

This PDF includes a chapter from the following book:

# **The Resistance Dilemma**

## **Place-Based Movements and the Climate Crisis**

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# Notes

## Chapter 1

1. "Pathways reflecting current nationally stated mitigation ambition until 2030 are broadly consistent with cost-effective pathways that result in a global warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming continuing afterwards" (IPCC 2018, 20).
2. All the theories described have their roots in political science, but there's also considerable commonality with the sociological concept of "strategic action fields" (Fligstein and McAdam 2011).
3. The term *policy regime* is used differently by some policy scholars to refer to contents of policy design or approaches more broadly rather than the governing arrangement (actors, institutions, and ideas) from which policy content arises (e.g., Howlett 2009; Eisner 2000; Harris and Milkis 1989).
4. Many other approaches prefer the category of "interests" rather than actor to create an alliterative triad of "interests, institutions, and ideas" (e.g., Hall 1993; Harrison and Sundstrom 2000; May and Joachim 2013). The regime approach used here prefers the term "strategic actors" because it better encompasses actors both within and outside the government. Many other approaches either have separate categories of state or government actors or, ironically, given the subject matter, don't really conceptualize government actors effectively in their framework. Government actors share many of the same incentives, resources, and strategies as nongovernment actors. What distinguishes them is that they have the resource of government authority.
5. Janzwood (2020) applies to several pipeline conflicts an integration of the McAdam and Boudet framework with an early version of the one presented in this book (Hoberg 2013).
6. This is similar to McAdam and Boudet's (2012) "political opportunity" variable.
7. McAdam and Boudet (2012) find that when a community has experience with similar projects, opposition to new projects is much less likely.

8. “In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in the case” (George and Bennett 2005, 6).

## Chapter 2

1. That 1.3 million barrels per day increase by 2035 is only a fraction of the 6 million barrels per day capacity that have received approval for construction (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2017a, 8).

2. Calculated from NEB data series Estimated Production of Canadian Crude Oil and Equivalent.

3. NEB reports production data by oil product type in a series called Estimated Production of Canadian Crude Oil and Equivalent, with subtotals given from Alberta; 79% of Canadian heavy oil is bitumen from the oil sands, and 47% of Canadian light oil is upgraded bitumen. Trade data are reported in the 2016 Oil Exports Statistics Summary, divided by light and heavy categories. In 2016, 2.3 million barrels per day of heavy oil and 0.8 million barrels per day of light oil were exported from Canada. Assuming that the same proportion of light and heavy oil products from Alberta’s oil sands and Canadian production as a whole are exported, 1.8 million barrels per day of heavy oil sands and 0.4 million barrels per day of oil sands upgraded to light would have been exported in 2016. That total of 2.2 million barrels per day would constitute 85% of the 2.6 million barrels per day exported from Alberta.

4. Throughout the book, all dollar figures are US\$ unless stated otherwise.

5. These data come from government of Alberta annual reports and can be found at [http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/annual\\_repts/govt/index.html](http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/annual_repts/govt/index.html).

6. This list of populations in the oil sands region comes from the Alberta Biodiversity Monitoring Network (2014, 38).

7. All these figures are from Government of Alberta (n.d.c), <http://economicdashboard.alberta.ca/>.

8. According to an April 2019 IHS Markit analysis, these costs have fallen significantly over the past several years because of reductions in both capital and operating costs: “All things being equal, the price of oil required to justify a new oil sands project—mining or SAGD—has fallen. . . . IHS Markit estimated that the lowest-cost oil sands project—an expansion of an existing SAGD facility—required a WTI price more than \$65/bbl in 2014 to break even. In 2018, this price had fallen into the mid-\$40s/bbl. A mine without an upgrader required a WTI price approaching \$100/bbl in 2014 compared with nearly \$65/bbl in 2018” (IHS Markit 2019).

9. One review of oil sands economics concludes that “this suggests that the greatest climate policy risks for oil sands are from the oil market impacts of global action on

climate change, not domestic climate change policies” (Heyes, Leach, and Mason 2018, 250).

10. The next two paragraphs come from Hoberg (2016).

11. The groups involved were Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, Dogwood Initiative, Greenpeace Canada, Natural Resources Defense Council, Rainforest Action Network, Sierra Club of Canada, Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Pembina Institute, West Coast Environmental Law, and Wildsight.

12. The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, which would ship natural gas from Canada’s north to the oil sands region.

### Chapter 3

1. In his thoughtful book *The Patch*, Chris Turner refers to these competing worldviews as High Modern and Anthropocene (Turner 2017).

2. The groups are Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, David Suzuki Foundation, Dogwood Initiative, Ecojustice, Environmental Defence, Equiterre, Greenpeace Canada, Pembina Institute, Sierra Club BC, and West Coast Environmental Law.

3. Pierre Trudeau was prime minister of Canada from 1968 to 1984, with the exception of a nine-month period during 1979–1980.

4. The next two sections are adapted from Hoberg (2016).

5. This section is taken from Hoberg (2016).

### Chapter 4

I’d like to thank Claire Allen and Xavier Deschênes-Phillion for research assistance, and Geoff Salomons for early research on this controversy. Thanks to Elizabeth Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. An earlier version of this chapter was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31–September 3, 2017, in San Francisco, California.

1. Using LexisNexis Academic, total mentions and keywords were searched for each year (January 1 to December 31) beginning January 1, 2008, and ending August 31, 2019. The publication sources included were limited to the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* (US edition) and their associated blog posts. Keyword searches included “Keystone XL” for the total number of mentions, “Keystone XL AND climate OR greenhouse gas OR global warming,” “Keystone XL AND jobs OR job OR economic OR economics,” “Keystone XL AND energy security,” “Keystone XL AND accident OR spill OR disaster OR damage OR leak OR Lac Megantic,” and “Keystone XL AND Native OR First Nation OR aboriginal OR indigenous.”

2. For an overview of the relationship between activist discourse, media reporting, and policy influence, see Howe, Stoddart, and Tindall (2020).

3. The applicable law at the time was Executive Order 13337, Issuance of Permits with Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States, dated April 30, 2004, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2004/05/05/04-10378/issuance-of-permits-with-respect-to-certain-energy-related-facilities-and-land-transportation>.
4. In 2013, the Sierra Club went so far as to reverse its century-old policy against civil disobedience to allow its leaders to risk arrest (Hodges and Stocking 2016).
5. Prior to the 2016 election, TransCanada responded to Obama's rejection by challenging the action in federal court. In addition, the company filed a \$15 billion claim under chapter 14 of NAFTA. Given Trump's reversal, however, these two challenges were withdrawn.

## Chapter 5

1. The report was preceded by five reports by the Pembina Institute that focused on salmon risks, upstream impacts in the oil sands, and the economic justification for the pipeline.
2. An alliance of nine First Nations from British Columbia's central coast, north coast, and Haida Gwaii.
3. The data come from Canadian Newsstream. The pipeline was identified with the terms "Northern Gateway" or "Northern Gateway pipeline." Issue mentions were captured with the following search terms: "greenhouse gas" OR "climate" OR "global warming"; "job" OR "jobs"; "accident" OR "accidents" OR "spill" OR "spills" OR "disaster" OR "disasters" OR "damage" OR "damages" OR "leak" OR "leaks"; "First Nation" OR "First Nations" OR "indigenous" OR "aboriginal" OR "aboriginals."

## Chapter 6

1. Annual total mentions and keywords were searched on Canadian Newsstream for each year from 2012 to 2017. The total number of sources was crossed with four categories: climate change, jobs, accidents/spills, and First Nations. Search terms for each category included pipeline name "AND climate OR greenhouse gas OR global warming"; pipeline name "AND job OR economic OR economics"; pipeline name "AND accident OR spill OR disaster OR damage OR leak OR Lac Megantic"; and pipeline name "AND native OR first nation OR aboriginal OR indigenous."
2. This section relies heavily on Hoberg (2018).
3. The statement was not in prepared remarks but in response to a reporter's question about his reaction to the government of Quebec seeking an injunction against the Energy East pipeline in March 2016:

I think there is a desire by provinces across the country, understandably, that they want to ensure that they're acquiring the kind of social license that hasn't been acquired in the past. And that's where we're looking at working constructively and collaboratively with jurisdictions across the country for projects in the national interest in a way that understands that even though governments grant permits, ultimately only communities grant permission. And drawing in voices from a range of perspectives is going to lead us to a better number of and better kinds of solutions, and better outcomes for everyone across the country. (CBC 2016c)

4. Prime minister of Canada's news page: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news>.
5. The Canadian House of Commons' parliamentary web page enables a keyword search of Hansard publications by parliament, session, and speaker, among other categorical search tags. Searches in English and French for "grant permission" returned zero related results for members of the Trudeau government. It was used three times by two different Liberal backbenchers but never by a member of the cabinet.
6. British Columbia's minister of environment and climate change strategy, George Heyman, stated that the premier told him that "stopping the project was beyond the jurisdiction of B.C., and to talk about it or frame our actions around doing that, as opposed to defending B.C.'s coast through a variety of measures that were within our jurisdiction, would be inappropriate and unlawful" (Pearson 2018).
7. British Columbia's statement of claim challenging the Alberta law contains a number of quotations by Alberta government officials explicitly referring to inflicting economic pain on British Columbia to justify the legislation.
8. Tsleil-Waututh Nation; Squamish Nation; Musqueam Indian Band; Coldwater Indian Band; Aitchelitz, Skowkale Shxw̓a:y Village, Soow Ahlie, Squiala First Nation, Tzeachten, Yakwekwioose, Skwah, Kwaw-Kwaw-Aplit & Ts'elxweyeqw Tribe et al (Sto:lo); Upper Nicola Band; and Stk'emlupsemc Te Secwepemc (West Coast Environmental Law 2017).

## Chapter 7

1. Because the review process was interrupted, a comprehensive evaluation of these projected economic benefits stemming from Energy East was never conducted, but regional analyses that have been done suggest that TransCanada's estimates may have been overstated, as argued by the Ontario Energy Board and the Montreal Metropolitan Community, for instance (Carlson et al. 2015; Communauté Métropolitaine de Montréal 2016).
2. Using Canadian Newsstream, the total mentions for each pipeline in English Canadian media were searched for each year (January 1 to December 31) from 2012 to 2016. Keyword searches for the total number of mentions for each pipeline included "Northern Gateway OR Northern Gateway Pipeline"; "Trans Mountain Pipeline OR TransMountain OR Trans Mountain"; "Keystone XL"; and "Energy East OR Energy East Pipeline."

3. Using Canadian Newsstream and Eureka.cc to count English and French Canadian media, respectively, the total mentions and keywords were searched for each year (January 1 to December 31) from 2012 to 2016. The total number of sources was crossed with four categories: climate change, jobs, accidents/spills, and First Nations. Search terms for each category included “Energy East Pipeline OR Energy East AND climate OR greenhouse gas OR global warming” / “Pipeline Énergie Est OR Oléoduc Énergie Est OR Projet Énergie Est AND changement climatique OR gaz à effet de serre OR réchauffement climatique OR climatique OR climat”; “Energy East Pipeline OR Energy East AND job” / “Pipeline Énergie Est OR Oléoduc Énergie Est OR Projet Énergie Est AND emploi”; “Energy East Pipeline OR Energy East AND accident OR spill OR disaster OR damage OR lead OR Lac Megantic” / “Pipeline Énergie Est OR Oléoduc Énergie Est OR Projet Énergie Est AND accident OR déversement OR Lac-Mégantic OR dommage OR désastre”; and “Energy East Pipeline OR Energy East AND Native OR First Nation OR aboriginal OR indigenous” / “Pipeline Énergie Est OR Oléoduc Énergie Est OR Projet Énergie Est AND première nation OR premières nations OR autochtones.”

4. The first one was initiated in Quebec on August 11 by Stratégies Énergétiques and the Association québécoise de lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique. It was followed by a second on August 22, by Ecojustice on behalf of an Ontario group opposed to Energy East.

5. Poitras (2018, epilogue) also provides an overview of reasons for the cancellation.

## Chapter 8

1. This statement is based on multiple interviews with respondents who chose to be off the record on this issue.

## Chapter 9

1. The environmental impacts of hydropower projects, especially large dams, are both complex and controversial. The energy resource is renewable, but there are a variety of environmental impacts that can occur. Because of their impacts on habitat, land, and fish and wildlife, large dams have traditionally been strongly opposed by environmentalists. As a result of these environmental impacts, many definitions of “renewable” in American state electricity regulations exclude dams above a certain size, even though they are technically renewable (Frey and Linke 2002).

2. Cox (2018) gives a thorough account of the resistance coalition.

3. “While the Project is not being proposed for exporting energy, the energy surplus in its early years would allow BC Hydro to assist other jurisdictions, such as California, in managing an increasing level of intermittent resources such as solar or wind. This assistance could be provided irrespective of the net import/export position of

BC Hydro compared to external jurisdictions. The dynamic capacity and storage would allow these external jurisdictions to integrate additional wind, solar, and run-of-river hydro, in turn lowering their GHG emissions and footprint of supply resources. BC Hydro's ratepayers would further benefit from the revenues associated with providing such a service" (Joint Review Panel 2014, 273).

4. See also Shaw and Zussman (2018) for a sense of the personal implications of Horgan's decision. Cox (2018, 252–253) also discusses the Horgan decision and its impact on Peace River area activists.

## Chapter 10

1. The feed-in tariff included domestic content provisions, or "buy local" rules, in an effort to tie renewable energy production to provincial economic growth in green manufacturing (Walker 2010). For wind projects, this was initially stipulated at 25%. The "buy local" provisions of the Green Energy Act were changed in 2012 after a World Trade Organization dispute was launched by Japan, the United States, and the European Union. The government attempted to appeal but was denied, causing the "buy local" provisions to be rescinded (Hill 2017).

2. NSTAR was a utility company in Massachusetts. In 2015, NSTAR and other subsidiaries were merged to become one large company, Eversource Energy, which is also the project developer of the Northern Pass Transmission project.

## Chapter 11

1. This section is derived from Hunsberger, Froese, and Hoberg (2020).



