in 2020), economic inequality has returned to pre–World War I levels—making midcentury an exception to the general rule that when return on capital outperforms general economic growth, social mobility decreases and inequality widens over time (see Table 302.60, “Percentage of 18- to 24-Year-Olds Enrolled in College, by Level of Institution and Sex and Race/Ethnicity of Student: 1970 through 2020,” ed. National Center for Education Statistics [2021], https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d21/tables/dt21_302.60.asp; Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer [Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard, 2014]).

78. See John Marsh, *Class Dismissed: Why We Cannot Teach or Learn Our Way Out of Inequality* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011). For further bibliography on the myth that education reduces poverty, see Marsh, *Class Dismissed*, 220n20.

79. David Blacker, *What's Left of the World: Education, Identity and the Post-Work Political Imagination* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2019).

80. I respond to this invitation in “Public Hearing.”

81. I take the idea of a “conservatory” from Eduardo Duarte, “Educational Thinking and the Conservation of the Revolutionary,” *Teachers College Record* 112, no. 2 (2010), 488–508.

WIDE AWAKE

1. Mary Caroline Richards, *Centering: In Pottery, Poetry, and the Person*, 2nd ed. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, [1962] 1989), 15–16. As I will demonstrate, Black Mountain College (BMC) was a community devoted to the virtue of “wide-awakeness” that I introduced in “Soul Action” (pp. 32 and 282n63). The lone documentary about BMC, *Fully Awake* (Cathryn Davis Zommer and Neeley House, dirs., *Fully Awake: Black Mountain College* [Documentary Educational Resources, 2008]), takes its title from the words of an unnamed student: “Every moment at Black Moment seemed alive in a way that few have since. This had to do with being asked to be fully awake, to be at a new threshold of perception” (2’24”).

2. Michael Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days* (New York: Spuyten Duyvil, 2003), 4.

3. John Andrew Rice, the leading figure in Black Mountain’s early years, not only knew (at least the outlines of) Dewey’s educational philosophy but would also have appreciated Dewey’s efforts to overcome psycho-physical dissociation through the Alexander Technique (see “Soul Action,” pp. 81–88), at one point observing that, “The constant admonition of a college should be not ‘Be intellectual!’ or ‘Be muscular!’ (in both cases the dividing line is the neck) but ‘Be intelligent!’” (Rice, quoted in Louis Adamic, “Black Mountain: An Experiment in Education,” in *My America, 1928–1938* [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938], 615).

Dewey was on the BMC board and visited the college three times, twice in the 1934–5 academic year and again for two weeks in March, 1936 (see <https://deweycenter.siu.edu/publications-papers/chronology.php>). Finding Dewey to be a “wonderful listener” and student of “the process of learning,” with a deep respect for every “individual’s right to be alive,” Rice declared Dewey “the only man I have ever known who was completely fit and fitted to live in a democracy” (Rice quoted in Katherine C. Reynolds, “Progressive Ideals and Experimental Higher Education: The Example of John Dewey and Black Mountain College,” *Education and Culture* 14, no. 1 [1997], 3, 6, 5, 6). Dewey had similar things to say about what he witnessed at BMC: “The work and life of the College (and it is impossible in its case to separate the two) is a living example of democracy in action. . . . The College exists at the very ‘grass roots’ of democratic life” (“1940.07.18 (13269): John Dewey to Theodore Dreier,” in *The Correspondence of John Dewey (I-IV), 1871–2007*, Electronic Edition, gen. ed. Larry Hickman, vol. 3: 1940–1953, eds. Harriet Furst Simon et al [Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation]).

4. Though Black Mountain officially closed in 1957, the college's last true year in operation was 1955–1956. Only a few returned in the fall of 1956, and in spring 1957 everyone had departed save Charles Olson, the college's final rector, who remained to settle accounts.

5. Here I include students, regular faculty, summer faculty, and others who participated in the life of the college. The reader should not put too much weight on these categorizations. I might just as well have put Albers in education, Cage in music, or Rauschenberg in painting. Other categories, such as performance or collage or sculpture, would have led to further reshuffling. For examples of successful graduates beyond the arts, see Mary Emma Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 52.

6. For a blow-by-blow account of its endless schisms and excommunications, see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*. For a critique of its educational philosophy from one of the excommunicated, see Eric Russell Bentley, "Report from the Academy," *Partisan Review* 12, no. 3 (1945).

7. Josef Albers, "Art at Black Mountain College (1946)," in *Josef Albers. An Anthology 1924-1978*, ed. Laura Martínez de Guereñu, María Toledo, and Manuel Fontán, 236, emphasis removed. This edited collection of Albers writings and some appreciative texts about him (henceforth *Albers Anthology*) forms one part of a larger exhibition catalogue, *Josef Albers: Minimal Means, Maximum Effect* (Madrid: Fundación Juan March, 2014). It is not clear if the catalogue had editors beyond the anthology editors.

8. Richards was the first to bring Artaud into English, and her translation of *The Theater and Its Double* remains well regarded. (See Antonin Artaud, *The Theater and Its Double*, trans. Mary Caroline Richards [New York: Grove Press (1938) 1958]). Tellingly, Richards relates that it was initially rejected by a theater magazine as too "sophomoric" (Mary Caroline Richards, *Opening the Moral Eye: Essays, Talks, and Poems*, 2nd ed., ed. Deborah Haynes [Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Press (1962) 1996], 35). For glimpses into her journey of integration, see Richards, *Centering*; and the documentary, Richard Kane and Melody Lewis-Kane, dirs., *M. C. Richards: The Fire Within* (Kane-Lewis Productions, 2004).

9. Aimee Levitt, "Fielding Dawson: The Best St. Louis Writer You've Never Read," *Riverfront Times*, August 18, 2010, <https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2010/08/18/fielding-dawson-the-best-st-louis-writer-youve-never-read>.

10. The context of Dawson's remark deepens the point:

When Fielding (Fee) Dawson was at ECU [Eastern Carolina University] for a residency, shortly before Jonathan Williams' in the fall of 1994, a student asked him what famous people had attended Black Mountain College. Fee had a just wrapped up a 40-minute colloquy that was an impassioned, personal history and description of all that made BMC uniquely outside the parameters of our

media-generated notion of fame that so easily confuses personality and marketability with art. Visibly stunned and for a few moments speechless as he no doubt considered how little of what he'd said had been heard by the questioner, Fee finally chuckled and muttered, "We were all famous. You just never heard of us" (Alex Albright, "We Were All Famous—You Just Never Heard of Us," *Appalachian Journal* 44/45, no. 3/4–1/2 [2014]: 226).

11. These attachments are tangible in works such as Jonathan Williams, *A Palpable Elysium* (Boston: David R. Godine, 2002); Fielding Dawson, *The Black Mountain Book: A New Edition* (Rocky Mount: North Carolina Wesleyan College Press, [1971] 1990), and Fielding Dawson, *An Emotional Memoir of Franz Kline* (New York: Pantheon, 1967).

12. Once we acknowledge this fact, that an institution of higher education should be judged according to its contribution to the flourishing of its graduates, we confront an acute methodological problem. It is easy to list famous alumni, and not too hard to collect statistics on the earnings of graduates. What is extremely difficult to determine is whether an institution aided its graduates in making discoveries and forming dispositions that helped them go on to craft good and meaningful lives. How does one peek in on these lives? What standards are used to assess them? How could one possibly sift out the influence of the college years from the myriad confounding variables? Exit interviews are useful, but many of the effects of college, for better or worse, will only reveal themselves in later life. While all HEIs confront this problem, the fact that BMC has been an object of fascination since its founding means that we have better than average access to portraits of its graduates. Though retrospective accounts focus on the undergraduate years, the impact of those years in later life is evident in the humanity of the person doing the recounting. For BMC, sources for this sort of longitudinal-existential reckoning (the word "assessment" seems out of place) include individual memoirs (see, for example, Dawson, *The Black Mountain Book*; and Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days*); an anthology of shorter retrospections (Mervin Lane, ed., *Black Mountain College: Sprouted Seeds, an Anthology of Personal Accounts* [Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990]); an exhibition at a reunion forty years after the closing of the college featuring ninety-four panels of visual and verbal remembrance (*Remembering Black Mountain College, Catalogue of an Exhibition Curated by Mary Emma Harris* [Black Mountain, NC: Black Mountain College Museum and Arts Center, 1996]); video oral histories (<https://www.blackmountaincollege.org/oral-histories/>); and a documentary film (Zommer and House, *Fully Awake*).

13. For example, Stankiewicz begins her review of Harris by asking, "Why should an unaccredited college which lasted only twenty-four years (1933–1957), enroll[ing] fewer than 1,200 students total . . . be the subject of a history?" (Mary Ann Stankiewicz, "[Review of Mary Emma Harris, the Arts at Black Mountain College]," *History of Education Quarterly* 28, no. 1 [1988]: 146). The review ends without her really answering this question.

14. Estimates vary. For most years, we do have data on how many students were enrolled but, especially when you add in summer session enrollments, it becomes difficult to determine the total number of unique students who passed through BMC. Fewer than 1,200 is the most common figure cited (see Stankiewicz above, and, e.g., Naomi Blumberg, “Black Mountain College,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Black-Mountain-College>). One influential source puts the figure a bit higher at “fewer than 1300” (Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 244). Díaz estimates the average enrollment over the twenty-four years at forty students per year, which would mean a total of only 960 (Eva Díaz, “Summer Session 1948,” in Helen Molesworth, ed., *Leap before You Look: Black Mountain College, 1933–1957* [Boston: Institute for Contemporary Art, 2015], p. 219). I think the average may be a bit higher than that, based on reasonable interpolations among the figures found in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 167, 228, 282, 323, 344, 361–362, 387, 410, 423, 430, and 465n2; Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 52, 175; and Albert William Levi, “The Meaning of Black Mountain,” in Lane, *Sprouted Seeds*, 183.

15. Charles Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” in *Muthologus: Lectures and Interviews*, ed. Ralph Maud (Vancouver: Talon Books, [1968] 2010), 285.

16. Conventionally, BMC is said to have had three phases, corresponding with each of its leading figures: Rice in the 1930s, Albers in the 1940s, and Olson in the 1950s. While Rice is usually described as the founder and first rector of Black Mountain College (BMC), neither claim is strictly true. BMC was founded by a small group centered on Rice and inspired by his dismissal from Rollins College and by the vision of an ideal college he had extolled there. Technically, Rice was BMC’s second rector, though its first, Frederick Georgia, served for only a year before Rice took over. As Duberman explains, “Though Rice was the acknowledged leader, it was thought best he not be so designated, since the official AAUP report on the Rollins affair hadn’t yet appeared and there was an off chance it might contain some censure of him” (Martin Duberman, *Black Mountain: An Exploration in Community* [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (1972) 2009], 20). Rice, then served as rector from 1934 to 1938. Albers joined the faculty during the college’s first year and stayed through AY 1948–1949, serving as rector only for the final six months of his tenure. After visiting in the fall of 1948 and teaching in the summer sessions of 1949 and 1950, Olson joined the faculty in 1951 and served as rector from 1953 to 1956. While sound as a generalization, this focus on charismatic leaders obscures both the dialectical nature of leadership at Black Mountain College (e.g., Albers serving as counterpoint to Rice, and Bill Levi serving as counterpoint to Albers) and the leadership of quieter figures such as Robert Wunsch and Ted Dreier (Wunsch served as rector from 1938 to 1944; Dreier from 1944 to 1947).

17. Quoted in “Ninth Year Begins in New Quarters,” in *Black Mountain College Newsletter* 15 (October 1941), <https://digital.ncdcr.gov/digital/collection/p249901coll44/id/702/rec/12>.

18. Donald M. Frame, ed. and trans., *The Complete Works of François Rabelais* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). This volume contains the five Gargantua and Pantagruel books and some miscellaneous writings.

19. Levi, “Meaning of Black Mountain,” 182. Levi served on the BMC faculty from 1945 to 1950, serving as rector from 1947 to 1948.

20. Levi, “Meaning of Black Mountain,” 182.

21. Levi, “Meaning of Black Mountain,” 181.

22. Levi, “Meaning of Black Mountain,” 182. With the Covid-19 pandemic, we have just experienced a version of this phenomenon. With students forced into remote learning, campuses stood empty. Suddenly, the lavish facilities—dorm rooms, food courts, rock climbing walls, professional-level sports arenas—went from money makers to loss leaders. Without denying the educational importance of living and learning together on campus or suggesting that campus leaders were indifferent to health concerns, I think it is fair to say that the decision to bring students back to campus in the fall of 2020 was one that, one way or another, had to be made.

23. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 26.

24. Buckminster Fuller taught at Black Mountain in the summers of 1948 and 1949. Scalability is obviously central to the work of Fuller, author of *Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969). In its own way, the concept of scale was just as important for Olson. Consider this description of Olson from Guy Davenport: “His attention was constantly changing focus, from rods and cones in a pigeon’s eye to the drift of continents. . . . Olson wanted his students to achieve vertically the entire horizon of human knowledge” (Guy Davenport, “Olson,” in *The Geography of the Imagination: Forty Essays by Guy Davenport* [San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981], 82).

25. Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 285. The quotations that follow are from the same source and page.

26. Richard Buckminster Fuller, “Josef Albers 1888–1976 (1978),” in *Albers Anthology*, 350.

27. Rice, quoted in Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 645.

28. Cf. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 432; on the closure of the college, see chap. 14. While the summer art institutes of 1952 and 1953 were “the most remarkable ever held,” the year-round community dwindled in the fifties (362). Nor were conditions ripe, as Duberman relates, for yet one more of BMC’s recoveries. Having always relied on having a mix of leaders, from the pragmatic to the ecstatic, leadership was now concentrated in the single figure of Olson, a man whose leadership style can only be described as shamanic. In this final phase, there developed an anything-goes, hard-drinking, tortured-artist culture. Some students were injured

in a horrible car crash. There was a looming morals charge involving an adulterous student. Impressed neither by Olson's leadership nor his Beat-poetic style of correspondence, BMC's chief patron, Stephen Forbes, finally pulled the plug.

29. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 18.

30. Levi, "Meaning of Black Mountain," 179.

31. I introduced this idea of bureaucratization in "Soul Action" (see pp. 65–67); I develop MacIntyre's account in "Job Prospects" (see pp. 225–228).

32. For an explication of Arendt's concepts of natality and action, see Chris Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 92–99. I return to this concept at several points in "Wide Awake." Compare my discussion of natality and banality in "Job Prospects" (see pp. 252–253).

33. See my discussion of Oakeshott's conception of *skholé* in "New Student Orientation" (pp. 100–102). I return to the phenomenology of *skholé* later in this essay (see pp. 127–128).

34. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 24; Duberman is stitching together, with his own interpolations, quotations from notes that Rice made in 1934 (see p. 452n33).

35. Quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 168.

36. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 65.

37. The Lake Eden property was purchased in 1937. The studies building was erected during the final year at Blue Ridge (1940–1941). Finish work continued during the first year at the new campus.

38. May Sarton, "Excerpt from Unpublished Letter to Rosalind Greene," November 1940, in Lane, *Sprouted Seeds*, 81.

39. See Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*. The picture that emerges from his group-dynamics-focused history of BMC is of a community where "creativity and tension [were] bedmates" (281), and tension was managed through the periodic expulsions that organize Duberman's account: Rice in 1939 (chap. 5); Bentley and followers in 1944 (chap. 7); Wallen and followers in 1948 (chap. 9); Dreier, the Alberses, and others in 1949 (chap. 10). While personal failings and conscious ideological differences partly explain each purge, this repetitive "search-and-destroy mission" is suggestive of projective identification and scapegoating, the archaic, unconscious, processes by which groups deal with "anxiety and unwanted parts" (Leroy Wells, Jr., "The Group as a Whole: A Systemic Socioanalytic Perspective on Interpersonal and Group Relations," in *Groups in Context: A New Perspective on Group Dynamics*, ed. Jonathon Gilette and Marion McCollum [Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1990], 72, 73). For some of the deep cultural roots of sacrifice and scapegoating, see Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, [1966] 2002); Mary Douglas, "The Go-Away Goat," in *The*

Book of Leviticus: Composition and Reception, eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Robert A. Kugler (Leiden: Brill, 2003); and René Girard, *The Scapegoat* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1986).

40. Olson was interviewed at Beloit College in 1968 (Olson, “On Black Mountain [I]”), and in his Gloucester home in 1969 (Charles Olson, “On Black Mountain [II],” in *Muthologus*).

41. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 347

42. Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 276.

43. Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 276.

44. While I go on to emphasize Olson’s attraction to the idea of a distributed or mobile college, he is clearly ambivalent about whether BMC has a necessary or contingent connection to its mountain home. On the one hand, Olson says that BMC is a society not an institution (Olson, “On Black Mountain [II],” 327–328). He enthusiastically cites Ed Dorn’s judgment that BMC was ultimately not a rooted structure, only people passing through an arbitrary location:

I think the value of Black Mountain was that very able people and very alive people were there off and on and through it. And that’s what made it a very important place to be. I don’t see any superstructure that existed there which would relate people and what they subsequently did, although there might be one, and a case could be made for it. But I don’t think that’s so important. It was literally a place, and it was very arbitrary. North Carolina is a very unlikely place . . . There was no important logic connected with why it should be there (quoted in David Ossman, “Edward Dorn,” in *The Sullen Art: Interviews with Modern American Poets* [New York: Corinth Books, 1963], 83).

Olson applauds Dorn’s take in two interviews (see Charles Olson, “Filming in Gloucester,” in *Muthologus*, 208–209; and Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 321–322 and 322n6).

On the other hand, Olson, the “poet of Gloucester,” was deeply attuned to place, to land, and to the local. (For an in-situ portrait of Olson’s site-specific practice, see the documentary, *Polis Is This: Charles Olson and the Persistence of Place* [Henry Ferrini, dir., Ferrini Productions, Inc, April 2007]. See also Eric Riewer, “A Sense of Locality: Olson in Gloucester,” *Cahiers Charles V*, no. 5 [1983]). Unsurprisingly, then, Olson was also drawn to a site-specific understanding of BMC, one he began to articulate in his very first visit to Black Mountain (see Charles Olson [attributed], “Black Mountain College as Seen by a Writer-Visitor, 1948,” *Credences* [New Series] 2, no. 1 [1982]; the rationale for the attribution appears on p. 87, the piece itself on pp. 89–90). Over the years, Olson became further attuned to this genius loci, “this strange spot, this first town on the plateau of the Alleghenies starting west,” this “little shallow ladle of a spoon at the bottom of a valley” in the shadow of a mountain of “Cherokee legend” (Olson, “On Black Mountain [I],” 278).

Olson tries to collect this ambivalence in an avian trope, as evident in these two moments from the Gloucester interview:

Go to the farms where you get back to simpler things! Go where you are boss, go where you isolate yourself! Go into holes . . . like in “The Kingfishers,” which I wrote just at the time I was at Black Mountain. That’s the point of the kingfisher: he lays his eggs in holes dug in banks. I mean lay some eggs, for god’s sake! Be fecund!

In the end, like a bird that had to fly, I had to fly from that nest as John [Rice] had originally conceived her as flying from a rented nest. (Olson, “On Black Mountain [II],” 328, 339).

45. On Olson’s Poundian imperative, see Francine du Plessix Gray, “Charles Olson and an American Place,” *Yale Review* 76, no. 3 (1987): 345. For Olson’s pathbreaking intervention in poetics, see Charles Olson, “Projective Verse,” in *Collected Prose: Charles Olson*, ed. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1950] 1997). In this essay, Olson cites the opening line of his poem, “The Kingfishers”: “What does not change / is the will to change” (Charles Olson, “The Kingfishers,” in *The Selected Writings of Charles Olson*, ed. Robert Creeley [New York: New Directions (1949) 1967]; quoted in Olson, “Projective Verse,” 246).

46. This is not to suggest, of course, that Olson was drawing on his contemporary, Arendt. Olson drew his inspiration from Pound, the transcendentalists, and other sources.

47. Charles Olson, “The Present Is Prologue,” in *Collected Prose*, 206–207.

48. Olson, “The Present Is Prologue,” 205.

49. In January, 1955, BMC student Ed Dorn asked Olson what he should read in order to understand the American West. Some days later Olson delivered to Dorn an overflowing, diagrammatic, epistolary essay—projective verse meets student-centered pedagogy—which began by stating two assumptions, the second of which is “that *sociology*, without exception, is a lot of shit—produced by people who are the most dead of all . . . this dreadful beast, some average and statistic” (since published as Charles Olson, “A Bibliography on America for Ed Dorn” (1964), in *Collected Prose*, 297, emphasis in original; for the backstory, see the editors’ note on p. 435).

50. See Charles Olson, “Plan for the Operation of Black Mountain College after 1956” (c. 1954), in Molesworth, *Leap before You Look*, 50. This title, which seems to have been supplied by Molesworth, awkwardly suggests that Olson somehow knew in 1954 that the college would close in 1956. No explanation is given of the tentative dating of the diagram. The diagram itself has two all-caps, underlined headers. In the upper left, under “The Corporation of Black Mountain College,” we find a governance structure and “principle of operation,” glossed by the medieval phrase “*societas magistrorum et discipulorum*,” a variant of the phrase “*universitas magistrorum et discipulorum*” (the corporation or union of masters and pupils) from which we derive the term “university.” Then the main image is placed under a header that reads “The Federated Operations of Said Corporation.” For Molesworth’s helpful reading of this image in the context both of impending closure and of the college’s embrace

of instability, see Helen Molesworth, “Imaginary Landscape,” in *Leap Before You Look*, 51.

51. While Olson was not a visual artist per se, under his projective program, the poetic page becomes a space for a kind of “visual performance” (for this argument, see Eleanor Berry, “The Emergence of Charles Olson’s Prosody of the Page Space,” *Journal of English Linguistics* 30, no. 1 [2002]; building on Johanna Drucker, “Visual Performance of the Poetic Text,” in *Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word*, ed. Charles Bernstein [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998])). And there is a clear continuum from projective verse through full-blown concrete poetry to word art. Olson was fascinated by pictorial writing, particularly Mayan glyphs. (For a rich exploration of the ways in which art and non-art images satisfy and frustrate our cross-cutting impulses to look, read, and decipher, see James Elkins, *The Domain of Images* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999]). Olson also felt a kinship with the young Cy Twombly, the BMC student who would go on to achieve fame as a painter of graffiti-like abstractions, whose canvases—like the chalked diagrams of a fevered instructor—feature words (visible, struck through, erased), diagrams, and cursive-like, looping skeins. In a letter to Robert Creeley (November 29, 1951), Olson shares that he had the “the pleasure, of talking to a boy as open & sure as this Twombly, abt *line*, just the goddamned wonderful pleasure of *form*, when one can talk to another who has the feeling for it—and christ, who has?” (see George F. Butterick, ed., *Charles Olson & Robert Creeley: The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 8 [Boston: Black Sparrow Press, 1987], 199). A year later, Olson wrote, for a show of Twombly’s, a glowing “preface” that suggested that both men were moved by the same archeological impulse (Olson, “Cy Twombly,” in *Collected Prose*). This diagrammatic impulse is found not only in Twombly but throughout modern art, from Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia through Ad Reinhardt’s commentaries on the artworld to Jean-Michel Basquiat, Gabriel Orozco, and Mark Lombardi (a nice place to jump into art historical debates around this impulse is Margaret Iversen, “Desire and the Diagrammatic,” *Oxford Art Journal* 39, no. 1 [2016]).

If all of Olson’s poetry has a diagrammatic aspect, full-fledged diagrams play an important role in Olson’s promethean writing practice, a practice that blurs the boundaries between poetry and prose, research and creative writing, the letter and the lesson plan (on the overlap between Olson’s poetics and pedagogy, see Alan Golding, “From Pound to Olson: The Avant-Garde Poet as Pedagogue,” in *Ezra Pound and Education*, ed. Steven Yao and Michael Coyle [Orono, ME: National Poetry Foundation, 2012]; Michael Kindellan, “Projective Verse and Pedagogy,” in *Staying Open: Charles Olson’s Sources and Influences*, ed. Joshua Hoeyneck [Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press, 2018]; and Jeff Gardiner, “Olson’s Poetics and Pedagogy: Influences at Black Mountain College,” in Hoeyneck, *Staying Open*). His “Plan for a Curriculum of the Soul” is at once a poem, a diagram, and a work of educational philosophy (Charles Olson, “A Plan for a Curriculum of the Soul,” *Magazine of*

Further Studies 5 [1968]). His aforementioned “Bibliography on America for Ed Dorn” at one point suddenly announces, “OK. I want to make a drawing,” after which follows a piece of projective, diagrammatic pedagogy (Olson, “A Bibliography on America for Ed Dorn,” in *Collected Prose*, 305). Olson’s other diagrammatic prose works include “Proprioception” (1961–1962), “The Vinland Map Review” (1969), and “Continuing Attempt to Pull the Taffy off the Roof of my Mouth” (1969) (all three are found in Olson, *Collected Prose*).

52. Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 268.

53. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 316, 319.

54. On the traveling seminar, see Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 345. On the university of the airwaves, see Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 275; cf. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 328.

55. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 328, 346.

56. Olson, “On Black Mountain (I),” 271.

57. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 344.

58. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 344.

59. M. C. Richards, “Black Mountain College: A Golden Seed,” *Craft Horizons* (June 1977), 70. A half century after this declaration and we indeed find new exhibitions and books on BMC appearing annually. In the last two decades, there have been four major exhibitions devoted to BMC in

- Spain: *Una Aventura Americana*, curated by Vincent Katz, Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, Madrid, October 2002–January 2003. Catalogue, Vincent Katz, ed., *Black Mountain College: Experiment in Art* Paperback reissue ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
- The United Kingdom: “Starting at Zero: Black Mountain College 1933–1957,” curated by Caroline Collier and Michael Harrison, Arnolfini, Bristol (November 2005–January, 2006), Kettle’s Yard, University of Cambridge (January–April 2006). Catalogue, Caroline Collier and Michael Harrison, eds., *Starting at Zero: Black Mountain College 1933–57* (Bristol and Cambridge: Arnolfini and Kettle’s Yard, 2005).
- Germany: “Black Mountain: An Interdisciplinary Experiment, 1933–57,” curated by Eugen Blume and Gabriele Knapstein, National-galerie im Hamburger Bahnhof, Museum für Gegenwart, Berlin, June–September 2015. Catalogue, Eugen Blume et al., eds., *Black Mountain: An Interdisciplinary Experiment 1933–1957*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Spector Books, 2019). See also *Black Mountain Research*, a book project by Annette Jael Lehmann, with the assistance of Verena Kitteland and Anna-Lena Werner (Bielefeld: Kerber Verlag, 2016).
- The United States: “Leap Before You Look Molesworth: Black Mountain College, 1933–1957,” curated by Helen Molesworth and Ruth Erikson, Institute

of Contemporary Art/Boston, October 2015–June 2016 (traveling to the Hammer Museum and Wexner Center for the Arts). Catalogue, Molesworth, *Leap before You Look*.

Other recent books include Eva Díaz, *The Experimenters: Chance and Design at Black Mountain College* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Anne Chesky Smith and Heather South, *Black Mountain College (Images of America)* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2014); Julie J. Thomson and Michael Beggs, *Begin to See: The Photographers of Black Mountain College* (Asheville, NC: Black Mountain College Museum + Arts Center, 2017); Jonathan Creasy, ed., *Black Mountain Poems* (New York: New Directions, 2019).

60. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. Maurice Natanson (Dordrecht: Kluwer [1962] 1982), 213.

61. Henry David Thoreau, *Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition*, ed. Jeffrey S. Cramer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1854] 2004), 88.

62. Though most are careful to describe Black Mountain as a liberal arts college with a fine arts emphasis, the legend of BMC as an art school persists. For example, the Royal Academy just ranked it as a world-changing art school (see Sam Thorne, “Eight Art Schools That Changed the World,” *RA Magazine* [Spring 2019], also published on the Royal Academy blog [March 28, 2019], <https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/article/eight-art-schools-that-changed-the-world-bauhaus-anniversary>). The documentary *Fully Awake* strikes a balance with its opening pair of captions: (1) “Founded in 1933, Black Mountain was an influential experiment in education”; and (2) “During its short existence, the school inspired collaboration and innovation, ultimately shaping 20th century modern art.” However, a search of JSTOR (keyword “Black Mountain College”; all fields; articles only; 1956–) yields 162 articles in art and art history journals, 25 in education journals, and 26 in overlapping journals (art education, music education, aesthetic education).

63. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 318, cf. 316. “Bindu” is a Sanskrit term meaning “drop,” “dot,” “point,” or “spot,” with specialized meanings in a range of Buddhist sects. Bindu is variously the vanishing point that organizes an image, the driving impulse, the essence, seed, or source. A moment earlier in the interview, Olson described BMC’s logo, designed by Josef Albers, as “that crazy *bindu*, we would say today, the pureness of that *bindu*, which was pure target, black and white target” (316). A moment before that, he characterizes BMC’s founding impulse by saying that Rice’s “agitation was really pedagogy.”

64. We can situate Black Mountain (1933) in the line that extends from the early experiments at Antioch (1852) and Berea (1855), through the founding of Reed (1908), Deep Springs (1917), the Experimental College at the University of Wisconsin (1927), and St. John’s (1937), to the massive wave of experimentation in the sixties. Higginson identifies no fewer than thirty-six noteworthy experiments from

1957 to 1972 (Reid Pitney Higginson, “When Experimental Was Mainstream: The Rise and Fall of Experimental Colleges, 1957–1979,” *History of Education Quarterly* 59, no. 2 [2019]: Table 1, pp. 204–205). The best book on the experimental tradition remains Gerald Grant and David Riesman, *The Perpetual Dream: Reform and Experiment in the American College* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

65. John A. Rice, “Foreword to the First *Black Mountain College Catalogue*, 1933/34,” in Blume et al, *Black Mountain: An Interdisciplinary Experiment*, 38.

66. This is how Reynolds characterizes Rice’s departures from the University of Nebraska and the New Jersey College for Women (Reynolds, “Progressive Ideals and Experimental Higher Education,” 3). The founding of BMC followed directly on the heels of Rice’s third attempt to fit into an institution, Rollins College, which ended not only in the firing of Rice but in the exit of an entire group of faculty and students sympathetic to him.

Given Rice’s counterdependence—his reflexive disdain for authority figures, institutional structures, and social mores—it is surprising how long he did last in academia. The ultimate non-department-man, Rice somehow left Nebraska as an associate professor and chair in the Classics Department. Here was a professor known for ignoring disciplinary boundaries and even course content to follow dialogues where they led. And his own scholarly trajectory shows how little he fit the model of disciplinary specialization: he received first honors in jurisprudence as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, pursued a PhD in classics at the University of Chicago (which he never completed), and returned to England on a Guggenheim to study eighteenth-century literature.

Indeed, Rice might well have served as a case study of the tensions between formative education and scholarly formation that I explored in *A Skeleton Faculty* in “Soul Action.” At Chicago, Rice found graduate school to be mere training for “technicians” and graduate students simultaneously immature (“older in years [but] in no other way”) and “hardened” (John Andrew Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, Southern Classics [Columbia: University of South Carolina Press (1942) 2014], 272). During his Guggenheim, though he sometimes enjoyed being a “detective,” he found research to be somehow necrophilic, concluding that “I could not spend my life apart from life” (297). Rice’s topic was the (then) contested authorship of “A Tale of the Tub,” which meant wading into the relationship between Jonathan Swift and Samuel Johnson. But Rice struggled with adopting the distantiated stance of the researcher. He sensed that walling off the eighteenth century or choosing sides between Swift and Johnson would be to erect walls within himself:

I was living in another century, and my own. Jonathan Swift was my author and Swift was half of the eighteenth century—Doctor Johnson was the other—and Swift was half, or more than half, of me. The trouble was, that I was both of them, minimum editions—and they were enemies.

Research is the report of what one has found out rather than of what one knows. The area of exploration is outside oneself, and, if not already dead, must be deadened. (296)

Rice did not want to accumulate “findings” about dead specimens but to achieve (what we called in “Soul Action”) “chest knowledge” through hermeneutic encounter with living voices. He would disavow neither his Swiftian nor his Johnsonian side, neither his eighteenth century loyalties nor his twentieth century sensibilities: he refused to edit himself down to a “minimum edition.” In his decade at Black Mountain, Rice did find his way back from instruction to teaching and from department meetings to intentional educational community. And in writing his autobiography and in his final decades as a writer of short stories, he found his way back from research reports to humane letters. I say more about Rice’s formation in the text below (see pp. 149–151).

67. Lane, *Sprouted Seeds*, 1–2. Lane oversimplifies in speaking of the group rallying around Rice’s plan to found a new college. Rice had led the critique of Rollins, but, in aftermath of the firings and departures from Rollins, it was the group that led the charge toward Black Mountain. It took a while to convince Rice to make it a go (see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 11–13).

I will not rehearse the entire story of Black Mountain College (BMC), which has already been richly narrated and illustrated. Duberman’s remains the definitive history. Notably, he not only chronicles the trials, tribalism, and triumphs of this community devoted to facing oneself, but takes the writing as occasion to confront his own beliefs and loyalties, sometimes even imaginatively projecting himself into BMC debates. All historians reach out to the past from interests rooted in the present, negotiating the familiar-strangeness of that which both shapes us and eludes us. As a historian at Princeton in the late sixties, Duberman is writing both from within the academic system that BMC sought to displace and amid a flowering of educational and communal experimentation that BMC can be said to have anticipated. To my mind, it is an uncommon virtue to foreground the conditions and stakes of one’s inquiry as Duberman does. It would be something of a performative contradiction if Duberman were to leave himself out of the history of a community that challenged the divorce of living and learning, knowing and becoming. For those who find Duberman too pointed and interlocutory, there is Mary Emma Harris’s more conventional, richly illustrated chronicle, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*. If both histories are framed by the three core BMC concepts—art, education, community—Harris concentrates on the first two of these and Duberman the final two. For a beautiful unpacking of the BMC archives, see Blume et al., *Black Mountain: An Interdisciplinary Experiment*. This is only one of several exhibition catalogues that, through both image and text, help us get a feel for the texture of life at BMC.

68. Rice, quoted in Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 624, 623.

69. From a group dynamics perspective, the life of a splinter group is interesting. One of the core lessons of psychodynamic, group-as-a-whole theory is that groups evoke, collect, and redistribute our human ambivalences around belonging, dependence, and authority. We long for inclusion and dread engulfment; we desire autonomy and fear exclusion; we want to be taken care of and deny our dependence; we wish to be relieved of the burden of directing our own actions and resent being told what to do. To help us sort out and contain these messy, conflictual feelings, groups typically spawn dependent and counter-dependent subgroups. (On the role of ambivalence, projective identification, and subgrouping in group life, see, e.g., Warren G. Bennis and Herbert A. Shepard, "A Theory of Group Development," *Human Relations* 9, no. 4 [1956]; and Wells, "The Group as a Whole"). As long as the splinter group is still nested within the larger system, it is unified in its counterdependence; and it need only look across the aisle or quad to keep tabs on its split-off desires for belonging, dependence, and heteronomy. However, if the rebels successfully oust the old guard, they must now find ways to contain these all-too-human ambivalences. Paradoxes ensue. The former factional leader is elevated to rebel-in-chief. Now each must decide what it means to be loyal to the insurrection, to follow the leader or maintain the spirit of counterdependence. Ejecting the other is an unstable strategy. The split-off part comes home to roost.

70. Rice, "Foreword," 38.

71. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Athens: Swallow Press/Ohio University Press [1927] 1954), 183.

72. Like Dewey, Rice was a progressive educator with qualms about progressive education as a program. Instead of meeting the pedagogical present with open minds, as Dewey had recommended, Rice found that many progressive educators "were running on something that happened a good while back"; instead of living an experimental, dialogical ethos, "they've got the thing laid out. This is the way to do it. And by God if you don't do it that way you're not it" (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 24). For the classic defense of this Deweyan ethos and critique of the reduction of progressivism into canned epitomes, see Joseph J. Schwab, "The 'Impossible' Role of the Teacher in Progressive Education," *School Review* 67, no. 2 (1959).

73. For detailed transcripts of these fall 1936 meetings, see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 102–113; the quotations are from pp. 104 and 109.

74. Charles Perrow, "Drinking Deep at Black Mountain College," *Southern Cultures* 19, no. 4 (2013): 93. The meeting took place in 1948.

75. See the exchange from a 1951 meeting, quoted in Kindellan, "Projective Verse and Pedagogy," 9–11. On p. 11, Adams remarks "that he doubts if anybody here knows what Mr Olson is talking about!"

76. The open educational question is the subject of Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, chap. 8. For a discussion of teaching as a practice, whose community is drawn together by their ongoing agreement to disagree over how best to understand the goods of that practice, see chaps. 2 and 6, for example, pp. 68–69 and 189.

77. Eva Díaz develops this theme, arguing that, in the pedagogy of Josef Albers, Buckminster Fuller, and John Cage, we find three different models of experimentation (see Díaz, *The Experimenters*).

78. John A. Rice, “Fundamentalism and the Higher Learning,” *Harper’s Monthly Magazine*, May 1937. To reiterate, Rice was equally troubled by the progressive’s lack of rigor as by rigor mortis of the great books crowd. Indeed, Rice sounded off in one BMC meeting that “‘progressive education’ when it is stupid, is much more stupid than the other kind” (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 24). It was Rice’s ambition to build a college that would let go of the usual formula (lecturing, cramming, regurgitation, grading, credentialing) without grabbing on to a new one, whether it be “read these books” or “follow the student’s interest.”

79. See, for example, Charles Olson, “A Later Note on Letter 15,” in *Selected Poems* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 155.

80. I discuss this in “Soul Action” (pp. 3–6 and 270n23).

81. For a critique of the pseudo-progressive rhetoric that MOOCs focus on the “learning experience” by enabling “just in time learning,” see Rashid Robinson, “Learning On-Demand: Massive Open Online Courses and the Privatization of the Educational Experience,” PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2021).

82. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 27.

83. Pound, *A B C of Reading* (Reading, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, [1934] 1961), 40.

84. Socrates compares himself to a gadfly in *Apology*. Regarding the midwife and matchmaker metaphors, for a guide to the Platonic references, see Avi Mintz, “The Midwife as Matchmaker: Socrates and Relational Pedagogy,” in *Philosophy of Education 2007*, ed. Barbara Stengel (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2008). The *Phaedo* offers a vision of the teacher figure accompanying students on the search for truth.

85. Olson, “On Black Mountain (II),” 319.

86. Alphonse de Lamartine, quoted in Dolores Hayden, *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism 1790–1975* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976), 348.

87. Here in “Wide Awake” I take this claim as axiomatic, having devoted “Soul Action” and “New Student Orientation” to its motivation and explication. This

subsection of “Wide Awake” also consolidates the critique, which runs throughout *Undeclared*, of the exchange-value logic that has captured the contemporary multi-versity (see “Campus Tour,” “Public Hearing” (pp. 194–195), and “Job Prospects” (pp. 206–207).

88. On this point, see Katherine Ki-Jung Jo, “Making the Examined Life Worth Living: The Ethics of Being a Liberal Educator” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 2019), <http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105850>.

89. For one version of the red pill, see Marc Bousquet, *How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage Nation* (New York: NYU Press, 2008), especially chap. 4.

90. Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation),” trans. Ben Brewster, in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 162.

91. Plato, *Republic*, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [c. 380 BCE] 2004), 212 (518d).

92. In 2015, the YMCA Blue Ridge Assembly, “after a great deal of research . . . prayer and reflection,” changed the name of the building from Robert E. Lee Hall to Eureka Hall (a new name inspired by the exclamation made by the Assembly founder, Willis D. Weatherford, when he first came upon the site where the building now stands). The YMCA Blue Ridge Assembly’s statement is preserved here: <https://kadampa-center.org/blue-ridge-assembly-statement-lee-hall>, accessed October 30, 2021.

93. “Blue Ridge Assembly Historic District,” National Register of Historic Places Inventory—Nomination Form, <https://files.nc.gov/ncdcr/nr/BN0005.pdf>.

94. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 36, quoting from the typed manuscript Cramer sent him, “I went to Black Mountain College” (see p. 450n16, and p. 453n63; misspelling of Doughten corrected). Cramer would go on to have a complicated relationship with Rice as I note below (p. 335n121) and as described in Katherine Chaddock Reynolds, *Visions and Vanities: John Andrew Rice of Black Mountain College* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 128–129 and 134–135.

95. Lane, *Sprouted Seeds*, 46.

96. Here we pick up several of the key themes—*skholé*, reorientation, arrival—of “New Student Orientation.” We will turn to Rousseau’s *sentiment de l’existence* to thicken our phenomenology of *skholé*; to Rice’s allegory of the doubled self to deepen our sense of what it takes to turn the soul; and to Rumaker’s narrative of finding his voice to concretize the idea of arrival as a protracted process.

97. It was called the “painted porch” because it doubled as an art gallery. Though no paintings were hung on the façade of Lee Hall, the centrality of the arts at Black Mountain further links its porch to the Stoa Poikile.

98. Dewey offered this anecdote about his difficulty in finding decent chairs for the Lab School: “We had a great deal of difficulty in finding what we needed, and finally one dealer, more intelligent than the rest, made this remark: ‘I am afraid we have not what you want. You want something at which the children may work; these are all for listening’” (John Dewey, “The School and Society,” in *The School and Society/the Child and Curriculum* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1900) 1990], 31). Proving again that Whitehead was right about all philosophy being a footnote to Plato, philosophy of education is just catching up to Plato’s stress on posture in his famous allegory of miseducation and transformation (see the epigraph on p. 71). Black Mountain was a place where learners were constantly shifting their literal and learning postures. This section thus links back to the discussion of Dewey’s postural re-education with Alexander (see “Soul Action,” pp. 82–88). It was Chris Moffett who first got me thinking about the educational importance of chairs and posture. My thinking in recent years has been enriched by dialogue with Samantha Ha DiMuzio about the educational and epistemological implications of walking.

99. This idea that it was ingenious branding to name the modern institution after the ancient idea of *skholé* comes from Kieran Egan (see 311–312n53).

100. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. Peter France (London: Penguin, 1979), 89.

101. Eve Grace, “The Restlessness of ‘Being’: Rousseau’s Protean Sentiment of Existence,” *History of European Ideas* 27 (2001): 140. As Grace explores, there are apparently conflicting versions of the *sentiment de l’existence*: the Rousseau of the Discourses and *Emile* stresses energetic action; the Rousseau of the *Reveries*, calm repose. Here is how Grace captures the active version: “The plenitude of life would seem to be felt when, like a race horse running at top speed, we stretch our every power, our every faculty, to its utmost” (140). In contrast, the Rousseau of the *Reveries* describes an equilibrium between our powers and our desires, a pleasure in simply being, with no need for striving. Grace concludes, and I concur, that we need not read these as rival accounts. Though the quiescent version is clearly ateleological, I see no implied teleology in the active version. The active principle seems to be an overflowing, “the natural expansiveness of life seeking exercise” not a needy filling of a void (140). As Grace points out (136), Rousseau himself held that the sentiment of existence was contingent upon shifting conditions, and described his *Reveries* as records of “daily fluctuations,” as “barometer readings of my soul” (Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, 33). It seems best then to read Rousseau as offering not rival conceptualizations of the experience, but an open-ended phenomenology of our access to it, a record of the variable conditions under which we may become present to ourselves (it may be on a vigorous hike rather than in sitting meditation) and take pleasure in our aliveness (it may be a moment of loafing blessed by a breeze rather than at a gallop).

102. Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, 88.

103. Rice, quoted in Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 626.

104. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” trans. William Arrow-smith, in *Unmodern Observations: Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, ed. William Arrow-smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1874] 1990); 165–166.

105. This idea has recently been compellingly restaged by René Arcilla. For his critique of educational reification, see René V. Arcilla, “Is There Really Such a Thing as Philosophy of Education?,” *Philosophical Studies in Education* 45 (2014). For his theory of education as being led out, see René V. Arcilla, *Wim Wenders’s Road Movie Philosophy: Education without Learning* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020). For an appreciative critique of Arcilla’s view of education as destiny, see Chris Higgins, “The Hermeneutic Straightaway,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 55, No. 4–5 [2021]]. For an autobiographical and conversational introduction to Arcilla’s thinking, see René V. Arcilla, Chris Higgins (respondent), and Samantha Ha (guest host), “How Can Education Be about Acquiring Nothing?,” *Pulled Up Short* (podcast), May 3, 2021, <https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/sites/pulled-up-short/episodes/season-one.html#006>.

106. For a discussion of the kitschification of education, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 252–253.

107. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 36.

108. While Rice wrote no systematic treatise on education, a fairly clear picture of his views emerges in his autobiography, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century* (for an interesting addendum, see John A. Rice, “Black Mountain College Memoirs, with an Introduction by William C. Rice,” *Southern Review* 25, no. 3 [1989]), and especially in Louis Adamic’s Rice-centered, indeed essentially co-authored, portrait of BMC. After an extended visit in the fall of 1935, Adamic brought the college to the world’s attention with a glowing piece in Harper’s (Louis Adamic, “Education on a Mountain,” *Harper’s Monthly Magazine*, no. 172 [April 1936]). After a series of further, shorter visits, he published an updated version (Adamic, “An Experiment in Education”). Significant portions of these largely overlapping portraits are given over to long conversational but polished quotations from Rice. Rice explains their working method: “Louis took a cottage in the village and came up at night with a list of questions, to be answered by me before the next night. What was the college trying to do, and how? That was the burden and I spent many late hours trying to answer” (Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 337).

Incidentally, it seems that both Duberman and Rice himself misdate Adamic’s initial visit. Adamic opens the Harper’s piece, published in April 1936, explaining that he visited BMC “early last autumn,” that is, fall 1935, a fact confirmed in the opening line of his revised chapter. Rice dates Adamic’s arrival impossibly to “the late autumn of 1936,” months after the article was out (Rice, *I Came out of*

the Eighteenth Century, 335). Duberman's date, though less implausible, is still erroneous. He has Adamic arriving in January of 1936 and staying for three months (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 116). Even if *Harper's* could turn a submission around in a month, it is absurd to suppose that Adamic would return to New York with an article written in March, describing experiences from January and February, thinking they had happened in the fall. Besides, Duberman himself cites correspondence between Rice and Adamic from that January and February, when they supposedly would have been together at Black Mountain (see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 473n7).

Some of Rice's responses to Adamic were drawn from his "Foreword" to the first BMC *Bulletin* and from two articles that built on it (see Rice, "Foreword"; John A. Rice, "Black Mountain College," *Progressive Education* 11 [1934]; and John A. Rice, "Black Mountain College," *School and Home* 16 [April 1935]). Thanks to Lopa Williams of the Boston College Library for tracking down the month of publication for the *School and Home* piece so that I could verify whether Rice had completed it before Adamic arrived.

Two other windows into Rice's views are his aforementioned critique of Hutchins (Rice, "Fundamentalism and the Higher Learning") and the early chapters of Duberman's history, a key source for which is a 1967 interview with Rice.

109. Rice develops his parable of the true and false self in Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 629–633. I have chosen to attribute the entirety of this allegory of the doubled self to Rice, despite some ambiguity in Adamic. The *Harper's* version features two long stretches of blocked text about the decline of village life, rise of the nuclear family, creation of the superficial self, and BMC as a new sort of village that feeds the true self and winnows away the false one—introduced respectively via "To condense what several people have said to me" and via "BMC people explain this as follows" (Adamic, "Education on a Mountain," 522, 524). However, in the chapter version, the first of these block-quotation-condensations is now attributed to Rice and the important first paragraph from the second *Harper's* block now appears without quotation marks (though featuring ellipses where Adamic removed a phrase from the *Harper's* block) and introduced only as "That is explained as follows" (Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 631).

110. This was central in the so-called communitarian correction of liberalism in the eighties. See for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, [1981] 2007), especially chaps. 3 and 15; Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," *Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (1984).

111. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 627, 626.

112. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 630. On webs of interlocution, see Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 35–40.

113. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 630.

114. Paul Simon, "Kodachrome" (1973), Universal Music Publishing Group.

115. I draw attention to the importance and difficulty of pedagogical beginnings in Chris Higgins, "Turnings: Towards an Agonistic Progressivism," in *Philosophy of Education 2008*, ed. Ron Glass (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2009), <https://educationjournal.web.illinois.edu/archive/index.php/pes/article/view/1358.pdf>.

116. Adamic, "Education on a Mountain," 524.

117. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 116.

118. Adamic, "Education on a Mountain," 524.

119. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 117.

120. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 118. While it is easy to hear this as blaming the victim, I think Rice is correctly sensing the group's own ambivalence around being ruled. Evarts suggests some of these relational dynamics when he says of Rice, "He was loved, feared, and sometimes hated. A real father figure" (John Evarts, quoted in Reynolds, *Visions and Vanities*, 129).

121. "The most profound influence" comes from Duberman, who is quoting one remark as representative of what he heard from "many" of Rice's former students (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 4). The other testimonials are all drawn from Reynolds, *Visions and Vanities*: Nat French on finally using his mind (87); Sue Spayth Riley on Rice as empathetic and respectful (134); Betty Young Williams on learning to question and on her internal dialogue with Rice (134). It is Doughten Cramer, whom we met earlier on the porch, who both acknowledges and endorses Rice's ego-bruising methods: "Mr. Rice succeeded in beating me down to a pulp. He was an inspiration to me" (135).

122. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 630.

123. Adamic says that the method of "group influence" had been "continually revised" in response to his article and the criticism it elicited from DeVoto, who had opined that the group dynamics described by Adamic were "vicious" and "downright dangerous" (Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 630; Bernard DeVoto, "Another Consociate Family," *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, no. 172 [April 1936]). Accordingly, whereas many portions of Adamic's 1938 chapter are identical to the *Harper's* article, the section on group influence clearly receives some attention. Indeed, Adamic softens the passage I quoted earlier (see p. 131), removing "bitter" before "enemy," adding "often" before "starved," and changing "must be attacked without mercy" to "must be allowed to recede and disappear" (Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 632).

124. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 631. This is my spin on Adamic's description of the heady opening days of term, with its feeling of a "grand

week-end party.” All of the quotations in my rehearsal of Adamic’s views on freedom, candor, etcera are drawn from p. 632 of this text.

125. We are focusing on a teacher’s agonistic efforts to help students work through their ambivalence about authenticity, but what if the purveyors of liberal learning are themselves still hobbled by a fear of freedom. Rice worried that “some of those who had joined the Black Mountain experiment didn’t even want freedom for themselves—though they were the last to know it” (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 28). Their love of freedom was only abstract, Rice insisted, the “intellectual structure they had built up in defense of freedom was quite at variance with [their] own emotional needs” (29). The practice of teaching requires a simultaneous practice of self-examination.

126. For the shadow side of interpellation/recognition, see Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes toward an Investigation)”; and Jessica Benjamin, *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

127. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 26.

128. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 632. It was precisely this aspect of Black Mountain that most offended DeVoto, who called out Adamic for praising a college that looked “a good deal less like an educational institution than a sanitarium for mental diseases” (DeVoto, “Another Consociate Family”).

129. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 641.

130. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 641.

131. Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 38. Harris mentions only casting-against-type, the less radical of Wunsch’s two methods (though thinking about the effect a role will have on an actor is already unorthodox).

132. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 641. The ellipsis is Adamic’s, though I have also elided a redundant phrase in this same spot.

133. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1958] 1998), 176–177.

134. In his account of educational exemplarity, Warnick is mainly worried about what he takes to be the default view that we simply choose our role models. However, I think he would agree that we do not want to swing to the opposite view that erases the agency in influence. For his communitarian corrective to our voluntaristic bias and interesting perception-based account of emulation, see Bryan Warnick, in *Imitation and Education* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008). For more on the dialectic of agency and influence, see “Soul Action,” pp. 16–17 and 277n13.

135. Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days*, 60.

136. Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days*, 60.

137. See Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days*, 60, 264, and 347. Actually, Olson never said this to Rumaker directly. After his first public reading, Rumaker was standing near Stefan Wolpe, who remarked to Olson in a stage whisper that “the trouble with Rumaker is that he doesn’t know how to *lie yet*” (264, italics original). Grinning delightedly, Olson made sure Rumaker took in Wolpe’s remark. It took a year, and multiple talks with Olson, who “hammered away at Wolpe’s insight,” before Rumaker could “grasp and make use” of the idea (264). And it was year’s after this that Rumaker finally “got to the core of Stefan’s meaning,” by formulating it in the maxim that “The lie of the imagination creates the truth of reality” (264).

138. Rumaker, *Black Mountain Days*, 25. To be exact, Rumaker and his three friends were first greeted by Olson’s wife, Connie, who showed them around the campus. Rumaker did not meet Olson until the second day of his visit.

139. Arendt, *The Human Condition*.

140. Arendt, *The Human Condition*.

141. Donald W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (New York: Routledge, [1971] 1989), 150. This section of “Wide Awake” picks up the main themes of “Soul Action.”

142. I develop this account of imagination in Chris Higgins, “Modest Beginnings of a Radical Revision of the Concept of Imagination,” in *The Imagination in Education: Extending the Boundaries of Theory and Practice*, ed. Sean Blenkinsop (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2009).

143. For Orwell’s descent down the mineshaft, see George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1958), 25–28.

144. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 28. “The sole cause of man’s unhappiness,” Pascal famously ventured, “is that he does not know how to stay quietly in his room” (Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, tr. A.J. Krailsheimer [London: Penguin, (1670) 1995], 37 [§136]). This recent study offers a chilling confirmation of our abiding inability to be alone with our own thoughts: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4330241/>.

145. I developed this point earlier, in “Soul Action” (pp. 14–15).

146. For a detailed defense of this proposition, that education is inseparable from a thick background conception of what it means to be, and to flourish as, a human being, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 254–273. This position is compatible with my claim above (pp. 121 and 330n76) that a vibrant educational community will nurture open questions about our becoming, rather than settling on a fixed anthropology, pedagogy, and ethics.

147. Indeed, we find two discourses, neither doing justice to the costs and dangers of transformative experience. Influenced by positive psychology, much school and curriculum talk simply pretends that students need give nothing up.

Transformative learning is a gentle climb on a sunny day. Meanwhile, most academics, at least most in the humanities, assume that the whole point of college pedagogy is to “trouble” students’ assumptions. And perhaps it is, but there is something ethically troubling about our blithe embrace of disruption when we give so little thought to supporting students through disorientation and disillusionment, let alone to the constructive phase of transformative education. There is good philosophical work challenging both discourses. As an antidote to the former, see Mark E. Jonas, “When Teachers Must Let Education Hurt: Rousseau and Nietzsche on Compassion and the Educational Value of Suffering,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 44, no. 1 (2010); Avi I. Mintz, “The Happy and Suffering Student? Rousseau’s Emile and the Path Not Taken in Progressive Educational Thought,” *Educational Theory* 62, no.3 (2012): 249–265; and Avi I. Mintz, “Helping by Hurting: The Paradox of Suffering in Social Justice Education,” *Theory and Research in Education* 11, no. 3 (2013). Yacek and Gary document the swing toward disruption (Douglas W. Yacek and Kevin Gary, “Transformative Experience and Epiphany in Education,” *Theory and Research in Education* 18, no. 2 [2020]). Stillwaggon probes how young people mourn the selves they are asked to give up (James Stillwaggon, “‘A Fantasy of Untouchable Fullness’: Melancholia and Resistance to Educational Transformation,” *Educational Theory*, 67, no. 1 [2017]); Yacek asks whether we can justify transformative learning ethically (Douglas W. Yacek, “Should Education Be Transformative?” *Journal of Moral Education* 49, no. 2 [2020]). And Jo considers how higher education and the professoriate would have to evolve were we truly to devote ourselves to helping students reintegrate after disruption (Katherine Ki-Jung Jo, “Making the Examined Life Worth Living: The Ethics of Being a Liberal Educator” [PhD diss., University of Illinois, 2019], <http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105850>).

148. After Kant (see *Über Pädagogik*, §29), it is common to speak of the “paradox of education,” referring to the tensions between freedom and restraint. I was introduced to the idea by Helmut Peukert (in a seminar on Levinas and Education at Columbia University in the mid-nineties), who, if I remember correctly, credited to Martin Buber his preferred form of the paradox, that one needs the influence of another to become oneself. I am not sure where, if anywhere, Peukert discusses this in print. Bernhard Grünwald similarly recalls that Peukert “once qualified” the dialectic of leadership and autonomy as a pedagogical paradox (see Bernhard Grumm, “Religious Education Teacher between Biography, Habitus and Power: Professional Ethical Perspectives,” *Journal of Christian Education in Korea* 61 [2020]). For an interesting discussion of the paradox, see Lars Løvlie, “Does Paradox Count in Education?” *Utbildning & Demokrati* 16, no. 3 (2007).

149. Higgins, “Turnings: Towards an Agonistic Progressivism.”

150. Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” 66.

151. Walker Percy, *The Moviegoer* (New York: Vintage, [1961] 1998), 13.

152. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 616, 615, emphasis original.

153. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 621, 615.

154. This koanic Q&A was inspired by the pugnacious ending of John Cage, “Experimental Music: Doctrine,” in *Silence: Lectures and Writings*, 50th anniv. ed. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, [1961] 2011).

155. For a classic statement of the relational imperative in education, see Martin Buber, “Education,” trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, in *Between Man and Man* (Boston: Beacon, [1926] 1955). What I am calling the hermeneutic stance is closely related to the German concept of *Bildung* which, in the Hegelian/Gadamerian variant I favor, involves a twofold mediation: individual self-formation (*bilden*: to form) is mediated by cultural images (*Bilden*), texts, and ideals; cultural re-formation is mediated by the particular ways in which individuals come into their own (for the beginnings of a rehabilitation of the concept, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, 2nd rev., Continuum Impacts ed. [New York: Continuum, (1960) 2004], 8–16). What I mean by the “existential imagination” is well represented by those critics—Erich Auerbach comes to mind—who, despite their erudition, are less interested in what they can show us about literary works and more interested in how the works involve us in a struggle to comprehend reality (see Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, Fiftieth anniv. ed., trans. Willard R. Trask [Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1953)] 2003).

156. Franz Kafka, “Letter to Oskar Pollak (27 January, 1904),” in *Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors* (New York: Schocken, 1977), 15–16.

157. This is the key premise of Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*.

158. Jonathan Lear, “Preface: The King and I,” in *Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

159. Quoted in Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 634, ellipses original. Though not everyone makes this distinction, I think Rice is correct to distinguish cynicism (a simplifying deflation) and irony (a complexity-acknowledging embrace of contraries).

By stressing the difficulty and necessity of asking authentic questions in teaching, Rice locates himself in a Socratic tradition. As Hans-Georg Gadamer puts it,

Among the greatest insights that Plato’s account of Socrates affords us is that, contrary to the general opinion, it is more difficult to ask questions than to answer them. When the partners in the Socratic dialogue are unable to answer Socrates’ awkward questions and try to turn the tables by assuming what they suppose is the preferable role of the questioner, they come to grief. Behind this comic motif in the Platonic dialogues there is the critical distinction between authentic and inauthentic dialogue (Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 356).

I discuss the importance of the live question to the life of the teacher and practice of teaching in Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 130–140, 254–278. On pp. 135–137, I introduce Gadamer’s typology of pseudo-questions, including the pedagogical question, or question with no questioner.

160. Albers belonged to this tradition as well. In his first Trinity lecture, he writes,

This is to remind us that the example, the indirect and unobvious influence, is the strongest means of education, that the unintentional influence of the teacher’s being and doing is more effective than many like to believe.

Therefore, we as teachers help develop others best through developing ourselves. In the end all education is self-education. And we as teachers have no right to demand from our students what we are unable or unwilling to do ourselves.

As development means growth, how can we develop others if our own growth is arrested? As growth is the aim and measure of development for the teacher as well as for the student, it is also its excitement and therefore its most effective stimulus. Without it, teaching is only a hard job and sour bread (Josef Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search: Three Lectures at Trinity College (1965),” in *Albers Anthology*, 294).

161. Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education, and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, [1927] 1967), v. For more on this minor tradition and the conception of teaching it contests, see A Skeleton Faculty in “Soul Action,” and Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 2–9, and chap. 5.

162. Richard Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” in *Philosophy and Social Hope* (New York: Penguin, 1999), 125.

163. Rorty, “Education as Socialization and as Individualization,” 126.

164. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 205. In the discussion of John Webb, I cite from this text parenthetically, by page number.

165. Hannah Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in *Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World*, ed. Melvyn Hill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 336–337.

166. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 615.

167. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 617, 616.

168. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 643; Rainer Maria Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, trans. M. D. Herter Norton, rev. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1954), 54. I develop this idea of poetic calling further in “Job Prospects” (see pp. 238–240 and 369n95).

169. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 272.

170. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 272.

171. As I discuss in “Soul Action” (see pp. 87 and 305n242), this is Bruce Wilshire’s term for embodied awareness of ourselves in relation to the good.

172. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 296.
173. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 619.
174. William Arrowsmith, "Teaching and the Liberal Arts: Notes toward an Old Frontier," in *The Liberal Arts and Teacher Education: A Confrontation*, ed. Donald Bigelow (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 12.
175. For an answer to this question, see Arcilla, *Wenders's Road Movie Philosophy*, 134–140.
176. On the sophomore as ideal, see "Soul Action," pp. 60–62.
177. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 38. Duberman is quoting from BMC's first catalogue.
178. BMC Catalog #1, quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 38.
179. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 38.
180. Richards, *Centering*, 120. For example, Rice, and just about everyone else, attended Albers's courses, and Xanti Schawinsky attended Rice's classes (Schawinsky describes one of Rice's class sessions in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 110).
181. Though this does not rule out, of course, that they sometimes took up the stance of students of each other's teaching.
182. Victor Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey and the Transcendent* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), passim, 84.
183. Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 88.
184. Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 79–83, passim, 89.
185. James, "Pragmatism and Humanism," quoted in Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 97.
186. I offer a more multidimensional conception of open-mindedness in Chris Higgins, "Open-Mindedness in Three Dimensions," *Philosophical Inquiry in Education* 18, no. 1 (2009).
187. Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 96.
188. Kestenbaum, *The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal*, 96.
189. The structure was actually invented in Germany in 1922. Fuller reinvented and popularized it, developing in dialogue with BMC student, Kenneth Snelson, the key structural principle of "tensegrity" (Fuller's term) or "floating compression" (as Snelson called it). In the summer of 1948, a large sphere constructed from venetian blind scrap that failed to rise was dubbed "the supine dome." In 1949, a smaller sphere built from aircraft tubing was successfully erected, Fuller's "Autonomous Dwelling Facility with a Geodesic Structure."
190. BMC student, Jerrold E. Levy, quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 295.

191. This is Duberman, embedding a quotation from Penn, in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 302.

192. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 302.

193. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 302.

194. *Fully Awake* (35:40–35:50).

195. *Fully Awake* (35:58–36:20).

196. *Fully Awake* (36:21–36:27).

197. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 303.

198. Both DeKooning and Cunningham are quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 296.

199. A bookend to this story of Bucky’s acting debut is that of the verbal and literal giant, Olson, deciding to study dance with Cunningham. According to one review of the documentary *Polis Is This*, Olson comes off “as a great, clumsy-looking bear of a man, resembling an out-of-shape offensive lineman” (<https://www.popmatters.com/72586-polis-is-this-charles-olson-and-the-persistence-of-place-2496032018.html>). The point, Cunningham explains, was not that Olson was “going to be a dancer”: he was seeking a “kind of physical experience” (quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 380). Olson worked hard and to Cunningham’s surprise he was, in his own way, “marvelous” (380). “I enjoyed him,” Cunningham recalls, “he was something like a light walrus” (380, emphasis original).

200. This paragraph not only draws together threads from the preceding sections of “Wide Awake” but also rehearses some of the major conclusions of “Soul Action.”

201. Josef Albers, “Combinative Form (1935),” in *Albers Anthology*, 230. Compare two related formulations: “education is first self-education” and “in the end, all education is self-education” (Josef Albers, “On Education (1945),” in *Albers Anthology*, 261; Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search,” 294).

202. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 180.

203. Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” trans. Denver Lindley, in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin, [1958] 1977), 186. The passage continues in an interesting vein. A half century before the rise of social media influencers, Arendt made this observation:

This may indeed be the reason that children of famous parents so often turn out badly. Fame penetrates the four walls, invades their private space, bringing with it, especially in present-day conditions, the merciless glare of the public realm, which floods everything in the private lives of those concerned, so that the children no longer have a place of security where they can grow.

204. Julia Connor, “Living a Making: Source in the Literary Work of M.C. Richards,” *Journal of Black Mountain Studies* 7 (2015). Connor mentions in particular the

Living Theater and the Open Theater. I do not know whether Peter Brook read Artaud in French or was also introduced to Artaud by Richards's translation. Pawlik notes that the founders of the Living Theater, Julian Beck and Judith Malina, met with Richards in April 1958 to discuss Artaud (Joanna Pawlik, "Artaud in Performance: Dissident Surrealism and the Postwar American Literary Avant-Garde," *Papers of Surrealism* 8 [2010]).

205. See <https://digital.ncdcr.gov/digital/collection/p249901coll44/id/622>.

206. This is Tudor's description of the new state of "musical perception" he needed to acquire (which he did in part by reading Artaud's *Theater of Cruelty* with Cage and M. C. Richards) in order to perform Boulez's "2nd Sonata." See Eric Smigel, "Recital Hall of Cruelty: Antonin Artaud, David Tudor, and the 1950s Avant-Garde," *Perspectives of New Music* 45, no. 2 (2007): 173. On the BMC Artaud reading group, see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 370.

207. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 300.

208. John Cage, "Defense of Satie," in *John Cage*, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (New York: Praeger, 1970): 81; quoted in Mary Emma Harris, "John Cage at Black Mountain: A Preliminary Thinking," *Journal of Black Mountain Studies* 4 (2013), <https://www.blackmountaincollege.org/mary-emma-harris-john-cage-at-black-mountain-a-preliminary-thinking/>.

209. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 300.

210. Indeed, Wunsch, who inaugurated BMC's drama program, also saw "dramatics as an educational discipline" and "as a meeting place for all of the arts" (quoted in Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 38).

Duberman makes the point that *Dans Macabre*, a participatory, mixed-media production in the round anticipates *Theater Piece No. 1*. On this point, Mary Emma Harris demurs, stressing that while the Schawinsky pieces, like Cage's proto-happening, were nonnarrative and mixed media, the former were "carefully planned and rehearsed, with nothing left to chance" (see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 90; Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 40).

211. Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 40.

212. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 89–90.

213. Quoted in Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 40.

214. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 294.

215. From one of Robert Sunley's interviews, curated by the Black Mountain College Project. See <http://blackmountaincollegeproject.org/Features/SUNLEY/SUNLEYpartII/OutsidetheClassroomDRAMA.htm>.

216. The pithy description of Arendt's space of appearance comes from Kimberly Curtis, *Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 71.

217. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 178.
218. See Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 208–220.
219. For an explication of Arendt’s concepts of action, the deed, and the space of appearance, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 92–99.
220. In this respect, and not only this one, Arendt’s view resonates with that of Simone Weil, who imagines the needs of the soul arranged in antithetical pairs. See Simone Weil, “The Needs of the Soul,” trans. Arthur Wills, in *The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind* (London: Routledge, [1949] 2002).
221. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 175.
222. John Ruskin, *Modern Painters*, vol. 3 (containing Part IV, “Of Many Things”): chap. 16, §28, emphasis original, available at <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/38923/38923-h/38923-h.htm>. Albers knew and liked this Ruskin passage (though he apparently attributed it to Emerson at first). For example, he ends his first and begins his second Trinity College lecture by quoting the last line (Albers, “Search Versus Research,” 295). Though it appears only once more in the Albers anthology, in “Concerning Abstract Art,” in her postscript to that essay, Guereñu say that the quote recurs “in many of Albers’ later texts” (Josef Albers, “Concerning Abstract Art (1939),” in *Albers Anthology*, 246).
223. Quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 41. I have deleted an interpolation from Duberman.
224. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 617.
225. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 637.
226. Adamic, “An Experiment in Education,” 637. Emphasis in the original. Here Rice’s analysis of the educative power of the arts dovetails with the idea of “practical *Bildung*” as developed by Hegel via Gadamer; for a précis, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 6–7.
227. Rice, “Foreword,” 40.
228. Francis Aljys, *Paradox of Praxis 1 (Sometimes Making Something Leads to Nothing)*, 1997. See <https://francisalys.com/sometimes-making-something-leads-to-nothing/>.
229. Richards, *Centering*, 19. Though Albers fully shared this philosophy, he recommended against a ceramics program on the implausible grounds that clay lacked this resistant property (Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 188).
230. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 41.
231. John Rice, “Organization and Procedure at Black Mountain College,” quoted in Jason Miller, “The Arts and the Liberal Arts at Black Mountain College,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 52, no. 4 (2018): 50; Adamic, “Education on a Mountain,” 519.
232. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 330. The second and third quotations are both from Adamic, “Education on a Mountain,” 519.

233. Rice, *I Came out of the Eighteenth Century*, 328, 329.

234. Adamic, "An Experiment in Education," 616–617.

235. In fact, Rice had found not one but two educators who resonated with this ideal of a rigorous–progressive general education rooted in studio classes. Josef's wife, Anni, a former student of Paul Klee who had just begun to direct the Bauhaus weaving workshop when the couple was forced to leave Germany, was to become an important member of the BMC faculty, not to mention a highly regarded textile artist.

236. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 46. Duberman's source for this is Albers himself, in his 1967 interview with the Alberses. Díaz refers to this quote as a "frequent refrain" in the Albers literature, citing only this source, which she describes as Albers quoting himself (Eva Díaz, "The Ethics of Perception: Josef Albers in the United States," *Art Bulletin* 90, no. 2 [2008]: 282n2).

We do find independent verification in Horowitz, who cites his 1996 interviews with Ted and Bobbie Dreier (Frederick A. Horowitz, "Albers the Teacher," in *Josef Albers: To Open Eyes. The Bauhaus, Black Mountain College, and Yale*, ed. Frederick A. Horowitz and Brenda Danilowitz [London: Phaidon, 2006], 261n1). However, on the Dreiers' version, the remark occurred even earlier, with Albers answering a question from student Norman Weston, when first walking up to Lee Hall. And they quote Albers in broken English, saying, "To make open the eyes."

Albers describes the moment twice more in the mid-sixties, both times recalling that he answered even more succinctly, "to open eyes." In the first Trinity lecture, he describes this as "his first educational sentence in English," adding that even in his later years at Yale he found that he had only more reason to stand by "his first educational promise on this continent" (Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 292; cf. Josef Albers, "March 1965 Interview," in Lane, *Sprouted Seeds*).

While it is true that Albers had studied English for only three weeks when he made this remark, its brevity is better explained by his lifelong devotion to economy, his preference of showing over telling, and his penchant for distilling ideas into as few well-chosen words if not a wordless action). Thus, at one point he writes that we

overvalue acoustical education, which means the oral and aural communication, [such that] . . . many classes attract only idle curiosity or offer only ephemeral entertainment.

Words may attract, but examples inspire and fire. The example is the strongest medium of education. The indirect influence of being and doing is more effective than many may believe. (Josef Albers, "A Second Foreword [1936]," in *Albers Anthology*, 235)

In this same unpublished piece (234), Albers writes, "Let us open eyes and minds more than books." Duberman (46) also adds this gem: "'I had to be careful,' [Albers] once shrewdly remarked, 'not to learn English too well because it would have interfered with my communication.'"

237. Josef Albers, "Concerning Art Instruction (1934)," in *Albers Anthology*, 218–219.

238. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 294; Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, 30th anniv. ed. (New York: Continuum, [1970] 2000), 71. Written in Portuguese in 1967–1968, the English translation appeared first; the Portuguese version came out in 1972.

239. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 293, 294. Indeed, already in the mid-thirties we find Albers protesting that "committing [facts] to memory [had] been overvalued" (Albers, "A Second Foreword (1936)," 234). "Why don't we promote more experiences," Albers asks at the outset of his Havana lectures, "instead of continuing or collecting our own or other people's experiences? Why make people learn things by memory, instead of teaching them to see inwardly?" (Josef Albers, "Constructive Form (1934)," in *Albers Anthology*, 223).

240. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 291.

241. Albers, "Art at Black Mountain College (1946)," 264; Josef Albers, "Dimensions of Design (1958)," in *Albers Anthology*, 282.

242. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 291.

243. See, for example, Josef Albers, "Op Art and/or Perceptual Effects (1965)," in *Albers Anthology*, 315.

244. Josef Albers, "[the Artist's Voice: Josef Albers] (1962)," in *Albers Anthology*, 287.

245. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 295.

246. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 295.

247. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 298. Regarding the sensitivities of soul, Albers writes, "every person has all the senses of the soul (e.g., sensitivity to tone, color, space)" (Albers, "Concerning Art Instruction (1934)," 218).

248. "An big artist," Albers would say disparagingly when the subject of professional artists came up (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 46).

249. Josef Albers, "Creative Education," in *The Bauhaus: Weimar, Dessau, Berlin, Chicago*, ed. Hans Maria Wingler (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, [1928] 1969), 142. The second part of this quote appears as an epigraph in Molesworth, *Leap before You Look*, 33.

250. Josef Albers, "Speech at Black Mountain College Luncheon, New York City Cosmopolitan Club (1938)," in *Albers Anthology*, 240.

251. On Dewey's use of "anesthetic" see "Soul Action," pp. 74 and 298n180.

252. Díaz, "The Ethics of Perception," 263.

253. Anni Albers, "Work with Material," in *Black Mountain College Bulletin* 5 (1938), http://toto.lib.unca.edu/findingaids/mss/BMCMAC/01_bmcmac_publications

/bmc_mac_pub_05_1937-38/bmc_05_bulletin_1938/default_bmc_05_bulletin_05_1938.htm. Reprinted as Anni Albers, "Work with Material," *College Art Journal* 3 (January 1944): 51–54.

254. Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 294.

255. Albers says that precision is a "decisive" factor "in art, as in all communication," in Albers, "Art at Black Mountain College (1946)," 264. Economy was central to Albers' understanding of art and aesthetic education. In a piece written shortly after arriving at Black Mountain, Albers declares that "We stress the economy of form: ratio of effort to effect" (Albers, "Concerning Art Instruction (1934)," 220). This latter phrase appears repeatedly in Albers's writings and is incorporated into his fourfold definition of art (origin, content, measure, aim) as the measure of art (see Josef Albers, "The Origin of Art (Ca. 1940)," in *Albers Anthology*, 253; "Search Versus Re-Search," 291). Albers also stressed care for one's materials and space. For example, his Yale colleague, Robert Engman, reports that "Albers would grow 'furious' when people abused property. 'If he saw you with your knee bent and your foot against the wall, it was almost like a ticket home'" (quoted in Horowitz, "Albers the Teacher," 79).

256. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 46.

257. Albers, "Speech at Black Mountain College Luncheon," 242.

258. Albers, "Speech at Black Mountain College Luncheon," 241.

259. "School of intentions": Albers, "Constructive Form (1934)," 222. "Cultivate human relatedness": Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 294. What I am calling "situational responsiveness," Albers calls "thinking in situations" (which he also defines as "imagination" or "flexible imagination") (see, e.g., Albers, "Search Versus Re-Search," 303, 310).

260. The phrase "spiritual constitution" appears twice: Albers, "Speech at Black Mountain College Luncheon," 235; Albers, "A Second Foreword (1936)," 240.

261. Albers, "Concerning Abstract Art (1939)," 245.

262. Though Albers and Arendt draw a similar distinction, they mark it with different terms. For Arendt "self-expression" is the lesser thing, the intentional sharing of our what-ness. She uses "disclosure" and "revelation" interchangeably to name the way in which our who-ness is temporarily uncloaked when we act in the public realm. Albers also likes the term "revelation" for this latter activity. Where he differs is in using "self-disclosure" to name the lesser thing. Meanwhile, Albers vacillates on "self-expression," often using it as an equal term of abuse while occasionally using it to name the genuine article. In the end, Albers's preferred terms are "revelation" and "realization."

For "self-expression" as the valorized term, see Albers, "Art at Black Mountain College (1946)," 264; Josef Albers, "My Courses at the Hochschule Für Gestaltung at Ulm (1954)," in *Albers Anthology*, 275; and Josef Albers, "Albers Answers:

‘What Is Art?’, ‘Can Art Be Taught?’, ‘What Would You Say to the Young Artist?’ (1958),” in *Albers Anthology*, 283. For the leveling of “self-expression and/or self-disclosure,” see Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search,” 312. See also his statement that he is “unable to accept self-expression either as the beginning of art studies or as the final aim of any art” (Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search,” 291). In one interview, Albers notes with pleasure that Cezanne, whom he admires, only used the word “expression” once, opting instead for the term “realize” (Albers, “[the Artist’s Voice: Josef Albers] (1962),” 287). In what would eventually become the motto for the Albers Foundation, Albers defined the aim of art as “the revelation and evocation of vision.”

No doubt differences between their views remain. It is possible that Albers’s sense of working over time to cultivate the vision that is revealed chafes against the way in which, for Arendt, self-disclosure cannot be willed. And certainly, the fact that Arendt classifies art under work, not action, is a major stumbling block in assimilating their views. On whether art should be so classified, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 102-104.

263. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 180, 179–180.

264. Josef Albers, untitled poem, *Origin 8* (Third Series), January 1968, Celebrating Josef Albers, 24. Originally in Josef Albers, *Poems and Drawings* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1958] 2006, unpaginated).

265. See, for example: <https://black-mountain-research.com/photography/#jp-carousel-503>; the first image in Harris, “John Cage at Black Mountain” (<https://www.blackmountaincollege.org/mary-emma-harris-john-cage-at-black-mountain-a-preliminary-thinking/>); Horowitz and Danilowitz, *To Open Eyes*, 97 and 77; Harris, *The Arts at Black Mountain College*, 82; and Molesworth, *Leap Before you Look*, 187.

266. “Insight into soul-action,” Dewey declares, “is the supreme mark and criterion of a teacher” (John Dewey, “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” in *John Dewey on Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1904) 1974], 319). But just as it is central to teaching to notice what students notice, so it is central to learning to attend to the teacher attending. For a discussion of these points see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 241–248.

267. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 228.

268. Josef Albers, “Truthfulness in Art (1937),” in *Albers Anthology*, 236.

269. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 74. For some examples of Alber’s antics, see p. 76.

270. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 76.

271. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 78.

272. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 131. I hope this brief sketch of Albers’s pedagogy does not seem hagiographic. Even an appreciative former student such

as Horowitz includes disturbing details about Albers pinching female students on the rear end (80), temper “tantrums” (78–79), and crits so “devastating” and “merciless” that some students “allegedly required days or weeks to recover after he had laid waste to their work, and even considered dropping out of school altogether” (78).

273. Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search,” Lecture II.

274. Josef Albers, “On My Work (1958),” in *Albers Anthology*, 284.

275. Josef Albers, “Teaching Form through Practice (1928),” in *Albers Anthology*, 214. For a discussion of congeniality in the context of vocation, see “Job Prospects,” pp. 237–240.

276. It is worth looking at the stunning, marvelously diverse leaf studies produced in Albers’s classes, for example Horowitz and Danilowitz, *To Open Eyes*, 233–235. Four of the thirty-six examples of student work displayed by the Albers Foundation are leaf studies (see <https://www.albersfoundation.org/alberses/teaching/students>). For eight of Albers’s own leaf studies, see <https://www.albersfoundation.org/art/highlights?artists=josef-albers&mediums=collage&page=1>.

277. Albers, “Teaching Form through Practice (1928),” 214.

278. Albers, “Search Versus Re-Search,” 291.

279. This sounds like anthropomorphization only if we assume that humans alone have a theatrical impulse, a premise contested by Gadamer who argues that “self-presentation is a universal ontological characteristic of nature” (Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 108). The idea that recognition of an other occasions a fuller self-enactment yielding “an increase of being” is also Gadamerian (while this animates the whole of *Truth and Method*, see in particular 135–152).

280. Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 76.

281. Albers, quoted in Horowitz, “Albers the Teacher,” 232. Horowitz is quoting from a lecture Albers delivered in 1966 at the University of Bridgeport, of which there are audiotapes. The first elision and the interpolation are Horowitz’s. The sentence I removed is truncated by another elision of Horowitz’s, making it a bit hard to parse. Albers refers to some subset of the twenty compositions as so diverse that they practically hail from “from different countries, different races.” It is unclear how problematic this metaphor proves to be.

282. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” in *Essays and Lectures*, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, [1841] 1983), 259–260.

283. Alfred North Whitehead, “The Rhythm of Education,” in *The Aims of Education*, 17.

284. See Zommer and House, *Fully Awake* (25:06). Two former students speak about the importance of these private spaces, one using the term “studio” and the other “study.”

285. This is Arendt's translation of the Latin aphorism that forms both the closing of *The Human Condition* and the opening of *The Life of the Mind*. For this exact version, see Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, One Volume Edition (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace & Company), 7–8. Note that Arendt incorrectly attributes the aphorism to Cato who, as Cicero reports, himself attributed it to Scipio Africanus.
286. Søren Kierkegaard, *Papers and Journals: A Selection*, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 161.
287. David Blacker, *Democratic Education Stretched Thin: How Complexity Challenges a Liberal Ideal* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 127.
288. See my earlier discussion of *skholé* and Oakeshott's concept of the interval in "New Student Orientation," pp. 99–102.
289. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 37.
290. Arthur Penn, in Zommer and House, *Fully Awake* (32:13–32:38).
291. Perrow, "Drinking Deep at Black Mountain College," 88.
292. Hannelore Hahn, in Zommer and House, *Fully Awake* (33:08–33:29).
293. Perrow, "Drinking Deep at Black Mountain College," 88–89.
294. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 92.
295. Sarton, Excerpt from Letter to Greene, 81.
296. Hahn, in Zommer and House, *Fully Awake* (33:56–34:28).
297. Sarton, Excerpt from Letter to Greene, 81.
298. Fielding Dawson, "Talk for Saturday, March 7, 1992: Education at Black Mountain," *Appalachian Journal* 44/45 (2017–18): 573.
299. Levi, "Meaning of Black Mountain," 184.
300. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), 80.
301. In the passage quoted, Dewey lists the four forms of hypostasization in a slightly confusing order: first that of the future, then that of the internal and the external, and finally that of the past.
302. See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 223; and, Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 92.
303. On the distinction between environment and surroundings, see Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 11–12. Dewey writes, "The things with which a man *varies* are his genuine environment. Thus the activities of the astronomer vary with the stars at which he gazes or about which he calculates" (11, emphasis original).

304. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 76.

305. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer takes the well-known interpretive principle—that one needs both to understand a text as a whole in order to notice its salient particulars and to understand its particulars to gain insight into its overall meaning—and gives it historical dimension and existential depth. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Part II. It is possible to read Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom as a common ancestor of both Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Dewey’s theory of reconstruction.

306. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 29.

307. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 76. Emphasis original.

308. Compare René V. Arcilla, *Mediumism: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Modernism for Existential Learning* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2010).

309. If the arts and education are not externally related, one making the other into its instrument, but definitionally interconnected, then we should find concepts at Black Mountain that are simultaneously pedagogical and aesthetic. And that, I want to argue, is just what we find in the concepts of medium and happenings and stage, in the concepts of centering in pottery and breath in poetry.

310. Rauschenberg and Cernovitch were students; Cage, Cunningham, and Tudor were summer faculty; and Olson and Richards were regular faculty.

The variations in recollections, kaleidoscopic to begin with and then frayed by time, are comically far-flung. *The date*: one attendee has it in early summer; most have it in August but cannot recall the exact date. A BMC calendar lists a concert by John Cage on August 16, but this may have been a different event. *The personnel*: most agree on the list above, though Carroll Williams has Cunningham accompanied by members of the company he had not yet assembled; and she has someone named Jay Watt, not David Tudor, performing a sound piece with radio and duck calls. *The arrangement*: Francine du Plessix Gray and Cage himself put Cage up on the ladder. M. C. Richards and David Weinrib put Cage at a lectern. Duberman offers five rival accounts from attendees on the basis of his interviews, concluding with this summary:

We now know there was a ladder—or at least a lectern—and if MC wasn’t on it (and she probably wasn’t, since she was riding a horse, or in a basket) then Rauschenberg or Olson was. Except that Olson was also in the audience. But possibly that was after he delivered his poem; or maybe he came down and sat in the audience in order to deliver his poem, since that, as you’ll recall, was broken into parts and it may be that he himself delivered only one of those parts (the part that was in French, perhaps). As for Rauschenberg, we know he exhibited something, either as backdrop or foreground—and something that he had made. Except of course the gramophone: clearly he couldn’t have made that—nor those discs, which were something from the twenties, or thirties, or Piaf. (Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 377–378).

311. It is also sometimes referred to as *Untitled Event (1952)*. Some consider it the first happening; others an important “proto happening.” I think Greg Allen probably gets the hermeneutic logic right when he observes—apropos of the remark by Nicholas Cernovitch, the event’s projectionist, that “nobody knew we were creating history”—“and they weren’t, at least until Cage began teaching the event at his legendary New School classes several years later to students who would be among the first performance artists” (see <https://greg.org/archive/2009/08/10/you-didnt-have-to-be-there-and-even-if-you-had.html>).

312. On Wolpe’s relationship to Cage’s Dadaistic turn, see Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 368.

313. Quoted in Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 375.

314. Michael Kirby and Richard Schechner, “An Interview with John Cage,” *Tulane Drama Review* 10, no. 2 (1965): 51.

315. Kirby and Schechner, “An Interview with John Cage,” 52.

316. This is based on the drawing that M. C. Richards made for William Fetterman in 1989 (William Fetterman, *John Cage’s Theater Pieces: Notations and Performances* [Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996], 100). No doubt, others remember the layout differently. Richards sketch seems clearly off on one point, since she shows Cunningham’s “dance path” outside the seating, whereas multiple attendees, including Cunningham himself, have him traversing the aisles (his only preparation, he says, was to practice in the aisles to see “how much I could manage without kicking somebody” [Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 377]).

317. John Cage, “Julliard Lecture,” in *A Year from Monday: New Lectures and Writings* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, [1952] 1967), 106, 106, 110. Recollections differ over what Cage read during *Theater Piece No. 1*. In 1961, Cage himself identified the text as his Julliard Lecture, and this accords with many of the testimonials, which recall him reading something about the relation of Zen and music, with a quotation from Meister Eckhart (John Cage, “Foreword” in *Silence*, x). The duration of the lecture also fits the timing of *Theater Piece No. 1*, as suggested by its sole remaining score. On this point, see Fetterman, *John Cage’s Theater Pieces*, 100.

318. Ruth Erikson, “Chance Encounters: Theater Piece No. 1 and its Prehistory,” in Molesworth, *Leap before You Look*, 299. Some remember the projections starting on the ceiling and moving down the wall. The paintings were suspended from the ceiling.

319. See the epigram that opens John Cage, “On Robert Rauschenberg, Artist, and His Work,” in *Silence*, 98. Cage refers to 4’33 as his “silent piece.” All of the following Cage quotes come from this essay.

320. On this distinction, see Chris Higgins, “Instrumentalism and the Clichés of Aesthetic Education: A Deweyan Corrective,” *Education and Culture* 23, no. 3 (2008).

321. Compare Rauschenberg's own characterizations of his work, for example: "I don't want the piece to stop on the wall. And it has to somehow document what's going on in the room and be flexible enough to respond" (quoted in Barbara Rose's *Rauschenberg* [New York: Vintage, 1987], 110); and "I had to make a surface which invited a constant change of focus and an examination of detail. Listening happens in time. Looking also had to happen in time" (quoted in G. R. Swenson, "Rauschenberg Paints a Picture," *Art News* [1963]: 45; requested in Jonathan Fineberg, "Robert Rauschenberg's 'Reservoir,'" *American Art* 12, no. 1 [1998]: 87).

322. Dorothy Gees Seckler, "The Artist Speaks: Robert Rauschenberg," *Art in America* (1966): 76; quoted in Fineberg, "Robert Rauschenberg's 'Reservoir,'" 86.

323. Cage, "Experimental Music," 12.

324. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 371; Kirby and Schechner, "An Interview with John Cage," 52.

325. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 372. For photographs of Cunningham (with Albers and Cage) and of Richards (with Tudor) holding what are likely the same white coffee cups as those used in *Theater Piece No. 1*, see Harris, "John Cage at Black Mountain" (<https://www.blackmountaincollege.org/mary-emma-harris-john-cage-at-black-mountain-a-preliminary-thinking/>).

326. A. V. Grimstone, ed., *Two Zen Classics: Mumonkan and Hekiganroku* (New York: Weatherhill, 1977), 44.

327. Duberman, *An Exploration in Community*, 376.

PUBLIC HEARING

1. John M. Gregory, "Inaugural Address," in *First Annual Report of Board of the Trustees of the Illinois Industrial University: From Their Organization, March 12, 1867, to the Close of the Academic Year, June 18, 1868* (Springfield: Bakee, Bailhache & Co., 1868), 174. Gregory was the first regent (the term president was adopted in 1894) of what is now known as the University of Illinois. Gregory addresses his remarks to "fellow citizens of Illinois." In the elided sentences, he explains that the founders will have to build this new kind of university even as they are running it.

2. Thomas Jefferson, "December 2, 1806: Sixth Annual Message," US National Archives. Transcript available at <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-2-1806-sixth-annual-message>.

3. President's Commission on Higher Education, *Higher Education for American Democracy*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper, 1947), 23, quoted in Nancy Folbre, *Saving State U: Fixing Public Higher Education* (New York: The New Press, 2010), 38.

4. David F. Labaree, "Consuming the Public School," *Educational Theory* 61, no. 4 (2011): 394.

5. Labaree, “Consuming the Public School,” 394.
6. David F. Labaree, *The Making of an American High School: The Credentials Market and the Central High School of Philadelphia, 1838–1939* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), xiv, and see chap. 6.
7. Labaree, “Consuming the Public School,” 393.
8. In both cases, these are Labaree’s figures: high school enrollment rose from 200,000 in 1890 to two million in 1920; college enrollment rose from 1.5 million in 1940 to 11.6 million in 1980 (David F. Labaree, *A Perfect Mess: The Unlikely Ascendancy of American Higher Education* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017], 104, 106).
9. Labaree, *A Perfect Mess*, 106.
10. This is the title of a track from Paul Simon’s album, *There Goes Rhymin’ Simon* (1973). See Labaree, *A Perfect Mess*, 97.
11. As reported in Gregor Aisch et al., “Some Colleges Have More Students from the Top 1 Percent Than the Bottom 60. Find Yours,” *The Upshot*, *New York Times*, January 18, 2017, <https://nyti.ms/2jRcqjs>. This article is based on the much-discussed Chetty study (see <https://opportunityinsights.org/paper/undermatching/>).
12. I compiled this table from the data provided in Nick Hillman, “Why Rich Colleges Get Richer & Poor Colleges Get Poorer: The Case for Equity-Based Funding in Higher Education,” *Third Way* (2020), <https://www.thirdway.org/report/why-rich-colleges-get-richer-poor-colleges-get-poorer-the-case-for-equity-based-funding-in-higher-education>. Hillman uses data from IPEDs and the Chetty study.
13. Generated using the *Times* interactive tool (<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/college-mobility/>) which is based on the Chetty data.
14. See Table IX, “Percentile Cutoffs in 2015 Dollars for Parent and Child Income by Birth Cohort,” in Chetty’s online data repository (https://opportunityinsights.org/data/?geographic_level=0&topic=0&paper_id=3084#resource-listing). The cut-off for the 99.9% for the 1991 cohort in 2015 dollars is \$3,028,600; in 2023 dollars, that is \$3,881,715. The cutoff for the 99% is \$630,500; in 2023 dollars, that is \$808,103.
15. Ozan Jaquette, *State University No More: Out-of-State Enrollment and the Growing Exclusion of High-Achieving, Low-Income Students at Public Flagship Universities*, Jack Kent Cooke Foundation, UCLA (2017), <https://www.jkcf.org/research/state-university-no-more-out-of-state-enrollment-and-the-growing-exclusion-of-high-achieving-low-income-students-at-public-flagship-universities/>.
16. Quoted in Jaquette, *State University No More*.
17. When I do not cite a source, the information offered is readily available on university websites. When a university lists a range, I take the average cost. When I refer to “tuition,” I am referring to the total annual estimated costs.

18. The webpage has since changed. Here is a historical link: <https://web.archive.org/web/20180101121507/https://www.admissions.illinois.edu/invest/tuition>.

19. See <http://admissions.indiana.edu/cost-financial-aid/tuition-fees.html>.

20. The website has since changed. Here is a historical link: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170312081554/https://admissions.indiana.edu/cost-financial-aid/roi.html>.

21. See <https://www.admissions.umd.edu/costs/> (accessed October 2015). The webpage has since changed and unfortunately there is no archived version.

22. IPEDs Table 330.10, “Average undergraduate tuition, fees, room, and board rates charged for full-time students in degree-granting postsecondary institutions, by level and control of institution: Selected years, 1963–64 through 2020–21,” https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d21/tables/dt21_330.10.asp. In 2020 dollars, the average annual cost at four-year publics was as follows: 1980 (\$7747); 2000 (\$13,005); 2020 (\$21,520).

23. The stratification evident in our New Jersey grid can be replicated in any state, looking only at public strata. In Illinois, for example, using the Times/Chetty college mobility tool, we find

- UIUC: median family income, \$109,000; grad income (at thirty-four), \$59,700; 50% of students from top quintile, 6% from the bottom.
- Southern Illinois University, Carbondale: family income, \$75,700; grad income, \$42,000; 31% from top quintile, 9.2% from the bottom.
- Chicago State University: family income, \$32,100; grad income, \$31,900; 4.7% from top quintile, 20% from the bottom.

24. Compare the eight-stage “devolutionary cycle” offered in Christopher Newfield, *The Great Mistake: How We Wrecked Public Universities and How We Can Fix Them* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016). Figure 1 (p. 36) shows the cycle at a glance.

25. One much-discussed cause is administrative bloat. On this, see “Campus Tour” (pp. 10 and 274–275n64–66).

26. Quoted in Folbre, *Saving State U*, 46. This was a favorite remark of Duderstadt’s, quoted in various forms. Folbre cites James J. Duderstadt, *The View from the Helm: Leading the American University during an Era of Change* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 145. Here, though, Duderstadt paraphrases his own oft-quoted remark somewhat differently, adding two more stages of the devolution of State U, inserting “state-related” in the progression from state-assisted to state-located, and citing approvingly a colleague’s quip that, while no longer state-supported, publics are still “state-molested” by “opportunistic state politicians.”

27. Kristen Cummings et al., *Investigating the Impacts of State Higher Education Appropriations and Financial Aid*, State Higher Education Executive Officers Association

(2021), Appendix A, p. 82, https://sheeo.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/SHEEO_ImpactAppropriationsFinancialAid.pdf.

28. According to the Government Accounting Office, in 2012, 25% of public college revenue came from tuition, 23% from state funds. See <http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667557.pdf>. Regarding four-year publics, see Kich, “A Real Numbers-Cruncher Weighs in on the Campos Article.”

29. See “Where does our money come from?” at <https://cfo.berkeley.edu/budget-101>.

30. Naomi Schaefer Riley and James Piereson, “Reimagining the Public University,” *National Affairs*, no. 42 (2020).

31. Mary Ellen Flannery, “State Funding for Higher Education Still Lagging,” *NEA Today*, October 25, 2022.

32. See <https://www.washington.edu/opb/uw-data/fast-facts/> and <https://publicaffairs.ku.edu/budget#:~:text=KU%20Revenues,18%20percent%20of%20KU's%20revenues>.

33. See <https://finance.umd.edu/budget/facts-and-figures/operating-budget>; <https://bpir.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3452/2019/06/FY20-Budget-Presentation-Fin-Affairs-6.10.19.pdf>; <https://www.rutgers.edu/about/budget-facts>; https://budget.wisc.edu/content/uploads/Budget-in-Brief_2021-22_V15-1.pdf; <https://budget.utexas.edu/about/budget>; <https://publicaffairs.vpcomm.umich.edu/key-issues/tuition/general-fund-budget-tutorial/>; https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/budget/documents/fy20_budgetdoc.pdf; <https://budget.psu.edu/BOTJuly/BoardDocuments%2022-23/incomepie.aspx>. For the Chapel Hill figure, see Jane Calloway, “Carolina’s Money: Where We Get It; How We Spend It,” *The Well*, March 11, 2021, <https://thewell.unc.edu/2021/03/11/>. For the UC Boulder figure, see Flannery, “State Funding for Higher Education Still Lagging.”

34. Thomas Mortenson, “State Funding: A Race to the Bottom,” *The Presidency* 15, no. 1 (2012): 29.

35. See <http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/years-of-cuts-threaten-to-put-college-out-of-reach-for-more-students>.

36. David Blacker, *The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2013), chap. 4.

37. This page was up for at least five years. It is mentioned in an OpEd in September 2014, and here is an archived link from September 2019: <https://web.archive.org/web/20190212015155/https://admissions.berkeley.edu/cost-of-attendance>.

38. Berkeley’s figure is misleading since it is in line with concurrent estimates of the average pay bump for any BA. Indeed, in 2018, the Federal Reserve calculated the college earnings advantage at \$31,800/year (as reported by CNN Business: <https://www>

.cnn.com/2019/06/06/success/college-worth-it/index.html). Meanwhile, these figures obscure the disturbing fact that poorer students see only a fraction of this gain. One study found that students whose families make less than 185% of the Federal Poverty Level get a 91% earnings boost over high school graduates, while those from families above this income level line get a 162% boost (Brad Hershbein, *A College Degree Is Worth Less If You Are Raised Poor* [Washington, DC: Brookings, 2016]).

39. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political-Economy*, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1977), 125.

40. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, 125.

41. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Conduct of Life,” in *Essays and Lectures*, ed. Joel Porte (New York: Library of America, 1983), 1060. In “New Student Orientation,” I say more about the existential use-value of liberal learning, which helps us stay in touch with the fugitive question, what is worth wanting? (see pp. 96–99).

42. Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, 128.

43. Wendy Fishman and Howard Gardner, *The Real World of College: What Higher Education Is and What It Can Be* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2022), Fig. 5.3, p. 130.

44. Jobbification: an ugly word for an ugly phenomenon. “Vocationalization” is more common, but, as I argue in “Job Prospects,” the jobbified university is not truly devoted to vocational education.

45. As I discuss in “Job Prospects,” there is a bitter irony here. Even as credentials, degrees in the arts and humanities are underrated. And as soon we expand our view beyond credentialing and job preparation, the arts and humanities emerge as the key contributors to vocational education writ large.

46. This data is drawn from the Humanities Indicator Project (<https://www.amacad.org/humanities-indicators>) as reported by Nathan Heller, “The End of the English Major: Enrollment in the Humanities Is in Free Fall at Colleges around the Country. What Happened?,” *New Yorker*, March 6, 2023.

47. Steven Johnson, “Colleges Lose a ‘Stunning’ 651 Foreign-Language Programs in 3 Years,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* 65, no. 20 (2019).

48. See <https://www.collegeart.org/news/2018/11/08/colleges-facing-cuts-to-arts-and-humanities/>.

49. See <https://dailynous.com/category/cuts-and-threats-to-philosophy-programs/>.

50. See http://www.esubulletin.com/news/emporia-state-suspends-academic-programs/article_e997ead2-3eca-11ed-a4ec-7703a48a5527.html.

51. Paul A. Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 36, no. 4 (1954): 387.

52. I say more about the land-grant tradition in “Soul Action” (see pp. 46–48 and 286n105).

53. Sarah Vowell, “A University of, by and for the People,” *New York Times*, February 15, 2018.

54. Here I am dealing swiftly with a question—the nature and value of public education—that I have explored in detail in other work: Chris Higgins and Kathleen Knight Abowitz, “What Makes a Public School Public? A Framework for Evaluating the Civic Substance of Schooling,” *Educational Theory* 61, no. 4 (2011); Chris Higgins, “The Possibility of Public Education in an Instrumentalist Age,” *Educational Theory* 61, no. 4 (2011); Chris Higgins, “The Public and Private in Education,” in *International Handbook of Philosophy of Education*, vol. 2, ed. Paul Smeyers (Dordrecht: Springer, 2018); and Chris Higgins, “From the Editor: Educational Philosophy as the Vanguard of the Public Humanities,” *Educational Theory* 68, no. 3 (2018).

55. Robert F. Kennedy, “Remarks at the University of Kansas,” March 18, 1968, available at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Remarks_at_the_University_of_Kansas.

56. Charles Taylor, “Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,” in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 190–191.

JOB PROSPECTS

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or on Education*, Introduction, Translation, and Notes by Allan Bloom, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books [1762] 1979), 201.

2. Hart Research Associates, “Falling Short? College Learning and Career Success,” survey conducted on behalf of the Association of American Colleges & Universities (2015), 1, https://www.aacu.org/sites/default/files/files/LEAP/2015employerstudent_survey.pdf.

3. The employers were asked to rate their employees’ preparedness in each area on a 1–10 scale. The percentages refer to the portion of employers who rated their employees 8–10 in the given area. I have averaged subcategories in two cases. Communication was divided into oral (28%) and written communication (27%). There are several categories related to diversity: “Awareness/experience of diverse cultures in US” (21%); “Working with people from diff. backgrounds” (18%); “Proficient in other language” (16%); and “Awareness/experience of diverse cultures outside US” (15%).

4. The Hamilton Project, “Career Earnings by College Major,” Interactive Chart (May 11, 2017). See http://www.hamiltonproject.org/charts/career_earnings_by_college_major/. Of the two business options, I chose “Business Management and Administration.” I checked both optional boxes, “Include Full-Time Workers Only” and “Include Graduate Degrees.” Among those who hold only a bachelor’s degree, business majors do consistently outearn history majors.

5. Hamilton Project, “Career Earnings by College Major.” I calculated career figures by averaging earnings at at ten, twenty, and thirty years post degree. I took

the average earnings of four engineering majors: aerospace, civil and architectural, computer, and electrical. Again, I selected both “Include Full-Time Workers Only” and “Include Graduate Degrees.”

6. Hamilton Project, “Career Earnings by College Major.” Again, I selected “Include Full-Time Workers Only” and “Include Graduate Degrees” and averaged the figures at ten, twenty, and thirty years. In this database, philosophy and religious studies majors are combined in a single category.

7. Adapted from Table 6 in Dirk Witteveen and Paul Attewell, “The Earnings Payoff from Attending a Selective College,” *Social Science Research* 66 (2017): 165. Witteveen and Attewell’s analysis is based on data from the first cohort of NCES’ Baccalaureate and Beyond longitudinal study, which tracked the labor market experiences of 1993 college graduates through 2003. The ten-year data on the second cohort, of 2008 graduates, should soon be available (there is a four-year snapshot available now).

8. See Ruth Walker, Christopher Moore, and Andrew Whelan, eds., *Zombies in the Academy: Living Death in Higher Education* (Bristol, UK: Intellect, 2013).

9. Megan J. Laverty, “There Is No Substitute for a Sense of Reality: Humanizing the Humanities,” *Educational Theory* 65, no. 6 (2015): 642–643. Laverty takes the phrase “managerial newspeak” from Raymond Gaita, who himself is building on George Orwell. When Laverty says that “we *now* know,” I take it that she is referring to the broadly hermeneutic, anti-behavioristic turn of the eighties, when thinkers such as Rorty, Taylor, and MacIntyre brought Diltheyan, Oakeshottian, and Gadamerian arguments to bear in Anglo-American philosophy of action. As MacIntyre puts it, “There is no such thing as ‘behavior,’ to be identified prior to and independently of intentions, beliefs and settings” (Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. [South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, (1981) 2007], 208).

10. Philip W. Jackson, in “The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching,” in *The Practice of Teaching* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986).

11. Laverty, “There Is No Substitute for a Sense of Reality,” 641n22; glossing Jackson, “The Mimetic and the Transformative,” 138n23.

12. The first strategy does not reduce everything to the bottom line, but it does leave work stranded there.

13. Let me here address three methodological questions. First, while I see these six tasks as necessary conditions of full vocational enactment, I take no stand on whether they collectively constitute a sufficient condition. This list may be incomplete.

Second, I am treating undergraduate education as the beginning of a process of vocational formation that extends beyond the university and across the lifespan. I speak of *formation* and *enactment* to distance my account from our default assumptions about the what, where, and when of vocational education. Only a

sliver of vocational learning amounts to preparatory didactics, as in “here are the tools and how to use them.” In order to learn to do the work well, we need not only instruction but formation of habits of thinking and doing, seeing, and valuing. Here we must heed John Dewey’s warning that the results of formal instruction are “superficial” and short-lived compared to the “sharing in actual pursuit” through which knowledge is “transmuted into character” (John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* [New York: Macmillan Company, 1916], 8). It is only after we engage the work, as apprentices in a community of practice, that we truly begin to fathom the how and why of it. And at this point, the causal arrow becomes bidirectional: we are not only forming ourselves for practice but forming ourselves through it. In pursuing the idea of vocation as a medium of one’s general education, I am building on previous work and earlier essays in this book. For a MacIntyrean and Deweyan theory of vocational formation and enactment, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching: An Ethics of Professional Practice* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), chap. 2 and pp. 111–130. In “Soul Action” (pp. 73–74), I introduced Dewey’s theory of vocation as medium. In “Wide Awake” (pp. 163–164), I further developed the idea of medium in relation to the arts and the concept of positive freedom.

Third, the language of “task” is meant to signal not steps in a linear process but enduring challenges to which we continually return. (Thanks to Jake Fay for pressing me to clarify this point.) There is a logic to the order which begins with finding a calling and ends with leaving it. At the same time, I have already indicated some of the nonlinear progressions in vocational life. For example, while credentialing is based in part on technical know-how, the richest technical education usually occurs on the job. Or consider two of the further knotty circles I will go on to explore. You cannot explore the ethical geography in and around your work if you have not yet chosen a line of work (task 3 depends on task 1); but you cannot fully understand how a line of work will connect you with what is important until you have begun to discern the goods internal to the practice (task 1 depends on task 3). Similarly, you cannot grow in and through a vocation if you have not chosen one (task 5 depends on task 1); but, vocations shape our abilities, sensibilities, and aspirations (task 1 depends on task 5).

14. For an analysis of the prestige market, see Frank Donoghue, *The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), chap. 5.

15. Elizabeth A. Armstrong and Laura T. Hamilton, *Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

16. As noted above, I am not here assuming a one-way relation between one’s makeup and one’s choice of vocation, as if our talents were all ready-made and fully formed. The phrase, hopes and talents, is meant to evoke this productive circular logic of vocations as simultaneously an expression of and formative influence on who we are. I explore one example of this vocational spiral of experience in my

discussion of Dr. John Sassall. For a theoretical exploration of vocational circles of experience, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, esp. chaps. 4 and 8.

17. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 308.

18. William Deresiewicz, “The Disadvantages of an Elite Education: Our Best Universities Have Forgotten That the Reason They Exist Is to Make Minds, Not Careers,” *American Scholar* 77, no. 3 (2008): 28–29.

19. See “Public Hearing” on the vicious circle of instrumentalization and jobbification.

20. For Oakeshott’s idea of the interval, see “New Student Orientation” (pp. 100–102). On the culture of “total work,” see Josef Pieper, “Leisure, the Basis of Culture,” trans. Gerald Malsbary, in *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* [South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, (1948) 1998].

21. Walker Percy, *The Moviegoer* (New York: Vintage, [1961] 1998), 13.

22. There are many factors foreclosing vocational dialogue. Contemporary students feel a tremendous pressure to hit the ground running on a clearly defined career path (indeed, most students are already juggling school and work). And there is the stigma attached to being undeclared. Universities offer less and less resistance to the general culture of busyness, distraction, and overwork. Faculty are constantly asked to do more. Tight budgets lead to big classes, discouraging individual relationships. Students think that office hours are only for course-related questions.

Even if the student does show up and broach these vocational/existential questions, the typical faculty member is unprepared to help (on the miseducation of the professoriate, see A Skeleton Faculty in “Soul Action”; on the “pastoral” dimension of higher education, see Katherine Ki-Jung Jo, “Making the Examined Life Worth Living: The Ethics of Being a Liberal Educator” [PhD diss., University of Illinois, 2019], <http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105850>).

To the argument that Gen Ed serves this function: in a recent survey of students at a state flagship, only 28% agreed (and only 2% of these, strongly) that “General Education courses have helped me or will help me choose a major” (Clarissa A. Thompson, Michele Eodice, and Phuoc Tran, “Student Perceptions of General Education Requirements at a Large Public University: No Surprises?” *Journal of General Education* 64, no. 4 [2015]: 285).

I was drawn to work at Boston College in part because of their commitment to vocational discernment. For example, Halftime retreats are organized around Michael Himes’ three-part version of what I am calling the great vocational question: What gives you joy? What taps your talents and expands your abilities? What does the world need you to be? Father Himes’ iconic video elaborating the three questions can be found online at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-4IKCENdnw>.

23. Maxine Greene, “The New Freedom and the Moral Life,” in *Landscapes of Learning* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978), 152.

24. On this point, see Arcilla's interesting discussion of the social importance of the dialogue between adolescent melodrama and adult cynicism in René V. Arcilla, *For the Love of Perfection: Richard Rorty and Liberal Education* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 134–148.

25. Thomas Piper, dir., *Five Seasons: The Gardens of Piet Oudolf* (2017).

26. Oudolf was born in October of 1944. I have taken this timeline—first nursery work at age twenty-six, design firm launched in 1976, farmhouse in Humelo purchased in 1982—from Sally McGrane, “A Landscape in Winter, Dying Heroically,” *New York Times*, January 31, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/31/garden/31piet.html>.

27. I explore the overlaps and divergences between the modern humanities and humane learning in Chris Higgins, “Waist High and Knee-Deep: Humane Learning Beyond Polemics and Precincts,” *Educational Theory* 65, no. 6 (2015).

28. In “Soul Action,” I send out a rescue party to hunt for the living formative ideals buried underneath the bureaucratic business that is Gen Ed.

29. Indeed, I have contributed to that study in previous work and two sections of this book. See Chris Higgins, “Turnings: Towards an Agonistic Progressivism,” in *Philosophy of Education 2008*, ed. Ron Glass (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2009); “New Student Orientation”; and “Wide Awake,” pp. 124–145.

30. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education*, ed. Timothy Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 28–29. I should explain two of my elisions.

The first removes Oakeshott's qualification that a culture is “the whole of what an associated set of human beings have created *beyond the evanescent satisfaction of their wants*.” This is confusing given that Oakeshott clearly holds that cultures are centrally defined through their particular constructions of “wants” and the arts through which to attain them. “To be human,” Oakeshott writes, is “to have wants and try to satisfy them” (25). In liberal learning, we may be “invited to pursue satisfactions [we] has never yet imagined or wished for,” but it is still satisfaction at issue (24). Oakeshott is not setting thinking against desiring. Culture for him is the elaboration of desire through imaginative conversation. True, man cannot live by bread alone: we need focaccia, right out of the oven, dripping with a good olive oil. The key word here is “evanescent” which in Oakeshott is typically code for shrinking your ambitions down to the fad of the moment.

My second elision removes a chauvinistic remark. Oakeshott says that it is “particularly [a culture] such as ours” that displays this rich variegation and dynamic internal tension. I do not mean to hide Oakeshott's ignorance, his apparent belief that other cultures are more homogeneous than ours. However, I worried that this moment of reflexive condescension would distract from what overall seems a successful acknowledgment of the contingency within and across cultures.

31. For a fuller catalogue of imaginative registers, see “New Student Orientation,” p. 97). Here is another of Oakeshott’s lists: culture is “an inheritance of feelings, emotions, images, visions, thoughts, beliefs, ideas, understandings, intellectual and practical enterprises, languages, relationships, organizations, canons and maxims of conduct, procedures, rituals, skills, works of art, books, musical compositions, tools, artefacts and utensils - in short, what Dilthey called a *geistige Welt*” (Michael Oakeshott, “Learning and Teaching,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 45).

32. For Oakeshott’s critiques of child-centered education and relevance see, for example, Michael Oakeshott, “Education: The Engagement and Its Frustration,” in *The Voice of Liberal Learning*, 71–77; and Oakeshott “A Place of Learning,” 31. I argue that Oakeshott nonetheless counts as a (novel kind of) progressive educational theorist in Higgins, “Turnings: Towards an Agonistic Progressivism.”

33. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 29.

34. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 29.

35. The first phrase comes from John Stuart Mill, the second from contemporary art historian Jonathan Fineberg. See John Stuart Mill, *On Utilitarianism* (1859), chap. 3, §1, various editions; and, Jonathan Fineberg, *Art Since 1940: Strategies of Being* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1994).

36. Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” 501.

37. Michael Oakeshott, “The Study of Politics in a University,” in *Rationalism in Politics*, 187.

38. Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” 493.

39. “The Study of Politics in a University,” 187. The term “conversability” comes from “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind” (492), where Oakeshott contrasts it with the tendency toward bullying or “eristic,” and with the congealing of a discourse into “dogmata,” appearing as “as set of conclusions reached.”

40. Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” 493–494.

41. Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” 494.

42. Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind,” 494.

43. J. D. Salinger, *Franny and Zooey* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 146, emphasis original.

44. The short “Franny” serves as a sort of prologue. The heart of *Franny and Zooey* is the long second novella, “Zooey,” which picks up the action at home with Zooey’s attempt to help Franny. We know that Lane attends Princeton because Franny is there for “the Yale game,” which suggests Princeton or Harvard, and Lane takes her to a restaurant favored by students who, “had they been Yale or Harvard men, might rather too casually have steered their dates away from Mory’s or Cronin’s” (Salinger, *Franny and Zooey*, 10).

45. Matthew Arnold, "Preface to Culture and Anarchy" (1869), in *Culture and Anarchy and Other Writings*, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 190. For a discussion of this passage and a critique of the tendency to celebrate or denounce such humanist epitomes rather than engage the thought behind them, see Higgins, "Waist High and Knee-Deep," *Educational Theory* 65, no. 6 (2015): 703–708.

46. Salinger, *Franny and Zooey*, 146–147, emphasis original.

47. William Wordsworth, "The World Is Too Much with Us," in *Selected Poems and Prefaces*, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, [1807] 1965).

48. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons, Routledge Classics ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 128. I have followed Sung Ho Kim (in the Weber entry of *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*) in restoring Weber's Nietzschean allusion by translating "*letzten Menschen*" as "last man" rather than "last stage" and "*Menschentums*" as "humanity" rather than "civilization." For alternate translations of Weber's "*Fachmenschen ohne Geist*" (Parson's "specialists without spirit") and more on the Nietzschean flavor of this sentence, see "Soul Action" (pp. 35–36 and 282–283n73). I have left Parson's "cage" even though two more recent translators, Baehr and Kalberg, convincingly argue that the "iron cage" is a mistranslation of "*stahlhartes Gehäuse*," the famous phrase that appears earlier in this paragraph. Weber describes a process in which the "lightly worn cloak" of calling ossifies into a "shell as hard as steel" (Baehr) or a "steel-hard casing" (Kalberg). The *Gehäuse* is not an external enclosure but an internalization of ideology, a sclerotic habitus. Nonetheless, here the *Gehäuse* seems to enclose all of us moderns, so Parson's classic "cage" seems preferable. See Peter Baehr, "The 'Iron Cage' and the 'Shell as Hard as Steel': Parsons, Weber, and the *Stahlhartes Gehäuse* Metaphor in the *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*," *History and Theory* 40, no. 2 (2001); Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The Revised 1920 Edition*, trans. Stephen Kalberg (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 177.

49. It is an exaggeration to suggest that standard approaches to professional ethics entirely collapse into ordinary morality. There is often a stress on role-specific moral obligations (e.g., client confidentiality) and on practice-specific moral dilemmas (e.g., whether to promote a very weak student or force him to repeat a grade). I nonetheless maintain that on the whole professional ethics favors questions of right over questions of good, duty and proscription over purpose and significance, and that indeed this deontic focus tends ultimately toward general principles. As I have argued elsewhere, following MacIntyre and others, the aretaic turn in recent ethics implies a shift in professional ethics. We turn to practices not to apply moral principles worked out elsewhere but to investigate the nature of the good. We do so not simply to curb self-interest but to better understand how practices help practitioners cultivate admirable selves and worthwhile lives. See Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*.

50. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*; Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Michael J. Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," *Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (1984).

51. For a reconstruction of the renaissance in substantive ethics, building on Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, and MacIntyre, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 21-35 and 42-43nn1-4.

52. There were actually three major critiques of liberalism in a span of three years. Beating MacIntyre and Walzer to the punch by a year was Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Another communitarian-leaning critic of liberalism is Taylor who helpfully intervened with Charles Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

53. See Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 12.

54. Though MacIntyre doesn't mention zombies, what I say here echoes the thought experiment with which he opens *After Virtue*.

55. See David Blacker, *The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2013), 53. I like Blacker's coinage, which, as he says, echoes the idea of "regulatory capture." Walzer himself refers to this process with the overly broad term "domination." "Colonization" might be apt, but Jürgen Habermas has made this (*Kolonisierung*) his term of art for the co-opting of the "lifeworld" (local, living, symbolic worlds, animated by communicative action) by "system" (instrumental rationality, market logic, and strategic action), a process that is closer to what I am calling "bureaucratization."

56. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 194.

57. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 194.

58. For a detailed explication and extension of MacIntyre's theory of practice, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, chap. 2. For discussion of its basic architecture, showing how goods and virtues are shaped at each levels of ethical life (practice, individual life narrative, and tradition), see pp. 48-55. For a detailed typology of internal goods, see pp. 55-63. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a close examination of what differentiates practices from other activities. For a review of the criteria separating practices from other activities, see pp. 63-80. For the relationship between practices and institutions, with a closer look at the distinction between internal and external goods, see pp. 73-78. For a brief discussion of the moral virtues that enable practitioners to resist the corruption of their practices, see p. 78.

59. Cf. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 188.

60. I composed this thought experiment in 2015. *The Queen's Gambit* has an ending just like this. MacIntyre appears nowhere in the credits.

61. Jeffrey Brenner, MD, as interviewed by Stephen J. Dubner in “How Many Doctors Does It Take to Start a Healthcare Revolution?,” *Freakonomics* podcast, April 9, 2015. The transcript is available at <https://freakonomics.com/podcast/how-many-doctors-does-it-take-to-start-a-healthcare-revolution-2/>.

62. Michael J. Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).

63. For this translation of Weber's “*stahlhartes Gehäuse*” (famously translated as “iron cage”), I am drawing on the translations of Baehr and Kalberg (see above, note 48).

64. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 75.

65. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 10. That the boundaries between practices need to be neither too porous nor impermeable is also a concern of MacIntyre's, as I show in my discussion of para-practices and the public role of practices. See Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 71–73 and 78–80.

66. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 10.

67. Walzer introduces the concepts of convertibility and dominance and the distinctions between simple and complex equality, and between monopoly and tyranny, in *Spheres of Justice*, chap. 1. In the preface (p. xv), Walzer describes distributive justice as “an art of differentiation.” For a discussion of liberal society as “a world of walls,” each of which “creates a new liberty,” see Michael Walzer, “Liberalism and the Art of Separation,” in *Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, [1984] 2007), 53.

68. He does, however, acknowledge, in the recognition chapter, that “no substantive account of self-respect will also be a universal account,” since there are particular forms of dignity attached to different lines of work. See Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 274–275.

69. The subjects of chapter 9 are kinship, love, sex, and marriage. While friendship does make several cameos in *Spheres of Justice*, for example, “love and friendship cannot be bought” (102), it is not treated as a good pursued within its own sphere nor emphasized in Walzer's discussion of affective ties. In a discussion of the limits of desert as a distributive principle, Walzer briefly turns to art appreciation as an example (24), but again this seems to call for no expansion or reorganization of his list of spheres.

70. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 8.

71. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 8.

72. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 8.

73. Presumably, Walzer himself would locate this good in the sphere of security and welfare, which he initially defines as communal arrangements to secure first our “survival and then [our] well-being” against the “indifference and malevolence

of nature” (65). However, while shelter as security fits here, the broader relation of dwelling and flourishing is taken up in later chapters. It comes up in one way in Walzer’s discussion of family and the domestic sphere in chapter 9. It then receives what might be its fullest expression in chapter 12, in Walzer’s discussion of the spherical corruption in Pullman, Illinois:

A man’s home is his castle. I will assume that this ancient maxim expresses a genuine moral imperative. . . . But what the maxim requires is not political self-rule so much as the legal protection of the domestic sphere—and not only from economic but also from political interventions. We need a space for withdrawal, rest, intimacy, and (sometimes) solitude (300, emphasis original).

74. Ronald Dworkin, “Review of M. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York, NY, 1983),” *New York Review of Books* 14 (1983).

75. Michael Walzer and Ronald Dworkin, “‘Spheres of Justice’: An Exchange,” *New York Review of Books* 21 (1983).

76. Walzer and Dworkin, “‘Spheres of Justice’: An Exchange.”

77. R.H. Tawney, quoted in Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 209. Walzer differentiates the first two types of schooling on pp. 206–207, adding general education on pp. 208–209.

78. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 196.

79. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 193.

80. Den Hartogh finds four distributive principles at work in *Spheres*: desert, free exchange, to ensure that individual needs are fulfilled by collective provision, and to ensure full membership. See Govert Den Hartogh, “The Architectonic of Michael Walzer’s Theory of Justice,” *Political Theory* 27, no. 4 (1999): 498.

81. Den Hartogh denies that Walzer finds any spheres in which, starting from a distinctive good, we then find a corresponding distinctive principle of distribution. Some of Walzer’s spheres (membership, security and welfare, honor) are *defined* by the range of application of a particular distributive principle, and so it is only “trivially” true that we find in them an autonomous distributive logic (Hartogh, “The Architectonic of Michael Walzer’s Theory of Justice,” 501). With other spheres, Walzer does start with a particular good, but in these cases, as I have already noted with reference to education, he often finds multiple distributive principles at work. Another problem with Walzer’s account is that, while his key message is to protect the integrity of the spheres, to avoid convertibility and domination, he builds some forms of domination into his system. Membership is a controlling good, a kind of moral trump suit, since the theory is about distribution, which presumes a bounded political community. There is the further question of whether Walzer was right to include money (and commodities) as a separate sphere, since money is not a good in its own right but a symbol of convertibility. Whereas domination by membership over other spheres is

acceptable, much of Walzer's book is about identifying limits to exchange logic, drawing limits around "what money can buy" (see pp. 103–107). Because Walzer makes money a separate sphere of value and a particular threat to the integrity of the other spheres, this blurs the distinction I am making between MacIntyrean and Walzerian accounts of corruption and integrity. Preserving the distinction between internal and external goods and defending the integrity of spheres start to amount to the same thing if money is central among external goods and chief among dominating spheres. That said, there are generative differences in their accounts. For example, Walzer's focus on distributive justice presumes a degree of scarcity and competition, a hallmark of MacIntyre's external goods. (In my discussion of MacIntyre, I show why this competitiveness criterion is too strict and also why he is mistaken to categorize recognition, which Walzer sees as a core sphere, as an external good. See Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 73–75). Rather than attempt to close the distance between the two theories, I am content to let MacIntyre stand for the threat that goods in any practice/sphere can begin to hollow out, devolving into formalism, expediency, and cost-benefit analyses while letting Sandel stand for the threat of convertibility on which some genuine good is instrumentalized to serve another genuine good.

82. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 295.

83. Oft-quoted, seldom cited, the first appearance I have found so far is in Ray Ginger, *Eugene V. Debs: The Making of an American Radical* (New York: Collier Books, 1949), 125.

84. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 297.

85. Jeremy W. Peters and Jackie Calmes, "Road Shows Get Rolling for Romney and Obama," *New York Times*, September 1, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/us/politics/next-to-native-status-claimed-by-ryan-in-the-drive-for-ohio.html>.

86. Harry Boyte and Nancy N. Kari, *Building America: The Democratic Promise of Public Work* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996).

87. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 62.

88. Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, 55.

89. In fact, for Dewey, it is impossible to have but one vocation, as I explain in "Soul Action" (see pp. 31ff.). Dewey uses the words "vocation" and "occupation" interchangeably.

90. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 309, emphasis original.

91. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 310.

92. In this and the following two paragraphs in the text, I am reprising the central themes of my book, *The Good Life of Teaching*, which examines the general relation

between work and self-cultivation before turning to the specific question of self-ful teaching.

93. John Dewey, “The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education,” in *John Dewey on Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1904] 1974), 318–319.

94. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 309–310. In “Soul Action,” I quoted the entire passage from which this line is drawn (see p. 74).

95. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, trans. M. D. Herter Norton, rev. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1954), 54. Written between 1903 and 1908, the letters were first published, in German, in 1929. Herter Norton’s English translation first appeared in 1934. The context here is Kappus’s love life, but Rilke’s general point is that we should approach life (work, relationships, and the rest) as a poetic calling and thus as an education in the broadest sense.

96. Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, 46, 40.

97. Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, 47, 78.

98. Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, 47.

99. Interview by Anderson Cooper, with Paris Denard, August 6, 2018, *Anderson Cooper 360*, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1808/06/acd.01.html>. Speaking to Denard about President Trump, West observed that what makes Trump immoral is not that he has a gangster element in his makeup—we all do—but that he gives his free rein:

I know there’s gangster in me. There’s gangster in you. There’s gangster in Trump. There’s gangster in Anderson. The challenge is how do we get control of those gangster elements such that we live a life of some decency and a slice of integrity? That’s what we’re talking about. It’s all about accountability. Accountability. Accountability.

100. Rilke, *Letters to a Young Poet*, 47.

101. Salinger, *Franny and Zooey*, 167–8.

102. See <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39063?redirectedFrom=congenial#eid>.

103. See <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/congenial>.

104. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1958] 1998), 179.

105. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 179–180.

106. Robert Farris Thompson, *Flash of the Spirit: African and Afro-American Art and Philosophy* (New York: Vintage, 1984). I was lucky enough to have my college experience shaped by “Master T” (as Thompson was known to the students of Timothy Dwight College), whose study of Yoruba and other influences on Black Atlantic art, culture, and spirituality taught him to reject this psychologism and individualism

of the modern West and to foster a community capable of summoning and paying witness to these flashes of the spirit (whether we call it *àshe* or *daimon*).

107. Talbot Brewer, *The Retrieval of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For more on the question of how we come to value a new structure of value, see my note in “New Student Orientation” (p. 308n28).

108. On the waning of the older tradition and the rise of a narrowly scientific conception of medicine, see Robert M. Veatch, *Disrupted Dialogue: Medical Ethics and the Collapse of Physician/Humanist Communication, 1770–1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

109. Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: Duckworth, 1986), 1–2.

110. That such civic roles, and thus seats in formal humanistic education, were reserved for men alone is true, but there were learned female humanists in the Renaissance. Grafton and Jardine use this fact to show the anachronism of our view of humanities education as general, nonvocational education. They show how teachers such as Guarino Guarini, Lauro Quirini, and Angelo Poliziano had to rework their understanding of humanistic education when corresponding with accomplished humanists Isotta Nogarola, Cassandra Fedele, and Alessandra Scala, women who were barred from such civic roles by the sexism of the day. These educators struggled to make sense of such aims as eloquence and erudition, personal virtue and self-cultivation, once detached from professional practices and civic functions. See Grafton and Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities*, chap. 2.

111. William Carlos Williams, quoted in James K. Gude, “Reflections from the History of Medicine,” *Sonoma Medicine: The Magazine of the Sonoma County Medical Association*, <http://www.nbcms.org/AboutUs/SonomaCountyMedicalAssociation/Magazine/TabId/747/language/en-US/PageId/201/sonoma-medicine-reflections-from-the-history-of-medicine.aspx>.

112. Walker Percy quoted in Gude, “Reflections from the History of Medicine.”

113. Percy quoted in Gude, “Reflections from the History of Medicine.”

114. Williams, quoted in Gude, “Reflections from the History of Medicine.”

115. John Berger, *A Fortunate Man: The Story of a Country Doctor (with Photographs by Jean Mohr)* (New York: Vintage, [1967] 1997), 24. I am so grateful to Megan Laverty for her gift of the perfect book at the perfect time.

116. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 55.

117. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 54–55.

118. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 55.

119. Berger embodies this virtue of imaginative perception whether he is writing about art, animals, Spinoza, or the predations of petrocapiatalism. See, for example,

John Berger, *Selected Essays*, ed. Geoff Dyer (New York: Vintage, 2003); John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?,” in *About Looking* (New York: Vintage, 1991), John Berger, *Bento’s Sketchbook* (London: Verso, 2015); and John Berger, “How to Resist a State of Forgetfulness,” in *Confabulations* (London: Penguin, 2016).

120. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 288.

121. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Reissued German-English ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, [1953] 1997), 48e (§115).

122. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd rev., Continuum Impacts, ed. and trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, [1960] 2004), 267–382, especially pp. 340–354. For an exploration of Gadamer’s theory as it applies to vocational experience, see Higgins, *The Good Life of Teaching*, chaps. 4 and 8.

123. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 270 and 350–352.

124. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 55.

125. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 55.

126. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 57.

127. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 57.

128. Freud describes psychoanalysis as a *Nacherziehung* in a number of places. See the *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), vol. 7, p. 267; vol 14, p. 311; and vol. 15, p. 450.

129. “*Mihi quaestio factus sum.*” “*Quaestio*” here is also sometimes translated as “puzzle” or “enigma,” or, as R. S. Pine-Coffin has it, “problem.” See Augustine, “*Confessiones*” (397–401 CE) in *Opera Omnia Cag*, Electronic Edition, Opera: Part 2, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 2000), 182ln40 (Bk. 10, §50); Augustine, *Confessions* (397–401 CE), trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin, 1961), 239 (Bk. 10, chap. 33).

130. Berger, *A Fortunate Man*, 143.

131. Jonathan Lear, “Preface: The King and I,” in *Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 4.

132. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

133. Sigmund Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII (1937–1939): Moses and Monotheism, an Outline of Psycho-Analysis and Other Works*, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, [1937] 1961), 248.

134. For an appreciation of one such lovably absurd dwelling, the one that we educational philosophers have built precisely by chewing it over, see Higgins,

“Educational Philosophy as the Vanguard of the Public Humanities,” *Educational Theory* 68, no. 3 (2019).

135. See Jonathan Lear, *A Case for Irony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 23. Compare my critique of Steven Pinker’s functionalism in “Soul Action” (see pp. 64–68 and 292n154).

136. Kenneth Burke, “Literature as Equipment for Living,” in *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1941] 1974).

137. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (1848), trans. Samuel Moore in cooperation with Engels (1888), <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm>, chap. 1.

138. Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, trans. Michael Henry Heim, Perennial Classics ed. (New York: HarperCollins, [1984] 1999), 2.

139. F. H. Bradley, “My Station and Its Duties,” in *Ethical Studies* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1876] 1988).

140. Iris Murdoch, “Metaphysics and Ethics” [1957], in *Existentialists and Mystics*, ed. Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1998), 75.

141. Charles Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals,” in *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

142. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 19, 23. This discussion of Oakeshott’s theory of our ambivalent relationship to our freedom as self-interpreting animals builds on my earlier discussion in “New Student Orientation” of liberal learning and the ordeal of consciousness (see pp. 96–99 and 103–104).

143. Oakeshott, “A Place of Learning,” 18.

144. Simone Weil, *The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind*, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge, [1949] 2002).

145. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 11. Compare my discussion of natality as an educational principle at Black Mountain College in “Wide Awake” (see pp. 115–118 and 141).

146. *Arche* is a Greek term meaning beginning, origin, source, principle, rule. “An-archic” is Birmingham’s term, nicely capturing how Arendt sees natality as both the arising of a new principle, a principle of beginning, and disruption of ruling conventions. See Peg Birmingham, “The an-Archic Event of Natality and the ‘Right to Have Rights,’” *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 74, no. 3.

147. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 247; Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harvest/Harcourt, 1973), 478–479.

148. Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, One Volume Edition (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace & Company), 4, quoted in Stephanie Mackler, *Learning for*

Meaning's Sake: Toward the Hermeneutic University (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2009), 27. Mackler offers the gloss that it would “be an exhausting existence if we had to understand everything for the first time.”

149. Pound, *A B C of Reading* (Reading, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, [1934] 1961), 13.

150. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening*, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, *Kierkegaard's Writings* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 32–33 (SV 11:146).

151. Wordsworth, “The World Is Too Much with Us.”

152. Elizabeth Bishop, “In the Waiting Room,” in *The Complete Poems, 1927–1979* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983). The poem has a long first section, followed by four further stanzas. I will cite parenthetically by stanza.

153. I offer a detailed discussion of Jinny's experience of rooted flow in “Soul Action” (see pp. 36–39).

154. William James, *Psychology: A Briefer Course*, vol. 14, *The Works of William James*, Electronic Edition (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, [1892] 2008), 21.

155. We find ourselves in the garden of forking paths and interestingly it may be from this Borges story from which Ishiguro drew his title:

It was under English trees that I meditated on that lost labyrinth. . . . I imagined a labyrinth of labyrinths, a maze of mazes, a twisting, turning, ever-widening labyrinth that contained both past and future and somehow implied the stars. Absorbed in those illusory imaginings, I forgot that I was a pursued man; I felt myself, for an indefinite while, the abstract perceiver of the world. The vague, living countryside, the moon, the remains of the day did their work in me; so did the gently downward road, which forestalled all possibility of weariness. The evening was near, yet infinite. (Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths” [1941], in *Collected Fictions*, trans. Andrew Hurley [London: Penguin, 1998], 122)

Hats off to Dennis Shirley who, when I told him the title of Ishiguro's novel, immediately recalled the phrase from (the translation) of Borges' “Garden of Forking Paths.” Though some have compared Ishiguro to Borges, I can find no discussion of the possibility that Ishiguro's title is taken from Borges.

156. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 62.

157. “Sclerotic habitus” is a gloss of Weber's “*stahlhartes Gehäuse*,” famously translated as “iron cage.” (see above, note 48).

158. Jonathan Lear, *Freud* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 152–153.

159. From Rushdie's blurb on the back cover of the Vintage International edition. See Kazuo Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

160. Selina Todd, "Domestic Service and Class Relations," *Past and Present* 203, no. 1 (2009): 183–184.

161. See <https://web.archive.org/web/20060825134010/http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/architecture/past/save/index.html>.

162. Now extinct in the wild (Britain), English butlers are apparently now in demand by the new superrich of Russia, China, and the Middle East.

163. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, chap. 1.

164. The issue of whether a series of small errors are trivial or significant is overdetermined for Stevens. Later, we learn that Miss Kenton struggled to get Stevens to see that the errors his aged father was making were a sign of his father's inability to continue to do the work (see Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*, 55–60).

165. Sigmund Freud, "Drives and Their Fates," trans. Graham Frankland, in *The Unconscious* (London: Penguin Books, [1915] 2006). The specific mechanisms I go on to mention are described on pp. 20–21.

166. Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," 24. For a gloss of this passage, see "New Student Orientation," pp. 96–97.

167. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, chap. 1.

168. I am referring to Mark Fisher, *Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009). The observation about the end of the world, which inspires Fisher's first chapter, has been attributed to both Fredric Jameson and Slavoj Žižek. Though Žižek does say something along these lines in the 2005 documentary bearing his name, it appears that Jameson got there first. In *Seeds of Time*, his 1994 book (based on his 1991 Wellek Lectures), he offers a less quotable version (xii). The version I quoted appears in Fredric Jameson, "Future City," *New Left Review*, May/June, 2003, <https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii21/articles/fredric-jameson-future-city>, though Jameson himself introduces it as something "someone once said."

169. Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), chaps. 3–4. He defines the concept on p. 63.

170. Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*, 184–190, 206–211, 240–245.

171. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 68.

172. Later that night, Stevens will recall an episode when Lord Darlington allowed a friend to show up Stevens's knowledge of foreign affairs to prove the proposition that "democracy is something for a bygone era" and that "the world is too complicated a place for universal suffrage" (Ishiguro, *The Remains of the Day*, 198).

After admitting that Darlington's views "will seem today rather odd—even, at times, unattractive," he appeals to duty (199). For Stevens, while a butler's loyalty must be "*intelligently* bestowed," once he finds someone "noble and admirable" he cannot be in the business of "forever reappraising his employer" (201, emphasis original; 200). In practice," Stevens reasons, it is "simply not possible to adopt such a critical attitude towards an employer and at the same time provide good service" (200).

173. Rousseau, *Emile*, 193.

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