

Notes

Preface

1. The description of the COVID-19 pandemic is dated at June 28, 2020.
2. For an overview of Wildschut's photographic work and his projects on borders, shelter, and the Ville de Calais, see his website, accessed June 26, 2020, <http://www.henkwildschut.com/>.
3. "The Plants That Make Refugee Camps Feel More Like Home," *The New Yorker*, January 28, 2020, accessed June 26, 2020, <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/the-plants-that-make-refugee-camps-feel-more-like-home>.
4. "Biography Henk Wildschut," accessed June 26, 2020, <http://www.henkwildschut.com/work/biography/biography-henk-wldschut/>.

Chapter 1

1. "300 March across the Italian Border at Montegenevre," Calais Migrant Solidarity, April 23, 2018, <https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/2018/04/23/300-march-across-the-italian-border-at-montgenevre/>. Following the protest, several activists were arrested for helping foreigners enter French territory as part of an organized gang. "The Trial of Solidarity at the Italian-French Border in Southern Alps," Comité de soutien 3 + 4, accessed May 26, 2020, <https://www.relaxepourles3plus4.fr/english/> For pictures of previous marches by Antonio Masiello, see "Alpine Crossing: Refugees Battle Extreme Weather to Reach France," *The Guardian*, January 26 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2018/jan/26/alpine-crossing-refugees-battle-extreme-weather-reach-france>.
2. The website of Generation Identitaire has videos of two patrolling helicopters and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) with the slogan "Defend Europe: Mission Alpes," and dozens of volunteers building a provisionary fence, a symbolic border in the snowy mountains. As the organization explains on its website, "first we closed the border to prevent illegal immigrants from entering France. Then we deployed in mobile

surveillance teams to monitor a larger area. Finally, we conducted investigations in order to understand where the illegal immigrants were passing by, who was smuggling them and how all this was organised in order to denounce them.” Generation Identitaire, accessed May 26, 2020, <https://generationidentitaire.org/>.

3. It was not the first time that Generation Identitaire organized a mission. In March 2016, the group barricaded bridges to stop migrants entering Calais. In the summer of 2017, its members sought to prevent nongovernmental organization (NGO) ships from aiding migrants in the Mediterranean. Generation Identitaire, accessed May 26, 2020, <https://generationidentitaire.org/>.

4. “French Court Jails Far-Right Activists over Anti-immigrant Alps Stunt,” *The Guardian*, August 26, 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/29/french-court-jails-far-right-activists-over-anti-migrant-alps-stunt>.

5. Médecins Sans Frontières, *Harmful Borders: An Analysis of the Daily Struggle of Migrants as They Attempt to Leave Ventimiglia for Northern Europe* (Milan/Rome: MSF, 2018).

6. “Borders,” Henk Wildschut, accessed May 26, 2020, <http://www.henkwildschut.com/work/borders-7/>.

7. “Alpine Migrant Route into France a Dead-End for Many,” *The New Humanitarian*, November 30, 2016, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2016/11/30/alpine-migrant-route-france-dead-end-many>.

8. “Migrants: La Roya, Vallée Rebelle,” *Libération*, November 22, 2016, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/11/22/migrants-la-roya-vallee-rebelle_1529973?xtor=rss-450. A famous “rebel” is French olive and poultry farmer Cédric Herrou. His farm is located in Breil-sur-Roya, on the border of Italy and France. Part of a network of villagers, Herrou has been helping migrants make their way north. Their actions of civil disobedience fit into a tradition of trespassing into privileged spaces that ought to be publicly admissible. Natasha Basu, *Is This Civil? Transnationalism, Migration and Feminism in Civil Disobedience* (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2019), 75–76.

9. “Police officers, and even the foreign legion, have been deployed in and around the Roya Valley. Officially, they are fighting terrorism as part of the government’s Operation Sentinel [an operation that stationed 10,000 troops on national territory]. In practice, soldiers patrol train stations and small roads, while police officers check trains and set up roadblocks, effectively sealing all exits out of the valley.” “Alpine Migrant Route into France a Dead-End for Many,” IRIN, November 30, 2016, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/58403d9d4.html>.

10. Human Rights Watch, *Subject to Whim: The Treatment of Unaccompanied Children in the French Hautes-Alpes* (New York: HRW, 2019), 1–4.

11. “France: Migrants at the Frozen Border,” *BBC*, December 12, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-42317793/france-migrants-at-the-frozen-border>.

12. My use of the notion of “vehicles” shares certain similarities with the notion of “interscalar vehicles” introduced by Gabrielle Hecht in “Interscalar Vehicles for an African Anthropocene: On Waste, Temporality, and Violence,” *Cultural Anthropology* 33, no. 1 (2018): 135. According to Hecht, interscalar vehicles are “objects and modes of analysis that permit scholars and their subjects to move simultaneously through deep time and human time, through geological space and political space.”

13. Robert MacFarlane, *Mountains of the Mind: Adventures in Reaching the Summit* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 144.

14. “Europe’s borders, like all borders, are the materializations of sociopolitical relations that mediate the continuous production of the distinction between the putative inside and outside, and likewise mediate the diverse mobilities that are orchestrated and regimented through the production of that spatial divide.” Nicholas De Genova, “Introduction. The Borders of ‘Europe’ and the European Question,” *The Borders of “Europe”: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2017), 21.

15. Isabelle Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 99–100.

16. Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 575–599; Bruno Latour, “On Technical Mediation,” *Common Knowledge* 3, no. 2 (1994): 29–64; Annemarie Mol, “Actor-Network Theory: Sensitive Terms and Enduring Tensions,” *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 50, no. 1 (2010): 253–269; Peter-Paul Verbeek, *What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). For a discussion of the notion of mediation, see Yoni van den Eede, “In between Us: On the Transparency and Opacity of Technological Mediation,” *Foundations of Science* 16, no. 2–3 (2011): 139–159.

17. In Mexican immigrants’ rights movements and in Chicano literature and popular culture, there is a saying that “We didn’t cross the border, the border crossed us.” The aphorism suggests that borders can cut through existing communities and territories, whether through natural or material means (a wall, fence, or river), administrative fiat (permits or rights to services such as schools and healthcare), economic sanctions (taxes or import duties), or sociocultural boundaries (gender, language, or race). The aphorism also underlines that the study of borders has everything to do with movement and mobility, of migrants and borders alike. See, for instance, Roberto Delgado Hernández, *Coloniality and Border(ed) Violence: San Diego, San Ysidro and the U-S/// Mexico Border* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2018); University of California at Berkeley, 2010), and Josue David Cisneros, *Rhetorics of Borders, Citizenship and Latina/o Identity* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013).

18. Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

19. Nail, *Theory of the Border*, 3–7.
20. Matthew Longo, *Politics of Borders. Sovereignty, Security, and the Citizen after 9/11* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 69–70.
21. “The border,” Longo argues, “is generative of political space; it is also the site of politics—of violence, of technologies of control and the architecture of the state.” Longo, *Politics of Borders*, 43.
22. “Viapolitics is not a synonym for the biopolitics of mobility, migration politics, or the autonomy of migration, though it does intersect these domains. What it does represent is a particular angle of inquiry, one that treats the interaction of humans and vehicles as an irreducible feature of migratory struggles. At the same time it is not a call for a general theory about migration, vehicles and politics. It is not a general theory because the ways in which vehicles, struggles and power interact is quite heterogeneous and defies any simplistic schema.” William Walters, “Migration, Vehicles, and Politics: Three Theses on Viapolitics,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 18, no. 4 (2015): 15.
23. As Walters points out, “a vehicle can become a mobile border zone” while border zones themselves are often movable entities. “New objects and understandings come into view once we see migration from the angle of its routes and vehicles.” Walters, “Migration, Vehicles, and Politics.”
24. Hein de Haas, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli, “Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies,” *International Migration Review* 52, no. 2 (June 2018): 324–367.
25. “Norway Tells Refugees Who Used Cycling Loophole to Enter to Return to Russia,” *The Guardian*, January 14, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/14/norway-tells-refugees-bikes-russia-bicycle-immigration-storskog>.
26. “Regimes of movement are thus never simply a way to control, to regulate, or to incite movement. Regimes of movement are integral to the *formation of different modes of being*.” As such, movement “allows different bodies to take form.” Hagar Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 14–15 (italics in the original).
27. Movements do not only entail the traveling of people. Movements also include the composition of bodies and assemblages. Composition indicates that “things” that bring together humans and technologies must be mediated so as to become part of a constellation. As Kotef suggests, “Standing as an opposition to nature, to stable power structures, to static state bureaucracy, politics brings the potential carried by instability: the potential of change, of widening the gaps allowing our agency, redistributing resources, and realigning power. A set of different (even if tangent) traditions of thinking about the meaning of ‘the political’ conceptualizes it as that which moves, as the moment of movement, or as that to which movement is essential.”

Kotef, *Movement and the Ordering of Freedom*, 13. In my view, the relationships between politics and nature, and between humans and technology, are less dichotomous than Kotef suggests.

28. Simon Cole, *Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 63–70. The United States began fingerprinting foreigners including Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century before applying it to other populations for other purposes. See Cole, *Suspect Identities*, 119–139.

29. For a telling account about “waiting” at borders, see Shahram Khosravi, “Waiting: Keeping Time,” *Migration: A COMPAS Anthology*, ed. B. Anderson and M. Keith (Oxford, UK: COMPAS, 2014).

30. Katy Hayward, “A Frictionless Border Is Impossible, an Invisible One Undesirable,” *Irish Times*, July 15, 2017.

31. The distinction originates from Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1977), 3–35. It is not without hesitation that I refer to Heidegger. It may seem unfortunate, to say the least, to start a discussion of technopolitics and borders by rereading his work. It is clear that Heidegger, who is widely considered one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, not only collaborated with the Nazi regime, but also sympathized with it intellectually and ideologically. The publication of his *Schwarze Hefte* (“black notebooks”) revealed much of the German philosopher’s personal thoughts during the defining period of 1931 until 1941. The black notebooks added a deeper and unquestionably more intimate chapter to the philosopher’s already damaged reputation and identified his philosophy as contaminated with Nazism, a blemish from which he never cleaned himself. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s thinking has been extremely influential and his emphasis on ontology has helped us reinterpret the conceptual history of Western philosophy and his “ontological distinction” remains an important, albeit debatable, contribution.

32. Mark Brown, “Politicizing Science: Conceptions of Politics in Science and Technology Studies,” *Social Studies of Science* 45, no. 1 (2015): 9.

33. Marieke de Goede’s “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 161–85 reminds us of the meaning of preemption in the war on terror and in European counterterrorism policies. Nick Vaughan-Williams’s *Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) relates border politics to Foucault’s understandings of security, territory and law, biopolitics and geopolitics, violence, and sovereign power. The “politics of possibility” in Louise Amoore’s *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Uncertainty beyond Probability* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013) alerts us to the security situations, books, and artworks concerned with unknown futures that arose after 9/11. The “politics of techniques, devices and acts” expressed in Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans’s “Critical Methods in International

Relations: The Politics of Tools, Devices and Acts," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014): 596–619 critically examines the conceptual repertoire of international relations and security studies, and considers methods themselves as devices and acts. The "post/humanitarian border politics" in Vicki Squire's *Post/Humanitarian Border Politics between Mexico and the US: People, Places, Things* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) invites us to visit the US-Mexico border region and the people, places, and things that affect the materiality, territory, and politics of the borderlands. The "politics of counting" in Martina Tazzioli's "The Politics of Counting and the Scene of Rescue. Border Deaths in the Mediterranean," *Radical Philosophy* 192 (June/August 2015) discusses various border death statistics and the gap between countable and uncountable deaths. The "politics of security technology" in Ruben Andersson's "Hardwiring the Frontier? The Politics of Security Technology in Europe's 'Fight against Illegal Migration,'" *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 22–39 analyzes the security technology of the "Seahorse network" that "hardwires" border cooperation into a satellite system connecting African and European forces, and shows how the initiative multiplies the involvement of actors and creates new forms of collaboration, competition and conflict. The "politics of prediction" in Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke's "Politics of Prediction: Security and the Time/Space of Governmentality in the Age of Big Data," *European Journal of Social Theory* 20, no. 3 (2016): 373–91 leads us to the field of security, Big Data, and the digital mediation of practices of policing, social control, and war. The "politics and the digital" in Mareile Kaufmann and Julien Jeandesboz's "Politics and 'the Digital': From Singularity to Specificity," *European Journal of Social Theory* 20, no. 3 (2016): 309–28 addresses mathematical functions, diagrams, and graphs, and examines the "relationship between 'the digital' and political acts" and the "new political subjects and subjectivities" this relationship brings about. The "kinopolitics" of Thomas Nail's *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) is a theory of motion that underlies the formation of societies and states and that distinguishes historically and systematically different types of borders at the US-Mexican border such as the fence, wall, cell and checkpoint. "Tempo politics," a concept introduced by Simon Sontowski's "Speed, Timing and Duration: Contested Temporalities, Techno-political Controversies and the Emergence of the EU's Smart Border," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 16 (2018): 2730–2746 concerns how the EU Smart Borders Package and the EU's bio databases problematize border control, primarily on the level of its temporalities.

34. For similar approaches to technopolitics and infrastructure, see Andrew Barry, *Material Politics: Disputes along the Pipeline* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); Timothy Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London: Verso, 2011); Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards, "The Technopolitics of Cold War. Toward a Transregional Perspective," *Essays on Twentieth Century History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); and Gabrielle Hecht, *Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). For Hecht, technopolitics is more than the "strategic practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals." It contains unpredictable dimensions that "exceed

or escape the intentions of system designers” as politics and technology morph into each other: “the material qualities of technopolitical systems shape the texture and the effects of their power.” See Hecht, *Entangled Geographies*, 3.

35. Marilyn Strathern, *The Relation: Issues in Complexity and Scale* (Cambridge, UK: Prickly Pear Press, 1995), 27–28.

36. Mark Elam, “Living Dangerously with Bruno Latour in a Hybrid World,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 16, no. 4 (1999): 1–24.

37. This notion of morphology has much in common with the views on technology of the German-American philosopher Ernst Kapp (1808–1896). Similar ideas were later advanced by Marshall McLuhan in his “extension theory” in Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (Corte Madera: Gingko Press, 2003), and by Bruno Latour as well, but Kapp’s work is much less known. A recent translation of his 1877 book *Elements of a Philosophy of Technology: On the Evolutionary History of Culture*, originally published in German, reveals Kapp’s original and still inspiring views on the relationship between humans and technology. See Ernst Kapp, *Elements of a Philosophy of Technology: On the Evolutionary History of Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).

38. Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” *Basic Writings* (Abingsdon, UK: Routledge, 1993), 239–257.

39. Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

40. One example is Ruben Andersson’s analysis in *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014) of clandestine migration trails and the various political and technological associations that relate Europe’s border regime to “illegal immigrants.” Another is Marieke de Goede’s “The Chain of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 1 (2018): 24–42, on detecting suspicious transactions to combat terrorism and other security treats. By following the actors and tracing the “chain of security,” she brings the imperative to “follow the actors” back to the original slogan “follow the money.”

41. See, for instance, Nicholas De Genova, “Introduction”; and Stephan Scheel, *Autonomy of Migration? Appropriating Mobility within Biometric Border Regimes* (London/New York: CRC Press, 2019).

42. Nicholas De Genova, “Introduction,” 6.

43. Nicholas De Genova, “Introduction,” 6.

44. Nicholas De Genova, “The Queer Politics of Migration: Reflections on ‘Illegality’ and Incurability,” *Studies in Social Justice* 4, no. 2 (2010): 101–126.

45. See “Geschiedenis van wij zijn hier,” *Wij zijn hier*, accessed May 26, 2020, <http://wijzijnhier.org/tijdslijn/geschiedenis-van-wij-zijn-hier/>.

46. As Peter Nyers says, “The migrant is not the only mobile agent at the border. The border, too, moves.” Peter Nyers, “Moving Borders: The Politics of Dirt,” *Radical Philosophy* 174 (July/August 2012): 2.

47. Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist, “Migration Infrastructure,” *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (2014): 124, 132, maintain a symmetrical point of view: “it is not migrants who migrate, but rather constellations consisting of migrants and non-migrants, of human and non-human actors.” They add: “Migration flows can be fragmented and short-lived, but infrastructure retains a particular stability and coherence.”

48. According to Ruben Andersson in “Hardwiring the Frontier? The Politics of Security Technology in Europe’s ‘Fight against Illegal Migration,’” *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 24–25, the framing of human and nonhuman groups as actants “allows for shifting the focus away from the two poles of migration studies—the (political science) view that privileges policy and the (ethnographic) insistence on a grounded ‘migrants’ perspective’—towards the material, virtual, and social interfaces of the migratory encounter. From this vantage point, the fences, control rooms, and data systems . . . act as mediators in a network.”

49. Paul Edwards. *A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 84.

50. My analysis here corresponds with Sandro Mezzadra’s and Brett Neilson’s argument in *Border as Method, or the Multiplication of Labor* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 18, which states that the border is “not so much a research object as an epistemological viewpoint that allows an acute critical analysis not only of how relations of domination, dispossession, and exploitation are being redefined presently but also of the struggles that take shape around those changing relationships.”

51. Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*.

52. See Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas, “The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Become More Migratory?” *International Migration Review* 48 (2014): 283–323.

53. “The 10-Point Action Plan in Action, 2016–Glossary,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, December 2016, 282, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-and-migration.html>. See also “Glossary of Migration,” *International Organization of Migration* (Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2019), 141–142.

54. “Asylum and Migration Glossary 6.0,” European Commission, May 2018, 263, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_en.

55. As Anthony Cooper, Chris Perkins, and Chris Rumford point out in “The Vernacularization of Borders,” *Placing the Border in Everyday Life*, ed. Reece Jones and Corey Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2016), 18, “The EU has emerged as a major actor in the business of creating, relocating, and dismissing borders. The EU shifts the borders

of Europe every time it enlarges, it turns national borders into European borders, it regulates and harmonizes European borders through Frontex, its border agency, and it has the power to decide where the important borders in Europe are to be found."

56. For a discussion of the relationships that states and empires have with borders, see Charles Maier, *Once within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth and Belonging Since 1500* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

57. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nina Nyberg Sørensen describe this in *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration* (New York: Routledge, 2013) as the rise of the "migration industry." Marijn Hoijsink, in *Securing the European "Homeland": Profit, Risk, Authority* (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2016), sees the privatization and commercialization of all kinds of tasks and technologies as the emergence of a "homeland security market." Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon, "Comparative Perspectives on Border Control: Away from the Border and Outside the State," in *The Wall around the West. State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe*, ed. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000); and "Actors and Venues in Immigration Control: Closing the Gap between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes," *West European Politics* 29, no. 2 (2006): 201–223, detail how the governance of migration is shifting to nonstate actors, such as to airlines, transport companies, and employers. Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist, writing about migration infrastructures in Indonesia and China in "Migration Infrastructure," *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (2014): 137, view the delegation of responsibility to local intermediaries as a strategy that turns companies into functioning arms of the state.

58. See, for instance, Amade M'charek, Katharina Schramm, and David Skinner, "Topologies of Race: Doing Territory, Population and Identity in Europe," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 39, no. 4 (2014): 468–487.

Chapter 2

1. See Dennis Broeders, *Breaking Down Anonymity. Digital Surveillance of Irregular Migrants in Germany and the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009) for a discussion of these concepts.

2. This is presumably what Frank Schipper and Johan Schot had in mind by using the term "infrastructural Europeanism." See "Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction," *History and Technology* 27, no. 3 (2011): 245–264.

3. See, for instance, Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, *Technologies of Power. Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), and Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, "Networking Europe," *History and Technology* 21, no. 1 (2005): 21–48.

4. See Irene Anastasiadou, *Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011); Jiří Janáč, *European Coasts of Bohemia: Negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal in a Troubled Twentieth Century* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Vincent Lagendijk, *Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008); Suzanne Lommers, *Europe on Air: Interwar Projects for Radio Broadcasting* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); and Judith Schueler, *Materialising Identity: The Co-construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss National Identity* (Eindhoven, Netherlands: Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, 2008).

5. I refer here to the research network “Tensions of Europe,” accessed May 27, 2020, <https://www.tensionsofeurope.eu/>.

6. According to Paul Edwards in “Infrastructure and Modernity: Scales of Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems,” in *Modernity and Technology*, ed. Thomas Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2003), 186: “by linking macro, meso, and micro scales of time, space, and social organization . . . infrastructures simultaneously shape and are shaped by—in other words, co-construct—the condition of modernity.”

7. In “Infrastructure and the State in Science and Technology Studies,” *Social Studies of Science* 45, no. 1 (2015): 137–145, Nicholas Rowland and Jan-Hendrik Passoth point to Sara Pritchard’s *Confluence: The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Jo Guldi’s *Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Allan Mazur’s *Energy and Electricity in Industrial Nations: The Sociology and Technology of Energy* (London: Routledge, 2013); and Andrew Barry’s *Material Politics: Disputes along the Pipeline* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

8. See Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity,” 12.

9. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins argues in “How Walls Do Work: Security Barriers as Devices of Interruption and Data Capture,” *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 2 (2016): 154: “barriers are not just barriers, fences or walls: they include openings, checkpoints and gates that allow for the movement of people and goods. This allowance and the subsequent governance of the comings and goings of people and goods suggests that barriers are not simply concerned with prescribing, securing and administering the *intra muros* . . . but with governing movement across them.”

10. As Brian Larkin notes in “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013): 327, 330: “infrastructures are material forms that allow for the possibility of exchange over space,” and “typically begin as a series of small, independent technologies with widely varying technical standards.”

11. As Didier Bigo argues in “Death in the Mediterranean Sea: The Results of the Three Fields of Action of European Union Border Controls,” in *The Irregularization of*

Migration in Contemporary Europe, ed. Jansen Yolande, Robin Celikates, and Joost de Bloois (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 59–60, borders can be “solid,” “liquid,” or “cloudy.” These do not necessarily coincide with where border control takes place (land, sea, or air), but distinguish among three “fields of action.” The first is the conception of the border as a solid barrier, related to an idea of “defense.” The second concerns border checks and practices of “policing and surveillance,” including processes of identifying, authenticating, and filtering. The third is “the universe of the transnational database.” Connected “to the digital and the virtual, to data doubles and their cohorts, to categorizations resulting from algorithms, to anticipations of unknown behaviors, to the prevention of future actions,” it “pervades the second universe (and sometimes the first) by justifying technology and the management of surveillance at a distance in the name of the protection of a group of the population.” From this point of view, “borders are pixels. The sea no longer exists.”

12. Addressing Bruno Latour’s theory of associations and his political theory of collectives, Sven Opitz and Uwe Tellman, “Europe as Infrastructure: Networking the Operative Community,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 141, no. 1 (2015): 186–187, aim to bring “communitarian discourses to the level of technological works” in order to “turn these technical matters of infrastructural politics into proper matters of concern,” as Latour calls them. The notions of “connectivity” and “collectivity” speak to Latour’s program of making things public, and thus to a visual approach to *Dingpolitik*.

13. Hein De Haas, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli, “Growing Restrictiveness or Changing Selection? The Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies,” *International Migration Review* 52, no. 2 (June 2018): 324–367.

14. Larkin [“The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” 336] suggests an aesthetic, anti-dualist maneuver to transcend the visible-invisible distinction in the working of technologies: “invisibility is certainly one aspect of infrastructure, but it is only one and at the extreme edge of a range of visibilities that move from unseen to grand spectacles and everything in between.”

15. As Olga Kuchinskaya argues in *The Politics of Invisibility: Public Knowledge about Radiation Health Effects after Chernobyl* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), a certain “politics of invisibility” informs the making and unmaking of public events and the shaping of public knowledge. This interplay between visibility and invisibility in infrastructure theory is close to Jacques Rancière’s notion of the “distribution of the sensible,” as developed in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 12, 70, 139. Based on the interplay between the visible and the invisible—on what is represented and what remains disclosed—politics comes into being once a given order of things is contested. Politics “re-frames the given by inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible, new configurations between the visible and the invisible, and between the audible and the inaudible, new distributions of space and time.” What becomes visible in such configurations is what Rancière calls “the part that has no part.” A similar circumscription of politics occurs in international border control and mobility policies.

16. Biao Xiang and Johan Lindquist, "Migration Infrastructure," *International Migration Review* 48, no. 1 (2014): 124.

17. This framing of humans and nonhumans as actants "allows for shifting the focus away from the two poles of migration studies—the (political science) view that privileges policy and the (ethnographic) insistence on a grounded 'migrants' perspective'—towards the material, virtual, and social interfaces of the migratory encounter. From this vantage point, the fences, control rooms, and data systems . . . act as mediators in a network," argues Ruben Andersson in "Hardwiring the Frontier? The Politics of Security Technology in Europe's 'Fight against Illegal Migration,'" *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 1 (2016): 24–25.

18. "Externalization" is analogous to "remote control" in Aristide Zolberg's "The Archaeology of 'Remote Control,'" in *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period*, ed. Andreas Fahrmeier, Oliver Faron, and Patrick Weil (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003) and "policing at a distance," as discussed by Elspeth Guild and Didier Bigo in "The Transformation of European Border Controls," in *Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal Challenges*, ed. Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010), 258.

19. See for instance, "Asylum and Migration in the EU: Facts and Figures," *European Parliament*, June 30, 2016 (updated July 22, 2019), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrant-crisis-facts-and-figures>; and "Mediterranean the Deadliest Sea for Refugees and Migrants, says UN Agency," *United Nations*, January 31, 2012, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/01/401822-mediterranean-deadliest-sea-refugees-and-migrants-says-un-agency>.

20. "Schengen Museum Ceiling Collapses—but It's Not a Sign, Mayor Says," *The Guardian*, May 16, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/16/schengen-museum-ceiling-collapse-bad-omen-europe-borders>.

21. While migration was of secondary concern, the raising of the Iron Curtain was likely to stimulate migration from Eastern Europe. Western European governments feared a potential so-called invasion from the East. For that reason, EU member-states began searching for durable solutions. Various member-states were also concerned about migrant workers and the legal status of guest workers and their families. The European Court of Justice had been growing increasingly assertive on the issue of the free movement of European Community citizens, ruling to restrict existing provisions by which member-states could expel people on the grounds of public policy, security, and health. See Ruben Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control. Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 62.

22. Italy had to wait to join the Schengen Area until 1997, and Greece until 2000, as provisions had to be made at their external borders. The Scandinavian countries joined in 2011. Of the twenty-six countries that are now part of the Schengen Area,

twenty-two have fully implemented the Schengen acquis. Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and associate members of the Schengen Area, but they are not members of the European Union. They implement the Schengen acquis through specific agreements.

23. See “The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders,” *Official Journal L 239*, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062, accessed November 5, 2020, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A42000A0922%2802%29%3AEN%3AHTML>.

24. As Guild and Bigo point out in “The Transformation of European Border Controls,” 266, “the definition of the external border is exclusively by reference to the definition of the internal border.”

25. See Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control*, 71–72.

26. According to Eurostat, between 2008 and 2012, there was a gradual increase in the number of asylum applications within the EU-27, after which the number of asylum seekers rose at a more rapid pace, with 400,500 applications in 2013, 594,200 in 2014, and then around 1.3 million in 2015 and 1.2 million in 2016. In 2017, the number of asylum applications saw a decrease of 44.5 percent in comparison with 2016, and continued a downward path in 2018. See “Asylum Applications (Non-EU) in the EU-27 Member States, 2008–2019,” *Eurostat*, accessed May 27, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.

27. Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Emina Ćerimović, Huub Dijstelbloem, and Mathieu Segers, *European Variations as a Key to Cooperation* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Open, 2020), 146.

28. “Technologies always embody compromise,” Wiebe Bijker and John Law argue in *Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 3, when describing the simultaneous development of technologies and societies.

29. The concept of imagination in this case shares some similarities with the idea of “sociotechnical imaginaries.” Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, in “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea,” *Minerva* 47, no. 2 (2009): 120, defined sociotechnical imaginaries in a study of US and South Korean responses to nuclear power as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects.” Whereas this notion expresses the entanglement between the social and technological order, it also maintains an emphasis on national projects that unites these orders in specific ways. However, imaginaries/imaginations do not emerge only from national configurations. In a

later study, "Future Imperfect," in *Dreamscapes of Modernity*, ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang Hyun Kim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4, Sheila Jasanoff re-defined sociotechnical imaginaries as "collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology."

30. The movement of political ideas through all kinds of practices, symbols, and materialities was vividly described by Benedict Anderson in his classic study of nationalism, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1983). Political ideas about nations and nationality proved to be highly mobile, firing the imaginations of people around the world through words, meanings, symbols, and technologies. The relationship between the form and content of politics has been addressed by Arjun Appadurai. In *The Future as Cultural Fact. Essays on the Global Condition* (New York: Verso, 2013), 64, he argues that it is crucial to understand the relationship "between the forms of circulation and the circulation of forms." In his discussion of "moving geographies," he points out that actors and things gain political significance as they travel, and that humans, words, images, and ideas often travel using different routes and vehicles. In the two volumes edited by Mark Salter, *Making Things International 1: Circuits and Motion* and *Making Things International 2: Catalysts and Reactions* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), the interaction between forms and circuits is studied through the analysis of all kinds of devices and techniques, ranging from passport photos and hotlines to drones and barbed wire.

31. Inspiration can be found in literature that combines the study of material geopolitical and governance issues with a science and technology approach. In *Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society* (London: Athlone Press, 2001), 67, Andrew Barry argues that "the difficulty in understanding the European economy and the European political system has been, at least in part, a function of the critical part played by a vast array of objects and technical devices in its make-up." In *Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil* (London/New York: Verso, 2011), Timothy Mitchell unpacks the substance of oil as well as the idea of democracy in a symmetrical move, demonstrating that both rely on specific practices in which the composing elements are processed and gathered together.

32. See "Mission and Tasks," Eurojust, accessed May 26, 2020, <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/mission-tasks.aspx>.

33. The seven ad hoc centers were Risk Analysis Centre (Helsinki), Centre for Land Borders (Berlin), Air Borders Centre (Rome), Western Sea Borders Centre (Madrid), Ad-hoc Training Centre for Training (Traiskirchen, Austria), Centre of Excellence (Dover, United Kingdom), and Eastern Sea Borders Centre (Piraeus, Greece). See "Origin," Frontex, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/>.

34. Gregory Feldman, *The Migration Apparatus* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 84.
35. "Partners & Agreements: Frontex," Europol, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/agreements/frontex>.
36. Maarten den Heijer, "Frontex and the Shifting Approaches to Boat Migration in the European Union: A Legal Analysis," *Externalizing Migration Management. Europe, North America and the Spread of "Remote Control" Practices*, ed. Ruben Zaiotti (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), 53.
37. den Heijer, "Frontex and the Shifting Approaches," 67.
38. Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, and Situ Studio, "Report on the 'Left-to-Die-Boat,'" *Forensic Architecture Project Goldsmiths University of London*, April 11, 2012; Tineke Strik, "Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe"; *Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who Is Responsible?* Doc. 12895. April 5, 2012; den Heijer, "Frontex and the Shifting Approaches"; David Scott FitzGerald, *Refuge beyond Reach. How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
39. The event fits in with what FitzGerald, *Refuge beyond Reach*, 6, calls the European Union's "architectures of repulsion."
40. Heller et al., "Report on the 'Left-to-Die-Boat.'"
41. den Heijer, "Frontex and the Shifting Approaches," 58–60.
42. Strik, "Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe."
43. "Wreck of Migrant Ship That Killed Hundreds Will Be Displayed at Venice Biennale," *The New York Times*, May 6, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/arts/design/migrant-boat-venice-biennale-christian-buchel.html>.
44. "Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten Point Action Plan on Migration," *European Commission*, press release, April 20, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm.
45. Michela Ceccorulli and Sonia Lucarelli, "Securing the EU's Borders in the Twenty-First Century," in *EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance*, ed. Spyros Economides and James Sperling (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018).
46. Henriette Ruhrmann and David FitzGerald, "The Externalization of Europe's Borders in the Refugee Crisis, 2015–2016," San Diego, CA, California University Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2017, 26–28.
47. Mariana Gkliatia and Herbert Rosenfeldt, "Accountability of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency: Recent Developments, Legal Standards and Existing Mechanisms," *School of Advanced Study University of London. RLI Working Paper No. 30*, 2018, 13.

48. REGULATION (EU) 2019/1896 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624.

49. "Schengen Information System," *European Commission*, accessed May 27, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen-information-system_en.

50. Dennis Broeders, "The New Digital Borders of Europe: EU Databases and the Surveillance of Irregular Migrants," *International Sociology* 22, no. 1 (2007): 7.

51. Broeders, "The New Digital Borders of Europe," 9.

52. "Schengen Information System."

53. "Eurodac," *European Data Protection Supervisor*, accessed May 27, 2020, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/glossary/e_en.

54. Dennis Broeders and Huub Dijstelbloem, "The Datafication of Mobility and Migration Management: The Mediating State and Its Consequences," in *Digitizing Identities: Doing Identity in a Networked World*, ed. Irma van der Ploeg and Jason Pridmore (New York/London: Routledge, 2015), 242–260.

55. Georgios Glouftsiotis, "Designing Digital Borders: The Visa Information System (VIS)," in *Technology and Agency in International Relations*, edited by Marijn Hoijsink and Matthias Seele (London/New York: Routledge, 2019), 178–179.

56. Broeders and Dijstelbloem, "The Datafication of Mobility and Migration Management."

57. See Huub Dijstelbloem and Albert Meijer (Eds.), *Migration and the New Technological Borders of Europe* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Michiel Besters and Frans Brom, "'Greedy' Information Technology: The Digitalization of the European Migration Policy," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 12, no. 4 (2010): 455–470.

58. According to the proposal, "the EES should apply to third-country nationals, both visa-required and visa-exempt travelers, admitted for a short stay (maximum 90 days in any 180-day period) in the Schengen Area. The EES should collect data (identity and travel document) and register entry and exit records (date and place of entry and exit) with a view to facilitating the border crossing of bona fide travelers at the same time as being able to identify overstayers. The EES will also record refusals of entry. The EES will replace the current system of manual stamping of passports." See "Entry/Exit System (EES)," *European Commission*, accessed May 27, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/entryexit-system-ees_en.

59. "European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)," briefing, *European Parliament*, October 18, 2018, accessed May 27, 2020, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599298/EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599298_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599298/EPRS_BRI(2017)599298_EN.pdf).

60. "Security Union: European Commission Welcomes the Final Adoption of the New European Criminal Records Information System on Convicted Third Country Nationals," press release, April 9, 2019, European Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2018_en.htm.

61. "Security Union: European Commission Welcomes the Final Adoption."

62. "EU Votes to Create a Gigantic Biometrics Database," *Schengen Visa Info*, April 23, 2019, 2020, <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/eu-votes-to-create-a-gigantic-biometrics-database-despite-criticism/>.

63. "EU Pushes to Link Tracking Databases," *Politico*, April 15, 2019 (updated April 16, 2019), accessed May 27, 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-pushes-to-link-tracking-databases/>.

64. Thomas Nail explains in *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 13 that his method is mainly materialist, as he "understands borders as regimes of concrete techniques and not primarily as ideas or knowledges that emerged independently from social and material conditions." The crucial word here, of course, is "independently."

65. Julien Jeandesboz, "An Analysis of the Commission Communications on Future Development of Frontex and the Creation of a European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)," *Briefing Paper European Parliament* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2008), 6–7.

66. Gregory Feldman, *The Migration Apparatus* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 94.

67. According to Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, "The establishment of a European Border Surveillance System ('EUROSUR') is necessary in order to strengthen the exchange of information and the operational cooperation between national authorities of Member States as well as with the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 (2) ('the Agency'). EUROSUR will provide those authorities and the Agency with the infrastructure and tools needed to improve their situational awareness and reaction capability at the external borders of the Member States of the Union ('external borders') for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving of the lives of migrants."

68. "Opinion 4/2018 on the Proposal for Two Regulations Establishing a Framework for Interoperability between EU Large-Scale Information Systems," European Data Protection Supervisor, April 16, 2018, 30.

69. Stephan Dünwald, "Europe's Global Approach to Migration Management: Doing Border in Mali and Mauritania," in *Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North*

America and the Spread of 'Remote Control' Practices, ed. Ruben Zaiotti (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), 116–119.

70. Henriette Ruhrmann and David FitzGerald, “The Externalization of Europe’s Borders in the Refugee Crisis, 2015–2016,” San Diego, CA, University of California Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2017, 5, 22.

71. According to Luiza Bialasiewicz, in “Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean,” *Geopolitics* 17, no. 4 (2012): 844, this is where we can best “perceive that which Peter Sloterdijk (1994) has called the uniquely European process of ‘translatio imperii.’ It is at/through borders that the European space is constituted and selectively ‘stretched’—or, to use Sloterdijk’s terms, ‘translated.’”

72. “Refugee Crisis Demands New Deal with Africa,” News item, Government of the Netherlands, November 7, 2015, <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/11/07/refugee-crisis-demands-new-deal-with-africa>.

73. Narin Idriz, in “The EU-Turkey Deal in Front of the Court of Justice of the EU: An Unsolicited Amicus Brief,” *T.M.C. Asser Institute for International & European Law*, Policy Brief 2017–03, accessed May 26, 2020, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3080838> discusses the relationship of the “Statement” with Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

74. Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Hertog, and Marco Stefan, in “It Wasn’t Me! The Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,” *CEPS Policy Insights* No. 2017/15, April 2017, 1, state that “the EU institutions purposefully—and unfortunately, successfully—circumvented the democratic and judicial checks and balances as laid down in the EU Treaties. . . . By choosing to conduct major policy decisions through press releases and refusing to take legal responsibility for the Statement, the EU institutions themselves jeopardize the Treaty-based framework that aims to ensure democratic rule of law and fundamental rights.”

75. Ceccorulli and Lucarelli, “Securing the EU’s Borders,” 7.

76. Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans, “Critical Methods in International Relations: The Politics of Tools, Devices and Acts,” *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014): 604.

77. Thomas Spijkerboer, “Afterword: From the Iron Curtain to Lampedusa,” in *Border Deaths: Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of Migration-Related Mortality*, ed. Paolo Cuttitta and Tamara Last (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 164.

78. FitzGerald, *Refuge beyond Reach*, 201–207.

79. See Paolo Cuttitta, “Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue NGOs: The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part I),” accessed January 4, 2019, <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies>

/blog/2018/04/pushing-migrants; and “Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue NGOs: The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part II),” accessed January 4, 2019, <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/04/pushing-0>.

80. Thomas Spijkerboer, “Afterword: From the Iron Curtain to Lampedusa,” in *Border Deaths: Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of Migration-Related Mortality*, ed. Paolo Cuttitta and Tamara Last (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2020), 164.

81. Institute for Race Relations (IRR), “Humanitarianism: The Unacceptable Face of Solidarity” (London: IRR, 2017).

82. Huub Dijstelbloem and William Walters, “Atmospheric Border Politics: The Morphology of Migration and Solidarity Practices in Europe,” *Geopolitics*, 2019, DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2019.1577826.

83. “Migration Data Management, Intelligence and Risk Analysis,” IOM, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.iom.int/migration-data-management-intelligence-and-risk-analysis>.

84. “IOM and Biometrics,” IOM, November 2018, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/IBM/iom_and_biometrics_external_info_sheet_november_2018.pdf.

85. See Philippe Frowd, *Security at the Borders. Transnational Practices and Technologies in West Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); and “The Promises and Pitfalls of Biometric Security Practices in Senegal,” *International Political Sociology* 11, no. 4 (2017).

86. See Frank Schipper and Johan Schot, “Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction,” *History and Technology* 27, no. 3 (2011).

87. For the historiographical meaning of the “laboratory” notion and how it was used by Schengen officials and EU officials as a metaphor, see William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr, *Governing Europe: Discourse Governmentality and European Integration* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 144; Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control*, 75–76; and Emek Uçarer, “Justice and Home Affairs,” in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Jörg Monar, in “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 4 (2001): 750, states that “the Schengen members never failed to emphasize that its role was to be that of a ‘laboratory’ for EC policymaking on the complete implementation of free movement and all related compensatory justice and home affairs measures.”

88. See Bruno Latour, “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” in *Science Observed. Perspectives on the Social Study of Science*, ed. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (London: SAGE, 1983), 141–170.

89. Jan Hendrik Passoth and Nicholas Rowland, "Actor-Network State: Integrating Actor-Network Theory and State Theory," *International Sociology* 25, no. 6 (2010): 832.

90. Broeders and Dijstelbloem, "The Datafication of Mobility and Migration Management."

91. Quoted in Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control*, 76.

92. As stated in Article 77 of Chapter 2 of the 2012 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

1. The Union shall develop a policy with a view to:
 - (a) ensuring the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders;
 - (b) carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders;

AND:

- (c) the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders

Article 77 continues:

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures concerning:
 - (a) the common policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits;
 - (b) the checks to which persons crossing external borders are subject;
 - (c) the conditions under which nationals of third countries shall have the freedom to travel within the Union for a short period;
 - (d) any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders;
 - (e) the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders.
3. If action by the Union should prove necessary to facilitate the exercise of the right referred to in Article 20(2)(a), and if the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may adopt provisions concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document. The Council shall act unilaterally after consulting the European Parliament.
4. This Article shall not affect the competence of the Member States concerning the geographical demarcation of their borders, in accordance with international law.

93. Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

94. For instance, Nick Vaughan-Williams, in "Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror," *Space and Polity* 12, no. 1 (2008):

77, argues, "As a control on the movement of subjects into and within Europe, practices of surveillance can be read as a form of bordering. Increasingly, such a control takes place in spaces that cannot be readily identified as either internal or external border sites in a simplistic sense."

95. As Wendy Brown states in *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 82, "these terms 'inside' and 'outside' do not necessarily correspond to nation-state identity or fealty, that is, where otherness and difference are detached from jurisdiction and membership."

96. In *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (New York: Verso, 2012), 4–6, Eyal Weizman speaks of an elastic geography of myriad actors and dispersed spatial organization. He concludes that the architecture of borders "cannot be understood as the material embodiment of a unified political will or as the product of a single ideology." Instead, "the architecture of the frontier could not be said to be simply 'political' but rather 'politics in matter.'" Weizman explains the architecture of border politics can be thought of in two ways. It can be used to read specific forms of border politics "in the way social, economic, national, and strategic forces solidify into the organization, form, and ornamentation of homes, infrastructure, and settlements." But it can also be employed "as a conceptual way of understanding political issues as constructed realities."

97. The political and material geography of borders is linked to what Louise Amoore, in "Cloud Geographies. Computing, Data, Sovereignty," *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 1 (2018): 4–24 calls the cloud geography of borders.

98. Rob Walker in *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 6 expresses his dissatisfaction with theories that "simply take historically specific-modern-ontological options as a given." His conceptualization of the inside and outside of states in a shifting global world order has not left the study of borders unaffected. As John Allen argues *Topologies of Power. Beyond Territory and Network* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2016), 136–137 "the idea of a 'blurred' inside and outside . . . seems to miss the point somewhat." Instead, "a variety of modes of exclusion and inclusion may be exercised" with a number of shades of gray in between, as Huub Dijstelbloem and Dennis Broeders argue in "Border Surveillance, Mobility Management and the Shaping of Non-publics in Europe," *European Journal of Social Theory* 18, no. 1 (2014): 21–38.

99. As Reece Jones argues in *Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India and Israel* (Chicago: Zed Books, 2012), 171, "The construction of a barrier on the border simultaneously legitimizes and intensifies these other exclusionary practices of the sovereign state. It legitimizes exclusion by providing a material manifestation of the abstract idea of sovereignty, which brings the claim of territorial difference into being. The barrier also intensifies these exclusionary practices, because once the boundary is marked 'the container' of the state takes form, the

perception of difference between the two places becomes stronger. By performing sovereign control, the state simultaneously reifies authority over that territory and defines the limits of the people that belong there." Of particular interest here is Jones's remark here that "once the boundary is marked 'the container' of the state takes form."

100. Linnet Taylor in "No Place to Hide? The Ethics and Analytics of Tracking Mobility Using Mobile Phone Data," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34, no. 2 (2016): 323 says, "Big data enables us to map people and movement without necessarily mapping land. The people are the territory. Thus, if the aim of much GIS work has historically been to establish claims to land and to govern people, the new data technologies are in comparison more remote: they allow the viewer to track, often in real time, and to influence. Particularly with regard to the transgression of state boundaries involved in irregular migration, as will be explored here, the new data from digital traces lend themselves to a post-Westphalian politics of influence and indirect action."

Chapter 3

1. The intimate relation between politics and technology resonates at the level of concrete border technology devices. As Karolina Follis points out in "Vision and Transterritory: The Borders of Europe," *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 42, no. 6 (2017): 1007, such devices "are not just paraphernalia or elements of the border spectacle . . . Rather, they are designed effectively to project power beyond the physical boundaries of sovereign territory."

2. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 67; Peter Sloterdijk, *Not Saved: Essay after Heidegger* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017), 384.

3. The discussion of Latour and Sloterdijk in this chapter builds in part on chapter 4 "The technological atmosphere" ["De technologische atmosfeer"], 89–108 of Huub Dijkstra, *The House of Argus: The Watchful Eye in Democracy* [*Het Huis van Argus: De Wakende Blik in de Democratie*] (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), but it has been thoroughly expanded, updated, and revised.

4. Willem Schinkel and Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens, *In Medias Res: Peter Sloterdijk's Spherological Poetics of Being* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 7.

5. "I take an interest in proving that human beings are no mono-elementary creatures. Whoever considers them in this way, is simply wrong. Almost all anthropology is suffering from a mono-elementary bias. It interprets us as creatures who in the end can only exist in one element, that is to say, on the mainland, in the so-called real. Against this tendency, I have been developing a theory of moves, a theory of transitions between elements and situations" Peter Sloterdijk and H.-J. Heinrichs,

Die Sonne und der Tod: Dialogische Untersuchungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), 336 quoted in René Ten Bos, “Towards an Amphibious Anthropology: Water and Peter Sloterdijk,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 27 (2009): 79.

6. Peter Sloterdijk, *Foams* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 107.

7. Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climate Regime* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 88.

8. Henk Oosterling, “Dasein als Design,” *De Groene Amsterdammer* 130, no. 14 (2009): 32.

9. Peter Sloterdijk, *Foams* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 23.

10. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 25.

11. John Gray’s “Blowing Bubbles,” *New York Review of Books*, October 12, 2017, critically reviews Sloterdijk’s work through this lens.

12. See Reviel Netz, *Barbed Wire: An Ecology of Modernity* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004).

13. “How Can Concertina Wire Supplier Help You?” *Hebei Wanxiang Concertina Wire Company*, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.concertina-wire.org/>.

14. In *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 2012), 24, Gloria Anzaldúa refers to the barbed-wired US-Mexico border as a “steel curtain” that creates an “open wound.”

15. “Hungary Builds New High-Tech Border Fence—with Few Migrants in Sight,” *Reuters*, March 2, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence/hungary-builds-new-high-tech-border-fence-with-few-migrants-in-sight-idUSKBN1692MH>.

16. “‘A Bloody Method of Control’: The Struggle to Take Down Europe’s Razor Wire Walls,” *The Guardian*, May 13, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/13/a-bloody-method-of-control-the-struggle-to-take-down-europes-razor-wire-walls>.

17. What began as chance encounters early in the millennium were followed by Latour writing a foreword to the French translation of Sloterdijk’s *Rules for the Human Zoo: A Response to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism* [*Regeln für den Menschenpark. Ein Antwortschreiben zu Heideggers Brief über den Humanismus*] (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008). In turn, Sloterdijk provided a chapter for the catalog of the exhibition *Making Things Public*. Thereafter, the two made frequent references to each other’s work and appeared together, such as at Harvard and Columbia University in 2009. They even spoke in each other’s honor, like when Latour was awarded the Siegfried Unseld Prize in 2008. In 2017, Latour was one of the speakers at a symposium to celebrate Sloterdijk’s seventieth birthday. (See Thomas Meany, “A Celebrity Philosopher

Explains the Populist Insurgency," *The New Yorker*, February 26, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/26/a-celebrity-philosopher-explains-the-populist-insurgency>.) Over the years, each has expressly sought a rapprochement with the other's work. For Sloterdijk, this was expressed in the *Spheres* trilogy. For Latour, it can be seen in *Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy*, edited by Latour and Peter Weibel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), which he put together for the exhibition of the same name; and in *Facing Gaia*.

18. See Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, and Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*.

19. See Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*.

20. For the study of borders and security, William Walters, in "Drone Strikes, Dingpolitik and Beyond: Furthering the Debate on Materiality and Security," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 2 (2014): 101–118, has advanced the notion of *Dingpolitik* to analyze Human Rights Watch's investigation of Gaza civilians allegedly killed by Israeli drone-launched missiles in 2008–2009. For Walters, "*dingpolitik* offers some crucial guidelines for an understanding of how material things become entangled in disputes, and how political controversy is mediated, shaped and channelled by the affordance of things. . . . *Dingpolitik* identifies multiple assemblies, not just the ones that convene in parliamentary buildings." Walters concludes that Latour's ontopolitical repertoire is useful not only to point to the importance of materialities of all sorts, but also to conceive the coming-into-being of issues and publics via technologies and how situations become visible or invisible. *Dingpolitik* proves to be an intriguing notion to "catch" publics via technologies. See also William Walters and Anne-Marie D'Aoust, "Bringing Publics into Critical Security Studies: Notes for a Research Strategy," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 44, no. 1 (2015): 45–68.

21. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 193.

22. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 193.

23. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 201.

24. Bruno Latour, "Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social," in *The Social in Question. New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences*, ed. Patrick Joyce, 117–132 (London: Routledge, 2001).

25. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 567.

26. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 602.

27. Sloterdijk, *Foams*, 565.

28. Sjoerd van Tuinen, *Sloterdijk. Binnenstebuiten denken [Thinking Inside Out]* (Kampen, Netherlands: Klement/Pelckmans, 2004).

29. Latour, *The Pasteurization of France*, 229.

30. See Sheila Jasanoff, "Future Imperfects," in *Dreamscapes of Modernity*, ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Sang Hyun Kim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 1–34.

31. Jasanoff, in "Future Imperfects," *Dreamscapes of Modernity*, hastens to say that this has little to do with his expertise because he is too knowledgeable for that.

32. Jasanoff, "Future Imperfects," 17–18.

33. As Latour explains in "Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern," *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 2 (2004): 245–246, "What is presented here is an entirely different attitude than the critical one, not a flight into the conditions of possibility of a given matter of fact, not the addition of something more human than the inhumane matters of fact would have missed, but, rather, a multifarious inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence."

34. Sloterdijk's and Latour's works are examples of immanent philosophical thinking. Latour builds on the philosophies of Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze himself called Spinoza the "Prince of Philosophers," in view of his unparalleled systematicity in his development of the notion of immanence. Latour and Sloterdijk are also indebted to Nietzsche. It was Nietzsche who, with his declaration that "God is dead," drew a definitive line through transcendental thinking. With the death of God, he ended thinking from outside, the idea of an external point of view, and an external reference point that is absent but still determines our existence and our thinking. This death certificate of the transcendental affects both the conditions that are put to thinking and the claims that can be made on the basis of that thinking. This life termination of the transcendental resonates in the impossibility of the "god trick of seeing everything from nowhere," as Donna Haraway points out in "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 581.

35. Latour, *Facing Gaia*, 88.

36. Latour, *Facing Gaia*, 91.

37. Latour, *Facing Gaia*, 116.

38. In particular, see Eric Voegelin's *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

Chapter 4

1. Peter Sloterdijk, *Foams* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 165.

2. "Dat is wat ik bewaak, de geest van Schiphol," interview with Jan Benthem in *Het Parool*, July 10, 2016, <https://www.parool.nl/nieuws/dat-is-wat-ik-bewaak-de-geest-van-schiphol~b8400ea1/>.

3. "The Interior of Schiphol: Teamwork on a Never-Ending Work in Progress," *Design History*, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.designhistory.nl/2016/the-interior-of-schiphol-teamwork-on-a-never-ending-work-in-progress/>.
4. Henk van Houtum, "Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU's External Border Regime," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 28, no. 6 (2010): 957; and Thomas Spijkerboer, "The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualising the Externalisation of Migration Control," *European Journal of Migration and Law* 20, no. 4 (2018): 452–469.
5. David Scott FitzGerald, *Refuge beyond Reach. How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 221.
6. See, for instance, Avishai Margalit, *On Compromise and Rotten Compromises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), which distinguishes between acceptable and rotten compromises.
7. See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *The Spirit of Compromise. Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), which describes the polarization of partisan politics in the United States and the decline of the noble art of compromise.
8. This approach is informed by an argument by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot in *On Justification: Economies of Worth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Following Boltanski and Thévenot, neither a general theory of justice to evaluate the value of compromises nor a theory of deliberative democracy to study their making and unmaking must be applied.
9. Boltanski and Thévenot, *On Justification*, 278.
10. As such, "airports make up central nodes in the critical infrastructure of globalization, where the circulation of high quantities of goods, persons and capital are managed," according to Peer Schouten in "Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 1. (2014): 24.
11. The analysis of Schiphol International Airport in this chapter partly builds on chapter 5 "Designed Space" ["Ontworpen ruimte"] of Huub Dijkstra, *The House of Argus: The Watchful Eye in Democracy [Het Huis van Argus: De Wakende Blik in de Democratie]* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), 83–94, but has been thoroughly expanded, updated, and revised.
12. The concept of AirportCity "captures the experimental development of the airport into a unique semi-public space open 24/7 that does not substitute a city center but creates a new image of 'cityness' born out of a juxtaposition of functions and a very peculiar diversity of users," Anna Nikolaeva, "Designing Public Space for Mobility: Contestation, Negotiation and Experiment at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 103, no. 5 (2012): 549.

13. Bart de Jong, *The Airport Assembled. Rethinking Planning and Policy Making of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol by Using the Actor-Network theory* (PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 2012), 27.
14. Mark Salter (Ed.), *Politics at the Airport* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
15. Stephen Graham, "Flowcity: Networked Mobilities and the Contemporary Metropolis," *Journal of Urban technology* 9, no. 1 (2002): 4–11.
16. Kenneth Frampton, *A Genealogy of Modern Architecture. Comparative Critical Analysis of Built Form* (Zurich: Lars Müller Publishers, 2015).
17. John Kasarda and Greg Lindsay, *Aerotropolis. The Way We'll Live Next* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
18. See Francisca Grommé, *Governance by Pilot Projects: Experimenting with Surveillance in Dutch Crime Control* (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2015) and Marijn Hoijsink, *Securing the European "Homeland": Profit, Risk, Authority* (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2016).
19. Étienne Balibar argues, in *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), that "the system of identity verifications . . . [allows] a triage of travelers admitted to and rejected from a given national territory. For the mass of humans today, these are at the most decisive borders, but they are no longer 'lines': instead they are *detention zones* and *filtering systems* such as those located in the center or on the periphery of major international airports" (italics in the original).
20. John Allen, in *Topologies of Power. Beyond Territory and Network* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2016), 130, argues that it is "the growth and sophistication of border security technologies, biometrics and pre-screening through data-mining in particular, designed to sort out the 'safe' from the 'risky' population, that has helped to anchor the idea that border controls and checks are now pervasive throughout society."
21. Mark Dierikx, Johan Schot, and Ad Vlot, "Van uithoek tot knooppunt: Schiphol," in *Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw, Deel V: Transport en Communicatie*, ed. Johan Schot and Harry Lintsen (Zutphen, Netherlands: Walburg Pers, 2002).
22. Gillian Fuller, "Welcome to Windows 2.1: Motion Aesthetics at the Airport," in *Politics at the Airport*, ed. Mark B. Salter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
23. Francis D. K. Ching, *Form, Space, and Order* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996); and David Harvey, "The Political Economy of Public Space," in *The Politics of Public Space*, ed. Setha Low and Neil Smith (New York: Routledge, 2005), 17–34.
24. Nikolaeva, "Designing Public Space for Mobility," 542–554.

25. Ewald Engelen, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Angelo Salento, and Karel Williams, "How Cities Work: A Policy Agenda for the Grounded City," *Cresc Working Paper Series*, Working Paper 141, 2016, 2.
26. Peter Sloterdijk, *Globes* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014).
27. Sze Tsung Leong, "Gruen Urbanism," in *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping*, ed. Chuihua Judy Chung, Jeffrey Inaba, Rem Koolhaas and Sze Tsung Leong (Cambridge, MA/Cologne, Germany: Harvard Design School/Taschen, 2001); and Sze Tsung Leong and Srdjan Jovanovic Weiss, "Air Conditioning," *Harvard Design School Guide to Shopping*.
28. Frederike Huygen, "The Interior of Schiphol: Teamwork on a Never-Ending Work in Progress," *Design History*, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.designhistory.nl/2016/the-interior-of-schiphol-teamwork-on-a-never-ending-work-in-progress>. This text was originally published in Dutch in *Flow: Het Schiphol van Nel Verschuuren 1968–2005* (Schiphol Group, 2006).
29. Frederike Huygen, "The Interior of Schiphol: Teamwork on a Never-Ending Work in Progress," *Design History*, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.designhistory.nl/2016/the-interior-of-schiphol-teamwork-on-a-never-ending-work-in-progress>. This text was originally published in Dutch in *Flow: Het Schiphol van Nel Verschuuren 1968–2005* (Amsterdam: Schiphol Group, 2006).
30. See Louise Amoore, "Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures," *Citizenship Studies* 13, no. 1 (2009): 17–30; and Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). Chapter 7 of this book will offer a broader discussion of this notion.
31. Louise Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Uncertainty beyond Probability* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 100.
32. Peter Sloterdijk, *Globes* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).
33. Rem Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, *S, M, L, XL* (Rotterdam, Netherlands, and New York: 010 Publishers/ Monacelli Press, 1995); Maarten Hajer, "The Generic City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 16, no. 4 (1999): 137–144.
34. J. G. Ballard, "Airports," *The Observer*, September 14, 1997. Quoted in Will Self, "The Frowniest Spot on Earth," *London Review of Books* 33, no. 9 (2011): 10.
35. Self, "The Frowniest Spot on Earth," *London Review of Books* 33, no. 9 (2011): 10–11.
36. Mark Augé, *Non-Places* (London/New York: Verso, 2008).
37. Nikolaeva, "Designing Public Space for Mobility," 542.
38. Augé, *Non-Places*.
39. Rachel Hall, *The Transparent Traveler. The Performance and Culture of Airport Security* (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2015), 15.

40. Peer Schouten, "Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 1 (2014): 9.
41. Schouten, "Security as Controversy: Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport," 8.
42. See Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror," *Political Geography* 25 (2006): 336–351; Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility*; and Marieke De Goede, Stephanie Simon, and Marijn Hoijsink, "Performing Pre-emption," *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 5 (2014): 411–422.
43. Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility*, 84, 102–103.
44. "Slimme camera op Schiphol spot afwijkend gedrag," *NRC Handelsblad*, September 11, 2014, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/09/11/terreurbestrijding-slimme-camera-op-schiphol-spot-1420549-a1350699>.
45. "Kick off Meeting," *Tresspass*, accessed June 2, 2020, <https://www.tresspass.eu/news/kick-meeting>.
46. "Schiphol als lewend lab," *NRC Handelsblad*, November 29, 2019, <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/11/29/schiphol-als-lewend-lab-a3982129>.
47. As Gregory Feldman describes in *The Migration Apparatus* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012): 84, "the Privium Program not only creates frictionless travel for passengers with economic capital, but it also pads that experience with extra comfort."
48. James Bridle, "What They Don't Want You to See: The Hidden World of UK Deportation," *The Guardian*, January 27, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/jan/27/hidden-world-of-uk-deportation-asylum-seamless-transitions>.
49. "Vreemdeling behandeld als crimineel," Jojanneke Spoor, accessed February 14, 2017, <http://www.napnieuws.nl/2010/10/22/6074/>.
50. According to Arjen Leerkes and Dennis Broeders, in "A Case of Mixed Motives? Formal and Informal Functions of Administrative Immigration Detention," *British Journal of Criminology* 50 (2010): 830–850, "it is noteworthy that the Dutch Expulsion Centers in Rotterdam and at Schiphol Airport were introduced under the banner of a government program that was called 'Towards a Safer Society.' . . . It seems that Dutch authorities increasingly use immigration detention (and criminal detention) for incapacitation purposes and not only as a measure of immigration policy."
51. "Apparently, somebody may be regarded as an 'illegal' even before a legal system had declared that they were attempting to remain on the soil of a European country without authorization by the state," according to Yolande Jansen, "Deportability and Racial Europeanization: The Impact of Holocaust Memory and Postcoloniality on the Unfreedom of Movement in and to Europe," in *The Irregularization of Migration in*

Contemporary Europe. Detention, Deportation, Drowning, ed. Yolande Jansen, Robin Celikates, and Joost de Bloois (London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 15–16.

52. Dutch Safety Board. *Fire at the Detention Centre Schiphol Oost* (The Hague: Dutch Safety Board, 2006), 170–174.

53. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

54. See Lieven de Cauter, *De capsulaire beschaving. Over de stad in het tijdperk van de angst* (Rotterdam, Netherlands: NAI Uitgevers, 2009).

55. See “About JFKIAT,” accessed November 10, 2020, <https://www.jfkt4.nyc/about/about-jfkiat/>.

56. In the opening lines of *Paris, Invisible City*, 2006, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/343>, Bruno Latour states that “we often tend to contrast real and virtual, hard urban reality and electronic utopias.” As a corrective, he aims to show that real cities consist of all kinds of networks that gather and circulate information so as to connect the streets to the maps to the control centers. As a result, “no single control panel or synoptic board brings all these flows together in a single place at any one time. . . . No bird’s eye view could, at a single glance, capture the multiplicity of these places. . . . There are no more panopticons than panoramas; only richly colored dioramas with multiple connections, criss-crossing wires under roads and pavements, along tunnels in the metro, on the roofs of sewers. . . . The total view is also, literally, the view from nowhere.”

57. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, *On Justification: Economies of Worth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

58. Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (London and New York: Continuum, 2004).

59. John Allen, *Topologies of Power: Beyond Territory and Network* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2016).

60. According to Bruno Latour, in *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climate Regime* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017), 93, this picture is misleading, as “the notion of a globe and any global thinking entails the immense danger of unifying too fast what should be composed instead.” For this reason, Mark Salter, in “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 31, no. 2 (2006): 167–189, describes the development of a global visa regime in terms of the construction of specific “political technologies.” William Walters, in “Rezoning the Global: Technological Zones, Technological Work, and the (Un-)Making of Biometric Borders,” in *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity*, ed. Vicky Squire

(London: Routledge, 2011), 51–73 likewise analyzes the making of biometric borders in terms of the development of “technological zones.”

Chapter 5

1. “Address by President Donald Tusk to the European Parliament on the Latest European Council of 15 October 2015,” European Council, October 27, 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/27/pec-speech-ep/>.

2. The International Organization on Migration (IOM) is now affiliated with the United Nations (UN), but it was born in 1951 out of the displacement of Western Europe following World War II, with the name of Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME).

3. European Commission, “The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows,” Fact Sheet, September 8, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf.

4. Michela Ceccorulli and Sonia Lucarelli, “Securing the EU’s Borders in the Twenty-First Century,” in *EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance*, ed. Spyros Economides and James Sperling (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018), 7.

5. This notion of a compromise shares some similarities with a Leviathan that emerges out of the interactions between actors and technologies without being part of the negotiating parties. In this comparison, the relationship between the Leviathan and the subjects ought to be understood as in the analysis of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, in “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan, or How Do Actors Macrostructure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do So,” *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology: Toward and Integration of Micro and Macro Sociologies*, ed. K. Knorr Cetina and A. Cicourel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), 299. In an analysis of the controversy between Electricity of France and Renault over the future of transportation and the choice between the gasoline-fueled engine and the electric car in the 1970s, Callon and Latour investigate the relationship between large-scale concepts, such as the industrial society, sustainability, and the energy transition, and micro-innovations such as the fuel cell. Instead of explaining the controversy in terms of a clash of interests, ideas, or conflicting technical solutions and reducing the debate to either a macro or micro level of analysis, Callon and Latour emphasize the relation between the two. They reject the view that the Leviathan, as a macro actor, is opposed to the micro actors, the subjects. Instead they consider the co-construction and the mutual establishment of these various actors as taking place via the emergence of networks. Ideas and concepts such as “sustainability” or “the industrial society” are not of a different category than micro-actors such as fuel cells and injection engines. Instead, they argue that “a macro actor . . . is a micro actor seated on black boxes.”

6. As in chapter 6, the interviews were organized, conducted, transcribed, and translated by Ermioni Frezouli. For a specific analysis of the entanglement between surveillance and rescue at sea based on this research, see Huub Dijkstra, Rogier van Reekum, and Willem Schinkel, "Surveillance at Sea: The Transactional Politics of Border Control in the Aegean," *Security Dialogue* 48, no. 3 (2017): 224–240.

7. As Özgün Topak observes in "The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece–Turkey Borderzones," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32, no. 5 (2014): 815–833, "surveillance at the Aegean Sea has gradually intensified over the years. The classic strategy of patrolling the sea with various types of vessels and air units is increasingly combined with 'smarter' systems, such as radars, satellites, and coordination centers."

8. "EUROSUR: Protecting the Schengen External Borders—Protecting Migrants' Lives," European Commission, Brussels, November 29, 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1070_en.htm.

9. As Julien Jeandesboz explains in "European Border Policing. EUROSUR, Knowledge, Calculation," *Global Crime* 18, no. 3 (2017): 256–285, EUROSUR includes "the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorized border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving of the lives of migrants." The description is partly based on OJEU, Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013, Article 2(1).

10. See Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda, "The Temporalization of Financial Markets: From Network to Flow," *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 7 (2007): 116. In addition, see Karin Knorr Cetina, "Scopic Media and Global Coordination: The Mediatization of Face-to-Face Encounters," in *Mediatization of Communication*, ed. Knut Lundby (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014).

11. The term "infrastructural Europeanism" was coined by Frank Schipper and Johan Schot in "Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction," *History and Technology* 27, no. 3 (2011).

12. Paul Edwards, "Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism," *Osiris* 21: 229–250.

13. Frank Schipper and Johan Schot, "Infrastructural Europeanism, or the Project of Building Europe on Infrastructures: An Introduction," *History and Technology* 27, no. 3 (2011): 246.

14. As Dennis Duez and Rocco Bellanova argue in "The Making (Sense) of EUROSUR: How to Control the Sea Borders?" in *EU Borders and Shifting Internal Security: Technology, Externalization and Accountability*, ed. Raphael Bossong and Helena Carrapico (New York: Springer, 2016), 24, "The making of the sea borders operated by EUROSUR is, first and foremost, an effort to make sense of a disparate and heterogeneous ensemble of elements. This controlled space does not only concentrate on and

encompass potential migrants, small vessels of smugglers, and international networks of criminals. This kind of border surveillance is also, at the same time, and somehow prominently, an effort to understand and maximize the potential use of different elements—radars, national authorities, boats, information analysis systems, etc.—already deployed for border surveillance. Hence, the setup of a surveillance system is both a matter of material and symbolic controls, and a continuous effort of mise-en-discours of protean elements. It is an attempted and continuous mustering of things, people, information, institutions, programs, and research.”

15. See Huub Dijkstra, “Migration Tracking Is a Mess,” *Nature* 543, no. 2 (2017): 32–34.

16. Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, October 22, 2013.

17. Lucy Suchman, “Situational Awareness: Deadly Bioconvergence at the Boundaries of Bodies and Machines,” *Media Tropes* 5, no. 1 (2015): 1.

18. Geoffrey A. Boyce, “The Rugged Border: Surveillance, Policing and the Dynamic Materiality of the US/Mexico Frontier,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34, no. 2 (2016): 246.

19. Martina Tazzioli, “Eurosur, Humanitarian Visibility, and (Nearly) Real-Time Mapping in the Mediterranean,” *ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies* 15, no. 3 (2016): 562, 563, 566.

20. European Parliament Resolution of 18 December 2008 on the Evaluation and Future Development of the Frontex Agency and of the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) (2008/2157(INI)) (2010/C 45 E/08).

21. See Ruben Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe* (University of California Press, 2014), 87–88.

22. See Julien Jeandesboz, in “European Border Policing. EUROSUR, Knowledge, Calculation,” *Global Crime* 18, no. 3 (2017): 257, 275.

23. Concrete practices in the area of border control are often accompanied by visions of the future. The report that advised setting up SIVE—the so-called Civipol study—already suggested generalizing the use of “SIVE-type” systems. Indicators of the future orientation of the study include the use of terms like “guiding images.” The priority areas for deploying such systems included the “southern contact zone between Spain and Morocco” (essentially the Canary Islands region), the “contact zone between Italy, Tunisia and Libya,” and the “contact zone between Greece and Turkey.” The report further stressed the possibility of using what it calls “new technologies,” including the Galileo satellite network and unmanned aerial vehicles. See Jeandesboz, “European Border Policing. EUROSUR, Knowledge, Calculation,” 274.

24. See James Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), and Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description* (London: Routledge, 2011).
25. Rogier van Reekum and Willem Schinkel, "Drawing Lines, Enacting Migration: Visual Prostheses of Bordering Europe," *Public Culture* 29, nos. 1/81 (2017): 34.
26. William Walters, "Live Governance, Borders, and the Time-Space of the Situation: EUROSUR and the Genealogy of Bordering in Europe," *Comparative European Politics* 15, no. 5 (2017): 794–817, begins with a quote from Peter Sloterdijk. The quote says that the term "live" allows us "to participate in events elsewhere." See Peter Sloterdijk, *Selected Exaggerations: Conversations and Interviews 1993–2012*, ed. B. Klein (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016).
27. Dijstelbloem et al., "Surveillance at Sea."
28. The classic reference is Bruno Latour's "Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World," in *Science Observed. Perspectives on the Social Study of Science*, ed. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay (London: SAGE, 1983). Elaborating on that view, Jan Hendrik Passoth and Nicholas Rowland, in "Actor-Network State: Integrating Actor-Network Theory and State Theory," *International Sociology* 25, no. 6 (2010): 818–841, have conceptualized states as laboratories. Likewise, Mike Bourne, Heather Johnson, and Debbie Lisle, in their study on security devices "Laboratizing the Border: The Production, Translation and Anticipation of Security Technologies," *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 4 (2015): 307–325, compare and connect laboratory sites and border sites. Martina Tazzioli's "The Circuits of Financial-Humanitarianism in the Greek Migration Laboratory," September 25, 2017, <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/09/circuits>, describes the first Refugee Cash Assistance program funded by the European Union at the island of Lesbos as a "laboratory of experimentation." Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli in "Choucha beyond the Camp: Challenging the Border of Migration Studies," in *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2017), 167, envision a specific refugee camp, Choucha in Tunisia, as a laboratory for a humanitarian border. Georgios Glouftisios, in "Designing Digital Borders: The Visa Information System (VIS)," *Technology and Agency in International Relations*, ed. Marijn Huijtenk and Matthias Seele (London/New York: Routledge, 2019), 167, describes the Visa Information System as a "laboratory."
29. See Ian Hacking's *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983).
30. Bruno Latour, *Science in Action* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 215–257.
31. Interview with the director of Greece's Sea Border Protection Department, Piraeus, September 16, 2014.

32. John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4–13.
33. Louise Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Uncertainty Beyond Probability* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 9, 81.
34. Amoore, in *The Politics of Possibility*, 102–103, argues, “As a mosaic of life signatures, the contemporary border is not merely a site of technology, where bodies become inscribed with code, but rather it becomes the sovereign enactment of possibility par excellence.”
35. Interview with the union representative of the Hellenic Coast Guard at Chios, September 9, 2014.
36. Interview with the Lesbos coast guard commander, Lesvos, February 25, 2016.
37. Dijstelbloem et al., “Surveillance at Sea,” 231.
38. Dijstelbloem et al., “Surveillance at Sea,” 232.
39. Interview with the union representative of the Hellenic Coast Guard at Chios, September 9, 2014.
40. Martina Tazzioli, “Spy, Track and Archive: The Temporality of Visibility in Eurosur and Jora,” *Security Dialogue* 49, no. 4 (2018): 274.
41. Martina Tazzioli, “Spy, Track and Archive: The Temporality of Visibility in Eurosur and Jora,” *Security Dialogue* 49, no. 4 (2018): 276, 281.
42. “Jean Asselborn and Dimitris Avramopoulos, during a Visit to Greece, Take Stock of the Implementation of the First ‘Hotspot’ on the Island of Lesbos,” *Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, October 10, 2015, <http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/10/16-asselborn-avramopoulos-lesbos/index.html>.
43. See, for instance, *IOM Greece*, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://greece.iom.int/en/iom-greece>.
44. Charalambos Kasimis, “Illegal Immigration in the Midst of Crisis,” *Migration Information Source*, March 8, 2012, 8–10, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/greece-illegal-immigration-midst-crisis>.
45. European Commission, “The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows.”
46. Tazzioli, “Spy, Track and Archive,” 280.
47. Silvan Pollozek and Jan Hendrik Passoth, “Infrastructuring European Migration and Border Control: The Logistics of Registration and Identification at Moria Hotspot,” *EPD: Society and Space* 37, no. 4 (2019): 3, 15.

48. Annalisa Pelizza, "Processing Alterity, Enacting Europe: Migrant Registration and Identification as Co-construction of Individuals and Politics," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 25, no. 2 (2019): 9.

49. Antonis Vradis, Evie Papada, Joe Painter, and Anna Papoutsis state in *New Borders: Hotspots and the European Migration Regime* (London: Pluto Press, 2019), 8, "Once an area is declared a hotspot, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, Europol and Eurojust come in to assist member states to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. What is envisioned by the EC is that the four agencies will support member-state authorities in the registration, identification and removal of apprehended migrants (using Frontex), the registration of asylum claims, the preparation of successful relocation claimants (by EASO) and the investigation and subsequent prosecution of crimes (by Europol and Eurojust)."

50. "Jean Asselborn and Dimitris Avramopoulos, during a Visit to Greece, Take Stock of the Implementation of the First 'Hotspot' on the Island of Lesbos," *Presidency of the Council of the European Union*, October 10, 2015, <http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/factualites/articles-actualite/2015/10/16-asselborn-avramopoulos-lesbos/index.html>.

51. Interview with the Chios general police director, Chios, March 1, 2016.

52. "Frontex Accepts Greece's Request for Rapid Border Intervention Teams," Frontex, accessed December 8, 2017, <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-accepts-greece-s-request-for-rapid-border-intervention-teams-amcPjC>.

53. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.

54. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.

55. Interview with the Chios deputy head of the coast guard, Chios, March 2, 2016. Some days later, he was upgraded to the head of the Chios coast guard. At that time, he acted as HCG head.

56. Interview with the mayor, municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.

57. Interview with the mayor, municipality of Lesbos, Lesbos, February 26, 2016.

58. Interview with the mayor, municipality of Lesbos, Lesbos, February 26, 2016.

59. As Karolina Follis argues in "Vision and Transterritory: The Borders of Europe," *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 42, no. 6 (2017): 1016, "transterritorial vision such as that produced by Eurosur likewise may offer the illusion of transparent surveillance at what one document describes as a 'nonnegligible' distance (European Commission JRC 2015). And yet, the picture it delivers is always already compromised by the oligoptic characteristics of its own infrastructure and by the culturally and politically mediated preconceptions of its embedded actors."

60. See Ian Chambers, *Mediterranean Crossings: The Politics of an Interrupted Modernity* (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2008); and Franco Cassano, *Southern*

Thought and Other Essays on the Mediterranean (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).

61. As Kerem Öktem states in “The Ambivalent Sea: Regionalizing the Mediterranean Differently,” *Mediterranean Frontiers. Borders, Conflict and Memory in a Transnational World* (London/New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), “one of the tensions that run through his [Braudel’s] epic work is the conflict between the claim to Mediterranean unity, and the very fact of the region’s political and religious division.” As Chambers, in *Mediterranean Crossings*, 49, puts it: “The space of the Mediterranean, both as sea and combinatory territory, remains elusive: a perpetual interrogation. The sea is not something to possess . . . If there is a unity in the Mediterranean, it is perhaps a hidden, critical ‘unity’ where the sea itself, as the site of dispersion and drift, exposes the fragility of inherited configurations.”

62. Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin, 1977).

63. Luigi Cazzato, “An Archaeology of the Verticalist Mediterranean: From Bridges to Walls,” *Mediterranean Review* 5, no. 2 (2012): 28.

64. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). See also Barry Ryan, “Security Spheres: A Phenomenology of Maritime Spatial Practices,” *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 6 (2015): 569.

65. Geoffrey A. Boyce, “The Rugged Border: Surveillance, Policing and the Dynamic Materiality of the US/Mexico Frontier,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34, no. 2 (2016); and Squire (2014; 2017).

66. Boyce, “The Rugged Border,” 256.

67. Boyce, “The Rugged Border,” 257.

68. Vicky Squire, “Desert ‘Trash’: Posthumanism, Border Struggles, and Humanitarian Politics,” *Political Geography* 39 (2014): 12.

69. Didier Bigo, “Death in the Mediterranean Sea: The Results of the Three Fields of Action of European Union Border Controls,” *The Irregularization of Migration in Contemporary Europe*, ed. Jansen Yolande, Robin Celikates and Joost de Bloois (London/New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

70. Bigo, “Death in the Mediterranean Sea,” 59.

71. This development accords with what Barry Ryan, in “Security Spheres: A Phenomenology of Maritime Spatial Practices,” *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 6 (2015): 579–580, describes as the securitization of maritime borders to design three-dimensional environments.

72. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, “Liquid Traces. Investigating the Deaths of Migrants at the EU’s Maritime Frontier,” in *The Borders of “Europe.” Autonomy of*

Migration, Tactics of Bordering, ed. Nicholas De Genova (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2017), 103.

73. Heller and Pezzani, "Liquid Traces," 103.

74. Heller and Pezzani, "Liquid Traces," 103.

75. Cf. William Walters, "Migration, Vehicles, and Politics: Three Theses on Viapolitics," *European Journal of Social Theory* 18, no. 4 (2015): 469–488.

76. Bruno Latour, *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181.

77. Gerard de Vries, *Bruno Latour* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 96.

Chapter 6

1. Katerina Rozakou, "Socialities of Solidarity: Revisiting the Gift Taboo in Times of Crises," *Social Anthropology* 24, no. 2 (2016): 196.

2. The concept of the "humanitarian border" is coined by William Walters in "Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border," in *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges*, ed. Ulrich Bröckling, Suzanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke (New York: Routledge, 2011).

3. "Human security" is an important international approach and concept in security studies. See, for instance, <https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/>.

4. Chris Rumford, *Citizens and Borderwork in Contemporary Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008) and Polly Pallister-Wilkins, "The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros," *International Political Sociology* 9, no. 1 (2015): 53–69.

5. Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

6. Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason*, 135–138.

7. Didier Fassin, "Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life," *Public Culture* 19, no. 3 (2007): 519.

8. Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 2011).

9. As in chapter 5, the interviews were organized, conducted, transcribed, and translated by Ermioni Frezouli. For a more specific analysis of the movability of the humanitarian border based on this research, see Huub Dijstelbloem and Lieke van der Veer, "The Multiple Movements of the Humanitarian Border: The Portable Provision of Care and Control at the Aegean Islands," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* (2019): 1–19.

10. Bernd Kasperek, "Routes, Corridors, and Spaces of Exception: Governing Migration and Europe," *Near Futures Online* 1 "Europe at a Crossroads," March 2016, <http://nearfuturesonline.org/routes-corridors-and-spaces-of-exception-governing-migration-and-europe/>.

11. See Alison Mountz, "The Enforcement Archipelago: Detention, Haunting, and Asylum on Islands," *Political Geography* 30 (2011): 118–128; and Allison Mountz, "Political Geography II: Islands and Archipelagos," *Progress in Human Geography* 39, no. 5 (2014): 636–646.

12. The aim is to study the islands as what Anne-Laure Amilhat Szary and Frédéric Giraut (2015, 3), in their introduction to *Borderities and Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), call a "laboratory for studying socio-spatial relations" that stages "the multiple rules and experiences of what a border can be."

13. My visit to Moria, September 10, 2014, with Rogier van Reekum and Ermioni Frezouli.

14. Walters, "Foucault and Frontiers," 146.

15. See Reece Jones, Corey Johnson, Wendy Brown, Gabriel Popescu, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, Alison Mountz, and Emily Gilbert, "Interventions on the State of Sovereignty at the Border," *Political Geography* 59 (2017): 6. As Chris Rumford, in *Citizens and Borderwork in Contemporary Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008), 5, points out, "people, not just states, engage in bordering activities."

16. Jones et al., "Interventions on the State of Sovereignty at the Border," 6.

17. Joel Hernandez, "Refugee Flows to Lesvos: Evolution of a Humanitarian Response," *Migration Policy Institute*, January 29, 2016, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-flows-lesvos-evolution-humanitarian-response>.

18. Polly Pallister-Wilkins, "Humanitarian Borderwork: Actors, Spaces, Categories," in Jones et al., "Interventions on the State of Sovereignty at the Border," 9.

19. See Dijstelbloem and van der Veer, "The Multiple Movements of the Humanitarian Border." See also Maribel Casas-Cortes, Sebastian Cobarrubias, Nicholas De Genova, Glenda Garelli, Giorgio Grappi, Charles Heller, Sabine Hess et al., "New Keywords: Migration and Borders," *Cultural Studies* 29, no. 1 (2015): 55–87; Peter Nyers, "Moving Borders: The Politics of Dirt," *Radical Philosophy* 174 (July/August 2012); Walters, "Foucault and Frontiers."

20. Visit PIKPA, Lesbos, September 10 2014, with Rogier van Reekum and Ermioni Frezouli.

21. Petra is located 5 kilometers north of Molyvos, and it's a very touristy area as well.

22. Interview with a member of PIKPA, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.

23. Nyers, "Moving Borders," 174.
24. Interview with the commander of the Lesvian coast guard, Lesbos, February 25, 2016.
25. The analyses of the situations at Lesbos and Chios in these sections and the interpretations of the interviews were conducted in cooperation with Lieke van der Veer. The analysis is partly based on Dijstelbloem and van der Veer, "The Multiple Movements of the Humanitarian Border."
26. Evthymios Papataxiarchis, in "Being 'There': At the Front Line of the 'European Refugee Crisis'—Part 1," *Anthropology Today* 32, no. 2 (2016): 5, observes that "everyone and everything else goes where the refugees go."
27. Interview with a freelance journalist who worked on Chios for an extended period of time, Chios, May 8, 2016.
28. Annemarie Mol, "Actor-Network Theory: Sensitive Terms and Enduring Tensions," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 50, no. 1 (2010): 259.
29. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.
30. Interview with a volunteer working in the fishing port of Agia Ermioni, Chios, March 10, 2016.
31. Interview with a volunteer related to Chios Solidarity, Chios, May 27, 2016.
32. Lathra, accessed May 28, 2020, <http://www.lathra.gr/>.
33. Interview with a member of Lathra, Chios, May 19, 2016.
34. Norwegian Refugee Council, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.nrc.no/who-we-are/about-us/>.
35. Interview with the area manager of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Greece, Chios, May 12, 2016.
36. Interview with the area manager of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Greece, Chios, May 12, 2016.
37. Interview with a consultant who worked for the Ministry of Migration, Athens, February 12, 2016.
38. Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," *Alternatives* 27, no. 1 (2002): 63–92.
39. Paolo Cuttitta, "Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean," *Geopolitics* 23, no. 3 (2017): 632–660.
40. Interview with the area manager of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Greece, Chios, May 12, 2016.

41. Interview with the former deputy head of the Chian coast guard, Chios, March 2, 2016.
42. Interview with a member of Lathra, Chios, May 19, 2016.
43. "MSF No Longer Take Funds from EU Member States and Institutions," *MSF*, June 16, 2016 (updated December 8, 2016), <https://www.msf.org.uk/article/msf-no-longer-take-funds-eu-member-states-and-institutions>.
44. Interview with a volunteer working for Solidarity Kitchen, Chios, May 17, 2016.
45. "Humanitarian practice, like the border itself, is influenced by the settings and the types of work or practices carried out, and as such is always in a state of becoming," as Pallister-Wilkins in, "Humanitarian Borderwork," 20, argues.
46. Walters, "Foucault and Frontiers," 148.
47. Interview with a member of Starfish Foundation, Molyvos, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.
48. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.
49. "Who We Are," *Doctors of the World*, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.doctorsoftheworld.org.uk/about-us>.
50. Interview with an employee of Médecins du Monde, Chios, May 4, 2016.
51. Interview with a member of Starfish Foundation, Molyvos, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.
52. Interview with a consultant who worked for the Ministry of Migration, Athens, February 12, 2016.
53. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.
54. Interview with a member of Starfish Foundation, Molyvos, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.
55. See Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, "On Humanitarian Refugee Biometrics and New Forms of Intervention," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 11, no. 4 (2017): 529; and Benjamin Meiches, "Non-human Humanitarians," *Review of International Studies* 45, no. 1 (2019): 1.
56. Interview with the commander of the Lesvian coast guard, Lesbos, February 25, 2016.
57. Interview with a volunteer working for Solidarity Kitchen, Chios, May 17, 2016.
58. Arjun Appadurai, in *The Future as Cultural Fact. Essays on the Global Condition* (New York: Verso, 2013), 64, argues that it is crucial to understand the relationship "between the forms of circulation and the circulation of forms."
59. Interview with an employee of Médecins du Monde, Chios, May 4, 2016.

60. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.
61. Interview with the deputy head of the Regional Authority of the North Aegean, Chios, March 2, 2016.
62. Interview with the deputy head of administrative and financial services of the Regional Authority of North Aegean, Lesbos, February 26, 2016.
63. Interview with the deputy head of administrative and financial services of the Regional Authority of North Aegean, Lesbos, February 26, 2016.
64. Interview with the general police director, Chios, March 1, 2016.
65. Interview with a member of Lathra, Chios, May 19, 2016.
66. Interview with the area manager of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Greece, Chios, May 12, 2016. As Pallister-Wilkins, "Humanitarian Borderwork," 8, points out, "the emergent and ephemeral humanitarian borderscape is structured and conditioned by the im/mobility of migrants as they are channeled through 'corridors' and 'narrow bands' structured by border controls and transport infrastructures."
67. Brigitta Kuster and Vasilis Tsianos, "Erase Them: Eurodac and Digital Deportability," *Transversal Texts*, no. 2 (2013): <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0313/kuster-tsianos/en>.
68. Vasilis Galis, Spyros Tzokas, and Aristotle Tympas, "Bodies Folded in Migrant Crypts: Dis/Ability and the Material Culture of Border-Crossing," *Societies* 6, no. 10 (2016): 1–11.
69. Interview with an employee of Médecins du Monde, Chios, May 4, 2016.
70. Interview with the former deputy head of the Chian coast guard, Chios, March 2, 2016.
71. Papataxiarchis, "Being 'There,'" 6–7.
72. Interview with a member of Starfish Foundation, Molyvos, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.
73. Interview with a freelance journalist who worked on Chios for an extended period of time, Chios, May 8, 2016.
74. As Pallister-Wilkins points out in "Humanitarian Borderwork," 7: "Humanitarian borderwork is very diverse in terms of actors and border spaces because of its contingent relationship with mobility. Fluctuating assemblages of actors with divergent socio-political objectives undertake humanitarian borderwork. These actors share humanitarian sensibilities but perform acts of rescue and caregiving for reasons that cannot be considered 'wholly' humanitarian . . . Humanitarian borderwork is therefore indicative of the instrumental and normative logics present in much humanitarian work, where pragmatic security concerns intersect with affective concerns for people's wellbeing and dignity."

75. Interview with a member of Lathra, Chios, May 19, 2016.
76. Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Chios, Chios, March 7, 2016.
77. Interview with the director of Politis Chios, a journal and news blog, Chios, May 10, 2016.
78. Interview with a freelance journalist who worked on Chios for an extended period of time, Chios, May 8, 2016.
79. Interview with an employee of Médecins du Monde, Chios, May 4, 2016.
80. Interview with a member of Starfish Foundation, Molyvos, Lesbos, February 24, 2016.
81. Interview with a freelance journalist who worked on Chios for an extended period of time, Chios, May 8, 2016.
82. Martina Tazzioli, "Containment through Mobility: Migrants' Spatial Disobediences and the Reshaping of Control through the Hotspot System," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44, no. 16 (2018): 2764–2779.
83. Nyers, "Moving Borders."
84. See Lindskov Jacobsen, "On Humanitarian Refugee Biometrics and New Forms of Intervention," 529–551; and Meiches, "Non-human Humanitarians," 1–19.

Chapter 7

1. "The List: The 34,361 Men, Women and Children Who Perished Trying to Reach Europe," *The Guardian*, June 20, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/the-list-34361-men-women-and-children-who-perished-trying-to-reach-europe-world-refugee-day>.
2. "People for Sale," CNN, October 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/specials/africa/libya-slave-auctions>.
3. "Greece: Frontier of Hope and Fear," Amnesty International, April 29, 2014, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR25/004/2014/en/>.
4. John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1998), 9.
6. See Marieke de Goede, Anna Leander, and Gavin Sullivan, "Introduction: The Politics of the List," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 32, no. 1 (2016): 4–5.
7. According to Anna Leander, "The Politics of Whitelisting: Regulatory Work and Topologies in Commercial Security," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*

34, no. 1 (2016): 48–66, lists have agency: “they can make things happen and can therefore be held co-responsible for political developments.”

8. Umberto Eco would probably have agreed: “Faced with something that is immensely large, or unknown, of which we still do not know enough or of which we shall never know, the author proposes a list as specimen, or indication, leaving the reader to imagine the rest” (Umberto Eco, *The Infinity of Lists: From Homer to Joyce* (London: MacLehose Press, 2009), quoted in De Goede et al., 7.

9. The discussion of the politics of the list thus can be continued with what Stäheli, in “Indexing—The Politics of Invisibility,” 15, calls their “politics of invisibility”: “list-making is not only a problem of selection, but it is necessarily a transformative and performative practice: it produces the items which the list will comprise.” Her argument thus speaks to Geoffrey C. Bowker’s and Susan Leigh Star’s observation in *Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), a groundbreaking work on the nature of classifications and their consequences, that “the material culture of bureaucracy and empire is not found in pomp and circumstance, nor even in the first instance of the point of a gun, but rather at the point of a list.” While Stäheli mainly meant lists made by state agents, the same would seem to hold for lists made by nonstate actors. The making of lists also recalls the notion of “agnotology,” introduced by Robert Proctor in “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance (and Its Study),” in *Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance*, ed. Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 1–37—that is, the study of ignorance and the publication of inaccurate or misleading data.

10. Tamara Last, Giorgia Mirto, Orçun Ulusoy, Ignacio Urquijo, Joke Harte, Nefeli Bami, Marta Pérez Pérez, et al., “Deaths at the Borders Database: Evidence of Deceased Migrants’ Bodies Found along the Southern External Borders of the European Union,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43, no. 5 (2017): 693–712.

11. Last et al., “Deaths at the Borders Database, 694.

12. Tamara Last and Thomas Spijkerboer, “Tracking Deaths in the Mediterranean,” in *Fatal Journeys. Tracking Lives Lost during Migration*, ed. Tara Brian and Frank Laczko (Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2014).

13. Last et al., “Deaths at the Borders Database, 709.

14. Donna Haraway, *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 581.

15. The following discussion elaborates on the analysis in Huub Dijstelbloem, “Migration Tracking Is a Mess,” *Nature* 543, no. 2 (2017): 32–34.

16. “Operations Portal, Refugee Situations,” UNHCR, accessed May 31, 2020, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations>.

17. IOM, *World Migration Report 2018* (Geneva, Switzerland: IOM, 2017), 160.
18. "WatchTheMed Alarm Phone Reports," *Watch the Med*, accessed May 31, 2020, <http://www.watchthemed.net/>.
19. "About," Watch the Med Alarm Phone, accessed May 31, 2020, <https://alarmphone.org/en/about/>.
20. See Dijstelbloem, "Migration Tracking Is a Mess."
21. "Our Story," Satellite Sentinel Project, accessed May 31, 2020, <http://www.satsentinel.org/>.
22. Marouf Hasian, Jr., *Forensic Rhetorics and Satellite Surveillance: The Visualization of War Crimes and Human Rights Violations* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).
23. IOM, *World Migration Report 2018*, 162.
24. IOM, *World Migration Report 2018*, 160–162.
25. The term was coined by Nicholas De Genova, "Spectacles of Migrant 'Illegality': The Scene of Exclusion, the Obscene of Inclusion," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36, no. 7 (2013): 1180. See for follow-ups on this topic also for instance Nicholas De Genova, "Introduction: The Borders of 'Europe' and the European Question," in *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering*, ed. Nicholas De Genova (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2017), 3–9.
26. Dijstelbloem, "Migration Tracking Is a Mess," 33.
27. See Huub Dijstelbloem, Rogier van Reekum, and Willem Schinkel, "Surveillance at Sea: The Transactional Politics of Border Control in the Aegean," *Security Dialogue* 48, no. 3 (2017): 224–240.
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36. IOM, *World Migration Report 2018*, 157, 158.
37. Koen Leurs, *Digital Passages: Migrant Youth 2.0. Diaspora, Gender and Youth Cultural Intersections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 14.
38. Kevin Smets, "The Way Syrian Refugees in Turkey Use Media: Understanding 'Connected Refugees' through a Non-mediacentric and Local Approach," *Communications* 43, no. 1 (2018): 113.
39. Sandra Ponzanesi, "Digital Diaspora's: Postcoloniality, Media and Affect," *Interventions* (2020): 7–11.
40. "The Left-to-Die Boat," Forensic Architecture, accessed May 31, 2020, <http://www.forensic-architecture.org/case/left-die-boat>.
41. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani, "Ebbing and Flowing: The EU's Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis," *Near Futures Online Issue 1 "Europe at a Crossroads"*, March 2016, accessed May 31, 2020, <http://nearfuturesonline.org/ebbing-and-flowing-the-eus-shifting-practices-of-non-assistance-and-bordering-in-a-time-of-crisis/>.
42. Ulrich Beck, *World at Risk* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009), 27.
43. Heller and Pezzani, "Ebbing and Flowing."
44. According to Dennis Rodgers and Bruce O'Neill, in "Infrastructural Violence: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Ethnography* 13, no. 4 (2012): 403, the term 'infrastructural violence' "explicitly draws attention to the fact that the workings of infrastructure can be substantially deleterious." For Rodgers and O'Neill (2012, 404), infrastructures constitute "an often ignored material channel for what is regularly referred to as 'structural violence,' which Paul Farmer has defined as 'violence exerted systemically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order.'" See Paul Farmer, "An Anthropology of Structural Violence," *Current Anthropology* 45, no. 3 (2004): 307. The notion of infrastructural violence can thus be read as the less state-oriented successor of what Michael Mann, in "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 113, called "infrastructural power"; that is, "the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."
45. Donna Haraway, *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 581.
46. Donna Haraway, *Feminist Studies*, 581.

47. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison. *Objectivity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).

48. Eyal Weizman, *Forensic Architecture: Violence at the Threshold of Detectability* (New York: Zone Books, 2017), 9.

49. See Louise Amoore, "Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror," *Political Geography* 25 (2006): 336–351; Louise Amoore, "Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures," *Citizenship Studies* 13, no. 1 (2009): 17–30; Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, "Border Theatre: On the Arts of Security and Resistance," *Cultural Geographies* 17, no. 3 (2010): 299–319; and Louise Amoore and Alexandra Hall, "The Clown at the Gates of the Camp: Sovereignty, Resistance and the Figure of the Fool," *Security Dialogue* 44, no. 2 (2014): 93–110.

50. The notion is developed by the art historian Jonathan Crary, in *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), in which he describes the historical relationship between ideas about vision and subjectivity. As he explains in *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 3 "vision is only one part of a body capable of evading institutional capture and of inventing new forms, affects, and intensities."

51. Louise Amoore, "Lines of Sight," 19, 22.

52. Luc Boltanski, *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

53. Crary, *Techniques of the Observer*, 9–11.

54. In many ways, these arguments speak to Foucault's oeuvre, especially his thesis in *Discipline and Punishment* (New York: Random House, 1975). According to Crary, Foucault, in emphasizing surveillance, pays little attention to the development of perception itself (see Crary, *Techniques of the Observer*, 19).

55. The argument in this section and the analysis of the "detective" is based in part on Huub Dijstelbloem, Chapter 7 "Seeing Like a Detective" [Kijken als een detective] of Huub Dijstelbloem, *The House of Argus: The Watchful Eye in Democracy* [*Het Huis van Argus: De Wakende Blick in de Democratie*] (Amsterdam: Boom, 2016), 114–131, but this discussion revises and updates the material in the book.

56. Bruno Latour, *Aramis or the Love of Technology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

57. Although it is dangerous to talk of periods that are strictly demarcated and clearly distinguished, it is still possible to distinguish three phases in the development of the detective novel. The first phase encompasses the Victorian detective novel, set in nineteenth-century Paris and London, which we know from Edgar Allan Poe and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. The second covers the rise of the hardboiled

detective in the works of Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler, in San Francisco and Los Angeles in early twentieth-century California. The third phase relates to what is called the postwar metaphysical or postmodern thriller, such as in the works of Paul Auster. Before that time, there were riddles to be found in the literature, exciting stories and characters deciphering deeds or misdeeds, such as in Voltaire's *Zadig*, but these can hardly be classified as detective literature. See, for instance, Josef Hoffmann, *Philosophies of Crime Fiction* (Harpending/Hertfordshire, UK: No Exit Press, 2013); Stephen Knight, *Crime Fiction Since 1800. Detection, Death, Diversity* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010); Martin Priestman (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); John Scaggs, *Crime Fiction* (London/New York: Routledge, 2005).

58. It is striking that Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* is not mentioned in any of the historical overviews that I have consulted. That would certainly enrich the description of the genre, because while the novel involves a murder, a perpetrator, and an investigator, it also explores above all the idea that it is the inner detection work by the main character and the search within his conscience—the question of whether he has a conscience at all—that ramps up the tension and makes the investigative work so intimate that the reader almost becomes an accomplice.

59. Luc Boltanski, *Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Novels, Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies*. (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 112: "The detective is the state in a normalised state of emergency."

60. Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment*.

61. His personal favorite was no. 50: *Deadlier than the Male*, the only novel by James Gunn, which was published in 1943.

62. Scott Dimovitz, "Public Personae and the Private I. De-compositional Ontology in Paul Auster's *The New York Trilogy*," *Modern Fiction Studies* 52, no. 3 (2006): 613–633.

63. Hasian, *Forensic Rhetorics and Satellite Surveillance*.

64. Paul Auster, *The New York Trilogy* (New York: Penguin, 1987), 8.

65. Dimovitz, "Public Personae and the Private I," 620.

66. "Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat," Crossing the Med Map, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://crossing-the-med-map.warwick.ac.uk/>.

67. *Migration Trail*, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://www.migrationtrail.com/>.

68. This corresponds with what Jacques Rancière argues in *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (London and New York: Continuum, 2004).

69. Jacques Rancière, *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics* (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 70.

70. See Nicholas Mirzoeff, *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality* (Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2011), which specifically studies relationships between the visible and the invisible. The right to look, Mirzoeff argues, is the right to escape from the totalizing effect of the visual—to not only be represented according to others, but to look and develop one's own perspective.

71. As Alison Mountz argues in *Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 23, “visibility proves crucial to understanding how states respond to migrants . . . during highly publicized, visible, visual, and seemingly exceptional crises along their borders.”

72. Jeffrey Green, *The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9.

73. Nadia Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

74. Green in *The Eyes of the People*, discusses how the Caesarian element can then enter into politics (he discusses Shakespeare's Roman tragedies of Julius Caesar, Coriolanus, and Antonius and Cleopatra). As Weber argued, the Caesarian style can imbue leadership with charisma that the bureaucracy and procedural and deliberative institutions cannot, at the cost of denying individuality to citizens.

75. In *Eyes* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), Michel Serres examines the links between seeing, thinking, and knowing, and, in contrast to Plato, he invites the reader to remain in the semidark underground of the cave rather than seeing the true form of reality in the full light of the Sun. After all, this is where the search must start, in the twilight and the shadows where nothing is completely clear. For this reason, Serres views the philosopher as a kind of detective.

76. Nick Vaughan-Williams concludes, in “Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the Citizen-Detective and the War on Terror,” *Space and Polity* 12, no. 1 (2008): 76–77, “The figure of the ‘citizen-detective’ is likely to mobilize a vigilant subject constantly on the look-out for suspicious behavior not only in civic places but also rather closer to home. The promotion of this form of surveillance constitutes a form of generalized borderwork whereby, again, the borders of sovereign community are (re)produced not only at the edge of territories but throughout society at large.”

77. “The gaze” is a translation of Foucault's account of the *le regard*, which he developed in *The Birth of the Clinic*. Andrew Barry emphasizes in *Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society* (London: Athlone Press, 2001), 56, the original term was meant “to refer to the process of making things visible rather than the act of looking as such.”

78. Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured*.

Chapter 8

1. Cf. the “pneumatic parliament” that was conceptually developed by Peter Sloterdijk and Gesa Mueller von der Hagen, see “Instant Democracy: The Pneumatic Parliament,” accessed November 16, 2020, <https://iffr.com/en/2006/films/instant-democracy-the-pneumatic-parliament>.

2. See also the distinction made by Étienne Balibar in *Brexit, the Anti-Grexit*, accessed November 16, 2020, <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2735-brexit-the-anti-grexit>, between “internal exclusion” and “external inclusion.” According to Balibar, Greece during its euro crisis was controlled by numerous policies in an internal exclusion process. The opposite happened with the Brexit crisis—negotiations with the UK were conducted in such a way that ties were kept as close as possible without being in the European Union through a process of external inclusion.

3. As Polly Pallister-Wilkins argues regarding security barriers in “How Walls Do Work: Security Barriers as Devices of Interruption and Data Capture,” *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 2 (2016): 157, “What was a fence made up of wire or a wall made up of concrete comes to enact an interruption in circulation, creating as it does so the time and space for the intervention of other devices and practices. As a device of interruption, security barriers work to configure a space in some way, creating a barrier using a range of materials that cannot be easily penetrated or moved through, restricting the movement of people and goods to materially deliberate spaces such as gates, crossing points and checkpoints that form an integral part of the device itself.”

4. See Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, *Sorting Things Out. Classification and Its Consequences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); David Lyon, *Surveillance after September 11* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003); Huub Dijstelbloem and Dennis Broeders, “Border Surveillance, Mobility Management and the Shaping of Non-publics in Europe,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 18, no. 1 (2014): 21–38.

5. The term “hidden integration” of Europe was coined by Thomas Misa and Johan Schot in “Introduction,” *History and Technology* 21, no. 1 (2005): 1–19.

6. The term “boundary project” refers to the notion of “boundary objects,” as developed by Bowker and Leigh Star, *Sorting Things Out*.

7. Jo Guldi describes in *Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) how British towns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were connected by the construction of roads. It was not a fluid transition; all kinds of controversies arose as the new road connections implied new divisions and exclusions. Guldi illustrates the kind of government and bureaucratic force required to bring about this change as the rise of the “infrastructural state.”

8. Peter Sloterdijk, *Not Saved: Essay after Heidegger* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2017), 90–95.

Coda

1. Stuart Blume, "Get Ready for the Global Fight over Vaccines," *New York Times*, April 30, 2020, SR3, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/30/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-vaccine-supply.html?searchResultPosition=1>.
2. According to this code, "the reintroduction of border control at the internal borders must remain an exception and must respect the principle of proportionality. The scope and duration of such a temporary reintroduction of border control at the internal borders is limited in time and should be restricted to the bare minimum needed to respond to the threat in question. Reintroducing border control at the internal border should only ever be used as a measure of last resort," Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 9, 2016, on a Union Code on the Rules Governing the Movement of Persons across Borders (Schengen Borders Code), and "Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control," *European Commission*, accessed May 30, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en.
3. Paola Tamma and Hannie Cokelaere, "Schengen Proves Hard to Reboot after System Meltdown," *Politico*, accessed June 1, 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/schengen-proves-hard-to-reboot-after-system-meltdown/>.
4. The following partly draws on Huub Dijkstra, "Bordering a Hybrid World: Infrastructural Isolation and the Governance of Human and Nonhuman Mobility," *Global Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (2020): 12789, <https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2020.12789>.
5. See Louise Bengtsson, Stefan Borg, and Mark Rhinard, "Assembling European Health Security: Epidemic Intelligence and the Hunt for Cross-Border Health Threats," *Security Dialogue* 50, no. 2 (2019): 115–130. An early example of this development is the Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMed-Mail) Program, founded in 1994 by the Federation of American Scientists, which took advantage of the emerging online connectivity offered by the web. See Stephen Roberts and Stefan Elbe, "Catching the Flu: Syndromic Surveillance, Algorithmic Governmentality and Global Health Security," *Security Dialogue* 48, no. 1 (2017): 49. Other examples include the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), established by Canadian health authorities in 1997, and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), based on data from GPHIN and other sources. A final example is the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), a response by the G7 countries and Mexico to the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States.
6. Examples include the ProMedProgram, the GPHIN program, and HealthMap.
7. See Bengtsson et al., "Assembling European Health Security," 122–123.
8. See Bengtsson et al., "Assembling European Health Security," 122–123.
9. Pierre Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 30.

10. Here, I refer to James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1998).

11. See Charles Kenny, "Pandemics Close Borders—and Keep Them Closed," *Politico*, March 25, 2020, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-borders-history-plague-146788> ; and A. Wess Mitchell and Charles Ingrao, "Emperor Joseph's Solution to Coronavirus," *Wall Street Journal*, April 6, 2020, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/emperor-josephs-solution-to-coronavirus-11586214561>.

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