

“A growing awareness of India’s economic and strategic potential has led to serious revaluation in the United States of the India relationship.”

India and America: Estranged No More

GAUTAM ADHIKARI

For more than half a century, the world’s two largest democracies—the United States and India—have had a difficult relationship. That unhappy situation appears to be changing. Today, a growing chorus of voices recommends a long-term strategic understanding, perhaps partnership, between the two. What such a relationship might mean is not yet clear, but a qualitatively higher level of strategic and economic cooperation seems almost inevitable. The direction, if not the precise definition, of future relations is clear.

In the emerging scenario, new frontiers include growing military-to-military cooperation regionally as well as in the global war on terrorism. But for the relationship to endure, India and the United States will have to boost sharply their economic as well as scientific, technological, and democratic ties in a manner that will enmesh the countries in bonds that can become self-sustaining. Most likely, a shared and deepening economic stake in bilateral relations will have to undergird a new relationship if it is to transcend problems of the past and enhance readiness on both sides to resolve differences.

During the past decade, India’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of 6 percent; the current rate is likely to exceed 7.5 percent. Most forecasters agree that huge pent-up demand gradually will come into play as economic reforms continue to improve all-round developmental performance, keeping growth rates high in the foreseeable future. A forecast by Goldman Sachs boldly suggests that India’s economy will maintain an average annual growth rate of 6 percent over the next 50 years, outstripping the performance of other major emerging economies such as China, Brazil, and Russia.

GAUTAM ADHIKARI, former executive editor of the Times of India, is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

PAST DIFFERENCES

A growing awareness of India’s economic and strategic potential has led to a serious revaluation in the United States of the India relationship. Through most of the latter half of the twentieth century, India and America, while sharing democratic values, did not share each other’s worldview on international strategy or economics. In the strategic realm, each had a different perspective on the cold war, including different assumptions about the Soviet Union and its intentions. As leader of the nonaligned nations movement, India saw the Soviet Union as a friendly state, a misguided, not ill-intentioned, power. The Americans found this stance immoral as well as damaging to their interests. After some years of trying to persuade India to come around, the United States found Pakistan a more useful ally.

Indians saw the US policy of arming Pakistan as hostile to their interests. They felt that the United States, because of its alliance with an often military-ruled Pakistan, was not a disinterested player when it should have been more supportive of democratic India. Wary of Pakistan’s growing military capabilities, India turned increasingly to the Soviet Union for support and before long became dependent on Soviet supplies and equipment for its armed forces. US ambivalence over the status of Kashmir, meanwhile, meant that India was forced to rely on Soviet support at the United Nations to sustain its case in that dispute. India appealed sporadically to Washington as Islamabad pursued its nuclear weapons program with active Chinese support, but Washington turned a blind eye. Not until the program was virtually complete at the end of the 1980s did the United States impose sanctions.

On nuclear policy, differences between India and America were and remain, beneath the surface, profound. After initially favoring complete world nuclear disarmament and shunning the nuclear

option in the 1950s, India reacted sharply in 1964 when the Chinese went openly nuclear. India carried out its first nuclear test in 1974, calling it a “peaceful nuclear explosion” and disavowing immediate plans to weaponize. In 1998, under the government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, India came out of the closet as a nuclear weapons power with a series of five underground tests. After having tried for decades to prevent open nuclear weaponization in the subcontinent, Washington was caught unawares by India’s tests. The United States imposed sanctions immediately on India and additional sanctions on Pakistan, which had followed soon after India with tests of its own.

By late 2000, most of the sanctions were lifted. Today, the United States is faced with a dilemma. It does not want to destabilize Pakistan, a crucial ally in the war against terrorism, nor does it want to undermine prospects for an important and steadily growing friendship with India. Yet nuclear restraint in South Asia remains essential for international efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands, as well as for reducing the risk of a nuclear exchange in the charged atmosphere of the subcontinent itself.

In the economic realm, India and the United States showed profound differences as well—until 1991. In the early years of India’s development, the nation’s policy making elite was made up mostly of people who were intellectual products of British Fabian socialistic thinking. To them free markets meant inequality and exploitation and were unsuited to a developing economy. Command economics ruled the development process, to be supervised by a civil service within a framework of public administration that was barely distinguishable from the preceding imperial model. For the English-speaking elite, consensus over public policy was easy to create in the early days of Indian democracy.

But it was a limited democracy. While political democracy was legislated from day one of the republic, the case for economic democracy—allowing open markets, encouraging enterprise, enabling the Indian masses to participate in a market economy with increasing purchasing power, and spreading growth widely—did not come into focus until much later. Because India’s economic model was semi-socialistic, a private sector functioned within the larger framework of central planning. But it had to operate within a maze of licenses, permits, and other restrictions, while foreign trade floundered in a swamp of tariffs and isolationist barriers in the name of self-reliance. By 1990, India’s share of

world trade had contracted to 0.4 percent, down from 2.4 percent in 1947. Annual GDP growth, an anemic 2 to 3 percent, was derisively dubbed the “Hindu rate of growth.”

Initially enthusiastic about an independent, democratic India—seen as a role model to counter Communist China—America gradually became disillusioned about India’s economic prospects as well as its value as a friendly player in world affairs. President Lyndon Johnson tried to force economic reform, particularly in agricultural policies, by suspending food aid at a time when large parts of India were facing severe drought. But the episode created deep resentment in India, adding to the already simmering anger over Washington’s perceived pro-Pakistan bias, which came into the open in 1971 with a pronounced tilt toward Pakistan during the Bangladesh war.

THE WATERSHED YEARS

Between 1989 and 1991, four major changes occurred—in the world at large as well as in South Asia—to alter realities in the US-India relationship.

The end of the cold war in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant that the basic plank of India’s foreign policy—nonalignment—became irrelevant. Although nonalignment—or at least the principle of proactive neutrality in world affairs—remains sacred for a few policy makers and commentators, the term has largely lost significance as New Delhi adapts to more innovative ways of dealing with the outside world. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, policy makers started a process of questioning their assumptions about foreign policy and India’s place in the world.

The second change came with the end of the Afghan war and the retreat of Soviet forces in 1989; the United States almost literally walked away from the region, leaving behind a mess. Pakistan’s intelligence services began to play an even more direct role than they had in the 1980s in managing war and politics in the region. Pakistan also had to confront a possible internal threat in the looming unemployment of thousands of mujahideen who had been trained for war in Afghanistan and might create domestic unrest unless they could be diverted to a new cause. Kashmir beckoned. By supporting Kashmir Muslim guerrillas with training, arms, and money and also allowing former mujahideen to enter the territory, Pakistan sparked a cross-border, low-intensity conflict with India. This conflict for a decade has been the chief source of tension between the nuclear-armed neighbors, though, in recent

months, the beginning of a peace dialogue and Pakistan's apparent steps to rein in cross-border infiltration have reduced the intensity of feelings.

Third, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had a major impact on India's economy. Initially, the war hiked world oil prices sharply, adversely affecting a number of developing economies, including India's, which depend on oil imports. The IMF classified these countries—40 in all—as “most immediately impacted countries” and gave them access to special funding designed for such contingencies. As with all such programs, the funding came attached to conditions—and that was when India began a round of serious discussions with the IMF and the World Bank on how to loosen its rigid economic structure.

Fourth, a new government under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao was elected in early 1991, and its first budget was a landmark in India's economic history. It broke sharply with the past by lowering tariffs, abolishing licenses and permits for a wide range of industries, and generally kicking off an era of liberalization of a kind that Indians should have tried decades before but had been prevented by a hangover of postcolonial economic thinking and policy choices. It also indirectly generated, by breaking open the economy from its shackles of protective self-reliant dogma, a storm of debate over how best the nation should deal with the world.

MOMENTUM FOR CHANGE

Although circumstances shifted radically in that short period between 1989 and 1991, qualitative change in the basic US-India relationship did not become visible until the late 1990s. The decade began with India initiating a determined effort to restructure its economy and with the United States prodding it to move more quickly. The pace of reform was slow, but the process brought the private sectors of the two countries to a significant level of understanding and cooperation. American investments in and trade with India have grown steadily since, though they remain modest compared with US-China trade and investment.

Three events in the late 1990s created a momentum for discernible change in the speed and direction of US-India relations. At the same time, a long-term trend reflecting India's relative weight in American eyes began to acquire critical mass. First,

as already noted, in May 1998 India carried out underground nuclear tests. Initially, the tests appeared to set up a new hurdle in normalizing relations with the United States. But with other changes occurring in the basic framework of the relationship and deeper links developing between the peoples and economies of the two nations, both sides realized the need to move beyond immediate points of discord to emerging areas of strategic agreement. In a series of unprecedented high-level talks, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, met eight times between June 1998 and February 1999. They moved beyond proliferation problems to develop a wider dialogue that covered possible strategic cooperation, problems of international terrorism, and the evolving shape of the global system. Whether India's newly declared nuclear status influenced US perceptions is difficult to determine, but policy makers as well as non-governmental analysts in Washington clearly felt that

An economically and militarily strong India, especially as an American ally, will create a countervailing force to China.

sanctions were not the way to solve the region's problems and that America should accord more weight to India's strategic and economic potential.

The second event occurred in the summer of 1999, when Pakistani forces suddenly intruded into Indian territory across the Line of Control (LOC) in Kargil. New Delhi reacted with restraint—while fighting to push back the Pakistanis—to give Washington a chance to intervene. President Bill Clinton summoned Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the Fourth of July weekend to demand an immediate return of his forces to the Pakistani side of the LOC. The prime minister had no choice but to comply. Clinton's firm action impressed New Delhi. It was seen as an indicator that the United States was moving away finally from its policy of “evenhandedness,” which India regarded as a tilt toward Pakistan, and might be ready to enter a new relationship with India.

The third event took place in March 2000, when Clinton became the first US president in 22 years to visit India. In a tremendously successful tour, he stayed in the country for five days, addressed its parliament, and created an enormous stock of goodwill among the Indian people and politicians. He visited Pakistan also, but for only five hours, stopping long enough to deliver a firm message to Islamabad advising against any destabilizing activity. Once again, the Indians were impressed.

Meanwhile, the presence and influence within the United States of an expanding Indian-American community continued to develop as a long-term trend with possibly profound significance for the future of US-India relations. Changes in US immigration laws in 1965, when America moved away from an immigration policy favoring Europeans, permitted a larger influx of Indians than before. Within a couple of decades, Indian-Americans had made their marks in several professions, but mainly in engineering, academia, and medicine. Another group of Indian origin, who moved from the United Kingdom and East Africa from the late 1970s, built businesses in import-export, garments, gems and jewelry, and the hotel industry. By the end of the 1980s, Indian-Americans in the United States numbered 1 million.

It was in the 1990s that the Indian-American presence began to be felt in any noticeable way. A large number of professionals and entrepreneurs, mostly young and highly qualified, migrated to America starting in the late 1980s to join high technology industries in areas such as software and computer development, aerospace, and telecommunications. Along with many in the earlier groups, they acquired wealth in the prosperous years of the 1990s. Some started their own companies—40 percent of start-ups in the Silicon Valley high-tech sector were by Indians or Indian-Americans—while others rose quickly through corporate hierarchies to become CEOs. Today, people of Indian origin living in the United States number 1.8 million. They form one of the richest and most highly educated ethnic groups in the country. A recent study published by Merrill Lynch estimates there are 200,000 millionaires among them. (That means, of America's 2.1 million millionaires, nearly 10 percent are of Indian origin.) What is remarkable about these figures is that they hold true after the burst of the technology bubble, in which many Indian-Americans lost chunks of wealth. The Indian-American community now takes active part in US political life; it is, for example, a major contributor to Senate and House contests and presidential races. The India caucus in Congress has more than 160 members, making it the largest of its kind. By lobbying the administration and Congress, Indian-Americans played an important role in the relaxation of US sanctions against India following the 1998 nuclear tests.

PARTNERS IN DEMOCRATIZATION?

The national security strategy of President George W. Bush's administration states clearly the new

approach toward India: "The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that US interests require a strong relationship with India." Three elements of the administration's security strategy with regard to India stand out as bases on which future US-India relations can be built: democracy as a shared value, military and strategic cooperation, and economic ties. At first glance, the promotion of political freedom would seem an easy area of cooperation between these two "natural allies," as Prime Minister Vajpayee has described the United States and India. But efforts in this area have not been all that successful so far. Both sides frequently cite the rationale of shared democratic values as an obvious glue to hold the two nations together, but differences persist in understanding what it implies.

In a post-September 11 world infested by terrorism that spews out of undemocratic countries, Americans appear to have become more committed than ever to the promotion of democracy as a means of stabilizing the international environment. America seems resolute in pursuing this goal, and the Indians concur with it, but they do so with a skepticism, bordering on cynicism, about American sincerity. They point to Pakistan, where US administrations have supported several military rulers during the past 50 years. They note that the United States has often seemed to prefer dependence on military dictators than on democratically elected governments to service its strategic requirements. Indians regret that they have not earned a democracy dividend from America, and that US tactical decision-making does not really give much weight to democratic values.

When it comes to the issue of cooperating in democracy promotion worldwide, bureaucracies on both sides have often appeared to be less than enthusiastic. Since 9-11, however, a renewed US emphasis on promoting democracy as a strategic goal has aroused India's interest in reiterating its case for greater recognition as a democratic partner in the war against terrorism. Indeed, intelligence and tactical cooperation among India, the United States, and Israel in the fight against global as well as regional terror has grown significantly.

EXERCISING THE MILITARY

Defense cooperation between the United States and India has taken off in a remarkably visible manner in the past two years. A joint US-Indian body of defense policy makers, the Defense Planning Group (DPG), met in December 2001 to approve broad-based collaboration, including a renewal of military-to-mil-

itary ties and the resumption of a defense-supplies relationship. The two countries have since held meetings between army, navy, and air force officers and created joint work groups on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue. The two countries have conducted several major military exercises, including a first-ever joint air forces interoperability training program in the northern Indian city of Agra, and the first joint exercise by US and Indian forces on American soil in Alaska. In the hilly jungles of Mizoram in northeast India, US special operations forces engaged their Indian counterparts in combined training on how to fight terrorists in difficult terrain. The two navies have begun joint operations in the Indian Ocean. US ships have begun docking at Indian ports.

India and America have a long way to go, however, before the cooperation becomes seamless. The two militaries do not share the same kind of equipment (much of India's is of Soviet design), nor do they have any shared experience of employing similar operational tactics. The Indians are also sensitive to perceptions of being in a subordinate position in the relationship. Working together will narrow these differences.

The defense supply relationship involves both private and public sectors. The Bush administration, working with Congress, has amended a law that had required notification of all applications for export to India of items on the US munitions list. Now only major defense equipment items with a value above \$14 million will require congressional notice, thus putting India in the same category as US allies like South Korea and Japan.

But here, too, there are differences in perception and purpose. The Indians want US investment in the Indian defense sector and view technology transfer as a crucial component of a closer US-India military relationship. The Americans are less interested in technology transfer and view Indian intentions with a degree of suspicion. In any case, the US defense supply system has a number of legislative and bureaucratic barriers that are likely to keep technology transfers to India more halting and infrequent than the Indians would like. On January 13, 2004, a sharp narrowing of differences became visible when President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee simultaneously announced increased cooperation in civilian, nuclear, space, and high technology to advance their growing strategic partnership.

STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE

In October 2002, the US Defense Department released, for restricted circulation, a study titled "Indo-US Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions." Through a series of interviews, it explores the thinking of decision makers in the United States and India who are responsible for building a close Indo-US military relationship. The study's findings highlight several key strategic issues.

One is the China factor. Views on both sides converge on this issue, though from slightly different standpoints. The Indians identify China as a long-term strategic threat as well as an economic rival. India has a persistent border dispute with the Chinese. Beijing has already helped Pakistan with its nuclear weapons program, and might be intent on encircling India by establishing base facilities and defense pacts in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. The Americans see China's long-term challenge in a broader Asian context, in East Asia as well as in the subcontinent. Both agree that China

represents the most significant threat to their future security as an economic and military competitor. However, military thinkers on both sides did not think that China should be the primary

focus of the Indo-US military relationship or a rationale for broader strategic ties. China will inevitably figure in US-India strategic thinking, and an economically and militarily strong India, especially as an American ally, will create a countervailing force to China and a hedge against Chinese ambitions. But the Indo-US bond must be a multifaceted, mature relationship sustained by a range of shared interests.

Another strategic highlight in the study is the war on terrorism, which has created a new context and impetus for the US-India relationship. Despite the success of counterterrorism measures under a joint working group on terrorism, at least three areas of divergence remain. There are differences in defining the threat: Americans see it as a global challenge; Indians are more preoccupied by regional eruptions—in Kashmir, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and occasionally along the Indo-Burma and Indo-Bangladesh borders. There are divergent views on the roots of terrorism, with Indians seeing Pakistan as the root of the problem, not a solution, and the Americans viewing Pakistan as a key ally in their overall war against terror. And the Indians worry that the war

Indians regret that they have not earned a democracy dividend from America.

on terror might destabilize the Persian Gulf and create wider disturbances in the region.

Pakistan remains a contentious issue. Indians feel the root of their problem with Pakistan is not Kashmir but Islamabad's anti-Indian ideology, of which Kashmir is one manifestation. They want the United States to put strong pressure on Islamabad to make Pakistan more democratic, economically stable, and free of terrorists. They believe Pakistan constitutes a ball and chain around India's neck, preventing India from extending its reach to cooperate with America beyond South Asia. Indians resent US attempts to equate the two states or treat them as a hyphenated regional problem because the difference between the two countries is so clear today. For Americans, who have found Pakistani military services useful for decades in the cold war and after, the trick is somehow to balance tactical crisis-management priorities in the war on terrorism, for which it needs Pakistan in the short term, with the desire to build a long-term strategic relationship with India.

With the revival of peace talks following Prime Minister Vajpayee's January 2004 visit to Islamabad for a regional summit and his meeting with Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, hopes of a closer proximity of views between the United States and India over Pakistan have risen. At the very least, India recognizes the usefulness of an American role (as long as it is behind the scenes) in maintaining pressure on Pakistan's military establishment to stabilize the border and negotiate longer-term peace measures.

The Defense Department report also highlights security in the Indian Ocean as a strategic consideration. Perhaps the most promising basis for military cooperation has been in the naval area, with the two nations' navies conducting a number of joint exercises, including anti-submarine training and combating piracy. This cooperation is aimed, in part, at containing China. The two navies already are jointly patrolling the Straits of Malacca, where China's navy may be vying for control. Despite differences of degree in perception of the Chinese threat, US and Indian interests appear to converge in keeping China out of the Indian Ocean.

Indians see the Persian Gulf as another region for potential Indo-US cooperation and strategic dialogue. A number of security interests make the Gulf region important for India: energy security, regional stability, the future of Islamic countries, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism. Indian analysts say India is well positioned to assist the United States in the region for three reasons. First, India sits in the middle of the Islamic world, which

stretches from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Second, it has good relations with most Islamic countries in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. Third, with one of the world's largest Muslim populations, it can help the United States understand the Muslim psyche better.

A final issue emphasized by the Defense Department analysis is nonproliferation. Indians assert that nonproliferation will remain an obstacle to cooperation until American policy-making circles accept India as a nuclear power and a nuclear "friend." They see different approaches on this issue: the State Department appears to see India still as a possible proliferator, while the Defense Department accepts India's nuclear capability and wants to embrace India as a strategic partner. But Indians recognize a crucial US role in controlling apparently rogue elements within Pakistan's nuclear weapons management structure, even though they find it difficult to accept (as the United States seems to for tactical reasons in the war on terror) that Pakistan's military rulers were totally unaware that leading Pakistani scientists and engineers had leaked nuclear designs and secrets to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

ECONOMIC TIES: READY FOR TAKEOFF?

The glass of economic ties is less than half full, both sides agree. Just how empty it is or why it is so raises the kind of questions over which Indian and US views diverge. When former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill recently described US-India economic ties as flat as a *chapatti*, India's ambassador to the United States, Lalit Mansingh, responded at a meeting in Washington in June 2003 that bilateral economic ties were more like a *tandoori roti*—growing steadily in thickness and size as it baked, though it was small dough to start with. Washington thinks US-India economic relations lag far behind advances in other areas, mainly because of India's slow pace of economic reform. New Delhi believes that economic ties have made significant strides and could make more if world circumstances and US barriers to trade and technology transfers permitted. Perhaps both sides are partly right.

Although the United States is India's primary trading partner, India ranks a lowly twenty-fifth on the list of US trading partners. But Indo-US trade continues to grow from year to year. In 2002, for example, when world merchandise exports to the United States grew by only 2 percent, India's merchandise exports to America expanded by 21 percent, from \$10 billion in the previous year to \$12 billion. Also in 2002, merchandise exports from the United States to the world dropped 5 percent—but

US merchandise exports to India shot up by 9 percent. US exports to India continued to grow in 2003, and at an even faster pace.

India's service exports to the United States grew by 20 percent in 2002. As is now well known, this part of Indo-US trade, mostly high-technology related, has been expanding phenomenally in recent times. One aspect of this growing economic interaction has raised a bump or two in the road to otherwise improving relations. Many US companies have started outsourcing jobs to India, creating anxiety in some American states. A study by Forrester Research of Cambridge, Massachusetts, estimates that sending service or knowledge-intensive work to countries like India could climb to 3.3 million US jobs sent abroad by 2015. India, with its large number of English speakers and over 2 million college graduates in 2002, might get 70 percent of these jobs.

In an election year, and with job growth still slow in the United States, outsourcing has become a politically charged issue, even though almost all economists agree that it greatly benefits the US economy while causing temporary dislocation and hardship in a few specific sectors. A number of states as well as the US Congress have either legislated or have pending legislation against outsourcing. But attempts to outlaw outsourcing may not work, especially in the private sector, and may violate World Trade Organization norms against restrictive trade practices.

For the United States, it is the slow pace of India's economic reforms that seems the main hurdle to better economic relations; indeed, US direct foreign investment in India has not grown at especially high rates (since 1980, India has attracted only \$18 billion in *total* foreign direct investment). And manufacturing as a percentage of India's economy actually declined in the past 12 years, from 30 percent to about 24 percent. Without US investment and trade ties improving dramatically from their present modest levels, India's perceived ability to balance China will weaken further in US eyes.

Indians argue that the political compulsions of a democratic system have made gradualism in reform necessary; indeed, this gradualism has reduced the number of people living in absolute poverty by at least 100 million over the past decade while creating a vibrant private sector and an expanding base of private wealth in rural areas as well as cities. The country's middle class has grown to between 150 million and 200 million people, making it one of the largest in the world. A network of consumer industries has grown to match the demands of that class. New centers of growth in services and information technol-

ogy have sprouted in the deregulated economy. The states have more decision-making power also, thanks to deregulation, and now go their own ways to attract foreign as well as domestic investment instead of relying on federal officials. Meanwhile, the very democracy that slows the momentum for change may help avoid extremes in economic life and ensure better durability of reforms.

The challenge of deepening economic relations should especially concern advocates of a strong, long-term strategic relationship between India and the United States. An enmeshed system of economic interests, built on expanding trade and investment, can create stable constituencies in both democracies for a sustained strategic relationship. Substantive stakes in each other's economies can help smooth the disagreements, unpredictability, sensitivities, and misunderstandings that often distort perceptions of each other. Common economic interests can stabilize mutual understanding of global and regional affairs, facilitate joint action in international forums, and help create a positive dependency on each other's economic well-being—as is the case between America and Europe, where political differences often are resolved with relative ease thanks to enduring economic relations and interests. ■

A Current History Snapshot . . .



“Violent rebellion against the authority of Great Britain in India, held in check, although not suppressed, by military force, on May 5 brought to its first climax the campaign of ‘civil disobedience’ launched almost exactly one month previously by Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. The arrest of the nationalist leader on that day brought both sides in the Indian conflict face to face in the positions that their previous utterances and actions had made seemingly inevitable. A week later the outcome of the situation still hung in the balance. . . . In the military sense, Great Britain retained control of the situation. The political outcome could not be foreseen.”

“India in Turmoil”
Current History, July 1930
 Ralston Hayden, University of Michigan