

Notes

Preface

1. For an introduction to the field, see Zunshine, "Introduction to Cognitive Literary Studies." For a representative bibliography, see Zunshine, "May 2020 Bibliography," as well as its more frequently updated counterpart at my Academia page: <https://uky.academia.edu/LisaZunshine>.
2. B. Schieffelin, "Found in Translation," 143.

Chapter 1

1. Twain, *Mississippi Writings*, 20.
2. For a discussion, see Fernyhough, "Metaphors of Mind." Note that plenty of cognitive scientists use "theory of mind," "mindreading," and "mental states" (or "internal states") in a literal sense. Indeed, for the purposes of studying the phenomena referred to by these terms, it does not seem practicable to be always carefully foregrounding their metaphoricity.
3. For a review of mindreading, see Apperly, *Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind."*
4. See, for instance, Tomasello, *Origins of Human Communication*, 173, 189.
5. Of course, I can imagine a context in which this statement will contain mental states. For instance, if I am standing in a long line and an authority figure comes over and tells us that this is the line only for people whose last names begin with a Z and that we should thus disperse, I may call out with some strong feelings, "My last name begins with a Z!" This is to say that my present examples are synthetic constructs designed to make a point rather than to represent accurately a range of real-life situations.
6. Mercier and Sperber, *Enigma of Reason*, 81. See also Martins and Fitch, "Do We Represent Intentional Action as Recursively Embedded?"
7. Tomasello, *Origins of Human Communication*, 173.

8. Miller, Kessel, and Flavell, "Thinking about People Thinking," 622.
9. On the difference between the effect on theory of mind of reading fiction and expository nonfiction, see Mar et al., "Bookworms versus Nerds."
10. In prose fiction, sentence- and paragraph-level complex embeddings may be particularly predominant. Compare to Auyoung's observation that "the prosaic organization of text across sentences and paragraphs emerges as a crucial scale at which narrative information can be strategically arranged" (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 63).
11. See Zunshine, "Commotion of Souls"; Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, "Increases in Perspective Embedding."
12. From this point on, I frequently omit the term "implied" as a modifier for reader/audience. Although the narratologist in me would strongly prefer to speak of implied readers as opposed to just readers, I find useful the distinction between the literary-critical (in my case, narratological) and empirical perspectives, recently outlined by Andrew Elfenbein. As he puts it, "Literary scholars may at times strive to occupy a position as close as possible to their understanding of the implied reader. . . . While I am comfortable with the 'implied reader' as a literary critical construct, I have seen no psychological evidence that actual readers envision an implied reader as they read or use an implied reader to gauge their own performance" (*Gist*, 199).
13. Compare to arguments developed by narratologists, such as Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh, who contend that "the rhetoric of fictionality is founded upon a communicative intent" ("Ten Theses about Fictionality," 64); by philosophers, such as Gregory Currie, who observes that a "narrative is an artefact, wherein the maker seeks to make manifest his or her communicative intentions" ("Framing Narratives," 18); by cognitive literary scholars, such as Andrei Ionescu, who notes that the relationship between reader and writer can in itself be "a very complex form of intersubjectivity" ("Manifesto," 9); and by cognitive linguists, such as Yanna Popova, who sees literature as "framing an interactive engagement with a reader" (*Stories, Meaning, and Experience*, 71).
14. Phelan and Rabinowitz, "Authors, Narrators, Narration," 37.
15. As Elfenbein puts it, "As soon as a reader can recognize that paradoxes, ambiguities, and uncertainties are intentional, at whatever level of agency intention is understood, representation becomes coherent" ("Mental Representation," 251).
16. See Bowes and Katz, "Metaphor Creates Intimacy."
17. Twain, *Mississippi Writings*, 24 (emphasis added).
18. Twain, 25 (emphasis added).
19. Gavaler and Johnson, "Genre Effect," 86, 91. For an analysis of the "interaction effect between genre and mentalizing" in case of espionage stories as compared to relationship stories, see also Carney, Wlodarski, and Dunbar, "Inference or Enaction?"

20. Ferrante, *Story of the Lost Child*, 250.
21. Rooney, *Conversations with Friends*, 242.
22. Cusk, *Transit*, 174.
23. Dangarembga, *Nervous Conditions*, 116.
24. Al Harthi, *Celestial Bodies*, 97.
25. Lerner, *Leaving the Atocha Station*, 84.
26. Williams, *Ninety-Nine Stories of God*, #61.
27. Gavalier and Johnson, “Genre Effect,” 79–108.
28. For a related critique of this stance, see Savarese’s *See It Feelingly*, in which he objects to its “very narrow conception of the social, as if the social were something that only human did with each other” (111).
29. Dick, *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, 4.
30. Savarese, *See It Feelingly*, 101.
31. Jackson, “Beautiful Stranger,” 79.
32. Forster, *Howards End*, 254.
33. Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, 413.
34. Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, 180.
35. Cao, *Story of the Stone*, vol. 1, 438.
36. And if we agree with Elaine Scarry’s argument that Shakespeare’s “beautiful young man” (*Naming Thy Name*, 4) was Henry Constable, then we have a poetic rejoinder written by Constable, who casts about for illusory explanations that may soothe *his* pain. The speaker of this sonnet (number 8 in Constable’s “Diana” cycle) suspects that his beloved (i.e., Shakespeare) placed him in harm’s way—by asking him to keep company with his mistress in his absence—on purpose. But if that’s the case—and here comes the complex embedment—then the speaker can make himself feel better by *imagining* that the beloved *wanted* him to *feel* this pain:

So when this thought my sorrowes shall augment,
That mine owne folly did procure my paine;
Then shall I say, to give my selfe content,
Obedience only made me love in vaine:
It was your will, and not my want of wit;
I have the paine—beare you the blame of it.

Or, as Scarry explains in her own tour-de-force of complex embedment, “I am in torment, says the speaker, a torment made worse by knowing my own folly brought this about; the only explanation that would make me gladly accept my pain would

be to know you so take pleasure in my torment that you scripted the entire event; if my pain gives you pleasure, I can accept my pain" (*Naming Thy Name*, 68).

37. Nizami, *Story of Layla and Majnun*, 10.
38. Anonymous, "The Wanderer," n. p.
39. Petronius, *Satyricon*, 50.
40. Homer, *The Odyssey*, 219.
41. Anonymous, *Epic of Gilgamesh*, 108.
42. Furlanetto et al., "Through Your Eyes." Note that in this case the word "actor" as used by the authors of this essay refers not to an actor onstage but to a person whose actions are observed by others.
43. Furlanetto et al.
44. See, for instance, Noel, "What Do We Actually See on Stage?"
45. Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, 5.1.
46. Hogan, *Sexual Identities*, 141.
47. Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, 3.4.97–98.
48. For a detailed discussion, see Zunshine, "Why Jane Austen Was Different."
49. Nizami, *Layla and Majnun*, 10.
50. See Whalen et al., "Validating Judgments," 293.
51. Chekhov, "Skripka Rotshil'da," n.p., translation mine.
52. Lu, *Madman's Diary*, 19. In the original: 我忍不住，便放聲大笑起來，十分快活。自己曉得這笑聲裏面，有的是義勇和正氣。老頭子和大哥，都失了色，被我這勇氣正氣鎮壓住了。
53. Pittard, *Listen to Me*, 2, 3.
54. Z. Smith. *On Beauty*, 3.
55. Forster, *Howards End*, 3.
56. Note the specific meaning of the word "intentionality" when used interchangeably with "mental state." As Mauricio D. Martins and W. Tecumseh Fitch observe,

It is important before going further to identify a potential source of confusion concerning "intention" and "intentional" stemming from the specialized interpretations of these terms as traditionally used by philosophers, that differ considerably from their ordinary English meanings. In ordinary English, "intentional" means "on purpose," but philosophers use "intentionality" to designate a particular characteristic of mental states. . . . In this sense, intentionality is a pervasive and fundamental feature of mental states like beliefs or desires, but including a wide range of other states including memories, hopes, knowledge, love—or intentions (in the ordinary sense). Thus, from the philosophers perspective, intentions are

just one among many different forms of intentional state. . . . [Thus] it is important to note that “intentionality” does not imply an “intention to do something.” (“Do We Represent Intentional Action as Recursively Embedded?,” 18)

57. Williams, *Ninety-Nine Stories of God*, #61.

58. Kulpa, “Review of *Ninety-Nine Stories of God*.”

59. Apuleius, *Golden Ass*, 112.

60. Ruden, “Translator’s Preface,” xv.

61. Peter Stockwell, MIT Press reader report, 2020.

62. Anonymous, *Epic of Gilgamesh*, 108.

63. Kidd and Castano, “Reading Literary Fiction and Theory of Mind,” 8. For a discussion of a controversy involved in the replication of the findings from the original 2013 study (i.e., Panero et al., “Does Reading a Single Passage of Literary Fiction Really Improve Theory of Mind?”), see also Kidd and Castano, “Panero et al. (2016)” and van Kuijk et al., “Effect of Reading a Short Passage.” For a useful metastudy that reviews recent research on fiction’s effects on social cognition, see Dodell-Feder and Tamir, “Fiction Reading Has a Small Positive Impact.” As its authors summarize (citations omitted throughout),

The effect of fiction on social cognition was larger when compared to no reading versus nonfiction reading. Indeed, if fiction’s causal impact depends on the extent to which a text provokes readers to consider mental states, then many forms of nonfiction (e.g., memoir) may likewise improve social cognition. Individual difference factors may also moderate the causal relation between fiction and social cognition. Given the same text, some readers may be more likely to benefit from fiction than others. Reading is an active experience, requiring willful participation by the reader. Thus, the benefits to social cognition may depend on the quality of a reader’s engagement with a text and motivation to understand the characters. For example, fiction’s impact may depend on a reader’s propensity to be transported into narratives, generate imagery while reading, or to simulate other minds. In the absence of this type of reader engagement, fiction is unlikely to effect any change at all. Furthermore, one’s existing knowledge base, expertise, or age of exposure may determine how likely one is to benefit from fiction reading. If so, prior social-cognitive ability would also moderate fiction’s impact. While we were not able to test these factors here, we recommend that future studies measure the role that individual differences play in moderating the effect of fiction reading on social cognition. While we show here that fiction effects a small causal improvement of social cognition, it is also likely the reverse causal relation exists. That is, fiction reading and social cognition might form a mutually facilitating and reinforcing pathway, akin to a “Matthew Effect.” Socially skilled individuals may gravitate toward fiction due to its social content more than less-skilled individuals. In doing so, readers further differentiate their social-cognitive skills from nonreaders as part of a self-reinforcing cycle. In summary, we find that fiction reading leads to a small improvement in social cognition. (1725)

64. As Phillips puts it, “We define close reading . . . as a style of focus—a mode of noticing details about literary form—that serves as a springboard for later analysis, writing, and criticism” (“Literary Neuroscience and History of Mind,” 58).

65. I have more to say about this in section 1.19.
66. See Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction*.
67. Elfenbein, *Gist*, 59, 139.
68. Elfenbein, 58. Compare to H. Porter Abbott's discussion in *Real Mysteries*, 10. Also, for a related discussion of the "online/offline" experience of reading and "promiscuous inference generation," see, respectively, Elfenbein, *Gist*, 83–84 and 86. Finally, for a critique of "decoupling reading from interpretation, a linkage so common in literary criticism that the claim 'there is no reading without interpretation' has become a truism, though it rests on a host of unexamined assumptions about both," see Elfenbein, *Gist*, 214.
69. Elfenbein, *Gist*, 19.
70. Elfenbein, 2. Compare to Anezka Kuzmičová's argument that "trained readers' minds may . . . take up various higher-order and formal aspects of the text in addition to the basic gist" ("Consciousness," 272).
71. Elfenbein, *Gist*, 2.
72. See Zunshine, "Who Is He to Speak of My Sorrow?"; and Steven Feld, *Sound and Sentiment*.
73. I have more to say about this in chapter 2, on mindreading and social status.
74. The full list of vignettes can be found here: <https://yale.app.box.com/s/qvk12d3vwrppimedrrdkkj5hgrdq5p76>.
75. Whalen et al, "Validating Judgments," 287.
76. Whalen et al., 288.
77. See Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, "Increases in Perspective"; Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, "Theory of Mind and Embedding of Perspective"; and Whalen et al., "Validating Judgments."
78. For details, see Zunshine, "Style Brings In Mental States."
79. To quote Elfenbein again, such stylistic nuances "could create a heightened textural density in reading, a sensation that does not produce paraphrasable meaning but a phenomenological feeling" (*Gist*, 35).
80. Hogan, *Sexual Identities*, 130.
81. While there are different ways to control for subjects' level of expertise, one may want to discuss with them beforehand situations that can lead to an overgenerous counting of embedded mental states. For instance, in my tutorial sessions, I used sentences similar to those I offered to you earlier in this chapter, such as "My last name begins with a Z" (no mental states), "I'm glad that my name begins with a Z because

the teacher may not get to the end of the list today” (two mental states), and so forth. Were I to do it again now, I would also point out that some sentences may look like complex (i.e., third- and fourth-level) embeddings, when in fact they are just parallel sets of low-level embeddings. Thus, “I *hope* he *doesn't realize* what I did last week because I am *scared* that he would be *angry* at me” contains two sets of second-level embeddings connected by “because” and not one four-level embedding. Here is what a four-level embedding may look like, based on the same material: “I *hope* that he *doesn't realize* that I am *scared* of him being *angry* at me if he finds out what I did last week.” Note the very different emotional tenor of this second sentence. Before, the speaker was afraid that “he” would be angry at her for what she did. Now she is worried that he would realize that he holds quite a bit of emotional power over her. It's a rather more interesting feeling (perhaps there is even a whiff of a story to it).

82. This would bear out the findings of the social psychologist Raymond Mar and his colleagues, who have shown that, contrary to the conventional belief that “bookworms” must be antisocial, there is actually a positive correlation between reading fiction and having good social skills (“Bookworms versus Nerds”), as well as the historical perspective offered by Elfenbein, who observes that “although reading is sometimes imagined as a withdrawal from social relationships, for many [eighteenth-century English] readers, reading novels sustained friendship and occasioned new ones” (*Gist*, 145).

83. This, of course, supports the aforementioned finding of Kidd and Castano. A similar argument has been made by social psychologists studying “attributional complexity”—a construct that was “proposed as an integration of several perspectives on cognitive complexity and includes the motivation to understand human behavior, along with the preference for complex explanations of it.” It has been suggested that people who are already “interested in explaining human behavior,” such as students who decide to major in psychology, are likely, in the process of their studies, to develop a “more complex explanatory schemata for human behavior as compared with other groups of students, such as students majoring in the natural sciences” (Fletcher et al., “Attributional Complexity,” 880).

84. Whalen et al, “Validating Judgments,” 293.

85. Whalen et al, 292, 294.

86. De Jaegher and Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making,” 490.

87. Forster, *Howards End*, 254.

88. For a foundational work on free indirect discourse, see Pascal, *Dual Voice*. See also Gunn, “Free Indirect Discourse.” For a recent discussion of FID from a cognitive perspective, see Mäkelä, “Possible Minds.”

89. Forster, *Howards End*, 241.

90. Forster, 253.

91. For a discussion of “the disparity between two kinds of engagement with fiction—the experience of the text and its interpretation,” see Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 10.

92. The enactive perspective on the extent to which embedded mental states are already in a work of fiction can be illustrated by the use of the classical example of a sponge, i.e., an object that changes depending on how it is acted upon. To quote De Jaegher and Di Paolo,

Traditional distinctions between action and perception arise only as the specialization of phases in an act of sense-making. Several examples that illustrate this point have been discussed in the enaction literature, but perhaps the simplest and clearest one is that of perceiving the softness of a sponge. . . . The softness of a sponge is not to be found “in it” but in how it responds to the active probing and squeezing of our appropriate bodily movements (e.g., with the fingers or the palms of the hand). It is the outcome of a particular kind of encounter between a “questioning” agent with a particular body (sponges are solid ground for ants) and a “responding” segment of the world. (“Participatory Sense-Making,” 489)

93. See also Troscianko, *Kafka’s Cognitive Realism*, 172.

94. De Jaegher and Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making,” 502.

95. One may speak here of the guidance provided by the author or, even more specifically, of what Gregory Currie calls the “guided attention” cultivated by the text (“Framing Narratives,” 25). For a discussion of how a reader may be made to share “the dispositions, preferences and knowledge that make [one character’s] response to [what is going on] a natural one,” see Currie, 22. Compare, also, to a recent compelling discussion, by Auyoung, of “postdictability” of *Pride and Prejudice*, that is, of the availability of “locally surprising information” that makes readers experience as “inevitable” certain emotional responses of the novel’s characters (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 47). Finally, compare to the argument by Scarry, who suggests that texts offer sets of “instructions” to their reader (*Dreaming by the Book*, 13).

96. Kuzmičová, “Consciousness,” 275.

97. Kuzmičová, 277. See also Kuzmičová and Bálint, “Personal Relevance in Story Reading.”

98. Kuzmičová, 277.

99. Compare to Auyoung: “No two occasions of reading are ever exactly the same, not just for different readers within the same interpretive community but even for the same reader, who may approach a single text with a variety of reading goals, fluctuating levels of motivation to pursue those goals, and newly acquired domains of background knowledge, to say nothing of the reader’s variable moods, preferences, and physical surroundings” (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 6). See also Elfenbein, *Gist*, 41–44; Graesser, Singer, and Trabasso, “Constructing Inferences”; and Cook, “4E Cognition and the Humanities,” 879.

100. Kuzmičová, “Consciousness,” 275.

101. One way to talk about this process is to rely on yet another series of metaphors and say that the secret life of literature is enactive, emergent, and embodied. There is, currently, a rich body of criticism that applies the enactivist approach to literature. See, for instance, Kukkonen, *4E Cognition and Eighteenth-Century Fiction*; Spolksy, *Contracts of Fiction*; Zunshine, "Embodied Social Cognition and Comparative Literature"; Tribble and Sutton, "Cognitive Ecology"; Polvinen, "Sense-Making and Wonder"; Polvinen, "Enactive Perception and Fictional Worlds"; Popova, *Stories, Meaning, and Experience*; Troscianko, *Kafka's Cognitive Realism*; and Garratt, *Cognitive Humanities*.

102. M. Johnson, *Embodied Mind, Meaning, and Reason*, 34. But see also Nikola A. Kompa's useful critique of "embodied accounts of language comprehension," 27.

103. De Jaegher and Di Paolo, "Participatory Sense-Making," 495. Also: "Overemphasis on [explanation and prediction involved in mindreading] has led most of the comparative social cognitive science to paint a picture of individuals who have to work out each other's minds much like they do with scientific problems" (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 486).

104. This description of the process of reading is explicitly modeled on De Jaegher and Di Paolo's definition of "social interaction as a regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter's scope can be augmented or reduced)" ("Participatory Sense-Making," 493). Compare to Auyoung's discussion of readers' experience with fictional characters as "a form of social connection in which their [i.e., readers'] autonomy is preserved" (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 120; see also 109).

105. For a discussion of challenges involved in this kind of study, see Elfenbein, *Gist*, 101.

106. Natalie Phillips reports a similar experience when she writes about conducting an interdisciplinary study involving cognitive scientists and literary scholars: "One of my favorite moments in the process, however, was when our group—three humanists and two scientists—met one evening to discuss the project. Something happened: the literary critics got excited about experimental variables; the scientists started waxing poetic about Jane Austen's style. Now, this kind of crosstalk has become part of our everyday lives" ("Literary Neuroscience and History of Mind," 57).

107. Elfenbein, *Gist*, 3–4.

108. If that is impossible, the next best thing to do is to "read actual articles rather than overviews popularizing scientific findings" (Elfenbein, 6).

109. Jackson, "Beautiful Stranger," 79.

110. As Ottessa Moshfegh sees it, the man in “The Beautiful Stranger” is “not quite sly enough to convince his wife that he’s the same person he was before he left” (foreword to Jackson, *Dark Tales*, viii).
111. Vapnyar, *Still Here*, 168–169.
112. To adapt Stanley Cavell’s term used to describe a particular Hollywood genre, this would make Vika’s story a variation of “the comedy of remarriage” (*Pursuits of Happiness*, 1).
113. Spark, *Girls of Slender Means*, 71.
114. Van Duijn, Sluiter, and Verhagen, “When Narrative Takes Over,” 148; italics in the original.
115. Van Duijn, Sluiter, and Verhagen, 151. Note that Van Duijn et al. use the term “multiple-order intentionality” (149) rather than “embedded mental states.”
116. Dunbar, *How Many Friends Does One Person Need?*, 180. See also Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, “Increases in Perspective Embedding” and Whalen et al., “Validating Judgments.”
117. Van Duijn, Sluiter, and Verhagen, “When Narrative Takes Over,” 149, 153. Compare to Ralf Schneider’s useful description of various sources of information involved in constructing a mental model of a character (“Cognitive Theory of Character Reception,” 122–123).
118. Quoted in Schenkar, *Talented Miss Highsmith*, 270.
119. Highsmith, *Price of Salt*, 363.
120. See Zunshine, *Why We Read Fiction*; Palmer, *Social Minds in the Novel*; and Vermeule, *Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?*
121. As Highsmith wrote later, the appeal of *The Price of Salt* “was that it had a happy ending for its two main characters, or at least they were going to try to have a future together. Prior to this book, homosexuals male and female in American novels had had to pay for their deviation by cutting their wrists, drowning themselves in a swimming pool, or by switching to heterosexuality (so it was stated), or by collapsing—alone and miserable and shunned—into a depression equal to hell” (afterword to *Selected Novels and Short Stories*, 579).
122. Isabelle Johnson, MFA workshop, University of Kentucky, March 22, 2019.
123. Hagan Smith, MFA workshop, University of Kentucky, March 25, 2019.
124. Taylor Sarratt, MFA workshop, University of Kentucky, April 1, 2019.
125. Auyong, *When Fiction Feels Real*, 121.

126. Dunbar, "Why Are Good Writers So Rare?," 7.

127. Dunbar, 17.

128. Miller, Kessel, and Flavell, "Thinking about People Thinking," 622. See also my argument in section 1.1.

129. Dunbar, "Why Are Good Writers So Rare?," 18.

130. Dunbar, 18.

131. As Hogan puts it (citations omitted):

It is not only unnecessary for universals to apply to all works; they need not apply to all traditions. Linguists use the term universal to refer to any property or relation that occurs across (genetically and areally unrelated) languages with greater frequency than would be predicted by chance alone. An absolute universal is merely a special case—a property or relation that occurs across traditions with a frequency of one. Universals with a frequency below one are referred to as statistical universals. On the whole, we should expect to find a limited number of hierarchies of statistically universal properties and relations, ordered according to abstraction and thus according to frequency (again, as abstraction increases, frequency can only increase or remain the same), with a few absolute universals at the apex of these hierarchies.

This extension of "universal" to statistically unexpected properties may seem odd, even misleading. However, it is perfectly in keeping with standard practices and definitions in all sciences, and is inconsistent only with common prejudices about the nature of literary or, more broadly, cultural universals. An example from the field of medicine may help to clarify things. It is a universal principle of medicine that secondhand smoke causes lung cancer, despite the fact that most people who have inhaled secondhand smoke never develop lung cancer. It is a universal principle because there is a statistically significant correlation between inhaling secondhand smoke and developing lung cancer (or, rather, there is a statistically significant correlation that cannot be explained by other factors—obviously it is important to distinguish between correlations that are primary or causal and those that are derivative or noncausal). Statistical universals of literature, as well as linguistics, anthropology, etc., are no different. ("Literary Universals," 42–43)

132. Zamiatin, *Мы*, 7; translation mine. Original: "Все это без улыбки, я бы даже сказал, с некоторой почтительностью (может быть, ей известно, что я—строитель "Интеграла"). Но не знаю—в глазах или бровях—какой-то странный раздражающий икс, и я никак не могу его поймать, дать ему цифровое выражение."

133. McCarthy, *Blood Meridian*, 3.

134. Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, 34.

135. Isabelle Johnson, MFA workshop, University of Kentucky, March 22, 2019.

136. Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, 111.

137. Defoe, 148.

138. Wharton, "Xingu," 25.

139. Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, 97.

140. Given the importance of embedded thinking for Defoe's novel, we should not hurry to conclude that, in contrast to twentieth-century introspective characters, eighteenth-century "heroes like Robinson Crusoe . . . did things in the external world that declared their beliefs and character" and that twentieth-century writers "replaced these kinds of heroes with heroes like Mrs. Dalloway and Stephen Dedalus, heroes whose reflective consciousness and inner lives supplied the novel's action" (Lantos, "Reconsidering Action," 157; emphasis in the original).

141. Wordsworth, "Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey," 1493, lines 58–65.

142. Herman, "Multimodal Storytelling," 204.

143. Palmer, "Storyworlds and Groups." For an important related analysis, see Palmer's *Social Minds in the Novel*, in which he shows how a town such as Middlemarch (2006) or Santa Dulcinea delle Rocce of Evelyn Waugh's *Men at Arms* can "actually and literally does have a mind of its own" (74).

144. Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, 115.

145. As pointed out earlier, research by Dunbar and his colleagues strongly suggests that fifth-level embedment of mental states represents "a real upper limit for most people" (*How Many Friends Does One Person Need?*, 180). Moreover, in one of the studies dealing with embedment of mental states that my colleagues and I conducted jointly with cognitive scientists, the question of how to process mental states shared by several people came up. For instance, while counting levels of embedment, some experiment participants felt that when two people experience the same doubly embedded mental states, the total number of embedments adds up to four. To avoid ambiguity on this count, we felt that, for the purpose of future studies, it would be useful to introduce subjects early on to Palmer's concept of "intermental unit" (Whalen et al., "Validating Judgments," 291).

146. Eliot, *Middlemarch*, 506.

147. Eliot, 505.

148. Henry, *Life of George Eliot*, 38.

149. The Middlemarch crowd knows its mind because George Eliot knew hers. That is, she knew where she stood on the subject of a rich landowner who dabbles in politics without caring about progress. But consider a different scenario. In some works of fiction, crowds don't know what they want. As Monika Fludernik observes, fictional crowds and, in particular, rioting mobs can be portrayed as dangerous precisely because they lack in consistency: the "monstrosity of the crowd consists in its magnitude and its divisibility into constituent groups with their own agendas"

(“Collective Minds,” 702); see also Fludernik, “Many in Action and Thought.” And, of course, the crowd’s dispersal “into many different viewpoints, [thwarts] the access of the multitude to political impact.” Just as in *Middlemarch*, this outcome may be a reflection of a particular ideology on the part of the author, and it is up to literary critics to figure out what “ideological premises and rhetorical strategies of naturalization, defense, or resistance” may underlie such unflattering representations of “collective minds” (Fludernik, “Collective Minds,” 710).

150. Apuleius, *Golden Ass*, 167.

151. Heliodorus, *Ethiopian Romance*, 73.

152. Murasaki, *Tale of Genji* (trans. Tyler), 8.

153. Murasaki, 8. Compare to other translations, e.g., Edward G. Seidensticker’s: “Ashamed before the Takasago pines, I would not have it known that I still live” (Murasaki, *Tale of Genji* [trans. Seidensticker], 9; or Arthur Waley’s: “Though I know that long life means only bitterness, I have stayed so long in the world that even before the Pine Tree of Takasago I should hide my head in shame” (Murasaki, *Tale of Genji* [trans. Waley], 9).

154. Irving, *158-Pound Marriage*, 38.

155. Cao, *Story of the Stone*, vol. 1, 124. Original: “不想如今忽然來了一個薛寶釵，年歲雖大不多，然品格端方，容貌豐美，人多謂黛玉所不及” (紅樓夢，第五回).

156. Note that in the original, even that mental state is not present in this explicit form. The word 謂 implies a verbal agreement rather than a mental state. 人多謂 is “all said” rather than “all agreed”—although this is a situation in which the boundary between the two is blurry.

157. Castano, Martingano, and Perconti, “Effect of Exposure to Fiction.” The authors consider this finding important for several reasons (citations are omitted): “First, it contributes to the ongoing discourse surrounding the role of fiction in shaping social cognition . . . and is consistent with theory and research on the characteristics of literary fiction and how they may impact cognition and cognitive style. . . . Second, understanding correlates and especially possible predictors of attributional complexity is of importance and has far ranging potential consequences because high attributional complexity attenuates racism . . . and plays a role in attitudes about important policy-related opinions.” See also Kidd and Castano, “Reading Literary Fiction and Theory of Mind”; and Wulandini, Kuntoro, and Handayani, “Effect of Literary Fiction.”

158. See Fletcher et al., “Attributional Complexity,” 880.

159. As Castano et al. put it, “For one thing, the variables that are specifically associated with exposure to literary fiction may be desirable from one perspective, but

problematic from other perspectives. Literary fiction is associated with greater attributional complexity, which seems a valuable cognitive style from a societal perspective. Yet, attributional complexity may also delay or derail decision-making and it has been shown to be negatively related to mental health" ("Effect of Exposure to Fiction").

160. See also Castano, "Art Films Foster Advanced Theory of Mind."

161. van Kuijk et al., "Effect of Reading a Short Passage."

162. See, for instance, the discussion by Ralph James Savarese, which complicates the distinction between genres that involve "understanding characters" and those "imagining different realities." Specifically, Savarese objects to "the distinction between literary and science fiction, as if the latter can't be 'literary,'" as well as to "the claim that science fiction isn't character-based" (*See It Feelingly*, 111).

163. Gavalier and Johnson, "Genre Effect," 82. As they point out, citing Russian Formalists' analysis of Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* and Laurence Sterne's *Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman*, a text may straddle categories and also migrate, in time, between them.

164. Peskin and Astington, "Effects of Adding Metacognitive Language."

165. Culler, "Closeness of Close Reading," 22.

166. Culler, 23.

167. B. Johnson, "Teaching Deconstructively," 141. Quoted in Culler, "Closeness of Close Reading," 23.

168. For a discussion of translation as a form of close reading, see Culler, "Closeness of Close Reading," 24.

169. For a discussion of nuances of mindreading attributions that depend on the translator's understanding of the emotional and kinesic meaning of the scene, see Bolens, *Kinesic Humor*, 95–105.

170. Zunshine, *Getting Inside Your Head*.

Chapter 2

1. De Jaegher and Di Paolo, "Participatory Sense-Making," 498.

2. Mercier and Sperber, *Enigma of Reason*, 100. See also Andrew Ionescu on how "folk psychology grounded in a folk sociology" may cause "erroneous interpretations of the others" in works of literature ("Manifesto," 9).

3. Hirschfeld, "Myth of Mentalizing," 101.

4. Sperber, *Rethinking Symbolism*, 115. What used to serve as a radical corrective to the view that mental life is "for the most part . . . conscious, or at least open

to introspection”—that is, Freud’s notion of the “unconscious”—is now outdated because it’s not radical enough: “Not some, but all mental processes, affective and cognitive, are now seen as largely or even wholly unconscious” (Sperber, 114). On the useful distinction between the cognitive and the traditional psychoanalytic unconscious in the context of cognitive literary studies, see Crane, “Cognitive Historicism,” 18.

5. Hogan, *Sexual Identities*, 232.

6. Snodgrass, “Women’s Intuition,” 149; see also Vignemont, “Frames of Reference in Social Cognition.” For a recent review, see Santos, Grossmann, and Varnum, “Class, Cognition and Cultural Change.”

7. Miller, *Losing It*, 180–181.

8. See, for instance, Baum, Garofalo, and Yali, “Socioeconomic Status and Chronic Stress.”

9. Simon Stern, email communication, March 8, 2018. For fascinating fictional correlatives—for example, when characters refuse to read mental states of their presumed social inferiors (e.g., as Nelly does Heathcliff’s, in *Wuthering Heights*) or when the “unreadable character” is a “socially marginalized” colonial “other” (as in Coetzee’s *Waiting for the Barbarians*), see Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, respectively, 125 and 143–144.

10. Sedgwick, “Privilege of Unknowing,” 23. I am grateful to Simon Stern for this reference.

11. Solnit, “Nobody Knows,” 5. Compare, too, to Fritz Breithaupt’s comment that “Nietzsche tells us that we should not expect rulers to have any capacity for self-observation” (*Dark Sides of Empathy*, 150).

12. Note that this is still the same old me who, under different circumstances, feels compelled to carefully parse the nuances of possible mental states of my dean and who, under yet different circumstances (that is, in classroom, analyzing complex mental states of characters, readers, and other critics), may find the process genuinely delightful. As Fletcher et al. observe, “The condition under which people with complex schemata revert to the use of simple schemata or heuristics, or the extent to which they do, are important questions for future research and theorizing” (“Attributional Complexity,” 883).

13. Ochs, “Clarification and Culture,” 329.

14. Ochs, 333.

15. Tobar, “Assassin Next Door.” I thank Doug H. Whalen for bringing this passage to my attention.

16. Vermeule, *Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?*, 86.

17. For a discussion, see Phillips, *Distraction*, 179–180; and Zunshine, “Bakhtin,” 118. See also Auyoung’s observation that if “even Mrs. Elton and Mr. Collins can feel real to Austen’s readers [i.e., “capable of rotundity,” as E. M. Forster puts it], the claim that fictional characters seem lifelike [i.e., not flat] is not necessarily a function of how much psychological depth they display” (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 40). Compare to Vermuele, *Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?*, 83.

18. Tolstoy, *Война и Мир*, 331. Original: “Une ville occupée par l’ennemi ressemble à une fille qui a perdu son honneur.”

19. Tolstoy, 279. Original (emphasis in the original):

Лицо Кутузова становилось все озабоченнее и печальнее. Из всех этих разговоров Кутузов видел одно—защищать Москву не было *никакой физической возможности*, в полном значении этих слов, то есть до такой степени не было возможности, что ежели бы какой-нибудь безумный главнокомандующий отдал приказ о даче сражения, то произошла бы путаница, и сражения все-таки бы не было; не было бы потому, что все высшие начальники не только признавали эту позицию невозможной, но в разговорах своих обсуждали только то, что произойдет после несомненного оставления этой позиции. Как же могли начальники вести свои войска на поле сражения, которое они считали невозможным? Низшие начальники, даже солдаты (которые тоже рассуждают), также признавали позицию невозможной и потому не могли одни драться с уверенностью в поражении. Ежели Бенигсен настаивал на защите этой позиции и другие еще обсуживали ее, то вопрос этот уже не имел значения сам по себе, а имел значение только как предлог для ссоры и интриги. Это понимал Кутузов.

20. For an analysis of the difference between the complexity of Kutuzov’s thinking as compared to Napoleon’s, see Allakhverdov, *Psichologia Iskusstva*, 76–78.

21. Austen, *Mansfield Park*, 197.

22. Austen, 310.

23. Austen, 113.

24. Zunshine, “From the Social to the Literary.”

25. Lee, “Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman,” 205. For in-depth discussion of “kinship sociality,” see Lee’s *Stranger*.

26. Lee, “Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman,” 209. Compare, too, to Breithaupt’s analysis of Nietzsche’s view of women: “In the world of Nietzsche’s thought, women are masters at manipulating the way they are seen by others. They understand how they are observed but, unlike the objective person, they do not comport themselves purely receptively and projectively in the face of observation. Rather, they stake a claim to the observations of others by disguising, masking, beautifying, or withholding themselves” (*Dark Sides of Empathy*, 160).

27. Lee, “Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman,” 210.

28. Cao, *Story of the Stone*, vol. 1, 20.

29. For discussion, see Zunshine, "I Lie Therefore I Am."

30. Zunshine, "Think What You're Doing," 47.

31. *Tale of Frol Skobeev*; translation mine. Original: "Смотри, мой друг,—говорит Скобеев,—в каком она здравии: таков вот родительский гнев—они её за глаза бранят и клянут, оттого она и при смерти лежит."

32. Morris, *Literature of Roguery*, 51.

33. For a valuable cognitivist reading of the picaresque novel, see Simon, "Contextualizing Cognitive Approaches." As he puts it,

The pizaro, the hero of the genre, must live by his own wits to survive in a Spanish society in which vast social inequalities exist, in spite of the enormous fortune plundered from its American possessions. Throughout the story of his survival, the protagonist will rely on his own ability to read others' mental states and manipulate them. The resulting complexity of the interplay of minds, between the pizaro and the other characters (pizaros or otherwise) who are all trying to outsmart each other, is a central feature of this genre. In sum, as need breeds ruse and craftiness, the social-economic disparities of early modern Spain are an essential component of the genre and serve as an important contextual factor in the rise of the literary representation of intentionality. (19)

34. For a discussion of the master-manservant dialectic, see M. Gillespie, "From Beau Brummell to Lady Bracknell," 179.

35. Cusk, *Saving Agnes*, 157.

36. Ellison, introduction to *Invisible Man*, xxi.

37. Ellison, xix.

38. Ellison, xxii.

39. This applies not just to the Invisible Man's position as a character but also to his stance as a writer/narrator of his story. As John F. Callahan points out,

Invisible Man's career as a failed orator teaches him that he must speak to us, his audience, in order to speak for us. And he returns to that condition of eloquence in the profound rhetorical question with which he ends: "Who knows but that on the lower frequencies I speak for you?" A writer's communication with his audience—citizens, some of which may also be other writers—may be an act of leadership. But, because of the nature of literature, narrative leadership is a symbolic act. Invisible Man, having set himself free, encourages his readers to take similar action. He does not attempt, as he has done presumptuously and blindly so many times, to lead his audience but to make contact on an equal individual basis. ("Frequencies of Eloquence," 87)

40. Ellison, *Invisible Man*, 508.

41. Ellison, 559.

42. For an analysis of the trickster/pizaro references in *Invisible Man*, see Nadel, *Invisible Criticism*. Nadel complicates Norton Frye's comparison of Ellison's protagonist to such classic folklore and literary figures as Brer Bear, Brer Rabbit, and the "tricky

slave of Roman comedy,” emphasizing “the specific conditions that created the Brer Bear and Brer Rabbit versions of the *iron*,” conditions that also obtain in the case of Invisible Man. For the latter “also manifest the specific marks of oppression and consequent encoding created by the racial caste system deeply embedded in the legal and extralegal institutions of the South. The slave in Roman comedy who wins his freedom ceases to be in an ironic position; he is not merely ostensibly free, not like the free black in the South, a slave without a master” (32–33).

43. As Valerie Smith observes, “Throughout the course of his life, the Invisible Man learns that he can never quite learn to be deceptive enough. No matter how devious he thinks he is, those who control him always manage to trick and betray him” (“Meaning of Narration,” 209).

44. Ellison, *Invisible Man*, 257.

45. Ellison, 478.

46. Ellison, 477.

47. One wonders to what extent this dynamic is still at play in other literary contexts in which white characters are portrayed as not being able to appreciate the complex subjectivity of Black characters. Consider, for instance, Jennifer Riddle Harding’s observation that in Charles Chesnut’s short story “Dave’s Neckliss” (1889), the narratees of the story within the story, John and Annie, see the narrator, an old African American man named Julius, “largely as a childish, ham-loving old man who tells whimsical stories about slavery” and that neither John nor Annie are capable of appreciating “Julius’s metaphors and his humor” (“Mind Enslaved?,” 439).

48. Not only does Evelina signal to Mr. Smith her social superiority, but she also manages to do so without offending her grandmother, Mme. Duval, who is present and quite happy with Mr. Smith’s courtship of her granddaughter. Here, as on many other occasions, Evelina’s speech manifests the quality of what the Burney scholar Julia Epstein describes as “double-edgedness” (*Iron Pen*, 111), which is a particularly fascinating term if we consider the embedments that underlie it.

49. Burney, *Evelina*, 220.

50. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” 265.

51. Bakhtin, 308, 262.

52. Burney, *Evelina*, 327.

53. Burney, 330–331.

54. See Holquist, *Dialogism*, 154–155.

55. As Brian McCrea puts it, building on Michael McKeon’s concept of “status inconsistency,” Burney’s “satire upon Mr. Smith doesn’t imply an endorsement of characters like Coverley and Merton” (*Frances Burney*, 54).

56. Burney, *Evelina*, 221.

57. Burney, 146.

58. Burney, 177.

59. Burney, 188.

60. Burney, 206.

61. Burney, 275.

62. That Captain Mirvan seems to embed mental states on the second level more consistently than, say, Mme. Duval or the Branghtons (who tend to stay around the first level) may reflect his peculiar role in *Evelina*. As Ruth Bernard Yeazell observes, “though there is scarcely a character in the novel who seems more distant from Evelina than this crude ex-sailor, he nonetheless has a remarkable tendency to aim his practical jokes at targets whom she herself has strong motives to attack” (*Fictions of Modesty*, 141).

63. Burney, 141. See Francesca Saggini for a discussion of Burney’s possible appropriation of the “long-established theatrical technique of employing particular speech patterns for characterization” (*Backstage in the Novel: Frances Burney and the Theater Arts* [University of Virginia Press, 2012], 78) in her representation of Captain Mirvan and Mme Duval.

64. Burney, 13, 19, 227, 355, 257.

65. Jane Spencer concurs: “on the whole the novel shows remarkably little sympathy for a grandmother deprived of her grandchild.” Spencer sees this as part of the general pattern informing Burney’s narrative: “With its strong emotional investment in the heroine’s relationship to her father and to father figures, *Evelina* honours the patriline and is ambivalent about the matriline” (“Evelina and Cecilia,” 27). While I agree with Spencer’s analysis, my focus here is on specific rhetorical strategies (such as low-level emedment of mental states associated with her) that make Mme. Duval a less sympathetic character than her personal losses might have entitled her to be. See also Kristina Straub’s useful discussion of the novel’s divided consciousness when it comes to the treatment of older women, such as Mme. Duval (*Divided Fictions*, 30).

66. Which may work, as it does more often than not, in Evelina’s case, as a heightened awareness of one’s own feelings (e.g., shame) in response to other people’s perceptions of oneself, what Yeazell calls Evelina’s “obsession with watching herself being watched” (*Fictions of Modesty*, 123).

67. As Epstein puts it, Mme. Duval’s “roughhewn sensibility makes it impossible for her to empathize with others” (*Iron Pen*, 113).

68. At least this is what we encounter in *Evelina*. We can’t assume that this is a general rule in fiction. Complexity does not imply moral goodness. High embedders

may come across as sensitive and intelligent people, or they may come across as peculiarly misguided, betrayed as it were by their sociocognitive complexity into ethically questionable or socially debilitating behavior. And do not forget about evil masterminds, whose hubristic Machiavellianism may render them abhorrent in the eyes of the reader. (Compare to Vermeule's important discussion of masterminds in *Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?*, 86.)

69. This happens when Tom Branghton uses his connection with Evelina to mooch a free ride out of Lord Orville (*Evelina*, 248–249).

70. Santos, Grossmann, and Varnum, "Class, Cognition and Cultural Change."

71. Santos, Grossmann, and Varnum.

72. Some literary critics feel very uncomfortable applying insights from contemporary psychology to the historical past. As Elfenbein explains,

Such investigations open themselves to an easy charge of anachronism: since most psychological findings derive from participants who postdate [the past centuries], we cannot know if those findings apply to earlier periods. Yet literary scholars routinely apply approaches and insights honed in the twentieth- and twenty-first century academy to works written in earlier periods. Nervousness about the use of cognitive science is an arbitrary invocation of rigor that misrecognizes the field's enabling anachronisms. Also, there is no reason to decide a priori that contemporary psychological findings are irrelevant to the past. If it is wrong to assume that there is no difference between now and then, it is equally wrong to assume that there are no continuities either; assertions of historical difference do not guarantee truth any more than do ones of continuity. (*Gist*, 168)

73. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History*, 119. Of course, the dynamic of the relationship between social class and cognitive complexity can be reversed. For a compelling example of such a reversal, see Ellen Bayuk Rosenman's argument that the working poor can be presented as having a more "layered consciousness of social interactions," and thus "the most satisfying understanding" of a social situation, than their middle-class "betters" do ("Rudeness, Slang, and Obscenity," 58).

74. Doody, *Frances Burney*, 3.

75. Zunshine, "Why Jane Austen Was Different."

76. Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, 4.3.110–114.

77. Zunshine, *Getting Inside Your Head*, chap. 3.

78. Vineberg, "Problem Plays," 33.

79. For an important discussion of what it means for an author to display an intuitive awareness of various "cognitive" insights that couldn't have been known to the scientific (or natural-philosophic) thought of their day, see Hogan, *Sexual Identities*.

80. For a discussion of goals, methods, and the disciplinary trajectory of cognitive historicism, see Crane, "Cognitive Historicism."

81. Lee, "Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman," 219. See also Lee, "Society Must Be Defended."

82. See also Emmerich, "GDR and Its Literature," 28.

83. For a recent discussion of functions of the unreliable narrator in the Russian novel of the 1920s–1930s, see Zhilicheva, "Функции 'Ненадежного.'"

84. For a discussion of a related dynamic in the GDR, i.e., when "some of the most significant works of GDR literature were either never published or only published years or even decades after the fact," see Emmerich, *GDR and Its Literature*, 20.

85. Borden, "Leonid Dobychin's *The Town of N*," viii.

86. Morris, "Russia," 213. See also Karin Leeder's observation about the literature produced in the GDR, which describes, to some extent, attitudes toward the official literary output of the Soviet Union. As she writes, "it is undoubtedly the case that for many years critical judgments in East and West were skewed more to political or moral considerations than aesthetic ones" (introduction to *Rereading East Germany*, 2).

87. See Günther, "Soviet Literary Criticism," 105. Elsewhere, Günther also points out that, "just as in the Soviet Union, in Germany in the 1930s, struggle for classicism meant the struggle against modernism" ("Zelevnaja Garmonija," 38; translation mine).

88. As Nancy Easterlin observes, "the history of literary theoretical approaches in the twentieth century . . . demonstrates the problem of assuming a correlation between aesthetic practices and the ideological implications of artworks. The vagaries of Marxist criticism serve as the most prominent example." In the three decades subsequent to the Russian Revolution in 2017, "arguments that unusual and non-representational techniques exposed class struggle kept pace with contrary arguments that mainstream realism served as the best mechanism for enlightenment" (*Biocultural Approach*, 98).

89. Hake, "Political Affects," 106–107. See also her discussion of "socialist modernism" (Hake, 108–109). See, however, Günther, "Zhelevnaya Garmonia," for a different perspective. As he puts it, "on the whole, totalitarian culture is an enemy of modernism; it represents, rather, a form of enforced postmodernism. Everything associated with the avant-garde is subjected to a strictest selection; what is selected is useful from the point of view of the official ideology" (31; translation mine).

90. Compare to Günther: "In literature and in art, the danger arose above all from ambiguity and lack of transparency, which—not without foundation—were seen as the source of dissidence and the possibility of 'ideological contraband'" ("Soviet Literary Criticism," 96). See also Emmerich's discussion of GDR literature after 1965, in which, as he observes, poets, in particular, became aware "of literature's potential as subversive counter-discourse, in which they could practice diverse ways of speaking—heteroglossia, dialogism and intertextuality—and thus undermine the monosemy-affirming language environment" ("The *GDR and Its Literature*," 25).

91. Günther, "Soviet Literary Criticism," 106.
92. Günther, 97. See also David Brandenberger's discussion of the resolution of the Central Committee, of December 1928, "on state publishing," which mandated, among other things, that publishing industry provided "for mass literature's maximal accessibility (in both form and content) in order to find the broadest swath of readership" (*Propaganda State in Crisis*, 23).
93. Günther, 106.
94. Günther, "Zheleznaya Garmonia," 40; translation mine.
95. For a discussion of the official GDR literature after 1965, see Emmerich, "The GDR and Its Literature," 22. Particularly, as he observes, in that time period, writers "made use of unconventional, eccentric or dislocated narrative perspectives, which reached the standards set by modernism decades earlier (self-reflexivity, discontinuity and lack of plot)" (24).
96. Ellison, introduction to *Invisible Man*, xix.
97. Ellison, xxi, xxii.
98. Günther, "Zheleznaya Garmonia," 27; translation mine.
99. Lee, "Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman," 219.
100. Gladkov, *Цемент*, 241; translation mine. Original:
- Глеб положил голову на колени Даши и увидел над собою ее лицо с огнистым пушком на щеках и глаза—пристальные, большие, встревоженные и любящие.
- Здесь, под небом, чувствуешь себя другим, Дашок. Вот лежу у тебя на коленях . . . Когда это было?.. И никогда я, кажется, не переживал ничего подобного. Я знаю только одно, что твоя любовь была больше и глубже моей, и я тебя недостоин. Я и сотой доли не пережил того, что пережила ты. Расскажи же мне сама о своих мытарствах . . . Может быть, я и себя тогда узнаю лучше.
- Воздух внезапно вспыхнул молнией: везде большими и маленькими звездами зароились огни. Волна восторга охватила Глеба; в волнении он поднялся на локоть.
- Даша, голубка, гляди . . . как хорошо бороться и строить свою судьбу!.. Ведь это—все наше . . . мы!.. Наша сила и труд . . . Будто вздох чувствуешь . . . вздох перед первым ударом . . . когда хочется размахнуться . . .
- Даша опять положила руки на его грудь. Она сама волновалась, и Глеб слышал, как глухими толчками билось ее сердце.
- Да, милый, хорошо бороться за свою судьбу . . . Пусть муки, пусть смерть . . . Страшно это . . . и не всякий может вынести . . . Я вот вынесла, потому что люблю тебя сильнее страха . . . А потом и другое поняла, другое полюбила . . . может, даже больше тебя . . .
- Говори, Дашок . . . что бы ни было—говори . . . Я уж научился не только слушать, но и . . . бороться с собой . . .
101. Of course, the socialist realist protagonists' tongue-tiedness also harks back to the literary convention, already well in place by the end of the nineteenth century, according to which a strong emotional experience "was thought to elude expression in language" (Martens, "Corporeality," 237).

102. Gladkov, Цемент, 236. Original: “Внутренние Прослойки.”
103. Gladkov, 220, 221, 222.
104. Emmerich, “The GDR and Its Literature,” 19.
105. Paul, “Gender in GDR Literature,” 108.
106. Claudius, *Menschen an unserer Seite*, 274–75; translated by and quoted in Paul, “Gender in GDR Literature,” 109.
107. Claudius, 171–172; translated by and quoted in Paul, 108.
108. See also Lee’s suggestive exploration of Chinese socialist realism in “When Nothing Is True.”
109. Wolf, *They Divided the Sky*, 34–35.
110. On Wolf’s subsequent commitment to “revise” socialist realism, expressed “in her comments in various interviews and essays,” see Wiesehan, “Christa Wolf Reconsidered,” 79.
111. “100 Must-Reads.”
112. See A. Richardson, *Neural Sublime*; Crane, *Shakespeare’s Brain*; Spolsky, *Satisfying Skepticism*; Phillips, *Distraction*; and Keen, *Thomas Hardy’s Brains*.

Chapter 3

1. Over the years, literary scholars have suggested several other essential features. See, for instance, Miall, “Science in the Perspective of Literariness”; and A. Richardson, “Studies in Literature and Cognition.”
2. As Nancy Easterlin puts it, some literary scholars point to the youth of neuroscience and the inferential nature of experimental psychology to confirm the prejudice that that science has nothing of interest to offer the student of literature. But drawing such a hasty conclusion is unwarranted in the light of the pragmatic process whereby ideas are tested, gain or lose force, and are rejected as invalid or accepted as legitimate knowledge by communities of learning. The more intellectually defensible conclusion to draw, given the experimental and provisional nature of so many psychological findings, is that our own uses of ideas from this new field will themselves be provisional and experimental. (*Biocultural Approach*, 154)
3. B. Schieffelin, “Found in Translation,” 143.
4. Keane, *Ethical Life*, 131.
5. Consider, for instance, how easily Soviet writers ignored the long tradition of whimsical narrators, under socialist realism.
6. Astuti, “Some After Dinner Thoughts.”
7. Astuti.

8. Duranti, "Further Reflections," 492. In fact, the etymology of the word "intention" testifies to the boundedness of mind reading with embodiment. As Duranti points out, "the contemporary understanding of intention comes from the Latin *intentiono* originally understood as an embodied movement or 'tension'" (*Anthropology of Intention*, 72–73). But see also Gregory Hickok for an alternative explication of the role of embodiment in mindreading (*Myth of Mirror Neurons*, 171–172).

9. Boyer, *Minds Make Societies*, 222.

10. As Karin Kukkonen observes, "It seems quite likely that thought does not coincide with language, but this does not mean that language would not have an effect on the ways in which we think" ("Does Cognition Translate?," 251). Specifically, as Lisa Feldman Barrett proposes, "words invite the formation of emotion concepts, and . . . these emotion concepts, by providing the kind of attention-guiding and perception-shaping predictions mentioned above, then enable us to understand inner bodily states in terms of meaningful emotions" (quoted in Kukkonen, 249).

11. Wolf, *City of Angels*, 19. As Elfenbein puts it, "we are . . . battling the linearity of writing to capture the nonlinear, weblike experience of reading" (*Gist*, 36).

12. See Drucker, *Graphesis*, 64–137. For a related discussion of "pictorialism" and cognition, see Troscianko, *Kafka's Cognitive Realism*, 41–42, 54.

13. Sabbagh and Baldwin, "Understanding the Role," 171.

14. M. Johnson, "Embodiment of Language," 630. See also Martins and Fitch, "Do We Represent Intentional Action as Recursively Embedded?" As they point out in the conclusion of their essay, "the point is that models positing recursion are only relevant for human cognition if humans actually represent and use implicit knowledge of recursion in their activities: a demonstration of which requires hard empirical work" (20). But see also Tomasello, *Origins of Human Communication*, 336. Finally, for a discussion of enactivism as an alternative to representationalism ("according to the enactivist view, there is no representation of the world inside the brain") and for a useful alternative view of "functional" representations, see Troscianko, *Kafka's Cognitive Realism*, 114, 73–75.

15. I owe this insight to the anonymous reader of my manuscript enlisted by the MIT Press.

16. Mercier and Sperber, *Enigma of Reason*, 81.

17. Some cognitive literary scholars working with an enactive paradigm (e.g., Kukkonen, Polvinen, Caracciolo, and Troscianko) experiment with moving in that direction. To appreciate challenges that they face—that is, to see how their analyses may still depend on their awareness of the dynamic created by complex embeddings—consider Troscianko's study of emotional appraisal as "an affective and enactive cognitive act" in Kafka's *Metamorphosis*. When Gregor Samsa overhears

his “mother worrying out loud to his sister that it would be a cruelty, not a kindness, to empty his room of furniture,” he wonders about his response to her suggestion, while Kafka’s readers are made aware that he may not fully realize what his response entails. As Kafka (in Troscianko’s translation) puts it, “On hearing these words from his mother Gregor realised that the lack of all direct human speech, along with the monotony of life within the family, must have confused his mind over the past two months, for he could not account otherwise for the fact that he could quite earnestly have longed for his room to be emptied” (*Kafka’s Cognitive Realism*, 167). As Troscianko explains,

After the fact, Gregor’s elaborative, experienced appraisal is that he’d longed for the room to be emptied because he’d been confused by the lack of verbal contact with other people and the monotony of family life. But the reader is also prompted here, precisely by the mention of confusion, to interpret things differently from Gregor: the obvious alternative is to understand what he glosses as confusion to be instead the natural cognitive changes resulting from his transformation into an insect and the simultaneous changes in his behavioural preferences. The antecedent appraisal would then be “this is a good thing, because I want to be able to crawl over the walls and ceiling more easily,” making Gregor happily anticipatory. Then, by the time of the realisation quoted here, he has reappraised events as “I thought this was a good thing because I was confused by being so isolated and bored (so I am upset),” implicitly with a new antecedent appraisal of “this is a bad thing, because I’m scared of becoming more fully an animal.” By highlighting the discrepancies between possible emotional appraisals, the text dramatises the ambivalences and fears involved in Gregor’s gradual transition to a more fully insect state, as well as his attempts to deny them. . . . [The] potentially unsettling aspect of this kind of evocation consists in the way that Gregor’s introspective capacities are so clearly yet subtly flagged as flawed: his access to the causes of his own mental states is presented as confused even as he supposedly identifies prior confusion in himself. The possibility of introspective insight, and in particular the transparency of emotion to itself, are called into question by the (somewhat messy) inseparability of thought and emotion in the form of appraisal. (167)

Note how Troscianko’s analysis of emotional reappraisals experienced by Gregor directly depends on her (and our) processing of a series of complex embeddings, which involve her/our awareness of Gregor’s flawed understanding of the meaning of his introspective insights. For Troscianko, highlighting complex embeddings present in the text serves as a means toward a particular interpretive end: it is a stepping stone toward her compelling exploration of antecedent and elaborative appraisals. What I propose here is that we slow down and become aware of that stepping stone as an underappreciated but crucial element of a critical analysis centering on enactive cognition.

18. For an overview of some alternatives to “cognitivism” (which provides the base for the current, metaphor-laden concept of theory of mind), such as, for instance, “antirepresentationalism” and “relationalism,” see Baggs, “Book Review,” 1947.

19. Vessel, Starr, and Rubin, “Brain on Art.” As Randy L. Buckner and Daniel Carroll observe, “default modes of cognition are characterized by a shift from perceiving the external world to internal modes of cognition that simulate worlds that are separate from the one being directly experienced” (“Self-Projection and the Brain,” 53).

20. Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter, “Brain’s Default Network,” 1, quoted in Hickok, *Myth of Mirror Neurons*, 171.

21. Li, Mai, and Liu, “Default Mode Network.”

22. Frith, “Social Mind?”

23. Dunbar, *How Many Friends Does One Person Need?*, 180. See also Whalen, Zunshine, and Holquist, “Increases in Perspective Embedding”; and Whalen et al., “Validating Judgments of Perspective Embedding.”

24. Stiller and Dunbar, “Perspective-Taking and Memory Capacity,” 95, 100.

25. For further discussion, see Stiller, Nettle, and Dunbar, “Small World of Shakespeare’s Plays,” 401.

26. Kanske et al., “Dissecting the Social Brain,” 6.

27. For a review, see Apperly, *Cognitive Basis*, 11–34. See also Milligan, Astington, and Dack, “Language and Theory of Mind.”

28. Astington, Pelletier, and Homer, “Theory of Mind and Epistemological Development,” 133, 142. See also Deena Skolnick and Paul Bloom’s study of children’s perspective taking in the case of fictional characters. As they point out, there is “considerable evidence that children have difficulty with conceptual perspective taking before the age of five” (“What Does Batman Think about Sponge Bob?,” B13.

29. See, for instance, an important volume, *Theory of Mind in the Pacific*, edited by Wassmann, Träuble, and Funke (2013). As Tanya Luhrmann summarizes in her review of the collection,

[This] book presents a series of research projects in the Pacific by experimenters and ethnographers. That region has long been famous for its so-called opacity of mind—for the strong sense that it is inappropriate to ask about someone else’s intentions, beliefs, and desires, or presume that one knows what they are. In what way might this strong cultural bias affect theory of mind? [What the researches found was that, although] theory of mind abilities develop universally among all human populations, [the] onset of mental state reasoning . . . varies across cultures as a consequence of different socialisation practices and ethnotheories concerning, for example, mental state talk. (“*Theory of Mind in the Pacific*,” 443)

30. Astington, Pelletier, and Homer, “Theory of Mind and Epistemological Development,” 133.

31. Onishi and Baillargeon, “Do 15-Months-Old Infants Understand.” For a discussion, see Mercier and Sperber, *Enigma of Reason*, 94–96.

32. To quote Rebecca Saxe, there is the puzzling divergence between “recent advances in developmental psychology [that] suggest that children have some understanding of false beliefs much *earlier* than age 3 years, and initial neuroimaging studies of children’s brains [that] suggest that key maturational changes in the

[right temporo-parietal junction] occur much *later* than age 5 years" ("New Puzzle," 108). To account for this divergence, some scientists now propose a two-system theory of mindreading; that is, they suggest that infants' theory of mind is housed in a neural system distinct from that in which it will be housed later in development (see Saxe, 110; and Apperly, *Cognitive Basis*, 108–181). The first system encompasses "low-level" processes that are cognitively efficient but inflexible, and the second, 'high-level' processes that are highly flexible but cognitively demanding." In this view, when we "make explicit judgments about what others think or want" (or want us to think), we rely on the "high-level" processes, but what "gets us through our social day" is a "combination of low-level mindreading processes and the rich endowment of social knowledge that we gain through development" (Apperly, *Cognitive Basis*, 143, 155). For some responses to this proposal, see Mercier and Sperber, *Enigma of Reason*, 341; and Carruthers, "Two Systems for Mindreading?"

33. Carruthers, "Two Systems for Mindreading?," 159.

34. This may date to David G. Premack and Guy Woodruff's "Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?"

35. Miller, Kessel, and Flavell, "Thinking about People Thinking," 623.

36. Saxe and Kanwisher, "People Thinking about Thinking People," 1835.

37. See Saxe and Powell, "It's the Thought That Counts."

38. Skerry and Saxe, "Neural Representations of Emotion," 1951.

39. Saxe and Kanwisher, "People Thinking about Thinking People," 1841.

40. Kanske et al., "Dissecting the Social Brain," 17.

41. See Keen, *Empathy and the Novel*; Savarese, *See It Feelingly*; and Breithaupt, *Dark Sides of Empathy*. Also, see Joshua Landy for a witty critique of the view that good literature "simply gives us no choice but to be improved by it" (*How to Do Things with Fictions*, 30). For important studies of empathy and literature conducted by social psychologists, see Mar, Tackett, and Moore, "Exposure to Media"; and Djikic, Oatley, and Moldoveanu, "Reading Other Minds."

42. As Elfenbein puts it, "Literary scholars assume that characters are not real people and that the questions appropriate to ask about them are not the same ones that we might ask about real people. Yet no matter how often we stress such a point, both students in literature classes and many critics find that it never fully takes hold. For all our efforts, readers persist in treating literary characters as if they were people they had met" (*Gist*, 59).

43. Nettle, email communication, June 28, 2006. Also, see David Herman's suggestive argument about "thinking about thinking—or intelligence about intelligence" (*Storytelling and the Sciences of the Mind*, 278).

44. Boyer, *Minds Make Societies*, 131, 153. See also Tomasello, *Origins of Human Communication*, chap. 5 (“Phylogenetic Origins”). As Tomasello puts it, “The combination of helpfulness and recursive mindreading led to mutual expectations of helpfulness and the Gricean communicative intention as a guide to relevance inferences, which could then come under social norms created by still another uniquely human propensity, in this case to be like and to be liked by others in this social group, as opposed to those other social groups” (218).

45. Kanske et al., “Dissecting the Social Brain,” 17.

46. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, quoted in Easterlin, *Biocultural Approach*, 156.

47. Easterlin, *Biocultural Approach*, 156.

48. See Palmer, *Fictional Minds*, for an exploration of this point.

49. As Auyoung puts it, the “sustained experience of reading between the lines intensifies the reader’s consciousness of being uniquely able to comprehend the implied author” (*When Fiction Feels Real*, 55). For a discussion of such “nonreciprocal sense of intimacy” between the reader and the author, see Auyoung, 109; and Auyoung, “Unspoken Intimacy.”

50. Compare to the religious studies scholar Paul C. Dilley’s critique of “strict universalism of . . . [a] proposal for a ‘cognitive historiography’ dedicated to discovering universal historical ‘rules’ based on evolutionary trends.” In its stead, similarly to literary scholars working with cognitive approaches to literature (e.g., see Crane, “Cognitive Historicism”), Dilley proposes a “‘cognitive historicism,’ on the model of New Historicism, with its emphasis on understanding texts in their ideological context, as well as uncovering the mechanisms of power in cultural representations” (*Monasteries and the Care of Souls*, 12).

Chapter 4

1. Luhmann, “Toward an Anthropological Theory of Mind,” 6.

2. Luhmann, 7.

3. B. Schieffelin, “Speaking Only Your Own Mind,” 433.

4. Robbins and Rumsey, “Introduction,” 407–408.

5. Astuti, “Some After Dinner Thoughts.”

6. Luhmann, “Toward an Anthropological Theory of Mind,” 11.

7. Luhmann, 11.

8. Bambi Schieffelin, personal communication, March 1, 2019.

9. Steven Feld, email communication, March 1, 2019.
10. Luhmann, "Toward an Anthropological Theory of Mind," 7.
11. Throop, "Suffering," 128.
12. Throop, 129.
13. Lepowsky, "Personhood," 48.
14. For a useful related analysis of comparative "perceptions of mental state access in the United States and Japan," see Wice at al. As they observe, the overall "results indicate that culturally variable norms specifying appropriate levels of mental state access play an important role in how individuals estimate their knowledge of other people's minds in close relationships" (n.p.).
15. Ochs and Schieffelin, "Language Acquisition and Socialization," 298.
16. B. Schieffelin, "Speaking Only Your Own Mind," 434.
17. B. Schieffelin, 433.
18. B. Schieffelin, 438. See also Bambi Schieffelin's more extensive treatment of this topic in her book *Give and Take of Everyday Life*, in which she observes that Kaluli say that "one cannot know what another thinks or feels" (72).
19. B. Schieffelin, *Give and Take*, 73. For a discussion, see Sabbagh and Baldwin, "Understanding the Role," 167. Also, compare to Ellen Dissanayake's argument about baby talk as a "proto-aesthetic device" ("Prelinguistic and Preliterate Substrates," 63).
20. B. Schieffelin, *Give and Take*, 71.
21. B. Schieffelin, 72–73.
22. Steven Feld, email communication, March 1, 2019.
23. Consider, for instance, premodern China, which, as Haiyan Lee argues, may have selectively drawn on the "opacity principle" in some of its "mainstream expressive culture," which prioritized "dramatic speech and action over interior monologues and embedded mental states" ("Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman," 205).
24. Bambi Schieffelin, personal communication, March 1, 2019.
25. Caldwell-Harris, Kronrod, and Yang, "Do More, Say Less," 53.
26. Oforlea, "Dilemma of the African American Detective."
27. Ochs and Schieffelin, "Language Acquisition," 303–304.
28. Keane, *Ethical Life*, 127.
29. B. Schieffelin, "Found in Translation," 143.

30. Throop, "Suffering," 133.
31. Ochs and Schieffelin, "Language Acquisition," 299.
32. Throop, "Suffering," 134.
33. Trawalter et al., "Attending to Threat," 1325. See also Argyle and Cook, *Gaze and Mutual Gaze*; and Mason, Tatkov, and Macrae, "Look of Love."
34. As Lasse Hodne puts it, in studies of gaze orientation in Western portraits, conducted by experimental art historians, "the overall reaction" of subjects showed that "frontal faces with direct gaze . . . were regarded to be more caring, trustworthy, harmonic, inclusive and respectable than the corresponding images with averted gaze and face" ("Memling's Portraits of Christ," 254). Compare to Kayo Muira and Motoko Koike's discussion of gaze orientation in Japanese Ukiyo-e pictures, in "Judgment, Interpretation and Impression of Gaze Direction." As they point out, an "averted" gaze or an "ambiguous" gaze direction may give rise to "negative emotion," even in a culture known for "a tendency to avoid direct eye contact" (218). As they suggest, one reason for this negative response may be that the avoidant figure (in this case, a woman standing next to a young child) may be perceived as refusing to engage in a culturally "desirable" practice of "viewing together" or "side-by-side relation" (219, 220).
35. Landau, "11 Reasons a Child Cannot Look You in the Eyes." As Landau puts it, "Particularly [in] Asian cultures, eye contact can be seen as a sign of disrespect. To look at someone directly can be considered bold or defiant, so it is avoided."
36. Landau.
37. Bambi Schieffelin, personal communication, March 1, 2019.
38. Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 146.
39. Abbott, 146–147.
40. See Savarese and Zunshine, "Critic as Neurocosmopolite," 21–26.
41. Hickok, *Myth*, 208.
42. Hickok, 224.
43. Blackman, "Reflections on Language," 149, 153. Quoted in Savarese and Zunshine, "Critic as Neurocosmopolite," 23.
44. Ochs and Schieffelin, "Language Acquisition," 299.
45. S. Richardson, *Clarissa*, 460.
46. Throop, "Suffering," 133.
47. Of course, direct eye contact can be experienced as intrusive and frightening in the context of the culture of transparency, too. See, for instance, Blakey Vermuele's

discussion of Big Brother's "enormous black staring eyes that seem to follow you everywhere" (*Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?*, 53).

48. Dilley, *Monasteries*, 14–15.

49. Dilley, 234.

50. Dilley, 295.

51. Dilley, 295.

52. Asztalos, "Faculty of Theology," 409.

53. Leff, "Trivium and the Three Philosophies," 308.

54. Robbe-Grillet, *Two Novels*, 51.

55. David Richter, email communication, April 23, 2018.

56. I use the word "naturalize" here the same way that Abbott does when he explains that "most readers of modernist texts . . . have learned to naturalize and thus accept without strain" certain "unique, even disturbing" textual features (*Real Mysteries*, 39; also 39n16). See also Monika Fludernik, *Towards a "Natural" Narratology*, 274.

57. Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 145.

58. Lorant, *Melville*, 333. Quoted in Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 129.

59. Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 128–130.

60. Troscianko, *Kafka's Cognitive Realism*, 199. For the full description of the experiment, see Troscianko, 217–218.

61. See Zunshine, *Getting Inside Your Head*, 150.

62. Abbott, *Real Mysteries*, 152.

63. B. Schieffelin, "Found in Translation," 150.

64. Ochs and Schieffelin "Language Acquisition," 294.

65. B. Schieffelin, "Found in Translation," 150.

66. B. Schieffelin, "Two Dukula Sulo: & One Dog"; B. Schieffelin, email communication, January 23, 2019.

67. Rumsey, "Empathy and Anthropology," 222.

68. Compare to Dissanayake's argument that, although "literary scholars occasionally pay lip service to the existence of oral literature, it may not be fully realized that a minute proportion of all humans throughout history have been readers or writers, yet they nevertheless invented and responded to literary language" ("Prelinguistic and Preliterate Substrates," 70).

69. For a full discussion, see Zunshine, "Who Is He to Speak of My Sorrow?"
70. E. Schieffelin, *Sorrow of the Lonely*, 197.
71. E. Schieffelin, 184.
72. Feld, *Sound and Sentiment*, 223.
73. Duranti, "Further Reflections," 493.
74. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 71.
75. Booth, "Control of Distance," 574.
76. Spivak, "Women's Texts," 1095.
77. Sontag, "Against Interpretation," 406.
78. If it's indeed the case that readers who treat *The Plum* as pornography miss complex embedments involving mental states of the implied reader and the implied author, then it would be similar to the phenomenon described by Chris Gavaler and Dan Johnson, who found that, when readers assume a priori that what they are reading has "lower literary merit" (such as science fiction) they "exert less inference effort" in figuring out characters' motivations ("Genre Effect," 86, 91). Perhaps one can even test this hypothesis, telling one group of the first-time readers of *The Plum* that it's a pornographic novel and another that it's literary classic and seeing how deeply these respective groups would delve into the text's intentionality. Also, compare the history of the critical analysis of *The Plum* to that of another classical Chinese novel, Wu Cheng'en's *Journey to the West* (ca. 1592), as highlighted by Yuanfei Wang. Read as a religious text, *Journey to the West* offers up very different constellations of mental states than when read as a humorous, even nonsensical story ("Fantastic Jokes").
79. Plaks, *The Four Masterworks of the Ming Novel*, 122, 123, 128.
80. Ballaster, *Seductive Forms*, 35.
81. See, for example, Nussbaum, "Finely Aware"; Nussbaum, "Literary Imagination"; and Bruner, *Actual Minds*. In general, as John Guillory points out, recent attacks on the humanities "provoked a torrent of books, articles, reports, and blogs in [their] defense . . . , all attesting to the value of critical thinking and other skills produced by humanities study" ("Monuments and Documents," 10).
82. See Guillory for a critique of the notion that the sciences do not foster critical thinking ("Monuments and Documents," 15).
83. According to Robbins and Rumsey, in "Pacific societies where the opacity doctrine is present, . . . people tend to put little store in the veracity of what others say about their own thoughts"—but it does mean that the further open discussion would go against established daily practices and would be "regarded as extremely invasive and unethical" ("Introduction," 408, 416). When such a discussion does

ensue—when, for instance, others have good reasons to disbelieve the person's initial claim and are invested in bringing the matter to communal attention—they still carefully refrain from openly articulating their versions of the person's mental states. Instead, a social context may be arranged in which the person would eventually revise their earlier statement. For a description of such a situation, see B. Schiefelin, "Speaking Only Your Own Mind," 438.

84. Ochs, "Clarification and Culture," 335. See also McNamara et al., who point out in their study of how "cultural models of mind shape moral reasoning," that in "North American samples, judgments of wrongdoing are scaled almost exclusively by the 'did they mean to,' intent-oriented mental state reasoning process, while judgments about punish-worthiness are scaled by the degree of severity calculated by the more mind-blind 'whodunnit' process (though scope of punishment can be scaled by intent). Because these processes do not perfectly overlap, mis-matches in intent and outcome (i.e., an accident that results in a bad outcome despite a positive or neutral intent) can receive more severe reactions than would be expected in a strictly intent-focused system" (96; in-text quotations omitted).

85. See Rosenberg, *How History Gets Things Wrong*.

86. Howard, *First World War*, 3; emphasis added.

87. Tro, *Chemistry*, 4.

88. Note that we can't just say that the author added an extra bit of narrative to his list of basic SI units and be content with this general explanation. For, while it may be true that we now experience the text as having slightly more of a narrative arc to it—as in, "first we do this, and then we do that"—what has made the actual specific difference is the introduction of a mental state.

89. Charon, "Spoken Body," 264.

90. Charon, 270.

91. See Columbia University School of Professional Studies, "Narrative Medicine."

92. See Charon, *Narrative Medicine*; and Charon et al., *Principles and Practice*.

93. Hoekstra, "From Darwin to DNA," 278.

Chapter 5

1. As Karin Kukkonen puts it eloquently in her discussion of the "curse of realism," the "novel is the literary genre of realism. Its narratives are situated in a place and time that are recognisably real, its characters are subject to coincidence and contingencies that are conceivably every-day, and their feelings are expressed in a language that gets progressively better at capturing the subtleties of experience" (*4E Cognition*, 14).

2. See, for instance, Cravens, "Lyric and Narrative Consciousness." See also Petrone's *Life Has Become More Joyous* for a discussion of the appropriation of Pushkin's by Stalinist ideology. Starting from the 1930s, the official Party line was that the "traits of simplicity and realism linked Pushkin of the prevailing literary style of the time, socialist realism" (117).
3. Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin*, 99.
4. Compare to Mark Turner's argument about compression in "Compression and Representation."
5. The general argument that art exaggerates familiar characteristics of reality is, of course, quite old. As Roman Jakobson wrote in 1922, "Exaggeration in art is unavoidable [according to] Dostoevskij; in order to show an object, it is necessary to deform the shape it used to have; it must be tinted, just as slides to be viewed under the microscope are tinted. You color your object in an original way and think that it has become more palpable, clearer, more real" ("On Realism in Art," 26).
6. For instance, when you listen to papers delivered by literary critics at scholarly conferences, such papers tend to embed complex mental states at an unusually high rate, for, after all, they often report and interpret complexly embedded mental states of literary characters.
7. Compare to Troscianko's observation that fiction "has the structural potential to prompt more reflexive instances than may occur in real life, resulting in an experience which is compelling, as we enactively engage, but may also be unsettling as moments of reflection accumulate, through perspectival shifts away from the primary focaliser" (*Kafka's Cognitive Realism*, 179).
8. As Jakobson puts it, "classicists, sentimentalists, the romanticists to a certain extent, even the 'realists' of the nineteenth century, the modernists to a large degree, and, finally, the futurists, expressionists, and their like have more than once steadfastly proclaimed faithfulness to reality, maximum verisimilitude—in other words, realism—as the guiding motto of their artistic program" ("On Realism in Art," 20). See also McHale, "Revisiting Realisms."
9. Troscianko, *Kafka's Cognitive Realism*, 213.
10. Plaks, "Full-Length Hsiao-shuo," 173.
11. Plaks, 172.
12. On the "weighty seriousness" of *Patterns of Childhood*, see Olney, *Memory and Narrative*, 255.
13. Iliopoulou, *Because of You*, 83.
14. Plaks, "Full-Length Hsiao-shuo," 176; emphasis added.

15. Plaks, 175. This relation would also work, to some extent, for Russian literature; see Munro, "Finance and Credit," 552.

16. Japan of the Heian period (794 to 1185) did not experience anything comparable to the kind of economic development that could be associated, however broadly, with the rise of the novel in the eighteenth-century western Europe, China, or Russia. Moreover, to expand our range of historical contexts beyond economics, we can look at Plaks's argument about the incommensurable intellectual environments of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century China and eleventh-century Japan. As he puts it, while in "terms of intellectual history, at any rate, it does make some sense to see in the novel a manifestation of the need for some kind of a synthesis, a comprehensive reevaluation of the sum total of past cultural experience, in order to adapt that to the perception of emerging new directions, [such] speculations, however, cannot satisfactorily account for a work such as the *Tale of Genii*, which partakes of a number of the defining characteristics of the novel form enumerated above, yet appeared in the vastly more restrictive social and intellectual context of the Heian court in eleventh-century Japan" ("Full-Length Hsiao-shuo," 176).

17. Plaks, 176.

18. Keane, *Ethical Life*, 131.

19. See Feld, *Sound and Sentiment*; and Zunshine, "Who Is He to Speak of My Sorrow?"

20. Such a refutation will still be grist for the mill of "cognitive historicism" and thus a welcome addition to a cognitivist project.

21. There is a long tradition of critical publications on deception in ancient Greek and Roman poetics. For an example of a specifically "cognitive" perspective, see Minchin, "Cognition of Deception."

22. Saussy, "Comparative Literature and Translation," 79.

23. See Austin, *New Testaments*.

24. I say "one such shift" because it's possible that Russian literature had undergone another, earlier shift before the Mongol Yoke (1237–1480). This argument depends on how one reads the late twelfth-century epic poem *The Song of Igor's Campaign*. If one is willing to see third-level embeddings in such lines as, for instance, "Let us, however, / begin this song / in keeping with the happenings / of these times / and not with the contriving of / Boyan" (31), then one would say, first, that third-level embedding of mental states not driven by deception was already available to the anonymous author of *The Song* and, second, that the literary context in which such an embedding had been possible must have been largely obliterated during the Yoke. Alternatively, one can adopt the view that "most old Russian literature

[including *The Song*] was not what we would consider fictional, or at least it presented itself as dealing with fact and reality” (Børtnes, “Literature of Old Russia,” 1). This would mean that occasional third-level embedments encountered in such works as *The Song* should be read the same way in which we read occasional third-level embedments in contemporary literary nonfiction; that is, their presence does not impact the overall status of the text.

25. Kuritzyn, *Tale of Dracula*; translation mine. Original:

И отправил царь к Дракуле посла, требуя от него дани. Дракула же воздал послу тому пышные почести, и показал ему свое богатство, и сказал ему: «Я не только готов платить дань царю, но со всем воинством своим и со всем богатством хочу идти к нему на службу, и как повелит мне, так ему служить буду. И ты передай царю, что, когда пойду к нему, пусть объявит он по всей своей земле, чтобы не чинили зла ни мне, ни людям моим, а я вскоре вслед за тобою пойду к царю, и дань принесу, и сам к нему прибуду». Царь же, услышав все это от посла своего, что хочет Дракула прийти к нему на службу, послу его честь воздал и одарил его богато. И рад был царь, ибо в то время вел войну на востоке. И тотчас послал объявить по всем городам и по всей земле, что, когда пойдет Дракула, никакого зла ему не причинять, а, напротив, встречать его с почетом. Дракула же, собрав все войско, двинулся в путь, и сопровождали его царские приставы, и воздавали ему повсюду почести. Он же, углубившись в Турецкую землю на пять дневных переходов, внезапно повернул назад, и начал разорять города и села, и людей множество пленили перебил, одних—на колья сажал, других рассекал надвое или сжигал, не щадя и грудных младенцев. Ничего не оставил на пути своем, всю землю в пустыню превратил, а всех, что было там, христиан увел и расселил в своей земле. И возвратился восвояси, захватив несметные богатства, а приставов царских отпустил с почестями, напутствуя: «Идите и поведайте царю вашему обо всем, что видели. Сколько сил хватило, послужил ему. И если люба ему моя служба, готов и еще ему так же служить, сколько сил моих станет». Царь же ничего не смог с ним сделать, только себя опозорил.

26. Ermolay-Erazm, *Povest' o Petre and Fevronii*; translation mine. Original: “Это, брат, козни лукавого змея—тобою мне является, чтобы я не решился убить его, думая, что это ты—мой брат.”

27. I am grateful to Denis Akhapkin for bringing this tale to my attention.

28. Zenkovsky, “Misery-Luckless-Plight,” 497. Original:

“Откажи ты, молодец, невесте своей любимой:
 быть тебе от невесты истравлену,
 еще быть тебе от тое жены удавлену,
 из злата и сребра бысть убитому!
 Ты пойди, молодец, на царев кабака,
 не жали ты, пропивай свои животы,
 а скинь ты платье гостиное,
 надежи [*] ты на себя гунку кабацкую,—
 кабаком то Горе избудетца,
 да то злое Горе-злочастие останетца:
 за нагим то Горе не погонитца,
 да никто к нагому не привяжетца,
 а нагому, босому шумить розбой!”
 Тому сну молодець не поверовал (*Tale of Misery*)

29. Zenkovsky, "Misery-Luckless-Plight," 497.
30. Morris, *Literature of Roguery*, 51.
31. Serman, "Eighteenth Century," 69.
32. Emin, *Letters of Ernest and Doravra*; translation mine. Original: "Забудь вину мою и знай, что пожирающая меня любовь наказания, но не презрения достойна. На осужденного на смерть никто не гневается; все о нем сожалеют; и ты, небесная красота, следуя светскому правосудию, сожалеи о несчастном, от которого последнее сие получаешь письмо, который тебя больше ничем огорчить не может и который идет на вечное заточение, неся с собою лютейшую о твоих приятностях память, коя бесконечно все его мысли, все чувства и всю природу мучить не перестанет."
33. Karamzin, "Bednaya Liza," 607; translation mine.
34. Karamzin, 612; translation mine, emphasis in the original. Original:

Все жилки в ней забились, и, конечно, не от страха. Она встала, хотела идти, но не могла. Эраст выскочил на берег, подошел к Лизе и—мечта ее отчасти исполнилась: ибо он *взглянул на нее с видом ласковым, взял ее за руку* . . . Ах! Он поцеловал ее, поцеловал с таким жаром, что вся вселенная показалась ей в огне горящего! «Милая Лиза!—сказал Эраст.—Милая Лиза! Я люблю тебя!», и сии слова отозвались во глубине души ее, как небесная, восхитительная музыка; она едва смела верить ушам своим и . . . Но я бросаю кисть. Скажу только, что в сию минуту восторга исчезла Лизина робость—Эраст узнал, что он любим, любим страстно новым, чистым, открытым сердцем.
35. Being shaped by does not mean, of course, copying. As Boyer puts it, "creating a tradition does not really consist in imitation but includes the constant reconstruction and correction of input" (*Minds Make Societies*, 253).
36. Note how thinking of literature as seeking new ways of representing fictional consciousness shifts our focus from the *subject* of literary discourse to the *effect* this discourse may have on the mind of the reader. According to Porter Abbott, this shift relocates "the intention of the art to what it does to the mind of the reader or viewer: from what art is *about* to what it cognitively *is*" (*Real Mysteries*, 82).
37. Pushkin, *Novels, Tales, Journeys*, 39.
38. Pushkin, 41.
39. Gogol, "Overcoat," 394; emphasis in the original.
40. Nabokov, *Lectures on Russian Literature*, 60.
41. Nabokov, 54.
42. Wood, *Fun Stuff*, 233.
43. As Ann Gaylin puts it, "the eavesdropping scene [in *Wuthering Heights*] is crucial to the very existence of the narrative" (*Eavesdropping*, 26).

44. Nabokov, "Translator's Foreword," x.
45. Lee, "Measuring the Stomach," 205.
46. Note that this account focuses on the European novel and leaves out poetry, particularly the Romantics. A complementary line of inquiry may look, for instance, at the pattern of embedment of mental states in narrative poems that are known to have influenced Pushkin, such as Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*.
47. Compare to Fritz Breithaupt's analysis of Nietzschean's view of shame: that is, the "awareness of being observed" (*Dark Sides of Empathy*, 43).
48. Pushkin, *Novels, Tales, Journeys*, 41.
49. Pushkin, 42.
50. Mersereau, "Nineteenth Century," 173.
51. Martinsen, *Surprised by Shame*, 1.
52. Martinsen, xv.
53. Ginzburg, *Записные Книжки*, 379; translation mine. Original: "Достоевщина как явление моральное и идейное мне в высокой степени противна, не потому, что чужда, но потому, что в какой-то мере свойственна."
54. I have explored this topic more fully in *Why We Read Fiction*.
55. Dostoevsky, *Idiot*; translation mine. Original:

Он понимал также, что старик вышел в упоении от своего успеха но ему все-таки предчувствовалось, что это был один из того разряда луинов, которые хотя и лгут до сладострастия и даже до самозабвения, но и на самой высшей точке своего упоения все-таки подозревают про себя, что ведь им не верят, да и не могут верить. В настоящем положении своем старик мог опомниться, не в меру устыдиться, заподозрить князя в безмерном сострадании к нему, оскорбиться.
56. Martinsen, *Surprised by Shame*, 31, 35. Also, as she reports, in "an 1873 *Diary of a Writer* article titled "Something about Lying" (*Nechto o vran'e*), Dostoevsky's narrative persona identifies shame as a critical motive for lying" (4).
57. Hegel, "Traditional Chinese Fiction," 395.
58. Lu, *Brief History*, 4.
59. This is the perspective taken by Y. W. Ma and Joseph S. M. Lau, the editors of *Traditional Chinese Stories*. Note that both their introductory notes (especially "Explanations," xx) and the subsequent reviews of this volume (see, for instance, Mair, "Review of *Traditional Chinese Stories*," 466; and DeWoskin, "Review of *Traditional Chinese Stories*," 774) provide a good example of what Hegel characterizes as the lack "of general agreement on criteria by which to identify" early Chinese fiction ("Traditional Chinese Fiction," 395).

60. Ma and Lau, "Explanations," in *Traditional Chinese Stories*, xx. As Ma and Lau observe,

Judging from fragments of these works that have survived, these writings can hardly be called fiction in the modern sense of the word. Nor, in our opinion, can passages from early historical works be regarded as fiction, properly speaking. No matter how lively the portraits of historical figures through the use of direct speech, they are nevertheless historical figures meant to be eyewitnesses of history. Indeed, unless one draws a line between fiction and history, it might even be possible to find some of the earliest examples of Chinese story in the markings on oracle bones. It would be a great irony if the ingenuity of a historian in recording fact should be read as fiction. (xx)

61. I am lifting this phrase from Riffin, *Om Муџа к Роману*, 78. Riffin uses it to describe a different kind of evolution in Chinese literary history, but his critique of the expectations of the linear development when it comes to literary history is relevant here.

62. Ma and Lau, *Traditional Chinese Stories*, 387. Original: 不能忍，夜伺其寢後，盜照視之，其腰已上生肉如人，腰下但有枯骨。

63. Ma and Lau, 414.

64. Owen, *Anthology of Chinese Literature*, 548.

65. Yu, "Story of Yingying," 184.

66. Yu, 185.

67. Quoted in Owen, *End of the Chinese "Middle Ages,"* 92.

68. Quoted in Owen, 96.

69. Owen, 101–102.

70. Note that the poetic convention of invoking present or future observers had preceded the poetry written in the Tang period. See, for instance, the ending of the famous "Preface to the Poems Collected from the Orchid Pavilion" ("Lantingji Xu," "蘭亭集序," fourth century AD) by Wang Xizhi, in which the speaker suggests that the future readers will empathize with the feelings expressed by the collection: "For the people who read this in future generations, perhaps you will likewise be moved by these words" ("後之覽者，亦將有感於斯文。").

71. Owen, *End of the Chinese "Middle Ages,"* 150.

72. Owen, *Anthology of Chinese Literature*, 518.

73. Owen, *End of the Chinese "Middle Ages,"* 168.

74. Owen, *Anthology of Chinese Literature*, 540.

75. Owen, *End of the Chinese "Middle Ages,"* 168.

76. I make this claim advisedly, taking into a consideration that (1) an expert reader of classical Chinese literature may see a broader variety of embedments in *Romance*

than I do and that (2) in principle, the subjective element unavoidably present in such claims serves to invite further research and discussion (and disagreement) rather than settling this question once and for all.

77. As Haiyan Lee puts it, “Martial tales are as much about the joust of brain as about the joust of brawn; and swashbuckling warriors invariably have to share the spotlight with shrewd strategists. In *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* . . . , beloved warriors like Guan Yu and Zhao Yun at times are little more than pawns in the elaborate schemes cooked up by the master strategist Zhuge Liang—whose name is synonymous with strategic wisdom in Chinese culture” (“Measuring the Stomach of a Gentleman,” 215).

78. Luo G., *Three Kingdoms*, 96. Original: “呂布入內問安，正值卓睡。貂蟬於床後探半身望布，以手指心，又以手指董卓，揮淚不止。布心如碎。”

79. On *The Western Wing* and literati culture, see M. Luo, *Literati Storytelling*, 179.

80. See, respectively, Tillman, “Selected Historical Sources”; and Shen, “Studies of *Three Kingdoms*,” 163.

81. Hayden, “Beginning of the End,” 43.

82. Shen, “Studies of *Three Kingdoms*,” 156.

83. Tillman, “Selected Historical Sources,” 53.

84. See Shen on “various artistic forms [that] aided in the dissemination of the story cycle” (“Studies of *Three Kingdoms*,” 156).

85. Monaco, “Review of DiaoChan.”

86. Schonebaum, introduction to *Approaches to Teaching*, 63. Scholars of Chinese literature have long been aware of the special role of *The Plum* for the course of Chinese literary history. Chen Dakang, for instance, saw 1590 “as the date at which the vernacular novel began to flourish” (Lu, *Brief History*, 101).

87. Please note that I use Wade-Giles in transcribing names of characters in *The Plum*, while using pinyin to transcribe names of characters in several other classical Chinese texts, such as *Dream of the Red Chamber*. For instance, I say Hsi-men Ch’ing instead of Ximen Qing, and Li P’ing-erh instead of Li Ping’er. The reason for this, potentially confusing, usage is that I want my English-speaking readers to be able to refer to David Tod Roy’s translation of *The Plum*, which uses Wade-Giles, and to David Hawkes’s translation of *Dream* (that is, *The Story of the Stone*), which uses pinyin. Generally, throughout this book, I use whichever system of Romanization the English translator of the cited text used.

88. Link, “Wonderfully Elusive Chinese Novel.”

89. Link.

90. Scott, “*Story of the Stone* and Its Antecedents,” 266.

91. Chang, "How to Read the *Chin P'ing Mei*," 204, 206.
92. Chang, 211.
93. Roy, *Plum in the Golden Vase*, vol. 2, 87.
94. Roy, 96.
95. Roy, 87.
96. T. Lu, "Interiority in *Jinpingmei cihua*." For a discussion of psychological interiority in classical Chinese texts, such as the *Analects* of Confucius, see Slingerland, "Cognitive Science and Religious Thought."
97. In fact, we can be made to feel sympathetic toward the liar. For instance, Utnapishtim does not judge Gilgamesh for attempting to deceive him: he sees that behavior as only too human. As he puts it to his wife, "Since the human race is duplicitous, he'll endeavor to dupe you" (Foster, *Epic of Gilgamesh*, 92).
98. Lee, "Response to the Panel."
99. Roy, *Plum in the Golden Vase*, 237. Original: "這個都是人氣不憤俺娘兒們，做作出這樣事來。爹，你也要個主張，好把醜名兒頂在頭上，傳出外邊去好聽?" (<http://www.guoxue123.com/xiaosuo/jd/jpmch/025.htm>).
100. See Zunshine, "Think What You're Doing."
101. Roy, *Plum in the Golden Vase*, vol. 2, 95.
102. Roy, 99.
103. Roy, 111. Original: "先不先只這個就不雅相，傳出去休說六鄰親戚笑話，只家中大小，把你也不著在意裡。"
104. Roy, 121.
105. See Nabokov's commentary in Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin*.
106. "Но наш герой, кто б ни был он / Уж верно был не Грандисон" (Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin*, 154).
107. Roy, *Plum in the Golden Vase*, vol. 2, 96.
108. Roy, 494.
109. Roy, 494. See also Plaks, *The Four Masterworks of the Ming Novel*, 163–164.
110. Plaks, *The Four Masterworks of the Ming Novel*, 122, 123, 128.
111. Kidd and Castano, "Reading Literary Fiction and Theory of Mind," 8.
112. To appreciate how unwelcome a sustained argument about Pushkin's engagement with Western literature would have been in Soviet Russia, see chapter 5 ("A

Double-Edged Discourse on Freedom: The Pushkin Centennial of 1937”) of Petrone’s *Life Has Become More Joyous* (113–148).

113. Plaks, “The Four Masterworks of the Ming Novel, 121.

114. Wu, *Scholars*, 40. Original: “知縣心里想道：‘這小斯那里害什么病！想是翟家這奴才，走下鄉，狐假虎威，著實恐嚇了他一場；他從來不曾見過官府的人，害怕不敢來了。老師既把這個人托我，我若不把他就叫了來見老師，也惹得老師笑我做事疲軟；我不如竟自己下鄉去拜他。他看見賞他臉面，斷不是難為他的意思，自然大著膽見我。我就順便帶了他來見老師，卻不是辦事勤敏？’又想到：‘堂堂一個縣令，屈尊去拜一個鄉民，惹得衙役們笑話。●●’又想到：‘老師前日口氣，甚是敬他；老師敬他十分，我就該敬他一百分。況且屈尊敬賢，將來志書上少不得稱贊一篇；這是万古千年不朽的勾當，有甚么做不得？’

115. Cao, *Story of the Stone*, vol. 1, 193. Original: “姨媽不知道。幸虧是姨媽這裏，倘或在別人家，人家豈不惱？好說就看得人家連個手爐也沒有，巴巴的從家裏送個來。不說了頭門太小心過餘，還只當我素日是這等輕狂慣了呢。”

116. Cao, 193.

117. Cao, 436.

118. Cao, 437.

119. Cao, 438.

120. See Zunshine, “From the Social to the Literary.”

121. Shang Wei points out that the literati novels “of the mid- and late Qianlong era . . . had so little in common with the earlier novels that their emergence in the mid-eighteenth century could well indicate the rise of a new narrative form” (“Literati Era,” 269). The profound influence of *The Story of the Stone* on the subsequent development of Chinese literature is a well-explored topic in critical studies; see Plaks, “Novel in Premodern China”; and Schonebaum, introduction to *Approaches to Teaching*. We may further enrich our understanding of that influence if we retrace its history by looking specifically at the patterns of embedment associated with it. It would be interesting to see, for instance, to what extent numerous imitations and revisions of this novel (see Wei, “Stone Phenomenon”) embed complex mental states in the same ambiguous, open-ended manner.

122. Cao, *Story of the Stone*, vol. 1, 205. Original: “黛玉忙又叫住，問道：「你怎麼不去辭辭你寶姐姐呢？」寶玉笑而不答，一逕同秦鐘上學去了。”

123. Talwar, Gordon, Lee, “Lying in the Elementary School Years,” 804.

124. Ermer, Cosmides, and Tooby, “Cheater Detection.”

125. Compare to William Flesch’s suggestive exploration of punishing cheaters in fiction, in *Comeuppance*.

126. On the adaptive role of the emotion of sexual jealousy, see Cosmides and Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions"; Daly, Wilson, and Weghorst, "Male Sexual Jealousy"; and Buss, *Evolution of Desire*.

127. Although the critical conversation about the relationship between form and context, both within and outside cognitivist contexts, has been rich and variegated (for some recent examples, see, for instance, Kramnick and Nersessian, "Form and Explanation"; and Levine, *Forms*), I focus deliberately on the earliest cases, such as Schiller and Vygotsky. For a recent engagement with Schiller's "conception of the liberating force of form," specifically from a cognitive perspective (i.e., that of probability designs), see Kukkonen, *Probability Designs*, 187.

128. "Darin also besteht das eigentliche Kunstgeheimnis des Meisters, dass er den Stoff durch die Form vertilgt" (Schiller, *Schillers Sämmtliche Werke*, 644; translation mine).

129. Vygotsky, *Psichologia Iskustva*, 180, 186. Original:

С этой точки зрения становится совершенно ясным, что, если те два плана в басне, о которых мы все время говорим, поддержаны и изображены всей силой поэтического приема, т.е. существуют не только как противоречие логическое, но гораздо больше, как противоречие аффективное,—переживание читателя басни есть в основе своей переживание противоположных чувств, развивающихся с равной силой, но совершенно вместе. . . . Разве не то же самое разумел Шиллер, когда говорил о трагедии, что настоящий секрет художника заключается в том, чтобы формой уничтожить содержание? И разве поэт в басне не уничтожает художественной формой, построением своего материала того чувства, которое вызывает самым содержанием своей басни?

130. I speak of heavy lifting intentionally, building here on Vygotsky's useful metaphor of the airplane in *Psichologia Iskussstva*, 288; for translation, see Vygotsky, *Psychology of Art*, 227.

131. Mateo Alemán, *Life and Adventure* (1823).

132. Garrido Ardila, "Origins and Definition," 1.

133. Wood, "Reality Testing."

134. Lerner, *Leaving the Atocha Station*, 23.

135. Lerner, 119.

136. Lerner, 133.

137. On egocentricity and mindreading, see Riva et al., "Emotional Egocentricity Bias."

138. Lerner, *Leaving the Atocha Station*, 57.

139. Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, 97.

140. Wood, "Reality Testing."

Chapter 6

1. See Luhmann, *Theory of Mind in the Pacific*, 443. See also McNamara et al., “Weighing Outcome,” who point out that (in-text citations omitted),

Developmentally, children living in more traditional and community-oriented groups often pass psychological tests that require them to use others’ beliefs to predict their behavior (i.e., false belief measures) at later ages . . . This is particularly so for children from cultural contexts with Opacity of Mind norms . . . This suggests a weaker, more distant cognitive/semantic connection between thoughts and behaviors for children in these societies. Conversely, exposure to a larger lexicon of mental state terms and more formal Western education predicts children will perform these tasks at younger ages . . . This suggests a tighter linkage between mental states and behaviors, and further implies more emphasis on intention for judging behavior. (96)

2. Dyer, Shatz, and Wellman, “Young Children’s Storybooks,” 19.

3. Dyer, Shatz, and Wellman, 34. See also Wulandini, Kuntoro, and Handayani, “Effect of Literary Fiction.”

4. See, for instance, Astington and Baird, *Why Language Matters*.

5. Peskin and Astington, “Effects of Adding Metacognitive Language,” 256.

6. Peskin and Astington, 254.

7. Peskin and Astington, 255.

8. An earlier version of this section appeared in Zunshine, “From the Social to the Literary,” under the heading “What Rosie Knew.”

9. Peskin and Astington, “Effects of Adding Metacognitive Language,” 253.

10. Harris, Rosnay, and Pons, “Language and Children’s Understanding,” 72.

11. Peskin and Astington, “Effects of Adding Metacognitive Language,” 265. See also Zunshine, “Secret Life of Fiction.”

12. Peskin and Astington, “Effects of Adding Metacognitive Language,” 266.

13. Peskin and Astington, 267.

14. Of course, “the exact interpretation of [Peskin and Astington’s] results needs more research” (Paul L. Harris, email communication, April 18, 2014). To begin with, the emphasis on the importance of reading fictional stories that make children work hard at deducing mental states does not mean to downplay the crucial role of talking to children about thoughts and feelings, and it may shed an interesting light on the underlying structure of those conversations. See, for instance, the study by Harris and his colleagues, who looked at children’s attribution of emotions, attendant upon their attributions of false beliefs, and found that while the four- to six-year-olds may judge correctly that Red Riding Hood doesn’t know that

the Wolf is waiting for her in her grandmother's cottage, they may still say that she is afraid rather than happy as she approaches the cottage. While thus positing a lag between "children's understanding of a protagonist's mistaken beliefs and their grasp of the emotions that flow from such beliefs," this study also found that "children with mothers who use more mental-state language make more correct attributions" of emotions (Harris, Rosnay, and Ronfard, "Mysterious Emotional Life," 107). Moreover, as Harris observes elsewhere, "a simple count of mental-state terms [used by mothers] may not be the most sensitive measure of effective maternal input even if it is a useful correlate. [It's possible] that it is the mother's pragmatic intent, notably her efforts to introduce varying points of view into a given conversation, that is the underlying and effective source of variation" (Harris, "Conversation," 77).

15. Rolston, *Traditional Chinese Fiction*, 217.
16. Dyer, Shatz, and Wellman, "Young Children's Storybooks," 22.
17. Burnett, *Annotated Secret Garden*, 1.
18. Burnett, 6.
19. Milne, *Winnie-the-Pooh*, 14.
20. For a witty analysis of mindreading in the honey scene, see Cave, *Thinking with Literature*, 42–45.
21. Kinney, *Diary of a Wimpy Kid*, 15.
22. Kinney, 35.
23. Jansson, *Moomin Falls in Love*, 17.
24. Jansson, 18.
25. Jansson, 19; my emphases throughout.
26. Carroll, *Alice's Adventures*, 29.
27. Travers, *Mary Poppins Omnibus*, 26.
28. Travers, 56.
29. Travers, 133.
30. White, *Stuart Little*, 11.
31. White, 25.
32. Compare to Emer O'Sullivan's suggestion that a study in "comparative poetics" of children's literature may concern itself with such a question as "how (and why) the beginnings of the new, complex, literary children's literature, which embraces

techniques common to the psychological novel, can be traced back to the end of the 1950s in England, the 1960s in Sweden, and around 1970 in Germany [Nikolajeva, *Children's Literature Comes of Age*] and why this form has taken longer to be accepted and produced in other children's literatures" (O'Sullivan, "Comparative Children's Literature," 192). It would be interesting to see if the frequency of complex embedments in the books for children described by O'Sullivan as having embraced "techniques common to the psychological novel" would indeed approach that of the psychological novel.

33. Knoepflmacher and Myers, "From the Editors," viii.
34. Beckett, *Crossover Picturebooks*, 175.
35. Beckett, 176.
36. Zunshine, "Secret Life of Fiction," 729.
37. Lockington, *For Black Girls like Me*, 221.
38. Lockington, 219–220.
39. Clark, *Kiddie Lit*, 80.
40. Clemens and Howells, *Mark Twain–Howells Letters*, 196.
41. Clark, *Kiddie Lit*, 80.
42. Clemens and Howells, *Mark Twain–Howells Letters*, 122.
43. Twain, *Mississippi Writings*, 3.
44. Clark, *Kiddie Lit*, 84, 81.
45. Quoted in Clark, 89.
46. Clark, 101.
47. Phelan and Rabinowitz. "Narrative Values," 163.
48. Phelan and Rabinowitz, "Authors," 35.
49. Compare to Hogan's observation that literature can present us "with emotionally affective situations, where emotion systems interact in sometimes very subtle ways—unlike the artificially limited situations that are necessary for the control of variables in experimental research" (*Sexual Identities*, 20). Also, on the processing of high-level embedments, see Dunbar, *How Many Friends Does One Person Need?*, 180.
50. Zunshine, "Commotion of Souls," 139.
51. Miller, Kessel, and Flavell, "Thinking about People Thinking," 622.
52. Phelan and Rabinowitz, "Narrative Values," 163.
53. Phelan and Rabinowitz, "Authors," 35.
54. Phelan and Rabinowitz, "Narrative Values," 163.

55. Another fascinating outlier, similarly classed with children's literature, yet embedding complex mental states at a frequency we would associate with literature for adults, is J. M. Barrie's *Peter Pan*. For a useful discussion of the "labyrinth of subjectivities" of its various textual incarnations, see Butte, *Suture and Narrative*, particularly chap. 4, "The Wounds of Peter Pan" (quote on 133). Although Butte does not deal with embedded mental states per se, his analysis of Barrie's texts as speaking "to several audiences in several registers at the same time" (136) reveals proliferation of complex embeddings.

56. As one anonymous Amazon purchaser puts it, "Although there are wonderful little snippets of family life, and a few hints of the conflicts between the feisty Laura and her more reserved and perfect sister Mary, the truth is, there isn't much of a plot here." slow-mamma, review of *Little House in the Big Woods*, Amazon, April 12, 2002, https://www.amazon.com/Little-House-Woods-Ingalls-Wilder/dp/0060581808/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1475604634&sr=1-1&keywords=little+house+in+the+big+woods.

57. Hill, "Introduction," xvi.

58. Quoted in Hill, xliii

59. Hill, xxxvi.

60. Hill, xxx.

61. Fellman, *Little House*, 6–7, 106.

62. Hill, "Introduction," lv.

63. Fellman, *Little House*, 85.

64. Wilder, *Little Town*, 12, 140.

65. Wilder, *These Happy Golden Years*, 49.

66. Wilder, 176, 184; my emphases throughout.

67. Fellman, *Little House*, 127.

68. For a broader discussion of "intermediality" of children's literature—that is, "a synergistic relation between stories and characters that originally appear in print and the forms into which they are subsequently transformed across media boundaries: film, video, DVD, audio adaptations," etc.—see O'Sullivan, "Comparative Children's Literature," 193. In one striking example she mentions, the Canadian classic *Anne of Green Gables*, by L. M. Montgomery, was not translated into German until the mid-1980s, and the translation was based on the film version" (O'Sullivan, 193).

69. Fellman, *Little House*, 123, 127–128.

70. Compare to Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer's classic argument that "most of the key elements of sophisticated narratives are present in a simpler form in picture books" ("Metalinguistic Awareness," 177).

71. For a discussion of “pleasure” involved in children’s interaction with twist endings, see Bellorín and Silva-Díaz, “Surprised Readers,” 118.
72. On the gendering of the small fish and the big fish, see Drabble, “Jon Klassen.”
73. On the gendering of Gruffalo, see Nick Miller, “Gruffalo Creator.”
74. And, of course, as Alexandra Berlina helpfully reminds me, they also know that the mouse is surprised that the Gruffalo, the monster that the mouse thinks it has invented, turns out to exist!
75. For a valuable review of problems inherent in the issue of identification, see Keen, *Empathy and the Novel*.
76. Talwar, Gordon, and Lee, “Lying in the Elementary School Years,” 804–810.
77. As Milligan et al. point out, age itself is not an “explanatory variable, but rather a proxy for various maturational factors that may explain variation, an important one of which is language ability” (“Language and Theory of Mind,” 638).
78. For a review, see Ahrens, “Picturebooks.”
79. See Kümmerling-Meibauer and Meibauer, “Early-Concept Books.”
80. Rey, *Curious George at the Zoo*, n.p.
81. Miller, *Pooh’s Honey Trouble*.
82. The number of reviews is growing, so by the time this book is in press, it will be higher.
83. The full review reads, “There is pretty much no story here, but if your little loves Winnie the Pooh, it’ll be a hit anyway. However, I must disagree with the recommended age of 3 & up. This book is for toddlers” (Linklau, “Cute for Toddlers,” Amazon, September 2015, https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R1YY7D6HAYZ6SX/ref=cm_cr_ar_p_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=1423135792).
84. As Bettina Kümmerling-Meibauer observes, the “text in Hutchins’s book merely informs the reader in a few words about Rosie’s walk and is supplemented only by participial constructions with changing place names. . . . The completely dull [text relates] events with almost no mention of the emotional reactions of those who participate in them” (“Metalinguistic Awareness,” 170).
85. Amazon, reviews of *Rosie’s Walk*, https://www.amazon.com/Rosies-Walk-Pat-Hutchins/dp/0020437501/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1477417845&sr=1-1&keywords=rosie%27s+walk.
86. For a discussion of the role of adults in mediating children’s relationships with books, see O’Sullivan, “Comparative Children’s Literature.” As she observes, “at every stage of literary communication we find adults acting for children” (191).

87. Richardson, *Literature*, 109; cf. Deppner, “Parallel Receptions of the Fundamental,” 58–59. See also O’Sullivan, “Comparative Children’s Literature,” 190. Also, in my book *Strange Concepts* (chap. 14), I have looked at an eighteenth-century text specifically geared toward three- to five-year-olds, Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s *Hymns in Prose for Children* (1781), but I don’t want to conclude too much based on just one case study.

88. Harris, Rosnay, and Pons, “Language,” 71–72. See also Rosnay et al., “Lag between Understanding”; and Hughes, White, and Ensor, “Talking about Thoughts.”

89. On the relationship between cross-writing and crossovers, see Falconer, “Children’s Literature.”

90. For a useful discussion of the role of illustrations in “metafictional picturebooks” (355), see Lissi Athanasiou-Krikelis, “Mapping.”

91. Lipson, *New York Times Parent’s Guide*, 48; Amazon, *Hush Little Baby* page, accessed 06/08/2021. https://www.amazon.com/Hush-Little-Baby-Folk-Pictures/dp/0152058877/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1535232923&sr=1-1&keywords=hush+little+baby+marla+frazee.

92. J. Freeman, *Books Kids Will Sit Still For 3*, 236; Gillespie, *Best Books for Children*, 712; Scholastic, *Hush Little Baby* page, accessed 12/18/2018. As of 06/08/21, Scholastic doesn’t seem to feature Frazee’s *Hush Little Baby* anymore, so this reference more accurately pertains to their former characterization. <https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/books/hush-little-baby-by-marla-frazee/>.

93. Amazon, *Hush Little Baby* reviews, accessed 12/18/2018. https://www.amazon.com/Hush-Little-Baby-Folk-Pictures/product-reviews/0152058877/ref=cm_cr_getr_d_paging_btm_4?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews&showViewpoints=1&sortBy=recent&pageNumber=4.

Conclusion

1. Wolf, *Patterns of Childhood*, 8. The translation is missing a part of one sentence. The full original (with the missing part italicized) reads, “Auffallend ist, daß wir in eigener Sache entweder romanhaft lügen oder stockend und mit belegter Stimme sprechen. Wir mögen wohl Grund haben, von uns nichts wissen zu wollen (oder doch nicht alles—was auf das gleiche hinausläuft). Aber selbst wenn die Hoffnung gering ist, sich allmählich freizusprechen *und so ein gewisses Recht auf den Gebrauch jenes Materials zu erwerben, das unlösbar mit lebenden Personen verbunden ist*—so wäre es doch nur diese geringfügige Hoffnung, die, falls sie durchhält, der Verführung zum Schweigen und Verschweigen trotzen könnte” (Wolf, *Kindheitsmuster*, 15).

2. See, for instance, Black and Barnes, “Fiction and Social Cognition.”

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
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